



PROJECT MUSE®

Gender and American Jews

Harriet Hartman, Moshe Hartman, Sylvia Barack Fishman


Published by Brandeis University Press

Hartman, Harriet & Hartman, Moshe & Fishman, Barack.

Gender and American Jews: Patterns in Work, Education, and Family in Contemporary Life.

Waltham: Brandeis University Press, 2009.

Project MUSE., <https://muse.jhu.edu/>.



➔ For additional information about this book

<https://muse.jhu.edu/book/15685>

CHAPTER 4

Labor Force Participation and Occupational Achievement

According to the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, not only are American Jewish women highly educated, they are (not surprisingly) active in the labor force and have high occupational achievement. These educational and economic characteristics grew out of a history of Jewish women being active in the labor force, reinforced by the tradition of supporting their families while their husbands engaged in religious study; by the immigrant experience, which pushed women to contribute to the household economy; and by active involvement in the contemporary women's movement, which emphasized women's equal participation in public roles. Such economic roles are facilitated by a relatively low rate of fertility, which reduces the familial obligations that constrain the pursuit of higher education and participation in the labor force. Despite their high level of education, labor force participation, and occupational status relative to other U.S. women, the 1990 NJPS data revealed a persistent gender gap in occupational achievement between Jewish women and Jewish men (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a).

One issue particularly of interest in the case of American Jews is how much gender equality they have achieved, a decade later, in labor force participation and occupational roles and rewards, given the high level of human resources both women and men have in terms of educational background. Do American Jewish women reach a plateau of labor force participation and a glass ceiling in terms of occupational achievement, despite their high educational level, or has economic parity been reached? Has the gender gap in occupational achievement narrowed since 1990? And what do we learn from the personal income data, which were not available in earlier studies of American Jews?

A second issue is how family roles affect the labor force participation of American Jewish women and men. Especially among Jewish women, family

responsibilities have exerted a pull out of the labor force, at least temporarily or partially (to part-time employment), despite their high educational level and resultant opportunity costs for reducing their labor force involvement. Recent qualitative research suggests that this dynamic continues among American Jewish women, more so than among American Jewish men (who respond to familial responsibilities by a push to provide more adequately for the family) (Prell, 2007a). Of particular interest is whether American Jewish women continue to be more responsive to familial responsibilities than their counterparts in the broader population, as they have in the past (Chiswick, 1986) or whether increasingly delayed marriage and smaller family size translate into a greater compatibility between women's family roles and labor force involvement than was seen in the past, and hence less differentiation between American Jewish women and their highly educated counterparts in the broader population.

As we have already seen, American women in general have increased their participation in higher education, especially in completing undergraduate and graduate degrees (Chao and Utgoff, 2005). However, the rate of women's participation in the labor force has been relatively stable for about a decade, after having increased dramatically in the preceding few decades (Chao and Utgoff, 2005, p. 1). In fact, women's employment declined in the early 2000s as a result of general labor conditions (Boushey, 2005).

In this chapter, we first describe American Jewish women's contemporary economic roles and consider the differences between their labor force participation and that of American Jewish men. Second, we consider whether American Jews are maintaining their distinction from the rest of the U.S. population in terms of their economic roles and the gender differences within them. Third, we consider whether American Jews' economic roles have changed since 1990 and whether the differences between Jewish men and women in these respects have narrowed. Finally, we look at comparative rewards for labor force participation (annual earnings and occupational prestige) between Jewish men and women.

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION

According to the 2000–01 NJPS, 66.0% of American Jewish men and 54.1% of American Jewish women work in the paid labor force. Of those employed, most work full time (35 or more hours per week): 87.1% of men and 68.9% of women. As we show later, this is quite comparable to the percentages found in the broader U.S. population.

Labor force participation rates vary with age, as expected. Because most Jewish men and women go on to higher education, their entrance into the paid labor force is often delayed until their education is complete. Therefore,

Table 4.1 Percentage of American Jews in Labor Force and Percentage Employed Full Time, by Age and Gender

Age group	In labor force (%)				Employed full time (% of those in labor force)		
	Total	Men	Women	Female Rate/ Male Rate	Total	Men	Women
18–24	54.9	49.0	60.3	1.23	60.6	70.8	53.1
25–34	79.1	85.1	73.2	.86	86.8	89.1	84.1
35–44	85.2	92.2	78.8	.85	77.7	91.4	62.9
45–54	80.6	88.1	73.5	.83	82.6	91.7	72.0
55–64	66.9	79.0	56.7	.72	81.5	87.6	74.3
65+	13.2	16.8	10.3	.61	53.7	61.2	43.6
Total	59.7	66.0	54.1	.82	78.4	87.1	68.9
(n) ^a	(4,050)	(1,792)	(2,266)		(3,490)	(1,220)	(1,270)

^aUnweighted sample size in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

only slightly more than half of 18- to 24-year-olds are in the labor force (Table 4.1). Labor force participation rates are higher among both men and women between the ages of 25 and 54, somewhat lower in the 55–64 age group, and dropping to less than 20% for those 65 and over, as they retire.

In the youngest age group, there is little difference between Jewish men and women’s labor force participation rates, although a slightly higher proportion of women in this age group are in the labor force (perhaps because fewer of them continue on to graduate school). The differences are greater between the ages of 25 and 54, women’s labor force participation rate hovering at about 85% that of men’s. Apparently men retire later than women, as women’s labor force participation rate is only 72% that of men’s among those aged 55–64, and only 61% of men’s among those 65 and older. This also reflects a cohort difference, as women’s labor force participation has been steadily increasing over the past few decades, so for many of these older women, participating in the labor force was not the norm for women or, especially, married women.

At all ages, Jewish women are more likely to work part time than are men. The differences are especially noticeable among those between the ages of 35 and 54; more than 90% of employed men work 35 hours per week or more, compared with 70–75% of women. These are the ages when women’s family roles (especially childrearing) are most demanding, which would explain the higher proportion of women employed part time. However, higher

proportions of employed women also work part time in the younger age group (18–24); and more than half of those 65 and older work only part time when they are employed. During the younger years, when many men and women are continuing their education, almost 30% of the men work part time as well; and during the older years (65+), the proportion of men employed part time is also higher.

Educational Differences in Labor Force Participation

Labor force participation is higher for those with a higher education, as expected (Figure 4.1). Because most of those whose education ended with high school are 65 and older, and most of those who have not completed their education are under 24, we have confined our presentation to those between the ages of 25 and 64. About 60% of those with a high school education or less are employed, compared with about three-quarters of those with some college education, 80% of those with an undergraduate or master’s degree, and more than 90% of those with a doctoral or professional degree. At all of these levels of education, a higher proportion of men are employed than are women, but the difference in labor force participation clearly is smaller at the higher educational levels. Among those with a high school education or less, about half of the women are employed, compared with 77% of the men; among those with some college education, women’s labor force participation is close to 80% that of men’s; and among those with doctoral and professional degrees, women’s labor force participation rate is virtually the same as men’s.

Education makes a bigger difference in the labor force participation rate of women than of men, which results in a smaller gender difference at




Figure 4.1. Percentage in labor force, by education and gender.

higher levels of education. Among those with a high school education or less, just half of the women are employed, compared with more than 90% of the women with doctoral or professional degrees. Among men, the variation is much smaller.

Family Roles and Labor Force Participation

Among American Jews, fewer married women are in the labor force than are non-married women (37.6% of the currently married, compared with 43.2% of the non-married). If we break down the non-married into never married, divorced or separated, and widowed, we find that more than half of the never married and divorced or separated are currently employed (58.3 and 53.6%, respectively), whereas only 11.4% of the widowed are. Most likely the percentage of the widowed who are employed is low because of their older ages.

Thus, if we confine our analysis to women aged 25–64 again, reducing the effect of retirement and of delayed entrance into the labor force because of higher education, the differences between married and non-married women persist, but are considerably smaller. The main difference is between never-married women, who participate in the labor force at nearly the same rate as never-married men, and women who have been married at least once (Figure 4.2). Women currently in their first marriage have the lowest labor force participation rate and differ the most from men with the same marital status. In contrast, current marriage is associated with more labor force participation for men.




Figure 4.2. Percentage in labor force, by marital status and gender.




Figure 4.3. Percentage employed full time (35+ hours/week), by marital status and gender.

Married women are also more likely to be working part time when they work than are non-married women (Figure 4.3). More than 90% of never-married women who are employed work 35 hours per week or more, compared with 61.9% of women currently in first marriages and 73.5% of remarried women. There is no such relationship for men, whose full-time employment hovers around 90% for those of all marital statuses except the widowed. There are several possible explanations for this difference in the employment of married and non-married women. The major explanations are that married women’s income may be considered supplemental to the household income, especially as most married men between the ages of 25 and 64 are employed (close to 90%), and married women are more likely to have children at home, which is more likely to negatively affect the labor force participation of mothers than that of fathers owing to traditional gender roles in the family, time, energy, and financial constraints of substitute childcare.¹

Having children in the household is certainly related to lower labor force participation (Figure 4.4). With every additional child, employment rates are lower; lower labor force participation is found especially for those with three or more children. Furthermore, women with children at home are more likely to work part time than are women with no children at home. The majority of employed women with more than two children at home are employed part time (Figure 4.4).

Having children under 18 in the household does not have the same impact on labor force participation for men as it does for women. In fact, men




Figure 4.4. Percentage in labor force (LF) and percentage of those in LF employed full time (FT), by number of children (women ages 25–64).

are more likely to be employed in the labor force at a full-time job when they have children under 18 at home than when they do not have young children at home (Table 4.2) (again echoing the findings of Prell, 2007a, from her small qualitative sample). As a result, the gender gap in labor force participation and especially full-time employment is greater when there are children in the home than when there are not.

Table 4.2 Presence of Children Under 18 in Household by Labor Force Status, Gender, and Education^a

Presence of children under 18 in household	In labor force (%)				Employed full time (%)			
	No children		1+ children		No children		1+ children	
Men	83.2	(771)	93.2	(422)	89.3	(636)	92.7	(396)
Women	72.0	(904)	70.0	(537)	82.2	(678)	58.1	(387)
Women's/men's rate of LFP ^b	86.5	75.1	92.0	62.9				
<i>Less education than undergraduate degree</i>								
Men	83.4	(212)	79.6	(109)	92.2	(173)	91.3	(93)
Women	60.4	(316)	59.5	(173)	74.8	(199)	61.8	(108)
Women's /men's rate of LFP	72.4	74.7	81.1	67.7				
<i>Education B.A.+</i>								
Men	83.1	(556)	98.6	(310)	88.1	(460)	92.7	(300)
Women	78.4	(586)	74.4	(359)	85.4	(477)	55.7	(274)
Women's/men's rate of LFP	94.3		75.5					

^aUnweighted sample size in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

^bLFP denotes labor force participation.

When we consider the educational attainment of men and women in addition to the presence of children under 18 in the household, we see that having children changes women’s labor force participation to only a small extent, whatever the woman’s level of education. However, men’s labor force participation is greater when they have children than when they do not (Table 4.2). As a result, among those with at least an undergraduate degree and no young children at home, women’s labor force participation and full-time employment are nearly equal to that of men. However, among those with children under 18 at home, for every four men employed, only three women are. The number of children under 18 at home has an even greater impact on the full-time employment of women. The impact of having children under 18 at home is greater for women who have college degrees: when they do not have children of this age at home, their full-time employment is very similar to men’s; when they do have children, the proportion employed full time is even lower than among women with less education. As a result, the gender difference in full-time employment is greatest for college-educated women with children under 18 at home (Table 4.2, Figure 4.5).

We considered the effect not only of “childcare burden,” but also of indicators of “familism” or family roles that may have influenced more long-term choices made regarding women’s participation in the labor force or a career. Although the presence of children under 18 in the household has an effect on women’s labor force participation (see Figure 4.3), having more children (whatever their ages) also is related to lower labor force participation. Other “familistic” indicators include marrying at an early age and having children at a younger age. To see whether this assumption of family




Figure 4.5. Percentage in labor force (LF) and percentage employed full time (FT), by education and presence of child under 18 in household.

roles at a younger age and having more children have an effect on women's labor force participation independent of the actual childcare "burden" of having children under 18 at home, we used a logistic regression analysis to predict women's participation in the labor force. The independent variables were the familistic indicators of age at marriage, age at first birth, and number of live births; and the current family role indicators of number of children under 18 at home, age of youngest child, and current marital status (married, 1; not married, 0). We also controlled for the woman's age and her highest educational attainment. Only women aged 25–64 are included in the analysis to minimize the effects of remaining in school to pursue a higher education and retiring from the labor force. The results are presented in Table 4.3.

Education is the factor most strongly related to a woman's labor force participation (the higher the education, the greater are the odds that she works in the labor force, no matter what her age or family situation), as indicated by the exponential coefficient of 1.492. Her current family situation is also related to her labor force participation: the more children under 18 in the household, the lower are the odds that she works in the labor force; the younger the youngest child, the lower are the odds of her working in the labor force. Current marital status is only weakly related to labor force participation ($p = 0.069$), reinforcing our findings that there is little "marriage penalty" on Jewish women with respect to their labor force participation. The indicators of prioritizing family roles (early age at marriage, early childbearing age) have little relationship to the odds of participating in the labor force once the presence and age of children in the household are controlled for. A woman's age

Table 4.3 Logistic Regression Analysis of Women's Labor Force Participation, by Current Family Status, Familistic Behavior, Education, and Age (Ages 25–64)

Independent variable	Unstandardized regression coefficient	Exponential coefficient
Education	0.400	1.492*
Age at first marriage	-.009	0.991
Age at birth of first child	-.009	0.991
Current marital status	-.376	0.687**
Age of youngest child	-.066	0.937*
Number of children under 18 in household	-.339	0.712*
Age	0.030	1.030
Nagelkerke R^2	0.113	—
(n)	(842)	—

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.10$.

Table 4.4 Multiple Regression Analysis of Women’s Hours of Employment, by Current Family Status, Familistic Behavior, Education, and Age (Ages 25–64)

Independent variable	Unstandardized regression coefficient	Standardized coefficient (β)
Education	.000	.000
Age at first marriage	.005	.049
Age at birth of first child	.004	.041
Current marital status	-.172	-.151*
Age of youngest child	.006	.139
Number of children under 18 in household	-.077	-.189*
Age	-.005	-.102
R	.298	
R ²	.089	
(n)	(586)	

* $p < 0.05$.

is not related to her labor force participation once her current family status and past family behavior and education are controlled for.

A similar analysis of women’s average weekly hours of employment shows that the only significant influences are current family situation: whether or not a woman is currently married and how many children under 18 are in the household. Even educational level does not have a significant relationship to hours of work, once current family status is taken into consideration (Table 4.4).

Comparison of Labor Force Participation with That of the Broader U.S. Population

The labor force participation of American Jews is quite similar to that of the broader U.S. population, among whom 70.0% of men and 57.5% of women were employed in 2000 (www.census.gov, Table QT-P24). Considering only the white U.S. population, there is an even greater similarity: 67.9% of men and 54.7% of women were employed in 2000 (www.census.gov, Table P150A). In terms of full- and part-time work, there is also great similarity. In the broader U.S. population, 86.0% of employed men and 71.0% of employed women worked 35 hours or more per week (www.census.gov, Table PCT82). Similarly, among the white population only, 86.1% of employed men and 69.5% of women worked 35 hours per week or more (Table PCT71A).

When we compare age groups, there is also great similarity, with two notable exceptions (Table 4.5). First, Jewish men aged 20–24 are much less likely to be in the labor force than are men in the broader U.S. population, owing to

Table 4.5 Percentage of American Jews and Non-Hispanic Whites in Labor Force, by Age and Gender^a

Gender	Age group	American Jews		U.S. whites	
Total	20–24	59.8	(242)	71.0	(11,223)
	25–54	81.9	(1,661)	80.2	(79,741)
	55–64	66.6	(425)	61.0	(14,965)
	65+	12.9	(802)	14.1	(4,260)
Total		60.0	(3,235)	68.1	(110,200)
Men	20–24	52.8	(119)	75.1	(6,026)
	25–54	89.0	(812)	87.9	(43,724)
	55–64	78.4	(196)	67.3	(8,018)
	65+	16.1	(362)	18.5	(2,390)
Total		66.2	(1,536)	70.4	(62,159)
Women	20–24	66.5	(123)	66.8	(5,207)
	25–54	75.1	(850)	72.5	(36,016)
	55–64	56.5	(229)	55.0	(6,947)
	65+	10.4	(440)	10.8	(1,870)
Total		54.3	(1,698)	56.1	(50,041)
Female rate/male rate	20–24	1.3		.89	
	25–54	.84		.82	
	55–64	.72		.82	
	65+	.65		.58	
Total		.82		.80	

Data source for Jews: NJPS, 2000–01; for non-Hispanic whites: Chao and Utgoff, 2005, Table 3.

^a*n* in parentheses in thousands; NJPS data weighted by person-weights provided with dataset.

the high proportion of Jewish men going on to higher education at those ages. Second, Jewish men have higher labor force participation rates at ages 55–64, probably also related to their higher education. Despite Jewish women’s relatively higher level of education than that of women in the broader U.S. population, their labor force participation rates are very similar at all ages.

When we control for education, most of the differences between the Jewish and total U.S. population are eliminated (Table 4.6). The differences between men at any of the levels of education is minimal, and the main differences in labor force participation between Jewish and all women are in the lower education groups. Labor force participation rates among women who have earned college degrees (the majority of American Jewish women) are very similar.

Gender differences in labor force participation in both populations are smaller at higher levels of education. At lower levels of education, there are

greater differences among American Jews than in the broader population. This is probably because most of the American Jews who discontinued their education after high school, or even after a few years of college, are on the average older than their counterparts in the broader population. Because older women were less likely to participate in the labor force, their participation rate is lowered by their age in addition to their lower level of education. This may be less true in the broader population, where there is a greater distribution of low through higher levels of education throughout the population.

Considering whether family roles have an impact on the labor force participation of Jewish women that is similar to their impact on women in the broader U.S. population (Table 4.7), we see similar rates of labor force participation among those who have never married and those currently in their first marriages. Among the currently remarried and the widowed, American Jewish women are more likely to be in the labor force than their

Table 4.6 Percentage of American Jews and Non-Hispanic Whites (Ages 25–64) in Labor Force, by Education and Gender^a

Gender	Education	American Jews		U.S. whites	
Total	High school or less	61.7	(253)	68.4	(44,993)
	Some college	74.4	(404)	77.7	(31,899)
	B.A.	80.2	(726)	82.1	(24,758)
	M.A.+	85.8	(694)	85.7	(13,153)
Total		78.7	(2,077)	75.4	(114,803)
Men	High school or less	77.0	(122)	77.3	(25,599)
	Some college	85.7	(162)	83.6	(15,796)
	B.A.	86.1	(362)	88.9	(13,100)
	M.A.+	91.5	(368)	89.8	(7,146)
Total		86.9	(1,004)	82.6	(61,643)
Women	High school or less	47.5	(132)	59.3	(19,392)
	Some college	66.9	(242)	72.6	(16,103)
	B.A.	74.7	(374)	75.7	(11,659)
	M.A.+	79.3	(326)	81.3	(6,006)
Total		71.0	(1,073)	68.5	(53,160)
Female rate/male rate	High school or less	.62		.77	
	Some college	.78		.86	
	B.A.	.87		.85	
	M.A.+	.87		.91	
Total		.82		.83	

Data source for Jews: NJPS, 2000–01; for non-Hispanic whites: Chao and Utgoff, 2005, Table 8.

^a *n* in parentheses in thousands; NJPS data weighted by person-weights provided with dataset.

Table 4.7 Percentage of American Jewish and U.S. Non-Hispanic White Women (Ages 25–64) in Labor Force, by Marital Status^a

Marital status	Jewish women		Non-Hispanic white women	
Never married	80.6	(175)	80.7	(7,340)
Currently married, first marriage	67.6	(607)	68.7	(31,753)
Currently married, remarriage	74.5	(114)	70.3	(9,861)
Divorced/separated	70.0	(134)	77.5	(10,794)
Widowed	72.0	(25)	59.3	(2,277)

Data source for Jewish women: NJPS 2000–01; for non-Hispanic white women: SIPP, 2001. ^a*n* in parentheses in thousands; NJPS data weighted by person-weights provided with dataset.

counterparts in the broader non-Hispanic white population. The main difference between widowed Jewish women and widowed women in the non-Hispanic white population is their level of education; that is, half of Jewish widows have at least an undergraduate degree, compared with only 13% of women in the broader population. This differential, however, exists in the other subgroups of women as well, though the differences are not as large. Jewish widows and widows in the broader population are of similar average age (55); it is possible that because college-educated women remain employed later in the life cycle, their higher education makes a greater difference among the widowed than in other groups.

The labor force participation of American Jewish women and the broader population of non-Hispanic white women is also quite similar when we control for number of children (Table 4.8). When we compare Jewish women to white women in the broader population with the same number of children, we see that education has a greater impact on Jewish women (Figure 4.6). It is especially interesting to note the extent to which educated Jewish women with four or more children (albeit a small number, unweighted $n = 23$) participate in the labor force compared with Jewish women with less education or white women, whatever their education. Most of the Jewish women with four or more children are Orthodox, and we shall see in Chapter 8 that this type of religious affiliation has a positive impact on labor force participation when there are large families.

Having children under 3 years of age at home results in lower labor force participation rates for Jewish women as well as for white women in the broader U.S. population; however, Jewish women’s labor force participation is affected more by having such a young child at home (Table 4.9). The labor force participation rate of Jewish women with a child under the age of 3 at home is less than 70% of the labor force participation rate of mothers with a

Table 4.8 Percentage of American Jewish and Non-Hispanic White Women (Ages 25–64) in Labor Force, by Number of Live Births^a

Number of live births	Jewish women		Non-Hispanic white women	
0	78.9	(356)	81.7	(13,119)
1	72.4	(170)	72.5	(10,202)
2	68.6	(319)	72.1	(20,229)
3	62.6	(138)	67.2	(11,476)
4+	56.3	(83)	56.6	(6,998)

Data source for Jewish women: NJPS, 2000–01; for non-Hispanic white women: SIPP, 2001.
^a *n* in parentheses in thousands; NJPS data weighted by person-weights provided with dataset.

3- to 5-year-old at home; among the broader white population, the percentage is slightly less than 90%. One of the reasons for this difference is that Jewish women with 3- to 5-year-olds at home are more likely to be employed than are women with children of that age in the broader white population. Among mothers of older children, the labor force participation rates are more similar between Jewish and white mothers. These patterns are true for women with and without undergraduate degrees, although level of education appears to have a somewhat greater influence on labor force participation among Jewish mothers with children under 3 at home. It should also be noted that among women with no children under 18 at home and who do not have a college degree, the labor force participation of Jewish women is lower than for the broader white population; this is probably because of the relatively older age of Jewish women who have not earned undergraduate degrees.




Figure 4.6. Percentage of American Jewish and non-Hispanic white women (ages 25–64) in labor force, by education and number of live births. *Data source* for Jewish women: NJPS, 2000–01; for non-Hispanic white women: SIPP, 2001.

Table 4.9 Percentage of American Jewish and Non-Hispanic White Women in Labor Force, by Age of Child under 18 in Household and Education^a

Age of youngest child in household	Education					
	Total		less than B.A.		B.A. or higher	
	Jewish women	Non-Hispanic white women	Jewish women	Non-Hispanic white women	Jewish women	Non-Hispanic white women
Under 3	50.5 (104)	55.2 (4,067)	47.0 (38)	55.0 (2,804)	52.5 (66)	55.6 (1,262)
3-5	74.5 (63)	63.8 (3,955)	67.3 (14)	62.1 (2,927)	76.5 (49)	68.7 (1,028)
6-17	81.4 (200)	75.7 (13,869)	74.3 (58)	73.6 (10,724)	84.3 (142)	82.7 (3,145)
None under 18	61.3 (330)	65.4 (16,813)	51.2 (162)	63.5 (13,903)	70.7 (168)	74.5 (2,911)

^a*n* in parentheses in thousands; NJPS data weighted by person-weights provided with dataset. *Data source* for Jewish women: NJPS, 2000-01; for non-Hispanic white women: SIPP, 2001.

In conclusion, the labor force participation rates of American Jewish women are remarkably similar to those of women in the broader white population. The sensitivity of Jewish women’s labor force participation to family roles, which has been noted in the past (Chiswick, 1986), appears to be confined, in 2000-01, to their greater tendency to curtail their labor force participation when they have a child under 3 at home. Other differences stem from the relatively older age of Jewish women who are widowed and who do not have undergraduate degrees, compared with their counterparts in the broader population, resulting in lower labor force participation rates of these groups of Jewish women.

Comparison of American Jewish Labor Force Participation in 2000-01 and 1990

Overall the labor force participation of American Jewish men and women is lower in 2000-01 than in 1990, which in large part is because the population is aging, so that a higher percentage are over 65. At almost every age except 18-24 and 65 and older, men’s labor force participation rates are quite similar to what they were in 1990 (Figure 4.7). The lower rates among those 65 and older may be attributable to the aging population, as the average age of the 65+ age group is older in 2000-01 than it was in 1990. The higher labor force participation rate of men aged 18-24 may result from different patterns of work during college or the completion of college at an earlier age.

Women's labor force participation rates in 2000–01 are also quite similar to what they were in 1990, with a few notable exceptions. The labor force participation rate of women aged 18–24 is almost double what it was in 1990; men's also increased but not as dramatically. One result is that women aged 18–24 are employed at a considerably higher rate than are men in the same age range. Compared with 1990, in 2000–01 women in the 18–24 age group are less likely to have ever married and are less likely to have already had children, which probably explains their higher rate of labor force participation in 2000–01. Another change is slightly lower labor force participation rates among women aged 25–39, and because this is the period during which women are most likely to bear children, it may be that family roles are having a greater impact than they did in 1990. In the 40–44 age group, however, labor force participation rates are higher than they were in 1990.

The comparison between women's and men's labor force participation rates does not show a consistently increasing tendency toward equality (Figure 4.8). In a few age groups (18–24, 40–44, and 50–54) the labor force participation rates are more similar (or women's rates are higher than men's), but in most of the groups the rates are less similar than they were in 1990 or are about the same. It is possible, then, that women's labor force participation has reached a plateau rather than continuing to increase toward parity with men's labor force participation, at least among American Jews.²

Men and women with less than a high school education were more likely to be in the labor force in 1990 than in 2000–01 (Table 4.10)—a pattern especially noticeable for women. Men and women with more than a high school education, however, participated in the labor force at about the same rate in 1990 as in 2000–01. The labor force participation of women with




Figure 4.7. Percentage of American Jews in labor force, by age and gender, 1990 and 2000–01. *Data sources:* NJPS, 1990; 2000–01.




Figure 4.8. Dissimilarity of female to male labor-force participation rates by age, 1990 and 2000–01. *Data sources:* NJPS, 1990; 2000–01.

doctoral or professional degrees, however, has become more similar to that of men at the same educational level.

Women’s marital status also seems to be related to their labor force participation somewhat differently in 2000–01 than in 1990 (Figure 4.9). First, the labor force participation of never-married women is higher in 2000–01 than it was in 1990: 68.2% of never-married women were employed in the labor force in 2000–01, compared with 57.6% in 1990. One of the reasons may be the increasing postponement of marriage, as we saw earlier; another may be the increasing postponement of birth of first child, which we also saw earlier. The delay of childbirth, in particular, may result in higher labor force participation of never-married women. On the other hand, divorced/

Table 4.10 Percentage of American Jews (Ages 25–64) in Labor Force, by Education and Gender, 1990 and 2000–01^a

Highest educational attainment	1990		2000–01	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
High school or less	81.8 (218)	61.5 (331)	77.0 (123)	47.5 (170)
Undergraduate college	86.6 (381)	70.7 (353)	86.0 (198)	71.6 (319)
M.A.	89.7 (155)	80.9 (174)	89.8 (437)	76.2 (488)
Doctoral, professional degree	94.0 (146)	87.0 (67)	94.6 (429)	91.3 (457)

Data sources: NJPS, 1990; 2000–01.

^a*n* in parentheses in thousands; NJPS data weighted by person-weights provided with dataset.




Figure 4.9. Percentage of American Jewish women in labor force, by marital status, 1990 and 2000–01. *Data sources:* NJPS, 1990; 2000–01.

separated and widowed women all participated more in the labor force in 1990 than in 2000–01. Especially striking are the differences among divorced and separated women, 78.6% of whom were employed in 1990, compared with 66.3% in 2000–01. Widowed women are less likely to be working as well, which may be a result of the aging population.

Women with no children or only one child were more likely to be employed in the labor force in 1990, but the rates are quite high for both time periods (hovering around 80% for women with no children and around 75% for women with only one child). Women with four or more children are more likely to be employed in 2000–01 than they were in 1990, perhaps reflecting the growth in childcare facilities and the norm for using them (Table 4.11). As a result, there has been a decline in the “child penalty” on labor force participation (the difference between the labor force participation rates of women with children and women with no children), from 17.0 in 1990 (calculated from Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, Table 3.9) to 11.5 in 2000–01. This reduction in “child penalty” mirrors a similar decrease in the broader U.S. population (Boushey, 2000).

When we compared the labor force participation rates of American Jews with those of the broader U.S. population in 1990, we found more differences than we found in 2000–01. In 1990, American Jewish women had higher labor force participation rates than many of their counterparts in the broader population, especially among women 45 and older; as a result, the gender differences between the labor force participation rates of Jewish men and women were smaller than they were in the broader U.S. population (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, Table 3.1, p. 65). In 2000–01, American

Table 4.11 Percentage of American Jewish Women in Labor Force, by Number of Children, 1990 and 2000–01^a

Number of children (live births)	1990	2000–01
0	84.9 (366)	78.9 (356)
1	78.1 (935)	72.4 (170)
2	67.5 (209)	68.6 (319)
3	66.5 (411)	62.6 (138)
4+	46.8 (80)	56.3 (83)

Data sources: NJPS, 1990; Hartman and Hartman, 1996, Table 3.9; and NJPS, 2000–01.
^an in parentheses in thousands, weighted by person-weights provided with each dataset.

Jewish women’s labor force participation was much more similar to that of the broader population, and gender differences were quite similar in both populations. In fact, in the 55–64 age group, men and women in the broader population were more similar in their labor force participation than were American Jews.

When education is controlled for, there seems to be more similarity between American Jews and the broader population in 2000–01 than we found in 1990 (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, Table 3.6, p. 88). At that time, we found that Jewish labor force participation rates tended to be lower, especially among men, at every level of education; in 2000–01, labor force participation rates were quite similar at each level of education, with one exception: as in 1990, we found in 2000–01 that less educated women in the broader population were more likely to be employed in the labor force than were less educated American Jews; however, in the other education groups labor force participation rates are quite similar for both men and women.

Generally, then, comparing 1990 and 2000–01, we find increasing similarity between American Jewish labor force participation patterns and those of the broader population, especially when age, education, and family roles are controlled for. Given the similarity in labor force participation between American Jews and the broader population, might we also expect to find increasing similarity in their occupations? We shall see that the results differ when we compare the occupational niches of American Jews with those of the broader population.

OCCUPATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT

The distinctiveness of American Jewish occupations continued in 2000–01 as it had in previous decades (see also Chiswick, 1999; 2007). Jews are particularly concentrated in professional occupations, and are overrepresented in sales and managerial or executive occupations (Table 4.12). In contrast,

they are underrepresented in service and blue-collar occupations and, particularly among women, in office or administrative support occupations.

Expressed as dissimilarity coefficients, more than 36% of the total Jewish population would have to change occupations to have a distribution similar to that of the broader non-Hispanic white population in 2000–01. Forty-one percent of the men would have to change occupations for the two distributions to be similar, and 31.7% of the women would have to do so. More than 42% of the American Jewish men have professional occupations, compared with less than 15% of the broader white population; 17.9% are in sales, compared with 10.6% of the broader white population; and only 6.2% are in blue-collar occupations, compared with 39% of the broader white population. Among women, the differences are similar, although they are somewhat smaller than among men: there is a much higher proportion of Jewish women with professional occupations and lower proportions with service and office or administrative support occupations compared with the broader white female population.

These differences are illustrated by a list of the top 10 occupations of American Jews and of the broader non-Hispanic white population (Table 4.13). Almost all of the 10 occupations employing the most Jewish men are in the managerial/executive, business/finance, or professional categories, with the exception of retail sales, in which 10.4% of Jewish men

Table 4.12 Occupations By Gender of American Jews and non-Hispanic Whites (Ages 25 and Over)

Occupation	American Jews (%)			U.S. non-Hispanic whites (%)		
	Total	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
Managerial/executive	13.3	13.4	13.1	10.4	12.8	7.8
Business/finance	7.5	8.7	6.3	4.6	4.2	5.1
Professional	43.2	42.8	43.8	17.1	14.9	19.6
Technical	3.9	3.4	4.3	4.2	2.6	5.9
Service	3.9	4.5	4.2	12.6	9.7	15.8
Sales	15.3	17.9	12.4	11	10.6	11.5
Office/administrative support	8.7	4.0	13.6	15.2	6.2	25.3
Foreman, skilled, unskilled workers	4.2	6.2	2.1	24.8	39.0	9.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(n, thousands) ^a	(1,893)	(968)	(921)	(112,167)	(58,997)	(53,170)

Data sources: NJPS, 2000–01; U.S. Census, 2000.

^aNJPS data weighted by person-weights provided with dataset.

Table 4-13 Ten Most Common Occupations of American Jews and Non-Hispanic Whites (Ages 25 and Over), by Gender^a

American Jews		U.S. non-Hispanic whites			
Men					
Occupation	%	% Male ^b	Occupation		
			%		
			% Male ^b		
Retail salespersons	10.4	44.7	Drivers/sales workers/truck drivers	4.4	93.5
Lawyers	5.4	71.9	First-line supervisors/managers of retail sales workers	2.5	57.2
Physicians and Surgeons	4.3	74.4	Managers, all other	2.1	65.8
Other teachers and Instructors	4.3	33.2	Carpenters	2.0	98.1
Managers, all other	4.1	65.8	Retail salespersons	2.0	44.7
Accountants and auditors	3.9	43.6	Janitors and building cleaners	1.8	68.1
Chief executives	3.6	81.3	Sales reps, wholesale and manufacturing	1.7	74.4
Engineers, all other	3.5	90.7	First-line supervisors/managers of production and operating workers	1.7	81.2
Management analysts	2.9	62.7	Laborers and freight, stock and material movers, hand	1.7	78.2
Computer programmers	2.4	72.6	Chief executives	1.6	81.3
Total/average	44.8	64.1	Total/average	21.5	74.2

<i>Women</i> Occupation	%	% Female ^b	Occupation	%	% Female ^b
Retail salespersons	7.4	55.3	Secretaries and administrative assistants	6.8	97.1
Elementary and middle school teachers	6.0	79.4	Elementary and middle school teachers	3.1	91.2
Other teachers and instructors	5.3	66.8	Registered nurses	3.7	92.9
Managers, all other	4.4	34.2	Bookkeeping, accounting and auditing clerks	2.9	91.2
Secretaries and administrative assistants	3.7	97.1	Retail salespersons	2.7	55.3
Office clerks, general	3.4	87.0	Cashiers	2.4	82.5
Lodging managers	3.2	49.2	First-line supervisors/managers of office and administrative workers	2.0	68.8
Registered nurses	2.9	92.9	First-line supervisors/managers of retail sales workers	2.0	42.8
Social workers	2.8	79.7	Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides	2.0	89.5
Lawyers	2.8	28.1	Customer service representatives	1.9	72.7
Total/average	41.9	67.0	Total/average	29.5	78.4

^aBased on the most detailed level of occupations available in the 2000 U.S. Census (509 occupations).

^bpercentage male and percentage female calculated from U.S. Census, total population (ages 16 and over).

Data sources: U.S. Census, 2000; NIPES, 2000-01.

are employed. In comparison, the 10 occupations employing the most men in the broader white population span most of the occupational categories of the labor force, from chief executives and managers to salespersons, drivers, carpenters, janitors, and laborers. However, no professional occupation is on this list, compared with 5 such occupations on the list for Jewish men. These 10 occupations account for 44.8% of the occupations of Jewish men, compared with 21.5% of the occupations of men in the broader white population. Three occupations are common to the lists for Jewish and white men: managers, all other; retail salespersons; and chief executives.

The 10 occupations employing the most Jewish women also contain 5 professional occupations (elementary and middle school teachers, other teachers and instructors, registered nurses, social workers, and lawyers), 2 managerial occupations (lodging managers and managers, all other), retail salespersons, secretaries/administrative assistants, and office clerks. These occupations account for more than 40% of the employment of Jewish women (comparable to the concentration of Jewish men in the top 10 occupations), compared with less than 30% for women in the broader white population (which is somewhat higher than the concentration of their male counterparts in the top 10 occupations). Four of these overlap with the list for the broader white population of women, and the other occupations listed are also in the broad categories of sales, managerial, or technical occupations. Thus, there is more overlap between the women's categories than between the men's.

Overall, Jewish men's and women's occupations are quite similar to each other; only 12.2% would have to change occupations to make the two distributions identical. In the top 10 lists of occupations, 4 are common to both Jewish men and women (retail salespersons; other teachers and instructors; managers, all other; and lawyers). (It is interesting, however, that whereas "lawyer" is one of the top 10 occupations for women, 73% of Jewish lawyers are men, compared with 70% in the broader population; a slightly lower percentage of Jewish doctors are men—67%—compared with 72% in the broader population.) In contrast, more than a third (34.5%) of the broader white population would have to change occupations to have identical distributions for men and women. Only 2 of the occupations overlap (retail salespersons and first-line supervisors of retail sales workers).

The greater similarity of Jewish men's and women's occupations is also reflected in the gender segregation of the occupations in which men and women are employed. Only 2 of the Jewish men's occupations employ more than 75% of men (chief executives and engineers), compared with 5 on the list of occupations for the broader white male population. On average,

Jewish men's occupations employ 62.9% of men, compared with 73.6% in the occupations of the broader population.

Jewish women are somewhat less likely to be employed in the traditional "female occupations" than are women in the broader white population, but even for Jewish women, 5 of their top 10 occupations employ more than 75% of women, compared with 6 of the broader female population's occupations. On average Jewish women's occupations employ 66.8% women, compared with 76.2% in the occupations of the broader population. Each of the top 10 lists for women reflect the concentration of women in typically "female" occupations, but overall there is less concentration of Jewish women in such occupations.

Compared with their occupational distribution in 1990, Jewish men and women seem to be similarly concentrated in a relatively small number of occupations. In 1990, the top 10 occupations of Jewish men employed 43% of Jewish men in the labor force (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, Table 4.3, p. 121); in 2000–01, 44.8%. Half of Jewish women in the labor force were employed in the top 10 occupations; in 2000–01, 41.8%. Whether this represents a significant reduction in occupational segregation for Jewish women is a little difficult to determine, as the occupational classifications have changed considerably. What we can note is that among the top 10 occupations for women, in 2000–01 lawyers edged out the accountants and bookkeepers of 1990, reflecting Jewish (and other) women's inroads into formerly nontraditional occupations for women. Among men, changes in the top 10 occupations also reflect the changing times: in 2000–01, computer programmers and chief executives edged out the real estate and advertising agents of 1990.

Education and Occupation

Clearly, much of the dissimilarity between the Jewish and broader population can be linked to American Jews' high educational achievement. To determine how much of the dissimilarity is reduced when education is controlled for, we calculated dissimilarity coefficients at each of four levels of education (high school or less, some college, B.A., or M.A. or higher) (Tables 4.14–4.16). The occupational distributions on which these dissimilarity calculations are based are found in the Appendix, Table A-1.

Table 4.14 presents the dissimilarities in occupational distribution of Jews at different educational levels. Looking at the gender differences in occupational distributions at each level of education, we can see that there are much greater gender differences among the less educated than among the more highly educated. Among those with a high school education or less,

nearly a third of the women (32.3%) would have to change occupation to have similar occupations as the men; among those with graduate degrees, only 13.5% would have to change their occupations to be similar to men at that level of education. Comparing the lower levels of education with the higher levels of education within gender, we can see that education makes a greater difference in the occupational distribution of Jewish women than in that of Jewish men. Comparing women with a high school education with women with graduate degrees, for example, we find a coefficient of dissimilarity of 67.2 (nearly two-thirds of the less educated women would have to change their occupations to make the distribution identical to that of women with graduate degrees); comparing similar levels of education among men, we find that the coefficient is 43.2. Similarly, the comparison of women with some college to women with graduate degrees shows a greater dissimilarity in occupations than among men. Comparing undergraduates with those with graduate degrees, however, we find that about a third of both men and women would have to change their occupations to be similar to each other. Thus, having a college degree makes an especially big difference in the occupations of women; once they have college degrees, be they undergraduate or graduate, education does not make a greater difference in occupational distribution than it does for men.

Table 4.14 Dissimilarity Coefficients for Occupational Distributions of American Jews (Ages 25 and Over), by Years of Education and Gender^a

Education	High school or less		Some college		B.A.		M.A.+	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
<i>High school or less</i>								
Men								
Women	32.3							
<i>Some college</i>								
Men	14.1	36.0						
Women	23.3	18.2	17.6					
<i>B.A.</i>								
Men	20.7	37.5	13.5	25.0				
Women	34.5	40.9	25.5	32.3	18.1			
<i>M.A. +</i>								
Men	43.2	55.6	36.9	48.5	30.4	21.9		
Women	51.3	67.6	46.8	57.5	41.9	34.4	13.5	

Data source: NJPS, 2000–01. See Appendix, Table A-1.

^aData are based on eight occupational categories.

Table 4.15 Dissimilarity Coefficients for Occupational Distributions of U.S. Non-Hispanic Whites (25 and Over), by Years of Education and Gender

Education	High school or less		Some college		B.A.		M.A.+	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
High school or less								
Men								
Women	48.0							
Some College								
Men	25.7	36.0						
Women	56.9	26.1	38.1					
B.A.								
Men	59.3	50.8	36.7	41.5				
Women	67.7	54.5	46.0	36.1	24.5			
M.A.+								
Men	73.4	67.6	57.9	57.0	28.5	25.2		
Women	75.5	73.8	59.5	57.7	39.0	26.0	15.1	

Data source: U.S. Census, 2000. See Appendix, Table A-1.

^aData are based on eight occupational categories.

Table 4.15 presents a similar analysis for the non-Hispanic white population in the United States. Here we find larger ranges in occupational distributions, especially for men. Less educated men in the broader population are much more likely to have blue-collar occupations than are Jewish men; as a result, the occupational dissimilarities between lower levels of education and higher levels of education are much greater for the broader population of men than for American Jews. Also, gender differences in occupational distribution in the broader population are much greater at lower levels of education than they are among American Jews.

Among men and women with master’s degrees or higher, only around 10% of the men and women would have to change their occupations to have identical distributions between Jews and the broader white population—a remarkably small amount. A similar coefficient is found for women with bachelor’s degrees, and a slightly higher coefficient (14.1%) for men with bachelor’s degrees. Most of the dissimilarity is concentrated in the lower education categories (less than a college degree), especially among men (Table 4.16, Figure 4.10).

With respect to the distinctiveness of Jewish occupations, another question is whether level of education results in similar differences in occupational distributions among Jews as it does in the rest of the population, or

Table 4.16 Dissimilarity Coefficients for Occupational Distributions Between American Jews and Non-Hispanic Whites (Ages 25 And Over), by Gender and Level of Education

Education	Men	Women
High school or less	44.3	35.3
Some college	31.5	21.5
B.A.	14.1	8.9
M.A.+	10.8	9.0

Data sources: U.S. Census, 2000; NJPS, 2000–01. See Appendix, Table A-1.

whether there is a “Jewish” pattern of occupational distribution no matter what the educational level. We also consider whether level of education has a similar effect for Jews and the rest of the population on gender dissimilarity in occupations.

Educational level results in greater dissimilarities among men in the broader population than among American Jewish men (Table 4.17, Figure 4.11). For example, more than 70% of the men with graduate degrees in the broader population would have to change occupations to be like the men with high school degrees or less, compared with only 43% of the Jewish men with graduate degrees who would have to change occupations to be like Jewish men with high school degrees or less. Fifty-eight percent of the men in the broader population who have graduate degrees would have to change their occupations to be like men with some college education, compared with slightly more than a third of the Jewish men with comparable education. However, among men with graduate degrees, about 30% of the broader population and of the Jewish men would have to change occupations to be like men with undergraduate degrees. So, again, the biggest




Figure 4.10. Occupational dissimilarity between American Jews and non-Hispanic whites, by gender and education, 2000. *Data sources:* NJPS, 2000–01; SIPP, 2001 (Wave 2).

Table 4.17 Dissimilarity Coefficients for Occupational Distributions of American Jews and Non-Hispanic Whites (Ages 25 and Over), with Different Levels of Education, by Gender

Education level A	Education level B	American Jews		Non-Hispanic whites	
		Men	Women	Men	Women
High school or less	Some college	14.1	18.2	25.7	26.1
	B.A.	20.7	40.9	59.3	54.5
	M.A.+	43.2	67.6	73.4	73.8
Some college	B.A.	13.5	32.3	36.7	36.1
	M.A.+	36.9	57.5	57.9	57.7
B.A.	M.A.+	30.4	34.4	28.5	26.0

Data sources: U.S. Census, 2000; NJPS, 2000–01. See Appendix, Table A-1.

differences are in comparison with the men with some college education or a high school degree or less, which can be explained by the high proportion of less educated men in the broader white population who have blue-collar occupations, compared with men with higher education level and Jewish men in general.

The findings are similar among women. Women in the broader population show greater dissimilarity in occupational distributions between educational levels than do Jewish women, especially in comparison with women with only a high school education. With a high school education or less, women in the broader population are more likely than Jewish women to have blue-collar occupations (17.6–3.1%) and service occupations (26–7.3%), while Jewish women are more likely to be in managerial positions (14.5–4.7%), business and finance, professional, sales, and office support (i.e., white-collar occupations). However, when we look at the differences




Figure 4.11. Occupational dissimilarity between education levels of American Jewish and non-Hispanic white men (ages 25 and over), 2000–01. Data sources: NJPS, 2000–01; SIPP, 2001 (Wave 2).

Table 4.18 Dissimilarity Coefficients Between American Jewish and Non-Hispanic White Men's and Women's Occupational Distributions by Level of Education, Ages 25 and Over

Education	American Jews	Non-Hispanic whites
High school or less	32.3	48.0
Some college	17.6	38.1
B.A.	18.1	24.5
M.A.+	13.5	15.1

Data sources: U.S. Census, 2000; NJPS, 2000–01. See Appendix, Table A-1.

between women with some college education, or with undergraduate or graduate degrees, these differences affect the broader population as much as they do Jewish women.

It should also be noted that in comparison with Jewish men, there is a greater dissimilarity between Jewish women with graduate or undergraduate degrees and women with a lower level of education than there is for Jewish men at similar educational levels. This is probably because of the higher concentration of Jewish women with college degrees in professional occupations, whereas the men with college degrees are spread over a greater range of occupations.

Among both Jews and the broader population, gender dissimilarity is lower for higher levels of education (Table 4.18, Figure 4.12). Gender differences are greater at each level of education for the broader population than for Jews, and the greater gender dissimilarity is especially apparent for those who have some college, or high school or less education. This is also probably




Figure 4.12. Gender dissimilarity in occupations of American Jews and non-Hispanic whites (ages 25 and over), by education, 2000–01. *Data sources:* NJPS, 2000–01; SIPP, 2001 (Wave 2).

a result of the higher proportion of men in the broader population who, with a lower level of education, have blue-collar jobs (62.9% of those with a high school education or less, compared with only 20.6% of Jewish men with a comparable education). Jewish men with less education are still concentrated in sales or—even with a low level of education—professional occupations. As a result, level of education makes a greater difference in gender dissimilarity of occupations for the broader population than for American Jews.

To sum up this section, education accounts for many of the differences in occupational distribution between Jews and the broader population in the United States—but not all. Large differences remain between Jewish men and men in the broader white population at lower levels of education, mainly because less educated men in the broader white population are much more likely to be employed in blue-collar occupations than are Jewish men at any level of education. This probably also explains why there is greater gender dissimilarity in occupational distribution in the broader population at lower levels of education than between American Jewish men and women. It also accounts for the greater effect of education on occupational dissimilarity among men in the broader population than among Jewish men. Similarly, the higher proportion of less educated women in the broader population employed in blue-collar and service occupations may account for the greater effect of education on occupational dissimilarity among women in the broader population than among Jewish women.

Given that the proportion of the population with a high school education or less is declining (NCES, 2007), it might be expected that occupational dissimilarity between American Jews and the broader population will also decline, but it is not clear that it will disappear completely.

Age Cohort and Occupation

The labor force has been undergoing a trend toward greater white-collar employment (Wyatt and Hecker, 2006), precisely the occupations in which Jews have been disproportionately employed, and toward less blue-collar and agricultural employment, the occupations in which Jews are least well represented. It would be expected, therefore, that dissimilarity between Jews and the broader population would be diminishing over time. The first way we examined this was to look at cohort differences in dissimilarity between the occupations of Jews and the broader white population by gender (Table 4.19). (The occupational distributions on which these dissimilarity calculations are based are found in the Appendix, Table A-2.) We can see that among both men and women, dissimilarity between Jews and the

Table 4.19 Dissimilarity Coefficients for Occupational Distributions between American Jews and Non-Hispanic Whites, by Gender, Age, and Education

Age cohort	Total		B.A.+	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
25-34	44.0	33.8	12.3	12.9
35-44	41.1	34.1	18.8	8.6
45-64	40.6	31.0	17.9	9.9
65+	41.7	31.7	21.3	14.4

Data sources: U.S. Census, 2000; NJPS, 2000-01. See Appendix, Tables A-2, A-3.

broader population does not really vary by age cohort, and the differences in dissimilarity by gender also remain constant over these cohorts.

When our analysis is confined to those with undergraduate or higher degrees, the dissimilarity is greatly reduced in each cohort, as expected (dissimilarity calculations are based on the occupational distributions in the Appendix, Table A-3). Among men, there is somewhat greater dissimilarity in the oldest cohort (65+) and somewhat less among men in the youngest cohort (25-34), which may reflect changes in the occupational structure which make more common the kinds of occupations Jews have been employed in, as already mentioned. Among women, a note of caution is in order: the variations in dissimilarity may result from the small number of Jewish women 65 and older who were in the labor force with undergraduate degrees or higher ($n = 15$). Among the younger cohort, ages 25-34, the somewhat higher occupational dissimilarity between Jewish women and women in the broader white population may be related to the higher educational achievement of Jewish women: nearly half of the 25- to 34-year-old Jewish women in the labor force had college degrees, graduate degrees, or professional degrees, compared with about a quarter of the women in the broader population.

In summary, cohort analysis provides little support for the expectation that dissimilarity between Jews and the broader white population is decreasing, for men or for women. It does make a case for the continuing distinctiveness of American Jewish occupations.

Occupation and Family Roles

We also considered whether family roles are at all related to occupational achievement. Some occupations might be more compatible with family roles, such as marriage and childrearing, than others, in that they are more

flexible with respect to part-time employment or actual hours of work, delayed entry, and reentry (Glass and Camarigg, 1992; Rosenfeld and Spenner, 1992). Other occupations might depend on a spouse to help out with “backstage” obligations, including social functions and service support, such as laundry and meals, more often fulfilled by wives than husbands (Hochschild, 1989). In 1990, we found that family roles were related to the types of occupations of American Jewish women and men, but in different ways:

Men in professional, technical, academic, and managerial occupations are more likely to be married, but they will have married at an older age, presumably after completing higher education. Although being married is not related to the occupations women are in, the age at which family roles have been entered is. Women in professional, technical, academic and managerial occupations had children later, and have fewer children than women in clerical, sales, blue-collar and service occupations. This lends support to the human capital theory, which suggests that women who have invested more in family roles would have less time and resources to invest in the labor force and hence would attain different occupations than women who invest more in the labor force and relatively less in family roles. Unlike women, men’s human capital may be raised by being married because of the support provided by the family, and therefore married men are also more successful in the labor force. (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, p. 137)

We looked at the relationship between family roles and occupational achievement for women and men ages 35–64 in 2000–01 (Table 4.20). We limited the analysis to these ages to cover the ages at which most first marriages had already occurred, most college education had been completed, and retirement was not yet entered. Looking first at men, we see that men in business/finance and sales occupations are the most likely to be currently married; these occupations are often enhanced by the “backstage wealth” families provide. It is interesting that men in management/executive positions were not the most likely to be married, as we would have expected, although a higher proportion of them had been married at least once in the past. Those in technical, service, office/administrative support, and blue-collar occupations were least likely to be married. The latter occupations appear often to be used as temporary positions for Jewish men; for example, a relatively low proportion of men are employed full time in office/administrative support jobs. Furthermore, in service, office/administrative support, and blue-collar jobs, men are the least educated (lowest proportions with college degrees). Those in technical and blue-collar occupations are the least likely to have ever been married. Age at marriage varies little from occupation to occupation, hovering on average around age 27; those in service

occupations married somewhat later, suggesting that it was more difficult for them to find a compatible spouse. Divorce rates are highest among those with management/executive, service, sales, office/administrative support, and blue-collar occupations: the former, perhaps because of the demand on spouses to help out with the occupation; the latter, perhaps because of the low monetary returns from these occupations, as discussed later. Men in business/finance occupations had the lowest rate of divorce.

Among women, family roles are mildly related to occupation. Women in business/finance and in service occupations are the least likely to have ever been married, and women in service and sales occupations are the most likely to have divorced. Without more detailed information on the timing of occupational history and its overlap with marital history, it is difficult to determine why. Perhaps it is easier for women to enter these occupations when their family status changes. Women in business/finance, service, and office/administrative support occupations are the least likely to be currently married, the former perhaps because of the demanding nature of the job (this is the occupation with the highest proportion of women working full time). Age at marriage hovers around 25 for most of the women, with minor variation by occupation. Age at first birth hovers around 27 for women in most of the occupations, somewhat lower for those in office/administrative support, somewhat higher for women in business/finance and professional, the occupations for which women have the longest preparation (the highest proportion with college degrees). It is difficult to explain the slight variation in the number of children by occupational status—women in business/finance, professional, and sales occupations have the most children, whereas women in management/executive, technical, and service occupations have the fewest.

Perhaps comparing these patterns (Table 4.20) with those in the broader white population (Table 4.21) will clarify the distinctiveness of the relationship between Jewish family characteristics and occupation. Compared with men in the broader white population, Jewish men apparently are much more likely to enter blue-collar, office/administrative support, and technical occupations as temporary and even, in the case of office jobs, part-time positions before marriage, but once married, they are more likely to assume other occupations. Jewish men in management/executive positions are less likely to be currently married than men in the broader white population, and a relatively large proportion of them are divorced, compared with those in other professions; this is not seen in the broader population. The proportion of those who have ever divorced is highest for Jewish men in sales, perhaps reflecting the strain that traveling sales jobs puts on marriages, as well as in lower-paying jobs such as blue-collar and service jobs.

Table 4.20 Family Characteristics, Education, and Percentage Employed Full Time of American Jews (Ages 35–64), by Occupation and Gender^a

	Married (%)	Ever married (%)	Ever divorced (%)	Mean age at marriage	Childless (%)	Mean age at birth of first child	Mean number of children	Employed full time (%)	College degree (%)	<i>n</i>
<i>Men</i>										
Management/executive	69.5	87.5	27.5	26.1				94.3	70.8	(121)
Business/finance	82.6	87.8	11.4	26.8				94.2	87.2	(69)
Professional	71.1	85.5	24.5	27.3				89.3	84.1	(261)
Technical	57.4	74.9	22.8	29.0				89.5	71.6	(25)
Service	64.0	86.5	28.9	28.6				94.7	33.5	(26)
Sales	75.9	89.1	37.5	26.9				90.9	62.5	(142)
Office/administrative support	56.5	72.0	27.5	24.2				59.5	58.5	(20)
Blue collar	63.2	78.8	30.1	25.8				91.2	36.5	(49)
<i>Women</i>										
Management/executive	69.9	87.5	30.2	24.4	28.9	26.3	1.5	76.6	64.6	(119)
Business/finance	66.6	79.9	22.6	23.8	25.6	27.2	1.8	56.9	75.8	(60)
Professional	71.6	91.0	28.3	25.1	19.8	28.7	1.7	69.1	88.0	(392)
Technical	61.7	81.8	26.8	24.0	37.2	25.2	1.4	62.9	60.6	(40)
Service	59.8	76.2	35.2	24.7	36.4	26.7	1.4	76.2	40.5	(40)
Sales	67.2	90.4	32.2	23.0	30.7	25.7	1.8	71.5	38.9	(120)
Office/administrative support	61.8	80.7	22.7	22.7	26.2	25.7	1.6	68.5	34.3	(107)
Blue collar	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	(14)

^aUnweighted *n* in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

Large proportions of men in these occupations in the broader population are divorced. Office and blue-collar jobs are also characterized by somewhat lower ages of first marriage for Jewish men; these are occupations, along with service occupations, in which there is a lower proportion of college-educated men. In all occupations, though, Jewish men are more likely to have college degrees than are men in the broader population. In the latter population, there is a much larger variation in the proportion that are college-educated: in management/executive, business/finance, professional, and technical occupations, more than half of the men have college degrees; while less than 20% of those employed in service, sales, office/administrative support, and blue collar occupations have college degrees.

Among women, there is less variation in marital status by occupation than among men. However, some occupations, including service and sales jobs, have higher proportions of divorced women; these occupations may have been easier to reenter when marital status changed and a job became necessary. In the broader white population, service, office, and blue-collar jobs have especially high proportions of divorced women. There is a little variation in age at marriage according to the extent of education common in an occupation (e.g., earlier ages of marriage for office and sales job), but the variation is not great for Jewish or white women. Among Jewish women, age at birth of first child is around 26 or 27, with little variation by occupation; in the broader population, there is a greater difference between occupations requiring more education (management/executive, professional, technical) and occupations requiring less (service, sales, blue-collar, and office/administrative support). Accordingly, the number of children born to women in service, sales, and blue-collar occupations is greater in the broader population. The pattern is not as clear for Jewish women. Finally, all women in the broader population are more likely to be working full time in most of the occupations, compared with Jewish women, with the exception of sales and service jobs.

Among Jewish women, the relationship between occupation and family roles is not as clear as it is among women in the broader white population, for whom occupational patterns suggest that certain occupations are more compatible with certain family statuses than others. Among Jewish women, variations in occupation seem to be related more to educational attainment than to family status. The next analysis confirms this conclusion. The results of a logistic regression predicting the odds of being in a high-status profession (managerial, business/finance, or professional) are presented in Table 4.22. Only education has a statistically significant effect on whether a woman is in a high-status profession; none of the current family roles (marital status, age of youngest child) have a statistically significant effect, nor do

Table 4.21 Family Characteristics, Education, and Percentage Employed Full Time of U.S. Non-Hispanic Whites (Ages 35–64), by Occupation and Gender^a

	Married (%)	Ever married (%)	Ever divorced (%)	Mean age at marriage	Childless (%)	Mean age at birth of first child	Mean number of children	Employed full time (%)	College degree (%)	n
<i>Men</i>										
Management/executive	78.4	92.8	29.5	22.9				98.1	57.2	(1,361)
Business/finance	80.5	92.0	26.7	23.3				98.4	66.3	(579)
Professional	73.9	87.1	30.6	22.5				95.5	49.2	(917)
Technical	74.8	88.6	30.2	22.3				96.7	62.0	(558)
Service	65.4	85.3	23.4	21.9				93.0	16.9	(921)
Sales	65.9	85.3	23.4	21.9				88.6	8.3	(205)
Office/administrative support	68.5	89.5	35.1	22.2				97.0	44	(1,060)
Blue collar	69.8	90.3	37.7	21.8	—	—	—	96.2	5.7	(1,963)
<i>Women</i>										
Management/executive	66.8	91.1	39.4	20.4	22.8	25.0	1.7	90.7	36.6	(1,364)
Business/finance	67.9	88.3	35.1	21.5	21.1	26.1	1.9	82.4	50.9	(460)
Professional	65.1	91.2	38.0	20.3	18.9	24.6	1.9	80.2	26.3	(1,848)
Technical	72.3	92.8	33.5	20.8	17.6	25.7	1.9	85.2	54.2	(1,019)
Service	61.5	91.9	40.9	19.9	14.7	23.6	2.1	77.0	10.6	(1,719)
Sales	69.8	88.5	26.2	20.8	17.8	23.0	2.2	67.8	7.7	(71)
Office/administrative support	60.1	91.3	51.8	19.2	15.3	22.3	1.8	93.6	18.3	(43)
Blue collar	60.7	91.8	45.7	19.7	11.4	22.7	2.2	85.8	3.1	(721)

Data source: SIPP, 2001.

^an in thousands.

Table 4.22 Logistic Regression for Predictors of High-Status Professions^a for Women (Ages 25–64), Employed Full Time

Independent variable	Jews		Non-Hispanic whites	
	Unstandardized coefficient	Exp (ß)	Unstandardized coefficient	Exp (ß)
Education	.923	(2.517)*	.535	(1.707)*
Age	-.065	(0.937)	.030	(1.030)
Age at first marriage	-.060	(0.942)	.014	(1.014)
Age at birth of first child	.080	(1.083)	-.021	(0.979)
Number of live births	.055	(1.056)	-.186	(0.830)*
Current marital status (not married/married)	.190	(1.210)	.169	(1.185)
Age of youngest child	.048	(1.050)	-.019	(0.981)
Nagelkerke <i>R</i> ²	.259		.075	
(Unweighted <i>n</i>)	(384)		(1,196)	

^aHigh-status profession = managerial/business/finance/professional occupation.

*Statistically significant at $p < 0.001$.

the more long-term indicators of familistic tendencies (age at marriage, age at birth of first child, number of live births). Age does not change the odds of being in such a profession. Jewish women do not appear to suffer from a “marriage penalty” (or advantage) or a “child penalty” in terms of occupational achievement. In the next chapter, when we look at Jewish couples, we will explore this further. Among the broader white population of women, however, although education has the most important influence on occupational attainment, number of children also has a statistically significant negative relationship with occupational attainment, showing that family roles are more closely related to occupational achievement than among Jewish women.

Occupational Rewards

Finally, we consider the rewards that Jewish men and women receive from their economic roles. We use two indicators of such rewards: annual earnings and occupational prestige. Note that each has some limitations. Many respondents are reluctant to report what their annual earnings are, not only on the NJPS but on surveys in general. An analysis of the response patterns for the 2000–01 NJPS has shown that the non-response is biased toward higher-income earners, at least among men (Chiswick and Huang, 2008). There is no reason to expect that this pattern differs for women. We suggest that rather than level of income, the main interest in what we present lies in the relationship between men’s and women’s earnings.




Figure 4.13. Median annual earnings, by gender and education (employed full time, ages 25–64).

Income. Jewish women earn only about 56% of what Jewish men earn. Confining our comparison to men and women employed full time does not change this differential appreciably. Among those employed full time with college degrees, the differential persists. Among those employed full time who do not have a college degree, women earn about 73% of what men earn annually (Figure 4.13). One reason that there is a greater gender differential between those with college degrees and those without is that women’s earnings do not increase as much with education as men’s do (Figure 4.14).

When we compare earnings within the same broad occupational group, we see that the greatest differentials are in occupations that confer the highest status (managerial/executive, business/finance, and professional; Table 4.23). This is true for the broader U.S. population, there being a wider




Figure 4.14. Median annual earnings (in thousands) and mean occupational prestige score (PRS), by gender and education (employed full time, ages 25–64).

gender gap in earnings in the highest-status occupations (Weinberg, 2004). Because so many Jewish men and women are in such occupations, the overall gender gap in occupational earnings is greater for the Jewish population than for the broader population. In technical and service occupations, Jewish men and women earn practically the same amount on average, but this is not true for the broader population, in which women employed full time earn about 76% of what men earn. In the broader population, the smallest gender gap in earnings is found in office/administrative jobs, but this contrasts with the Jewish population.

One of the reasons for the greater gender gap among Jews might be the actual distribution of men and women among detailed occupations. Looking again at the 10 most common occupations of Jewish men and women, we can see that in several of the common occupations of men, women on average make less than two-thirds of what men make (Table 4.24). In the most common occupation of women (retail salesperson), women make only two-thirds of what men make (in the broader population). Note that we could not go into this detail using the comparison of Jewish men's and women's earnings because of the relatively small number of respondents in each detailed occupation.

Family characteristics may also be related to the gender gap in occupations. Investing in family roles, especially at early ages, may interrupt

Table 4.23 Gender Gap In Median Annual Earnings of American Jews and Non-Hispanic Whites (Ages 25 and Over), Employed Full Time, by Occupation

Occupation	Ratio of Women's to Men's Earnings			
	Jews		Non-Hispanic whites ^a	
Management/executive	61.3	(249) ^b	71.7	(10,221) ^c
Business/finance	60.3	(127)	74.1	(4,558)
Professional	67.6	(678)	73.1	(21,371)
Technical	96.9	(63)	76.1	(4,680)
Service	94.2	(57)	78.6	(13,763)
Sales	71.8	(256)	62.1	(9,984)
Office and administrative support	71.8	(95)	88.9	(14,966)
Blue collar	81.1	(60)	72.4	(11,280)
Total	66.8	(1,698)	80.4	(101,224)

^aChao and Utgoff (2005, Table 18). Median usual weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers, 2004 annual averages; *n* in thousands.

^bUnweighted sample size in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.

^c*n* in thousands.

Table 4.24 Gender Gap in Median Annual Earnings in the Ten Most Common Occupations of Jewish Men and Women

<i>Men</i>		
Occupation	Jewish men in occupation (%)	Ratio of women's to men's earnings in U.S. ^a
Retail salespersons	10.4	64.7
Lawyers	5.4	73.4
Physicians and surgeons	4.3	52.2
Other teachers and instructors	4.3	74.9
Managers, all other	4.1	—
Accountants and auditors	3.9	74.5
Chief executives	3.6	69.9
Engineers, all other	3.5	77.3 ^b
Management analysts	2.9	75.9
Computer programmers	2.4	87.4
<i>Women</i>		
Occupation	Jewish women in occupation (%)	Ratio of women's to men's earnings in U.S. ^a
Retail salespersons	7.4	64.7
Elementary and middle school teachers	6.0	84.6
Other teachers and instructors	5.3	74.9
Managers, all other	4.4	—
Secretaries and administrative assistants	3.7	92.0
Office clerks, general	3.4	95.4
Lodging managers	3.2	84.7
Registered nurses	2.9	86.8
Social workers	2.8	95.7
Lawyers	2.8	73.4

^aChao & Utgoff, 2005, Table 18. Median usual weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers, 2004 annual averages.

^bRatio for all engineers (breakdown not available).

women's careers or reduce the amount of time and energy that can be devoted to them. To test the extent to which family roles are related to women's earnings, we used a multiple regression of annual earnings. We included their pattern of investment in family roles by controlling for age at marriage, age at birth of first child, or number of children, as well as their current family roles (current marital status and age of youngest child). We controlled for age, education, and hours of work (analyzing the earnings of full-time-employed women only; Table 4.25). Among women employed full

Table 4.25 Multiple Regression Analysis of Median Annual Earnings for Women (Ages 25–64), Employed Full Time

Dependent variable	Standardized coefficient (β)	Unstandardized coefficient
Education	.349	1.756*
Age	.091	0.056
Age at marriage	-.005	-0.006
Age at birth of first child	.024	0.026
Age of youngest child	-.097	-0.051
Number of live births	.084	0.464
Current marital status	.081	0.959
R	.363	0.390
R ²	.132	0.152
(Unweighted <i>n</i>)	(219)	

*Statistically significant at $p < 0.05$.

time, earnings are most strongly related to their education, rather than to their familistic characteristics or current family roles. None of the family characteristics or age have statistically significant relationships with median annual earnings (Table 4.25). Note, however, that only 15.2% of the variance is explained by these variables ($R^2 = 0.152$), so clearly there are other factors at work in predicting earnings, such as length and stability of career pattern, husband's education and earnings, size and type of employer. What is notable is that, again, there appears to be no "marriage penalty" or "child penalty" with respect to Jewish women's earnings.

Occupational Prestige. A second measure of occupational rewards is the occupational prestige score, a ranking of the "social desirability" of an occupation. Measured by how individuals in the general population rank occupations, occupational prestige is related to the ability and skills perceived to be necessary for an occupation as well as the material and other rewards associated with it (Wegener, 1992). The occupational prestige scores that we use are adapted from those developed for the 1980 Census categories of occupation and adapted to the 1990 Census categories (Nakao and Treas, 1994). Since then, a new study of occupational prestige has not been undertaken, but the scores have been adapted to the 2000 Census categories of occupation.³ No new prestige scores have been collected in the United States since 1989, but their stability, both over time and between genders, is fairly well established (as summarized in Hauser and Warren, 1997). Again, we suggest emphasizing the comparison of men's and women's occupational

prestige scores, with the expectation that any bias that may be present would affect men's and women's scores similarly.

For each detailed occupation, a prestige score was assigned on the basis of adaptation for the 2000 Census categories, as already mentioned. The mean prestige score reported for men in professional occupations (Table 4.26), for example, is an average of all of the detailed occupations that Jewish men hold in the broader professional category.

What is perhaps most striking is the similarity of Jewish men's and women's occupational prestige scores. Despite the differences in the occupations that Jewish men and women hold in each of the broader occupational groups, as we discussed earlier, their mean occupational prestige scores in each broad occupational group are very similar. This mirrors the lack of gender difference in occupational prestige ratings for men and women found in the broader U.S. population (Fox and Suschnigg, 1989; Nakao and Treas, 1994). While we note some changes in the mean occupational scores according to these broader categories between 1990 (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, Table 4, p. 14) and 2000–01, we caution against drawing any conclusions from this comparison, because the composition of the broader categories changed considerably between the 1990 and 2000 Censuses. However, it should be noted that in 1990 there was a considerable gender gap in occupational prestige favoring men over women, which could be explained by differential education, age (which can be interpreted as a proxy for years in the labor force), hours of work per week, and marital status (Hartman and Hartman, 1996a, pp. 153–62).

Table 4.26 Mean Occupational Prestige Scores for American Jews (Ages 25–64) by Occupation and Gender, 2000–01

Occupation	Total (<i>n</i>) ^a		Men (<i>n</i>) ^a		Women (<i>n</i>) ^a	
Managerial/executive	52.6	(361)	52.6	(173)	52.6	(188)
Business/finance	57.8	(206)	59.8	(111)	53.7	(95)
Professional	64.9	(1,121)	66.3	(522)	63.3	(599)
Technical	48.9	(117)	49.0	(53)	48.8	(64)
Sales	36.8	(126)	36.9	(51)	36.6	(75)
Office/administrative support	41.3	(436)	41.5	(231)	41.2	(205)
Service	39.3	(254)	39.2	(61)	39.3	(193)
Blue collar	37.0	(105)	36.5	(83)	38.3	(22)
Total	53.7	(2,726)	54.1	(1,285)	53.1	(1,441)

^aUnweighted *n* in parentheses; calculations performed using person-weights provided with dataset.




Figure 4.15. Median annual earnings (in thousands) and mean occupational prestige score (PRS), by gender and age (employed full time, ages 25–64).

This similarity in occupational prestige scores is found in all age cohorts from ages 25 to 64. Just as constant is the gap in earnings between men and women in all age cohorts (Figure 4.15). Here we have controlled for full-time employment in order to eliminate the possibility that the gender gap arises from unequal hours of work.

In the next chapter we will see how these patterns of gender similarity and difference play out for married couples.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we have looked at the labor force participation and occupational patterns of American Jewish women and men, as well as the role that education plays in these patterns, and have compared them to patterns in the broader U.S. population. Once we controlled for education, we found remarkable similarity between American Jews and the broader population in terms of labor force participation. Women’s labor force participation is affected by their marital status, in that women in first marriages are less likely to be working in the labor force and less likely to have full-time jobs when they do. However, remarried women are more likely than women in first marriages to be in the labor force and to be working full time. As a result, there is greater similarity between men and women in remarriages than in first marriages. Women’s labor force participation depends noticeably on whether there is a child under the age of 3 at home; however, this sensitivity, though greater than that found in the broader population, indicates a greater similarity between Jewish women and women in the broader population than has been found in the past. Furthermore, the “child penalty” on labor force participation of women is smaller than it was in 1990.

Both Jewish men and women differ in their occupational patterns from the broader population in that a higher proportion are in professional occupations and a lower proportion are in blue-collar or service occupations. As a result, occupations vary less by level of education among American Jews than they do in the broader population; and there is greater similarity in the occupations of American Jewish men and women than in those of men and women in the broader population. American Jewish women and men also have very similar occupational prestige. However, there is a large gender gap in income among American Jews, consonant with the wider gaps in income found among the educated in the broader population.

The higher level of education of Jewish women thus does not translate into income rewards, although it does bring about greater similarity in labor force participation patterns, especially when there are no young children at home, and greater similarity in occupational achievement and prestige.