EASTERN BELORUSSIA REGION

Jewish men remove guns from a barrack in Mogilev, July to October 1941. The German caption reads: “collection of looted guns.”
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Jewish men remove guns from a barrack in Mogilev, July to October 1941. The German caption reads: “collection of looted guns.”

USHMM WS #74318, COURTESY OF ŻIH

Pre-1941: Vitebsk, Mogilev, and parts of the Gomel’, Minsk, and Poles’e oblasts, Belorussian SSR, Soviet Union; 1941–1944: Rear Area, Army Group Center (rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet Mitte); post-2001: Republic of Belarus

The entirety of the eastern Belorussia region lay within the Belorussian SSR in 1938. After June 1941 and until the spring of 1942, the German military authorities and the Einsatzgruppen established some 101 ghettos or points of concentration for Jews in eastern Belorussia, divided as follows: 41 in the Vitebsk oblast’, containing about 30,000 Jews; 31 in the Mogilev oblast’, holding some 38,000 Jews; 15 in what is now the Gomel’ oblast’, with approximately 13,000 Jewish residents; and 14 in the Minsk oblast’, with about 16,000 Jews. For some locations a lack of information has made it very difficult to determine whether or not a ghetto existed there. Most ghettos were located in the Rayon centers, sometimes also holding Jews brought in from surrounding villages, although several Rayons contained 2 or more ghettos. The period of ghetto formation was accompanied by the mass murder of the Jewish population by units of the Security Police (Einsatzgruppen), Wehrmacht, Order Police, Waffen-SS, and various non-German auxiliaries.

According to the 1939 census, there were more than 250,000 Jews living in the region of eastern Belorussia. Thousands of Jewish refugees arrived from western Belorussia in the first days after the German invasion on June 22, 1941, but many other Jews were evacuated, fled in time, or were recruited into the Red Army. However, a systematic evacuation of key personnel, mainly Communist Party and state officials, as well as industrial workers, was possible only from a few larger cities with good railway connections. For example, in Orsha, located on a main railway line, only about 25 percent of the Jews remained at the start of the German occupation, whereas in Polotsk, probably around 75 percent of the 1939 population was trapped there, although this number included many refugees from further west.

In the first two months, the rapidly moving units of Einsatzgruppe B, supported by SS, Order Police, and Wehrmacht units, conducted a number of killing Aktions directed against suspected Communists and the Jewish leadership. In August 1941, Einsatzgruppe B and other units initiated large-scale killings of Jewish women and children. For example, in Surazh, Einsatzkommando 9 carried out the total annihilation of the Jews on August 15, 1941, without forming a ghetto.1 The liquidation of most of the larger ghettos established in the main cities was conducted in October and November 1941; but many ghettos in smaller towns and villages were not liquidated until the first six months of 1942. The limited personnel of the Einsatzgruppen, poor roads and communications, and the cold winter of 1941–1942 all contributed to the prolongation of the killing Aktions into the spring and summer of 1942.

An elderly woman sits among the ruins of her home, destroyed by the German attack on Vitebsk. The original German caption reads: “This was Vitebsk!”
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An elderly woman sits among the ruins of her home, destroyed by the German attack on Vitebsk. The original German caption reads: “This was Vitebsk!”

USHMM WS #09468, COURTESY OF PATRICIA MARK

The military commandant’s offices (Ortskommandanturen) appointed a local Belorussian administration and a local police force (Ordnungsdienst) in each Rayon. The first anti-Jewish measures introduced by the military included the wearing of identifying markings and the introduction of forced labor. Other regulations included restrictions on trading with non-Jews and confinement to the limits of the settlement.

The commander in charge of Rear Area, Army Group Center (Befehlshaber des rückwärtigen Heeresgebiets Mitte, or Berück Mitte), General der Kavallerie Max von Schenckendorff, issued an order for the creation of separate Jewish quarters on July 13, 1941. It stated that Jews were to be concentrated in a closed community in houses only occupied by Jews.2 Among the first ghettos established in eastern Belorussia were those in Slavnoe (according to survivors, on July 9), Zembin (mid-July 1941), Ostrovno (on July 19), Krupki (July), and Bogushevichi (late July or early August). Ghettoization, however, was not a high priority. Subsequent guidelines issued by the Army High Command (OKH) in mid-August, and circulated by the Berück Mitte on September 12, advised that fenced ghettos were only to be established when the location of the Jewish quarter in relation to the non-Jewish residential area made it necessary for the effective guarding of the Jewish quarter, which could not be achieved by other means. Such ghettos were only to be established in towns with larger Jewish populations and only if other more urgent tasks would not be neglected in consequence. Jews could leave the Jewish quarters only for work assignments or with special permission [End Page 1640] from the Ortskommandant.3 These orders, which left much initiative to commanders at the local level, explain how the patchwork of open ghettos, enclosed ghettos, and also other places with no resettlement of the Jews came about.

As a result of the flexible guidelines, at least 17 unfenced or open ghettos (Judenviertel) were established in eastern Belorussia; but there were significant variations, even among these. In Beshenkovichi and Chashniki, Jews were not resettled, but they were forbidden to leave the town, and their houses were marked with wooden Stars of David. In Tolochin, the Jews were resettled into a separate area, which was not fenced but was guarded by the local Belorussian police. In Osipo vichi, the Jews were confined to certain streets that they could not leave, but the area remained unfenced and non-Jews living there were not resettled. In Trudy, all the Jews were concentrated in three houses, from which the non-Jews were removed.

Among reasons given for establishing ghettos was the Germans’ need for more housing space, especially in places that had witnessed considerable destruction. Another motivation was the aim of restricting Jews’ access to the food supply. The ghettos also served the additional purpose of trapping much of the Jewish population in preparation for the killing Aktions.

A variety of different sites were used as ghettos. Many were established in the poorer parts of town, often where Jews had lived before in the small wooden houses typical of the region. In the village of Grodzianka, a long, wooden construction similar to a barracks served as the ghetto. The Jews of Tal’ka were concentrated in a former pioneer camp, and those of Pukhovichi in the former sanatorium of the postal service. In Gorodok, the ghetto was fenced on three sides, with a river forming its boundary on the fourth; a watchtower was built at the highest point along the ghetto fence. In the small village of Obol’, a single house served as the ghetto. In Shumilino, the ghetto consisted of 10 houses “surrounded with barbed wire. Old cans and bottles were hung on the wire, and if somebody touched it, they rang. A guard with a machine gun sat on a watchtower, and he opened fire at everybody who came close to the wire.”4

In most cases the ghettos were established and overseen by the Ortskommandanturen, but in some cases, especially in larger cities, the Einsatzgruppen also played a leading role. In Orsha, the ghetto was established following a decision taken in the office of the Ortskommandantur. It consisted of between 25 and 40 houses, where about 2,000 people were concentrated. The Jews were given three days to move in. On one side, the ghetto was bordered by the Orshitsa River, and on the other sides it was enclosed with barbed wire and guarded. The Jewish cemetery was included in the ghetto area.5

In September 1941, Egon Noack, commander of Vorauskommando Moskau subordinated to Einsatzgruppe B, arrived in Mstislavl’, and after consulting with the mayor and the head of the local police, he ordered the creation of a ghetto in the “Sloboda” section of town. All Jews were ordered to move into the ghetto, while local Belorussians were evacuated from this area. During this visit, the Security Police under Noack collected fur coats from the Jews, and after the ghetto was established, the Security Police shot 30 Jewish men.6 Ghettoization was often accompanied by anti-Jewish violence and the confiscation or looting of property. In Mogilev, the Jews allegedly tried to sabotage resettlement into the ghetto, which resulted in the Security Police shooting 113 Jews.7 In Ostrovno, on the day of the resettlement, a young Jew who refused to move into the ghetto was shot and killed. During the resettlement of the Jews into the Polotsk ghetto, the Nazis confiscated Jewish property, beating many Jews in the process.

Most ghettos in the region were severely overcrowded, and despite the short duration of many of them, epidemics of typhus and other diseases linked to malnutrition, exposure, and overcrowding were common. In the Lepel’ ghetto, some of the houses had neither doors nor windows. Jews were crammed 30 to 40 people to each house. The ghetto inmates were forbidden to leave their houses or even to look out the windows. In winter they were forbidden to take water from wells; they could only melt snow instead.8 In Vitebsk, the area of the ghetto was so severely damaged that the Jews had to scavenge in the ruins to find some makeshift shelter. In the Liuban’ ghetto, each house contained at least three or four families.

A survivor of the Liozno ghetto, B. Chernyakov, has described conditions there: “The police burst into ghetto houses in the winter at any time of the day or night. They broke the windows, beat the Jews with sticks and whips, and chased them out into the freezing cold. Not a single window pane remained in one of the houses … even though 40 people lived there in – 40° weather. Infested with lice, the people slept on rotten, wormy straw. A typhus epidemic broke out, claiming several lives every day.”9 Survivors report from a number of ghettos that the Germans supplied no food at all to the inmates, which meant that deaths from starvation occurred, in some cases on a large scale.

Most historians argue that the exploitation of the Jews for labor was only of marginal importance in the ghettos of this region, since much of the heavy industry had been evacuated or destroyed by the Soviets, and sufficient non-Jewish manpower remained. Nonetheless, Jews were used for forced labor in almost all eastern Belorussian ghettos. Forced labor tasks included cleaning the streets, repairing roads, digging military defenses, and cleaning or craft work for the German occupying forces. Sometimes, however, forced labor was intended merely to humiliate the Jews. In Parichi, Jews were taken out each day for forced labor, and when there was no work for them, the authorities still made them move sand from one place to another.

In September 1941, the Wehrmacht forbade the use of Jewish workers other than in closed columns.10 According to historian Christian Gerlach, this order effectively excluded Jewish craftsmen from the economy and accelerated the process of destruction. As the measure was implemented, it was accompanied by the mass murder of most of the Jewish population in the larger cities. Since the Jews of eastern Belorussia were much less involved in crafts and light industry than those in the former Polish regions, they could be replaced more easily. The acute food shortages in the cities, exacerbated by the [End Page 1641] Germans’ own “Hunger Plan,” led German authorities to starve out and shoot Jews en masse. Fear of disease spreading became another reason to liquidate those that remained.11

Among the main units responsible for the murder of the Jews in eastern Belorussia in the fall of 1941 were Einsatzkommandos 8 and 9 of Einsatzgruppe B. Einsatzkommando 8, assisted by Police Battalions 316 and 322, murdered more than 6,000 Jews in Mogilev in two large Aktions in October. Another Einsatzkommando 8 detachment shot 7,000 Jews in Borisov, assisted by the local Belorussian police. Detachments of Einsatzkommando 9 carried out mass shootings of Jews, for example, in Vitebsk, Ianovichi, and Sirotino. Wehrmacht units participated in anti-Jewish Aktions, for example, in Krupki and Krucha, and provided support to the operations of the Einsatzgruppen. A report by Ortskommandantur I (V) 324 in Parichi reflects the suddenness of developments: “on October 18, 1941, a security command of the SD in Bobruisk appeared in Parichi and liquidated the Jews living here.”12

Indigenous forces and other auxiliaries also played an important role. Apart from the Ordnungsdienst based in every town and village, men of the collaborationist Russian National People’s Army (RNNA) and Ukrainian auxiliaries also participated in ghetto liquidation Aktions.

About 25 of the eastern Belorussian ghettos existed for less than two months, such that they can be considered destruction ghettos. Of these, 16 were liquidated in the fall of 1941 and the others in the first six months of 1942. In some places, such as Drissa or Osveia, the Jews were collected together in a “special camp” or ghetto for only a few days before they were shot; others existed for a few weeks, such as in Klimovichi or Gorodok, and in most respects resembled other ghettos.

From a few ghettos, selected skilled workers were spared initially from the killing Aktions, but this was usually for only a few weeks. In Mogilev a forced labor camp for Jews was established alongside the ghetto, which later also held non-Jews before its liquidation in 1943. Jews from western Belorussia were sent to a forced labor camp near Borisov in December 1942; they were shot there after a few months in 1943.

Little is known about the Jewish Councils in the eastern Belorussian ghettos other than the names and professions of some Jewish elders and council members. As elsewhere, their tasks included registering the Jews and meeting German demands for forced labor and “contributions.” They also probably allocated housing and provided some social services, including rudimentary medical care. In Vitebsk and a few other ghettos, there is evidence of a Jewish police force. In Tal’ka, Jewish elder Meyer Rabinovich was shot when he protested about the treatment of the Jews in the ghetto.13 Attempts were made to maintain religious observance and other social activities despite the difficulties. In Shchedrin, the Jews prayed at home, as there was no synagogue within the ghetto boundaries. Efforts were also made to bury the dead according to Jewish rites.

The attitudes of the local population towards the ghettos varied from direct participation in German anti-Jewish policies to providing assistance and shelter. Jewish survivors from Ianovichi recalled their non-Jewish neighbors with great bitterness, as with the coming of the Germans, the attitude of the local population towards the Jews changed drastically: “The locals could come to a Jew and take away whatever they wanted, even a cow …; they might also beat you with a stick.”14 The German authorities also spread virulent propaganda against the Jews. The establishment of ghettos gave non-Jews the opportunity to loot property that was left behind. In most ghettos in the region, Jews were able to barter their last possessions for food with the non-Jewish population despite German prohibitions. In Borisov, the initial mood of support for the anti-Jewish measures gave way to fears that the remaining local population might also be killed once the full scale of the massacres became known.15

From the end of 1941, a number of Jews escaped from the ghettos to join the growing Soviet partisan movement. Many Jews served with distinction in the Soviet partisans and carried out attacks against German garrisons and the local police. Despite some antisemitism in the ranks of the partisans, official Soviet policy treated all nationalities equally, and Soviet units offered some refuge to Jews escaping from the ghettos. Other Jews survived in hiding, usually with the help of a number of non-Jews.

Many of the Jews in the small open ghetto in Kolyshki were fortunate to be liberated by the Red Army. The German authorities had collected the Jews in a few intact houses marked with distinctive symbols. The Jews suffered from frequent robberies in the “ghetto,” and some Jews caught foraging outside the village were shot. On February 9, 1942, a Soviet reconnaissance unit recaptured Kolyshki, and a few days later some of the Jews moved deeper into Soviet-held territory, with the unit commander’s approval. Unfortunately, more than 100 Jews who remained behind were murdered in March, after the Germans’ return.

The ghettos liquidated in the first six months of 1942 were mainly smaller ones in more remote towns and villages, although a few were larger, such as that in Beshenkovichi, which contained more than 800 people. The Khotimsk ghetto was liquidated in early September 1942 and was probably not the last ghetto in the region, as Belorussian sources date the liquidation of the Sloboda ghetto to October 1942.

On liberation by the Red Army, very few Jewish survivors of the German occupation remained in eastern Belorussia. The Soviet Extraordinary State Commission (ChGK) documented the mass grave sites and obtained some descriptions of ghettos from local inhabitants. Just as German trials of Einsatzgruppen members have helped to piece together the daily brutality of the killing squads, now the trials of Soviet collaborators located in the Committee for State Security (KGB) archives are beginning to help historians gain a clearer picture of the attitudes among the local population during the persecution and murder of the Jews.

SOURCES

Of the secondary works dealing with the fate of the Jews in the ghettos of eastern Belorussia, the following are recommended: Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weissrussland 1941 bis 1944 (Hamburg: HIS, 2000); Peter Klein, ed., Die Einsatzgruppen in der besetzten Sowjetunion 1941/42 (Berlin: Hentrich, 1997); Raul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europäischen Juden, vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1982); Daniel Romanovsky, “The Holocaust in the Eyes of Homo Sovieticus: A Survey Based on Northeastern Belorussia and Northwestern Russia,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 13:3 (Winter 1999): 355–382; and Leonid Smilovitsky, “Ghettos in the Gomel Region: Commonalities and Unique Features, 1941–42” (presented at the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies Symposium on “The Holocaust in the Soviet Union,” United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, November 2003), available at jewishgen.org.

Of use in helping to identify smaller ghettos were the following publications: Vladimir Adamushko et al., eds., Handbuch der Haftstätten für die Zivilbevölkerung auf dem besetzten Territorium von Belarus 1941–1944 (Minsk: State Comittee for Archives and Documentary Collections of the Republic of Belarus, 2001); Marat Botvinnik, Pamiatniki genotsida evreev Belarusi (Minsk: Belaruskaia Navuka, 2000); Emanuil Ioffe, Belorusskie evrei: Tragediia i geroizm, 1941–1945 (Minsk: Arti-Feks, 2003); Rossiiskaia Evreiskaia Entsiklopediia, vols. 4–6 (Mos-cow: Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Jewish Encyclopedia Research Center, “Epos,” 2000–2007); and Shmuel Spector and Geoffrey Wigoder, eds., The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life before and during the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem; New York: New York University Press, 2001).

Relevant collections of testimonies and other primary sources include the following: R.A. Chernoglazova, ed., Tragediia evreev Belorussii (1941–1944): Sbornik materialov i dokumentov (Minsk: Izdatel’ E.S. Gal’perin, 1997); Ilya Ehrenburg and Vasily Grossman, The Complete Black Book of Russian Jewry (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002); David Meltser and Vladimir Levin, eds., The Black Book with Red Pages (Tragedy and Heroism of Belorussian Jews) (Cockeysville, MD: VIA Press, 2005); Joshua Rubenstein and Ilya Altman, eds., The Unknown Black Book: The Holocaust in the German-Occupied Soviet Territories (Bloomington: Indiana University Press in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2007); Ida M. Shenderovich and Aleksandr Litin, eds., Gibel’ mestechek Mogilevshchiny: Kholokost v Mogilevskoi oblasti v vospominaniiakh i dokumentakh (Mogilev: MGU im. A.A. Kuleshova, 2005); Leonid Smilovitskii, Katastrofa evreev v Belorussii 1941–1944 gg. (Tel Aviv: Biblioteka Matveia Chernogo, 2000); Gennadii Vinnitsa, Gorech’ i bol’ (Orsha, 1998); and Gennadii Vinnitsa, Slovo Pamiati (Orsha: Orshanskaia Tipografiia, 1997).

Relevant documentation can be found in the following archives: AUKGBRBMO; AŻIH; BA-BL; BA-L; BA-MA; BLH; CDJC; GAGO; GAMINO; GAMO; GARF; GAVO; IfZ; IPN; MA; NA; NARA; NARB; RGASPI; RGVA; USHMM; VHAP; VHF; YIVO; and YVA.

NOTES

1. YVA, TR-10/388a (Berlin trial of members of Einsatzkommando 9 [Filbert] held in 1961), p. 47; Soviet sources date the Aktion in Surazh on July 28 or August 2, 1941.

2. Berück Mitte, Abt. VII/Mil. Verw., Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 2, July 13, 1941, NARB, 409-1-1, p. 71, as cited by Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, p. 524.

3. Berück Mitte, Abt. VII/Kr.-Verw., Verwaltungsanordnungen Nr. 6, September 12, 1941, as cited in ibid., p. 525.

4. Eyewitness Yakov Mogilnitskii, as cited by A. Shulman and M. Ryvkin, Porodnennye voinoi (Vitebsk, 1997), p. 33.

5. See Vinnitsa, Gorech’ i bol’, pp. 66–69.

6. See Sta. Kiel, 2 Js 762/63, vol. 4, p. 152, statement of Woldemar Klingelhöfer, October 5, 1963; and vol. 1, pp. 48–49, statement of Klingelhöfer, July 1, 1947.

7. Tätigkeits- und Lagebericht, no. 6 (October 1–31, 1941), in Klein, Einsatzgruppen, p. 230.

8. Testimony of Roza Fishkina, GARF, 7021-84-104. See also Vinnitsa, Gorech’ i bol’, pp. 46–48.

9. B. Chernyakov’s letter, in Ehrenburg and Grossman, The Complete Black Book, pp. 187–188.

10. OKW/W.F.St./Abt. L (IV/Qu), Betr.: Juden in den neu besetzten Ostgebieten, September 12, 1941 (BA-MA), as cited by Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, p. 578.

11. See ibid., p. 645.

12. BA-BL, R 2104/25, report of OK I(V)324, n.d.

13. BA-L, II 202179/67, Dok. Bd. I, statements of Semen Panschey and Kondrat Molchan; Dok. Bd. II, statement of Anna Koreny.

14. YVA, O-3/4614.

15. NARA, N-Doc. 3047-PS.

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