Project MUSE®: Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology - Latest Articles
https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164
Project MUSE®: Latest articles in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology.daily12026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00text/htmlen-USVol. 1 (1994) through current issueLatest Articles: Philosophy, Psychiatry, & PsychologyTWOProject MUSE®Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology1086-33031071-6076Latest articles in Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology. Feed provided by Project MUSE®Self-Diagnosis and its Implications in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry: Addressing Epistemic Injustice and Childism
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988342
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The conventional diagnostic process in medicine involves collecting observable signs and reported symptoms (Berrios, 1996). From this diagnostic, health care professionals form a probabilistic cluster of signs and symptoms (i.e., syndromes) (Kendler & Parnas, 2012). Such a conventional view of the diagnostic process is based on different processes. First, complex psychiatric terms are embedded within conceptual, theoretical, and contextual clinical frameworks. Second, various contextual factors including, for instance, epidemiology, current laws and medical guidelines, or societal expectations, are retrieved. Finally, patient characteristics such as medical history, sociocultural background, and personal biography
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallSelf-Diagnosis and its Implications in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry: Addressing Epistemic Injustice and Childism2026-04-21text/htmlen-USSelf-Diagnosis and its Implications in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry: Addressing Epistemic Injustice and Childism2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®1112072026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Extending the Analysis of Childism in Psychiatry
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988343
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Self-diagnosis among children and young people is an issue that is attracting increasing attention from mental health professionals and philosophers. In this context, Brunet and Gauld's article is a welcome contribution that, while placing the growing phenomenon of self-diagnosis at the center of the discussion, brings together literatures that often advance in isolation, particularly those on the concepts of childism and of epistemic injustice in psychiatry. We recognize the desire for nuance that emerges from the article, which shows the benefits and risks associated with self-diagnosis, particularly among young people. Although it demonstrates both the need and the practical difficulties of accessing psychiatric
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallExtending the Analysis of Childism in Psychiatry2026-04-21text/htmlen-USExtending the Analysis of Childism in Psychiatry2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®188652026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Reclaiming Voice: Self-Diagnosis as Epistemic Resistance in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988344
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Brunet and Gauld's examination of self-diagnosis through the lenses of epistemic injustice and childism offers a crucial intervention in child and adolescent psychiatry. Drawing on previous work analyzing childism as systemic discrimination against minors, this commentary explores how self-diagnosis represents not merely clinical challenge but epistemic resistance. I argue that understanding self-diagnosis requires attention to the structural power asymmetries that shape whose knowledge counts, and that psychiatric practice must evolve toward genuine epistemic partnership rather than benevolent paternalism.The Invisibility of Childism in Psychiatric PracticeBrunet and Gauld's article makes a vital contribution by
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallReclaiming Voice: Self-Diagnosis as Epistemic Resistance in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry2026-04-21text/htmlen-USReclaiming Voice: Self-Diagnosis as Epistemic Resistance in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®365312026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Childism in Clinical Practice: Child Specificity, Intersectionality, and Micro-Interactional Dynamics
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988345
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We thank Laelia Benoit and Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien, as well as Sarah Arnaud, for their insightful analyses, which open at least three directions to continue the discussion: i) how to distinguish clinical doubt from childism and epistemic injustice, ii) how to understand childism through an intersectional lens, and iii) how structural forms of discrimination relate to micro-interactional clinical dynamics. In this response, we address successively each of these three complementary axes.In their comment, Gagné-Julien and Arnaud highlight the methodological difficulty of determining when clinical doubt (Porter, Elnakouri, Meyers, Shibayama, Jayawickreme, & Grossmann, 2022) is appropriate and when it becomes a form of
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallChildism in Clinical Practice: Child Specificity, Intersectionality, and Micro-Interactional Dynamics2026-04-21text/htmlen-USChildism in Clinical Practice: Child Specificity, Intersectionality, and Micro-Interactional Dynamics2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®258262026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Speaking of Depersonalization: Reality Testing, Language, and Lived Experience
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988346
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Depersonalization/derealization disorder (DPDR) is a highly distressing condition characterized by feelings of unreality of the self, one's surroundings, or both. Despite being associated with major morbidity (American Psychiatric Association, 2022, p. 345), DPDR remains poorly understood and under-researched. Part of the lack of understanding—or so I argue—stems from the desire to categorize psychiatric patients in a binary way as delusional or not delusional. This dichotomy has led to a way of talking about DPDR that obscures the nature of the disorder itself. Wittgenstein spoke of the way that a picture can hold us captive and hide possibilities from us, adding that "we could not get outside it, for it lay in
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallSpeaking of Depersonalization: Reality Testing, Language, and Lived Experience2026-04-21text/htmlen-USSpeaking of Depersonalization: Reality Testing, Language, and Lived Experience2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®769742026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Depersonalization: An Unsettling Dissonance of Lived Experience and Reality Testing
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988347
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"Speaking of Depersonalization: Reality Testing, Language, and Lived Experience" (2026) explores the limitations of psychiatric nosology and nomenclature in comprehensively grasping the essence, nuances, and complexities of depersonalization/derealization (dpdr). It describes how binary constructs such as present-vs-absent reality testing and subjective vs objective knowing fail to fully capture the "disintegration of lived experience" in people with dpdr, especially those with "severe and continuous" symptoms. I appreciated the paper for compelling us to think deeply about constructs like reality, knowing, and experiencing, yet I did not find myself aligning with its conclusions. I share my perspective speaking
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallDepersonalization: An Unsettling Dissonance of Lived Experience and Reality Testing2026-04-21text/htmlen-USDepersonalization: An Unsettling Dissonance of Lived Experience and Reality Testing2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®122162026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Beyond "Reality Testing": Doubt and Lived Experience in Depersonalization and Derealization Disorder
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988348
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Depersonalization derealization disorder (DPD) is typically defined by two criteria. First, patients experience lasting or recurring impressions of unreality (or alienation) concerning themselves, their body, or the world around them. Second, their reality testing remains intact, which usually means they know these impressions are misleading and that they, their body, or the world are in fact real (and not alienated). In his stimulating article, Casey (2026) primarily argues that individuals with intense and constant forms of DPD neither believe nor disbelieve that their body or themselves are unreal or alien; and a fortiori, they do not know if they are real. Instead, they are in doubt about these matters.Casey
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallBeyond "Reality Testing": Doubt and Lived Experience in Depersonalization and Derealization Disorder2026-04-21text/htmlen-USBeyond "Reality Testing": Doubt and Lived Experience in Depersonalization and Derealization Disorder2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®293262026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Depersonalization, Phenomenologically Speaking
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988349
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It is hard for me to adequately express my gratitude for having two top scholars in the field comment on my essay, Speaking of Depersonalization. I have already been the glad beneficiary of Simeon and Billon's work in the past (in Simeon's case, for two decades) and I find myself yet again profiting from their expertise. I am grateful for the opportunity to respond, although there is not space to do justice to the richness of these commentaries. I ask the reader to not mistake my required brevity for glibness.Simeon objects that it is a "naïve oversimplification to say that psychiatric nosology frames reality testing as a ubiquitous, simple, and straightforward binary." She goes on to grant that, as it appears in
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallDepersonalization, Phenomenologically Speaking2026-04-21text/htmlen-USDepersonalization, Phenomenologically Speaking2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®183902026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Altered Rationality? Integrating Psychedelic Experiences Into Rational Thinking Through the Critical Anchor Approach
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988350
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Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the therapeutic potential of psychedelic experiences and delusions, which have increasingly been explored not only for their psychological impact but also for their transformative effects on belief systems and self-understanding. But such experiences often challenge conventional norms of rationality, raising questions about how to integrate insights from altered states of consciousness without falling into epistemic overreach or metaphysical speculation.Both delusional and psychedelic states can involve vivid, emotionally charged, and seemingly revelatory experiences that resist standard evidentiary scrutiny. Delusions, traditionally considered as manifestations of
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallAltered Rationality? Integrating Psychedelic Experiences Into Rational Thinking Through the Critical Anchor Approach2026-04-21text/htmlen-USAltered Rationality? Integrating Psychedelic Experiences Into Rational Thinking Through the Critical Anchor Approach2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®1449972026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21On Altered Reality
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988351
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In the developing field of psychedelic-assisted therapy and wellness, there loom large philosophical questions pertaining to the significance of the psychedelic experience—questions touching the three traditional pillars of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology (ethics and aesthetics). This article from Borkel et al. (2026) asks for the application of an epistemology against metaphysical postulations in psychedelic-assisted therapy to prevent 'epistemic harm' and thus retain what the authors consider to be metaphysical neutrality. More specifically, the authors advocate that a method of rationality—which they formalize as the 'Critical Anchor Approach' (CAA)—be applied to psychedelic experiences that
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallOn Altered Reality2026-04-21text/htmlen-USOn Altered Reality2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®274782026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Mindfulness as a Critical Anchor: Empirical and Theoretical Considerations
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988352
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Borkel et al. propose the Critical Anchor Approach (CAA) as a way to minimize epistemic (knowledge-related) harms of psychedelic experiences while maximizing their benefits. One key pillar of the CAA is the use of mindfulness to promote a critical stance toward psychedelic-induced mental states. We are sympathetic to the overall goals and methods of the CAA, and we see mindfulness as a promising component of this framework. However, the proposed use of mindfulness to promote critical thinking raises several questions. Here, we identify some of these questions and suggest directions for clarifying how mindfulness might best function as a "critical anchor."Serotonergic psychedelics such as LSD and psilocybin can
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallMindfulness as a Critical Anchor: Empirical and Theoretical Considerations2026-04-21text/htmlen-USMindfulness as a Critical Anchor: Empirical and Theoretical Considerations2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®248732026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Epistemic Autonomy, Metaphysical Restraint, and Mindfulness in Psychedelic-assisted Therapy
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988353
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We agree with Sjöstedt-Hughes that there is no way to banish metaphysical questions from this field; on the contrary, psychedelic experiences due to their felt intensity and enhanced feeling of realness force them to the surface. Our points of disagreement concern 1) whether the clinical setting is an appropriate venue for engaging in such debates, and 2) the extent to which metaphysical suggestions threaten the patient's psychological autonomy (Borkel et al., 2026). Our answer to the first is "no," and to the second "yes," insofar as we hold that introducing metaphysical speculation in a clinical context is highly problematic due to drug-induced high suggestibility and salience. Therapists ought not to frame
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallEpistemic Autonomy, Metaphysical Restraint, and Mindfulness in Psychedelic-assisted Therapy2026-04-21text/htmlen-USEpistemic Autonomy, Metaphysical Restraint, and Mindfulness in Psychedelic-assisted Therapy2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®376112026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21The Autistic Strife for Autonomy: Modeling Sensory Integration Challenges with the Metaphysics of Spinoza and Maimonides
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988354
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Providing a unified integrative model of autism spectrum disorder is notoriously difficult due to the complexity and variety of the symptoms and the largely differing developmental histories. Research on autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has therefore shifted from examining autism as one thing to understanding it as a "compound or 'fractionable' condition" and acknowledging that "complexity and comorbidity is the norm" (Happé & Frith 2020). Another development is the shift from conceptualizing autism as a deficit or developmental disorder to the "neurodiversity perspective" (Happé & Frith 2020; Woods, Milton, Arnold, & Graby 2018).Although symptoms and life trajectories differ widely, many accounts of ASD nonetheless
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallThe Autistic Strife for Autonomy: Modeling Sensory Integration Challenges with the Metaphysics of Spinoza and Maimonides2026-04-21text/htmlen-USThe Autistic Strife for Autonomy: Modeling Sensory Integration Challenges with the Metaphysics of Spinoza and Maimonides2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®936892026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Rethinking Psychiatric Experience: Life Narratives, Ontological Insecurity, and Collaborative Knowledge Production in Mental Health Research
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988355
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In a context where mental health expertise has historically flowed from North to South and from clinicians to patients, the PSYGLOCAL project sought to invert this paradigm by investigating how psychiatric users and survivors construct alternative epistemologies that challenge the hegemonic globalization of mental health.1 This research addressed a significant gap in mental health scholarship by systematically examining the interrelationships between "knowing, doing, and being" (Barad, 2007, p. 391) across diverse mental health epistemologies, with particular attention to the knowledge-building potential of lived experience. Through oral history and collaborative methodologies, our investigation was guided by two
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallRethinking Psychiatric Experience: Life Narratives, Ontological Insecurity, and Collaborative Knowledge Production in Mental Health Research2026-04-21text/htmlen-USRethinking Psychiatric Experience: Life Narratives, Ontological Insecurity, and Collaborative Knowledge Production in Mental Health Research2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®872402026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21The Unrealized Potential of Phenomenology in Understanding Addiction: A Critical Exploration
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988356
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Phenomenological concepts and insights have found their way in the fields of medicine, mental health studies and psychopathology over the last two decades (e.g., Carel, 2008, 2016; Fuchs, 2005, 2007; Leder, 1992; Mishara, Moskalewicz, Schwartz, & Kranjec, 2024; Ratcliffe, 2008, 2009; Sass & Parnas, 2006; Slatman, 2014; Stanghellini et al., 2019; Svenaeus, 2011; Toombs, 1992). A key reason for this, is the potential of phenomenological concepts and descriptions to illuminate the lived experiences of people experiencing physical or mental pain and those in need of care. But while phenomenology has fairly established itself in numerous interdisciplinary research initiatives, its application to the study of
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallThe Unrealized Potential of Phenomenology in Understanding Addiction: A Critical Exploration2026-04-21text/htmlen-USThe Unrealized Potential of Phenomenology in Understanding Addiction: A Critical Exploration2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®1471382026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Complexity in Configuring and Reproducing the Addictive Experience
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988357
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The study by Petropoulos et al. (2026) on contemporary advances in the phenomenology of addictive behavior refines, on temporal, spatial, and methodological grounds, the possibilities and needs of a scientific analysis of addiction and states of intoxication. Their analysis organizes the themes, problems, and interdisciplinary relations that the study of addiction generates within this new niche of discussion that has emerged in phenomenology over the last two decades, extending the originally Husserlian method into particularly novel and scientifically urgent fields. In the unfolding of their interpretation, one of the greatest achievements of transcendental phenomenology becomes evident: its interdisciplinary
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallComplexity in Configuring and Reproducing the Addictive Experience2026-04-21text/htmlen-USComplexity in Configuring and Reproducing the Addictive Experience2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®124942026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Beyond a Deficit-oriented Approach to Addiction: Husserl and Heidegger on the Fundamental Role of Temporal Experience
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988358
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Marcela Venebra Muñoz (2026) correctly emphasizes the existence of multiple phenomenologies, noticing that the discussion of core phenomenological themes in our paper (Petropoulos et al., 2025) draws mostly from the work of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty and less so from Edmund Husserl. In the following, we wish to take Muñoz's reference to multiple phenomenologies at task and show how this multiplicity can be fruitful in addiction research. We show how insights drawn from Husserl and Heidegger can add nuance to the temporal disruption that phenomenological research has associated with addiction. By integrating the transcendental rigor of Husserl with the existential insights of Heidegger, we will map
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallBeyond a Deficit-oriented Approach to Addiction: Husserl and Heidegger on the Fundamental Role of Temporal Experience2026-04-21text/htmlen-USBeyond a Deficit-oriented Approach to Addiction: Husserl and Heidegger on the Fundamental Role of Temporal Experience2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®420892026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21Uncertainty As a Suicidogenic Factor
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988359
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One major contributor to suicidality is an agent's pessimistic perceived certainty that their future is bound to bring about distress, or that the adversity they are currently experiencing will continue unabated. However, suicide literature sometimes indicates that uncertainty also factors into suicidality, although how it contributes to suicidality—directly or indirectly—remains under-researched. A prime example of the suicidogenic properties of uncertainty is provided by Kay Redfield Jamison, who points out that in many individuals with psychiatric conditions, "the awareness of the damage done by severe mental illness…and fears that it may return again play a decisive role in many suicides" (Jamison, 1999, p.
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallUncertainty As a Suicidogenic Factor2026-04-21text/htmlen-USUncertainty As a Suicidogenic Factor2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®1012432026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21About the Authors
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/988360
<p></p>
Sarah Arnaud teaches philosophy at CÉGEP (College) Édouard Montpetit in Canada and is a member of the Centre de Recherche en Éthique, as well as an executive council member of the Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry (AAPP). Her research interests lie in the area of the epistemology and the ethics of psychiatry –mainly on the role of values and first-person perspectives for the understanding of psychiatric categories–and in philosophy of mind—mainly on emotion, consciousness, and the self. These areas intersect in most of her work: she has written on the role emotions play in eating disorders, and is currently working on affective harm in psychiatry, for which she proposes an account of
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Project MUSE®https://muse.jhu.edu/2026-05-15T00:00:00-05:00https://muse.jhu.edu/journal/164/image/coversmallAbout the Authors2026-04-21text/htmlen-USAbout the Authors2026-04-212026TWOProject MUSE®164502026-05-15T00:00:00-05:002026-04-21