Go to Page Number Go to Page Number
In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

The Monist, 27 (Oct 1917) 635-37

Agnes Cuming (“Lotze, Bradley, and Bosanquet,” Mind, April 1917) declares Lotze’s logic to be a partial revolt against the intellectualism of Hegel. 2 Our intelligent experience, according to Lotze, is only a small part of the real world and thought is only a small part of our intelligent experience. Thought is a tool, a substitute for adequate perceptive intuition. Bradley’s and Bosanquet’s logic are similar in so far as each is influenced by Lotze. They hold an almost identical definition of “idea,” and agree in their theories of judgment. Bradley however arrives at reality ontologically and Bosanquet epistemologically. “Knowledge for Bosanquet is the system of reality progressively demonstrated before our eyes. . . . In this emphasis on System as the postulate of knowledge . . . Bosanquet is in advance of Bradley” [166]. Lotze insists on feeling as a criterion, and is thus very far from Bosanquet with his conception of system, but he admits the essential of Bosanquet’s position, which is the inadequacy of feeling. Lotze is a dualist: he divides sharply the feeling which supplies the material from thought, exercising a formal activity upon it. In Bradley the dualism becomes a gloomy scepticism; thought and its object are forever sundered. But Bosanquet bridges the gulf. In both Bosanquet and Bradley the separation of thought and reality is inherited from Lotze with his idea of the “scaffold” of thought [164]. The only possible criterion of knowledge is immanent–a criticism of a lower from a higher point of view. Miss Cuming considers that Bosanquet has improved upon both Lotze and Bradley; the direction which she believes to be progress seems to be almost a return to more orthodox Hegelianism.


Published By:   Faber & Faber logo    Johns Hopkins University Press