Project MUSE®: Quaestiones Disputatae - Latest Articles
https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669
Project MUSE®: Latest articles in Quaestiones Disputatae.daily12026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00text/htmlen-USVol. 5 (2015) - vol. 10 (2020)Latest Articles: Quaestiones DisputataeTWOProject MUSE®Quaestiones Disputatae2374-555X2150-5756Latest articles in Quaestiones Disputatae. Feed provided by Project MUSE®Editor’s Introduction
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774084
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Hylomorphism is the theory according to which the entities within a specified domain are best understood as composed of both matter and form. Hylomorphism was first introduced as a theory of material objects by Aristotle (though Plato’s own view of material objects can, to a certain extent, be considered hylomorphic). Aristotle introduced the theory of hylomorphism in his Physics as a general account of physical change, but he also extended his theory to offer detailed analyses of various phenomena in chemistry (On Generation and Corruption), biology (On the Soul), and cosmology (the later books of his Metaphysics). During the medieval period, hylomorphism became the dominant view. Medieval scholastics advanced
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669/image/coversmallEditor’s Introduction2020-11-24text/htmlen-USEditor’s Introduction2020-11-242020TWOProject MUSE®1330822026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002020-11-24Aquinas on the Union of Body and Soul
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774085
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Recently, an increasing number of authors in the current literature on the philosophy of mind have hailed Aristotelian hylomorphism as promising a viable passage between the flesh-mangling Scylla of dualism, tearing body and soul apart, and the soulless abyss of the Charybdis of materialism, sinking us into the depths of senseless, cold matter. I, for one, am guilty as charged, on at least two counts, on account of two papers (Klima 2007, 2009). But one could also cite any number of “analytical Thomists” or even other contemporary philosophers of mind who are flirting with hylomorphism precisely for this reason— namely, its promise to overcome the apparent impasse between materialism (in its various modern guises
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669/image/coversmallAquinas on the Union of Body and Soul2020-11-24text/htmlen-USAquinas on the Union of Body and Soul2020-11-242020TWOProject MUSE®863872026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002020-11-24Remnants of Substances: A Neo-Aristotelian Resolution of the Puzzles
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774086
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The rehabilitation of Aristotelian hylomorphism as an account of nature is fully underway. Recent developments in science (including quantum mechanics, quantum chemistry, and thermodynamics) and relativity theory have opened up new space in the philosophy of nature for Aristotelianism, or so I have argued (Koons 2017, 2018aKoons 2019). However, any proponent of an Aristotelian revival must frankly confront the fact that many features of Aristotle’s account of nature have been refuted and superseded. There’s no returning to five elements or to crystalline spheres in the heavens. In response, we Aristotelians insist on a distinction between primary and secondary features of the Aristotelian paradigm— between the
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669/image/coversmallRemnants of Substances: A Neo-Aristotelian Resolution of the Puzzles2020-11-24text/htmlen-USRemnants of Substances: A Neo-Aristotelian Resolution of the Puzzles2020-11-242020TWOProject MUSE®672022026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002020-11-24Was Your Mother Part of You? A Hylomorphist’s Challenge for Elselijn Kingma
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774087
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What relationship best describes gestating mammals and their offspring? This question has received surprisingly little attention, given that human beings’ development includes a gestation. Much of the imagery and language surrounding this relationship— as well as some philosophical arguments1—evince a widely accepted assumption: that the gestating mammal is a “container” or a “niche” for the separate developing animal.But Elselijn Kingma2 argues that the biological evidence suggests a different, more intimate characterization: that of parthood. She claims that the organism with which a mammal is pregnant (what she calls a “foster”3) is a part (specifically, a body part) of the pregnant organism (which she calls the
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669/image/coversmallWas Your Mother Part of You? A Hylomorphist’s Challenge for Elselijn Kingma2020-11-24text/htmlen-USWas Your Mother Part of You? A Hylomorphist’s Challenge for Elselijn Kingma2020-11-242020TWOProject MUSE®661972026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002020-11-24Evaluating Hylomorphism as a Hybrid Account of Personal Identity
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774088
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Psychological accounts of personal identity have been widely considered superior to biological accounts of personal identity on the basis of their being more attuned to our practical concerns.1 Locke understood person to be a “forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents, capable of law, and happiness and misery” (1975, 346). Persons are creatures that can self-consciously pursue a prudent path and be held responsible for their actions. The typical responses to the famous brain transplant and consciousness transfer thought experiments are alleged to show that we are identical to the being with whom we have practical concerns as the result of sustained psychological
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669/image/coversmallEvaluating Hylomorphism as a Hybrid Account of Personal Identity2020-11-24text/htmlen-USEvaluating Hylomorphism as a Hybrid Account of Personal Identity2020-11-242020TWOProject MUSE®844672026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002020-11-24Saint Thomas Aquinas and the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774089
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According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, human beings are set apart from all other animals because of their capacity to reason.1 By grasping and employing universal concepts, we are able to understand the natures of things—not just recognize and know their particular instances. We can, of course, know particulars. I might imagine a giant donut, deliberate about which of my shirts to wear today, or judge that the milk in my fridge is still fresh. When I do, for Aquinas, I do so with my brain-based inner-sense organs.2 But when I grasp universals—for instance, when I understand what it is to be human or contemplate the good—I cannot do so with a bodily organ. In Aquinas’s view, the universal character of intellective
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669/image/coversmallSaint Thomas Aquinas and the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem2020-11-24text/htmlen-USSaint Thomas Aquinas and the Too-Many-Thinkers Problem2020-11-242020TWOProject MUSE®746182026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002020-11-24Survivalism versus Corruptionism: Whose Nature? Which Personality?
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774090
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Contemporary interpreters are in the midst of an ongoing debate about Aquinas’s view of the status of human beings or persons in the interim period between death and resurrection. Everyone agrees that, for Aquinas, death is the separation of the soul from the body; the human body corrupts and ceases to exist, while the human soul survives and continues to exist. The disagreement is about Aquinas’s view of what happens to the human being or person—to Socrates, for example. According to corruptionists, Aquinas thought that human beings or persons corrupt along with their bodies—that is, they cease to exist at death and only begin to exist again when their souls are reunited with their bodies at the resurrection.1
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669/image/coversmallSurvivalism versus Corruptionism: Whose Nature? Which Personality?2020-11-24text/htmlen-USSurvivalism versus Corruptionism: Whose Nature? Which Personality?2020-11-242020TWOProject MUSE®692682026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002020-11-24Surviving Corruptionist Arguments: Response to Nevitt
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774091
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I greatly appreciate Turner Nevitt’s elucidation and critical engagement with what he describes as the “deeper and more problematic disagreements between survivalists and corruptionists about how to understand some of the most basic principles of Aquinas’s metaphysics,” his goal being to “advance some more systematic reasons for thinking that corruptionists are right and survivalists are wrong—both about how to understand the basic principles of Aquinas’s metaphysics, and about how to apply them to the question about the status of human beings or persons between death and resurrection.”1 In responding to Nevitt’s argument on behalf of survivalism, I have two goals: first, to defend a particular survivalist
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669/image/coversmallSurviving Corruptionist Arguments: Response to Nevitt2020-11-24text/htmlen-USSurviving Corruptionist Arguments: Response to Nevitt2020-11-242020TWOProject MUSE®828402026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002020-11-24After Survivalism and Corruptionism: Separated Souls as Incomplete Persons
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774092
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Thomas Aquinas consistently defended the thesis that the separated rational soul that results from a human person’s death is not a person. Nevertheless, what has emerged in recent decades is a sophisticated disputed question between “survivalists” and “corruptionists” concerning the personhood of the separated soul that has left us with intractable disagreements wherein neither side seems able to convince the other. In our contribution to this disputed question, we present a digest of an unconsidered middle way: the separated soul is an incomplete person. We define survivalism, corruptionism, and incomplete persons as follows:Survivalism The human person survives death along with the separated rational soul because
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669/image/coversmallAfter Survivalism and Corruptionism: Separated Souls as Incomplete Persons2020-11-24text/htmlen-USAfter Survivalism and Corruptionism: Separated Souls as Incomplete Persons2020-11-242020TWOProject MUSE®582492026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002020-11-24Survivalist, Platonist, Thomistic Hylomorphism: A Reply to Daniel De Haan and Brandon Dahm
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/774093
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The debate over the personhood of the separated soul enjoys great prominence in recent Thomistic philosophy not only because it has to do with a topic of deep existential importance—whether we survive our deaths—but also because it, more than most other debates, brings together and shows the significance of many of Aquinas’s metaphysical principles. Perhaps no paper has revealed just how much this debate brings together those principles as have Daniel De Haan and Brandon Dahm’s recent papers, both in the Thomist and here in Quaestiones Disputatae.1 In this response to their papers, I first highlight two of their most important contributions to the debate over the separated soul and then raise four objections to
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/669/image/coversmallSurvivalist, Platonist, Thomistic Hylomorphism: A Reply to Daniel De Haan and Brandon Dahm2020-11-24text/htmlen-USSurvivalist, Platonist, Thomistic Hylomorphism: A Reply to Daniel De Haan and Brandon Dahm2020-11-242020TWOProject MUSE®348582026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002020-11-24