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THE PURITANS' TWO BODIES

THE PURITANS WHO came to the New World were steeped in Renaissance thought. Almost all of the New England Puritans' education, their "intellectual life, scientific knowledge, morality, manners and customs, notions and prejudices, was that of all Englishmen" (P. Miller and Johnson 1:7). Indeed, as Howard Mumford Jones has argued, "seventeenth century New England writing . . . began in the Renaissance, but it did not linger there" (107). Thus, it would be a mistake to think that "the real history of America is the history of the spread on the continent of Anglo-Saxon habits and Anglo-Saxon ideals" (Ziff xi). Furthermore, scholars disagree about whether New England Puritanism and its intellectual tradition had a significant impact on American life and letters. In the revisionist strand of American studies, New England and the Puritans have been denied this pivotal position in the creation of a genuinely American culture, refuting the positions of Perry Miller and Sacvan Bercovitch. While criticism of the one-sided focus of early American studies is indisputably justified [this focus in itself—at least partly—being an attempt of nineteenth-century historians to provide a point of origin for the new nation], I would nevertheless argue that American Puritanism must be regarded as an important factor, not as a homogeneous movement and a unidirectional influence, but as a network of different movements and tensions within early American society, and as such deserving of attention and analysis. I have decided to mainly focus on the writings of the Puritans of John Winthrop's Massachusetts Bay Colony, since these documents have the advantage of providing the rhetoric of a rich discursive, as well as communal, 'body.'

I do not want to go into a detailed discussion of the Puritan movement in England and the reasons that led to the Puritans' leaving their mother country. It should suffice to stress that the Puritans' exodus to America can be read as a consequence of what Hardt/Negri have termed the crisis inherent in [the beginning of] modernity. The revolutions around the time of the early Renaissance were grounded in a denial of transcendence and a focus on the

needs and powers of this world. This emergent radical revolutionary process of deterritorialization, however, with its tendency toward democracy, also brought with it the force of reterritorialization, a force attempting to contain and control these emerging dynamics: "It arose within the Renaissance revolution to divert its direction, transplant the new image of humanity to a transcendent plane . . . , and above all oppose the reappropriation of power on the part of the multitude. The second mode of modernity poses a transcendent constituted power against an immanent constituent power, order against desire" (*Empire* 74). This 'quasi-return' to an almost feudal structure, which closed off the space in Europe for the revolutionary movements of the multitude, led to the Puritans' "nomadism and exodus, carrying with them the desire and hope of an irrepressible experience" (76). The Puritans who came to America, then, were positioned between the two modes of state centralization [in its 'monarchic' aspect, with its strategies of control and administration] on the one hand, and religious reformation [with its focus on the question of salvation] on the other hand. Foucault has argued that it is at this very intersection, at this very historical junction in which the Puritans were placed, that "the problem comes to pose itself with this peculiar intensity, of how to be ruled, how strictly, by whom, to what end, by what methods, and so on. There is a problematic of government in general" ("Governmentality," *Power* 202). And it was this problematic that is placed at the core of the Puritan 'civil and ecclesiastical' Body|Politic.

In 1620, William Bradford and the Pilgrim separatists signed the Mayflower Compact, in which they stated: "We . . . Having undertaken for the Glory of God and advancement of the Christian Faith and Honour of our King and Country, a Voyage to plant the first Colony in the Northern Parts of Virginia, do by these presents solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and one of another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a Civil Body Politic, for our better ordering and preservation" (Bradford 83–84). The Puritans imported to the New World a metaphor that had a long history and tradition, yet they also modified it in a highly significant way. The fiction of the king's two bodies had justified the king's power as inaugurated by God, had supported the hierarchical structure of state and society as unalterable. It was "more than a device of rhetoric; it [was] a statement of truth, of a correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm which reveals an identical condition in both" (Hale 12); it had been, strictly speaking, no metaphor at all, but a 'natural fact.'¹ As Foucault puts it, "in a society like that of the seventeenth century, the King's body wasn't a metaphor, but a political reality. Its physical presence was necessary for the functioning of the monarchy" ("Body/Power," *Power/Knowledge* 55). The Puritans transferred this corporeal analogy to the American continent, and in the very

process literally translated the symbolic civil Body|Politic of Bradford and Winthrop. Here, the corporeal metaphor, applied in the formation of a new society, signifies both the autonomous political force as situated in the communal body [without the monarchic head] as well as the necessity of that very communal body to be yoked together—unity here is a *cause* more than an *effect* to be achieved. In their covenant theology and its social counterpart, the contract—Bradford’s “we . . . combine ourselves”—the American Puritans anticipated a model offered later by Hobbes.

Ten years after the Mayflower Compact, in his sermon “A Modell of Christian Charity,” Winthrop described in more detail how this combining into the civil Body|Politic should be achieved. In 1630, as the *Arbella* rode at anchor in Massachusetts Bay, he put forth the ideological basis for the Massachusetts Bay Colony, of which he was to be governor for the next twelve years. The central metaphor is that of a community of believers unified in the body of Jesus Christ, of which they are the members. In true Puritan fashion, Winthrop bases his argument on the Bible, his sermon being a long meditation on Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians. Since this letter provides Winthrop with a reading of the corporeal metaphor with respect to the Body|Politic’s order and hierarchy, the Massachusetts Bay settlement can be regarded as being grounded in Pauline dogma. Verses 12–27 of chapter 12 of the letter constitute a pivotal text for Winthrop’s idea of a community and deserve to be quoted in full:

For as the body is one, and hath many members and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also *is* Christ. For by one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether *we be* Jews or Gentiles, whether *we be* bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit. For the body is not one member, but many. If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? And if the ear shall say, Because I am not the eye, I am not of the body; is it therefore not of the body? If the whole body *were* an eye, where *were* the hearing? If the whole *were* hearing, where *were* the smelling? But now hath God set the members every one of them in the body, as it hath pleased him. And if they were all one member, where *were* the body? But now *are they* many members, yet but one body. And the eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you. Nay, much more those members of the body, which seem to be more feeble, are necessary: and those *members* of the body, which we think to be less honorable, upon these we bestow more abundant honor; and our uncomely *parts* have more abundant comeliness. For our comely *parts* have no need: but God hath tempered the body together, having given more abundant honor to that *part* which lacked: that there should

be no schism in the body; but *that* the members should have the same care one for another. And whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be honored, all the members rejoice with it. Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular.

In contrast to the concept of the king's two bodies, which saw the Body|Politic not so much as consisting of a multitude of citizens but as composed of the functional aspects of the governing 'head,' I argue that this Pauline view of the body, as adapted and revised by the Puritans, not only presents a much more structured and differentiated² model of the Body|Politic, but also transfers its cohesive force to the actual members of the body: the head is not a separate, controlling organ, but its function is incorporated in the body of the people|community. No longer functioning as a microcosm of the feudal state, this view of the body marks the emergence of a radically different concept of the Body|Politic, in which the law establishes principles of social organization not by a royal or divine bloodline, but by a contract that owes more to strategies of mercantilist exchange than to monarchical structures of government.³ The traditional, medieval hierarchy was replaced by a model that highlighted the relationship between equal members, as well as their bond with God.

From this perspective, the Puritan Body|Politic is more of an additive, heterogeneous, and composite body than the homogeneous totality envisioned in the king's two bodies. In fact, by leaving the mother country, the Puritans were practically out of reach of the monarchic head and of the hierarchical structure of the English church. The 'real' head of their Body|Politic was God—an invisible head, though no less real in his effects. Yet, as an invisible head, God worked his 'cohesive power' through the members of the body, by means of their love and obedience. In the early American communities, people joined together, electing political and spiritual leaders. Churches were organized into congregations. The ministers preached and interpreted the Bible, looking for signs of damnation or salvation, yet the laws of the congregation were mainly defined by self-discipline—ministerial control, imposing order on the community, was a foreign concept at least in the early years of the New England settlements. Thus, in the New England communal structure, some of the revolutionary spirit and the radical egalitarian principles of the English Levellers were brought over to America, where the early colonists gave life to these ideas.⁴ When New England writers referred to the traditional figure of the Body|Politic, with the head on top, they did so not in order to evoke a familiar image, but to convey a different message with it. For example, Nathaniel Ward wrote in his satire *The Simple Cobler of Aggawam in America*: "Equity is as due to People, as Eminency to Princes:

Liberty to Subjects, as Royalty to Kings: If they cannot walk together lovingly hand in hand, *paripassu*, they must . . . part as good friends . . . ; the head and body must move alike: . . . *The body beares the head, the head the crown; If both beare not alike, then one will down*" (45). Despite its ultimately conservative stance on questions of religion and politics, Ward's book almost reverses the figure of the traditional Body|Politic, or at least claims a mutual dependence quite different from the top-down hierarchic relation.

Thomas Lechford, an English Puritan and a resident in Boston from 1638 to 1641, accused the colonists of denying the divine right of a "hereditary, successive, *King, the son of Nobles*" (140) to appoint magistrates and ministers. Rather, the laymen had established themselves as equals to the ministers, and magistrates were appointed by popular election. Lechford was shocked at the form of "*independent government of every congregational Church ruling it selfe, which introduceth not onely one absolute Bishop in every Parish, but in effect so many men, so many Bishops, according to New-Englands rule, which in England would be Anarchie & confusion . . . for if all are Rulers, who shall be ruled?*" (5). Lechford's last question focuses on the very possibility of 'state-constitution,' for, according to Deleuze|Guattari, "the State is what makes the distinction between governors and governed possible" (*Thousand Plateaus* 359). The New England Congregational system, then, is a system of 'alliances,' organized more as what Deleuze|Guattari famously call a nomadic war machine—a decentralized aggregate that is more like a pack than a family—than as a state apparatus. Cut loose from the motherland, the New England Puritans share "the local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities . . . it is in bands that a religious formation begins to operate" (360). Consciously resisting every merely worldly authority [at least in principle], the Puritans saw their various churches iterating the Pauline model on which every singular church was built—although, as the clergyman John Davenport stated, "particular Churches be distinct and severall *Independent* bodies, every one as a city compact within itself, without subordination under, or dependence upon any other but Jesus Christ" (40). Conflating ecclesiastical [church] and civil [city] political bodies, Davenport's prescription also reveals the dual nature of a constitution situated between the gravitational forces of both self-organization and imposed order. On the one hand, Davenport stresses independence; on the other hand, he comments that all "Churches [are] to walk one by one and the same rule, and by all means convenient, to have the counsell and help of one another, when need requireth, as members of one body, in the common faith under Christ their only Head" (*ibid.*).

Lechford, reporting back to the mother country, where "*multitudes are corrupted with an opinion of the unlawfulness of the Church-government*

by *Diocesan Bishops*" (3), sees the New England way as a challenge to monarchy, and he is eager to stress that this kind of popular government will eventually lead to fatal results: "*In time their Churches will be more corrupted then now they are . . . How can one deny this to be Anarchie and confusion?*" (6). Drawing from experience, he concludes that "there is no such government for *English* men, or any Nation; as Monarchy; nor for Christians, as by a lawfull Ministerie, under godly Diocesan Bishops, deducing their station and calling from Christ and his Apostles, in descent or succession" (144). Popular election, in contrast, is unlawful, since even "the great body, heart and hands, and feete" (140) belong to the king, "but especially the Head" (140). Yet, on the basis of the Bay Colony Charter of 1629, the Massachusetts Bay Colony tried to establish a basically self-governed commonwealth.

Winthrop's "A Modell of Christian Charity" starts with the fact of the various members' social differences, which he justifies by referring to their necessity in God's Plan: "GOD ALMIGHTY in his most holy and wise providence, hath soe disposed of the condition of' mankind, as in all times some must be rich, some poore, some high and eminent in power and dignitie; others mean and in submission" (33). This, Winthrop argues, is a condition in line with the whole of God's creation; it parallels the "variety and difference of the creatures, and the glory of his power in ordering all these differences for the preservation and good of the whole" (*ibid.*) on the smaller scale of the community. The reason for these [social] differences is that "every man might have need of others" (34)—thus, differences are the prerequisite of social cohesion, and fragmentation is the cause for striving for unity. The fact of differences, according to Winthrop, institutes a process of the Body/Politic's self-ordering: such a divinely planned system "moderat[es] and restrain[s] them [the members of the community]: soe that the riche and mighty should not eate upp the poore nor the poore and dispised rise upp against and shake off their yoake . . . In the regenerate, in exercising his graces in them, as in the grate ones, their love, mercy, gentleness, temperance &c., in the poore and inferior sorte, their faithe, patience, obedience &c." (*ibid.*). Revolution, as well as oppression, is ultimately a futile action in such a community, as Winthrop draws a conclusion supported by the Bible—"1 Cor. 12:26. *If one member suffers, all suffer with it, if one be in honor, all rejoyce with it*" (40). Rebellion would be close to self-mutilation. Thus, one significant revision of the traditional Body/Politic was that in the Puritan civil Body/Politic, the popular body—the people—was seen not as a chaotic mass, grotesque, or, as Foucault puts it, "a mass among which it was useless to differentiate" (*Discipline and Punish* 198), the very unreasonable body over which the head had to rule, and which in fact desperately needs

the head in order to survive. Instead it was seen as a body structured in itself, consisting of other bodies not dependent on the head only, but also on mutual obligations. Thus, what this system of differences ultimately instigates [and on which it in fact relies—otherwise the social body would break apart at these predetermined rupture joints] is love, so that, because of mutual dependence, “they might be all knitt more nearly together in the Bonds of brotherly affection” (*Modell* 34). Love, in turn, is supported by the underlying imaginary dimension of identification based on likeness, “for the ground of loue is an apprehension of some resemblance in the things loued to that which affects it. This is the cause why the Lord loues the creature, soe farre as it hathe any of his Image in it; he loues his elect because they are like himselfe, he beholds them in his beloued sonne. So a mother loues her childe, because shee throughly conceives a resemblance of herselfe in it” (42). This passage points to the idea that, before Adam’s fall, God created man in His own image. After the fall, in man’s state of sin and corruption, it is no longer correct to speak of him as mirroring God, but the more man shows the signs of grace and salvation conferred on him—it is the elect who are already saved—the more he reclaims this original image.

The love between fellow men, or between husband and wife, is ultimately based on the model of Christ’s love, and it is this love that makes a whole and unified body—“*Love is a bond of perfection . . . it makes the worke perfect*” (40)—and this holds true for both the communal and the individual body. Like the civil Body|Politic that is knit together by brotherly affection and faith in and obedience to God’s word, the love of and for Christ provides the believer with the “best proportioned body in the world” (*ibid.*), taking the perfect body of Christ as example and paradigm. It is Christ’s love as “ligament” that connects the parts of both the communal and individual body, since “there is noe body but consists of partes and that which knitts these partes together, gives the body its perfection” (*ibid.*). The term *ligament* is of special significance here. On the one hand—in its anatomical sense—it refers to the sinews and the connective tissue that give cohesion to a body; that hold the body, its muscles and bones, together; that keep the joints stable. Less than a century before Winthrop’s sermon, Andreas Vesalius, the great Renaissance anatomist, had first revealed the importance of the ligaments, showing that the muscles were in fact composed of flesh and connective tissue, so that the body kept itself cohesive by this very substance, which made action possible. On the other hand, the term *ligament* also has a legal and symbolic sense and refers to the law that regulates and constitutes a social body. Sir John Fortescue, a Renaissance lawyer who had been fighting for the abolition of the categories of free and unfree, aiming for a new legal status of the subject that would eventually lead to the mod-

ern notion of citizenship, stated that the “law, by which a group of men is made into a people, resembles the nerves and sinews of a physical body, for just as the physical body is held together by the nerves and sinews, so this mystic body [of people] is bound together and united into one by the law, which is derived from the word ‘ligando’” (30). Thus, Perry Miller’s observation of the abundance of “highly legalistic formulations” (*Jonathan Edwards* 30) in seventeenth-century Puritan texts is concise but has to be read in various registers. In Winthrop’s plan for the Massachusetts Bay Colony, then, the ligament is the point where anatomy, love, contract, and law—as well as the real, imaginary, and symbolic bodies—intersect, resulting in a conflation of the *corporeal* and the *corporate*. The body of the community is ultimately envisioned as a rhizomatic, growing, and changeable body, self-organized by productive relations, given direction and tentative metastability by divine laws, yet still being not closed and static, but an open and dynamic hyperorganism, and capable of producing what Deleuze/Guattari would call “emergence-effects.” On the other hand, the very corporeal and organic metaphoricity also points toward the direction of overcoding and subordinating the potential multiplicity into one body. The Body/Politic of the Massachusetts Bay Colony consists of a complex interplay of both heterarchical democratic and hierarchical totalitarian tendencies.

Winthrop’s sermon reads like a manual for an aspiring community, and it almost exactly calls upon those forces and strategies that Freud—nearly three centuries later—would analyze in “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.” Freud here *describes* the “formula for the libidinal constitution of groups” (147), which parallels the formulas that Winthrop *prescribes*. Commenting on Gustave Le Bon’s study *La psychologie des foules* as well as other studies of group formation, Freud sees the tendency of these works to explain how “the members of a random crowd of people can constitute something like a group” resulting not only from the fact that the individuals forming a group “must have something in common with one another, a common interest in an object” (112), but also from what Le Bon terms “‘magnetic influence’” (quoted in 102)—comparable to the force of suggestion employed by a hypnotizer. Simultaneously criticizing Le Bon’s omission of an analysis of the very nature of the “bond” (99)⁵ that holds the group together and “protesting against the view that suggestion, which explained everything, was itself to be exempt from explanation” (117–18), Freud attempts to employ the concept of *libido* in his explanation of the cohesive force present in group formation, noting that libido is “a concept which has done us such good service in the study of psychoneuroses” (119). He draws a close connection between individual psychology and the constitution of the *Massenseele*, a complicity that is nonetheless far from being a simple and

straightforward relation of cause and effect. Though Freud attempts to use his analysis of the unconscious forces of the individual to explain aspects of the mental life of groups, systematically arguing that group life arises from these individual and unconscious forces, he also states that the opposite is true: there is no way to understand the unconscious of the individual without taking into account the mental life of the group to which he or she belongs: “The psychology of groups is the oldest human psychology; what we have isolated as individual human psychology, by neglecting all traces of the group, has only since come into prominence out of the old group psychology, by a process which may still, perhaps, be described as incomplete” (155). Ultimately, however, Freud concedes that both individual and group psychology must have come into existence simultaneously, both “that of the individual members of the group and that of the father, chief, or leader. The members of the group were subject to ties just as we see them to-day, but the father of the primal horde was free” (155–56). The relations of part and whole, the various libidinous ties among the members of the horde as well as to their “father, chief, or leader” now become the focal point of Freud’s analysis of the cohesive forces at work within the group. He points out a “double kind of tie” (162) operating in the libidinal structure of the group. Similarly, Winthrop had stressed the fact that there are “two rules” directing the communal interrelationship, “a double Law by which wee are regulated in our conversation towards another” (“Modell” 34). Winthrop identifies those two ties as “the lawe of nature and the lawe of grace,” or “the morall lawe [and] the lawe of the gospell” or “mercy” respectively (*ibid.*). Reading these two laws within the framework provided by the dual meaning of Winthrop’s significant view of love as ligament, the moral law/law of nature corresponds to the love among the members of the community [Winthrop equates this law with the law that commands man “to love his neighbour as himself . . . given to man in the estate of innocency” (34–35)], whereas the second law [the law after the fall of Adam] introduces differences and rules into this all-encompassing notion of love; it is more a law in the strictly legal sense, a call for obedience and obligation. Thus, Winthrop proceeds by giving exact rules to be followed according to the law of mercy. In Freud’s text, this “double kind of tie” is analyzed according to the libidinal forces at work. Following the various texts he discusses, Freud is quite free in his use of the term *group*, referring to “very fleeting groups and extremely lasting ones; homogeneous ones, made up of the same sorts of individuals, and unhomogeneous ones; natural groups, and artificial ones, requiring an external force to keep them together; primitive groups, and highly organized ones with a definite structure” (“Group Psychology” 122)—ranging from “groups of a short lived character” to “stable groups” (111). These various

modes and stages of organization are read into the kinds and forces of the libidinal connection operative in group formation.

The New England 'primal hordes' of Bradford and Winthrop, I argue, were positioned at a nodal point in between these two different group formations. On the social level, they were not a homogeneous group, as Winthrop's sermon made unmistakably clear by referring to the differences between rich and poor; yet, on another level, they belonged to a structure that Freud uses as a paradigmatic example of an artificial group: the church. Winthrop points to this nodal position when he states that the Mayflower party set out, in "mutuall consent, through a speciall overvaluing providence and a more than an ordinary approbation of the Churches of Christ, to seeke out a place of cohabitation and Consorteshipp under a due forme of Government both ciuill and ecclesiasticall" ("Modell" 45). According to Freud, like the army, the church belongs to a group with a leader [n + 1], and he mentions the "possibility of a leading idea being substituted for a leader" ("Group Psychology" 124) and refers to the church and religious groups in general, noting that they, "with their invisible head, form a transitional stage" (129). Yet the "morphology of groups" (*ibid.*), however high its level of abstraction, is characterized by the two-fold libidinal ties providing its internal cohesion. First of all, there is a leader "who loves all the individuals in the group with equal love" (123). The love between the group members is the second feature in Freud's "double kind of tie." In artificial, highly organized groups such as the church [or the army], "each individual is bound by libidinal ties on the one hand to the leader (Christ, the Commander-in-Chief) and on the other hand to the other members of the group" (124-25). Thus, a "democratic strain runs through the Church, for the very reason that before Christ everyone is equal" (123).⁶ Accordingly, the members of the Church "call themselves brothers in Christ, that is, brothers through the love which Christ has for them." For Freud, an atheist, this love of Christ is an "illusion" (*ibid.*). Winthrop, on the other hand, takes pains to stress that the love between the members of the community [which is modeled on the love offered for Christ]⁷ is "a reall thing, not imaginarie . . . This loue is as absolutely necessary to the being of the body of Christ, as the sinews and other ligaments of a naturall body are to the being of that body" ("Modell" 44).⁸

Freud goes on to observe that in group formation, concerning self-love or narcissism, with its concomitant aggressiveness against others, "the whole of this intolerance vanishes, temporarily or permanently" ("Group Psychology" 131).⁹ Despite Schopenhauer's analogy of the freezing porcupines, according to which too close a proximity to others is something to be dreaded, individuals in groups behave as if they were one. Narcissism, Freud

observes, “knows only one barrier—love for others, love for objects” (132). These limitations to self-love are not operative outside the group of which one is a member; thus Freud takes it as evidence that “the essence of group formation consists in new kinds of libidinal ties among the members of the group.” Yet these libidinal ties cannot be of a sexual nature; they belong to a different set of emotional relations, to the class of what Freud terms “identifications” (ibid.). Ultimately, the “formula for the libidinal constitution of groups” (147)—at least of such groups “that have a leader and have not been able by means of too much ‘organization’ to acquire secondarily the characteristics of an individual”—is as follows: “A *primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego*” (ibid.). Winthrop’s love for/of Christ and among the members of the group is the libidinal ligament providing cohesiveness for the Puritan community. Such an introjection promises to stabilize the individual, and in fact ultimately constitutes it as a desiring subject. As Lacan puts it: “The object takes the place . . . of what the subject is—symbolically—deprived of” (“Desire” 15).

As both a specular and a symbolic identification, it would be more apt to say that it is not only the *ego ideal*, but also the *ideal ego* that is at stake here, a primarily intrasubjective conception of an ideal of narcissistic [and imaginary] omnipotence. Although Freud does not always explicitly distinguish the terms *ideal ego* and *ego ideal*, he uses them in a variety of contexts. In contrast to the *ideal ego*, Freud identifies the *ego ideal* as [or at least as a modality of] the *super-ego* [*Über-Ich*]. It denotes an ideal model to which the subject strives to adjust itself qua *symbolic* identification. Thus, the term *identification* itself requires a closer analysis. With regard to the Oedipus complex, Freud writes that identification is first of all “the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person . . . A little boy will exhibit a special interest in his father; he would like to grow like him and be like him, and take his place everywhere” (“Group Psychology” 134). Yet at the same time, in addition to this early idealization of identification with the father, the little boy also forms a libidinal tie with his mother. The little boy “exhibits . . . two psychologically distinct ties: a straightforward sexual object-cathexis towards his mother and an identification with his father which takes him as his model” (147). In yet another step, seeing his father as a rival, the subject’s “identification with his father then takes on a hostile colouring and becomes identical with the wish to replace his father in regard to his mother as well” (ibid.). In addition to the fact that, as Freud has noted, the former type of identification is friendly, while the latter is aggressive, this latter type is ultimately of a completely different kind than the former, in-

volving the awareness of the male child that he is not the father. Identification proper, then, the realm of the *ideal ego*, is a speculative, imaginary process. The latter type of identification, which is more closely related to the *ego ideal*, is more like a kind of future promise *and* a prohibition, situated at the nodal point where the imaginary folds into the symbolic. Speculative identification—as an omnipotent fantasy of already being what one hopefully will aspire to [the dialectics of the mirror stage]—is replaced by a symbolic contract that creates the difference of subject and object in the first place as a set of differences.¹⁰ Because of the *ego ideal*'s complicity with the *super-ego* [the law of the father], the function of the father here is necessary twofold:¹¹ it both represents the no [*non*] of paternal authority and interdiction, and the subject's ideal figure of identification, the name [*nom*] that it adopts and that introduces it into the symbolic.

Likewise, Winthrop's Body/Politic is inextricably related to a contract, a political, legal and religious symbolic register operating via a third agent: the *ego ideal*, Christ, or God the father. The community—and each individual—is “written into existence” (Bercovitch, “Model”) by the paternal law, instigated by God.¹² According to Lacan, each body—individual and communal—is subjected to this law of the signifier from the beginning: “The Law is there *ab origine*” (*Seminar III* 83). The name of the father gives coherence and unity to bodies both social and real, a name that is also a no to disorder and dissent, hence a yes to order and authority. In the Puritans' religious version of the Oedipus complex, the subject accepts the name and law of God. The consequences of that acceptance for the individual and communal subject can best be described by referring to Lacan's notions of the law and the symbolic register. Submission to the law of the signifier [and the name of the father is the preeminent signifier] is the prerequisite for the coming-into-being of the subject: “The subject is born in so far as the signifier emerges in the field of the Other. But, by this very fact, this subject—which, was previously nothing if not a subject coming into being—solidifies into a signifier” (*Four Fundamental Concepts* 199), so that the subject is inscribed into a system of differences, of sexual, social, and other binaries. The intrusion of the signifier separates once and for all an original, natural ‘state of innocence’ [being] from ‘culture’ [meaning]. In fact, it is the paradoxical notion of an ‘originary signifier’ that necessarily takes the position of ‘origin.’ As a consequence, this “signifier ‘One’ is not just any old signifier. It is the signifying order” (*Seminar XX* 143)—the structure of language as such. Taking one signifier out of a “swarm” (*ibid.*) of signifiers as a representative of truth, the subject's *ego ideal* is formed by an identificatory process. This representative of truth has to be identified with the symbolic father, because it is “in the name of the father [i.e., the symbolic father] that we must recognize the

support of the symbolic function which, from the dawn of history, has identified his person with the figure of the law” (*Écrits* 67, emphasis in the original). In Lacanian terminology, the *name of the father*, the *unary signifier* *SI* and the *phallus* are different registers of one and the same function. The law that the father is seen to represent is the law of the signifier. The name that the child learns to speak properly and to take as his own through the negotiation of the Oedipal conflicts is precisely this name of the father. This cultural significance of paternity has nothing to do with biological origins. It is the child’s acceptance of a particular signifier that confers upon him an identity, and this identity is essentially a “function of symbolic identification” (*ibid.*). The name of the father places the subject in a relation to other subjects—the symbolic thus being a bond connecting each subject to the father and the members of the family, as well society as a whole, with the imaginary aspect of mutual love always underlying the connections.

The Puritan civil Body|Politic—as a combined body—does not start from some quasinatural unity, though it has to be admitted that this very unity is nevertheless something to be achieved, to be fought for. By using the analogy of the human body ‘made whole’ by its inscription into a contract, a network of rules and regulations, the Puritans’ attempt can be read as following the vicissitudes of the ‘real body’ and its entry into the symbolic as outlined by Lacan. According to Lacan, as a consequence of the fact that the real is what cannot be represented [what is imaginary or symbolic] the real ‘provides’ signifiers that structure human relations. The real body is “first of all that which can carry the mark, suitable to inscribe it into a chain of signifiers” (“Radiophonie” 61). The symbolic is a structure that “carves up [the] body, a structure that has nothing to do with anatomy” (“Television” 6), but with an *imaginary anatomy* Lacan mentioned with respect to hysterics. Commenting on hysterical symptoms, Lacan shows that they are structured according to “a certain imaginary Anatomy which has typical forms of its own . . . I would emphasize that the imaginary anatomy referred to here varies with the ideas (clear or confused) about bodily functions which are prevalent in a given culture” (“Some Reflections” 13). Thus, the “imaginary anatomy” is first of all an image of the meaning that the body has for the subject, a meaning that is regulated by the subject’s social world or culture—in Lacanian terms, the symbolic order that subsumes both individual and collective phantasms of the body. The body is the “hysterical nucleus of the neurosis in which the hysterical symptom reveals the structure of a language, and is deciphered like an inscription” (*Écrits* 50). In a curious temporal reversion, then, for the speaking subject, the symbolic body *produces* the real body: “The first body produces the second one, by incorporating itself in it” (“Radiophonie” 61). The symbolic, the name of the father, “corpsif[s]”

(*ibid.*) the real body—that is, it castrates the real body, but by the very fact of this dismemberment projects a symbolic identity on it.¹³ When the Puritan community found that it could not depend only on an exegesis of God's commandments but needed a more detailed set of rules, the Massachusetts government created the Body of Liberties, a 'second skin,' the adherence to which safeguarded the functioning of the Body/Politic. The Body of Liberties was still inextricably tied to God's laws and the accorded places of the individual bodies within the community's structure, as outlined in Winthrop's "A Modell of Christian Charity." In that sermon, moreover, the body is rendered perfect only within Christ's love—that is, in the desire of the Other—and by answering his demands, obeying his word. The set of necessary [social] differences that, according to Winthrop, both require and can be regulated by love also points to the paradox of the symbolic. Before [the cohesive force of] the law, the body consisted of disparate bodies, part objects, body parts; yet, the law itself, although creating a unity-effect, creates fragmentization and differences within that body in the first place. With regard to the individual body, it is precisely language—not any biological given—that isolates the distinct parts of the body.

The body of the believer is a hysterical body in the Lacanian sense. It also has to be read as a signified body, because of the operation that "places in the position of a signifier . . . [the] body itself" (*Écrits* 301). The typical question of the hysteric—What does the Other want from me?¹⁴—ultimately is the basic component of [symbolic] subjectivity. Hysteria is a matter of existential questioning, and both the questions and their answers *write themselves* onto the body in hysterical symptoms. For the Puritans, as much in Winthrop's own time as in the century to follow, there was, as Jonathan Edwards put it, "no question whatsoever, that is of greater importance to mankind, and that it more concerns every individual person to be well resolved in, than this, what are the distinguishing qualifications of those that are in favor with God, and entitled to his eternal rewards? . . . and wherein do lie the distinguishing notes of that virtue and holiness, that is acceptable in the sight of God?" (*Religious Affections* 84)—the ultimate question being: Can my body provide me with an unambiguous answer? According to Edwards, the fact "that religious affections are very great, or raised very high" (127) is no sign, nor is the fact "that they have great effects on the body" (131). Yet because of the union of body and soul, "there never is in any case whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or inclination of the soul, without some effect upon the body" (98). However, due to "the same laws of the union of the soul and body, the constitution of the body, and the motion of its fluids, may promote the exercise of the affections." Equating mind and soul as concepts contrary to the body proper,

Edwards claims that it is “not the body, but the mind only, that is the proper seat of the affections. The body of man is no more capable of being really the subject of love or hatred, joy or sorrow, fear or hope, than the body of a tree, or than the same body of man is capable of thinking and understanding. As it is the soul only that has ideas, so it is the soul only that is pleased or displeased with its ideas. As it is the soul only that thinks, so it is the soul only that loves or hates, rejoices or is grieved at what it thinks of.” As a consequence, “an unbodied spirit may be as capable of love and hatred, joy or sorrow, hope or fear, or other affections, as one that is united to a body,” just as an unspirited body would be incapable of such affections. Like the unbodied spirit, however, a spirited body—a body animated with Christ’s love—can provide answers: the body, despite all its baseness, was the primary site of knowledge for the Puritans, who were extremely concerned with interpreting the meaning of individuals’ bodies within their community. In addition, ‘experience’ is ultimately inscribed in the intersubjective realm of communication, on the covenant between God and his believers. Thus, the capacity of the body to *mean*, to literally *embody* experience, depends on the body’s representational status, on its function as a blank page.

In the best-case scenario, then, the Puritan’s body was a “Mystic Writing Pad”¹⁵ for—in Edwards’s words—“divine things” (240), a material analogue to spiritual facts, the inscriptional surface for signs of grace. The body bears the marks of the Puritan symbolic, and it was God the father who—as the ultimate *subject-supposed-to-know*—was to provide the answers to these burning questions. This is a paradigmatic example of Lacan’s thesis that the Discourse of the Hysteric produces the Discourse of the Master,¹⁶ which in the case of religion consists of the codification of God’s will into God’s law. It comes as no surprise that Winthrop held that “libertye is maintained & exercised in a waye of subjection to Authoritye” (*Journal* 588). To a modern reader, the use of the word *liberty* in a context that seems to suggest more the repressive aspects of the law might seem cynical or at least surprising, yet in the seventeenth century, as the Puritans themselves had experienced, the liberty—for example—to do good according to their religious principles could be suppressed by an evil civil [and even religious, in the case of Archbishop Laud] power. For the Puritans, then, to worship in their own manner was a privilege to be wrestled from sinful authorities, and to be secured and safeguarded by their own government. Thus, a ‘benign’ and ‘good’ authority—religious, clerical and political—was not to be questioned. In fact this answers the pressing questions of the Puritan hysteric and shows the right way into liberty which, as liberty from the bondage of sin, is to be understood as the free will for submission to his kingdom comewith all the gendered implications of this phrase included: “The womans owne

choise makes such a man her husband, yet beinge so chosen he is her Lord” (ibid.).¹⁷

It is the acceptance of obedience to the name of the father and the inscription in/of his desire that renders both the communal and individual body whole, “*without spott or wrinkle*” (Winthrop, “Modell” 40), modeled on the perfect body of Christ. The examples of the Puritan Body/Politic presented so far all focus on the image of the ‘whole’ body: the correspondences between the political body and the physical body depend on the condition of bodily integrity, corporeal unity, the smooth functioning of the members in their respective places, situated within a precisely framed whole. Each member is only a part of the whole body, and therefore less than the whole, but the whole can exist only as the totality of its members. The image of the ideal state parallels an equally idealized image of the human body. With reference to Barthes, the underlying body-phantasm here is one of homogeneous wholeness, with a discrete inside and outside, and without deformities, disabilities, or missing parts. Within the economy of the body as a whole, it is the human face that occupies a particular prominent place—the face has the power to overcode the whole body. It is in fact the face that makes the head seem separate from the body, as an independent—and controlling—agent, apt to figure prominently in the metaphor of the Body/Politic. According to Deleuze/Guattari, “the face is Christ . . . Jesus Christ Superstar: he invented the facialization of the entire body and transmitted it everywhere” (*Thousand Plateaus* 176). In his notebook, John Saffin, a Boston merchant and—like Winthrop—a trained lawyer, wrote down a vision of Christ’s body as a model for imitation, in particular pointing out the perfection of Christ’s face:

A Man of stature some what tall and Comely, with A very Reverend Countenance such as the beholders may both Love and feare his haire of the Coloure of a Philbird full Ripe and plaine allmost downe to his Eares from his Eares Downward somewhat Curled & more greyant of Collour waveing about his shoulders in the midst of his head goeth a seame or partition of his haire After the maner of Nazarits his forehead very plaine and smooth, his face without Spott, or wrinkle beautified with Red. His Nose & mouth so formed as Nothing could be Reprehended . . . ; in speaking very temperate modest and wise A Man for his Singular Beauty surpassing the Children of Men.
(12–13)

In a similar vein, Edward Taylor, apart from praising “His Glorious Body” in general, creates a whole *blazon* of Christ’s body,¹⁸ yet zooms in on his face, describing in detail Christ’s eyes, cheeks, lips, teeth, locks, etc. In both Saffin and Taylor, Christ’s face is the divine face which reflects God’s absolute

gaze, the word|glance made flesh. A countenance to be both loved and feared, reflecting both Christ's modesty and wisdom [and corresponding religious values and affections such as humility, pity, and concern] it 'subjects' its beholders because it signifies power, knowledge, and domination, and because Christ provides a [nonetheless unattainable] model for imitation, creating a space in which the subject can 'find itself.'

As Georg Simmel observed in "The Aesthetic Significance of the Face," it is in the face "that the soul finds its clearest expression" (276). For Simmel, the face can be said to be overcoding the body since the face, "of all the parts of the human body, . . . has the highest degree of this kind of inner unity" that defines the organism as a whole—"the intimate relation of its parts and the involvement of the parts in the unity of the life process" (ibid.). The face not only reflects the unity and symmetry of the whole body, but also a perfect Body|Politic, "the ideal of human co-operation . . . that completely individualized elements grow into the closest unity which, though composed of these elements, transcends each of them" (277). The symmetry of the face in general—and of Christ's perfect face in particular—perfectly embodies Winthrop's contention that "the care of the publique must over-*sway* all private respects, by which, not only conscience, but meare civill pollicy, dothe binde us. For it is a true rule that particular Estates cannot subsist in the ruin of the publique" ("Modell" 45). The face—like the whole, perfect body, as well as the Body|Politic—is successful in mirroring the soul in that it reflects "the absolute encompassment of each detail by the power of the central ego" (Simmel 277), in the Puritan case based on the mirror identification with Christ's *ideal ego*. In contrast, if the overcoding power of the face loses its grip, the effect is a "centrifugal movement" which Simmel equates to a process of despiritualization, a weakening of "the perceivable domination of the mind [or central ego] over the circumference of our being," the ultimate outcome of which for Simmel takes a form similar to Lacan's *imagos* of the *corps morcelé*: "baroque figures, whose limbs appear to be in danger of breaking off" (Simmel 277). The face reflects the perfection, symmetry, and unity that for Simmel is a sign of the body's pervasion by the mind or central ego.

Winthrop had invoked Christ's body as a model of the "*perfection of partes*" ("Modell" 40), of a "*glorious body*"—and the love of and for Christ [*imitatio Christi*] as the way to approach perfection in oneself. In fact, the concept of perfection—or perfectibility—runs like a red thread through Puritan thinking. In its application to the well-knit Body|Politic, it provides a fitting example of Mary Douglas's contention that, since consideration of the form of the human body always implies social and political dimensions as well, "bodily perfection can symbolize an ideal theocracy" (*Purity and*

Danger 4). Cotton Mather talks of the “pristine Perfection” to which men’s “Spirits and . . . their Bodies” (*The Angel of Bethesda* 10) should be restored. In fact, identity—at least Christian identity—does not exist without a mirroring identification with the *ideal ego* of Christ: for Mather, “without the *Imitation of Christ*, all thy *Christianity* as a meer Nonentity” (*Christianity to the Life* 17), and the imitation of Christ comes close to an imitation of the perfection and beauty of that *ideal ego*. Jonathan Edwards described beauty in the following terms:

All beauty consists in similarness, or identity of relation. In identity of relation consists all likeness, and all identity between two consists identity of relation. Thus, when the distance between two is exactly equal, their distance is their relation one to another, the distance is the same, the bodies are two; wherefore this is their correspondency and beauty. So bodies exactly of the same figure, the bodies are two, the relation between the parts of the extremities is the same, and this is their agreement with them. But if there are two bodies of different shapes, having no similarness of relation between the parts of the extremities; this, considered by itself, is a deformity, because it disagrees with being . . . And so in every case, what is called Correspondency, Symmetry, Regularity, and the like, may be resolved into Equalities . . . all the natural motions, and tendencies and figures of bodies in the Universe are done according to proportion, and therein is their beauty. (“The Mind” 695)

Although Edwards might be thinking here along the lines of pleasant proportions such as the golden section, his description also parallels the implicit fractality in the frontispiece to Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, valuing sameness and homogeneity over difference and heterogeneity.

However, a distinction has to be made between things of importance and mere trivialities, and the human body and the church share a prominent status, even in their material composition—according to Edwards, the body’s symmetrical harmony “affects the mind more than the beauty of a flower . . . And the proportions of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the same proportions in some slight compositions, made to please children” (“A Dissertation” 274). In fact, a distinctive marker “wherein those affections that are truly gracious and holy, differ from those that are false, is beautiful symmetry and proportion” (*Religious Affections* 365), and it is but an iteration—on a smaller, individual scale—of the symmetry of the Body/Politic: “There is a beauty of order in society, besides what consists in benevolence, or can be referred to it, which is of the secondary kind. As, when the different members of society have all their appointed office, place and station, according to their several capacities and talents, and everyone keeps his place and continues in his proper business. In this, there is a beauty,

not of a different kind from the regularity of a beautiful building, or piece of skilful architecture, where the strong pillars are set in their proper place” (“A Dissertation” 275). Ultimately, the intelligible order of society is formed from the outside, its symmetry being an effect of a planning instance, and the traditional image of society as an organism ‘naturalizes’ the harmony and control that the ‘architects’ of that society sought when they employed law and authority to ensure the orderly structuring of ‘the Many’ into ‘One.’ That closely echoes the narrative of oedipalization, of channeling the multiplicity of desires into a single, fixed, individual: “the agreement of a variety in one common design, of the parts of a building, or complicated machine, is one instance of that regularity . . . consisting in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to *one general purpose*” (ibid., my emphasis). Through authority and law, the regularity is upheld: “Right is secured; Injuries are suppressed; Offenders are punished; the Obedient are Rewarded; The Good Order and Peace designed is preserved, and the General Weal promoted” (Saltonstall 18). As Marcel Mauss, Norbert Elias, and in particular Michel Foucault have shown, such regulatory practices produce subjects and inscribe discipline into the very materiality of their bodies.¹⁹ Beyond any metaphoricity, the attempted imitation of Christ—the sinful body facing its *ideal ego*—and the inscription of God’s law produce a certain type of body: obedient, doing good, a body continuously watching and observing itself for signs of grace or damnation, and producing a subject in Foucault’s double sense of the word: to be “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to” (“The Subject and Power” 331).²⁰

However, as Lacan has shown in his work on the mirror stage, the celebrated image of the phallic, whole, and well-proportioned body—the embodiment of Freud’s *ideal ego*, the *Ideal-Ich* (*Écrits* 7, note 1)—is always concomitant with the spectral possibility of its own dismemberment;²¹ what has to be accounted for is the notion of two [however related] phantasms of the human body. For Lacan, these two body-images are tied to each other insofar as the fragmented body is created belatedly from within the symbolic and is, in fact, an effect of the identification with the *ideal ego*, and further, the *ego ideal*. The aggressivity and fear revealed in the images of fragmentation and corporeal dislocation are the “correlative tendency of a mode of identification that we call narcissistic, and which determines the formal structure of man’s ego and of the register of entities characteristic of his world” (16). On the level of the dream as well as on the level of [artistic] representation, as Lacan’s allusion to Bosch’s paintings suggest, the image

of the fragmented body symbolizes castration anxiety, the fear of fragmentation, as well as of loss of control. It is important to note that for Lacan, the body-image is not merely a projection of a prior, 'real' body, but the condition through which the body must be experienced in the first place. Where, then, is the point of conjunction between *imagined communities* and the *imaginary anatomy* of the bodily ego? The dynamic interplay between the whole and the fragmented body can be translated into 'political terms' by way of Mary Douglas's contention that the physical body symbolically reproduces the anxieties of the social body and, I argue, vice versa. Douglas notes: "The human body is always treated as an image of society and . . . there can be no natural way of considering the body that does not involve at the same time a social dimension" (*Natural Symbols* 70). For her, "the body is a model that can stand for any bounded system. Its boundaries can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious" (*Purity and Danger* 116). The body-image becomes a model for narratives, individual and communal, and is in turn also narrativized. Reading Douglas with Lacan, however, the body as a system is inescapably and inherently fragmented, just as the unity of the whole, communal body is both constituted and threatened by the diversity of its members, the very diversity which is necessary to form an 'organ-ized' body in the first place. It is only possible to resolve the diversity in the overall scheme of wholeness, by claiming that in this metaphor's "most obvious kind of unity in diversity . . . the parts of both are found to correspond isomorphically to each other" (Fletcher 71). If the underlying structure of the analogy between individual and state is an allegorization of the internal relations of the parts of a whole, an individual or communal body, then the diversity of the human body, particularly when its different organs and members parallel different aspects of the communal body, creates a body-image always in danger of being torn apart—the 'unity in diversity' is also a 'diversity in unity'—*metaphor* [promise of wholeness/identity] is always already subverted by *metonymy* [part off for the whole]. In the traditional heuristic of the king's two bodies, dismemberment of the Body|Politic had been thought of primarily as a separation of the head from the body, not so much a fragmentation of the body itself. Wholeness of the commonwealth meant the head's government of and control over the body—any violence against the Body|Politic by the body of the people would eventually result in disturbing the head's control over that body, and had to be prevented or, as Foucault has shown, rigorously and spectacularly re-established. A body without a head is not likely to survive: "What state the body can be in if the head . . . be cut off, I leave to the reader's judgement" (James 65). The inviolable and God-given hierarchy of the head over what

Bakhtin calls the “lower stratum,” of the king over his subjects, is the necessary condition on which the survival of both the individual body and the state depend (Bakhtin 368).

Winthrop’s sermon, by translating the fragmentation produced by the ‘cutting agency’ of the symbolic upon the real body into the imaginary anatomy of social differences [differences that are God-given and ultimately, like the ‘corpsification’ of the real body, produce a unified body], reveals the threat of fragmentation as something that might occur to the body as such—not just a separation between head and body, but something concomitant to the promise of corporeal and communal unity. By depicting the body as an organism inherently structured, rather than stressing [in theory at least] the head’s control over the body, this body in question *had to be* whole and healthy. In the Puritans’ rewriting of the Body|Politic, the whole *must* indeed be [or, at least, be pronounced to be] prior to its parts if both the body and its individual members are to survive, hence Winthrop’s insistence that “wee *must* be knitt together, in this worke, as one man. Wee *must* entertaine each other in brotherly affection. Wee *must* be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluties, for the supply of other’s necessities. Wee *must* uphold a familiar commerce together in all meekness, gentleness, patience and liberality. Wee *must* delight in eache other; make other’s conditions our oune; rejoyce together, mourne together, labour and suffer together, allwayes haueing before our eyes our commission and community in the worke, as members of the same body” (“Modell” 46–47, my emphasis). This almost desperate insistence, however, nonetheless acknowledges the possibility of dismemberment. In fact, Winthrop relates this scenario to a time before the intervention of Christ’s love and ligament: “The severall partes of this body considered a parte before they were united, were as disproportionate and as much disordering as soe many contrary quallities or elements” (40). This state of bodily disorder and fragmentation was undone and healed “when Christ comes, and by his spirit and loue knitts all these partes to himselfe and each to other”—bodily unity and cohesion is guaranteed only via a third agent, Christ. However, there is always the danger of backsliding,²² of regressing to that state of disintegration and disorganization, both on the level of the individual body—in the bodily fragmentation caused by sin—and on that of the Body|Politic. As for the members as a whole, it might always be the case that “Sin has . . . Invaded them, Marr’d the Rectitude of their Faculty’s, and subjected them to the Empire of Lust and Passion . . . And from hence (as the proper Fountain) all the Disorder & Confusion in the World takes its rise. Hence tis that the Good Order, Beauty and Tranquility of Society’s is so often defac’d and disturbed” (Bulkeley 40).

The New England Puritan theocracy had to face insurgents, dissenters, and disturbers of society during its first century of existence, and it was confirmed in its view that the only alternative to strong and righteous government was chaos and anarchy, which was to be prevented by all means: "Irreligion and Profaneness, Unrighteousness, and Oppression, Disorder, and Confusion . . . invade a People, when the Rod of Dominion is broken, the Bands of Authority dissolved, and every man is his own King" (Saltonstall 7). Thus, there is good "reason to reckon Government in the prime Rank of God's Mercies."²³ It is only by following God's will and God's law, then, and by being infused with Christ's spirit and love, that a general bodily disorder might be prevented and that the New England community might aspire to becoming an *ego ideal* in itself to be identified with by "succeeding plantations" hoping "'the Lord make it likely that of *New England*.' For wee must consider that wee shall be as a citty upon a hill. The eies of all people are uppon us" ("Modell" 47), attempting to establish similar versions on a larger scale of their own "formula for the libidinal constitution of groups."

The love that knits a community together proceeds into that very community by faith, by the labor in God's name, by the desire to obey his words. In accordance with Romans 4:5—"but to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness"—the old covenant of works was supplanted by the covenant of grace. As a consequence, not good deeds but only the experience of conversion, the unconditional turn from a life of sin to repentance and a life dedicated to following God's will could ultimately inspire an authentic relationship to God. The Reformation theology of Martin Luther started from the thesis that the necessary turn from the false righteousness of good works to a justifying faith had been dismissed by the Roman Catholic Church. Only the grace of faith could regenerate the convert and free him or her from the enslavement of sin. The concept of conversion was closely related to the notion of predestination, a doctrine originating in the teachings of John Calvin, who held that God, in his infinite mercy—despite humanity's original depravity and sinfulness—would spare a small number of the elect from eternal damnation. These 'saints' would know about their salvation by a profound sense of inner assurance that they possessed God's 'saving grace.' This utopian hope was at the heart of the experience of conversion, which might come upon individuals suddenly or gradually, in their earliest youth or even just moments before death. Thus, God decided before the beginning of history who would be saved or damned; this decision could not be affected by human behavior. Edwards, in his sermon "Justification by Faith

Alone,” a long commentary on Romans 4:5 that can be read as the justification for the doctrine of faith, defines faith quite differently than the simple notion of belief. Rather, faith is a disposition of “union” with Christ. It is a sign of the relationship that exists between man and God in the flesh: “God don’t give those that believe a union with or an interest in the Savior as a *reward* for faith, but only because faith is the soul’s *active* uniting with Christ, or is itself the very act of Union, *on their part*. God sees it fit, that in order to a union being established between two intelligent active beings or persons, so as that they should be looked upon as one, there should be the mutual act of both, that each should receive the other, as actively joining themselves one to another” (*Discourses* 16).

Yet the doctrine of faith and predestination did not make good works and a disciplined life unnecessary—in fact, these aspects of human life were strictly regulated in the Puritan community. Creating a society in accordance with God’s will and living a godly life were seen not so much as a cause, but rather as an effect of salvation: Christ “loues his *elect* because *they are like himselfe*” (“Modell” 42). Put another way, by identifying with Christ, the Lacanian *ego ideal*, the “ideal point . . . placed somewhere in the Other, from which the Other sees me, in the form I like to be seen” (*Four Fundamental Concepts* 268), the elect subjects [in order to be assured of their salvation] had to be reflected back in a likeable form: whole, pure, without taint or wrinkle. Thus, by “*beholding the glory of the Lord in the glass of the Gospel*”—i.e., by obeying his law and word—“*wee are changed into the same Image*” (R. Mather 23). The glass, as Lacan has pointed out, is also a mirror, one of a very particular kind: “Think of the mirror as a plane of glass. You’ll see yourself in the glass and you’ll see the objects beyond it. That’s exactly how it is—it’s a coincidence between certain images and the real” (*Seminar I* 141). The fact that the transparent glass is always already a mirror results in the paradox of a promised transparency of reflection: “The real objects, which pass via the mirror, and through it, are in the same place with the imaginary object.” What we are dealing with here is “nothing other than the images of the human body, the hominisation of the world, its perception in terms of images linked to the structuration of the body . . . The essence of the image is to be invested by the libido” (141). Christ—the *ego ideal*—is “the mirror in which God beholds us when he wishes to find us acceptable to himself” (Calvin, *Sermons* 47), the mirror|glass “wherein we must, and without self-deception may, contemplate our own election” (Calvin, *Institutes* part 3, chap. 24, para. 5). The glass of the mirror promises fulfillment [and salvation] exactly by making these ‘objective’ qualities seen in the Other ‘subjective,’ by throwing the gaze back onto the spectator: the “union” proclaimed by Edwards is effected by the saints’ having “the whole

image of Christ upon them: they have ‘put off the old man, and have put on the new man’ entire in all his parts and members” (*Religious Affections* 365).²⁴ With regard to the body-image reflected in the mirror, the Puritan’s hope was that it showed the “new man,” the precious pureness of Christ’s “Pearle-like” body, as Taylor puts it in a poem fittingly called “The Reflexion” (Taylor 14). Much has been written about Puritan self-debasement, and how “the individual affirming his identity by turning against his powers of self-affirmation” ultimately faces the dilemma that “to affirm and to turn against are both aspects of self-involvement” (Bercovitch, *Puritan Origins* 20).

The Puritans followed St. Augustine, who stated that two different kinds of love are the origin of two different kinds of cities: “self-love in contempt of God unto the earthly; love of God in contempt of one’s self to the heavenly. The first seeketh the glory of man, and the latter desires God only, as the testimony of the conscience, the greatest glory” (*City of God* book 4, para. 28). Augustine then proceeds to relate this “self-love” to the body, or, to be more precise, to “the flesh”: “In the earthly city the wise men follow either the goods of the body or mind or both, living according to the flesh . . . but in the other, this heavenly city, there is no wisdom of man but only the piety that serveth the true God and expecteth a reward in the society of the holy angels and men, that God may be all in all.” In this respect, Augustine’s comment is an elaboration of 2 Corinthians 5:6: “Whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord.” Ultimately, as Augustine testifies, “the love of God unto the contempt of self builds up the city of God,” or, the ‘City upon a Hill,’ for that matter. Thus, the love of the self always was a love of the body as well. However, from the perspective of Christ, the ‘mirror of election,’ with whom the believer was to identify, the body, the flesh devoid of any spiritual wholeness, was only a corrupt material shape. Yet this was what the Puritan did not want to see. The body-image to be reflected was both the body mirrored in the perfect body of Christ, but also the body perfected by God’s law [the gospel], reflecting both the imaginary relation between *ego* and *ideal ego*, and the relation between *ego* and *ego-ideal*—which is of a symbolic nature, since it is, as Lacan puts it, “the symbolic relation, which determines the greater or lesser degree of perfection, of completeness, of approximation, of the imaginary. This representation allows us to draw the distinction between the *Idealich* and the *Ichideal*, between the ideal ego and the ego-ideal” (*Seminar I* 141).

This conflation of specular identification [ego] and symbolic identification [subject] referred to earlier with respect to Freud’s “Group Psychology”—the latter supporting “the perspective chosen by the subject in the field of the Other, from which specular identification may be seen in a satisfactory

light” (Lacan, *Four Fundamental Concepts* 268)—upheld the fiction of a whole body, both individual and communal. What was ultimately required was the ligament of God’s law, his name, so that the body might not fall apart. Edwards rightly stresses the *legal* aspect of the union of Christ and his believers, and the law’s capacity of creating a single, whole body:

The *union* of the members of the body with the head, is the ground of their partaking of the life of the head. It is the *union* of the branches to the stock, which is the ground of their partaking of the sap and life of the stock. It is the *relation* of the wife to the husband, that is the ground of her joint interest in his estate: they are looked upon, in several respects, as one in law . . . God, in requiring this in order to an union with Christ as one of his people, treats men as reasonable creatures, capable of act and choice, and hence sees it fit that they only who are one with Christ by their own act, should be looked upon as one *in law*. What is *real* in the union between Christ and his people, is the foundation of what is *legal*: that is, it is something really in them, and between them, uniting them, that is the ground of the suitableness of their being accounted as one by the judge. (*Discourses* 14).


Thus, in close connection with this Puritan Body|Politic stands the ‘whole body’ as a utopian promise of the union with God, which, as Edwards’s statement makes clear, finds its ‘natural’ expression in marriage, the relation of wife to the husband. The concept of conversion—the ultimate experience of grace and Christ’s love—is told as a story of marriage, embodying St. Paul’s paradigmatic conversion in gendered terms. As a consequence, Puritan ministers consistently employed female imagery to symbolize the process of conversion and salvation, the way to true sainthood.

It has to be stressed that the experience of conversion draws on the transformation of all saintly souls, both male and female, into clean, feminine slates inscribed by the word of both Christ and God the father, employing a corporeal imagery for the most spiritual aspects/lacts. Thus, according to Edwards, “the saints are the jewels of Jesus Christ, the great potentate, who has the possession of the empire of the universe; and these jewels have his image enstamped upon them by his royal signet, which is the Holy Spirit. And this is undoubtedly what the Scripture means by the seal of the Spirit; especially when it is stamped in so fair and clear a manner, as to be plain to the eye of conscience; which is what the Scripture calls our spirit” (*Religious Affections* 233). Calvin, referring to the figural language of scripture, describes salvation through the spirit of Christ as “that sacred marriage, by which we become bone of his bone, and flesh of his flesh, and so one with him, (Eph. 5:30,) for it is by the Spirit alone that he unites himself to us. By the same grace and energy of the Spirit we become his members, so that he

keeps us under him, and we in our turn possess him" (*Institutes* part 1, chap. 1, para. 3). In the same spirit, Thomas Shepard states that "the soul hence gives itself, like one espoused to her husband, to the Lord Jesus" (*Works* 2:31). As David Leverenz has succinctly put it, "female imagery provided a transformational vocabulary satisfying desires for dependence while denying ambivalence in fantasies of regressive union" (145). Thus, the Puritan hysteric's pressing questions about the "distinguishing qualifications of those that are in favor with God" were answered by a double phantasm of self-abandoning dependence. Being transformed into Christ's brides, the saints were also affirmed as God's children, a fact that Edwards again relates to the hylomorphic image of inscription, of putting a stamp on the believer:

When God sets his seal on a man's heart by his Spirit, there is some holy stamp, some image impressed and left upon the heart by the Spirit, as by the seal upon the wax. And this holy stamp, or impressed image, exhibiting clear evidence to the conscience, that the subject of it is the child of God, is the very thing which in Scripture is called the seal of the Spirit, and the witness, or evidence of the Spirit. And this image enstamped by the Spirit on God's children's hearts, is his own image; that is the evidence by which they are known to be God's children, that they have the image of their Father stamped upon their hearts by the Spirit of adoption. (*Religious Affections* 232)

The metaphor of the sacred marriage favored by Puritan ministers expresses the willful resignation to be ruled, governed, almost owned by God. The paradox involved here was that Puritan men had to subjugate their male qualities—in fact, their qualities as a 'head'—in order to become female, to become Christ's bride and body. The regenerate's marriage to Christ was first of all a marriage of the soul, the heart, as that 'bodily' organ through which the husband, Christ, would enter the saint's body in order to save him/her. Yet it would be mistaken to think that there was an easy opposition between soul/heart²⁵ and body. In fact, the soul/heart was also described in physical terms. The English Puritan Richard Sibbes, whose writings had a great deal of influence on the New England Puritans, describes the heart first of all as precisely *not* denoting "the inward material and fleshy part of the body," denying it any physical quality. He goes on to affirm that "all the powers of the soul, the inward man, as Paul calleth it, 2 Cor. iv. 16, is the heart" (quoted in Cohen 37). There seems to be a distinction between two kinds of bodies—the "fleshy" material and what Sibbes calls the "inward man." On the one hand, this metaphor is yet another example of the symmetrical correspondences that, according to Edwards, reveal true grace, the [hopeful] correspondence of inward and outward man. On the other hand, the more physical aspect of the phrase draws strength



“The Inward Man,” from Andreas Vesalius, *De Humani Corporis Fabrica* [1541].

from the idea [championed, e.g., by the anatomist Vesalius] of the female genitalia as “the scrotum and penis of the man inverted” (Guillaume Bouchet, quoted in Laqueur 63)—i.e., the complexity of the metaphor points to the female soul as the introjection of both Christ and sexual pleasure. These two aspects connect in the idea of consummation that was demanded by the idea of the sacred marriage—a consummation, it must be noted, that was always deferred [to ‘Judgment Day’]. Increase Mather concedes that “in this Life Believers are Espoused to Christ. At his Second coming will be the Consummation of the Marriage. Christ will then come as a Bridegroom” (*Practical Truths* 54).

The metaphor of the marriage between regenerate believers and Christ also denotes the almost ecstatic joy they hope to experience in the consummation of their union with Christ. Winthrop describes this ecstasy: “God brought me by that occasion in to suche a heavenly meditation of the love betweene Christ & me, as ravished my heart wth unspeakable ioye; me-thought my soule had as familiar & sensible society wth him as my wife could have wth the kindest husbände . . . w^{ch} made me to recall to my view the love of my earthly marriages, w^{ch} the more I thought upon, the more sensible I grewe of the most sweet love of my heavenly husband, Christ Jesus” (*Life and Letters* 1:105–6).

Remarkably, in Puritan writing, a prevalent stress on the unbodied spirit is belied by a tradition of corporeal imagery of devotion and passion.²⁶ In the sacred marriage, that ultimate communion of the saints in heaven, the ligament that knits the communal body together, is reaffirmed and strengthened—as Taylor puts it, “a curious knot God made in Paradise, /And drew it out inamled neatly Fresh. /It was the True-Love Knot, more sweet than spice/And set with all the flowres of Graces dress./Its Weddens Knot, that ne’re can be unti’de. /No Alexanders Sword can it divide” (468). The heavenly union between Christ and believer, to be consummated in death and salvation, ultimately relied on a constant struggle between two aspects of the Puritan self: the sinful, wicked side and the redeemed, saved side. The paradoxical nature of such a conception of self lies in the fact that the sinful

self is needed in order to attain a glimpse of grace—stressing one's depravity, showing one's worthlessness, was the only way to salvation. Anne Bradstreet has illustrated this struggle in her poem "The Flesh and The Spirit" and has significantly rendered it as an 'internal dialogue' between two sisters. The one, flesh, "had her eye/On worldly wealth and vanity" (108) and represents the sinful aspect of the Puritan self, whereas the other, Spirit, "did rear/Her thoughts unto a higher sphere" and thus stands for the "unregenerate part" (109). Although they are sisters, even "twins," "yet deadly feud 'twixt thee and me;/For from one father are we not./Thou by old Adam wast begot./But my arise is from above,/Whence my dear father I do love." What is important, however, is the fact that this "deadly feud" cannot be resolved in life: "For I have vow'd (and so will do)/Thee as a foe still to pursue./And combat with thee will and must/Until I see thee laid in th' dust." Not attempting to reconcile the struggle, the very continuity of it will finally lead to salvation, to the final triumph in death, and the ascendance to heaven: "The city where I hope to dwell,/There's none on Earth can parallel;/The stately Walls both high and strong/Are made of precious jasper stone;/The gates of Pearl, both rich and clear,/And Angels are for Porters there;/The streets thereof transparent gold/Such as no eye did e're behold" (110).

In salvation, the saints "from sickness and infirmity/Forevermore they shall be free;/Nor withering age shall e're come there,/But beauty shall be bright and clear;/This city pure is not for thee,/For things unclean there shall not be" (ibid.. "Things unclean" as referring to the sinful flesh looms large also in Taylor's poetry: "Unclean, Unclean: My Lord, Undone, all vile/Yea all Defild: What shall thy Servant doe?/Unfit for thee: not fit for holy Soile,/Nor for Communion of Saints below./ A bag of botches, Lump of Loathsomeness:/Defild by Touch, by Issue: Leproust flesh" (129). Thus, it looks as if in salvation the soul departs from the body and rises to heaven, leaving its sinful, material shape behind. However, the final consummation of the marriage to Christ, the saints' ascendance to heaven, was sometimes rendered in very bodily terms. Heaven, ultimately, for Cotton Mather is a "*Material City*," albeit of a very purified kind:

Creatures as they cannot live out of the World . . . so, neither can they live out of *Matter*. The *Place* for the Communication of GOD unto us, must be where the most Noble and Sublime *Creatures* find the Noblest & Purest *Matter* . . . Tis a *City* to be inhabited by *Bodies* . . . But insist upon it if you please, that it be an *Ethereal City*. And Lett ye *Matter* be so rich, & so fine, & so splendid that *Gold* and *Gems* are little better than *Shadows* of it . . . *Spiritualize* the *Matter* as much as You please; But if you think, a *Visible City*, of a

Cubical Form is too *Corporeal* a Thing, yett you must allow, That there will be a *Place* of Reception for Bodies; and in this *Place* these *Bodies* must be so much *Together*, that they may *Converse* with one another, and maintain an admirable *Order* among them. (*The Threefold Paradise* 244–45)

Paradise, regeneration, salvation, resurrection, eternal life—all these were purified images of the Puritan Body|Politic, of bodies together in an harmonious, “admirable order” and hierarchy. Sharing with Bradstreet a sense for the riches of paradise, Mather lets one suspect that the pure and precious matter of the Heavenly City also refers to the matter of the bodies present. The resurrected bodies had to be clean and symmetrical, whole, approaching the image of Christ’s body—in Taylor’s words: “Thou wilt have all that enter to Thy fold/Pure, clean, and bright, whiter than whitest snow/Better refined than most refined gold” (129).²⁷ Samuel Sewall also stresses the importance of the body’s wholeness: “Last night at Mr. Thomas’s had Discourse about the Body. Mr. Dudley maintained that the Belly should not be raised, because he knew no use of it. I maintained the Contrary, because Christ saw no Corruption . . . I dare not part with my Belly, Christ has Redeemed it; and there is danger of your breaking in further upon me, and cutting off my Hand or Foot . . . This morning comes to my mind: I can’t believe the blessed womb that bore our Saviour, will always be buried. Her Son, her Father, her God will Redeem it from the prevailing power of the Grave” (*Diary* 2:747).

It is not only the distinction between body and soul, then, but—due to the ‘law of union’ connecting both inextricably to each other—it is also the difference between what Edwards might have called an unspirited body and a spirited body that plays a crucial role here. In one of Taylor’s poems, these two bodies are seen entangled in a kind of blood transfusion, with Christ being the donor: “Pardon, Lord, my fault: and let thy beams/Of Holiness pierce through this Heart of mine./Ope to thy Blood a passage through my veins./Let thy pure blood my impure blood refine /Then with new blood and spirits I will dub/My tunes upon thy Excellency good” (84). Following Freud’s insight that a sense of self always follows a sense of the body, the dual aspect of the Puritan self ultimately relies on two different concepts of the body, a difference that refers to the dichotomy of *sarx* and *sōma* in Pauline anthropology and biblical thought in general.²⁸ “As a substantive form,” Charles Lloyd Cohen states in *God’s Caress*, “the individual consists of *sarx*, ‘our mortal flesh’ (2 Cor. 4.11) . . . and *sarx* provides the material with which sin catalyzes human wrongdoing” (31). In contrast, *sōma* “portends the person . . . as a godly creation . . . *Sōma* defines the connection between believers and Christ” (33–34). Thus, *sōma* refers to the inward man, *sarx* to

the outward man. In Lacanian registers, *sōma* can be read as the body inscribed into the symbolic register, the law of the father, whereas *sarx* bears close resemblance to the 'real body,' the sinful flesh not animated by grace.

These two kinds of bodies are also juxtaposed in the opposing titles of two Puritan texts, Samuel Willard's *Compleat Body of Divinity*, and Nehemiah Walter's *The Body of Death Anatomized*. For Willard, all the members of the body, the body as *sōma*—again, individual and communal—were “to be at the Command and under the Government of the Nobler Part” which is Christ, the head, or His individual and corporeal representative, the soullheart: “Here are the Hands, Organs suited to perform the Devices of the Soul, wherewith many Works are wrought . . . And here are the Feet which carry the Body according to the Direction of the Soul” (123). In contrast, the “body of death” described in Walter's sermon is *sarx*, is a body of sinfulness, “because it overspreads the *whole body* of Man. *Original Sin* eats into the *Body*, and diffuses it self thro' every Member thereof, and employs them as instruments to act by . . . 'tis a Mass of Corruption, a Collection of Lusts . . . 'Tis called a *Body of death*, Partly, because it makes men *Dead* unto and in Spiritual Duties . . . *Original Sin* is a *Deadly Principle*” (1–2). Sin, like a disease, destroys the body from within. Like a cancer, it eats the body from the inside, running “from one joynt to another, from toe to the foote, from foote to the legge, from the legge to the thigh, till it have wasted and destroyed the life of the body: Even so, if we give Sin but an entrance, it will soon overspread the whole man” (Cawdray 695–96). What disease is to *sarx*, sin is to *sōma*. These two kinds of bodies curiously make themselves seen at the moment of death, in that last moment of the believer's preparation either for damnation or salvation. The first case is described in an anatomist's language by Cotton Mather, giving a detailed catalog of the flesh's corruption: “All things intimate that it can't be long before the Silver Cord of your spinal marrow will be snap't or before the Golden Bowel of the Membrane that covers your Brain, will be broken; . . . before the pitcher of your Arterious Vein be crackt at the right ventricle of your heart, which is the Fountain from whence it fetches your blood into your Lungs; . . . before the Wheel of your great Artery, be split at the left venticle of your Heart, which is the Cistern whereby 'tis carried into and through that noble Bowel; . . . before the circulation of your Blood be fatally and forever stop'd, and that Liquor of Life corrupt in a total stagnation of it” (quoted in T. Holmes 1:16).

However, salvation, as a promise for wholeness, can also reveal itself directly in the material body. Such a miraculous alternative was reported to John Winthrop Jr. In a letter to Roger Williams, he states that “the Almightye . . . somtymes . . . lets us see His mighty power over nature itselſe

& all His creatures, in giving a reall renovation to some men . . . There are now living, in these parts 2 who being above 80 yeares have lately had reneved teeth,” and he hastens to relate the report of a regenerate [in the literal sense of the word] minister, who, “in his very old age, (the particular number of his yeares I doe not perfectly remember, but I thinke it was above an hundred),” had his “head . . . againe covered with youthfull haire, & he had new teeth, and having vsed for forty yeares before to read with his spectacles, could afterward read the smallest print with his old renewed eyes, without the help of any glasses” (530). In contrast to the cohesive [and sometimes even rejuvenating and reconstructive] force of the name of the father, it is sin that destroys the body. Sin “chop[s] at the tree of life of the outward man, till at last it falls” (Willard, *Compleat Body of Divinity* 224) and is rendered ‘incomplete.’²⁹

The metaphor of the marriage and deferred consummation in heaven clearly owes a lot to the fiction of courtly love. The descriptions of Christ’s body Saffin and Taylor, for example, can be safely placed within the convention of the Petrarchian *blazon*. Lacan, in his seminar on *The Ethics of Psycho-Analysis*, has hinted at the two-sided coin of *sublimation* and *abjection* involved in the drama of courtly love, one that closely parallels the two opposite bodies involved in the Puritan sense of self. In its common definition, the concept of courtly love is read as an extreme effort of sublimation, of elevating the ‘High Lady’—in the Puritan’s case, Christ/the feminized soul, the inward man—to a purely spiritual realm of religious ecstasy.³⁰ Lacan hints at the connections that have been drawn “between this apparatus or organization of the forms of courtly love and an intuition that is religious in origin” (*Seminar VII* 148). Ultimately, he argues, such a perspective is doomed to fail if both courtly love and religious ecstasy are analyzed in terms of sublimation only. He concedes that in courtly love, “the feminine object is emptied of all real substance” (149), parallel to the rendering of Christ’s body in terms of pureness and preciousness. However, by “transform[ing] the person in question into a symbolic function” [that is, into an *ego ideal*] by means of sublimation, courtly love, poetic creation, and Puritan discourse all posit “an object [one] can only describe as terrifying, an inhuman partner. The Lady is never characterized for any of her real, concrete virtues, for her wisdom, her prudence, or even her competence . . . On the contrary, she is as arbitrary as possible in the tests she imposes on her servant” (149). It is this very willfulness and arbitrariness that makes for the undecidability of the Puritan’s burning question with regard to grace and salvation. Yet, as Freud points out, in sublimation—the fantasy sustained by the *ego ideal*, and in the formation of groups—the fact that drives are “inhibited in their aim [*zielgehemmt*]” (“Group Psychology” 142, pa-

renthesis added) leads to the idealization of the object that has taken the place of the *ego ideal* and results in the fact that “everything that the object does and asks for is right and blameless” (144).³¹ The relentless obedience to this “inhuman partner” is sublimated into an unconditional love for an ideal figure, veiling its traumatic status as “*das Ding*, as the absolute Other of the subject” (Lacan, *Seminar VII* 52) which is nevertheless an object “that one is supposed to find again.” In Lacanian terms, then, “sublimation . . . raises an object . . . to the dignity of the Thing” (112), the ‘Thing’ being the “beyond-of-the-signified” (54), the forever lost object around which the subject’s desire spirals: the hinge between ‘the real’ and ‘reality,’ insofar as it is simply a ‘hollow,’ always [mis]represented by the symbolic and imaginary objects in the subject’s desire—the “objects *o*”—that try to occupy that ‘empty place.’³² Sublimation [elevating one of these objects to “the dignity of the Thing,” so that in this object the subject might experience the very failure to represent the Thing] implies the subject’s attempt to reenter the real from which language has expelled him. Both courtly love and Puritan theology are fantasies structured around the Janus face of the object *o*, pointing at the Thing’s status as being of the real—the real containing both the *ideal* and the *material*, the *sublime* and the *abject*.

Ultimately, in Puritan discourse, it is the inward man that is wooed, the spirited body animated by Christ within oneself. Being a ‘corporeal representative’ of the *ego ideal*, it is not difficult to see here a version of the object *o* that Lacan fittingly addresses as “*in you something more than you*” (*Four Fundamental Concepts* 268). The paradoxical status of the object *o* as both object and “cause of desire” (ix) and its connection to the soul is inadvertently revealed in John Cotton’s concept of grace, as he uses it in his sermon *The Way of Life*. Hoping for grace, the believer, immersed in the eternal struggle of “the flesh lusting *against* the spirit,” “compassed” (6) in this conflict, “wants faith, and a soft heart, an humble spirit, and zeale for Gods glory; *now he wants every thing*” (7). It is the ambiguity of the term *want* that connects grace, the body infused with Christ’s love, to the object *o*—the fullness of grace relies on a corrupted, fragmented body in the first place: “we no sooner receive a spirit of Grace, but we find our selves compassed about with a body of death” (6). It is ultimately the fact that even “the best of Men have the *Remainders of Corruption* in them as long as they continue in this world” (Walter 4) that calls for the concept of grace, for “the Voice of one that longs for, that breathes and pants after Deliverance” (3). Paradoxically, the regenerate “desires to be *Delivered* from the *Terrifying Power of Indwelling Sin* . . . that . . . fills them with perplexing doubts and fears” (15). However, “if you have not a *Sorrowful* sense of *Corruption* you will not earnestly *Desire Grace* . . . how should a man long to be *Sanctified* that

is unaffected with his *Filthiness*? 'Tis sense of *Sin* which works desires of *Grace*" (21). Ultimately, "'tis necessary that you be touched with a feeling of *Corruption*" (21) to desire and achieve regenerating grace—a corruption, however, that has to be lamented and fought with all strength available.

The desired fullness in God [in the symbolic *Name-of-the-Father*] has to be paid for with castration [the acceptance of the *No-of-the-Father*], which, however, works by means of being repressed: the body of death is not seen so much as plenitude but as something seriously deficient—"it tends to and issues in *Death*" (2). It is exactly this play between absence and presence—lack and fullness—that also points to the price to be paid for sublimation: "Sublimate as much as you like; you have to pay for it with something. And this something is called *jouissance*. I have to pay for that mystical operation with a pound of flesh" (*Seminar VII* 322). Lacan's "sublimate as much as you like" echoes Mather's "*Spiritualize* thee matter as much as you please"—but whereas in Mather there is the utopian need that there still be matter, or the body, however refined it may be, Lacan argues that sublimation in fact is grounded in the very cancellation and/or abjection of the body, by the fact that the subject has to renounce "*jouissance*" in favor of lawful desire. Castration—i.e., the inscription into the Name-of-the-Father—"means that *jouissance* must be refused, so that it can be reached on the inverted ladder (*l'échelle renversé*) of the Law of desire" (*Écrits* 324). The tragedy of this strategy, however, involves the fact that when the fantasy structured around the sublime object *o* [the soul, representing God *within* the subject] breaks down, the material object representing it [the body itself] turns into "*a gift of shit*" (*Four Fundamental Concepts* 268). Taylor stresses this very process in his poem "Our Vile Bodie": the body derived of God's spirit is just "*a varnisht pot of putrid excrements./And quickly turns to excrements itself*" (219).³³ Slavoj Žižek has stressed the 'desublimating' effect apropos of the fantasy of courtly love, which is the concomitant reverse of the object *o*'s Janus face:³⁴ "She looks beautiful from the proper distance, but the moment the poet or knight serving her approaches her too closely . . . , she turns her other, reverse side towards him, and what was previously the semblance of fascinating beauty is suddenly revealed as putrefied flesh, crawling with worms, the disgusting substance of life" (66). The "proper distance" Žižek is referring to, I argue, also comprises the perspective point Lacan has mentioned, the symbolic vantage point from which 'I like to be seen.' Once this distance is violated, once this perspective point loses its focus, anamorphic reality—consisting of the representational registers of the symbolic and the imaginary—is for a moment suspended, and the ugly face of the real shows itself. Since self-love [and abjection, its opposite] is clearly involved here—"the element of idealizing exaltation that is expressly sought in the

ideology of courtly love . . . is fundamentally narcissistic" (*Seminar VII* 151), a projection that involves *ego*, *ideal ego*, and *ego ideal*—it is one's own body that suddenly turns into what Taylor calls "a Flesh and Blood bag" (49). It is ultimately the forgetting or denial of the cohesive force of the Name-of-the-Father that 'dismembers' the body. Functioning almost like a symbolic skin—a different version of what Didier Anzieu has aptly called the "skin ego"—the Name-of-the-Father holds together and contains the body. As Jean Laplanche has stated, "words themselves can be used as a skin" (49), should the ego skin be missing or be corrupt, or should there be need of a second, double skin—the symbolic has powers to 'regenerate' the containing and supporting capacity of the skin [and the ego, by analogy]. Both the image of the *ideal ego* [Christ] and the power of the *ego ideal* [God's word] function similarly in their capacity to heal the body: "Am I new minted by thy Stamp indeed?/ Mine Eyes are dim: I cannot clearly see/Be thou my Spectacles that I may read/Thine Image, and Inscription stampt on mee./If thy bright Image do upon me stand/I am a Golden Angell in thy hand./Lord, make my Soule thy Plate: thine Image bright/Within the Circle of the same enfoile/And on its brims in golden Letters write/Thy Superscription in an Holy style" (Taylor 16). The structural analogy of word and image, law and imitation, contract and resemblance reveals itself clearly in Winthrop's rhetoric. Stressing the necessity of abiding by the contract with God, he warns his listeners that "if wee shall neglect the observation of these articles which are the ends wee have propounded, and, *dissembling with our God*, shall fall to embrace this present world and prosecute our carnall intentions, seeking greate things for ourselves and our posterity, the Lord will surely breake out in wrathe against us" ("Modell" 46, my emphasis). The word *dissembling* here refers to the act of disguise and treason, of not keeping one's word. Yet it can also be read as negating or even willfully destroying an originary resemblance: God created man in his own image. It is because of this resemblance [or, better, the remnants of resemblance, since man's sinfulness has compromised this likeness] that God "loues the creature, soe farre as it hathe any of his Image in it; he loues his elect because they are like himselfe" (42). A willful forgetting or denying of his law, or undoing of the likeness left, comes close to a rejection of his love. It is because of this, as "the onely way to avoyde this shipwracke, and to provide for our posterity," that the Puritan community must be knit together "as one man" (46), as one body infused with his word and law, and in resemblance to Christ. Thus prepared, the body of "every-One's that under th' honor'd Signe/Of Christ his Standard, shal his Name enroule,/With holy Vowes of Body and of Soule"³⁵ was at least capable of wholeness and salvation, whereas sin distracts this promise of fullness and—like a defect or illness—is

able to destroy the Body|Politic: “I am Deform’d, and Uggly all become” (Taylor 208).

In a letter from December 15, 1617, commenting on the readiness of the Separatist Puritans under William Bradford to sail to Virginia, their Leyden pastor John Robinson wrote: “We are knit together as a body in a most strict and sacred bond and covenant of the Lord, the violation whereof we make great conscience, and by virtue whereof we do hold ourselves straitly tied to all care of each other’s good and of the whole, by every one and so mutually” (quoted in Bradford 34), foreshadowing Winthrop’s rhetoric of the body knit together, with his ligament echoing Robinson’s “sacred bond.” More than thirty years later, while rereading his manuscript, Bradford added the following nostalgic note to Robinson’s letter:

O sacred bond, whilst inviolably preserved! How sweet and precious were the fruits that flowed from the same! But when this fidelity decayed, then their ruin approached. O that these ancient members had not died or been dissipated (if it had been the will of God) or else that this holy care and constant faithfulness had still lived, and remained with those that survived, and were in times afterwards added to them. But (alas) that subtle serpent hath slyly wound in himself under fair pretence of necessity and the like, to untwist these sacred bonds and tied, and as it were insensibly by degrees to dissolve, or in a great measure to weaken, the same. I have been happy, in my first times, to see, and with much comfort to enjoy, the blessed fruits of this sweet communion, but it is now a part of misery in old age, to find and feel the decay and want thereof (in a great measure) and with grief and sorrow of heart to lament and bewail the same. (34, note 6)

Taking the body of Christ as the [spiritual and corporeal] phallogocentric ideal also provides a model of patriarchal fidelity, a fidelity to both God and the elders or founders of the community, a fidelity that, as Bradford bewails, has “decayed” in following generations. In 1676, Increase Mather, commenting that King Philip’s War was not only the machinations of the devil, in sending the Indians, but a direct outcome of the New England Puritans’ sins, wrote that “nor were our sins ripe for so dreadful a judgement, until *the Body of the first Generation* was removed, and another Generation risen up which hath not so pursued, as ought to have been, the blessed designs of their Fathers” (“A Brief History” 86). This phrase is remarkable in that it makes a crucial distinction between the *body* of the fathers’ generation and the subsequent generation, in which the reference to a *body* is absent, implying the advanced state of sinful dissolution that the community of the sons has already reached. The dismemberment of the Body|Politic is a direct consequence of forgetting or denying the Name-of-the-Father, of not

pursuing God's "blessed design." Taylor, in an elegy upon the death of Samuel Hooker, a pastor of Hartford, Connecticut, lamented that "You have a Father lost, and Choice one too./Weeping for him is honour due from you./Yet let your Sorrows run in godly wise/As if his Spirits tears fell from your eyes./Strive for his Spirit: rather Christ's than His./To dwell, and act his Flesh, yourselves, to bliss./Its pittie these in him conjoyn'd, up grew/Together, should be parted here in you" (484). Yet he also warned the congregation of the dreadful consequences of not striving for the father's spirit: "Be n't like such babes as parents brains out pull/To make a Wassill Bowle then of the Skull./That Pick their Parents eyes out, and the holes/Stuff up with folly, as if no braind Souls./You are of better form than this sad guise/Yet beare this Caution: Some apostatize." Forgetting the father's word and law also implies a dismembering of the father, of the very image of the whole body, the inward man, and ultimately the severing of all that gives coherence also to one's own body: "And strive your Sires, and Grandsires Life and Line/Through you their Flesh and blood may brightly shine./Imminde your Father's Death bed Charge and aime./You are his Very Flesh, and Blood, and Name" (ibid.).

Once the sacred bond, the ligament is dissolved, 'untwisted,' the communal body—as well as the individual body—dissolves, too. Ultimately, sin, the denial of the Name-of-the-Father, is an "*Enmity against God* [that] can never be reconciled to Him" (Walter 9). The sinner directly opposes God's word, has become subject to the law of sin, and has wasted every right to corporeal integrity, as Cotton Mather puts it, "because God said of old, *Let us make Man in our Image*, the Devil is ever saying, *Let us pull this man to pieces*" (*Wonders* 47). Giving in to the devil ultimately results in "no less than a dissolution upon the world" (16). In a perverted imitation of Winthrop's vision of believers as the prolonged extremities of God—"this great king will haue many stewards, Counting himself more honoured in dispensing his gifts to man by man, than if he did it by his owne immediate hands" ("Modell" 33)—Satan abuses those who have fallen under his bondage [the Salem witches, in this case] to reach his aim: the destruction of the bodies of the righteous. In 1692, Mercy Lewis attested in the Salem witchcraft trials that a witch "did tortor me most cruelly . . . and allmost redy" to pull all my bones out of joynt." However, as a true believer, by "being up held by an Almighty hand . . . I indured his tortors that night" (Boyer and Nissenbaum 2:483). The trope of the "bones out of joynt" was a common one employed in the testimonies against the torturers. With regard to the Old Testament's "eye for an eye," it seems fitting that one of the prominent ways of executing witches was to press them to death: a heavy board was placed on the convict's chest, and heavy stones and rocks were piled on that

board—presumably all bones ended up “out of joynt.” Two other methods of punishment also point to the two aspects of the ‘fragmented body’ and the body ‘held together’ by the namelaw of the father. A person convicted of high treason could be drawn and quartered: the criminal was drawn behind a cart to the place of executing, hanged by the neck but cut down before he died, and ritually disemboweled; then the body was cut into four separate pieces [quarters] and buried in widely separated, unconsecrated ground, so that the soul could never rest. Another form of punishment was maiming: slitting the nostrils or cutting off the ears. The ‘fragmentation’ of the sinful body was to be made visible, to be made ‘real.’ In this ritualistic fragmentation of the body, it is important to point out the importance of the several aspects involved: the ‘real body’; the seeing, observing eye; and the presence of the Puritan community. The whole procedure is embedded in a public spectacle, and it has to happen ‘on the body.’ The ‘inner’ bodily fragmentation as a result of sinful living and transgression of the law must necessarily come out into the open, into the realm of the public. It is a spectacle that expects from the body to reveal what has been ‘written’ on it, that gives evidence of its ‘inside,’ that testifies for it in a bloody and corporeal ‘language.’ In an analogy to a kind of ‘economic debt,’ the moral guilt has to be ‘paid for’: the integrity of the Body|Politic, flawed by the sinners’ failure, has to be restored, with the punishment and torture of the sinners as a rightful compensation. The Puritan conception of the body still belongs to the regime of what Foucault has called “the old partners of the spectacle of punishment, the body and the blood” (*Discipline and Punish* 16). However, criminals were often required to wear on their clothing [or have branded on their bodies] a letter of the law: for instance, *A* for adultery, *B* for blasphemy or burglary, *C* for counterfeiting, *D* for drunkenness, *F* for forgery, *H* for heresy, *S* for sedition, *T* for theft—an alphabet of humiliation.³⁶ As a badge of shame, and with the possibility of repentance, the ‘forgetting of the Name|Law’ was written on the body so as to keep it whole, but also to remind the subject of the danger of fragmentation.

Right from the beginning, in order to prevent the devil from entering the communal body of devote believer, the elders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony attempted to stabilize the ligaments knitting that body together.³⁷ In an order issued May 8, 1631, the colony decreed that “no man shall be admitted as a freeman, to the freedom of this body politic, but such as are members of some of the churches within the limits of the same” (Shurtleff 1:87), fortifying the boundaries of the body by some kind of self-referential feedback loop, restricting admission to the community to those who already are both part of the ‘greater body’ of the church and already residing “within the limits of the same.” With this move, the potentially rhizomatic structure of

the growing body of the community transformed itself into a static, centralized Body|Politic fully formed, closed off from the outside, and organized according to a top-down structure. The Body|Politic's solidity was being tested during the disturbing events which came to be known as the Antinomian Controversy, to which I will now turn.