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Gender and American Jews

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
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CHAPTER 9

How Jewishness is Related to American Jews' Dual-Earning Patterns

In the preceding two chapters, we considered whether an individual's Jewishness was related to his or her behavior with respect to family formation, childbearing, labor force participation, and occupational achievement and rewards. In this chapter, we look at the family as a unit to get some insight into how Jewishness is related to the division of economic roles in the family. We want to know how Jewishness is related to both spouses being engaged in economic roles outside the home and whether the effect of having young children at home on the parents' economic behavior is modified by their Jewishness. If Jewishness is related to family decisions about economic behavior, what aspect of Jewishness is responsible: the religious and/or the ethnic? Do religious identity and ethnic identity have similar effects on couples' economic behavior in all denominations of American Jews? Note that we have information only on how the respondent expresses Jewishness, that is, the respondent's denominational preference and expressions of Jewish identity. We do know whether or not the spouse is identified as Jewish, and we will explore the relationship of secular achievement to this aspect of Jewishness in the next chapter. Here we focus on the relationship between the couple's economic roles and the respondents' denominational preferences and expressions of Jewish identity.

We see this as a further inquiry into the ways in which religious identity and ethnic identity penetrate family decisions and secular behavior. If we find that Jewish denomination and expressions of Jewish identity are *not* related to a couple's allocation of economic roles and the spouses' relative contributions to the family economy, we will have an indication of secularization; that is, Jewishness will be separate from such decisions and behavior. If we find a relationship between Jewishness and a couple's economic roles and rewards, we will have insight into one mechanism by which religious identity and ethnic identity on the individual level are translated into

everyday behavior for Jewish men and women. In turn this may be a model for how other religious and ethnic identities influence the day-to-day activities and orientations of individuals and families expressing other contemporary identities.

We begin by looking at denominational differences in dual-earning patterns; we follow this with a consideration of scores on the Jewish identity factors.

DENOMINATION AND DUAL EARNING

The purpose of this section is to examine whether the denominations differ in terms of the economic roles of married couples. As we have already mentioned, intimate relations often mirror the broader social and cultural context, and certainly are influenced by patterns in the surrounding society. Denominational groups may form reference groups for norms affecting marital patterns, and therefore couples within a particular denomination may differ from those in another. We measure here, however, only the denomination of the respondent, not the denominational preference of the spouse.

One hypothesis regarding dual earning and denominational preference is that the more traditional the denomination, the more “Jewish” is the dual-earning pattern, following the distinctiveness of the Jewish dual-earning pattern shown in Chapter 5. That is, we would expect more traditional Jews to have a higher proportion of dual earners than their counterparts in other denominational groups; we would also expect a great degree of homogeneity between spouses in terms of education and occupation and large contributions by wives to joint earnings, though at the same time we would anticipate that wives act as secondary earners in the face of family need, such as the presence of many children at home or a husband’s low salary/husband’s income lower than the wife’s. A somewhat contradictory hypothesis is that the more egalitarian the denomination, the closer to equality are the spouses in terms of economic roles (extent of labor force participation, contribution to earnings, homogeneity in terms of occupational prestige and earnings). A final hypothesis is that denomination is not related to the pattern of dual earning: that the variation among Jews in terms of dual earning is primarily a result of educational differences between the spouses and childrearing responsibilities. Our earlier findings, that denominational differences in labor force participation and occupational achievement appear to result from educational differences and family roles of women, suggest that the last might be the strongest hypothesis.

We see that among married Jewish couples in each denomination, the majority are dual earners, as was found in 1990 (Fishman, 1993). Along

Table 9.1 Percentage of Married American Jews in Dual-Earner Couples, by Denomination and Age of Respondent^a

Denomination	Age of respondent		
	25–44 ^b	44–64	65+ ^c
Orthodox	48.0 (106)	58.0 (92)	11.1 (44)
Conservative	63.0 (145)	54.2 (237)	6.6 (174)
Reform/Reconstructionist	66.7 (263)	62.3 (348)	9.5 (162)
Unaffiliated	66.1 (147)	58.2 (222)	2.8 (131)

^aUnweighted *n* in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

^bAnova of denomination significant at $p < 0.05$.

^cAnova of denomination significant at $p < 0.10$.

with this, we find a lower proportion of dual earners among the Orthodox than among Conservative, Reform, and unaffiliated Jews. We can see that these denominational differences are concentrated in the main age group (25–44) of people involved in childbearing and childrearing, among whom the Orthodox have a significantly lower proportion of dual-earner couples than do the other denominational groups (Table 9.1). In the oldest age group, in contrast, the Orthodox do not have fewer dual-earner couples than the other groups (although the unaffiliated group does).

It is reasonable to expect that the denominational differences are strongly related to childbearing and childrearing, as we found in 1990 (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, ch. 6) and above for the whole sample. As we have seen, the Orthodox have more children than the other denominational groups: they are also more likely to have four or more children under 18 at home, and fewer of them have no young children at home.

If we control for number of children and denomination, we see that number of children does not, however, explain all of the denominational differences in dual earning (Figure 9.1). Denominational differences persist, but the proportion of dual earners does not vary linearly by number of children at home for any denominational group. Families with three or more children may have higher proportions of dual earners than families with fewer children, perhaps because of the need for more income in large families. For some groups, there are more dual earners when there are no children under 18 at home; among the Orthodox, there is a lower proportion of dual earners in this category.

To get a better understanding of this variation, and because the extent of the wife’s labor force participation contributes the most variation in the




Figure 9.1. Percentage of dual-earner households, by denomination and number of children under age 18.

likelihood and pattern of dual earning, we analyzed the wife’s labor force participation by a logistic regression for each denominational group separately (Table 9.2). The dependent variable was the wife’s labor force participation (0, not employed; 1, employed). The independent variables were the husband’s and wife’s age, the husband’s and wife’s education (and hence earning potential), and the number of children under 18 at home.

In each denominational group, the wife’s education was the most important factor related to her labor force participation, which indicates her career orientation and earnings potential (and opportunity costs if she does not participate in the labor force). The number of children under 18 at home was significantly related to the extent of the wife’s labor force participation among Conservatives and Reform/Reconstructionists, but it does not have as strong a relationship as does the wife’s education to her labor force participation. It is interesting that the number of children had the smallest effect among the Orthodox (seen by comparing the unstandardized regression coefficients for number of children across denominational groups). Perhaps the variation among Orthodox Jews, most of whom have at least one young child at home, is not great enough to explain differences in the wife’s labor force participation.

Even more strongly affected by number of children under 18 at home are the wife’s hours of employment (Table 9.3). Among dual-earner families with more children under 18 at home, wives are less likely to be employed full time than those in families with fewer children. Among the Orthodox,

fewer wives are employed full time, especially among those with two or more children at home; among those with three or more children at home, only 27.5% are employed full time. Among Conservatives, those with two children at home are employed considerably fewer hours than those with one child or no children at home; and among those with three or more children at home, only 27.8% are employed full time. Among Reform/Reconstructionists with three or more children at home, only 13.8% are employed full time. There are also denominational differences that persist when number of children at home is controlled for: Orthodox women are least likely to have full-time employment, except among those with three or more children; unaffiliated and Reform/Reconstructionist women are most likely to be employed full time when they have no children or two children at home; among women with one child at home, Conservative women are most likely to be employed full time. Certainly educational differences affect these work hours, but apparently there are denominational norms, which also have an influence.

Table 9.2 Logistic Regression Analysis of Labor Force Participation by American Jewish Wives (Ages 25–64), by Spousal and Family Characteristics and Denomination^a

Independent variable	Denomination			
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform/ Reconstructionist	Unaffiliated
Wife's age	0.025 (1.026)	0.026 (1.027)	0.020 (1.020)	0.027 (1.028)
Husband's age	0.007 (1.007)	-0.005 (0.995)	-0.004 (0.996)	-0.026 (0.975)
Wife's education	0.365 (1.440)**	0.261 (1.298)	0.431 (1.539)*	0.346 (1.413)*
Husband's education	0.051 (0.950)	-0.077 (0.926)	-0.108 (0.898)	-0.213 (0.808)
Number of children under 18 at home	-0.027 (0.973)	-0.236 (0.790)**	-0.332 (0.717)*	-0.178 (0.837)
Predicted correctly (%)	68.7	81.2	80.7	83.5
Nagelkerke R ²	.083	.050	.081	.046
(Unweighted n)	(134)	(271)	(455)	(249)

*Significant at $p < 0.05$; ** significant at $p < 0.10$.

^aData are unstandardized coefficients; exponential coefficients are in parentheses.

Table 9.3 Percentage of Wives Employed Full Time among Dual-Earner Families, by Number of Children and Denomination^a

Denomination	Mean number of children under 18 at home			
	0	1	2	3+
Orthodox	72.3 (40)	64.7 (27)	48.2 (13)	27.5 (33)
Conservative	78.8 (125)	80.8 (47)	50.6 (54)	27.8 (21)
Reform/Reconstructionist	82.3 (204)	64.2 (89)	65.8 (84)	13.8 (22)
Unaffiliated	85.5 (119)	66.0 (45)	70.8 (51)	— ^b

^aUnweighted *n* in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

^bLess than 10 (unweighted) cases.

Probably because of the difference in the number of children under 18 at home, there are significant differences between the denominations in terms of how work hours compare between the spouses (χ^2 significant at $p < 0.05$). Orthodox couples are the most conventional, with 68.2% of husbands employed more hours per week than wives. Conservative couples are the next most conventional, with 63.2% of husbands employed more hours than wives. In Reform/Reconstructionist couples, slightly more than half of husbands are employed more hours than wives. Finally, among the unaffiliated, the couples in which the wife is employed as much as or more than the husband outnumber conventional couples, in which the husband is employed more hours than the wife (Figure 9.2).




Figure 9.2. Comparison of husband's and wife's hours of employment, by denomination.

To study the effect of children and the husband's hours of employment on wives' hours of employment in dual-earner couples, we entered wife's mean hours of employment per week as the dependent variable in a multiple regression analysis, with the independent variables being wife's and husband's ages, wife's and husband's levels of education, number of children at home, and husband's mean hours of work per week (Table 9.4). The wife's and husband's ages were entered as control variables, with the expectation that the older the age (of either), the lower would be the hours of employment. Their ages might also reflect the ages of the children at home, however, with younger wives expected to have younger children and therefore to have fewer hours of paid employment. Education of the wife was expected to have a positive relationship with hours of paid work, as higher education is associated with higher-level careers and career commitment. Higher education is also related to a higher income, which would make it more worthwhile to work longer hours in the labor force.¹ The husband's education, having a similar relationship to his occupation and income, might be inversely related to the wife's hours of paid work, as the lower his education level, the lower his income might be and hence the greater the need for the wife's income. We expected number of children to be inversely related to the wife's hours of paid work, as the more children at home, the greater the demands on her time outside the labor force (her unpaid labor). Finally, we expected the husband's hours of employment to be inversely related to the wife's hours of employment—the fewer hours he is employed, the greater the need for her labor hours and income (and vice versa). Because of the greater number of children among the Orthodox, it was expected that their work hours would be most responsive to the number of children at home, whereas in the other denominations, the wife's hours of employment might be related more to the wife's characteristics (e.g., education) and less hindered by the number of children at home, since there would be fewer of them.

Our expectations were not borne out. In all of the denominational groups, the number of children under 18 in the household is the dominant influence on the wife's hours of employment—the more children at home, the fewer are the hours the wife works. Comparing the relationship of number of children at home with hours of employment across the denominations (using unstandardized regression coefficients), we can see that number of children has a smaller effect on the hours of employment of Orthodox wives than on those of non-Orthodox wives. On the other hand, the effect of the husband's education is stronger (at least double the unstandardized coefficient) among the Orthodox than the other

Table 9.4 Multiple Regression Analysis of Weekly Hours of Employment of American Jewish Wives (Ages 25–64), by Spousal and Family Characteristics and Denomination^a

Independent variable	Reform/ Unaffiliated			
	Orthodox	Conservative	Reconstructionist	Unaffiliated
Wife's age	-0.066 (-.049)	0.076 (.054)	0.106 (.072)	-0.157 (-.114)
Husband's age	0.280 (.203)	-0.350 (-.267)**	-0.113 (-.082)	0.120 (.092)
Wife's education	2.142 (.187)	0.010 (.001)	1.568 (.124)*	1.714 (.151)*
Husband's education	-2.853 (-.240)**	-1.169 (-.117)	-1.096 (-.093)**	-1.580 (-.150)*
Number of children under 18 at home	-1.687 (-.223)*	-4.971 (-.403)*	-4.306 (-.306)*	-5.057 (-.370)*
Husband's weekly hours of employment	0.091 (.081)	-0.045 (-.049)	0.007 (.005)	0.260 (.237)*
Multiple <i>R</i>	0.357	0.440	0.328	0.444
<i>R</i> ²	0.127	0.194	0.108	0.092
(Unweighted <i>n</i>)	(84)	(208)	(354)	(195)

* Significant at $p < 0.05$; ** significant at $p < 0.10$.

^aData are unstandardized coefficients and (in parentheses) standardized coefficients.

groups, indicating that when the husband's education level (and hence his earning potential) is lower, Orthodox wives are more likely to compensate by working more hours in the labor force. Rather than children being the only consideration in terms of weekly hours of employment, Orthodox wives also respond to the larger family situation, especially the husband's income. This is true in the other denominational groups as well. The wife's own education is also related to more hours of employment, except among Conservatives. The Conservatives are the only group in which the husband's age is a significant factor in how many hours the wife works (the older the husband, the less likely the wife is to work long hours).

One clue about this variation in wife's hours of work is related to self-employment. Orthodox women are more likely to be self-employed than are women in the other denominational groups (Figure 9.3), and Orthodox women who are self-employed are more likely to work full time than women in other denominations (Figure 9.4); however, Orthodox women employed by others are much less likely to work full time.




Figure 9.3. Percentage of women (ages 25–64) self-employed, by denomination.

Although we do not have information on the self-employment of both spouses (only on that of the respondent), we do have information on the occupations of both spouses (as presented in Chapter 5). Using broad occupational groupings, we see that about a third of all wives are employed in the same occupation as their husbands, across all denominations. There is some variation as to what kinds of occupational combinations we find. Classifying the occupations as managerial/business/professional or not, we observe that the highest proportion of couples in all denominational groups are those in which both husband and wife are in managerial/business/professional occupations (as we see for couples in




Figure 9.4. Percentage of women (ages 25–64) employed full time, by employment status and denomination.

Table 9.5 Occupational Combinations of American Jewish Spouses (Ages 25–64), Employed Full Time, by Denomination^a

Husband's occupation	Wife's occupation	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform/ Reconstructionist	Unaffiliated
MBP	MBP	51.4	46.8	47.6	38.7
MBP	Not MBP	7.7	15.3	14.9	19.5
Not MBP	MBP	24.8	20.6	20.7	21.6
Not MBP	Not MBP	16.1	17.3	16.8	20.2
	(<i>n</i>) ^b	(40)	(122)	(24)	(120)

^aData are percentages. MBP denotes “managerial/business/professional.”

^bUnweighted *n* in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

which both spouses are employed full time; Table 9.5). When spouses have different occupations, it is more likely that the wife’s occupation is professional, as we have already seen, so the next most common combination is one in which the wife is in a managerial/business/professional occupation and the husband is not. There are slight variations in this pattern by denomination: the Orthodox are the most likely to have both spouses in managerial/business/professional occupations, and the unaffiliated are the least likely; among the unaffiliated, more than the other denominational groups, neither spouse is likely to be in these occupations. This makes the unaffiliated most like the broader white U.S. population (as shown in Chapter 5).

These occupational patterns are reflected in the comparison of occupational rewards between spouses across denominations, as we see in the next section.

DENOMINATION, OCCUPATIONAL REWARDS, AND DUAL EARNERS

Income differs somewhat for husbands and wives in the different denominational groups (Table 9.6): Orthodox men have relatively lower incomes than non-Orthodox men, which may be related to educational and age differences between the denominations; unaffiliated men have the next lowest incomes, followed by Reform/Reconstructionist. The highest earnings are found among Conservatives (Anova of income variation by denomination significant at $p < 0.05$). The variation among women in the different denominations is smaller, with Conservative women earning more than the others, perhaps related to their somewhat older age, and Orthodox women earning the least of the groups, perhaps related to their fewer hours of employment per week. Looking only at husbands

and wives employed full time (the bottom half of the table), we find that the denominational differences are smaller and not statistically significant. Orthodox women's lower income disappears, relative to the other denominations.

Among couples in which both husband and wife are employed full time, both Orthodox and Conservative couples reach near parity in spouses' incomes, with wives contributing almost half of the family's earnings. The unaffiliated have the lowest ratio of wife's to husband's earnings, with wives earning on average only 58% of what husbands earn. When hours of employment are not controlled for (top half of the table), unaffiliated husbands earn almost double their wives' income, whereas Conservative women make three-quarters of what their husbands earn. Thus, hours of employment explain much of the disparity in earnings among the Orthodox and Conservative groups, but less so among the Reform/Reconstructionist and unaffiliated groups.

In terms of further comparisons between husbands and wives, in each denomination the dominant pattern is that of conventional education, income, and occupational prestige differences; that is, in comparison with their wives, most husbands have the same or higher education, the same or higher income, and the same or higher occupational prestige. Although there are some minor denominational variations in terms of the incidence

Table 9.6 Median Annual Earnings of American Jewish Couples (Ages 25–64) by Denomination

Denomination	Median annual earnings of husbands (\$)	Median annual earnings of wives (\$)	Wives' earnings/ husbands' earnings	(n) ^a
<i>Total</i>				
Orthodox	52,000	37,500	67.6	(92)
Conservative	82,500	52,500	76.5	(155)
Reform/ Reconstructionist	72,500	42,500	61.1	(269)
Unaffiliated	62,500	42,500	53.9	(173)
<i>Both husband and wife employed full time</i>				
Orthodox	72,500	52,500	88.2	(25)
Conservative	62,500	62,500	89.2	(69)
Reform/ Reconstructionist	72,500	42,500	73.3	(136)
Unaffiliated	67,500	47,500	58.0	(85)

^aUnweighted n in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

of unconventional spousal differences (Table 9.7), they are balanced by slightly higher percentages of spouses whose education, incomes, or occupational prestige are equal. (For example, although in Orthodox couples the proportion of couples in which the wife has completed more education than her husband is slightly lower than in the other denominations, there is a higher percentage of Orthodox wives having the same education as their husbands.) The denominational variation is not statistically significant for any of the comparisons. Thus, traditional patterns of male dominance do not seem to vary by denomination.

In summary, in this section we explored whether a preference for a more traditional Jewish denomination would lead to the dual-earner patterns that distinguish Jews from the broader population. The results were mixed. The Orthodox (the most traditional denomination) do not have a higher proportion of dual earners than the other denominations, partly because they have more children. However, the extent of Orthodox wives' labor force participation is affected by their husband's earning power and their own earning power even more than it is by the number of children at home. One of the reasons might be the need for greater income when there are more children at home. Another might be a more pervasive familism that indicates commitment to the family's needs, which can result in greater labor force participation on the part of the wife. With regard to the equality of the spouses in terms of education, income, and occupational prestige, we found no significant differences between the denominations, which does not support the idea that the more traditionally Jewish a couple is, the more the "Jewish" pattern of dual earners is followed.

Table 9.7 Unconventional Spousal Differences for American Jewish Couples (Ages 25–64), by Denomination

Husband–wife comparisons	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform/ Reconstructionist	Unaffiliated
Wife has more education than husband (%)	25.3	27.0	25.0	24.8
Wife has higher occupational prestige than husband (%)	41.8	48.7	48.5	46.8
Wife has higher annual earnings than husband (%)	17.0	22.3	14.5	20.2
(<i>n</i>) ^a	(178)	(348)	(543)	(319)

^aUnweighted *n* in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

DUAL EARNING AND JEWISH IDENTITY

In this section we analyze the extent to which various ways of expressing Jewish identity are related to patterns of dual earning. We expected that there would be a number of ways in which the dual-earning pattern might intersect with Jewish identity: if Jewish identity is expressed in a more traditional way, it may reflect strong familistic values, which in turn may restrict women's labor force participation to the extent that it conflicts with family roles. Therefore, more traditional Jewish identity may be associated with a lower incidence of dual-earner couples, especially if there are children at home. Furthermore, some ritual behavior may take time away from career commitment, which might limit the dual-earning pattern. Strong ethnic and public expressions of Jewish identity may reflect exposure to social norms that influence the respondent's behavior, suggesting that the relationship between Jewishness and secular behavior and achievement may be a result of social networks.

On the other hand, involvement in a job may take time away from participation in Jewish activities, such as volunteering for Jewish organizations. Employment may also indicate greater involvement in the secular world, and thus be associated with less particularistic identification as a Jew.

Most of the indicators of Jewish identity reflect the respondent's personal attitudes about what being Jewish means or what the Jewish community is about. Some are related to the respondent's behavior (e.g., attachment to Jewish culture or involvement in formal Jewish organizations), and a few are related to rituals observed by anyone in the household (e.g., commitment to *halacha*, which may involve someone in the household lighting Sabbath candles, keeping kosher at home, as well as practicing personal rituals). Therefore, we are looking primarily at the relationship between married respondents' expressions of Jewish identity and the dual-earning patterns of their family.

We divided each of the Jewish identity factors into "strong Jewish identity" and "weak Jewish identity" (approximately two groups of equal size). We then compared the proportion of dual earners in each group (Table 9.8). Generally there were only small differences between the two groups of strong versus weak Jewish identity on any of the factors, and the differences were statistically significant for only three factors. Furthermore, the direction of the differences was not the same for all factors. Thus, for the factor of Jewish identity called Activity—indicating that being Jewish means being active in the contemporary Jewish community—there was a higher percentage of dual earners among those with a stronger identity than among those with a weaker identity. For the private ethnic expression of involvement in Jewish culture (Culture) and the public ethnic expression

Table 9.8 Percentage of Dual Earners for American Jewish Couples by Strength of Jewish Identity^a

Jewish identity factor	Type of factor	Strong identity (%)	Weak identity (%)
Activity	Private (mixed)	57.1 (790)	49.5* (710)
Universal Morality	Public (mixed)	61.4 (825)	58.6 (675)
Ritual	Private religious	57.3 (513)	61.9 (914)
Belief	Private religious	58.9 (882)	61.3 (629)
Ceremony	Public Religious	60.3 (924)	60.8 (503)
Tribalism	Private ethnic	63.6 (722)	58.1 (710)
Culture	Private ethnic	57.2 (742)	62.7** (736)
Attachment to Israel	Private ethnic	58.3 (561)	62.0 (923)
Exceptionalism	Public ethnic	58.5 (816)	63.1* (616)
Organizations	Public ethnic	61.7 (599)	58.5 (865)
Israel's Role Central	Public ethnic	61.4 (881)	60.3 (603)

^a*n* in parentheses; mean for weighted sample; significance tests on unweighted *n*.

**t*-test significant at $p < 0.05$.

***t*-test significant at $p < 0.10$.

of American Jewish exceptionalism (Exceptionalism), there was a higher percentage of dual earners among those with stronger identity than among those with weaker identity. Because the differences are small and in different directions, it does not seem that Jewish identity has a strong relationship with proportion of dual earners. We will revisit this at the end of the chapter when we predict the proportion of dual earners by denomination, Jewish identity, family characteristics, and demographic factors.

Looking at the weekly hours of employment by strength of Jewish identity revealed more differences. The couple's combined hours of employment are somewhat lower for dual-earner couples in which the respondent has a strong Jewish identity on most of the factors, and some of these differences are statistically significant (Table 9.9). Respondents with a stronger Jewish identity in terms of personal commitment to halachic ritual, participation in public religious ceremonies, and personal attachment to Jewry (Tribalism) and to Israel have fewer combined work hours than those more weakly identified (most at the level of significance of $p < 0.05$). Most of the other differences are in the same direction, even if not statistically significant. The reason appears to be the fewer hours of employment of the wife among dual-earner couples in which the respondent has a stronger Jewish identity for almost all of the factors (eight of which are statistically significant). Thus, stronger Jewish identity is associated with fewer hours of paid

employment for the wife, which usually results in a smaller number of combined couple hours of employment per week.

In terms of comparisons between husbands and wives, the occurrence of unconventional differences (i.e., when the wife is employed more hours than the husband, has a higher education than the husband, has higher annual earnings than the husband, and has higher occupational prestige than the husband) does not appear to be related to the strength of Jewish identity. We looked at correlations between the Jewish identity factors and the variables comparing husband's and wife's education, weekly hours of

Table 9.9 Mean Weekly Hours of Employment in Dual-Earner Couples (Ages 25–64), by Strength of Jewish Identity

Jewish identity factor	Mean combined hours of employment		Mean hours of employment of husband		Mean hours of employment of wife	
	Strong identity	Weak identity	Strong identity	Weak identity	Strong identity	Weak identity
Activity	81.2 (421)	82.0 (400)	46.3 (577)	45.5 (525)	34.5 (488)	37.0* (464)
Universal Morality	83.6 (455)	82.5 (366)	46.7 (595)	46.4 (507)	36.6 (535)	36.9 (417)
Ritual	79.3 (260)	82.3* (529)	45.8 (368)	45.7 (696)	33.3 (308)	36.9* (607)
Belief	80.9 (486)	82.4 (342)	45.7 (652)	46.2 (464)	35.1 (557)	36.6** (404)
Ceremony	80.5 (522)	83.0** (267)	45.9 (711)	45.4 (353)	34.5 (596)	37.8* (319)
Tribalism	80.8 (393)	83.0** (414)	46.1 (542)	46.0 (536)	34.7 (443)	37.2* (481)
Culture	80.6 (393)	82.5 (421)	46.3 (543)	45.6 (549)	34.5 (459)	37.0* (483)
Attachment to Israel	78.6 (294)	83.3* (531)	45.3 (412)	46.3 (688)	33.4 (349)	37.2* (602)
Exceptionalism	82.6 (482)	80.9 (325)	46.5 (630)	45.5 (448)	36.2 (548)	35.7 (376)
Organizations	80.6 (335)	82.4 (464)	46.3 (446)	45.4 (624)	34.3 (382)	37.1* (545)
Israel's Role Central	80.9 (491)	82.4 (334)	45.5 (646)	46.5 (454)	35.3 (563)	36.3 (388)

*Anova significant at $p < 0.05$; ** significant at $p < 0.1$.

^aUnweighted n in parentheses; mean for weighted n ; significance tests on unweighted n .

employment, annual earnings, and occupational prestige; there was only one statistically significant correlation. We also looked at comparisons of respondents expressing strong and weak identity on each of the Jewish identity factors in terms of the proportion of couples with “unconventional” spousal differences (the wife employed more hours than the husband, the wife having a higher education than the husband, the wife earning more than the husband, and the wife having higher occupational prestige than the husband); there were very few statistically significant differences (measured by χ^2 analysis). We concluded that Jewish identity does not seem to be related to the occurrence of unconventional spousal differences in economic behavior or rewards.

However, looking at the proportion of “equally dependent spouses,” that is, the proportion of couples in which the wife earns 40–59% of the joint earnings, we do find a consistent pattern (Figure 9.5). The proportion of “equally dependent spouses” is lower among those with stronger Jewish identity. Among those couples with a stronger Jewish identity, husbands are more likely to earn more than their wives (probably because the wives are employed fewer hours). Thus, the wives among those with stronger Jewish identity are clearly in the pattern of “secondary earners,” with weaker career commitments than their husbands.

Whether this is because of family roles or Jewish identity itself will be explored in the next section, when we analyze the relative importance of




Figure 9.5. Percentage of “equally dependent spouses,” by strength of Jewish identity factor. (*Asterisk indicates t -test significant at $p < 0.05$.)

Table 9.10 Scores on Jewish Identity Factors for Respondents in Single-Earner and Dual-Earner Couples

Jewish identity factor	Single-earner couples	Dual-earner couples
Activity	-.423	-.327
Universal Morality	.090	-.075*
Ritual	-.453	-.284*
Belief	-.352	-.284
Ceremony	-.492	-.541
Tribalism	-.590	-.500
Culture	-.456	-.386
Attachment to Israel	-.190	-.187
Organizations	-.278	-.324
Exceptionalism	.009	-.206*
Israel's Role Central	-.341	-.197
(<i>n</i>) ^a	(1183)	(991)

**t*-test between respondents in single-earner and dual-earner couples significant at $p < 0.05$.

^aUnweighted *n* in parentheses; mean score of weighted *n*; significance calculated on unweighted *n*.

denomination, Jewish identity, family characteristics, and demographic factors in explaining the occurrence of equally dependent spouses.

Finally, following the research that suggests that greater involvement in the secular labor force might affect how religiosity is expressed, we looked at the difference in Jewish identity scores between respondents in dual-earner and single-earner families to see whether the dual-earning pattern might be related to how Jewish identity is expressed (Table 9.10). Perhaps the first thing to be noted is that the differences in scores between respondents in single-earner and dual-earner couples are statistically significant only for three of the Jewish identity factors. On two of these factors, respondents in dual-earner couples express stronger Jewish identity than those in single-earner couples; on one of these, respondents in single-earner couples express stronger Jewish identity than those in dual-earner couples.

Dual-earner couples are more likely to see being Jewish as being part of a universal moral community and heritage. This viewpoint minimizes the particularistic, tribal aspects of being Jewish, and emphasizes Jews' aspiration to make the world "a better place." It fits in well with other "universalistic" worldviews offered by other mainstream religions in the United States (Heilman, 2003-4). It also minimizes the conflict between being Jewish and fitting into the broader U.S. context. At the same time,

dual-earner couples are more likely to understand being Jewish as being part of a cultural, ethnic, religious group of a worldwide people (Exceptionalism). This too fits with the mainstream U.S. orientation toward co-existent denominations and does not raise any conflicts between being Jewish and fitting into the broader U.S. context. Dual-earner couples are less likely, however, to express personal commitment to halachic rituals, such as keeping kosher, keeping the Yom Kippur fast, and keeping the Sabbath, which often do conflict with involvement in the broader U.S. society. Therefore, dual-earner couples are more likely to minimize the difference being Jewish presents in the broader U.S. context and to emphasize the universal aspects of being Jewish.

In the same direction, but not statistically significant, are the findings that dual-earner couples are less likely than single-earner couples to understand being Jewish as being active in the Jewish community and in Jewish practice; to personally be attached to the Jewish people, to Israel, and to the Jewish culture; and to have strong beliefs about religion (e.g., the belief that religion is important in one's life, the belief that one can pray in one's own words, the belief in God).

Being in a dual-earner couple apparently does not take time away from involvement in formal Jewish organizations, as can be seen by the lack of statistical significance in the comparison of the factor scores of dual-earner and single-earner couples.

SUMMARY ANALYSES OF DENOMINATION, JEWISH IDENTITY, AND DUAL-EARNING PATTERNS

Both denomination and Jewish identity appear to have weak relationships with dual-earning patterns. In the final section of this chapter, we look at whether any of the "Jewishness" indicators have independent relationships with dual-earning patterns once we take into account the educational background of both spouses, ages of spouses, and indicators of family roles (number of children at home). We use regression analyses that include dummy variables of denomination (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and unaffiliated, with Reconstructionist being omitted), selected Jewish identity factor scores (representing private religious, public religious, private ethnic, and public ethnic expressions of Jewish identity), demographic characteristics (age, education), and family variables (number of children under 18 in the household) to explain the likelihood of being in a dual-earner couple, the hours of work of the dual-earner couple, and the wife's contribution to the couple's annual earnings.

In the logistic regression of the likelihood of being in a dual-earner couple (Table 9.11), we see that being Orthodox is significantly associated

with a lower likelihood of dual earning, as is the public religious expression of Jewish identity (Ceremony), even with the other variables controlled for. In fact, being Orthodox has the strongest relationship (negative) with the likelihood of being a dual earner, and this is after the number of children and the wife's level of education have been controlled for. As expected, being a dual-earner couple is more likely the higher the wife's education, the smaller the number of children under 18 in the household, the older the wife, and the younger the husband. Together these variables explain about 10% of the variance, predicting correctly just slightly more than two-thirds of the cases (67.3%). Thus, we see that Jewish identity and denominational norms do have an effect on the couple's economic behavior, beyond the demographic and familistic indicators associated with Jewishness.

The extent to which the couple is involved in the labor force (their joint weekly hours of employment) is related mainly to the number of children under 18 in the household (Table 9.12), which affects primarily the wife's hours of work, as we have seen in Chapter 5. None of the denominational

Table 9.11 Logistic Regression Analysis of Dual Earning, by Denomination, Jewish Identity, Spousal Characteristics and Number of Children

Independent variable	Unstandardized regression coefficient	Exponential regression coefficient
<i>Denominational preference</i>		
Orthodox	-0.578	0.561*
Conservative	-0.424	0.654**
Reform	-0.300	0.741
Unaffiliated	0.015	1.016
<i>Jewish Identity Factor</i>		
Ritual (private religious)	-0.099	0.906
Ceremony (public religious)	-0.185	0.831*
Culture (private ethnic)	0.136	1.145
Exceptionalism (public ethnic)	-0.067	0.936
Husband's education	-0.008	0.992
Wife's education	0.332	1.393*
Husband's age	-0.051	0.951*
Wife's age	0.037	1.038*
Number of children under 18 in household	-0.169	0.845*
Nagelkerke R ² (Unweighted n)	.097 (1,124)	

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.10$.

Table 9.12 Multiple Regression Analysis of Weekly Hours of Employment for American Jewish Couples (Ages 25–64), by Denomination, Jewish Identity, Spousal and Family Characteristics

Independent variable	Unstandardized coefficient	Standardized coefficient (β)
<i>Denominational preference</i>		
Orthodox	-1.012	-.017
Conservative	.841	.020
Reform	-0.491	-.013
Unaffiliated	-2.021	-.050
<i>Jewish identity factor</i>		
Ritual (private religious)	0.180	.009
Ceremony (public religious)	0.017	.001
Culture (private ethnic)	0.583	.032
Exceptionalism (public ethnic)	-0.328	-.016
Husband's education	0.133	.009
Wife's education	1.067	.067
Husband's age	0.005	.006
Wife's age	0.025	.027
Number of children under 18 in household	-3.576	-.220*
R	0.251	
R ²	0.063	
(Unweighted n)	(788)	

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.10$.

groups have independent relationships with the couple's hours of employment that are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$, nor do any of the Jewish identity factor scores.

The likelihood of unconventional income differences—the wife earning more than the husband—is most strongly related to the spouse's education (the lower the husband's education and the higher the wife's education), as might be expected, as well as the number of children in the household (the more children, the less the wife is likely to work in the labor force and hence to earn more than the husband; Table 9.13). However, the public ethnic expression of Jewish exceptionalism (believing in the uniqueness of the Jewish people) is also related to unconventional differences in income, and being Orthodox is weakly related (negatively) as well (even after the number of children and the spouse's education are controlled for). Therefore, the Jewishness indicators are not the most important influences on the

wife's contribution to the household income, but they are not completely unrelated either.

Finally, we analyzed whether the Jewish identity factors have the same relationship (or lack thereof) to the dual-earning patterns within denominational groups. We considered the percentage of dual-earner couples, the combined hours of employment of husband and wife, the ratio of wife's to husband's employment hours, and the contribution of the wife's earnings to the couple's earnings. We used regression analyses for each of these variables (a logistic regression analysis for the incidence of dual earners in the denominational group and multiple regression analyses for each of the other dependent variables), with the independent variables being representative of private religious expressions of Jewish identity (Ritual), public religious expressions (Ceremony), private ethnic expressions (Culture), and

Table 9.13 Multiple Regression Analysis of Contribution to Household Earnings of American Jewish Wives (Ages 25–64), by Denomination, Jewish Identity, Spousal and Family Characteristics^a

Independent variable	Unstandardized coefficient	Standardized Coefficient (β)
<i>Denominational preference</i>		
Orthodox	0.195	.095**
Conservative	0.019	.013
Reform	-0.118	-.087
Unaffiliated	-0.046	-.032
<i>Jewish identity factor</i>		
Ritual (private religious)	0.043	.063
Ceremony (public religious)	-0.038	-.059
Culture (private ethnic)	0.060	.094
Exceptionalism (public ethnic)	-0.111	-.156*
Husband's education	-0.111	-.156*
Wife's education	0.105	.189*
Husband's age	0.002	.073
Wife's age	0.002	.050
Number of children under 18 in household	-0.081	-.142*
R	.336	
R ²	.113	
(Unweighted n)	(460)	

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.10$.

^aData represent the ratio of the wife's income to that of the husband.

public ethnic expressions (Exceptionalism)—as in the analyses in the preceding section; we also controlled for husband's education, wife's education, husband's age, wife's age, and number of children under 18 in the household.

We have indicated with bold type those regression coefficients that are statistically significant to make the relationships across denominational groups clearer. As an explanation of the incidence of dual earning, the wife's education is a significant factor in each of the denominational groups (Table 9.14). The husband's age is significant for the non-Orthodox (the younger the husband, the more likely is the couple to be dual earner). For the Conservative and the Reform/Reconstructionist groups, dual earning is negatively related to the number of children under 18 in the household. For the Orthodox and the unaffiliated groups, public expressions of Jewish identity are significantly related to the incidence of dual earning, even when education, age, and number of children are controlled for. For the Orthodox a public ethnic factor, and for the unaffiliated a public religious factor, have significant relationships with dual earning (the stronger the identity, the greater is the incidence of dual earning). It is interesting that among the Conservative and the Reform/Reconstructionist denominations (the largest American Jewish denominations), none of the Jewish identity factors have an independent relationship with dual earning. We will return to this point in the final section.

With respect to the couple's combined hours of employment, among both Orthodox and Conservative groups, ethnic Jewishness is significantly related to how many hours the couple works, but this is not the case for other groups (Table 9.15; again, the regression coefficients that are statistically significant are in bold). Among the Conservative and Reform groups, the age of the husband and wife, and the number of children under 18 in the household, are also important in explaining how many hours the couple is employed. For the unaffiliated groups, only number of children under 18 significantly explains the variation in the couple's hours of employment.

In the analysis of the wife's contribution to the couple's joint earnings (Table 9.16), we can see that Jewish identity is related to the wife's contribution in both Orthodox and Conservative groups, but not in Reform/Reconstructionist or unaffiliated groups (again, see the regression coefficients in bold, which are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$ or $p < 0.10$). The stronger the public religious identity, the greater is the wife's contribution to the household economy. However, the stronger the ethnic factors (for Conservatives), the lower is the wife's contribution. The public and ethnic nature of these relationships suggests the influence of the norms of the surrounding denominational culture; it is interesting that the influences are not all in the same direction.

Table 9.14 Logistic Regression Analysis of Dual Earning in American Jewish Couples in Each Denominational Group (Ages 25–64), by Jewish Identity, Spousal and Family Characteristics^a

Independent variable	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform/ Reconstructionist	Unaffiliated
<i>Jewish identity factor</i>				
Ritual (private religious)	-0.211 (0.809)	-0.285 (0.752)	-0.065 (0.937)	0.018 (1.018)
Ceremony (public religious)	-0.110 (0.896)	-0.041 (0.959)	-0.143 (0.867)	-0.454 (0.635)*
Culture (private ethnic)	0.041 (1.042)	0.283 (1.327)	-0.026 (0.856)	0.297 (1.345)
Exceptionalism (public ethnic)	-0.631 (.532)*	-0.014 (.986)	-0.047 (0.708)	0.050 (1.051)
Husband's education	0.030 (1.030)	0.023 (1.023)	-0.050 (0.591)	-0.006 (0.994)
Wife's education	0.465 (1.592)*	0.313 (1.368)*	0.295 (1.342)*	0.343 (1.409)*
Husband's age	0.006 (1.006)	-0.047 (0.954)*	-0.060 (0.942)*	-0.064 -(0.938)*
Wife's age	0.027 (1.027)	0.028 (1.029)	0.036 (1.037)	0.047 (1.048)**
Number of children under 18 in household	-0.075 (0.928)	-0.237 (0.789)*	-0.254 (0.775)*	-1.005 (0.995)
Nagelkerke R ² (Unweighted n)	.254 (250)	.078 (632)	.079 (993)	.124 (738)

* $p < .05$; ** $p < 0.10$.

^aData are unstandardized regression coefficients and (in parentheses) exponential coefficients.

Among Orthodox Jews, the wife's contribution is greater when the couple is younger and there are fewer children in the household. Among Conservatives, only the Jewish identity factors are significantly related to the wife's income contribution. Among Reform/Reconstructionist Jews, only the number of children in the household is related to the wife's contribution. For the unaffiliated, the fewer the number of children and the higher the wife's education, the greater is the wife's contribution to the joint income.

What we see in the last two analyses is that Jewish identity has an independent relationship with the dynamics of the dual-earning pattern among the Orthodox and Conservative, even when demographic and family variables

Table 9.15 Multiple Regression Analysis of Combined Hours of Employment of American Jewish Couples in Each Denominational Group (Ages 25–64), by Jewish Identity, Spousal and Family Characteristics^a

Independent variable	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform/ Reconstructionist	Unaffiliated
<i>Jewish Identity Factor</i>				
Ritual (private religious)	6.198 (.208)	-1.339 (-.746)	0.919 (.035)	-0.593 (-.021)
Ceremony (public religious)	-1.736 (-.040)	-2.807 (-.114)	1.606 (.087)	0.881 (.045)
Culture (private ethnic)	4.004 (.150)	3.800 (.181)*	-1.725 (-.091)	-0.319 (-.015)
Exceptionalism (public ethnic)	-4.257 (-2.03)**	-1.151 (-.054)	-0.059 (-.003)	0.345 (.017)
Husband's education	-0.102 (-.007)	-1.151 (-.054)	-0.283 (-.332)	-1.014 (-.066)
Wife's education	1.858 (.125)	-0.494 (-.029)	2.107 (.138)*	1.736 (.104)
Husband's age	0.084 (.076)	-0.170 (-2.03)*	0.089 (.115)*	-0.036 (-.041)
Wife's age	0.138 (.130)	-0.132 (-1.47)*	0.095 (.110)*	-0.013 (-.015)
Number of children under 18 in household	0.140 (.015)	-4.624 (-2.49)*	-5.192 (-2.66)*	-4.083 (-1.88)*
R	.414	.408	.321	.226
R ²	.172	.167	.103	.051
(Unweighted <i>n</i>)	(76)	(190)	(320)	(182)

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.10$.

^aData are unstandardized regression coefficients and (in parentheses) standardized coefficients, β .

have been controlled for; this is not so for the Reform/Reconstructionist or unaffiliated groups. This suggests that their Jewish identity has less to do with their secular economic behavior than it does for the Orthodox and Conservative groups.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we have asked whether Jewishness is related to the economic behavior of Jewish couples (in which at least one spouse is Jewish), looking at denomination and expressions of Jewish identity as indicators of "Jewishness." An affirmative answer limits the notion of secularization,

suggesting that religious and ethnic identity continue to be related to secular behavior. Relationships between primarily ethnic and public expressions of Jewish identity would suggest that they have more to do with social networks and norms than with religiosity per se. The fact that we found that it is identification with public and ethnic expressions of Jewish identity that are related to the dual-earning patterns of American Jews suggests that the structural forces binding Jews together as a community are reinforced by patterns of economic behavior within American Jewish families. These results thus reinforce the dynamic suggested by Goldscheider and Zuckerman's (1985) work

Table 9.16 Multiple Regression Analysis of Wife's Contribution to Combined Earnings of American Jewish Couples in Each Denominational Group (Ages 25–64), by Jewish Identity, Spousal and Family Characteristics^a

Independent variable	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform/ Reconstructionist	Unaffiliated
<i>Jewish identity factor</i>				
Ritual(private religious)	0.081 (.129)	-0.212 (-.083)	0.016 (.021)	0.085 (.055)
Ceremony (public religious)	-0.258 (-.283)*	-0.393 (-.145)**	0.048 (.087)	0.086 (.078)
Culture (private ethnic)	0.049 (.088)	0.365 (.158)**	0.005 (.008)	0.038 (.032)
Exceptionalism (public ethnic)	-0.040 (-.091)	0.352 (.149)*	0.019 (.032)	-0.032 (-.028)
Husband's education	-0.024 (-.039)	-0.143 (-.093)	-0.026 (-.059)	-0.106 (-.123)
Wife's education	-0.039 (-.123)	-0.023 (-.012)	0.046 (.100)	0.169 (.180)*
Husband's age	0.005 (.214)*	-0.006 (-.062)	0.001 (.051)	0.005 (.098)
Wife's age	0.005 (.204)**	-0.009 (-.095)	0.002 (.074)	0.005 (.095)
Number of children under 18 in household	-0.049 (-.249)*	-0.089 (-.043)	-0.085 (-.146)*	-0.178 (-.147)*
R	.516	.272	.202	.249
R ²	.266	.074	.041	.062
(n)	(47)	(102)	(176)	(120)

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.10$.

^aData are unstandardized regression coefficients and (in parentheses) standardized coefficients, β .

on the “transformation” of the nature of American Jewry and what binds the American Jewish population together; they suggested that many American Jews are “bound tightly by occupational, residential, and other structural ties to the community” (p. 241) and that these ties reinforce “Jewish” norms regardless of variations in religious ideology and belief.

Looking at denominational preference as an indicator of traditional or egalitarian Jewishness, we found few indications that denomination itself is related to labor force behavior or couples’ achievement. Orthodoxy does not seem to foster or impede the dual-earning pattern or equal achievement between spouses, nor do the more egalitarian Reform/Reconstructionist denominations. Rather, the influence of Orthodoxy seems to work through the greater familistic orientation (more children at home, the wife’s determination of her hours of employment on the basis of the husband’s occupation and age, and the wife’s choice of an occupation that may be more flexible during her childrearing years), whereas the distinctiveness of the Reform/Reconstructionists seems to be a reflection of their somewhat higher educational achievement. The various indicators of Jewish identity were most strongly related to variation in the wife’s work hours than to any patterns of achievement or labor force participation.

When we combined denomination, Jewish identity, demographic characteristics, and family indicators to predict the likelihood of a couple being dual earner, we were testing whether the weak effects of Jewishness that we had seen on couple’s economic behavior and achievements were the result of differential age, education, and family characteristics rather than direct relationships with Jewishness. We found that being Orthodox and the strength of public ethnic Jewish identity had independent relationships with being a dual-earner couple and the wife’s contribution to the couple’s earnings. Therefore, the relationship between Jewishness and the couple’s economic patterns could not be explained entirely by the demographic and family indicators we controlled for.

Finally, we looked at the denominations separately to see whether the same Jewish identity factors correlated with couple’s economic patterns in each denomination. We wondered whether the Orthodox were guided more by religiosity than the other groups, whether Conservative and Reform/Reconstructionists might be guided more by ethnic identity, and whether the unaffiliated might be guided to a lesser extent by Jewishness than those respondents who had expressed denominational preferences. We found that public involvement in Jewishness was related to the extent of the wife’s labor force participation (hours and contribution to household earnings) among both the Orthodox and the Conservative denominations, but not among the Reform/Reconstructionist or unaffiliated groups.

Involvement in public religious expression of Jewish identity was related to the wife's greater contribution to the couple's earnings. For the Orthodox, public ethnic expression of Jewish identity was related to the couple being involved more hours in the labor force, but for the Conservative group, stronger ethnic identity was related to less involvement of the wife in the labor force. That it is public involvement in Jewish identity that is related to this behavior suggests that the denominational community involves norms of behavior that spill over into the couple's economic functioning; it is possible that the denominational community also provides an infrastructure of support for such behavior, such as childcare facilities. That the Reform/Reconstructionist and unaffiliated groups are not as highly influenced in their secular behavior by their Jewish identity suggests greater secularization on their part, in the sense that their religious community has less effect on their secular economic behavior. Our findings thus refine Goldscheider and Zuckerman's (1985) conclusions by suggesting that the ties that bind secular behavior and Jewish identity are not equally distributed throughout the American Jewish population.