In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

INTRODUCTION We had free elections, . . . we elected a free parliament, we have a free press, we have a democratic government. Yet we have not managed to deal with the burdensome legacy of the totalitarian system. Powerful structures of the former regime still exist and remain at work. . . . Many places are governed by the same people as before. . . . The old bureaucracy persists at all levels. . . . It is not true that our revolution failed. It just has not been finished yet. —Václav Havel, ‘‘Výročı́ okupace Československa vojsky Varšavského paktu’’1 Should we revoke our de-Baathification policy, as some in Washington now seemed to want? I wearily reminded the others that Iraq was a zero-sum game. We needed to keep the Shia and Kurds in mind too. Calling back former [Baathist, mostly Sunni] senior army officers would not solve our problems. —L. Paul Bremer, My Year in Iraq2 This chapter introduces the issue of policies designed to deal with personnel inherited in the apparatus of transitional states from previous regimes. The puzzle is that transitional personnel policies as well as their absence may negatively impact democratization. This is because these policies carry symbolic meanings that may create social effects that contradict their original political purpose of establishing trustworthy government. We identify major institutional innovations in Central Europe, manifested in a variety of alternative personnel policies, as plausible ways to address this conundrum . The alternative policies may convey a message of inclusion and conversion of inherited personnel and may produce different constellations of PAGE 1 ................. 18039$ INTR 06-09-11 09:17:18 PS 2 Introduction political and social effects. The theoretical and empirical investigation of the effects of different personnel policies on trust in government and historical divides in society is the primary objective of this book. The Personnel Problem and Its Problematic Solutions: Chile, South Africa, and Iraq How can states undergoing the transition from authoritarianism to democracy deal with inherited state personnel complicit with abuses of prior regimes? Failure to acknowledge the problem of the inherited personnel, or an inability to effectively address it, may create considerable obstacles for the prospects for democratization. Whether open or clandestine, loyal to the past elite or seemingly ‘‘accommodating’’ to the new democracy, members of the anciens régimes who have retained their positions of influence have impaired democratic consolidation and undermined critical policies in many transitional countries. The so-called authoritarian enclaves, consisting of non-democratic institutions, unresolved human rights problems, and ‘‘social actors not fully willing to play by democratic rules,’’ have for a long time been impediments to redemocratization in Chile and other countries of the Southern Cone.3 The result has been an ‘‘incomplete democracy ’’ that maintained itself via the inherited constitutional and judicial structures and prevented the democratically elected government from launching political and social reforms for more than a decade.4 In South Africa, the continuation of the former apparatus had even more ominous consequences. While Nelson Mandela and his African National Congress (ANC) were negotiating the handover of political power with the reformist president Frederick de Klerk and his not-yet-reformed National Party (NP), the remnants of the old elite, with vast experience in the technology of political and military power, were actively seeking to derail the process . Entrenched in the administration and armed forces, sections of the outgoing white minority government instigated and prolonged so-called black-on-black violence in the early 1990s.5 The country found itself on the brink of civil war after the South African Ministry of Defense trained and armed the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) to stir violent clashes with the ANC and encourage the independence of the KwaZulu-Natal province.6 However, systematic solutions to the problem of inherited personnel may be difficult for transitional governments to implement: these PAGE 2 ................. 18039$ INTR 06-09-11 09:17:18 PS Introduction 3 governments may be relatively weak in the face of rigid legal, institutional, and structural constraints imposed by previous regimes and backed by their powerful security apparatuses. In South Africa, the ‘‘Inkathagate scandal’’ of 1991 led eventually to the demotion of the minister of defense, Magnus Malan, and the minister of police, Adriaan Vlok, to lower cabinet positions by President de Klerk.7 Nonetheless, later negotiations between the outgoing NP government and the ANC at Kempton Park resulted in the approval of a so-called sunset clause.8 According to this clause, the apartheid-era personnel would retain their positions until the...


Additional Information

Related ISBN
MARC Record
Launched on MUSE
Open Access
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.