Project MUSE®: Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology

Project MUSE®: Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology - Latest Articles https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353 Project MUSE®: Latest articles in Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology. daily 1 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 text/html en-US Vol. 3 (2006) - vol. 5 (2008) Latest Articles: Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology TWO Project MUSE® Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 1750-0117 1742-3600 Latest articles in Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology. Feed provided by Project MUSE® The Weights of Evidence https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258355 For lawyers, the most familiar sense of evidential weight can be described as the “convincing force” or “persuasive value” of a mass of evidence. A verdict is rendered by comparing it with the applicable standard of proof. In a civil case, for the party bearing the burden of persuasion to be entitled to a favorable verdict, ordinarily the weight of the evidence must satisfy the standard of proof “by a preponderance of the evidence” in favor of that party’s claim, while in a criminal case, for the prosecution to be entitled to a favorable verdict, the weight of the evidence ordinarily must be so strong as to render the prosecution’s claim true “beyond reasonable doubt” (Strong 2006, 483). Another sense of ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall The Weights of Evidence 2009-01-23 text/html en-US The Weights of Evidence 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 72233 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 Introduction https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258356 Epistemology and the philosophy of law are both thriving, but it is unfortunate that there is so little interaction between the two. Few books on epistemology deal with legal evidence, and few books on the legal system’s approach to evidence even recognize the sphere of philosophical epistemology. Law is not listed in the index to the admirable Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, and its entry on evidence moves on quickly after distinguishing what epistemologists and lawyers mean by evidence. The Oxford Handbook on Epistemology also has no index entry on law and only one short discussion of how psychology has affected evidence law. Perhaps more surprisingly, the Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall Introduction 2009-01-23 text/html en-US Introduction 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 5133 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 A Functional Approach to the Spousal Evidentiary Privileges https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258357 Under the typical rules of evidence in U.S. jurisdictions, relevant evidence is presumptively admissible at trial (see Federal Rules of Evidence 402). Intuitively, to best facilitate uncovering the truth, all relevant evidence needs to be before the trier of fact. In most circumstances, however, testimony regarding what one spouse tells the other in private is not admissible and, because a person can avoid testifying about anything he or she knows about his or her spouse simply by stating that he or she does not want to testify about it, many things a person knows about his or her spouse may not get into evidence either. While the scope, character, and very existence of these exceptions to the general principle ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall A Functional Approach to the Spousal Evidentiary Privileges 2009-01-23 text/html en-US A Functional Approach to the Spousal Evidentiary Privileges 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 58097 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 On the Epistemic Authority of Courts https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258358 This paper offers a preliminary exploration of the epistemic authority of courts. Part I claims that, in order to have epistemic authority, a factfinder must be both cognitively competent and be able to give a systemic and generally dependable assurance with respect to her accuracy and impartiality. Part II argues that Carl Ginet’s concept of “disinterested justification” is crucial for understanding and satisfying this special-assurance requirement. Part III narrows the applicability of Ginet’s concept of “disinterestedness.” There, I argue that disinterested justification informs accounts of epistemic authority that feature justified believers, as opposed to beliefs. Part IV expands Ginet’s concept to ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall On the Epistemic Authority of Courts 2009-01-23 text/html en-US On the Epistemic Authority of Courts 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 33147 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law – and Epistemology Too https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258359 Epistemologists have discovered the law of evidence, and they do not like what they have found. Not only have they criticized, often with good reason, those various rules of evidence that are based on confused philosophy or unsound psychology, but they have also condemned the very idea of a law of evidence characterized by reliance on rule-based exclusions of relevant evidence. Ordinary epistemological inquiry, the critics insist, is loath to ignore any item of evidence that would make an epistemic determination more accurate or more reliable. Why then, so the argument goes, should the legal epistemology we call the law of evidence operate on such wildly different assumptions regarding the role of rules ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law – and Epistemology Too 2009-01-23 text/html en-US In Defense of Rule-Based Evidence Law – and Epistemology Too 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 53014 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 The Public Face of Presumptions https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258360 Received wisdom tells us that it is less than ideal, if not downright irresponsible, to rely on presumptions. In law and logic, presumptions are tools allowing us to reach conclusions when information is limited. By definition, they are second-best devices. Common usage treats them even less charitably. To “presume” is “to undertake without clear leave or justification.” To be “presumptuous” is to act on the basis of an unjustified belief, to the shame of the presumer and the injury of those presumed against. Unsurprisingly, scholarship on the subject has focused on either limiting or defending our use of the practice and the term “presumption.” This essay argues for a reevaluation of presumptions ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall The Public Face of Presumptions 2009-01-23 text/html en-US The Public Face of Presumptions 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 59611 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 Warrant, Causation, and the Atomism of Evidence Law https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258361 The issue that concerns me here is whether and if so, when and why, a congeries of diverse pieces of evidence can warrant a conclusion better than any of its elements alone. This is a quite general epistemological question. But in the legal context it has been especially salient in cases involving complex evidence of (general) causation; so let me begin with a couple of these. “My” epistemological question came explicitly to the attention of the Supreme Court in 1997, in General Electric Co. v. Joiner. In 1991, Robert Joiner had been diagnosed with small-cell lung cancer; he was only 37. Believing that his cancer had been promoted by his exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) contaminating the ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall Warrant, Causation, and the Atomism of Evidence Law 2009-01-23 text/html en-US Warrant, Causation, and the Atomism of Evidence Law 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 64380 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 Brain Images as Legal Evidence https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258362 Brain images are becoming more and more common in courts. Feigenson (2006) found 130 reported opinions involving PET and/or SPECT evidence but only 2 reported opinions citing fMRI evidence. Helen Mayberg, however, has served as an expert witness in over 50 trials in recent years, many of them involving fMRI evidence, and a number of judges have informally told us that evidence from neuroscience, including fMRI, has become standard in capital sentencing. Some lawyers and neuroscientists are critical of this trend. A few have even suggested in conversation a temporary moratorium on brain images as legal evidence in criminal trials, except possibly in capital sentencing. This paper will ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall Brain Images as Legal Evidence 2009-01-23 text/html en-US Brain Images as Legal Evidence 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 61281 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258363 “Only connect,” said E. M. Forster (2000). But surely, this cannot be enough. After all, the most outrageous theories result from making eccentric connections. Conspiracy theories, astrological systems, and the like all arise out of connecting the most disparate elements and making them fit into a coherent whole. Witch trials too. In light of a solid corpus of beliefs about devilish women’s powers, mental illness can certainly be explanatorily connected with the action of supernatural forces. Clearly, not every connection will do. This, I would argue, gives rise to the most serious problem that coherence theories of justification should face. Put bluntly, there are few limits to what the human mind may be ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding 2009-01-23 text/html en-US Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 70136 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 Explaining the Tension between the Supreme Court’s Embrace of Validity as the Touchstone of Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Courts’ (Seeming) Rejection of Same https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258364 This paper will briefly introduce the non-science forensic sciences, say why it is fair to characterize those fields as lacking conventional scientific foundations, and state what the Supreme Court requires of federal courts as a condition of admission of proffered expert testimony on empirical (scientific) issues. The paper will then seek to explain the contradiction between the Supreme Court’s commands and how the lower courts generally treat the non-science forensic sciences; that explanation will grow from an array of social epistemological roots. Under the broader umbrella of the forensic sciences – some of which borrow their essential knowledge from well-tested conventional basic and applied ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall Explaining the Tension between the Supreme Court’s Embrace of Validity as the Touchstone of Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Courts’ (Seeming) Rejection of Same 2009-01-23 text/html en-US Explaining the Tension between the Supreme Court’s Embrace of Validity as the Touchstone of Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Courts’ (Seeming) Rejection of Same 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 64482 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and Experts: Testing the Validity of Forensic Science https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258365 In the now-seminal 1993 case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow, the Supreme Court delineated judges’ responsibilities vis-à-vis scientific evidence introduced in federal courts. The Court said that federal trial court judges must serve as gatekeepers, assuring that parties’ proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable. “Evidentiary reliability will be based on scientific validity,” the Court explained. (Daubert 1993, 590, n.9) How, then, ought judges to assess reliability? Daubert provides a set of flexible and non-exclusive criteria for judges to consider. These include whether the evidence in question has been tested; whether it is generally accepted in the relevant expert community; whether it has ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and Experts: Testing the Validity of Forensic Science 2009-01-23 text/html en-US Of Black Boxes, Instruments, and Experts: Testing the Validity of Forensic Science 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 63542 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 Explanationism All the Way Down https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258366 The nature of juridical proof is a critical question for the field of evidence. Perhaps it is also an interesting question for epistemology, as this symposium suggests. For obvious reasons, one possibility that has been explored is that juridical proof is, or at least is best understood as, probabilistic. The law assigns decision rules to essentially all cases, and those seem easily understood as probabilistic. The preponderance of the evidence easily bears the interpretation of requiring proof of elements to exceed .5; proof beyond reasonable doubt plausibly means a very high probability of guilt, .95 perhaps; and intermediate (and lower) burdens of persuasion may entail intermediate (or lower) probability ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall Explanationism All the Way Down 2009-01-23 text/html en-US Explanationism All the Way Down 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 37951 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23 The Elementary Epistemic Arithmetic of Criminal Justice https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367 In the epic battle between those who hold that we should convict more of the bad guys and those who think we should convict fewer of the good ones, each side exhibits the classic symptom of the ideologue: a mighty indifference to the empirical data. The one camp firmly believes that false convictions are as rare as hen’s teeth, which they are not, and that convictions massively deter crime, which may or may not be true. The other camp believes that the costs of false acquittals are trivial compared to the costs of false convictions, thereby justifying its opposition to putting any meaningful controls on the frequency of false acquittals. The trouble here is that the social and human costs of false acquittals ... <a href="https://muse.jhu.edu/article/258367">Read More</a> Project MUSE® https://muse.jhu.edu/ 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/353/image/coversmall The Elementary Epistemic Arithmetic of Criminal Justice 2009-01-23 text/html en-US The Elementary Epistemic Arithmetic of Criminal Justice 2009-01-23 2009 TWO Project MUSE® 55918 2026-05-18T00:00:00-05:00 2009-01-23