



PROJECT MUSE®

Gender and American Jews

Harriet Hartman, Moshe Hartman, Sylvia Barack Fishman


Published by Brandeis University Press

Hartman, Harriet & Hartman, Moshe & Fishman, Barack.

Gender and American Jews: Patterns in Work, Education, and Family in Contemporary Life.

Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2009.

Project MUSE., <https://muse.jhu.edu/>.



➔ For additional information about this book

<https://muse.jhu.edu/book/15685>

CHAPTER 8

How Jewishness is Related to Gendered Patterns of Secular Achievement

We saw in the preceding chapter that Jewishness is related to variation in family behavior, and we were able to isolate some particular elements of Jewishness that are related to such variation. The most striking variation is that the family behavior of Orthodox Jews is very different from that of the other denominational groups, and we could trace some of the reasons for this difference. The difference could be explained partly by demographic features (such as age and age at marriage) and partly by strength of religious Jewish identity, expressed by the Orthodox in their commitment to halachic ritual and religious belief. Family situation also seemed to be closely related to affiliation or lack thereof.

In this chapter we turn to secular achievement—education, labor force participation, occupational achievement, and occupational rewards (occupational prestige, annual earnings)—and again ask whether any of the patterns of secular achievement are related to different expressions of “Jewishness.” In Chapters 3 to 5, we considered whether Jewish secular achievement patterns were distinct from those of the broader U.S. population. Here we ask whether Jewish secular achievement varies in ways that are consonant with different expressions of Jewishness, as presented in Chapter 6. By focusing on this relationship, we address the question of whether investment in Jewish “cultural capital,” “religious capital,” “ethnic capital,” or “social capital” might be related to patterns of secular achievement. The literature that has linked the high educational and occupational achievement of Jews to “cultural particularity” and Jewish social networking (summarized in Burstein, 2007) suggests that there is a link between at least certain aspects of Jewish identity and educational and economic achievement. Hurst and Mott (2006) suggest that men and women who have “moderate” Jewish religious connections and behaviors (as opposed to connections that are extremely particularistic or observant, on the one hand, or extremely secular,

on the other) have higher secular achievement. In this chapter we hope to shed further light on this relationship and the patterns of gender (in)equality in educational and labor force achievement. We build on our earlier research based on the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, 1996b). In this work, we found that Jewishness was related to higher education among both men and women, but that the relationship between labor force activity and Jewishness differed for men and women. Married Jewish men tended to work longer hours, as providers; married Jewish women curtailed their labor force participation and consequently had lower occupational achievement:

Apparently Jewish involvement, because of the Jewish familial orientation, increases the gender differentiation in the family, which in turn affects the relationship between gender and labor force participation. This gender differentiation in turn affects occupational achievement. Jewishness, however, is not directly related to labor force participation or to occupational achievement; that is, there seem to be no proscriptions of women's secular achievement, only a positive value attached to family life, which has its own effect on secular achievement. (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, pp. 247–48)

Inquiry into the relationship between secular behavior and Jewishness is important not only from a Jewish standpoint, but in terms of understanding the role that religion and ethnicity play more generally in contemporary society. Although the classical “secularization thesis,” which posited a decline of religion in the contemporary world, has largely been debunked, the interpretation of secularization as a disjunction between religion and secular behavior, especially in the public arena, has to a greater extent been validated (see discussions in Christiano, Swatos, and Kivisto, 2002, ch. 3, and Furseth and Repstad, 2006, ch. 5). Yet it too has been plagued by contradictions, such as the impact of religion on politics, and religion's impact on gender roles in the economy. Although with our data set we cannot uncover the mechanisms of influence, we can determine the extent to which the secular and religious or ethnic arenas are related for American Jews. Furthermore, we can determine whether it is the “private” or “public” expressions of Jewish identity that are more strongly related to public economic behavior.

Because we have separate measures of ethnic and religious identity, we can also address the question of whether religious or ethnic Jewish identity has a stronger relation to secular achievement. Because of secularization, it may be that religious identity has less to do with secular achievement than does ethnic identity, which involves both cultural and social ethnic capital,

conceivably more helpful in terms of educational achievement and the labor market.

We are limited in that we cannot tell which came first—Jewish identity or secular behavior (or whether they are mutually reinforcing), and actually we have little knowledge in general of how Jewish identity changes over the life course (Horowitz, 2000, has shown us the importance of such a longitudinal perspective). So we are looking at the relationship between secular achievement and Jewish identity rather than the impact of one on the other. It could well be, for example, that secular education changes Jewish identity or vice versa, that certain occupations are accompanied by lifestyles that reinforce or undermine religious or ethnic contacts and identity, and that certain types of Jewish identity facilitate certain kinds of occupations or occupational lifestyles. This analysis also lets us reexamine the “structural location” hypothesis regarding gender differences in religious identity, that is, whether women who have secular positions similar to those of men have similar Jewish identity or continue to have stronger Jewish identity. But again, we cannot test the causal effect, only the relationship.

We begin by looking at variations in achievement by denominational identification, and then we examine how secular achievement is related to various expressions of Jewish identity. We consider gender equality in achievement within the various subgroups of American Jews in this chapter, and within married couples in Chapter 9.

One way in which denominations differ that is relevant to this inquiry is the extent to which integration into the broader society is promoted (both structurally and ideologically). Ideologically, the denominations promote greater or lesser integration with the broader non-Jewish community, with the most particularistic being the Orthodox and the least being the Reform groups, which have aspired to diminish the differences between Jews and the broader community; however, Conservative denominations also promote integration into the broader community while also preserving a strong particularistic Jewish identity. There is also a sizable minority of Jews who do not identify with any of the main American Jewish denominations, who have been categorized in our analysis as “unaffiliated.” They are expected to be the least separate from the broader population and, in this analysis, to have the least dissimilarity in occupational distribution. The degree of particularism or separation from the broader society may influence which reference group provides the most salient norms of secular achievement and gender equality in such achievement, both within families and in the general patterns of American Jews.

Denomination, as we have already suggested, also reflects how traditional the orientation to Jewishness is, the extent to which it accommodates

secularity or modernity, and how demanding it is in terms of particularistic obligation or commitment. Jewishness is by no means monolithic—that is, there is much variation within denominations, and much overlap as well, especially since denominational affiliation may be quite fluid (see, e.g., Hartman and Hartman, 1999, based on 1991 New York data). Nevertheless, denominational categories are often used to denote variation between American Jews and therefore are useful to examine. They are important to look at from a practical standpoint also; that is, by describing differences between denominational groups, we may help denominational leaders to understand their affiliates (or, in this case, at least those who identify with their denomination).

But as we have seen, denomination does not capture the “messy nuances” of variation in Jewish identity (Mayer, 2001), and our multiple measures of Jewish identity are a step in that direction. By considering later in the chapter whether ethnic or religious, public or private expressions of Jewish identity are most related to secular behaviors, and how they interact with denominational preferences, we come closer to understanding the persistent ties of religion to contemporary secular behavior, and the roles of Jewish and ethnic identity in promoting or mitigating gender equality in secular achievement.

DENOMINATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE EDUCATION OF AMERICAN JEWS

We confine our analysis to men and women aged 25–64, so that on the young end of our sample spectrum we will not be confounding the results with students still completing their education, and on the older end we will not be confounding the results with the different patterns of educational attainment we saw earlier for those 65 and over (especially women). We see in Table 8.1 that there are differences in educational attainment between the denominations: the Orthodox have the lowest proportion with college degrees, slightly more than half, followed by the unaffiliated, with slightly more than 60%, whereas more than 70% of Conservatives and Reform/Reconstructionists have college degrees. This pattern of difference is similar for men and women, although in each denomination men have a higher education than women. The denominational difference is not just a result of the age composition of the denominational groups, or of the tendency among Orthodox Jews to marry at a younger age than Jews in other groups: in a multiple regression of educational achievement (not shown here), educational variation is significantly related (negatively) to being Orthodox or unaffiliated (for men), even when age and age at first marriage are controlled for, and is positively related to age (the older having higher

Table 8.1 Educational Attainment, Educational Dissimilarity between Genders, and Educational Dissimilarity from Broader Population (Ages 25–64)

Denomination	B.A. or higher (%)			Dissimilarity between men and women's educational attainment	Dissimilarity between denominational group and non-Hispanic white U.S. population	
	Total	Men	Women		Men	Women
Orthodox	55.1 (196) ^a	58.7 (104)	50.8 (92)	9.5	32.3	29.9
Conservative	70.0 (695)	74.1 (277)	66.9 (418)	15.5	47.7	44.8
Reform/ Reconstructionist	74.5 (867)	79.6 (346)	69.9 (521)	13.1	53.2	49.1
Unaffiliated	62.9 (633)	64.8 (294)	60.8 (339)	4.7	38.4	39.9

Data sources: NJPS, 2000–01; U.S. Census, 2000.

^aUnweighted *n* in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

educational achievement) and age at first marriage (the older one is at the time of one's first marriage, the higher the educational achievement). Among women, being Orthodox is significantly related to lower educational achievement, even when age and age at first marriage are controlled for; being younger and marrying at an older age are related to higher educational achievement.

The denominational variation in education results in the unaffiliated and the Orthodox being the least dissimilar from the broader white U.S. population; the Conservative and the Reform/Reconstructionist groups show the greatest dissimilarity.¹ The low degree of dissimilarity between the unaffiliated and the broader population is actually the only finding that is consonant with our expectations: if the unaffiliated can be considered more marginal to the Jewish community, we would expect them to be least differentiated from the broader population. That a higher proportion of unaffiliated are intermarried reinforces this expectation (see also Chapter 10). That they are joined in this low degree of dissimilarity by the Orthodox, however, does not conform to the explanation of Jewish distinctiveness as marginality or as integration into the broader society.

In terms of gender difference, we expected that the more egalitarian the denomination in terms of religious roles, the greater the similarity would

be between men and women in terms of their educational attainment. However, this was not what we found. First of all, there is not much dissimilarity between men and women in any denomination: dissimilarity coefficients between men and women’s educational distribution within any denomination do not exceed 15.5% who would have to change their education in order for men’s and women’s distributions to be similar. The highest coefficients of dissimilarity between men and women within a denomination are found among the Conservatives and the Reform/Reconstructionists, presumably because more of the men go on to get doctoral and professional degrees than do women. The lowest degree of dissimilarity is found between men and women among the unaffiliated and the Orthodox. The latter is similar to a finding of 1990—greater gender equality regarding education and occupation among the Orthodox than among other denominational groups (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a)—and recalls the historical roots of gender equality in Jewish secular achievement that we discussed earlier.

DENOMINATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

Overall, there are few differences in labor force participation rates between the denominations, with the overall labor force participation rate for those aged 25–64 hovering around 80%. The same is true when we compare men in different denominational groups, the labor force participation rate hovering around 87% (Figure 8.1). However, when we compare women, we see that the Orthodox women have the lowest labor force participation rate. As a result, the ratio of female to male participation in the labor force is lower for the Orthodox (71%) than for the other denominational groups (82–89%).




Figure 8.1. Percentage in labor force (ages 25–64), by gender and denomination.

Even more striking are the denominational differences in full-time employment of women (Figure 8.2). Slightly more than half of Orthodox women are employed full time, compared with around 70% of Conservative and Reform/Reconstructionist women and nearly 80% of the unaffiliated.

Is the reason Orthodox women are less likely to be employed full time that they have more and younger children at home or that they are less likely to have a college degree? The multiple regression analysis presented in Table 8.2 addresses this question. Hours of employment is the predicted variable; the independent variables are education (highest degree achieved), age at first marriage, and age at birth of first child (to indicate how early family roles were entered), current marital status, age of youngest child under 18 in the household, and number of children under 18 in the household (to indicate current childcare and marital obligations); age is controlled for to adjust for any cohort or life-cycle variation above and beyond education and family characteristics.

When we control for education (model 1), being Orthodox or Conservative does not have an independent effect on hours of work; being Reform or unaffiliated is significantly associated with more hours of work, even when education is controlled for. However, once we control for family characteristics (model 2), none of the denominational groups have independent relationships with hours of work. Comparing the unstandardized regression coefficients of model 1 and model 2 shows that the relationship between each of the denominational groups and hours of employment decreases considerably when family characteristics are controlled for. The only significant relationships are between hours of employment and current marital status (married women are employed fewer hours) and number of children under 18 in the household (the more young children, the fewer the hours the mother is employed)—both practical influences (non-married women need to support themselves; young children are more likely to need a caregiver in the home,




Figure 8.2. Percentage employed full time (ages 25–64), by gender and denomination.

Table 8.2 Multiple Regression Analysis of Hours of Employment for American Jewish Women (Ages 25–64)^a

Independent variable	Model 1		Model 2	
Orthodox ^b	-0.094	(-.062)	-0.029	(-.019)
Conservative ^b	0.084	(.062)	0.040	(.037)
Reform ^b	0.127	(.130)**	0.064	(.066)
Unaffiliated ^b	0.150	(.131)*	0.074	(.065)
Education	0.000	(.001)	0.001	(.002)
Age at first marriage			0.005	(.047)
Age at birth of first child			0.002	(.021)
Current marital status			-0.168	(-.148)*
Age of youngest child under 18 in household			0.005	(.106)
Number of children under 18 in household			-0.070	(-.172)*
R	.152		.305	
R ²	.023		.093	
(Unweighted <i>n</i>)	(586)			

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.10$.

^aData are unstandardized coefficients and (in parentheses) standardized coefficients, β .

^bUsing dummy variables, 0 represents “does not identify with denomination”; 1 represents “identifies with denomination.” The category “Reconstructionist” was omitted.

which often makes it economically impractical for one of the parents to work full time). Thus, education, marital status, and number of children under 18 in the household appear to explain the denominational differences in the number of hours women are employed. These are more important than familialistic indications such as age at first marriage, age at birth of first child, or age of youngest child, which are also included in the model.

DENOMINATION AND OCCUPATION

Next we turn to denominational differences in the occupations of men and women. Given the slight differences in educational attainment between the denominations, we might expect somewhat different occupational distributions. We might also expect greater similarity between the occupations of men and women in the more egalitarian denominations (Reform/Reconstructionist) and the least similarity among the Orthodox (although our findings in 1990 suggested greater occupational similarity between Orthodox men and women than in other denominations).

Although there are commonalities in the occupational distributions across denominational groups, there are also differences within each gender

(Table 8.3). Among the men, the most common types of occupation are professional; sales and management executive are the next most common; technical and service occupations are the least common in all denominational groups of men. While there is a higher proportion of managers/executives among Conservative and Reform/Reconstructionist men than among the Orthodox or unaffiliated, dissimilarity coefficients between men in different denominations do not exceed 13.5, which indicates strong similarity across all denominational groups (less than 14% of men in each denomination would have to change their occupations for all of the denominations to have identical occupational distributions).

There is a similar pattern of consistency among women: professional occupations are the most common, followed by management/executive, sales, and occupational support. Among the Orthodox, however, more than half of employed women have professional occupations, in contrast to about 40% of women in the other groups. As a result, the highest degree of dissimilarity is between Orthodox and Conservative women, at 17.3; the dissimilarity coefficients between women in other denominational groups do not exceed 11.9 (indicating that less than 12% of women in one denominational group would have to change occupations to have an occupational distribution identical to that of women in another group, using the broad occupational categories).

Comparing the occupations of men and women in each denomination, we find the greatest degree of dissimilarity among the Orthodox (17.1) and the Reform/Reconstructionists (16.5). In these two groups there is a disproportionate percentage of women in the professions, compared with men. In the Conservative and unaffiliated groups, the distributions of men's and women's occupations are more similar.

Looking at more detailed occupations, we can compare the top 10 (detailed) occupations (with the highest proportion employed in each denomination) in each denominational group. We see that there is quite a bit of overlap between the denominations (Table 8.4). Among men, 6 of the top 10 occupations are shared by all denominational groups; 9 of 10 occupations in the non-Orthodox groups are shared by at least one other group. It is the Orthodox who differ the most from the other denominations, with 3 of their top 10 occupations not appearing in the other groups: sales representatives, wholesale and manufacturing (although retail salespersons appears in all denominations); directors of religious activities and education; and butchers, meat, poultry, fish (presumably at kosher facilities).

There is a similarly consistent pattern among women: half of the top 10 occupations are common to all denominational groups (teachers, retail

Table 8.3 Occupational Distribution for American Jews (Ages 25–64) by Denomination and Gender^a

	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform/ Reconstructionist	Unaffiliated
<i>Men</i>				
Management/executive	10.3	15.2	13.7	9.0
Business/finance	7.5	12.1	8.1	4.9
Professional	38.0	37.4	39.2	42.2
Technical	1.7	3.8	2.5	3.8
Service	2.5	2.2	3.1	5.4
Sales	12.5	14.1	17.6	19.1
Office/ administrative support	6.7	3.7	3.1	3.4
Blue collar	8.8	4.7	5.7	5.0
Other	12.0	6.7	7.1	7.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
<i>Women</i>				
Management/executive	9.3	15.3	12.2	10.2
Business/finance	4.6	8.1	5.6	5.1
Professional	53.4	36.2	43.1	41.0
Technical	2.4	3.3	5.0	4.8
Service	1.9	0.8	5.2	5.6
Sales	12.8	11.6	11.2	13.7
Office/ administrative support	11.8	13.6	12.6	13.4
Blue collar	0.6	3.5	1.1	2.0
Other	3.1	7.5	4.1	4.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Dissimilarity coefficient between men and women's occupations	17.1	10.4	16.5	11.1

^aData are percentages.

salespersons, managers, and secretaries), and another 4 occupations occur in three denominational groups (lodging managers, registered nurses, lawyers, and office clerks). Again, it is the Orthodox who are the most highly differentiated from the other denominational groups, with 5 occupations that do not appear in the top 10 of the other groups: secondary school teachers, preschool and kindergarten teachers (although other teachers are in all groups), bookkeepers (although accountants appear in other groups), computer scientists, and occupational therapists.

Table 8.4 Top Ten Occupations of American Jewish Men and Women by Denominational Preference^a

	Orthodox	Conservative	Reform/Reconstructionist	Unaffiliated
<i>Men</i>	Retail salespersons (6.3)	Physicians and surgeons (6.7)	Retail salespersons (10.8)	Retail salespersons (12.3)
	Other teachers and instructors (5.7)	Retail salespersons (6.6)	Lawyers (7.3)	Computer programmers (4.9)
	Accountants/auditors (5.1)	Accountants/auditors (6.5)	Chief executives (4.1)	Other teachers and instructors (4.2)
	Computer programmers (5.0)	Managers, all other (6.1)	Other teachers and instructors (4.0)	Chief executives (3.9)
	Engineers, all other (4.3)	Lawyers (5.8)	Physicians and surgeons (3.9)	Engineers, all other (3.2)
	Sales Representatives, wholesale and manufacturing (3.1)	Management analysts (4.8)	Managers, all other (3.3)	Postsecondary teachers (3.0)
	Lawyers (3.0)	Engineers, all other (3.2)	Management analysts (3.0)	Accountants/ auditors (2.0)
	Directors, religious activities and education(2.9)	Real estate brokers/ sales agents (3.0)	Engineers, all other (3.0)	Physicians and surgeons (2.8)
	Managers, all other (2.4)	Chief executives (3.0)	Real estate brokers/sales agents (2.5)	Managers, all other (2.6)
	Butchers, meat, poultry, fish processing workers (2.3)	Driver/sales workers and truck drivers (2.7)	Post-secondary teachers (2.4)	Medical assistants/ health support (2.4)

Women	Elementary and middle school teachers (16.8)	Retail salespersons (7.8)	Retail salespersons (5.7)	Retail salespersons (7.6)
	Retail salespersons (9.5)	Elementary and middle school teachers (5.9)	Other teachers and instructors (4.9)	Secretaries, administrative assistants (5.8)
	Other teachers and instructors (7.5)	Lodging managers (4.9)	Elementary and middle school teachers (4.2)	Other teachers and instructors (5.7)
	Managers, all other (5.1)	Accountants/auditors (4.2)	Managers, all other (3.5)	Managers, all other (5.6)
	Secondary school teachers (5.1)	Other teachers and instructors (4.2)	Office clerks, general (3.3)	Elementary and middle school teachers (4.8)
	Preschool and kindergarten teachers (5.0)	Office clerks, general (4.1)	Registered nurses (3.1)	Social workers (3.7)
	Bookkeeping, accounting, auditing clerks (3.3)	Managers, all other (3.8)	Lodging managers (3.0)	Office clerks, general (2.8)
	Secretaries, administrative assistants (3.1)	Registered nurses (3.3)	Lawyers (3.0)	Registered nurses (2.7)
	Computer scientists, systems analysts (3.0)	Secretaries, administrative assistants (3.2)	Social workers (3.0)	Sales and related workers, all other (2.6)
	Occupational therapists (2.9)	Lawyers (3.1)	Secondary school teachers	Lawyers (2.2)

■ Occupation occurs in two columns only.

■ Occupation occurs in one column only.

^aPercentage of total occupational distribution in that gender and denomination in parentheses.

Between the men and women in each denominational group, there is an overlap of only 3 or 4 occupations. Physicians and surgeons, which are in the top 10 occupations of three of the men's denominational groups, do not appear in the top 10 occupations of any of the women's groups, nor do chief executives, real estate brokers/sales agents, post-secondary teachers, or engineers. In the women's groups but not the men's are lodging managers; registered nurses; secretaries; office clerks; secondary school, elementary/middle school, and preschool/kindergarten teachers; and social workers. It seems that gender differences in specific occupations persist across all denominations

The denominational groups show much more similarity to each other than to the broader population, among both men and women. Overall, the denominations show little variation in their dissimilarity from the broader white population (Table 8.5). In all of the denominational groups and the unaffiliated, slightly more than a third would need to change occupations to have occupations similar to those of the broader white population. Among men, only the Orthodox show a slightly greater degree of similarity (dissimilarity coefficient, 37.7) to the broader population than the Conservative, Reform, or unaffiliated groups (dissimilarity coefficients, 43.3, 42.1, and 43.2, respectively). The younger age and somewhat lower educational level of the Orthodox in the NJPS sample, compared with the Conservative, Reform, and unaffiliated, may account for this difference. Among the women, the Orthodox are somewhat less similar (dissimilarity coefficient, 39.0) to the broader female population than are the Conservative, Reform, or unaffiliated (33.1, 31.1, 29.2, respectively). This is because, as we have seen, there is an especially high proportion of Orthodox women in professional occupations (55%), compared with women in the other denominations and in the broader population of white women.

Because of the great disparity in education between Jews and the broader white population, we also looked at differences in occupational distribution, among those with college degrees only, between each denomination and the broader population (based on the occupational distributions in Table A-5 of the Appendix). Here there is somewhat more variation. Among the men, it is the unaffiliated who stand out, with a dissimilarity coefficient of 26.0, compared with dissimilarity coefficients of 15.0, 16.8, and 14.0 among the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform, respectively. In comparison with their affiliated counterparts with college degrees, relatively fewer unaffiliated men are employed in management or business and finance, and relatively more unaffiliated men are in sales. As men with college degrees in the broader white population are more likely to be in management and somewhat less likely to be in sales than are Jewish men with college degrees, this increases the difference

Table 8.5 Occupational Dissimilarity Coefficients between American Jews and Non-Hispanic Whites (Ages 25 and Over) by Gender, Education, and Denominational Preference

Denomination	Total		B.A.+	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Orthodox	37.7	39.0	15.0	28.6
Conservative	43.3	33.1	16.8	11.7
Reform/Reconstructionist	42.1	31.1	14.0	9.0
Unaffiliated	43.2	29.2	26.0	13.5

Data sources: U.S. Census, 2000; NJPS, 2000–01.

in occupational distribution for the unaffiliated. Among women with college degrees, the Orthodox are particularly different from their counterparts in the broader population, resulting from a high proportion of college-educated Orthodox women (more than 78%) with professional occupations, compared with only 58% of their counterparts in the broader population. There is a lower percentage of college-educated Orthodox women than of college-educated women from other groups in sales occupations.

DENOMINATION AND OCCUPATIONAL REWARDS

The occupational differences just described result in significant income differences between the various denominations among men but not women (Table 8.6). Among men, the highest earnings are found among Conservatives and Reform/Reconstructionists; the unaffiliated and Orthodox have lower incomes. When we consider only those who are employed full time, the unaffiliated achieve considerably lower earnings than the Orthodox. There is much less variation in women’s earnings; among women who are employed full time, Orthodox women achieve higher earnings than non-Orthodox women (but because they are a relatively small group, this difference does not result in a statistically significant analysis of variance).

The higher the men’s income, the lower is the ratio of women’s to men’s income. Among the Orthodox, the ratio changes considerably when we compare the total with those employed full time, indicating that much of the gender difference in income in this group results from the greater tendency for Orthodox women to work part time. Among full-time employees, women make nearly 85% of what men make, quite high even compared with the broader U.S. population. In the other groups, controlling for full-time employment does not alter the comparison of men’s with women’s income: for Conservatives and Reform/Reconstructionists, women make about half of men’s earnings; unaffiliated women make about two-thirds.

The denominational differences in income disappear when education, marital status, and number of children at home are controlled for. In the multiple regression of annual earnings presented in Table 8.7, dummy variables for each of the main denominations are entered (the omitted category is Reconstructionist), whereas age, education, current marital status, and number of children under 18 in the household are controlled for. We can see that denominational differences in income are not statistically significant. The main explanatory variables for income differences are education, age, and, for men, number of children in the household: the higher the education, the higher the earnings; the older the respondent (and hence the more seniority), the higher the earnings; and for men, the greater the number of children in the household, the higher the earnings. Note also that women's income is not well explained by these variables. Education explains about half of the variation in women's income as it does in men's (comparing the unstandardized regression coefficients), and generally less than 8% of the variation in women's income is explained by these variables.

To sum up the denominational differences in secular achievement, there are denominational differences in education and extent of labor force participation, especially among women. However, denominational differences in labor force participation can be explained by educational differences and

Table 8.6 Occupational Rewards for American Jews (Ages 25–64), by Denomination and Gender^a

Denomination	Mean annual earnings (\$)			Mean occupational prestige	
	Men ^b	Women	Ratio M/W	Men	Women
Orthodox	80,785 (71)	52,077 (42)	64.5	54.04 (89)	53.54 (71)
Conservative Reform/	119,190 (146)	55,869 (154)	46.9	55.95 (223)	52.66 (230)
Reconstructionist	94,358 (237)	50,025 (269)	53.0	53.58 (333)	53.51 (407)
Unaffiliated	78,520 (210)	50,056 (186)	63.7	52.30 (263)	50.94 (257)
<i>Full time only</i>					
Orthodox	90,493 (61)	76,477 (23)	84.5	56.17 (79)	53.10 (38)
Conservative Reform/	122,370 (132)	56,332 (106)	46.0	56.00 (204)	52.27 (172)
Reconstructionist	97,440 (216)	53,367 (205)	54.8	53.89 (300)	54.69 (307)
Unaffiliated	81,955 (189)	53,408 (145)	65.2	52.38 (229)	51.73 (205)

^aUnweighted *n* in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

^bAnova of denomination significant at $p < 0.05$ (for both total and full time).

Table 8.7 Multiple Regression Analysis of Annual Earnings of American Jewish Men and Women (Ages 25–64), Employed Full Time

Independent variable	Men		Women	
Orthodox ^a	-1.469	(-.066)	1.654	(.079)
Conservative ^a	0.974	(.060)	0.587	(.047)
Reform ^a	-0.008	(.000)	0.320	(.650)
Unaffiliated ^a	-0.568	(-.036)	0.780	(.285)
Education	2.022	(.329)*	1.222	(.245)*
Marital status ^b	0.463	(.032)	0.320	(.029)
Number of children under 18 in household	0.533	(.085)*	0.096	(.015)
Age	0.070	(.100)*	0.050	(.097)*
R ²	.390		.274	
R	.152		.075	
(Unweighted <i>n</i>)		(600)		(483)

* $p < 0.05$.

^aUsing dummy variables, 0 represents “does not identify with denomination”; 1 represents “identifies with denomination.” The category “Reconstructionist” was omitted.

^b0, not married; 1, married.

family situation. The main occupational differences are between the Orthodox and non-Orthodox denominations, and they do not result in income or prestige differences that cannot be explained by education, age, or family characteristics. Thus, denominational differences in occupational rewards do not appear to be a result of denomination per se, and are related only indirectly to denomination through educational differences.

As we have already mentioned, denomination is a very imprecise indicator of Jewish identity and does not get at the nuances of different types of Jewish identity. Should we, then, expect that expressions of Jewish identity will be more closely related to secular achievement? In the following section we explore the relationship between expressions of Jewish identity and secular achievement, and observe whether the relationships that we find are similar in the various denominations.

JEWISH IDENTITY AND SECULAR ACHIEVEMENT

In this section, we analyze the extent to which various ways of expressing Jewish identity are related to patterns of secular achievement. This relationship is critical for understanding why American Jews are such high achievers: if it is because of the Jewish religion or culture, we would expect strong expressions of religious or ethnic identity to be related to higher secular

achievement. Because we have both religious and ethnic identity indicators, we can distinguish between what in the Jewish heritage is most closely related to higher secular achievement. If it is the religious tradition of education that is spilling over to secular achievement, we will find religious expressions of Jewish identity more strongly related to secular achievement; if it is the identification with the Jewish people and accompanying norms of behavior, the ethnic expressions of Jewish identity are likely to be more strongly related to secular achievement. We can also distinguish between personal, familistic expressions of Jewish identity and more public, collective expressions of that identity. More public, collective identity is likely to reflect social norms associated with American Jews, whereas personal expressions of Jewish identity may reflect more ideological orientations. On the other hand, involvement in a job may take time away from involvement in Jewish activities, such as volunteer work at Jewish organizations. Employment may also indicate greater involvement in the secular world and may thus be associated with less particularistic Jewish identification. We consider these relationships separately for men and women, as participation in the labor force and the accompanying occupational achievement follow different patterns for men and women.

To begin with, we divided each of the Jewish identity factors into “strong Jewish identity” and “weak Jewish identity” (two sample groups of approximately equal size) and compared (with *t*-tests) secular achievement between the two groups for men and women separately. As measures of secular achievement, we looked at the percentage of those who were college educated, the percentage of those participating in the labor force, the percentage of those working full time in the labor force (Table 8.8), the percentage of those engaged in managerial/business/professional occupations, the mean annual earnings, and the mean occupational prestige (Table 8.9).

Striking differences are found in the proportion of both college-educated men and women with stronger and weaker Jewish identity. For the private expressions of religious identity, stronger Jewish identity is associated with a lower level of education; for the private expressions of ethnic identity, stronger Jewish identity is associated with a higher education. For the public religious and ethnic expressions of Jewish identity, stronger identity is associated with a higher education (with one exception: those who have a stronger identity with Israel’s central role have a lower level of education than those who have weaker identity in this respect). Also striking is the difference in percentage of women employed full time in the labor force: for every Jewish identity factor, those with stronger Jewish identity are much less likely to be employed full time than are those with weaker Jewish identity (Figure 8.3).

Table 8.8 Educational Attainment, Labor Force Participation, and Full-time Employment of American Jews (Ages 25–64), by Jewish Identity Factor and Gender^a

Jewish identity factor	B.A.+ (%)		Employed in labor force (%)		Employed full time (35+ hours per week) (%)	
	Strong Identity	Weak Identity	Strong Identity	Weak Identity	Strong Identity	Weak Identity
<i>Men</i>						
Activity (private mixed)	72.9 (509)	73.9 (628)	86.4 (508)	87.0 (622)	92.5 (439)	88.2* (541)
Universal Morality (public mixed)	74.5 (591)	72.3 (546)	86.0 (587)	87.5 (543)	89.7 (505)	90.5 (475)
Ritual (private religious)	68.4 (373)	76.6* (735)	87.7 (373)	87.0 (732)	88.7 (327)	90.4 (637)
Belief (private religious)	70.3 (569)	75.1** (590)	86.6 (569)	86.8 (585)	89.5 (492)	90.4 (508)
Ceremony (public religious)	79.7 (596)	67.5* (532)	91.1 (574)	83.1* (531)	91.2 (523)	88.2 (441)
Tribalism (private ethnic)	77.3 (463)	70.6* (657)	88.0 (465)	86.0 (652)	89.7 (409)	90.7 (561)
Culture (private ethnic)	77.0 (478)	69.3* (671)	88.7 (476)	85.8 (668)	89.1 (422)	90.1 (573)
Attachment to Israel (private ethnic)	80.2 (408)	69.8* (721)	88.0 (409)	85.2 (915)	87.5 (360)	91.5*** (609)
Exceptionalism (public ethnic)	76.7 (639)	69.0* (481)	88.4 (635)	84.9** (482)	89.3 (561)	91.7 (409)
Organizations (public ethnic)	79.7 (394)	69.6* (750)	88.9 (396)	85.3*** (742)	88.9 (352)	90.1 (633)
Israel's Role Central (public ethnic)	71.2 (614)	76.3* (515)	85.8 (613)	86.7 (511)	89.7 (526)	90.3 (443)

Table 8.8 (continued)

Jewish identity factor	B.A.+ (%)			Employed in labor force (%)			Employed full time (35+ hours per week) (%)			
	Strong Identity	Weak Identity		Strong Identity	Weak Identity		Strong Identity	Weak Identity		
<i>Women</i>										
Activity	62.5 (712)	68.9* (684)		72.8 (713)	75.7 (680)		69.9 (519)	80.2* (515)		
Universal Morality	68.6 (821)	61.4* (575)		74.2 (819)	74.2 (574)		74.3 (608)	76.1 (426)		
Ritual	58.5 (424)	69.8* (886)		67.8 (425)	77.7* (883)		68.4 (228)	78.1* (686)		
Belief	60.7 (837)	72.1* (556)		71.0 (835)	77.7* (556)		72.8 (593)	77.6** (432)		
Ceremony	68.2 (761)	63.2** (549)		74.6 (761)	74.2 (547)		71.3 (568)	80.8* (406)		
Tribalism	66.2 (616)	66.9 (706)		71.4 (616)	77.8* (704)		70.5 (440)	79.4* (548)		
Culture	69.1 (647)	63.3* (711)		73.0 (648)	75.6 (705)		70.8 (473)	78.8* (533)		
Attachment to Israel	71.2 (497)	63.4* (890)		74.0 (499)	74.7 (886)		70.5 (369)	78.0* (662)		
Exceptionalism	73.3 (765)	57.3* (559)		76.3 (764)	72.8 (556)		74.6 (583)	76.5 (405)		
Organizations	69.6 (517)	63.1* (839)		72.7 (516)	74.3 (638)		69.6 (375)	79.6* (623)		
Israel's Role Central	63.2 (828)	70.7* (559)		73.6 (825)	75.7 (560)		72.5 (607)	79.3* (424)		

*t-Test significant at $p < .05$; ** significant at $p < 0.1$.

^aUnweighted n in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.




Figure 8.3. Percentage of women (ages 25–64) employed full time, by strength of Jewish identity.

Occupational achievement is also related to Jewish identity: both men and women with strong Jewish identity, especially ethnic identity, are more likely to have a managerial, business, or professional occupation (Table 8.9). Men with stronger Jewish identity are more likely to have higher annual earnings than men with weaker Jewish identity; and occupational prestige is higher among those with stronger Jewish identity. The relationships are particularly strong and consistent for ethnic identity.

Thus, relationships between Jewish identity and secular achievement seem to be fairly consistent, with higher secular achievement among those with stronger Jewish identity. Women are the exception: they are less likely to be employed full time when they have strong Jewish identity. This fits with the pattern we saw earlier among dual earners, where compared with wives in the broader U.S. population Jewish wives were more likely to be “secondary earners,” that is, employed part time when family roles beckoned.

JEWISH IDENTITY, DENOMINATIONAL PREFERENCE, AND SECULAR ACHIEVEMENT

Many of the denominational differences we observed in secular achievement disappeared once we held family and demographic characteristics constant. We also want to see whether any denominational differences remain once we control for Jewish identity, demographic variables, and family characteristics. As we mentioned earlier, in 1990 we found that Jewishness influenced family characteristics more than it influenced labor force participation and subsequent occupational achievement and rewards

Table 8.9 Occupational Attainment and Rewards of American Jews (Ages 25-64), by Jewish Identity and Gender*

Jewish identity factor	In managerial/business/professional occupations (%)		Mean annual earnings (\$)		Mean occupational prestige score	
	Strong Identity	Weak Identity	Strong Identity	Weak Identity	Strong Identity	Weak Identity
<i>Men</i>						
Activity	62.7 (474)	57.4* (594)	105,810 (283)	94,874 (358)	54.0 (426)	53.4 (529)
Universal Morality	61.9 (551)	57.5 (517)	96,055 (360)	103,340 (321)	53.9 (494)	53.4 (461)
Ritual	60.6 (358)	58.4 (694)	115,260 (217)	94,319* (411)	54.7 (324)	52.8** (612)
Belief	59.8 (535)	57.6 (559)	108,010 (313)	91,797* (345)	54.0 (476)	52.7 (502)
Ceremony	63.8 (551)	53.9* (501)	112,600 (314)	90,509* (314)	54.8 (497)	52.0* (439)
Tribalism	65.3 (435)	55.1* (624)	112,440 (255)	90,231* (390)	55.4 (255)	52.0* (390)
Culture	64.1 (451)	54.7* (634)	108,620 (269)	90,892* (381)	54.2 (407)	52.7 (562)
Attachment to Israel	61.7 (389)	57.0 (672)	112,930 (231)	91,143* (409)	54.8 (347)	52.5* (597)
Exceptionalism	61.0 (613)	57.0 (446)	108,200 (370)	86,655* (275)	54.2 (553)	52.3* (394)
Organizations	66.1 (378)	54.2* (699)	114,050 (219)	91,268* (424)	55.2 (339)	52.3* (621)
Israel's Role						
Central	59.6 (576)	57.7 (485)	101,930 (343)	95,631 (297)	53.6 (518)	53.1 (426)
<i>Women</i>						
Activity	60.8 (607)	59.6 (591)	53,445 (312)	57,394 (329)	53.1 (560)	52.2 (547)
Universal Morality	62.3 (700)	57.2** (498)	56,182 (387)	54,389 (254)	53.4 (646)	51.6* (461)
Ritual	57.6 (347)	60.9 (779)	54,026 (172)	56,459 (430)	51.7 (323)	52.9 (722)

Belief	60.4 (702)	59.9 (489)	55.172 (364)	57.598 (280)	52.5 (647)	52.8 (456)
Ceremony	61.9 (656)	57.0 (470)	55.754 (338)	55.776 (470)	53.6 (605)	51.2 (440)
Tribalism	61.6 (516)	60.0 (627)	57.548 (259)	55.978 (363)	53.9 (465)	52.1* (591)
Culture	65.0 (554)	56.1* (611)	56.364 (286)	56.076 (344)	54.4 (510)	51.1* (569)
Attachment to Israel	63.4 (426)	58.1** (768)	56.030 (233)	56.281 (408)	54.1 (393)	52.0* (710)
Exceptionalism	64.5 (676)	55.3* (467)	58.804 (364)	53.566 (258)	53.9 (625)	51.4* (431)
Organizations	64.1 (434)	56.6* (734)	60.205 (220)	52.865** (397)	54.0 (400)	51.5* (670)
Israel's Role Central	60.5 (704)	59.2 (490)	54.340 (379)	58.779 (262)	52.8 (657)	52.8 (446)

**t*-test significant at $p < 0.05$; ** significant at $p < 0.10$.

^aUnweighted *n* in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

(Hartman and Hartman, 1996a; 1996b). According to our findings, Jewish identity is stronger for women than for men; we wanted to see whether Jewish identity has a greater effect on the secular achievement of women than of men, once we control for denominational preference, demographic variables, and family characteristics. We also found somewhat different relationships between Jewishness and secular achievement for older and younger respondents in 1990, so we wanted to control for age cohort as well.

We continue our analysis by presenting the results of a series of regression analyses, which have as dependent variables various indicators of secular achievement (education, extent of labor force participation, occupation, earnings, and occupational prestige); the independent variables are denominational preference (dummy variables for Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and unaffiliated, with Reconstructionist the omitted category), selected Jewish identity factors (those factors that in the *t*-test analyses had the strongest relationships to secular achievement), demographic variables (age cohort), and family characteristics (age at first marriage, number of children under 18 in the household, and current marital status).² We analyze the relative strength of each of these independent variables in explaining the secular achievement of Jewish men and women, respectively.

We summarize our findings in Table 8.10 (results of the detailed regression analyses are available from the authors upon request). Only independent variables that had regression coefficients with a statistical significance of $p < 0.10$ or $p < 0.05$ are presented. The results with respect to labor force participation of men are omitted, as less than 10% of the men aged 25–64 were not participating in the labor force and the results of the analysis were inconclusive. Otherwise, there is a regression analysis for men and women, respectively, for each of the dependent variables. The dependent variables of labor force participation and occupation are dichotomies (participation in the labor force or not; managerial/professional/business occupation or not) and therefore were analyzed by means of binary logistic regression. The other analyses were multiple regression analyses. The effects of each of the independent variables are those that remain after the other independent variables are held constant.

We see that of the denominational variables, being Orthodox has a weak negative relationship with three of the secular achievement indicators for men (education, occupation, and mean annual earnings) and a weak positive relationship with annual earnings for women (possibly because Orthodox women are so much more likely to be in professional occupations, as we saw earlier). Controlling for denomination does not eliminate many of the relationships between secular achievement and the measures of Jewish identity. So even after controlling for denomination, demography, and family characteristics, stronger ethnic identity is related to higher educational achievement, occupation, and occupational prestige; but stronger religious identity (Ritual, Ceremony) is associated with a lower educational level for both men and women and a lower-status occupation for men. However, stronger religious identity is associated with higher occupational prestige and earnings for men. For men, it is possible that the strong ethnic identification is a result of secular achievement rather than a force toward secular achievement. (As we cautioned before, we cannot determine the causal direction with these data, and both secular achievement and Jewish identity may influence each other.) For women, personal ethnic attachment to the Jewish people (Tribalism) is negatively associated with labor force participation and occupational achievement. However, women who have higher occupational prestige are more likely to be active in Jewish organizations.

Occupation and occupational rewards are strongly and positively related to education for both men and women (as is labor force participation for women).

Few family characteristics figure in the secular achievement of men. However, for women, the number of children at home curtails labor force participation and full-time employment (as we have already seen). Currently married women are employed fewer hours than non-married

women, and they are more likely to be in managerial, business, or (even more likely) professional occupations.

Thus, we have refined the findings from the 1990 NJPS that “Jewishness” affects labor force participation, occupation, and ensuing rewards only through its influence on education or family characteristics. We see that there is a relationship between ethnic Jewish identity and higher occupational achievement that does not disappear when denomination, education, age, and family characteristics are controlled for. We also see that there is a relationship between secular achievement and stronger religious identity, although it tends to be weak, as well as a relationship between occupational prestige and earnings and weaker religious identity. Relationships between Jewishness and secular achievement tend to be similar for men and women, with one exception: strong ethnic identity for women (Tribalism) is associated with lower labor force participation and (weakly) with lower occupational attainment.

We do not see evidence that Jewishness affects women’s secular behavior to a greater extent than it affects men’s; rather, there are more aspects of Jewish identity that retain independent relationships with occupational achievement among men than women. So it seems that some of the correlation between secular achievement and Jewishness for women results from the influence of Jewishness on family behavior (as we saw in the preceding chapter); for men, however, secular achievement is less closely related to family characteristics than to education and Jewish identity. It is possible that occupational achievement enables men to become better integrated into the Jewish communal scene, which reinforces their Jewish identity.

We suspected that Jewish identity might carry more weight for the Orthodox, for whom Jewish identity seems to be central to many aspects of life, than for the other denominational groups, especially the Reform/Reconstructionist and the unaffiliated, who tend to be more secular in orientation. To study this, we repeated the earlier regression analyses for separate denominational groups to see whether the same expressions of Jewish identity were related to secular achievement in each denomination and gender (the regression models are the same as used earlier, minus the dummy variables for denomination). We summarize the results of our analyses in Table 8.11 (detailed results of the regression analyses are available from the authors upon request).

With regard to educational attainment, it is clear that ethnic Jewish identity is related in a similar positive way in each of the denominational groups and for each gender. The identity factor Activity (believing that being Jewish encompasses being active in the contemporary American Jewish community

Table 8.10 Relationships among Secular Achievement, Denomination, Jewish Identity Factor Scores, Demographic Variables, and Family Characteristics of American Jews (Ages 25–64) by Gender^a

Independent variable	Education	Labor force participation ^b	Weekly hours of employment	Managerial/business/professional occupation ^b	Occupational prestige score	Mean annual earnings (for full-time-employed)
<i>Men</i>						
Denomination	–Orthodox**		—	–Orthodox**	—	–Orthodox*
Jewish identity factor	–Activity* –Ritual** +Culture* +Exceptionalism*		+Activity*	Ceremony** +Tribalism**	+Ritual* +Tribalism*	+Ritual
Demographic variables				+Education*	+Education*	+Education*
Family characteristics	+AgeMarri*		+Marital*		—	—

Table 8.11 Relationships among Secular Achievement, Jewish Identity Factor Scores, Demographic, and Family Characteristics of American Jews (Ages 25–64), by Gender and Denominational Preference^a

Denominational preference	Education	Labor force participation ^b	Weekly hours of employment	Managerial professional occupation ^b	Occupational prestige score	Mean annual earnings (for full-time-employed)
<i>Men</i>						
Orthodox	+Exceptionalism** +Culture* +Age* +AgeMarri*		—	+Organizations* -AgeMarri*	+Tribalism* +Education* -AgeMarri*	+Exceptionalism* +Organizations* +Education*
Conservative	+Exceptionalism* +Culture*		—	+Organizations** +Education*	+Education* +Education**	+Ritual* +Education**
Reform/ Reconstructionist	-Activity* -Ritual** +Exceptionalism** +Culture** +Agemarr* +Marital*		+Marital*	+Education*	+Ritual* +Education*	+Education**
Unaffiliated	+Exceptionalism* +Culture* +Organizations**		—	+Tribalism* +Education*	+Tribalism** +Education*	+Education*

Women

Orthodox

-Activity*
+Ritual*
+Culture*
+AgeMari
-Chh**

+Education*
+Marital*

-Tribalism*

+Ritual*
+Education*

-Tribalism**
+Education*
+Chh*

-Culture**
+Organizations*
+Chh*

Conservative

-Activity*
+Tribalism**
+Exceptionalism*
-Age*
+AgeMari*

+Ritual*
+Ceremony*
+Tribalism*
-Age*
+AgeMari*

+AgeMari*
-Chh*
-Marital*

-Activity**
+Ritual*
+Education*

+Education*
+Marital**

—

Reform/
Reconstructionist

+Exceptionalism*
+Culture*
-Age*
+AgeMari*

+Activity*
+Ceremony*
-Tribalism**
+Education*

-AgeMari*
-Chh*
-Marital*

-Tribalism**
+Education*
+Marital*

+Education*

+Education**

Unaffiliated

-Tribalism*
+Exceptionalism*
+Culture**
+Organizations*

-Activity*
+Tribalism**
+Education*

+Ceremony*
+Agemari*
-Chh*

+Education*
+Education*

+Education*
+Age*

-Culture**
+Education*

^aJewish identity factor scores: Activity, Ritual, Ceremony, Tribalism, Exceptionalism, Culture, Organizations (weak → strong); age at first marriage (AgeMari), number of children under 18 in household (Chh), current marital status (Marital, o, not married; i, married). Independent variables with statistically significant regression coefficients, based on multiple regressions, except where indicated (-, negative relation; +, positive).

^bo, no; i, yes. Based on logistic regression.

and practice) is related negatively to educational attainment, as is personal religious identity (Ritual) in Reform/Reconstructionist and unaffiliated groups of men, and among Orthodox and Conservative women. So here we see that, for Orthodox and Conservative men, ritual observance is not an obstacle to higher education, but it is for women in these groups; and it is for men in the less observant denominational groups.

Among Orthodox, Conservative, and unaffiliated women, activity in the Jewish community is related negatively to secular achievement, but among Reform/Reconstructionist women, it is related positively to secular achievement. It is possible that the different denominational reference groups place different value on women's integration into the labor force and certain occupations.

Whereas, for Orthodox and unaffiliated men, personal ethnic identity (Tribalism) has a positive relationship to secular achievement, for women, it has different relationships to secular achievement. It has a positive relationship to education and labor force participation among Conservative women, a positive relationship to education but a negative relationship to labor force participation among the unaffiliated, a negative relationship to labor force participation and occupational attainment among the Reform/Reconstructionist, and a negative relationship to occupational prestige among the Orthodox. Again, it is possible that the different denominational groups have different communal norms for women's labor force achievements, so that sometimes Jewishness competes with women's secular involvement, and sometimes it reinforces or supports it. For Orthodox women, the more hours they are employed, the weaker their ethnic identity, but this relationship is not found in the other denominational groups, among whom the most important variables affecting hours of employment are the number of children at home and whether or not a woman is currently married. Consistent across all denominations and both genders is the importance of education for occupational achievement and rewards (hence indirectly affected by Jewishness).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has answered some of the questions we started out with and raised other issues for further research. Denominational groups tend to differ with respect to labor force participation and occupational achievement, particularly among women, and particularly comparing the Orthodox with the non-Orthodox. Much of this difference among women can be explained when we control for family characteristics. Some of the difference among men can be explained by the somewhat lower educational attainment of Orthodox men. The denominational groups appear to exert

two kinds of influence on secular achievement: they reflect norms about familism, which are related to age at marriage, age of childbearing, and number of children, which in turn are related to the labor force involvement of women and their subsequent occupational achievement. They also provide reinforcement for high secular achievement, particularly among men.

But many of the denominational differences can be explained by strength of Jewish identity in its various forms. Therefore, when we control for expressions of Jewish identity and denomination, it is expressions of Jewish identity more than denominational preference that are related to secular achievement. Some aspects of Jewish identity are related to secular achievement in all denominational groups. We cannot say that Jewish identity has a relationship to secular achievement only among the Orthodox; and we do not find that religious identity (as opposed to ethnic identity) has a greater influence among the Orthodox than the other denominational groups. However, among women in particular, ethnic Jewish identity has a different relationship to secular achievement when we compare denominational groups. Thus, among the Orthodox, personal ethnic identity is lower among women who are more involved in the labor force, but among Conservatives, personal ethnic identity is higher among women active in the labor force. Among Reform and Reconstructionist women, there is also a negative relationship between personal ethnic identity and labor force involvement.

What we can conclude is that some types of Jewish identity retain an independent relationship with secular achievement in each of the denominational groups and for each gender; that this relationship is different for men and women in the denomination; and that this relationship differs between denominations. But the fact that there is an independent relationship to secular achievement, for the most part positive, suggests that the American Jewish community is not completely secularized; its particularistic investments in Jewish social and cultural capital are often related to higher secular achievement, especially for men.

We recall from our discussion about gender and Jewish identity in Chapter 6 that one of the explanations for women's greater religiosity (found not only among Jews) is that women have a less structural stake in secular status (e.g., less occupational achievement). However, Orthodox and Conservative women who are more personally religious (on the identity factor Ritual) are more likely to have higher-status occupations (managerial, business, or professional), Conservative and Reform/Reconstructionist women who are more personally religious are more likely to be in the labor force, and the unaffiliated who are more personally religious are likely to be employed more hours per week. This certainly undermines

this structural hypothesis. Orthodox and unaffiliated women who achieve higher annual earnings are less involved in Jewish culture, but Orthodox women with high earnings are more involved in Jewish organizations.

To better understand the influences of the different denominational milieus on women's labor force involvement, or the influence of women's labor force involvement on integration into a denomination's ethnic milieu, we suggest more qualitative research to uncover the mechanisms of the interrelationships.