Iamblichus and the School of Ammonius, Son of Hermias, On Divine Omniscience

E. Tempelis: Iamblichus and the School of Ammonius207 Iamblichus and the School of Ammonius, Son of Hermias, On Divine Omniscience Elias Tempelis An original epistemological view of Iamblichus was used by Ammonius, Stephanus and an anonymous commentator in their discussion on divine omniscience.1 This view is actually what has been preserved from Iamblichus' own commentary In De Interpretatione. The Neoplatonic school of Ammonius offers a possible account of God's experience of the world, which is conceptually defensible. Even though the views of Ammonius, Stephanus and the Anonymous Commentator on the subject are expounded in their commentaries In De Interpretatione2 they argue that the laws of 1 In most cases several scholars have dealt with Ammonius, but within the framework of an attempt to determine Boethius' dependence on him regarding this metaphysical problem. As a consequence, similar or parallel ideas of other members of this school, like Stephanus or the anonymous author of the commentary In De Interpretatione, have received practically no attention. Ammonius (In De Interpretatione 122ff.) was first mentioned by J. Orelli (Alexandri Aphrodisiensis de Fato Quae Supersunt, etc. [Zürich 1824] 335) as a source for Boethius' metaphysics with regard to the concept of necessity. F. Klingner ("De Boethii Consolatione Philosophiae," Philologische Untersuchungen, A. Kiessling and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, eds., vol. 27 [Berlin 1921] 1 1 1) repeats the argument. H.R. Patch ("Necessity in Boethius and the Neoplatonists," Speculum 10 [1935] 401) and P. Courcelle ("Boèce et l'École d'Alexandrie," Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire 52 [1935] 208) refer to Ammonius' distinction between simple and hypothetical necessity. P.T.M. Huber (Die Vereinbarkeit von göttlicher Vorsehung und menschlicher Freiheit in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius [Zürich 1976] 52-3) correctly argues that the doctrine of the twofold necessity was not applied by Ammonius to his own discussion about divine providence and free will. Cf. R.W. Sharpies, "Temporally Qualified Necessity and Impossibility," LCM 3.4 (1978) 89-91. For a detailed examination of the parallels among Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius, see Courcelle (above, this note); Courcelle, "Les Lettres Grecques en Occident, de Macrobe à Cassiodore," Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, vol. 159 (Paris 1948) 268ff.; Huber (above, this note) and L. Obertello, "Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius on Divine Knowledge," Dionysius 5 (1981) 127-64. 2 Ammonius, In De Interpretatione 128.15-135.25; Stephanus, In De Interpretatione 34.5- 208Syllecta Classica 8 (1997) the Aristotelian syllogisms are superficial and not founded upon facts. Thus they do not apply them to the Neoplatonic solution to the problem, which includes not only metaphysical, but also epistemological, ethical and physical considerations as well.3 Nevertheless, this does not mean that what can be said about divine omniscience violates the laws ofhuman logic in general. Ammonius' and Stephanus' arguments should be conceived within their attempt to define the relation between God and the world.4 The answer to the inquiry about how God knows the world in a determinate way is to be sought on a metaphysical level with the assistance of the Iamblichean theory about the relation between the knowing subject and the object known. To start with, Ammonius and Stephanus examine the truth value of two opposing beliefs: Belief (a): The world is governed by fate or the providence of the divine. Therefore, everything in the world occurs determinately and by necessity. This is something which applies also to all eternal realities.5 Belief (b): Some things are produced by particular causes and happen by contingency. Human beings have a free will and, therefore, they ought to cultivate their education and virtue in order to act in a better way.6 Although Ammonius and Stephanus do not state it from the beginning, their main concern is to reconcile the two opposite views. Their argumentation will be pointing to the conclusion that even if God exercises providence, nothing in the material world occurs determinately and by necessity.7 Furthermore, the events 36.38, Anonymous, In De Interpretatione 55.6-56.14. Even though Stephanus generally depends on Ammonius (see R. Vancourt, Les Derniers Commentateurs Alexandrins d'Aristote: L'École d' Olympiodore, Etienne d'Alexandrie...