Project MUSE®: Southeast Asian Affairs - Latest Articles
https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462
Project MUSE®: Latest articles in Southeast Asian Affairs.daily12026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00text/htmlen-USVol. 2003 through current issueLatest Articles: Southeast Asian AffairsTWOProject MUSE®Southeast Asian Affairs1793-91350377-5437Latest articles in Southeast Asian Affairs. Feed provided by Project MUSE®Introduction
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978681
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We are pleased to present the 2025 edition of Southeast Asian Affairs. Since it was launched in 1975, the volume has recorded the evolution of regional and national developments in Southeast Asia. As in many past years, Southeast Asia in 2024 presented a mixed picture of steady economic progress and enormous potential, together with security and political challenges, as well as shortfalls in governance.In 2024, the struggle to consolidate power remained a significant challenge across Southeast Asia as countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Cambodia navigated the aftermath of their respective elections. What initially seemed like opportunities for effective governance slipped into
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallIntroduction2025-12-25text/htmlen-USIntroduction2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®179642026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Continental Drift: Southeast Asia Amidst Regional Wars, Great Power Rivalry, and Globalization at Risk
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978682
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Amid an intensifying major power rivalry and polarizing regional wars in Europe and the Middle East, the search for direction in Southeast Asia, as Chong Ja Ian described in the previous issue, has become an individual pursuit by nation-states rather than a collective one in 2024. Despite shared objectives of economic growth and regime security, Southeast Asian states have taken different, and at times divergent, foreign policy paths to realize them. A slow but not imperceptible continental drift is under way as their economies and politics shift along with global trends of protectionism and centrifugal forces of great power competition. Southeast Asians resolutely insist on not “choosing sides”, but their
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallContinental Drift: Southeast Asia Amidst Regional Wars, Great Power Rivalry, and Globalization at Risk2025-12-25text/htmlen-USContinental Drift: Southeast Asia Amidst Regional Wars, Great Power Rivalry, and Globalization at Risk2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®784332026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Southeast Asia’s Economic Performance and Outlook
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978683
<p></p>
Although the Covid-19 pandemic may appear to be a distant memory, its impacts continued to shape recovery in Southeast Asia in 2024. The near-term economic outlook for Southeast Asia remains generally positive, supported by resilient domestic demand and continued strength in external demand, driving exports and investment. The overall outlook remains positive despite the rise in risk and uncertainty affecting the regional and global economies. These include, for instance, the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, and further escalation in US-China tensions leading to increased use of protectionist measures. The re-election of Donald Trump in November as the forty-fifth president of the United States has increased
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallSoutheast Asia’s Economic Performance and Outlook2025-12-25text/htmlen-USSoutheast Asia’s Economic Performance and Outlook2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®625952026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Southeast Asia: Coping with a Challenging Trade Order
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978684
<p></p>
This chapter examines the shifting dynamics of the global trade order, in particular the growing threat of protectionism and its implications for ASEAN economies. It also highlights the intensifying global competition, which could pose an additional challenge for ASEAN members as they adapt to a more restrictive trade environment. Finally, it outlines strategies to strengthen the region’s economic resilience and competitiveness.Section 1 analyses the current trends in world trade and concludes that, while trade remains resilient, it is slowing and becoming increasingly vulnerable to government-imposed restrictions. This shift is driven by global imbalances and a tendency of governments to protect domestic
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallSoutheast Asia: Coping with a Challenging Trade Order2025-12-25text/htmlen-USSoutheast Asia: Coping with a Challenging Trade Order2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®558612026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25The South China Sea Dispute: Philippines-China Tensions Front and Centre
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978685
<p></p>
In 2024 the trend lines in the South China Sea dispute continued to move in the wrong direction. Sino-Philippine tensions escalated as the administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. continued to push back against China’s territorial and jurisdictional claims in the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Tensions were centred on the Philippines’ monthly resupply missions to its garrison on board a grounded warship on Second Thomas Shoal. China’s use of grey zone tactics—provocative actions below the threshold of armed conflict, including ramming Philippine vessels and using water cannons against their crews—triggered fears that Manila might call on its treaty ally the United States for military support
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallThe South China Sea Dispute: Philippines-China Tensions Front and Centre2025-12-25text/htmlen-USThe South China Sea Dispute: Philippines-China Tensions Front and Centre2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®622122026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Brunei Darussalam in 2024: Steady Growth Amidst New Opportunities and Ongoing Challenges
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978686
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The year 2024 ushered in notable positive developments for Brunei Darussalam, starting with the grand celebration of Prince Abdul Mateen’s wedding, the fourth son of Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah, in January. The economy showed strong signs of recovery, with real GDP growth projected at 2.4 per cent by the IMF in September, while AMRO+3 estimated up to 4 per cent and ADB forecasted 3.7 per cent. This marked a notable improvement from the modest 1.4 per cent growth recorded in 2023. The recovery was largely attributed to an earlier-than-expected increase in oil production, driven by the new Salman oil field, which became operational in late 2023, and other newly developed fields. This growth helped offset the
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallBrunei Darussalam in 2024: Steady Growth Amidst New Opportunities and Ongoing Challenges2025-12-25text/htmlen-USBrunei Darussalam in 2024: Steady Growth Amidst New Opportunities and Ongoing Challenges2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®609022026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Hun Manet’s Worldview: An Exploratory Study
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978687
<p></p>
More than a year and a half has passed since Prime Minister Hun Manet assumed the leadership of Cambodia, and during this time he has introduced and implemented a range of domestic and foreign policies that reflect his vision for the nation. His leadership has been marked by a series of statements and impromptu comments that offer insight into his political philosophy, values and approach to governance. In terms of public sector reforms, he focuses on maintaining stability while promoting efficiency and productivity.To construct a nuanced understanding of his worldview, this chapter reviews the perspectives of external observers and insiders. Moreover, a selection of remarks made by Hun Manet since he took office
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallHun Manet’s Worldview: An Exploratory Study2025-12-25text/htmlen-USHun Manet’s Worldview: An Exploratory Study2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®552192026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Indonesia in 2024: Limits to Indonesia’s Ambitious Economic Programmes
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978688
<p></p>
Former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s final year in office has been a hectic one. His endorsement of the campaign of former defence minister Prabowo Subianto—which featured his eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as the vice president—proved instrumental to Prabowo’s election victory, making Prabowo the country’s eighth president after two prior unsuccessful bids. Despite this transition, Jokowi has demonstrated little intention to withdraw from politics. To maintain his influence over future policies, Jokowi supported leadership change within the Golkar party, enabling Bahlil Lahadalia, a loyal associate and former head of the Investment Board, to replace Airlangga Hartarto as party leader.Jokowi’s final year in
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallIndonesia in 2024: Limits to Indonesia’s Ambitious Economic Programmes2025-12-25text/htmlen-USIndonesia in 2024: Limits to Indonesia’s Ambitious Economic Programmes2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®482082026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25From Jokowi to Prabowo: Scrutinizing Indonesia’s Leadership Transition
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978689
<p></p>
Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s presidency from 2014 to 2024 transformed Indonesia’s political and economic landscape. He embodied a new democratic leadership style that emphasized grassroots participation and relied heavily on populist rhetoric to mobilize support. He prioritized infrastructure development, economic growth, and social welfare measures to reduce poverty and enhance connectivity. While these measures were arguably successful, he also faced major hurdles such as fiscal sustainability, public debt, democratic backsliding and inadequate anti-corruption measures—all of which tarnished his reformist reputation. The transition from Jokowi to Prabowo Subianto, who won the 2024 presidential election, was crucial to
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallFrom Jokowi to Prabowo: Scrutinizing Indonesia’s Leadership Transition2025-12-25text/htmlen-USFrom Jokowi to Prabowo: Scrutinizing Indonesia’s Leadership Transition2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®836732026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Laos in 2024: Progress and Persistence
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978690
<p></p>
There was an increase in economic growth in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) in 2024. The remarkable success of Visit Laos Year 2024 and a rise in agriculture and electricity-related exports brought about a modest increase in the Lao PDR’s real GDP percentage. There was also an uptick in foreign investments in special economic zones (SEZs) within and outside the capital Vientiane. Similarly, the Lao PDR increased its focus on harnessing renewable energy resources as another development driver. Despite the steady progress, macroeconomic difficulties—particularly kip depreciation and price hikes—persisted, impeding the efforts of the Lao government to be removed from the list of least developed
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallLaos in 2024: Progress and Persistence2025-12-25text/htmlen-USLaos in 2024: Progress and Persistence2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®750732026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Malaysia in 2024: From Reformasi to Reformati
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978691
<p></p>
Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was in deep political trouble at the start of 2024. In August 2023, there were six state elections held in the states of Selangor, Penang, Kelantan, Terengganu, Negeri Sembilan and Kedah. The results were politically damaging to Anwar and the Unity Government. Anwar had hoped to claw back some of the Malay votes lost to the opposition Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, especially Parti Islam Malaysia (PAS). Instead, PN and PAS did extraordinarily well in the elections. PN increased its share of the votes and won additional seats in all six states.1 Hence the momentum was with the opposition at the start of the year, and Anwar’s Unity Government did not look as it may last. In December
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallMalaysia in 2024: From Reformasi to Reformati2025-12-25text/htmlen-USMalaysia in 2024: From Reformasi to Reformati2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®725672026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Malaysia: Economic Progress and Political Stasis
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978692
<p></p>
Malaysia’s fifteenth general elections (GE15) in 2022 left the country with a hung parliament and substantial uncertainty over what might lie ahead. Pakatan Harapan (PH) leader Anwar Ibrahim forged an unlikely “unity” or “Madani” coalition government with Zahid Hamidi and his Barisan Nasional (BN). That government has remained stably afloat, yet mostly by not rocking the boat: substantial reforms remain largely off the table. The same concerns that stymied progress in 2023, especially of ethnonationalist challenge, remain germane,1 albeit with an added frisson now of geopolitical uncertainty: elections elsewhere, particularly in the United States, have stepped up uncertainty about the state of the world—and
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallMalaysia: Economic Progress and Political Stasis2025-12-25text/htmlen-USMalaysia: Economic Progress and Political Stasis2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®543302026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Myanmar in 2024: Struggle Continues for Glimmers of Light
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978693
<p></p>
The year in review saw a Myanmar still mired in conflict. Both sides of the political divide continued to assert their claim to govern amidst deteriorating socio-economic conditions, conscription fears and an increasingly uncertain future for many communities struggling with the consequences of the 2021 coup. As of December 2024, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma) listed at least 6,000 deaths (outside of armed clashes) since the 2021 coup and over 28,000 arrests, of which over 21,000 remain in detention.Despite its receding administrative control across several parts of Myanmar, and the loss of significant and strategic commands and posts, particularly in the northern Shan and Rakhine
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallMyanmar in 2024: Struggle Continues for Glimmers of Light2025-12-25text/htmlen-USMyanmar in 2024: Struggle Continues for Glimmers of Light2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®747442026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25From Pawns to Power: How the Arakha Army Came to Dominate Rakhine State
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978694
<p></p>
When a group of Rakhine youths established the Arakan Army (AA)—later renamed the Arakha Army—in 2009,1 most observers saw them as ineffective idealists and pawns of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). The Thein Sein administration did not think the AA would be a fully fledged party to the peace process. Likewise, the KIO and other ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs) did not foresee the AA emerging as a major ERO capable of controlling much of Rakhine State.2 When the leader of the AA, Twan Mrat Naing, said that he wanted Rakhine State to become fully autonomous, like the Wa Self-Administered Division, some ERO leaders dismissed his vision as unrealistic. However, the AA’s 2019 offensive demonstrated
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallFrom Pawns to Power: How the Arakha Army Came to Dominate Rakhine State2025-12-25text/htmlen-USFrom Pawns to Power: How the Arakha Army Came to Dominate Rakhine State2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®378252026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25The Philippines in 2024: Disruptions, Distractions and Dynasties
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978695
<p></p>
The Philippines’ political trajectory remained anchored to the dynamics of its ruling dynasties in 2024. The Marcos-Duterte alliance, which secured a dominant victory in the 2022 elections with an unprecedented electoral mandate not seen since the martial law era, appeared poised to consolidate its grip on power. Campaigning under the banner of “Uniteam”, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. and Sara Duterte promised to uphold the legacies of President Rodrigo Duterte while pursuing a vision of national unity grounded in pro-people leadership. As heirs to the populist-autocratic presidencies of their fathers, the duo pledged to transcend the country’s fractious political landscape. Yet, despite the availability of more
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallThe Philippines in 2024: Disruptions, Distractions and Dynasties2025-12-25text/htmlen-USThe Philippines in 2024: Disruptions, Distractions and Dynasties2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®835542026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Tightrope Diplomacy: Philippine Foreign Policy Recalibration Under Marcos Jr. amid South China Sea Tensions and Political Rifts
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978696
<p></p>
In 2024, the Philippines found itself navigating a turbulent landscape defined by intensifying geopolitical rivalries and domestic political upheaval. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the nation has undertaken a bold recalibration of its foreign policy, abandoning strategic ambiguity in favour of a more assertive and pragmatic approach. This shift is driven not just by escalating tensions in the South China Sea, where China’s aggressive manoeuvres have become increasingly confrontational, but also by internal pressures that demand a redefinition of national priorities.China’s provocations in the South China Sea have left the Philippines with limited options. Confronted with water cannon attacks, blockades and
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallTightrope Diplomacy: Philippine Foreign Policy Recalibration Under Marcos Jr. amid South China Sea Tensions and Political Rifts2025-12-25text/htmlen-USTightrope Diplomacy: Philippine Foreign Policy Recalibration Under Marcos Jr. amid South China Sea Tensions and Political Rifts2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®353072026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Singapore in 2024: Uneventful Generational Leadership Change, Humming Economy amid Cost-of-Living Concerns, and Rallying Team Singapore
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978697
<p></p>
On 15 May 2024, Lawrence Wong (born in 1972), was sworn in as Singapore’s fourth prime minister in a solemn ceremony on the pristine garden lawn of the Istana. Only the third leadership handover since Singapore’s independence, this generational change in leadership was a historic occasion. It was the culmination of a process of leadership renewal and succession that had taken more than a decade and that was rudely disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic, which Wong’s predecessor, Lee Hsien Loong, had described as the “crisis of a generation”.In April 2021, in a move that stunned the nation, then presumptive successor Heng Swee Keat took himself out of the running for the top job, two and a half years after emerging as
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallSingapore in 2024: Uneventful Generational Leadership Change, Humming Economy amid Cost-of-Living Concerns, and Rallying Team Singapore2025-12-25text/htmlen-USSingapore in 2024: Uneventful Generational Leadership Change, Humming Economy amid Cost-of-Living Concerns, and Rallying Team Singapore2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®636102026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Assets and Challenges: Singapore’s Third Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, Hands over to Successor
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978698
<p></p>
On 15 May 2024, Singapore’s third prime minister (PM), Lee Hsien Loong, witnessed a successor chosen by the fourth generation of leaders of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP), fifty-two-year-old Lawrence Wong, take up the mantle on the lawn of the presidential residence, the Istana.Mr Wong was his peers’ second choice after the first, the more senior Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) Heng Swee Keat, stepped aside in April 2021 so that Singapore could have the benefit of a younger person with a “sufficiently long runway” to lead when the time came. This was the knock-on effect of PM Lee promising voters in the July 2020 general election he would remain at the helm to guide Singapore out of the Covid-19 global
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallAssets and Challenges: Singapore’s Third Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, Hands over to Successor2025-12-25text/htmlen-USAssets and Challenges: Singapore’s Third Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, Hands over to Successor2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®571012026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Thailand in 2024: Institutional Reform Impossible and Instability Continues
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978699
<p></p>
Thailand ended 2024 on a disappointing note. There has been no attempt by elected governments to initiate important reforms for the country’s politics and economics. Although the election on 14 May 2023 marked the end of the eight-year military regime led by General Prayut Chan-ocha, the path to democratic consolidation in Thailand remains obstructed. The conservative establishment still wields significant influence over the political and economic direction of the country, and the governments led by the Pheu Thai Party (PTP) have been compliant to the establishment.One year on, it is evident that the PTP has abandoned its electoral promises, including its commitment of non-cooperation with military-backed political
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallThailand in 2024: Institutional Reform Impossible and Instability Continues2025-12-25text/htmlen-USThailand in 2024: Institutional Reform Impossible and Instability Continues2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®645962026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Thailand’s Economic Challenges in 2025
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978700
<p></p>
This chapter examines Thailand’s economic performance in 2024 and explores the challenges expected in 2025. The first section analyses Thailand’s economic performance, highlighting moderate improvements in the country’s GDP alongside relative price stability. But despite stable prices, a critical concern is the looming risk of deflation, which could pose significant challenges to sustained economic growth. The second section explores Thailand’s export competitiveness, emphasizing its continued importance to the country’s economy. The share of goods and services exports in GDP remained substantial, driven by key factors such as the growing significance of the United States as an export destination and the increasing
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallThailand’s Economic Challenges in 20252025-12-25text/htmlen-USThailand’s Economic Challenges in 20252025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®488212026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Timor-Leste in 2024: Stable at Home, Progress on Foreign Policy
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978701
<p></p>
Timor-Leste in 2024 enjoyed political and economic stability with little to no significant conflict or controversy among its political elite and parties. Such stability allowed for a successful visit by Pope Francis, which saw strong participation from the country’s predominantly Catholic population of 1.34 million. Over half of the population directly participated in the main event, a Papal mass by the sea near the capital city, Dili.1 Foreign policy initiatives, especially furthering Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN and developing its relations with larger powers, were pursued smoothly because of this general stability. Timor-Leste’s policy of building closer relations with Indonesia through ongoing
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallTimor-Leste in 2024: Stable at Home, Progress on Foreign Policy2025-12-25text/htmlen-USTimor-Leste in 2024: Stable at Home, Progress on Foreign Policy2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®598102026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Vietnam in 2024: Back in Business?
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978702
<p></p>
On 19 July 2024, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) announced General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s death, thus confirming the end of his thirteen-year run as party leader. Media outlets changed their colour schemes to black and white in his honour, while leaders such as Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and VNA chair Tran Thanh Man published lengthy tributes to his leadership.1 As of December 2024, the website of the official party mouthpiece Nhan Dan still featured a special link for a tribute to Trong underneath only two other former leaders—Ho Chi Minh and Nguyen Van Linh, who presided over the initial stages of Vietnam’s economic opening.After Trong’s death, then-president To Lam swiftly moved into the breach and
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallVietnam in 2024: Back in Business?2025-12-25text/htmlen-USVietnam in 2024: Back in Business?2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®623302026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Vietnam at the Crossroads: Opportunities and Challenges in Global Supply Chain Restructuring
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978703
<p></p>
Global supply chains have long been the backbone of twenty-first-century manufacturing and trade, fostering unprecedented levels of efficiency and specialization. However, rising nationalism and protectionism have disrupted established trade relationships, with new uncertainties arising from events like Brexit in 2016 and the US-China trade war since 2018. The Covid-19 pandemic further exposed vulnerabilities in these highly interconnected and efficiency-driven supply chains, compelling countries to prioritize domestic industries and resilience over the cost-saving advantages of global outsourcing. The pandemic also accelerated a global shift towards environmentally sustainable supply chains, particularly in
... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978819">Read More</a>
Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallVietnam at the Crossroads: Opportunities and Challenges in Global Supply Chain Restructuring2025-12-25text/htmlen-USVietnam at the Crossroads: Opportunities and Challenges in Global Supply Chain Restructuring2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®518982026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25Cambodia in 2024: Generational Change and Enduring Autocracy
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978818
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Cambodia underwent a historic political transition in 2023 when Prime Minister Hun Sen, after thirty-eight years of rule, passed the reins to his eldest son, Hun Manet. This handover had been long in the making and was part of a broader generational shift within Cambodia’s dominant political dynasties, which remain deeply influential in shaping the country’s political and economic landscape. Alongside Hun Manet, many other princelings took on new ministerial positions in 2023, such as Sar Sokha replacing his father Sar Kheng as Ministry of Interior head and Tea Seiha succeeding his father Tea Banh as Ministry of National Defence head. The central focus for 2024 thus revolved around the prospective changes the
... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978819">Read More</a>
Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmallCambodia in 2024: Generational Change and Enduring Autocracy2025-12-25text/htmlen-USCambodia in 2024: Generational Change and Enduring Autocracy2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®578232026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-252024 Presidential Elections: Reviewing Jokowi’s Influence on Prabowo’s Landslide Victory
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978819
<p></p>
A graph posted by Financial Times chief data reporter John Burn-Murdoch went viral on social media following the defeat of Kamala Harris by Donald Trump in the US presidential election. The graph indicated that it was not Harris’s gender or race that caused her to lose but high inflation because of supply-side disruptions caused by the global pandemic.1 Burn-Murdoch posited that the Democrats joined 2024’s “graveyard of incumbents”, a phenomenon where every ruling party in developed countries contesting elections suffered a loss of votes.2 In 2024, governing parties and leaders experienced an unprecedented series of reversals, ranging from the Tories in Britain and Emmanuel Macron’s Ensemble coalition to the
... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/978819">Read More</a>
Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/462/image/coversmall2024 Presidential Elections: Reviewing Jokowi’s Influence on Prabowo’s Landslide Victory2025-12-25text/htmlen-US2024 Presidential Elections: Reviewing Jokowi’s Influence on Prabowo’s Landslide Victory2025-12-252025TWOProject MUSE®446882026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002025-12-25