



PROJECT MUSE®

The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma

Hyde, Susan D.

Published by Cornell University Press


Hyde, Susan D.

The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm.

1 ed. Cornell University Press, 2011.

Project MUSE., <a href="

<https://muse.jhu.edu/>.



➔ For additional information about this book

<https://muse.jhu.edu/book/26089>

Access provided at 2 Apr 2020 21:09 GMT with no institutional affiliation



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

INDEX

- Abbink, Jon, 164
Abstention buying, strategic manipulation
 and, 180–81, 184
Abu Seda, Hafez, 86
Advocacy-based theories of norm creation,
 15–18, 203–4
Afghanistan, 76
Africa
 criticism of monitoring in, 164
 democracy-contingent benefits and, 68,
 101–2
 strategic manipulation in, 175, 182
 trends in election monitoring, 67
 See also specific countries
African Union, 89, 105. *See also* Organiza-
 tion of African Unity (OAU)
Akerlof, George, 9, 10, 11
Algeria, 84–85, 195
Aliiev, Ilham, 179–80
Alliance for Progress, 97
Angola, 164
Annan, Kofi, 86
Arab League, 89, 170
Argentina, 97
Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 116–17
Armenia, 111, 113, 128, 129, 132–42, 195
 checking “as if” randomization, 138–40
 data and results, 140
 effect of monitors on vote share, 141–42
 natural experiment research design, 135–38
Asia, trends in election monitoring, 67. *See*
 also specific countries
Asian Network for Free Elections
 (ANFREL), 34
Australia, 41, 74
Austria, 86, 87
Autocratic regimes
 decision to invite observers, 103
 election monitoring in, 195–96
 norm diffusion and, 41
 See also specific countries
Axelrod, Robert, 10–11
Azerbaijan, 179–80
Bahrain, 122, 123
Balaguer, Joaquín, 59
Barnett, Michael, 24
Batista, Fulgencio, 1, 57, 95–96
Belarus, 47, 111, 176, 178, 185, 192, 195
Belgium, 41, 74, 86, 194
Benefit-seeking signals. *See* Signaling norms
Benin, 123
Betancourt, Rómulo, 96
Bhutto, Benazir, 177
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), as
 signal-based norm, 197–99
Bjornland, Eric, 40
Blair, Tony, 104
Bolivia, 58, 99
Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 85
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 100
Boycott of elections, by opposition parties,
 182–83
Bratton, Michael, 175
British Parliamentary Human Rights
 Group, 64, 99
Burnham, Forbes, 99
Bush, George H. W., 103
Bush, George W., 7, 103–4, 105, 201
Bütthe, Tim, 197

- Calingaert, Daniel, 160
- Cambodia, 178
- Cameroon, 109
- Canada, 41, 87
- Canas, Dr. Alberto F., 56–57
- Candidate exclusion, as strategic manipulation tactic, 177
- Carothers, Thomas, 160, 169
- Carroll, David, 105
- Carter, Jimmy, 18, 103, 132
- Carter Center
Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct for International Election Observation, 169
 democracy-contingent benefits and, 102
 Ethiopia and, 85, 89–90
 Haiti and, 18
 Indonesia and, 132, 143, 145–54, 156
 Jamaica and, 61
 Nigeria and, 18, 181
 Peru and, 118–19
 role of, 18, 34
 strategic manipulation and, 170
 Togo and, 120
 Zambia and, 60
- Castro, Fidel, 1, 57, 95
- Central banks, as signal-based norm, 199–201
- Chavez, Hugo, 33
- Chile, 6, 33, 38–39, 75, 87, 122
- Chiluba, Frederick, 61
- China, 33, 74, 102, 195–96
- Chirac, Jacques, 104
- Clinton, Bill, 103, 201
- Cold War
 democracy promotion during and after, 36–37, 94–100, 190–91
 election observation during and after, 28, 47, 67–73
- Commonwealth, 59, 105, 164, 170, 172, 173
- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 159–60, 170, 185, 195
- Commonwealth of Independent States-Elections Monitoring Organization (CIS-EMO), 159–60
- Commonwealth Secretariat, 61, 102
- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 101
- Consolidated democracies
 election observation as international norm and, 193–95
 norm diffusion and, 41
 quantitative analysis of invitations to observe, 74–75
See also True democrats; *specific countries*
- Cook, Robin, 104
- Cooperative norms, 15, 18–19, 203–4
- Copenhagen Document (1990), 101, 111, 195
- Costa Rica, 30, 31, 56–57, 58, 96, 98, 99
- Côte d'Ivoire, 177, 180–81
- Council of Europe, 105
- Cranenburgh, Oda van, 182
- Cuba, 1, 2, 56–57, 86, 95–96, 97, 122, 192, 194
- Czech Republic, 75, 122
- Davis-Roberts, Avery, 105
Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct for International Election Observation, 7, 63, 169
- Declaration of Santiago, 96
- Demirchian, Karin, 134
- Demirchian, Stepan, 134
- Democracy, election observation as international norm and, 5–6, 13–15, 21, 186–91. *See also* Consolidated democracies; True democrats
- Democracy premium, 35–38, 45–46, 106
- Democracy promoters and promotion benefit-seeking signals and, 44–48
 during Cold War, 36–37, 94–100, 190–91
 as common post-Cold War goal, 100–109
 implications and future research, 207–8
 norm diffusion and, 41
 pseudo-democrats and, 109–25
 quantitative analysis of invitations to observe, 73
 role in benefit-seeking behavior, 33–34
- Democracy-contingent benefits, 43, 52–53, 89–125
 democracy premium and, 35–38, 45–46, 106
 democracy promotion and Cold War, 36–37, 94–109, 190–91
 Ethiopia's 2005 elections and, 89–91
 international benefits consequences, 113–21
 negative reports and, 109, 110–13
- Democratic Republic of Congo, 162
- Dobbin, Frank, 21
- Dominican Republic, 58, 59, 99, 183
- Donno, Daniela, 178

- Duarte, José, 59
 Duvalier, François, 96, 177
- Ebadi, Shirin, 2
Economist, 89, 135
 Ecuador, 99
 Egypt, 7, 30, 76, 79, 85–86, 113, 122, 123, 124
 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 96
 El Salvador, 59
 Election day fraud, 164–65. *See also* Strategic manipulation
 Election observation and observers, 34–35, 95, 126–57
 Armenian presidential election in 2003, 128, 129, 132, 133–42
 democracy and, 5–6, 13–15, 21, 186–91
 democracy-contingent benefits and refusal to invite, 121–24
 domestic and international observers, 166–67
 Indonesian presidential election in 2004, 128, 129, 132–33, 142–57
 need for credentials from host government, 6–7
 observers' strategies for dealing with strategic manipulation, 163–74
 pre-election conditions and, 110–11
 risks of, 8
 theory and testing methodology, 126–33
 trends and, 66–67
 See also Election observers, state decision to invite; Signaling norms
Election Observation Handbook (OSCE/ODIHR), 169
 Election observers, state decisions to invite, 50–52, 56–88
 Cold War and, 67–73
 early inviters, 58–62
 normalization of, 83–88
 quantitative evidence, discussion of results, 78–83
 quantitative evidence, methodology, 62–78, 216–23
 Elkins, Zachary, 20–21, 197, 198
 Ethiopia, 85, 89–91, 123, 179
 Europe, trends in election monitoring, 67.
 See also specific countries
 European Commission, 102, 120
 European Union (EU), 6, 34
 Belarus and, 185
 democracy-contingent benefits and, 105, 106
 Ethiopia and, 85, 89–90
 Peru and, 119
 strategic manipulation and, 170
 Zambia and, 111
 Zimbabwe, 172–73
 Eyadema, Gnassingbe, 120, 121
- Fearon, James, 23–24, 25
 Figueres, José, 31, 56–57
 Finkel, Steven E., 107
 Finnemore, Martha, 16–17, 23
 Foreign aid. *See* Democracy-contingent benefits
 Foreign Assistance Act, of U.S., 119
 Foreign direct investment, BITs as signal-based norm and, 197–99
- France
 decision to invite observers, 74, 86, 87, 194
 democracy-contingent benefits and, 104
 Togo and, 120
 Franck, Thomas, 51, 106–7
 Francophonie, La. *See* International Organization of La Francophonie
 Fraud. *See* Strategic manipulation
Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice (Goodwin-Gill), 169
 Freedom House, 114, 115
 Frondizi, Arturo, 97
 Fujimori, Alberto, 3, 32, 117–19
 Fukuyama, Francis, 102
- Game theory, benefit-seeking signals and norm diffusion, 40–48, 211–15
- Garrett, Geoffrey, 21
 Geghamian, Artashes, 134
 Geisler, Gisela, 175
 Georgia, 84, 111, 116, 160, 162
 Gerber, Alan, 128–29
 Germany, 38, 94, 95, 104, 120
 Ghana, 33, 164, 175
 Gleditsch, Kristian, 21, 102
 Goodwin-Gill, Guy, 169
 Government types, pre-election uncertainty about, 71–72, 74–75
 Great Britain. *See* United Kingdom
 Green, Donald, 129
 Grenada, 59
 Guan, Mei, 129
 Guatemala, 58, 99
 Guei, Robert, 180–81
Guidelines for International Election Observing, 169

- Guinea, 122, 123
 Guyana, 99
 Guyana Human Rights Association, 64, 99
 Guzman, Andrew, 197, 198
- Haiti, 18, 96, 116, 177
 Hammar skjöld, Dag, 57
Handbook for European Union Election Observation, 169
 Hessling, Gerti, 164
 Humphreys, Macartan, 129
 Huntington, Samuel, 48, 51
 Hussein, Saddam, 64, 201
- Ikenberry, John, 103
 Independent central banks, as signal-based norm, 199–201
 India, 75, 87
 Indonesia, 33, 128, 129, 132–33, 142–57, 177
 Institutional theory of norm creation, 15, 18–19, 203–4
 Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), in quantitative evidence, 66
 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 201
 International benefits. *See* Democracy-contingent benefits
International Country Risk Guide, 115
International Herald Tribune, 124
 International Human Rights Law Group, 64, 99, 169
 International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 65, 99
 International norms
 advocacy-based theories of creation of, 15–18, 203–4
 caveats regarding, 22–25
 costs and consequences of, 22, 25
 election observation and, 2–3, 5–9
 implications and future research, 202–5
 institutionalist theory and cooperative, 15, 18–19, 203–4
 policy diffusion and creation of, 20–22
 use of term, 5
 See also Signaling norms
 International Organization of La Francophonie, 102, 105, 120, 170
 International Parliamentary Union, 169
 International Republican Institute (IRI), 34, 102, 170, 172
 International weapons inspectors, as signal-based norm, 201
- Iran, 1–2, 7, 47, 86, 113, 122, 123, 194
 Iraq, 64, 76, 104–5, 123, 201
 Israel, 30, 75, 76, 79
 Italy, 87, 194
- Jamaica, 61, 182
 Japan, 74
 Jordan, 122, 123
- Kalla, Jusuf, 147
 Katzenstein, Peter, 23
 Kaunda, Kenneth, 33, 60–61
 Kazakhstan, 195
 Kelley, Judith, 17, 40, 81, 102
 Kennedy, John F., 96–97, 103
 Kenya, 109, 164, 172, 175
 Keohane, Robert, 23
 Kocharian, Robert, 133–35, 141
 Krasner, Stephen, 23
 Kremer, Michael, 129
 Kuwait, 122, 123
 Kyrgyzstan, 195
- Laos, 47, 122, 123, 192
 Latin America, trends in election monitoring, 67. *See also specific countries*
 Laws, changes in and strategic manipulation, 176
 Lenarčič, Janez, 194–95
 Lieberman, Joseph, 2
 Lijphart, Arend, 38
 Long-term observers (LTOs), 166
 Low-quality election observers, strategic manipulation and, 169–70
 Lukashenko, Alexander, 176, 178, 185
 Luxembourg, 38
- Madagascar, 123
 Mahathir, Mohamed, 61
 Malaysia, 47, 61, 86, 113, 122, 123, 194, 195
 Manipulation. *See* Strategic manipulation
 Marcos, Ferdinand, 59–60, 165
 “Market for lemons” theory, of Akerlof, 9–10, 11
 Marshall Plan, 95
 Masters, William, 129
 Maxfield, Sylvia, 11, 200
 McCoy, Jennifer, 99
 McFaul, Michael, 102
 McNamara, Kathleen, 199–200

- Media
 monitoring of, 166
 used in strategic manipulation, 176–77, 178
- Mejías, Oscar, 59
- Merkel, Angela, 1–2
- Mexico, 179
- Middle East, trends in election monitoring,
 67. *See also specific countries*
- Miguel, Edward, 129
- Milner, Helen, 197
- Milošević, Slobodan, 3
- Mitterrand, François, 104
- Moldova, 160
- Mubarak, Hosni, 7, 85–86
- Mubarak, Jamal, 124
- Mugabe, Robert, 3, 32, 158, 171–74
- NAMFREL, 165, 166
- National Democratic Institute (NDI), 34,
 60, 169
 Belarus and, 185
 democracy-contingent benefits and, 102
 negative reports and, 111
 Peru and, 118–19
 Philippines and, 165
 strategic manipulation and, 170
 Zimbabwe, 172
- Neoliberal economic institutions, as signal-
 based norm, 199–201
- Netherlands, 38, 87
- New York Times*, 56–57, 90
- New Zealand, 74
- Nicaragua, 18, 33, 38, 58, 68, 99, 100, 176
- Niger, 111
- Nigeria, 172, 181
- Noriega, Manuel, 48–49
- Norm entrepreneurs, 15–18
- Norms. *See* International norms; Signaling
 norms
- North Africa, trends in election monitoring,
 67. *See also specific countries*
- North Korea, 33, 41, 47, 122, 192
- Norway, 194
- Obama, Barack, 1–2, 103, 104
- OECD, 76, 107, 218, 220
- Olken, Benjamin, 129
- Oman, 122, 123
- Opposition parties
 acceptance of results, 38
 quantitative analysis of invitations to
 observe, 74
 reactions to international observers,
 182–83
 strategic manipulation and exclusion of,
 177–81, 184
- Organization for Security and Coopera-
 tion in Europe's Office for Democratic
 Institutions and Human Rights
 (OSCE/ODIHR), 6, 34, 101, 139, 170
 Armenia and, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137
 Azerbaijan and, 179–80
 Belarus and, 185
Election Observation Handbook, 169
 long-standing democracies and,
 194–95
 negative reports and, 111
 Russia and, 159–60
 Ukraine and, 49
 United States and, 86–87
- Organization of African Unity (OAU)
 democracy-contingent benefits and, 102
 strategic manipulation and, 170, 172,
 173–74
 Togo and, 120–21
See also African Union
- Organization of American States (OAS)
 acceptance of monitoring, 98–99
 charter and aims, 94–95
 democracy-contingent benefits and,
 95–99, 105
 early monitoring, 58–59
 Peru and, 118–19
 resistance to monitoring, 1, 18, 20,
 56–57, 91
 strategic manipulation and, 170
- Ortega, Daniel, 33, 176
- OSCE Magazine*, 194
- Ouattara, Alassane Dramane, 177
- Pacific Islands Forum, 105
- Pakistan, 109, 177
- Panama, 49, 59, 109, 162
- Parallel vote tabulation, 49
- Patterson, Percival, 61
- Peceny, Mark, 104
- Peru, 38, 117–19
- Philippines, 59–60, 109
 strategic manipulation in, 162, 165,
 166
- Pinochet, Augusto, 6, 39
- Policy diffusion, norm creation and, 20–22
- Pooling equilibrium, 44–45
- Portugal, 95

- Pre-election conditions
 refusal to send observers and, 110–11
 strategic manipulation and, 166, 171–72, 175, 183
 uncertainty about government type and, 71–72, 74–75
- Préval, René, 116
- Price, Richard, 16
- Property rights of investors, BITs as signal-based norm and, 197–99
- Pseudo-democrats, 7, 109–25
 “dilemma” of, 22, 48, 186
 as early inviters of observers, 58–62
 quantitative analysis of invitations to observe, 73
 refusal to invite observers, 121–24
 role in benefit-seeking behavior, 31–33, 189
 signaling and dynamics of norm diffusion, 40–48
- Putin, Vladimir, 32, 158
- Quick counts, of votes, 49, 165–66
- Rasmussen, Anders Fogh, 104–5
- Reagan, Ronald, 103
- Rhodesia, 59
- Rich, Roland, 40
- Ríos Montt, Efraín, 58–59
- Romania, 109
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 199
- Rural areas, strategic manipulation and, 166
- Russia, 101, 102, 192, 194, 195
 strategic manipulation in, 158, 159–60, 170–71
- Sandbu, Martin, 129
- Santa-Cruz, Arturo, 119
- Saudi Arabia, 41, 74
- Schedler, Andreas, 174, 175, 178
- Sen, Amartya, 103
- Separating equilibrium, 44
- Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 170, 195
- Shevardnadze, Eduard, 84
- Signaling norms, 185–209
 credible signals, 38–40
 domestic consequences, 48–50, 191–92
 empirical implications, 50–54
 evolution of election observation norm, 193–96
 findings, 190–93
 game theory and norm initiation and diffusion, 40–48, 211–15
 implications and future research, 202–8
 international norm creation and, 3–5, 9–13, 19–20, 27, 28–31
 relevant actors, 31–35
 theory of, 187–90
 theory of, extended to other norms, 196–202
- Sikkink, Kathryn, 16–17, 23
- Simmons, Beth, 20–21, 197, 198
- Simpser, Alberto, 178
- Singapore, 30, 123, 192
- Smith, Tony, 95
- South Africa, 102
- Southern African Development Community (SADC), 172, 173
- Sovereign bonds, signaling and credit ratings, 11–12
- Sovereignty costs
 benefit-seeking signals and, 42–49
 normalization of election monitoring, 87–88
- Soviet Union. *See* Cold War; Russia
- Spain, 87, 95, 105
- Spence, Michael, 11
- Stiftung*, 95, 104
- Strategic manipulation, 49, 53–54, 158–84, 192–93
 Belarus and, 185
 benefit-seeking signals and, 28, 42–48
 implications and future research, 205–6
 international supervision norm and, 184
 manipulators versus monitors, 161–63
 negative reports and, 113–15
 opposition parties and monitors, 182–83
 quantitative analysis of invitations to observe, 73
 strategies, tactics, and criticisms of monitors, 163–74
 strategies and tactics of manipulators, 174–81
- Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 143, 145, 147, 150, 155–56
- Switzerland, 38, 86
- Syria, 122, 123
- Tajikistan, 195
- Tannenwald, Nina, 16
- Ter-Petrosian, Levon, 133, 134
- Time trends, quantitative analysis of invitations to observe, 76–78

- Tobin, Jennifer, 199
- Togo, 119–21, 122
- Tomz, Michael, 34
- Trounstine, Jessica, 175
- True democrats
 role in benefit-seeking behavior, 31–33
 signaling and dynamics of norm diffusion, 40–48
See also specific countries
- Turkmenistan, 33, 122, 123, 192
- Two-turnover test, 38
- Uganda, 59
- Ukraine, 49, 116
- United Kingdom
 decision to invite observers, 74, 86, 87, 194
 democracy-contingent benefits and, 94–95, 101
 Ethiopia and, 90
- United Nations
Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct for International Election Observation, 7, 63, 169
 democracy-contingent benefits and, 105
 initial resistance to monitoring, 1, 18, 20, 56–57, 91, 100
- United States
 Belarus and, 185
 bilateral investment treaties and, 197
 decision to invite observers, 74–75, 86–87, 194, 195
 democracy-contingent benefits and, 94–99, 101
 Haiti and, 116–17, 118
 military assistance from, 76, 79
 post–Cold War democracy promotion of, 103–5
 Togo and, 120
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 95
- University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes, 87
- Uzbekistan, 195
- Venezuela, 33, 96
- Vietnam, 47, 122, 123, 192
- Vote buying, strategic manipulation and, 180–81, 184
- Vote counting, strategic manipulation and, 165–66
- Voter registration lists, strategic manipulation and, 179–80, 184
- Wantchekon, Leonard, 129
- Ward, Michael, 21, 102
- Washington, George, 31
- Washington Office on Latin America, 99
- Weapons inspectors, as signal-based norm, 201
- Wendt, Alexander, 23–24, 25
- Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, 95
- Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang (SBY), 143, 145, 147, 154, 155–56
- Yugoslavia, 3, 109, 116
- Yushchenko, Viktor, 49
- Zacher, Mark, 24
- Zambia, 33, 60–61, 68, 111, 171
- Zenawi, Meles, 85, 89–91
- Zimbabwe, 48, 59, 192, 195
 strategic manipulation in, 158, 162, 170, 171–74

