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Chapter 1 Introduction 1. See Christopher B. Howe, Y. Y. Kueh, and Robert Ash, China’s Economic Reform: A Study with Documents, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon Press, 2003, especially my own contributions (Chapters 3, 4, and 7) therein about “Creating a market-oriented industrial and economic system” and the chronology (Chapter 3), “Industrial change and technological upgrading” (Chapter 4), and “China’s foreign economic relations” (Chapter 7) for a concise interpretative study of China’s economic reforms and opening up. 2. For a Chinese interpretation of taoguang yanghui see Xiong Guangkai (former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army), “China’s diplomatic strategy: Implication and translation of Tao Guang Yang Hui”, in Foreign Affairs Journal (published quarterly by The Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs), No. 98 (Winter 2010). 3. Vis-à-vis the state-owned Soviet export monopolies, Chinese import buyers are clearly the weaker trading partners, despite their acting more or less as monopsonists. Cf. for example, John F. Nash, Jr., “The bargaining problem”, Econometrica, Vol. 18, No. 2. (April 1950), pp. 155–62 for a theoretical exposition of the market form of “monopoly versus monopsony”. 4. See Guo Yi Yao (Y. Y. Kueh), “Political and economic trends on the Chinese mainland and the prospects for (political) reuniÀcation across the Taiwan Straits”, in TKP, 1–4 February 2000. I then also explicitly noted that the “equalizing” trends were already highly visible especially with respect to such major metropolitans on the mainland as Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangzhou, in relation to Taipei; and one need not indeed expect a full equalization for the purpose of reuniÀcation in terms of average nominal GDP per capita, given that the combined absolute number of, say, the “middle class” in the mainland cities should be largely comparable, if not more than its counterpart on the island. 5. These are all ofÀcial statistics from Japan given in english/data/handbook/c11cont.htm for 2009. 6. Staffan Burenstam Linder, The PaciÀc Century Economic and Political Consequences of Asia-PaciÀc Dynamism, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986, p. 116. 7. This happened in fact already nearly a decade ago; see United States General Accounting OfÀce, Rapid Advances in China’s Semiconductor Industry Notes Underscore Need for Fundamental US Policy Review, Washington DC, April 2002. The US report, deÀning the technological gap in terms of “feature size” (measured in microns) argues that “since 1986, China’s efforts to improve its semiconductor manufacturing capability have narrowed the gap between US and Chinese semiconductor manufacturing technology from between seven to ten years to two years or less”. 8. And also clearly alluded to in my paper presented at the Asian Development Research Forum (ADRF) conference held in Bangkok, 2–3 December 2002, shortly after the ofÀcial signing of the ASEAN 10+1 FTA agreement (see asterisk note in Chapter 12 for details). 9. Immediately following my oral presentation at the ADRF conference (ibid.), I was rigorously challenged by a senior ASEAN ofÀcial by the question, “Why then ASEAN 10+1 after all?” The question was obviously directed against the somewhat “unpleasant” point I had made that ASEAN 10+1 FTA would not help to substantially alter the long-term scenario of ASEAN as a trading bloc remaining “peripheral to the Chinese trading system” (see Chapter 12). My immediate response was: “Without ASEAN 10+1 FTA, you would be even worse off!” Chapter 2 The Emergence of the Greater China Economic Circle 1. For most purposes of this article, we deÀne “Greater China” in terms of the two southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Occasionally, however, our analysis extends to mainland China as a whole. 2. Global trade grew by 7.93% per annum, Taiwan’s by 13.61%, Hong Kong’s by 16.00%. See IMF—IFSYB 1992, pp. 108–15. Note that in 1992, China’s merchandise trade expanded by a further 22% (ZGTJZY 1993, p. 101). 3. IMF data for China reveal a reversal of the pattern of trade expansion in the Àrst and second halves of the 1980s. In the earlier period, import growth sharply exceeded that of exports; latterly, the opposite was the case. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, the second half of the decade witnessed an acceleration of growth of both exports and imports. 4. See, for example, Yun-wing Sung, The China-Hong Kong Connection: The Key to China’s...


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