



PROJECT MUSE®

The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma

Hyde, Susan D.

Published by Cornell University Press


Hyde, Susan D.

The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm.

1 ed. Cornell University Press, 2011.

Project MUSE., <a href="

<https://muse.jhu.edu/>.



➔ For additional information about this book

<https://muse.jhu.edu/book/26089>

Access provided at 31 Mar 2020 04:08 GMT with no institutional affiliation



This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures

- I.1. Internationally observed elections, 1960–2006 8
- 1.1. International observation, election manipulation, and probability of victory 43
- 2.1. Total number of elections per year, 1960–2006 66
- 2.2. Diffusion of elections and election observation by region 67
- 2.3. Regime type in observed elections vs. global average 70
- 2.4. Elections with pre-election concerns about fraud 71
- 2.5. Elections held by transitional government 72
- 2.6. Elections held following suspended elections 72
- 2.7. First multiparty elections 73
- 3.1. Changes in democracy-contingent benefits over time 94
- 3.2. Trends in observed elections and foreign aid to government and civil society 108
- 3.3. Percentage of bilateral official development assistance devoted to democracy assistance 108
- 3.4. Negative reports, 1975–2005 112
- 3.5. Bilateral foreign aid to Haiti 118
- 3.6. Bilateral foreign aid to Togo 122
- 3.7. Noninviting countries, 2000–2006 123
- 4.1. Round one vote share for incumbent in monitored vs. unmonitored polling stations 142

- 5.1. Average number of reported short-term observers
per observed election, 1960–2004 *167*
- 5.2. Trends in international observation missions *171*

Tables

- 2.1. Observed elections and Cold War alliances, 1962–1988 *68*
- 2.2. Observed elections and Cold War alliance patterns, 1989–1994 *69*
- 2.3. Binary logit, observed elections *77*
- 2.4. Effects of country characteristics on the probability
of inviting observers *80*
- 2.5. Alternative explanations *83*
- 4.1. Armenia round one observer coverage by region *139*
- 4.2. Logistic regression of round two monitoring
on background covariates *140*
- 4.3. Effects of observations on vote share for
President Robert Kocharian *141*
- 4.4. Logistic regression of assigned-to-treatment group
on registered voters *146*
- 4.5. Carter Center observation coverage of villages in Indonesia *148*
- 4.6. Summary statistics for all available village-level variables *149*
- 4.7. Estimated effects of intent to treat on total votes
for Megawati *151*
- 4.8. Estimated effect of observers on total votes for
Megawati in observed villages *153*
- 5.1. Election manipulation and observer response *168*
- B.1. Descriptive statistics for table 2.3 *221*
- B.2. Countries included in analysis *222*
- B.3. Excluded countries by reason for exclusion *223*