Project MUSE®: Expeditions with MCUP - Latest Articles
https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/796
Project MUSE®: Latest articles in Expeditions with MCUP.daily12026-05-16T00:00:00-05:00text/htmlen-US2019 through current issueLatest Articles: Expeditions with MCUPTWOProject MUSE®Expeditions with MCUP2688-5395Latest articles in Expeditions with MCUP. Feed provided by Project MUSE®Beans before Bullets: Asymmetric Logistics as Deterrence and Offense in Near-peer Competition
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/949596
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During In their commentary piece on U.S. military strategy, “The Forgotten Part of the Contest: Army Logistics in the Pacific,” Carmelia Scott-Skillern and Peter Singer lament that modern military planning circles fail to live up to U.S. Army general Omar Bradley’s adage that “professionals talk logistics,” asserting that modern leaders are instead focusing on tactics and offensive strategy with “the cottage industry of think tank ‘wargames’ that has sprung up over the last few years.”1 They also mention that their publication outlet, War on the Rocks, has published scant few articles on the subject of logistics (fewer than six in the past two years.) An examination of similar academic publication outlets in the
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-16T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/796/image/coversmallBeans before Bullets: Asymmetric Logistics as Deterrence and Offense in Near-peer Competition2025-01-15text/htmlen-USBeans before Bullets: Asymmetric Logistics as Deterrence and Offense in Near-peer Competition2025-01-152025TWOProject MUSE®466862026-05-16T00:00:00-05:002025-01-15Toward a Strategic Culture-Enabled Theory of Black Sea Trilateral Cooperation
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/950064
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Why do some interstate alignments, cooperation efforts, or even alliances succeed while others fail? How does cooperation and alliance formation occur in otherwise unlikely cases? This article considers the evolution of international relations theoretical models to increasingly account for nonutilitarian, nonmaterialist factors in state interest formation and particularly in alignment and alliance formation. This article further argues that strategic culture as an analytical approach can fortify existing prevailing theoretical models to better integrate material and nonmaterial factors.1 To illuminate this concept, the article closes with a case study of the phenomenon of Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Georgia (TAG) Black Sea
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-16T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/796/image/coversmallToward a Strategic Culture-Enabled Theory of Black Sea Trilateral Cooperation2025-01-27text/htmlen-USToward a Strategic Culture-Enabled Theory of Black Sea Trilateral Cooperation2025-01-272025TWOProject MUSE®953462026-05-16T00:00:00-05:002025-01-27Recommendations for Improving the U.S. Marine Corps' Force Design
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/950976
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The U.S. Marine Corps' Force Design (formerly Force Design 2030) is a plan currently being implemented to restructure the Service to meet the challenges of peer threats, especially in the Indo-Pacific.1 Force Design creates a radically different Marine Corps to meet the challenges of peer adversaries across the range of military operations. This emphasis contrasts with the previous demand for counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This article offers some timely recommendations to improve the Force Design roadmap. To that end, the article first looks at the broad strokes of the strategic environment. Second, the article explains what stand-in forces (SIF) are and
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-16T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/796/image/coversmallRecommendations for Improving the U.S. Marine Corps' Force Design2025-02-06text/htmlen-USRecommendations for Improving the U.S. Marine Corps' Force Design2025-02-062025TWOProject MUSE®760152026-05-16T00:00:00-05:002025-02-06Continuing Dilemmas: Russia and Twenty-First-Century Positional Warfare
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/954075
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Russian military doctrine since the eighteenth century has favored offense over defense. For this reason, when innovation complicates offensive warfare, Russia must find a way around it. This problem is not unique to Russia, but both Russian and U.S. publications offer a strong understanding of how this has played out historically. When machine guns and trenches became the features of modern war in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) and World War I (1914–18), the Russian armed forces lost what was historically their primary means of defeating an enemy: their powerful infantry and their skilled use of the bayonet, which the Imperial Russian Army general Aleksandr Suvorov said they handled more skillfully than all other
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-16T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/796/image/coversmallContinuing Dilemmas: Russia and Twenty-First-Century Positional Warfare2025-03-20text/htmlen-USContinuing Dilemmas: Russia and Twenty-First-Century Positional Warfare2025-03-202025TWOProject MUSE®706882026-05-16T00:00:00-05:002025-03-20OCOM: The United States Needs an Oceanic Command
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/956722
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No single agency has the responsibility, authority, and perspective both to develop and to execute the country's maritime strategy.The abuse of the U.S. Navy fleet by the U.S. combatant commands (COCOMs) must end.2 This article proposes that Congress pass legislation amending the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act by creating a new combatant command within the Unified Command Plan with a global charter for maritime power: the U.S. Oceanic Command (OCOM). This might sound like a drastic solution to the U.S. Navy's many current malaises, but the past provides precedent for a solution to revitalize American seapower.3 It also accounts for the extreme difficulty of imposing other solutions
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-16T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/796/image/coversmallOCOM: The United States Needs an Oceanic Command2025-04-11text/htmlen-USOCOM: The United States Needs an Oceanic Command2025-04-112025TWOProject MUSE®543382026-05-16T00:00:00-05:002025-04-11Integration and Innovation Challenges in U.S. Navy Logistics
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/966862
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Battles are decided by the quartermasters before the first shot is fired.The U.S. Navy's management practices and leadership have lagged in ensuring that an effective system of logistics can adequately support operational effectiveness, particularly given the challenges of both new and legacy weapon and support systems paired with an increased pace of operations. In this article, the authors suggest that the primacy of logistics to military operations requires effective integration through both management practices and leadership. Notably, what can be termed the two solitudes of logistics, represented by the acquisition and sustainment functions, need to evolve significantly in the Navy, in the direction of shared
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-16T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/796/image/coversmallIntegration and Innovation Challenges in U.S. Navy Logistics2025-08-01text/htmlen-USIntegration and Innovation Challenges in U.S. Navy Logistics2025-08-012025TWOProject MUSE®1243542026-05-16T00:00:00-05:002025-08-01The Legality of International Espionage Based on the Nature of the Target and the Perpetrator
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/966863
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Since the beginning of recorded history, espionage, defined as the "intelligence activity directed towards the acquisition of information through clandestine means," has been used in diplomacy and war.1 Today, there are several disciplines of intelligence collection—including signals intelligence (SIGINT), open-source intelligence (OSINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), and human intelligence (HUMINT)—but in the past, there were no technological means for intelligence gathering, only collection by human sources.2 Indeed, HUMINT "represents the oldest and most elemental form of intelligence activity."3 Therefore, this article will deal
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-16T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/796/image/coversmallThe Legality of International Espionage Based on the Nature of the Target and the Perpetrator2025-08-01text/htmlen-USThe Legality of International Espionage Based on the Nature of the Target and the Perpetrator2025-08-012025TWOProject MUSE®659172026-05-16T00:00:00-05:002025-08-01Logistics Gray Swan: History Mocks U.S. Readiness
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/966864
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A gray swan event is a known, possible event that is considered to have a low probability of occurrence and/or a low detrimental impact should it occur. In the realm of U.S. defense, such an event might be a multifront, multidomain, high-technology war embroiling the United States. The authors posit: Is the United States prepared to fight, sustain, and win such a conflict? Furthermore, is the U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) capable of inventing, manufacturing, and delivering adequate amounts of munitions, ordnance, and other materiel required so that the United States can effectively deter—and, if needed, win—such a conflict?After researching this question, the authors believe that it is increasingly evident
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-16T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/796/image/coversmallLogistics Gray Swan: History Mocks U.S. Readiness2025-08-01text/htmlen-USLogistics Gray Swan: History Mocks U.S. Readiness2025-08-012025TWOProject MUSE®1335272026-05-16T00:00:00-05:002025-08-01