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## Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java

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
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## CHAPTER 13

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# The remaining opposition: Seeking a neutral public space

There is now no significant opposition to the deeper Islamisation of Javanese society. There is only difference of opinion about what shape Islamic life should take, the extent to which variety and pluralism within Islam are acceptable or desirable, how Islamic society should relate to the significant non-Muslim minorities in its midst, and what role Islam (or, indeed, religion more generally) should play in public life. On none of these issues is there a clear consensus. There is hardly anyone — at least hardly anyone who is publicly visible — who thinks that the deepening influence of Islam is undesirable or should be reversed, except of course for Christian proselytisers seeking a harvest of souls for their own version of the supernatural and individuals like Soetiyono Tjokroharsoyo in Surakarta. But even the most unrealistic Christian can hardly imagine, as some did in the 1970s, that a majority of Indonesians might be converted to Christianity; religious people may live lives that depend on leaps of faith, but it would take a gigantic leap to think that. There is no political force that resists the influence of Islam, as there was in the first two decades of independence. History has moved on, bringing profound social change with it.

The main form of resistance now concerns how religion should affect public life, about the undesirability of that very thing Islamists want: an Islamised government and public space. In Chapter 10 we looked at the small Liberal Islamic movements, for whom religion is a private matter in which the state should not interfere. This view has significant intellectual roots within Indonesia, as we have seen above. Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Djohan Effendy, Dawam Rahardjo, Said Agil Siradj, Masdar F. Mas'udi and others sought a neutral public space for years, during both the

New Order and the subsequent democratic age.<sup>1</sup> In the midst of deeper Islamisation across society, from the urban middle classes to country villagers, their arguments have remained at an intellectual level rather detached from the social and political realities surrounding them. Liberals' views parallel those of the American-based Sudanese authority on Islam and human rights, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, who argues that one can only live as a true Muslim when one does so freely, without government or other compulsion, and thus argues for a separation of religion and the state. His views have been disseminated in Indonesia and are influential, but have been criticised by Islamists.<sup>2</sup> Such Liberal ideas do attract wider support, but have limited political weight behind them.

It is necessary for those who seek a non-religious public space in Indonesia to work within a religious discourse. Their situation is not like that of secularists in Europe but does parallel that of similarly minded people in the United States. Susan Jacoby observes that in the 1950s American Christian liberals became progressively more divided from conservatives, so that in effect a Catholic and Protestant conservative alliance against Communism and secularism came into being. This meant that, in an age of rising religiosity, American secularists (i.e., those who 'who do not subscribe to any faith', have a predominantly secular worldview and think religion to be a private matter) found themselves in alliance with religious liberals in opposing church influence in public life. She goes on,

American secularists' recognition of their common ground with religious liberals was (and is) tactically necessary in the pursuit of shared political, social and legal aims. But that recognition, since the end of the Second World War, has precluded the kind of direct challenges to religion that freethinkers mounted in the nineteenth century.<sup>3</sup>

In the current political and religious atmosphere of Indonesia, those who seek a Liberal separation of religion and the state must couch their

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<sup>1</sup> This history is considered further in Assyaukanie, *Islam and the secular state*, Chapter 5.

<sup>2</sup> These views are argued particularly in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Islam and the secular state: Negotiating the future of Shari'a* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University press, 2008). The Indonesian translation of this was published in 2007, before the English edition, and provoked significant controversy.

<sup>3</sup> Susan Jacoby, *Freethinkers: A history of American secularism* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005), pp. 311–5; quotation from p. 313. Her definitions of 'secularist' are on pp. 6–7.

appeal in more acceptable terms than secularism or Liberalism (both declared by MUI, after all, to be *haram*), so they usually turn to *Pancasila* (which MUI cannot declare *haram* since it is the foundation of the Indonesian state). That concept remains contested, as it has been since 1945. It was thoroughly corrupted by Soeharto and in the immediate post-Soeharto years it seemed to disappear from public discourses altogether. Yet in political, legal and constitutional terms it remains important, for the constitution rests upon *Pancasila* as its foundation and *Pancasila's* first principle is *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa*, 'belief in the one God'. So the Indonesian state — and, in decentralised Indonesia, over 500 local branches of that state — are constitutionally entangled in some unclear way in religious affairs. That lack of clarity provides room for contention. We noted that when the Constitutional Court upheld the blasphemy law in April 2010, it commented that

The state — consistent with the mandate of the Constitution — also has a responsibility to upgrade piety and noble character. The religious domain is a consequence of the acceptance of *Pancasila* ideology. In the *Pancasila* state there may be no activities that cause estrangement from religious standards and religiosity.<sup>4</sup>

It is thus unconstitutional to be an atheist in Indonesia and unconstitutional to deny religion a role in public life, but what that role should be remains a matter of controversy.

There was a time, in the 1940s to 1960s, when *Pancasila* was seen as the alternative to Islam, as the non-Islamic philosophical option. Given the religionising of virtually all discourse in Indonesia, reflected in the words of that Constitutional Court argument above, this is no longer so. 'Belief in the one God' is generally seen as making religion a core function of the state, as exemplified in the existence of a Ministry of Religious Affairs. To Islamists like Abu Bakar Ba'asyir or Ust. Mudzakkir of Gumuk, *Pancasila* is *haram* because it underpins the Indonesian state, which is itself unacceptable because national identities divide and thus weaken the world-wide Islamic *ummah*. Others who accept the idea of an Indonesian nation, however, can interpret *Pancasila* as facilitating a state role in Islam and vice-versa.

So for those who want a secular or religiously neutral public space, a particular interpretation of *Pancasila* has to prevail. In 2006, a symposium was held at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta on the theme 'The restoration

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<sup>4</sup> The Constitutional Court ruling is reported at <http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=website.BeritaInternalLengkap&cid=3941>

of *Pancasila*: bringing peace to the politics of identity and modernity'. This was organised by the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Indonesia, the *Tempo* organisation, the Brighten Institute for Public Policy and Development Studies and the Democratic Education Association (Perhimpunan Pendidikan Demokrasi). This brought together many of the nation's leading intellectuals to consider how *Pancasila* might reclaim a place in national life after its corruption by Soeharto. Some of the essays, it must be said, were rather tediously theoretical, but the general thrust was to link *Pancasila* to the values encapsulated in the national motto *Bhinneka tunggal ika*. That is an Old Javanese phrase officially (if rather inaccurately) translated as 'unity in diversity'.<sup>5</sup> It was adopted in the early days of the Republic as a 'classical' Indonesian equivalent to the United States' *e pluribus unum*.

For the participants in the Jakarta seminar, it was important that *Pancasila* be understood as an expression of the unity of Indonesia within the reality of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, and as something that rules out any idea of an Islamic state. Goenawan Mohamad, for instance, criticised the idea of an Islamic state for its naivety about the possibility of perfecting human society.<sup>6</sup> Azyumardi Azra explicitly linked the terms 'multiculturalism' and *Bhinneka tunggal ika*.<sup>7</sup> Dawam Rahardjo labelled *Pancasila* 'secular' and said,

Of course *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* [belief in the one God], or monotheism, is the foundation of the state. But the state is not founded on the teachings of a particular religion, still less on a particular school of a religion. In this matter the state is neutral towards the religions that are adhered to by its people.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The phrase comes from the 14th-century Old Javanese work *Sutasoma* and expresses the mystical unity of Śiva and the Buddha: 'They are different, but yet they are one (*bhinneka tunggal ika*), as there is no duality in the Truth of Reality'. For a discussion of how this 'yoga of non-duality' (as Ensinnck called it) survived into Islamised Java in the 18th century, see my paper 'Unity and disunity in Javanese political and religious thought of the eighteenth century', *Modern Asian Studies* vol. 26 (1992), no. 4, pp. 663–78.

<sup>6</sup> *Restorasi Pancasila: Mendamaikan politik identitas dan modernitas; Prosiding symposium peringatan Hari Lahir Pancasila, Kampus FISIP UI, Depok, 31 Mei 2006* (Bogor: FISIP UI, Kelompok Tempo Media, Perhimpunan Pendidikan Demokrasi, and Brighten Institute, 2006), pp. 46, 51.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 151, 154. 'Multiculturalism' became a preferred term in the wake of MUI's 2005 *fatwa* declaring 'pluralism' to be *haram*.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 303.

The seminar culminated in an 'Indonesianness Declaration' (*Maklumat Ke-indonesiaan*) which declared, *inter alia*,

Thus, Indonesia does not regard *Pancasila* as a religion — just as Indonesia has never based and does not wish to base itself on any single religion. The great values of religions inspire us, but just because of that, we recognise the limitations of humankind. Within those limitations, there is no one who can compel, who has the right to monopolise the truth, who should dominate discussion. ... Therefore on this day we call: let us build the spirit of Indonesia, build its body, within difference and unity!<sup>9</sup>

We need hardly add that this was not a call that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Mudzakkir and his FPIS followers or the cadres of HTI were interested in hearing.

Even in this essentially Liberal assembly, however, there were echoes of the problems seen on the ground. The Dean of the Faculty observed,

Implementation of the principles of *Pancasila* can give birth to contradictory attitudes. The principle of tolerance in religious life as hoped-for in the first *sila* can give birth to an intolerant attitude if the Minister of Religion permits one religion to invite the followers of another faith to its religious ceremonies.<sup>10</sup>

In other contexts, too, there were efforts to remind the people of *Pancasila* as a set of ideas that could bind Indonesians together regardless of their diversity. PDIP of *Kabupaten Kediri* held such an occasion on the same day in 2006 as the Jakarta seminar. It featured Budiman Sudjatmiko, now a PDIP member, who ten years before had led the leftist People's Democratic Party (PRD) which the Soeharto regime crushed. There were also ordinary farmers and workers there to tell of their problems (which *Pancasila* would help to solve, it was implied).<sup>11</sup> Three years later a '*Pancasila* Congress' was held at Gadjah Mada University, where there were calls to get rid of the stigmatisation of *Pancasila* as the ideology of Soeharto's New Order.<sup>12</sup> In 2010 the head of the State Intelligence Agency As'ad Said Ali expressed concern at another Yogyakarta seminar about *Pancasila* losing credibility with the young, for which he blamed the schools.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 434.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>11</sup> *RK*, 27 May 2006.

<sup>12</sup> *Kmps*, 1 June 2009.

<sup>13</sup> *JktP* online, 19 May 2010.

This was mostly whistling in the dark: Soeharto's damage to *Pancasila* and its own inherent lack of specificity cause it to remain the weakened philosophical foundation of a weakened state. Although all political parties engaged in electoral politics would say that they support *Pancasila* and *Bhinneka tunggal ika*, none would use this as an appeal to stand against the tide of Islamisation. That would run the risk of reviving the murderous *aliran* politics of the past and stand in the way of using Islamic appeals to win votes. There would be no political advantage in going down that route. So *Pancasila* has become an orphan of the revolutionary past. Liberal intellectuals remain willing to support it as a means of reclaiming a secular or religiously neutral public space, but in the real world of contemporary Indonesia it can regain little or no political or social traction.

NU and Muhammadiyah figures have no difficulty in supporting *Pancasila*. For them it merits support because *Pancasila* (a) endorses Indonesian nationalism while also (b) religionising the public space. We may recall Ky. H. Muslim Imampura (Mbah Lim), who named his *pesantren* near Klaten Pondok Pesantren al-Muttaqien *Pancasila* Sakti, a name which combines a place for believers with 'supernaturally powerful *Pancasila*'. It would be rare for an Islamic leader to depict *Pancasila* as 'secular', as Dawam Rahardjo did in the Jakarta seminar. In 2010, Ky. H. Agus Miftach, an NU *kyai* and head of an organisation called the National Unity Front (Front Persatuan Nasional),<sup>14</sup> spoke of the need to reinforce *Pancasila* as the national ideology so as to bring the nation back to its rightful path, for the sacral ideas encapsulated in *Pancasila* would prevent evil conduct, such as corruption. He is quoted as saying,

A nation having 'belief in the one God' has already embedded a religious spirit into the implementation of state affairs, so that the doings of the state are in the realm of the sacral, and places everything that is profane below it. This, then, is the purification of the state with the national *Pancasila* ideology.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Information on Agus Miftach and FPN found at the organisation's website, <http://persatuan.web.id/>.

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in *AntaraNews.com*, 7 Apr. 2010. The idea 'that the doings of the state are in the realm of the sacral' (*olah kenegaraan berada di wilayah yang sakral*) seems treacherously close to Ayatollah Khomeini's 1988 declaration that his government represented a divinely ordained 'absolute mandate', making the affairs of state religious in character and giving its commandments the status of divine commandments. I cannot, however, think that that was what Agus Miftach actually meant. See Said Amir Arjomand, 'Shi'ite jurisprudence and constitution making in the Islamic Republic of Iran', in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms*

Below the level of intellectuals and people with influence in public affairs, *Pancasila* is often invoked by *kebatinan* people to justify and protect their beliefs. To them, it is attractive because it is of Indonesian origin and associated with Sukarno (still a heroic figure to many) and it justifies their *Weltanschauung*, which they think of as also being rooted in Java's indigenous heritage. Thus, to *kebatinan* adherents, *Pancasila* is not some complex philosophy that intellectuals can have seminars about. Rather, it is a protective concept — a sort of *jimat* perhaps — that is (a) undeniably acceptable to most Indonesians and (b) not Islam. We noted in Chapter 11 that the *wong kere* claim *Pancasila* as their spiritual guide. Its importance was also underlined by the head of a *Kebatinan* movement in Yogyakarta.<sup>16</sup> *Kebatinan* figures in Surabaya say that *Pancasila* is 'final, settled', that it is 'our way of life'.<sup>17</sup> A 2009 seminar held in the National Library in Jakarta was advertised as being about 'Sabda Palon Nayagenggong from age to age', thereby invoking the anti-Islamic figures of *Babad Kedhiri* and the other anti-Islamic books originally written in Kediri in the 1870s, described above. The meeting was less an intellectual occasion than one for assertions of Javanese cultural superiority, especially over Islam. Most attendees expressed their *pro-kejawan* sentiments and distance from or opposition to Islam, at least in its hard-line versions. Not surprisingly, several spoke of the necessity to preserve and promote *Pancasila*, one presenter (from Surakarta) even insisting that it needed 'enforcement'.<sup>18</sup>

What all of this means is that *Pancasila* has next-to-no chance to be a secularist doctrine, for (like the rest of society) it has been religionised. That is not to say that it has been made into a religion, but rather that it is widely taken as an ideology which (a) actually does not matter much any more and (b) insofar as it does matter, encompasses and welcomes all nationally recognised forms of belief.

Therefore Liberals of all persuasions, secularists, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and *kebatinan* adherents cannot hope for a secular public space

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*and the state: Remaking politics, economics and militance* (The Fundamentalism Project, vol. 3; Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 96–7.

<sup>16</sup> The group is called 'Ngudi Utomo' (with obvious echoes of Budi Utomo); *KR*, 17 Dec. 2007.

<sup>17</sup> Discussion with Drs KRAT Basuki Prawirodipuro and KRT Giarto Nagoro, Surabaya, 25 Nov. 2007.

<sup>18</sup> The seminar was held 6–7 Oct. 2009. I was an invited speaker and gave an academic paper about the historical origins of the Sabda Palon story which was of interest to hardly anyone.



**Illustration 43** Villagers at the sacred tree of Sempu, 2007  
(photo by Suhadi Cholil)

but must hope for a religiously neutral one, in which all beliefs can take part on equal terms. That is, however, a challenge in a nation where the overwhelming majority of the populace — according to 2011 estimates, some 86 per cent, or over 211 million people<sup>19</sup> — are Muslims. Many Liberal Muslims and figures from the large-scale organisations Muhammadiyah and NU also support such a conception of the public space, and it is only for that reason that it is a reasonable aspiration and a significant counter to Islamists' wish to make Islam the determinant of public affairs.

At grass-roots level, we have seen multiple episodes of inter-faith conflict in this book, but there are also many examples throughout Javanese society of the wish for village-level harmony providing support for positive inter-faith relations. Take the village of Sempu in Bantul, south of Yogyakarta. Here the myths about Sabda Palon are still known. There one can see rather grand Chinese graves nicely kept, a Buddhist temple, a mosque, a Catholic church and a tree that villagers regard as sacred. In the midst of

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<sup>19</sup> According to the online CIA World Factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>.

this plurality of faiths, the spirit of village tolerance and harmony remains strong.<sup>20</sup> We noted above that, near Kediri, the village Tanon has a population of some 3,000, most of them peasant farmers. They are about 30 per cent Hindu, 10 per cent Christian (mostly Catholic), and the remaining 60 per cent Muslim, with one Buddhist, each faith with its own place of worship. This diversity, according to the village head, developed in the years after 1965–6. There is harmony, not least because there have been multiple inter-religious marriages and many families thus have more than one religion within themselves.<sup>21</sup>

To maintain a harmonious public space in the midst of this Islamising but still pluralistic society — with its inherent risks of fanatical conduct and inter-religious conflict emerging, as they have from time to time — several communities took initiatives to create inter-religious forums. The Yogyakarta version was one of the first. In January 1997, at a time when Indonesia was experiencing tragic episodes of inter-communal conflict, a meeting of inter-religious activists was held at the LKiS offices in Yogyakarta and continued under the umbrella of an organisation known as DIAN/Interfidei (standing for Institut Dialog Antar Iman, Inter-faith Dialogue Institute), then led by the Protestant theologian Dr Th. Sumartana (1944–2003, b. Banjarnegara).<sup>22</sup> Another active participant was the prominent Catholic priest, writer, architect and general cultural figure Y.B. Mangunwijaya (1929–99, b. Ambarawa). The Muslim side was represented particularly by Ky. H. Abdul Muhaimin (b. Kota Gede 1953). These discussions led to the formal declaration in February 1997 of the FPUB (Forum Persaudaraan Umat Beriman, Fraternity Forum for Communities of Faith). In the context of the dying stages of the New Order, FPUB attracted suspicion from the Soeharto government. Then extremist Muslim voices denounced it as a clandestine Christianisation project and Abdul Muhaimin was called a *kafir*, an apostate, or a secret agent of Zionism. FPUB ignored all of this. It has equally ignored MUI's 2005 *fatwas* by continuing with joint prayer activities and supporting pluralism, which it simply renamed multiculturalism. It has continued to do its work of maintaining inter-religious discussions and defusing conflicts in Yogyakarta. It has the support of Sultan Hamengkubuwana X and the active involvement

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<sup>20</sup> Email from Suhadi Cholil, 18 Aug. 2007.

<sup>21</sup> *RK*, 13 Dec. 2004

<sup>22</sup> DIAN/Interfidei was founded in Yogyakarta in 1992. More information found at its website, <http://www.interfidei.or.id/>. On Th. Sumartana, see [http://www.tokoh-indonesia.com/ensiklopedi/s/sumartana-th/sumartana\\_th2.shtml](http://www.tokoh-indonesia.com/ensiklopedi/s/sumartana-th/sumartana_th2.shtml).

of supporters of inter-communal harmony.<sup>23</sup> Other aspects of Yogyakarta are conducive to inter-religious tolerance. There are no religiously defined housing enclaves and all faiths mix with each other on a daily basis; even graveyards are mixed.<sup>24</sup> The press is restrained and does not blow up episodes of conflict.<sup>25</sup>

In Kediri city a similar organisation was established in 1998, at the time of conflict in other places. Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War), who was then leading Ansor in Kediri and was thus involved in guarding churches, played a leading role in setting up this Paguyuban Kerukunan Antar Umat Beragama (PKAUB, Association for Harmony among Religious Communities). Thousands of local people of all faiths met at the local Universitas Islam Kediri campus for joint prayers. From this was born PKAUB, which aspired to encompass all religious groups in the town. Even the exclusivist LDII took part. At some point this *paguyuban* expanded its membership from officially recognised world religions to encompass also *kebatinan* groups, so that it is now known as Paguyuban Kerukunan Antar Umat Beragama dan Penghayat Kepercayaan (PKAUB-PK, Association for Harmony among Religious Communities and Instillers of Beliefs). Gudang Garam recognises its own self-interest in having a peaceful town and has consistently funded PKAUB-PK activities. At meetings, matters of belief are not touched upon — those are private matters for each person or community — but rather common social issues are addressed.<sup>26</sup>

Managing inter-religious relations in Kediri city is undoubtedly made easier by the fact that non-Muslim minorities are small. The Christian population has remained at around 9 per cent at least since the 1990s. Hindus and Buddhists together amount to less than 1 per cent, *kebatinan* does not register in the statistics at all (although there are certainly some followers there) and 90 per cent of the population is recorded as Muslim.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Imam Subkhan, *Hiruk pikuk wacana pluralisme di Yogya*, pp. 78–102; discussion with Imam Subkhan, Yogyakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.

<sup>24</sup> Comments made by Prof. H.M. Amin Abdullah in our conversation in Yogyakarta, 13 June 2007.

<sup>25</sup> An observation by Imam Subkhan, Yogyakarta, 13 Sept. 2008.

<sup>26</sup> Discussions with Ky. H. Anwar Iskandar (Gus War), Kediri, 28 Aug. 2003, 26 Oct. 2008; *RK*, 21 Sept. 2003, 7 July 2006; *MmK*, 19 Jan. 2005, 8 Apr. 2006.

<sup>27</sup> Based on the series *Kota Kediri dalam angka*. According to the volume for 2005/6, the percentages then were Muslim 90.2, Christian 9.0, Hindu 0.3 and Buddhist 0.4. Almost the same figures can be found in the volume for 1998.

This is quite unlike Surakarta or Yogyakarta, where Christians are a much more significant proportion of the population.

The fate of similar organisations elsewhere has been patchy, to say the least. Surakarta saw some of the worst rioting anywhere in Indonesia in 1998 and again in 1999 and an attempt was made there to establish a forum for inter-communal harmony. As soon as the rioting died down, however, the local business people whose support and funding was crucial lost interest and the initiative died. One of the problems there is that many owners of local businesses actually live in Jakarta and have been slow to acknowledge that they have social responsibilities in Surakarta.<sup>28</sup> The new mayor (2005–15) Jokowi established a programme of inter-religious meetings, with a group of about 40 meeting at his residence once a month. He noted that, at least in the early stages, the Islamic leaders were forthright in their views but the minority religious representatives still tended to hold back.<sup>29</sup> There are other small-scale initiatives by various groups, but as we have seen amply displayed above, Surakarta remains a place where religious differences are a major source of tension and conflict.

In 2006, in the face of multiple conflicts over the building of places of worship, the Ministers of Religious Affairs and the Interior ordered that organisations should be established in all jurisdictions to resolve these matters locally. These were to be called Forums for Harmony among Religious Communities (FKUB, Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama). Some have evidently worked reasonably well, but there is no suggestion that they constitute a significant guarantee of inter-religious harmony.<sup>30</sup>

In these various efforts to diminish or eliminate conflict, whether through some form of *Pancasila* revival or through inter-religious dialogue, the leaders and activists discussed in this chapter are promoting a Liberal position. The same is true of the villagers of Sempu, whether at Friday

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<sup>28</sup> According to information from Drs Soedarmono on several occasions. A major study of the background to social conflict in Surakarta is Mulyadi and Soedarmono, *Runtuhnya kekuasaan 'Kraton Alit'*.

<sup>29</sup> Discussion with Ir Joko Widodo (Jokowi), Surakarta, 3 Nov. 2006.

<sup>30</sup> In Surabaya, the local FKUB seems to function acceptably. It is headed by Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said and has 17 members: 6 from NU, 3 from Muhammadiyah, 2 from MUI (one each from Muhammadiyah and NU), 1 Catholic, 2 Protestants, 1 Confucian, 1 Hindu and 1 Buddhist. LDII, *Shi'a* or *kebatinan* are not represented. Inter-religious conflict has been limited and no churches have been burned. Discussion with Ky. H. Imam Ghazali Said, *pesantren* An-Nur, Wonocolo, Surabaya, 23 Oct. 2008.

prayer at the mosque, saying Mass in the church, or paying homage to their sacred tree. That is to say, they are defending the rights of individuals and their communities to enjoy freedom in their religious and broader life, so long as no harm is done to the rights of others. They are opposed to the use of violence in any context and seek ways to prevent it. They prioritise associated values such as freedom of thought, interfaith harmony and social and religious pluralism (or ‘multiculturalism’). They regard these as sources of social enrichment rather than as threats or, at the very least, they recognise them as realities in Javanese society that must be managed. Among the Islamisers whom we have concentrated on in this book, however, are many who hold quite different views. In the concluding Part below we will consider further the significance of this difference of view, of this contest about how to seek a better future.

