Project MUSE®: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy - Latest Articles
https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/343
Project MUSE®: Latest articles in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy.daily12026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00text/htmlen-USVol. 41 (2005) through current issueLatest Articles: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American PhilosophyTWOProject MUSE®Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy1558-95870009-1774Latest articles in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy. Feed provided by Project MUSE®Missionary Traitor: A Roycean Analysis of Samuel Austin Worcester and Loyalty to the Beloved Community
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/983856
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Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friendsIn 1827, the Cherokee people published their constitution as a means of protecting tribal sovereignty. In retaliation to the democratic actions of the Cherokee, Georgia passed a state law that said no white people were allowed in Indian territory. The motivation was to shrink boundaries and hinder coalitions with sympathizers. This law sought to target Samuel Austin Worcester1 and other missionaries due to their roles as friends and political advisors within varying tribal communities. In response, Worcester published a rebuke of the state of Georgia for their unchristian actions. In response, he was arrested and sentenced to four
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/343/image/coversmallMissionary Traitor: A Roycean Analysis of Samuel Austin Worcester and Loyalty to the Beloved Community2026-02-20text/htmlen-USMissionary Traitor: A Roycean Analysis of Samuel Austin Worcester and Loyalty to the Beloved Community2026-02-202026TWOProject MUSE®947262026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002026-02-20Precis of Peirce on Inference
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/983857
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A practicing scientist, Charles S. Peirce had a lifelong interest in inference as our means of efficiently ascertaining what is true. Inference is the psychological process whereby we move from putatively true premises to some conclusion. All inference uses signs. When those signs are signs of reality, and when our inferences are good, the result is true representations of the way the world is (conclusions) substituted for other true representations of the way the world is (premises). Peirce understands inferential validity to consist in the substitution of one sign for another sign in a truth-producing way. He draws an analogy to American currency, when the dollar was still on the gold standard. On the gold
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/343/image/coversmallPrecis of Peirce on Inference2026-02-20text/htmlen-USPrecis of Peirce on Inference2026-02-202026TWOProject MUSE®222842026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002026-02-20Comments on Richard K. Atkins’ Peirce on Inference
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/983858
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Richard Atkins’ Peirce on Inference is one of the best books recently published on Peirce, and certainly the best on Peirce’s logic. Atkins aims and succeeds to provide a “charitable retrospective perspective on Peirce’s theory of inference” (Atkins 2023, p. 1). “Theory of inference” should not here be taken to embrace the whole of Peirce’s logic, of course, but only the central department of it, namely “logical critics.” Peirce defines logical critics as “the study of the nature of the trust that ought to be placed in different kinds of reasoning” (R 602 = SWS, p. 242, 1906), and this is precisely the part of Peirce’s logic that is under examination in Atkins’ book.1From the methodological point of view, Atkins’
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/343/image/coversmallComments on Richard K. Atkins’ Peirce on Inference2026-02-20text/htmlen-USComments on Richard K. Atkins’ Peirce on Inference2026-02-202026TWOProject MUSE®354512026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002026-02-20Inference, Guiding Principles, and Ideas: Comments on Richard Atkins’ Peirce on Inference
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/983859
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Richard Atkins’ book Peirce on Inference is an extraordinary addition to the latest scholarship on Peirce. This does not come as a surprise to me: throughout the years, Atkins’ scholarship has often served as my compass in navigating some of Peirce’s most technical writings. We now have a landmark work on his theory of inference which, in true Peircean spirit, follows the genealogical development of this key component of his logic, and places it within the broader context of his account of inquiry. I find the book an example of what Peirce scholarship, at its best, should aspire to: not just exegetic work on Peirce’s texts, but a more ambitious and systematic operation to improve the accessibility of Peirce’s
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/343/image/coversmallInference, Guiding Principles, and Ideas: Comments on Richard Atkins’ Peirce on Inference2026-02-20text/htmlen-USInference, Guiding Principles, and Ideas: Comments on Richard Atkins’ Peirce on Inference2026-02-202026TWOProject MUSE®547212026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002026-02-20Commentary on Richard K. Atkins’ Peirce on Inference
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/983860
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It is a great pleasure to be included in this event. Oxford University Press asked me to read the original typescript of Peirce on Inference. I learned a lot from reading the first typescript, more from reading the second, and yet more from re-reading the book for this event.Atkins engages at length with an issue that deeply puzzles me and I plan to inflict some of my puzzlement on y’all. Here’s a path into the puzzle: For a variety of reasons, someone who only knew Peirce via his theory of inquiry would probably expect him to be some variety of Bayesian. Such ideas as that we must begin wherever we actually find ourselves, that it’s idle to pursue rock-solid foundations for our intellectual pursuits, that our
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/343/image/coversmallCommentary on Richard K. Atkins’ Peirce on Inference2026-02-20text/htmlen-USCommentary on Richard K. Atkins’ Peirce on Inference2026-02-202026TWOProject MUSE®343152026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002026-02-20Replies to Commentators
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/983861
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First and foremost, I wish to thank my friends and colleagues, Professors Bellucci, Ambrosio, and Kasser, for their insightful remarks on the book. I have learned much from reading their work, and I am honored that they have taken the time and made the effort to comment on my book. It is a great pleasure to discuss these topics with such esteemed scholars. I would also like to thank Prof. Aaron Wilson for organizing the symposium, and for his excellent work as Executive Director of the Charles. S. Peirce Society. He also reviewed the book in an earlier volume of this journal, for which I am grateful. With his permission, I will also make some comments on his remarks there.Bellucci offers some critical remarks on my
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-12T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/343/image/coversmallReplies to Commentators2026-02-20text/htmlen-USReplies to Commentators2026-02-202026TWOProject MUSE®552482026-05-12T00:00:00-05:002026-02-20