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Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java

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
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CHAPTER 7

The political and social settings

Introduction

In the following seven chapters, we will observe a major transformation in the social, political, religious and cultural dynamics of Java, and hence of Indonesia. This history is, like all histories, plagued by imperfect and contradictory evidence and multiple, often confusing, directions of events. Nevertheless, there is a dominant trend evident from the story that follows, which involves an important change in the direction of causation, a shift in the source of initiatives for change.

Throughout this book, the nature of the reigning political regime has been crucial to the story. Whether Java was under Dutch colonial rule or Japanese wartime occupation, was in the midst of its Revolution or experimenting with political freedom and democracy in the 1950s, the political regime facilitated certain developments in the spheres of religion and culture and inhibited others. Down to the mid-1960s religious, social, cultural and political polarisation gravely threatened social harmony, leading in the end to the horrific slaughters of 1965–6 that ushered in Soeharto's regime. In the preceding two chapters, we have seen how Soeharto's New Order brought an aspiring totalitarianism to Indonesia and facilitated a much deeper Islamisation of Javanese society, a profound social change from Java's past. Even while multiple scholars, journalists and politicians, both within Indonesia and outside, maintained the view that the Javanese constituted a sort of impregnable *abangan* bastion against greater Islamic influence in Indonesian affairs — an idea resting largely on the still-influential 1950s work of Clifford Geertz — Javanese society was moving beyond this stereotype.

Here we will see how in the post-Soeharto years, it became less a case of the political regime setting the religious agenda than the reverse: religious

dynamics shaping the political regime. In the concluding Chapter 14 of this book, we will investigate some of the larger issues that are involved here — including the question of whether politicians' surrender of initiative to religious groups is necessary, given the realities of how political power works. Even though expressly Islamist political parties did poorly in elections, the Islamisation of the society from the grass roots upward persuaded politicians that they must make their compromises with the increasingly powerful faith — perhaps in many cases because Islam was increasingly powerful in their own lives. By the time of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14), a much weakened presidency was reluctant to wield state authority against even the more thuggish forms of religious activism.

Thus it was that Soeharto's wish to make everyone act and believe by the standards of *Pancasila* — and to define what that meant — was superseded by the wish of religious activists to make all Muslims act and believe by the standards of Islam, a wish pursued with governmental acquiescence and sometimes direct support. But just what those standards actually amount to was contested, as we will see in this Part of this book. Soeharto could arrogate the right to say what *Pancasila* was, but there was no single voice with the power to say what Islam was. One sort of totalitarian aspiration was thus succeeded by another, but the religious version was plagued by the contested nature of religious authority that is found in virtually all faiths.

By the time of the Yudhoyono presidency, the policy of regional autonomy facilitated Islamisation and Islamist agendas in local contexts, despite the frequent failure of Islamists either to win power through national elections or to amend the national constitution to their liking (as they failed to do in the long process of amending the constitution in 2002). But regional autonomy also introduced another complication. Each region sought to find something to capture its particular identity, often with the hope of attracting the attention of (mostly domestic) tourists. This turned their attention to local art forms, which in many cases were of pre-Islamic origin or at least in a style unwelcome to more puritan forms of Islam.¹ Thus the homogenising aspirations of Islamic reformers now faced another trend in the opposite direction: the frequently heterogenising agenda of regional autonomy.

¹ A similar observation is made in Hatley, *Javanese performances*, p. 199. *Kebatinan* figures also expressed the view that regional autonomy provided a good opportunity for *kebatinan* to revive after Soeharto's attempt to impose a homogeneous national culture; discussion with Drs KRAT Basuki Prawirodipuro and KRT Giarto Nagoro, Surabaya, 25 Nov. 2007.

The political setting: The second freedom experiment

Soeharto's resignation in 1998 ushered in a period of extraordinary political change in Indonesia, whereby within a very few years one of the most centralised, authoritarian and non-democratic states was transformed into a decentralised democracy — rather chaotic, to be sure, but one where government was moved much closer to the people and elections really did change who were their representatives and governors.²

Soeharto's protégé and Vice-President B.J. Habibie succeeded as President for just 17 months (1998–9). Pro-democracy activists feared the worst, but in fact Habibie laid the foundations for Indonesia's 'second freedom experiment', as this chapter calls it. He freed political prisoners and arranged for free and fair national elections. Most controversially, Habibie allowed a United Nations-supervised referendum in East Timor in 1999 which led to the excision of that territory (conquered by Indonesia in 1975) and the creation of the new nation of Timor-Leste. In the midst of ongoing social violence and economic crisis, Habibie achieved much more in the way of reform than many imagined possible.

Habibie had a reputation as a devout Muslim, as well as a promoter of immensely expensive, loss-making state technology projects. He followed a practice known among pious circles of voluntarily fasting on each Monday and Thursday as an additional religious discipline. His combination of modern technological knowledge, civilian background and Islamic piety made his presidency welcome to many who sought a greater role for Islam in the nation — notably people who had found ICMI to be a useful professional and religious vehicle for their own aspirations. The alliance we noted in the previous chapter among an increasingly 'green' military, Islamist groups and the former Soeharto regime — all of them feeling threatened by globalisation and various forms of liberalisation — continued to resonate under Habibie. One of the military men he worked closely with was Gen. Z.A. Maulani (1939–2005), a 1961 graduate of the Magelang Military Academy. He was on Habibie's expert staff when he was Minister for Research and Technology and in the crisis month of May 1998 was briefly secretary to Habibie as Vice-President. Thereafter he became Indonesia's intelligence chief as head of the State Intelligence Coordination Body (BAKIN, Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara) from 1998 to 2000. In 2002 Maulani, now retired from

² An overview of the period down to 2008, with references to the most important studies, may be found in Ricklefs, *History of modern Indonesia*, Chapters 24–5.

active government service, published a book entitled *Zionism: The movement to subjugate the world*. This asserts the authenticity of the well-known forgery 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion',³ writes of a Jewish conspiracy to take over American finance, politics and foreign affairs, to dominate the world's press, the IMF and World Bank and so on.⁴ Another person Habibie was close to was Anwar Harjono, who succeeded Natsir as head of DDII when the latter died in 1993. We have noted above Anwar Harjono's increasing antipathy towards Christianisation and other perceived threats to Islam such as Communism, atheism and secularism.⁵ Other connections between senior military men and Islamists also continued.

In the first post-Soeharto parliamentary elections of June 1999, there were 48 parties contending, several with explicitly Islamist agendas. Muhammadiyah circulated a call to all Muslims, telling them it was 'obligatory to choose one of the parties ... which represents the interests of the Islamic *ummah* and genuinely fights for reform'. A call published by a group calling themselves the Islamic Society for Democracy quoted *Qur'an* 3:28 as saying 'Let not believers make unbelievers leaders by abandoning believers'⁶ and went on, 'Don't choose a party that is dominated by non-Muslim candidates' — a charge frequently leveled by Islamist activists at Megawati's PDIP party. This echoed advice given by MUI on 7 June, which many people reportedly regarded as a legal ruling (*fatwa*).⁷ In fact, the *ummah* was hardly united politically. There was great animosity particularly between Abdurrahman Wahid's followers (PKB supporters) and those of Amien Rais (supporters of PAN). Anti-Amien demonstrations in Bangil and Pasuruan threatened such violence that he had to cancel a trip there in June 1999.⁸

³ It may be noted *en passant* that Henry Ford's famously anti-Semitic book *The international Jew*, originally published in 1920 and which also published these 'Protocols', has been translated into Indonesian, but I failed to note the translator or publisher when I saw this work on sale in an Indonesian bookshop.

⁴ Z.A. Maulani, *Zionisme: Gerakan menaklukkan dunia* (Jakarta: Penerbit Daseta, 2002).

⁵ Feener, *Muslim legal thought*, p. 116.

⁶ Abdel Haleem's translation renders the verse rather differently: 'The believers should not make the disbelievers their allies rather than other believers'; *Qur'an: A new translation by Abdel Haleem*, p. 36.

⁷ These two 'calls' (*seruan*) appeared side-by-side in *JP*, 5 June 1999, and were also no doubt published in many other newspapers. The MUI advice (*tauisiyah*) is discussed in Moch. Nur Ichwan, 'Ulamā', state and politics: Majelis Ulama after Suharto', *Islamic law and society* vol. 12 (2005), no. 1, pp. 55–8.

⁸ *Kmps*, 15 June 1998.



Illustration 15 PDIP election rally, Surakarta, June 1999,
with supporters dressed as *wayang* clowns

Despite such efforts, even in this first election very many Indonesians proved unwilling to accept the political advice of religious leaders and responded positively to Megawati's image as the daughter of Sukarno and the foremost representative of anti-New Order politics. The specifically Islamist PPP had a modest level of support, with 10.7 per cent of the national vote. PAN, led by Muhammadiyah's former head Amien Rais but with a clearly secularist platform, did worse at 7.1 per cent. PKB, headed by Abdurrahman Wahid, gained 12.6 per cent. The big winners were two parties with no special claim on a self-consciously Muslim constituency: Megawati's PDIP, which won fully 33.7 per cent of the national vote and — surprisingly to many — Golkar, which had managed to present itself as a 'new Golkar' and gained 22.4 per cent nationally.

The results in the Javanese heartlands, as given below, demonstrate the appeal of PDIP there, the weakness of Golkar compared to its national result

— where ironically it became the heir to Masyumi's position of the 1950s as the main representative of the outer islands — and the predictable strength of PKB in East Java, where NU's popular support was always greatest (not least because of overwhelming support of Madurese living there) and where it beat PDIP into second place.

Table 17 Percentage of valid votes won by major parties in Central and East Java and Yogyakarta, 1999⁹

Region	PDIP	Golkar	PKB	PPP	PAN
Central Java	30.7	9.8	11.5	7.6	5.1
Yogyakarta	16.0	6.3	7.4	2.3	8.7
East Java	23.5	8.9	24.9	3.4	3.3

Although PDIP was the largest party and Megawati had a presumptive claim to be elected by the national parliament (MPR) as President, astute manoeuvring by Abdurrahman Wahid handed him the vote for the presidency. He held the post for just 21 months (1999–2001). The man who most represented the hopes of Liberal thinkers, who had the authority of a Traditionalist 'blue blood' but insisted on a secular state, was now President of Indonesia. But he was very sick: he had suffered strokes and was blind, so to his long-standing idiosyncrasies and mystical inclinations were added a damaged mind and an inability to read anything himself.¹⁰ He was nevertheless remarkably energetic and worked to overthrow the legacies of Soeharto and Habibie. He supported openness in government and pluralist tolerance in society. But his erratic statements and impatience with critics, along with growing rumours of corruption among his circle and involving Abdurrahman himself, soon doomed his presidency. Modernist youth

⁹ Calculated on the basis of figures in *SPK* online, 16 June 1999. These are provisional results, but I've been unable to locate official final results (which would not differ significantly) for these areas.

¹⁰ An example of the way his mind was working: in 2007, he told me that the previous year in Kediri he had met with 'grandfather Semar' (the most powerful of the god-clowns of the *wayang*), who was born 700 years before. If Abdurrahman called Semar, he would come to him every day; discussion with Ky. H. Abdurrahman Wahid, Jakarta, 7 June 2007. There were many publications exploring Abdurrahman's conduct and thought. For example, see Khoirul Rosyadi, *Mistik politik Gus Dur* (Yogyakarta: Jendela, 2004).

organisations associated with Muhammadiyah, PAN and other parties were prominent in denouncing Abdurrahman and demanding that he be removed from office.¹¹ NU's youth activists in Ansor were prepared to defend their *kyai* with physical force if necessary and attacked Muhammadiyah and Golkar properties in East Java.¹²



Illustration 16 Abdurrahman Wahid, Ciganjur, October 2009

¹¹ For example, *JktP* online, 15 Jan. 2001.

¹² *Tempo*I, 7 Feb. 2001, 29 May 2001; *JktP* online, 27 May 2001; *KmpsO*, 9 Feb. 2001.

Abdurrahman acted to free the press from Soeharto-era constraints. This fostered some good journalism, as exemplified in several Jakarta-based newspapers, the leading papers of Yogyakarta and the Surabaya-based *Jawa Pos*, but it also allowed the publication of much Revivalist, Dakwahist, and Islamist literature — including extremist forms of these. The latter was exemplified by magazines such as *Sabili* (the most influential of these),¹³ *al-Wa'ie*, *Risalah Mujahidin*, *Suara Hidayatullah* and others, as well as very many books. Extremists loathed Abdurrahman. One of the many inflammatory anti-Abdurrahman books published during his presidency was written by Dr Sidik Jatmika of the Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, published by Wihdah Press — a publishing enterprise of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (about which, more below)¹⁴ — and entitled *A Zionist movement with a Malay face*, featuring on its cover Abdurrahman's head with a star of David superimposed.¹⁵

With crisis and controversy on all sides, at the end Abdurrahman was ready to abandon his own principles and overturn Indonesia's democracy by declaring a state of emergency. The relevant minister (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, later to be president himself), however, refused to do so. Abdurrahman was impeached by the MPR in mid-2001, whereupon his Vice-President Megawati was elevated to the presidency (2001–4).

Megawati's presidency was notable for a restoration of the dignity of her office but little else. She had little competence for discharging the duties of a president and, it seemed, still less interest in anything but the status that came with it. Two fundamental developments took place during her presidency. The first was the decentralisation of the nation. A law passed in 1999 and implemented from 2001 introduced regional autonomy. Because of the fear of the nation breaking up, authority and budgets were not devolved to the level of provinces and special districts (of which there were 33) but rather to the level of regencies and cities, of which there were over 400 at the time, a figure that grew to 530 by 2009. Religion — along with defence,

¹³ A useful history of *Sabili* is in Miftahul Anam, 'Fatwa sesat "Media umat"', *MaJEMUK* no. 26 (Mei-Juni 2007), pp. 6–17. For an authoritative account of publishers associated with JI, see International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's publishing industry* (Asia report no. 147. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 28 Feb. 2008).

¹⁴ International Crisis Group, *Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's publishing industry*, p. 2.

¹⁵ Sidik Jatmika, *Gerakan Zionis berwajah Melayu* (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, AH 1422/2001).

foreign relations, justice and monetary affairs — was one of the areas reserved for national-level determination, but (as we shall see) in fact much in the way of religious affairs came to be determined locally, especially with a national government unwilling to exercise its prerogatives in this area. From one of the world's most tightly controlled and centralised nations, Indonesia was now one of the most decentralised.

The second major development followed upon the al-Qaeda attacks in the United States in September 2001 and the subsequent American-led invasion of Afghanistan. Suddenly there were major demonstrations protesting the impending invasion in Indonesia's towns and cities, often led by Indonesians who had military experience in the earlier anti-Soviet *jihad* in Afghanistan. Down to this time, the contending understandings of Islam by Modernists and Traditionalists and political differences between them had frequently produced disagreement, tension and conflict. Now both of those schools of thought — represented above all by Muhammadiyah and NU, who were quick to label themselves 'mainstream' and 'moderate' — realised that they faced a common threat in more extremist versions of Islam, and began to cooperate with each other more than to bicker. Thus, animosities that went back to the founding of Modernist movements in Indonesia in the first years of the 20th century at last declined into a shared tolerance and opposition to extremism. Muhammadiyah and NU leaders were soon jointly declaring their opposition to imposing *shari'a* law in Indonesia and to the use of violence for religious purposes, and emphasising their commitment to the Indonesian national state (rather than the idea of a universal caliphate), in opposition to the demands of more extremist groups.¹⁶

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became president in 2004, the first president in Indonesian history to be directly elected by the people. He was reelected in 2009 for a further five years. With that direct election mandate, he might seem to have been in a strong position to provide leadership at national level, but decentralisation meant that the presidency's prerogatives were sharply restricted and much of Indonesian politics had become local politics. There were times when SBY (as he was commonly known) — who was not a man ever noted for decisive action — seemed nearly paralysed by the political constraints of his position. We will see below the rather remarkable extent to which he was prepared to surrender political initiative to religious leaders and unwilling to stand against religiously inspired violence.

¹⁶ For example, *JktP* online, 1 Jan. 2003. Other leading scholars also expressed such views.

Throughout these years, violent and extremist religious movements grew within Indonesia, as did the opposition to them.¹⁷ There was bloody Muslim-Christian fighting in Maluku (eastern Indonesia) which cost over a thousand lives in 1999. Churches were bombed in 11 cities across Indonesia on Christmas Eve in December 2000, including several in East Java, leaving 19 dead: this was the first significant attack by the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), although it was not yet identified as such by the authorities at that stage. The 2002 JI bombs in Bali were the deadliest, killing 202 people, most of them foreign tourists. In the wake of this violence, eventually even sceptics were obliged to accept that Indonesia had an Islamic terrorist problem. Extremists and their sympathisers continued to deny that this was so and preferred absurd ideas such as the Bali bombs having been secret CIA ‘mini-nuclear’ devices. A special police anti-terrorism task force known as Densus 88 (from Detasemen Khusus 88, Special Detachment 88) was formed with American and Australian support, and soon proved itself highly competent at detecting, disrupting, capturing and/or killing domestic terrorists. While these developments grabbed headlines both domestically and internationally, such terrorist violence remained a marginal phenomenon in the context of the larger society. It is that larger topic of the broader changes in Javanese society to which we now turn.

The *santri-abangan* balance

Just as we did before considering the history of *aliran* politics in the 1950s and early 1960s, we will try here to assess the balance of numbers between the two sides of Javanese society, after the Islamising transformations of Soeharto’s New Order. It must be said at the outset that, despite the introduction of social surveys done to international standards in Indonesia, the information we have on this issue in the early 21st century is hardly any better than half-a-century before. Over the past four decades I asked many people in Indonesia — and in the research for this Part of this book over the years 2003–11, I asked nearly everyone I spoke with — what they estimated the balance between *santri* and *abangan* to be. In recent years, such

¹⁷ A valuable brief overview is to be found in Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Reformasi, religious diversity and Islamic radicalism after Suharto’, *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* vol. 1 (2008), pp. 23–51.

estimates were complicated by changing terminology. *Abangan* have become more likely to call themselves *kejawen* (Javanese, or Javanist, implying truly authentic Javanese identity), probably because of the implication that those called *abangan* were people without religion, whereas *kejawen* claim to have a coherent, but truly Javanese, set of beliefs. For the *santri* side, *abangan* or *kejawen* is sometimes taken to mean just followers of *kebatinan* sects rather than a broader social category. In the midst of these confusions, many had the impression that *abangan* were declining as a proportion of the Javanese population, but there were just as many shrewd observers who thought *abangan* had become a minority as who thought that they still constituted a majority. The term *santri*, too, seems to be changing — probably reflecting a growing view of Javanese society as more uniformly Muslim, so that *santri* is less important as a broad social category — and seems now to be used more frequently in its original meaning of a student at an Islamic school (a *pesantren*, the place of the *santri*).

Social surveys can shed some light on this issue but they are problematic. Colleagues at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta supported my research by adding specific questions to their annual social surveys over three years (2006, 2008, 2010).¹⁸ Comparison of these surveys suggests that the samples were not entirely consistent or as representative as one would wish, the number of respondents was small and they were probably influenced by knowing that questions were being put by people from an Islamic university.¹⁹

Nevertheless, it is useful to note that responses reflected a generally high level of self-identification and reported practice as observant Muslims. To avoid a spurious impression of accuracy, figures in the tables below are rounded to the nearest whole percentage.

¹⁸ The surveys were conducted by PPIM (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, Centre for the Study of Islam and Society) at UIN Jakarta, at the direction of Prof. Jamhari Makruf.

¹⁹ As a control, in the 2006 and 2008 surveys, respondents were asked what party they had voted for in the national parliamentary election of 2004. The results showed inconsistencies between the samples. For example, in Central Java 18.1 per cent of the 2006 sample said that they had voted for Golkar and 6.5 per cent that they had voted for the Democrat Party; in 2008 these answers were given by, respectively, 7.4 and 26.4 per cent. In a national survey of some 1200 respondents, the numbers for the Javanese heartland were necessarily small, e.g., a total of around 600 across Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java in the 2010 survey.

Table 18 Self-identification as *santri*, *abangan* or other, as rounded percentages, 2006 survey²⁰

<i>Santri</i>	<i>Abangan</i> or <i>kejawen</i>	Other
57	23	20

Table 19 Frequency of observation of the five daily prayers, as rounded percentages, 2006 and 2010 surveys²¹

	Always/Routinely/Often enough	Rarely
2006	90	9
2010	89	9

Table 20 Frequency of fasting during Ramadan, as rounded percentages, 2006 and 2010 surveys²²

	Always/Routinely/Often enough	Rarely
2006	93	6
2010	94	5

A less formally sampled telephone survey by research colleagues in the regency of Kediri produced results which are consistent with the tables above.

²⁰ Survey conducted by PPIM (see note 18) in March 2006, with 398 respondents across Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java. The 'other' category seems to reflect people who were unsure of, or rejected, the terminology being used, rather than the *kebatinan* affiliation which such a category indicated in Tables 8 and 9 above, for a *kebatinan* follower could have identified him- or herself as *kejawen* in 2006; Cf. table 22 below.

²¹ Surveys conducted by PPIM (see note 18) in March 2006 and August 2010, with 398 and 584 respondents respectively across Central Java, Yogyakarta and East Java. The categories used here bring together those who answered *selalu/rutin/sering/cukup sering* and *jarang*.

²² See the preceding note.

Table 21 Frequency of observation of the five daily prayers and fasting during Ramadan, as rounded percentages, 2007 telephone survey, Kediri²³

	Always/Very often/Often enough	Rarely/Very rarely
5 daily prayers	92	4
Ramadan fast	95	1

In another survey of 500 respondents in Jekulo (Kudus area) in 2004, 81 per cent of respondents said that they carried out the five daily prayers.²⁴

We can draw at least one reasonably sound conclusion from this survey data. Given the problematic nature of all social surveys regarding sensitive topics such as religion — where respondents may tell you what they believe and do, what they want you to think they believe and do, what they believe you want them to believe and do, what they believe the society regards as acceptable belief and behaviour, or combinations of these — we can conclude that even if the data above is not convincing in detail about actual levels of religious observance, it does tell us about the dominance of religious paradigms and expectations in Javanese society generally in the post-Soeharto era. As Micklethwait and Wooldridge put it when addressing the issue of ambiguities in religious statistics, ‘Would you confess to atheism in Texas, let alone Jeddah?’²⁵

The Kediri telephone survey provided another insight into the weakening significance of *santri-abangan/kejawen* distinctions, as can be seen in Table 22. Respondents were asked to self-identify along such lines. A

²³ The survey was conducted by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi in February–April 2007, with valid responses from 287 respondents over the age of 17, 93.3 per cent of whom identified as ethnically Javanese. Suhadi Cholil was identified as a member of staff of Gadjah Mada University and Imam Subawi as a senior journalist at *Radjar Kediri*, so no connection with an Islamic university was presented to respondents, unlike in the PPIM surveys cited in previous tables. The categories used here bring together those who answered *selalu/sangat sering/cukup sering* and *jarang/sangat jarang*.

²⁴ Achmad Ta’yuddin, ‘Masyarakat toleran: Budaya demokrasi dan partisipasi politik (Studi kasus perilaku politik umat Islam Jekulo Kudus pasca orde Baru)’ (Magister Agama thesis, Program Studi Agama dan Lintas Budaya, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2005), p. 51.

²⁵ Micklethwait and Wooldridge, *God is back*, p. 26.

Table 22 Self-identification as *santri*, *abangan* or other, as rounded percentages, 2007 telephone survey, Kediri²⁶

<i>Santri</i>	<i>Abangan</i> or <i>kejawen</i>	Other (national, neutral, ordinary, common, general)	No answer
52	7	24	13

majority called themselves *santri*, but about a quarter rejected the distinction and another 13 per cent declined to answer at all. Those who said that they were 'other' gave themselves descriptions such as 'national', 'neutral', 'ordinary', 'common' or 'general' Muslims. That is, they responded that they thought of themselves as Muslims but refused to be situated in the old dichotomy.

Earlier in this book, we have taken the number of Javanese going on the *hajj* to Mecca as another indication of the depth of Islamisation. That indicator for the post-Soeharto years is consistent with the other evidence for a dramatically deeper Javanese commitment to Islam, but the figures themselves are subject to a major constraint. That is, the Saudi Arabian government imposes a quota of 0.1 per cent of the domestic Muslim population for pilgrims from any country each year. For Indonesia, that means some 200,000, well below the number of aspirant *hajjis* in an increasingly pious nation with more people able to afford the trip. So there has developed a years-long waiting list. By 2008, East Java's quota (33,935 per year) was already taken up down to 2012 and in 2009 it looked like the years down to 2015 would be booked out.²⁷ In 2008, Yogyakarta's quota for 2011 was already filling²⁸ and by 2011 it was filled until 2018.²⁹ In 2010, Central Java's quota was just 29,435 but there was already a waiting list beyond that of nearly 80,000 people. As a consequence, there would be no

²⁶ Survey conducted by Suhadi Cholil and Imam Subawi, February–April 2007, with valid responses from 287 respondents over the age of 17, 93.3 per cent of whom identified as ethnically Javanese. The Indonesian terms used for 'other' were *nasional*, *netral*, *biasa*, *awam* and *umum*.

²⁷ *Republika* online, 17 June 2009. Note that waiting lists were real, for they consisted of people who had already made bank deposits towards their costs. In 2004, each pilgrim had to pay about USD2,768 for a 'full board and transport package'; *JktP*, 16 Dec. 2004.

²⁸ *Republika* online, 16 Oct. 2008.

²⁹ According to email from Arif Maftuhin, 2 June 2011, based on published Yogyakarta Department of Religion data.

further vacancies for pilgrims from Central Java until 2013.³⁰ Such figures make for a dramatic comparison with those in Tables 5 (showing 3,889 departures in 1956) and 14 (with 4,024 departures in 1974) above.

The pilgrimage data is persuasive, and whatever our lingering uncertainties about how robust survey data can be, it is reasonable to conclude that by the early 21st century, a strong sense of Islamic identity and widespread orthopraxy characterised much of Javanese society. Even if people who responded to the surveys exaggerated their Muslimness, their doing so would reflect the dominance of an Islamised identity and discourse in Javanese society. In the 1950s, *abangan* had no hesitation to express their lack of interest in prayer or fasting or the pilgrimage, even to show contempt for *santri* practice and belief; sixty years later, such views — where still held — were more likely to be concealed. Certainly those spending their money on the *hajj* may be regarded as responding to a much more dominant Islam. The next chapter explores further how dominant this Islamised identity and discourse have become in Javanese society.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 1 March 2010.