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The second intifada, which began on September 29, 2000, has been the most intensely deadly and destructive period in Israel/Palestine since 1967.2 It terminated the interim, shattering any prospects that diplomacy might have held for an end to Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and a two-state solution.3 Palestinian towns, villages, and refugee camps have been laid waste, and Israeli buses and cafes have been blown apart in paroxysms of violence that Richard Falk aptly termed a “death dance.”4 The dance metaphor is so Wtting because it cuts through the nationalist polemics and polarizations that have been generated by all the suVering, loss, and fear to capture the fact that the conXict in Israel/ Palestine grips everyone, albeit in markedly diVerent ways. Whether a political resolution is possible in the future remains an open question. But the answer has been complicated inexorably by the violence and destruction of the last years. The history and analysis of the Israeli military court system presented in this book provide a basis for understanding the eVects of the conXict on the lives and relations among people in Israel/Palestine. The roots of the second intifada are entwined in the military court system, which has been a central setting for the conXict. However, the second intifada does Conclusion The Second Intifada and the Global “War on Terror” No nation at war with another shall permit such acts of war as shall make mutual trust impossible during some future time of peace. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays1 235 mark a change in Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, notably the expansion from a predominantly “law enforcement model” to a “war model.” During the second intifada, the Israeli military court system has continued to function in its conventional capacity as an institutional setting where the Israeli military enforces military and emergency laws by arresting , interrogating, prosecuting, convicting, and imprisoning Palestinians. But to some extent the system has been marginalized as extrajudicial executions (i.e., assassinations) have come to vie with prosecutions as means of punishment and deterrence for suicide bombings by Palestinian militants .5 Both suicide bombings and assassinations have a history that predates the second intifada,6 and both emanate from rights claims— dystopian in the extreme—to kill to survive. The increased use of both and the cyclical relationship between them attest to political failures to accommodate the interests that people would kill for. As Ghassan Hage writes, “It is only because of the failure of the political that such . . . violence emerges as a matter-of-fact possibility.”7 Suicide bombings and assassinations can by no means be considered equivalent except in their eVects (death).8 Nor are these the only forms of violence that characterize the death dance. But together they illustrate with brutal clarity the human costs of unbearable injustice and intractable conXict. The violence of the second intifada has been compounded and political recourse complicated by the fateful overlap of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the U.S. government’s launching of a global “war on terror.” Consequently, Israel/Palestine has the ignominious distinction of providing a testing ground to debate the interpretations, applicability, and enforceability of international humanitarian law (i.e., the laws of war) in the twenty-Wrst century.9 Contrary to the claim that in war law is silent (inter armes silent leges), in Israel/Palestine, law speaks volumes, in a cacophony. In this conclusion, I continue my inquiry into law and conXict during the second intifada, highlighting connections between events and developments in this context and the U.S. government’s global “war on terror.” Law Enforcement and War The continuing operation of the Israeli military court system during the interim (1994–2000) and its enduring jurisdiction over the entire West Bank and Gaza are clear evidence of the continuation of the occupation. 236 CONCLUSION The Palestinian Authority (PA), established by negotiated agreement in 1994, created its own security courts with jurisdiction over Palestinians in Areas A and B. Politically, this overlapping jurisdiction manifested itself as a proxy role for the PA to control Palestinians and punish those who threatened Israel. While Israel had relinquished administrative control over some aspects of Palestinians’ lives, the state retained eVective control over Israel/Palestine in its entirety because of its continuing capacity to regulate the movement of people and goods and access to resources, and because the PA was a subordinate rather than an independent...


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