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INDEX

Adams refinery: erected, 41; name changed and plant modernized, 73

Addyston Pipe & Steel case: role of in Corporate Revolution, 8–9, 17, 152; prohibits cartels, 187; Taft’s role in, 299

Advertising: as barrier to entry of competitive firms, 19; pushed by American Sugar Refining Co., 327

American, the. See American Sugar Refining Company

American Beet Sugar Company: organized as merger of Oxnard enterprises, 244; conflict with American Sugar Refining Co., 244–46; saved by affluence of stockholders, 246; and working arrangement with the American, 246–47; ventures of in southern Colorado, 247–48; Havemeyer insists Robert Oxnard take over, 250; as price leader, 262; ends commission payments to the American, 272–73; the American sells interest in, 312

American Can case: and consent decree in sugar industry, 319; abandoned by Harding administration, 324

American Sugar Refinery (California): one of two West Coast firms, 89; and market-sharing arrangement with California Sugar Refining Co., 89–90; aided by Hawaiian growers, 90; joins trust, 92; charter annulled, 140–41, 153–54; and battle with Spreckels, 153–58; leased to Western Sugar Refining Co., 166

American Sugar Refining case: points up difficulty of applying Sherman Act, 291; criminal suit stymied, 302–3, 312; civil suit stymied, 303–4; bill of complaint prepared for, 304; delayed until other cases decided, 304–5, 316; pretrial testimony begun, 306–7; government’s objectives in, 307–12; criminal prosecution of abandoned, 312; government testimony completed, 312–14; affects company behavior, 314–15; out-of-court settlement rejected, 316, 319; pretrial testimony ends, 316; and International Harvester precedent, 318; government resists consent decree in, 319; and United States Steel precedent, 324; ended, 324

American Sugar Refining Company: early profits of, 118; organized, 150; capital debt structure of, 151; as combination, unchanged from trust form, 151; purchases Philadelphia rivals, 152, 169–72; reaches understanding with Spreckels, 166; capital stock of, increased, 170; and advantages gained from Philadelphia acquisitions, 172; reaction to company’s purchases, 174; and E. C. Knight case, 176–77, 179–80; accused of senatorial bribery, 180–84; faces problem of entry, 188–90; and working arrangement with wholesale grocers, 188, 191–95; obtains concessions from railroads, 196–206; agrees to act as “evener,” 196–202; and railroad rebates 197–206; interest of in Mollenhauer refinery, 208–9; as price leader, 210–11, 329; extends special advantages to independents, 211; reasons for avoiding price wars, 211–12; seemingly solves problem of entry, 213; threatened by Arbuckle Brothers’ packaging machine, 214–15; enters coffee business, 216; price war with Arbuckle Brothers begins, 216–22; aided by railroads, 220–21; begins selling sugar in cotton bags, 221; forced to tap reserves, 221; acquires major interest in National Sugar Refining Co. of N.J., 224–25; working arrangement with the National, 225; price war with Arbuckle Brothers ends, 226–27; retains dominant position in industry, 227–28; supplies capital funds to sugar beet firms, 229, 249; share of sugar market, 229, 259; acquires half-interest in Utah factories, 235–37; interest held in beet sugar enterprises, 240–43, 248; and American Beet Sugar Co., 245–47; marketing arrangement with Alameda Sugar Co., 247; fears overinvolvement in sugar beet industry, 248; stimulates efficiency in sugar beet industry, 250; and disposal of surplus raw sugar, 255–56; affiliates of agree to division-of-markets plan, 257–58; prosecuted for receiving illegal rebates, 264, 278–82; shows characteristics of megacorp, 265–66; as sixth-largest U.S. industrial corporation, 265–66; dividends after price war with Arbuckle Brothers, 268; and long-term contract with Hawaiian growers, 268–69; commission payments by American Beet Sugar Co. ended, 272–73; scraps factor plans, 276; experiments with other barriers to competition, 276; forces railroads to continue rebates, 277; settles rebate case, 281–82; purchases Camden refinery, 283; and Segel affair, 282–88; and difficulties with Baltimore refinery’s minority stockholders, 286; seeks to prevent erection of refinery in New Orleans, 286; antitrust suits against, 291, 300–304, 307, 314–16, 324–25; co-operates in war effort, 291, 320–21; prosecuted for customs frauds, 291–94; refining costs of, 294–95n10; fined for customs frauds, 295; and settlement of private antitrust suit, 300–302; change in management of, 307–8; congressional investigation of, 308; effect of Havemeyer’s death on, 307–10; builds new refinery at Chalmette, La., 310; threatened by Horace Havemeyer, 310–11; and control of the National of N.J., 311–12; Babst becomes president of, 320; accepts consent decree, 324–25; changes in organizational structure of, 325–28; finds it difficult to reestablish hegemony after war, 329–30; forced to surrender voice in other companies, 330

American Tobacco case: marks end of Corporate Revolution’s first phase, 18; decision in, 20, 305–6; causes delay in American Sugar Refining case, 304–5; importance of, 305; Taft administration’s handling of criticized, 313, 315

American Tobacco Company: one of six largest industrial corporations, 265–66; provides example for American Sugar Refining Co., 276; antitrust prosecution of, 20, 305–6

Anthracite coal industry: pioneers in consolidation techniques, 15

Antitrust laws: role of in Corporate Revolution, 8–9; difficulty of enforcing, 21, 176, 330, 334; introduced by New York legislature in 1888, 133–35; weighed by Congress, 142–44; effect of E. C. Knight case on, 186–87; effect of Addyston Pipe & Steel case on, 187; hamper Havemeyer’s control, 264; Northern Securities case as precedent for, 298–305; first funds voted to enforce, 303; immunity granted under, 303; principle of compelling corporations to produce records established under, 304; American Tobacco and Standard Oil cases set precedent for, 305–6; importance of International Harvester case to, 318; United States Steel case as precedent for, 324; fail to restore competitive conditions in sugar refining, 330. See also Sherman Act

Arbuckle, John: and conflict with American Sugar Refining Co., 214–17; agrees informally to end price war, 227

Arbuckle & Company, Pittsburgh wholesaler, 213. See also Arbuckle Brothers

Arbuckle Brothers: enters sugar refining, 188, 214–15; nation’s largest coffee roaster, 213; and price war with American Sugar Refining Co., 216–22, 226–27; qualifies for railroad rebates, 277

Arnold Committee. See New York State legislature, investigation of trusts

Atkins, Edward F.: opposes sugar beet acquisitions, 268n22; second in command at American Sugar Refining Co., 307; points out change in the American’s management, 308

B. H. Howell, Sons & Co., encourages building of new refineries, 209; ties of with American Sugar Refining Co., 209–10; adversely affected by price war, 222; joins Henry Havemeyer in Cuban ventures, 309–10; cancellation of its commission agreement threatened, 310–11

Babst, Earl D.: becomes president of American Sugar Refining Co., 320; represents U.S. on wartime International Sugar Committee, 320; pushes advertising strategy, 327; legal background of, 328

Bacon Committee. See U.S. Congress, investigation of trusts

Bain, Joe S.: on Corporate Revolution, 5–6

Baltimore Sugar Refining Company: taken over by American Sugar Refining Co., 172–73; minority stockholders give the American trouble, 286, 288

Barriers to entry: factor in evolution of market structure, 10; during Period of Imperfect Competition, 11; during Golden Age of Competition, 13, 44–45; during Corporate Revolution, 19; during colonial period, 29; created by Federal officials in whisky industry, 51; in sugar refining, 188–208; wholesale distribution outlets as, 193–95; railroad rebates as, 204, 206; economies of scale as, 207; absolute cost advantages as, 207–8; product differentiation as, 208; factor plans as, scrapped by American Sugar Refining Co., 276; experiments with retail outlets and advertising as, 276, 327; in agricultural implements, 317; in steel, 323

Bayard, Nicholas: erects first refinery in New York City, 26

Bay State Sugar Refining Company: joins trust, 74; shut down, 114

Belcher Sugar Refinery: purchased by trust, 82; high cost of operation of, 115; shut down, 115

Berle, Adolph A., 1

Big business: World War I leads to change in attitude toward, 320. See also Consolidation

Bliss, Colonel George: counsel to Arnold committee, 127

Bonaparte, Charles J.: rules out government prosecution of American Sugar Refining Co., 300–301

Booth, William T.: charges customs frauds, 52

Boston: first refineries in, 27; refineries in 1887, 73–74; refiners balk at trust agreement after Greenpoint refinery burns, 83; Knapp suggests that the American dispose of refinery in, 315

Boston Sugar Refining Company: joins trust, 74; turned into warehouse, 114

Brandeis, Louis D.: shapes Wilson antitrust policies, 313

Brooklyn Cooperage Company: subsidiary of American Sugar Refining Co., 206; obtains railroad rebates, 206–7

Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal: built, 197; source of conflict with Pennsylvania R. R., 201–2; receives “transfer” allowance from railroads, 277; important Havemeyer property, 309, 311

Brooklyn Sugar Refining Company, 65, 68, 71

Bunker, George: head of Delaware Sugar House, 170; sells out to American Sugar Refining Co., 170–71; organizes National Sugar Refining Co. in Yonkers, 190; on Doscher’s effect on industry, 226

Burr, Edmund: urges working arrangement with American Sugar Refining Co., 247

California: sugar beet industry founded in, 230–32; largest beet factories in America located in, 243–44; sugar beet season in, 256; factories agree to division-of-markets plan, 257–58

California & Hawaiian Sugar Company: organized by Hawaiian growers, 270; has difficulty operating Crockett refinery, 270–71; agrees to market-sharing plan, 271–72

California Sugar Refining Company: owned by Claus Spreckels, 87; one of two surviving West Coast firms, 89; and price war with American Sugar Refinery, 90; leased to Western Sugar Refining Co., 166, 173

Capital: manufacturers’ fear of expropriation of, 14, 101–2, 333; lack of mobility of in sugar refining in 1880’s, 56–57, 67

Capital funds: supplied to sugar beet companies, 229, 249; Cutler search for, 234

Capital markets: role of in Corporate Revolution, 3, 97, 100; during Golden Age of Competition, 13; as affected by trust certificates, 16, 99–100; advantages of liquidity provided by, 91, 100; industrial-securities market created, 99. See also New York Stock Exchange

Capital requirements: as obstacle to consolidation, 3; during colonial period, 29. See also Barriers to entry

Carnegie, Andrew: refuses to join steel combination, 72; deprecates importance of trusts, 189

Centrifugal machine: invention of, 35; leads to charges of customs frauds, 53

Chandler, Alfred D., Jr.: on Corporate Revolution, 4–5; and concept of multi-departmental enterprise, 325

Civil War: effect of on sugar industry, 41–42

Cleveland, Grover: antitrust attitude of, 177–78; appoints Olney attorney general, 178

Coffee-roasting industry: Arbuckle Brothers pre-eminent in, 213; American Sugar Refining Co. enters in retaliation, 216; price war in, 216–17, 226

Colonial Sugars Company: Gramercy, La., refinery acquired by Cuban-American Sugar Co., 309–10

Colorado: beet sugar industry established in, 232; beet factories consolidated, 241; Havemeyer and American Sugar Refining Co. acquire interest in industry of, 241; factories agree to division-of-markets plan, 257–58

Community of interests: on West Coast in 1884, 89–90; in sugar in 1890’s, 208–12; re-established, 226; threatened by Henry Havemeyer’s death, 310

Competition, resurrection of: impossibility of, 16; considered in sugar refining, 147–48; Wilson administration seeks, 315; in sugar refining falsely claimed by Justice Department, 329

—“ruinous”: role of in Corporate Revolution, 6–7, 100–101; during Golden Age of Competition, 13–15; after 1873 in sugar refining, 56–57, 62–63, 69; cited in defense of sugar trust, 137; in coffee-roasting, 217; desire to avoid as motive in formation of International Harvester Co., 317; desire to avoid as cause of Corporate Revolution, 332. See also Market control, desire for; Excess supply relative to demand

—unfair: charges of in 1870’s, 50, 59–60; English view on, 286; not evident in International Harvester case, 317; not evident in United States Steel case, 322–23

Competitive ethic: trust form strikes at, 125

Competitive model: approximated in immediate post-Civil War period, 43–46, 48; approaches perfection, 69; railroads help make possible, 93–94; leads to instability, 101, 333–34

Congress, U.S.: bribery of charged, 62, 180–84; and railroad legislation, 121; reaction of to trusts, 126, 130–31; investigates trusts, 126, 130; looks to states for solution to trust problem, 131; public pressure on, 142; considers Sherman Act, 142–44; reaction of to American Sugar Refining Co.’s Philadelphia acquisitions, 174; and antitrust funds, 176, 303; investigation of the American and U.S. Steel Corp., 303

Consolidation: initial plan for in sugar refining, 76; almost sabotaged, 83–84; arguments for, 90; due to desire for control over prices, 101–2, 332–33; economies from, 110–16; unchanged by trust’s reorganization, 151; effect of independent refineries on, 159; of independent refineries, 223–24; of Utah beet factories, 239–41; changing court attitude toward, 291; power of courts to break up established, 306; in agricultural implements, 317; in steel, 322. See also Corporate Revolution; Price Control; Trust device

Continental Sugar Company: Havemeyer and American Sugar Refining Co. acquire interest in, 242, 309, 311; Havemeyer forces change in management of, 250

Continental Sugar Refining Company (Boston): joins trust, 74; connected to Standard Sugar Refining Co.’s plant, 114

Cordage trust: reportedly organized, 124; suffers financial ruin, 189

Corporate form: appearance of in sugar refining, 46

Corporate laws, changes in: role of in Corporate Revolution, 8; made by New Jersey, 16, 148–49; New York willing to make, 148

Corporate Revolution: suggested causes of, 1–10; third stage of industrial evolution, 17–23; causes of in sugar refining, 93; begins, 187; end of first phase of, 264; results of, 331; lessons of, 332–35. See also Consolidation

Costs. See Sugar beets, cost of processing; Sugar refining costs

Cottonseed oil trust: and industrial-securities market, 99; existence revealed, 123; linked to Standard Oil Co., 123–24; legal attack on, 141; reorganizes as holding company, 149–50

Court of Appeals, U. S., for the Second Circuit: overturns E. C. Knight precedent, 301–2

—for the Sixth Circuit: decision of in Addyston Pipe & Steel case, 299

—for the Third Circuit: decision of in E. C. Knight case, 180

Cuban-American Sugar Company: Havemeyer’s ties to, 309, 311; acquires Colonial Sugars Co. refinery, 310

Cuban cane sugar: takes up Louisiana slack, 39; faces monopsony, 108; marketing season for, 255

Customs frauds: charges of in 1870’s, 50, 54; investigation of, 52, 294nn9, 10; difficulty of preventing, 61; evidence of discovered at Havemeyer & Elder, 290–93; extent of in sugar refining, 294; Earle reports suspicions of, 300

Cutler, Thomas R.: ties of to American Sugar Refining Co., 234–35; develops Utah beet industry, 234–39; organizes consolidation of Utah and Idaho beet factories, 239–40

Cutting family: joins Oxnard in sugar beet venture, 230; becomes stockholder in American Beet Sugar Co., 244; Bayard seeks accommodation with Havemeyer, 246

DeCastro & Donner: part of Havemeyer holdings, 71; placed in reserve, 114

Delaware Sugar House: sells out to American Sugar Refining Co., 170–71; combined with Spreckels refinery, 179

Department of Justice, U.S.: separate antitrust division established in, 303; officials await Standard Oil and American Tobacco decisions, 304–5; officials oppose out-of-court settlement, 314–15; claims competition restored, 329

Depression of 1893: onset marked by collapse of National Cordage Co., 16–17; demonstrates strength of consolidations, 17; economy’s emergence from helps launch first phase of Corporate Revolution, 187

Dewey, Donald: on causes of Corporate Revolution, 8–9

Dick, William: role of in 1886 output-limitation scheme, 67; trustee of Sugar Refineries Co., 78; holds interest in Mollenhauer refinery, 208

Dick & Meyer Refinery: agrees to join trust, 75; burns down, 114

Dill, James: role of in revision of New Jersey corporate statutes, 148–49

Dissolution suits: against American Sugar Refining Co., 291; against American Tobacco and Standard Oil companies, 305–6; James Knapp’s proposals with regard to, 315; against International Harvester Co., 317

Distribution network; role of in Corporate Revolution, 4–5; as barrier to entry, 18, 188, 195; American Sugar Refining Co. adopts rebate system initially to protect, 192; cost of maintaining in sugar industry, 193; poses problem for Arbuckle Brothers, 219–20. See also Wholesale grocers

Dividends: under sugar trust, 118; paid by American Sugar Refining Co., 118, 213, 221, 268n21; the American forced to pass, 329

Doscher, Claus: on reasons for joining trust, 71; re-enters sugar refining business, 218–19; influence of eliminated from industry, 226

Dos Passos, John R.: role of in devising trust agreement, 76–78; as outside promoter, 98; approaches Adolph Segel about selling out, 283

Drawback allowances: as competitive ameliorative, 57; bring British protest, 58; reduced, 66–67

Dutch Standard: for determining sugar purity, 52; demands for elimination of, 54, 62

E. C. Knight & Co.: initially agrees to join trust, 75; decides to stay out, 80; profits after trust formed, 161; hurt by competition with Spreckels, 163; sold to American Sugar Refining Co., 170–71; refinery combined with Franklin plant, 179

E. C. Knight case: gives legal sanction to holding company, 17, 152; government’s complaint in, 176–77; Harrison administration’s handling of, 176–77; temporarily suspended, 177; intervening developments, 179; revived under Cleveland, 179; decision in announced by lower courts, 179–80; appealed to U.S. Supreme Court, 180; Supreme Court decision in, 184–86; as part of larger judicial pattern, 185; forces American Sugar Refining Co. to tolerate rivals, 211; discourages subsequent prosecution of the American, 300–301, 315; precedent of overturned in Earle suit, 301–2

Earle, George H., Jr.: appointed receiver of Segel enterprises, 289; sues American Sugar Refining Co. under Sherman Act, 289; wins civil suit against the American, 298, 301–2; fails to persuade Roosevelt administration to prosecute the American, 300; asks government to end suit against the American, 321

East Boston refinery: adopts use of steam in sugar refining, 34

East Coast refineries: benefit from relative decline in Louisiana output, 39; Civil War’s effect on, 41–42; number of in post–Civil War period, 43; enter into pooling arrangement, 63–64; and 1886 output-limitation agreement, 67; marketing area of delineated, 251; sources of raw sugar, 255

Eastwick, Edward P.: argues for uniform tariff, 61; spokesman for William Havemeyer’s interests, 61

Economies of scale: role of in Corporate Revolution, 2–6, 102; analyzed, 102–3; role of in sugar consolidation, 103–4, 119; trust’s nature precludes, 107; as barrier to entry into sugar refining industry, 207; resulting from consolidation of Utah beet factories, 239

Efficiency: stimulated in sugar beet industry, 249–50

Elkins Act: passage secured by Theodore Roosevelt, 274; forces railroads to cancel rebates, 277; prosecution of American Sugar Refining Co. under, 278–82; convictions under obtained, 279, 281–82; unsettled issues under cleared up, 279, 282

Entrepreneurship: in building first steam-powered refinery, 32–33; in erecting first waterfront plant, 40, 61; displayed by Havemeyer, 229; American Sugar Refining Co.’s contribution to diminished, 330

Entry into industry: ease of in immediate post-Civil War period, 44; as factor limiting monopoly, 97; argument that monopoly precludes, 137, 179–80; American Sugar Refining Co. grapples with problem of, 188–90; success of in sugar refining, 188, 208–9, 212, 214–19, 228, 253–54, 273, 310, 328; undermines cordage combination, 189; relation of to sugar margins, 212–13; discouraged by price war, 227; threatened, 273, 282–83, 288; Havemeyer’s efforts to discourage, 285–86

Era of the Conglomerate: described, 23

Erie Railroad: grants secret rebates to American Sugar Refining Co., 197

Excess supply relative to demand: during Golden Age of Competition, 50; gives rise to whiskey ring, 51; in 1870’s and 1880’s, 62–63; as factor in sugar consolidation, 70–71, 117; and dumping in Missouri River area, 244–45, 253; seasonal nature of, 255. See also Competition, “ruinous”

Export of refined sugar: temporarily stimulated by drawbacks, 57–58; importance of to industry, 66–67; increases during World War I, 327–28

Firms, marginal: effect of on industry price, 63

Forest City Sugar Refining Company: purchased by trust, 82; shut down, 115

Franklin Sugar Refining Company: merged with American Sugar Refining Co., 161, 171; agrees to rebates for wholesale grocers, 192; and relationship with McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 210. See also Harrison, Frazier & Co.

Fuller, Melville W.: and decision in E. C. Knight case, 184

Gary, Elbert H.: sets policies with public opinion in mind, 323

Gilded Age of Politics: affected by competitive struggle of business, 15

Golden Age of Competition: described, 12–17; first phase of in sugar refining, 34–49; second phase of in sugar refining, 50–70; impossibility of re-creating, 334

Grant, Ulysses S.: administration tarnished by whiskey-ring scandal, 51

Great Merger movement. See Corporate Revolution

Great Western Sugar Refining Company (New Jersey): formed, 241; Havemeyer and American Sugar Refining Co. interest in, 241, 309, 311; as price leader, 262; the American sells interest in, 312

Gulick, Charles A., Jr. See Seager, Henry R.

Gunton, George: argues merits of consolidation, 145

Handicraft techniques: prevalence of during Period of Imperfect Competition, 11

Harding, Warren G.: antitrust policies of, 324; administration agrees to consent decree in American Sugar Refining case, 324

Hardwick committee: investigates American Sugar Refining Co., 308

Harlan, John M.: writes dissent in E. C. Knight case, 185–86

Harrison, Benjamin: signs Sherman Act, 144, 175; antitrust policies of administration criticized, 175–76; handling of E. C. Knight case, 176–77

Harrison, Charles: initially refuses to join trust, 73–75; sells out to American Sugar Refining Co., 169–71

Harrison, Frazier & Co.: largest refinery in Philadelphia, 73; refuses to join trust, 80; profits after trust formed, 161; hurt by competition with Spreckels, 163; name changed to Franklin Sugar Refining Co., 169; agrees to merge with American Sugar Refining Co., 169, 171; plant combined with E. C. Knight refinery, 179

Havemeyer, Hector: partner of brother William, 61; trustee of Sugar Refineries Co., 78; member of appraisal committee for Sugar Refineries Co., 79; forced to rebuild refinery, 83

Havemeyer, Henry O.: started in business, 40; role of in 1880 pooling arrangement, 63; on industry profits in 1880’s, 66; on importance of exports, 67; attitude toward joining trust, 71–73, 75; hostility toward, 74; reports consolidation set, 75–76; trustee of Sugar Refineries Co., 78; and appraisal of properties, 79; first to sign trust agreement, 84; boasts of power over Cuban growers, 108; on tariffs and trusts, 95–96; on limitations to raising sugar prices, 97; on economies from consolidation, 104; on independence of trust members, 106; cites steadier work provided by trust, 109; on savings from stabilization, 117; relates profits to economies, 118; rejects competition as norm, 125; testimony of before Arnold committee, 126–28; points out advantages of New Jersey corporate laws, 150; president of American Sugar Refining Co., 151; sends Oxnard to West Coast, 153; thwarts Matthiessen take-over bid, 164; reaches accommodation with Spreckels, 166; involved in 1894 bribery charges, 182–84; on E. C. Knight case, 186; promotes merger to form National Sugar Refining Co. of N.J., 188, 223–24, 228; uses wholesale grocers as entry barrier, 193–95; obtains concessions from railroads, 196–206; personal interest of in rebate arrangements, 201–2; extends special advantages to independent refineries, 211; reasons for avoiding price wars, 211–12; exercises price control, 212, 250–63; practices stay-out pricing, 212–13; and Arbuckle challenge, 214–17, 219–21; anger of over Doscher entry, 218–19; receives common stock of the National of N.J., 223–24; and control over the National, 225; eliminates Doscher influence, 226; reaches informal understanding with John Arbuckle, 227; fails in policy of stay-out pricing, 228; supplies funds to sugar beet companies, 229, 249; overcomes sugar beet challenge, 229–50; interest in sugar beet factories, 241–43, 248, 309; and American Beet Sugar Co., 245–47; supervises sales for beet companies, 246–47; forces change in beet factory management, 250; insensitivity of to change, 264; hampered by fear of antitrust laws, 264, 271; among the last of his generation active in the American, 264–65; interest in the National of N.J. criticized by Lowell Palmer, 265; holds few shares in the American, 266–67; personal methods of in directing the American, 267–68; negotiates settlement of conflict in West, 270–71; protests end of commission payments, 272; and loan to Adolph Segel, 284–88; efforts of to discourage new entry, 285–86; discounts significance of rebate and Earle suits, 289–90; dies, 290; held responsible for customs frauds, 293, 294n10; not succeeded by son, 307; death of diminishes the American’s influence over industry, 308–10; ties of to Cuban-American company, 309–10

Havemeyer, Horace: slated to succeed father in business, 267; fails to take over after father’s death, 307; seeks to establish rival interest to American Sugar Refining Co., 310–11; foiled in attempt to take over National Sugar Refining Co. of N.J., 311

Havemeyer, Theodore A.: started in business, 40; on investment needed to work lower-grade sugars, 56; on drawback allowances, 57; as leader of major refiners, 60–61; argues against uniform tariff, 62; attitude of toward joining trust, 71–73, 75; partner in Harrison, Frazier & Co., 73; trustee of Sugar Refineries Co., 78; dies, 264

Havemeyer, William: leads smaller refiners, 61; role of in 1880 pooling arrangement, 63; on reasons for winter losses, 66; role of in 1886 output-limitation scheme, 67–68; asks Searles to work for consolidation, 69; on Searles’ efforts in organizing trust, 72; on reason for including all firms in trust, 72, 75; on how refining properties were valued, 80; on Revere Sugar Refining Co.’s decision to stay out of trust, 80; forced to rebuild refinery, 83

Havemeyer & Elder: origin of, 40; capacity of in immediate post–Civil War period, 44; joins 1881 price-fixing scheme, 64–65; destroyed by fire and rebuilt, 65; as low-cost producer, 65–66, 71; impact of on industry prices, 66; represented on board of trustees of Sugar Refineries Co., 78; expanded, 114–15; takes title to West Coast plant, 154–55; customs frauds discovered at, 290–93; becomes high-cost refinery, 294n10

Havemeyer family: arrives in United States, 28, 31; first generation of enters business for itself, 31; second generation of retires, 33; Frederick C. re-enters sugar refining, 39–40; builds first waterfront refinery, 40; provides leaders of opposing industry factions, 60–61; regrets sale of trust certificates, 266–67; influence in American Sugar Refining Co. dwindles, 307

Havemeyer Sugar Refining Company: Hector Havemeyer’s properties consolidated into, 61; Greenpoint refinery of burns down, 83; rebuilt, 114; plants of connected with others, 114

Hawaiian sugar growers: Spreckels’ dominance over, 88–89; join forces with Spreckels’ rival, 90; crop of committed to Spreckels, 154; trust outbids Spreckels for crop of, 155; buy rival refinery, 253; marketing season of, 255; enter into long-term contract with American Sugar Refining Co., 268–69; begin producing “washed” sugars, 269; seek to put pressure on Spreckels, 269–70; organize Sugar Factors Association, 270; reopen Crockett refinery, 270

Hayes, Rutherford B.: attempts to refurbish party image, 51–52

Hearst, William Randolph: as political threat to Theodore Roosevelt, 275–76; his New York American obtains evidence of secret rebating, 276; trumpets role in rebate cases, 278; capitalizes on publicity of rebate convictions, 280

Heike, Charles R.: on Havemeyer’s dominant role in American Sugar Refining Co., 265; convicted in customs fraud case, 296n15; called to testify in civil suit against the American, 303

Higginson, Henry Lee: intervenes with President Taft on behalf of American Sugar Refining Co., 307–8

Holding company: first developed, 15; solves problem of competition from within, 18; New Jersey sanction of, 16, 149; passes antitrust scrutiny, 17, 152, 187; cottonseed oil and lead trusts reorganize under, 149–50; advantages of, 150; susceptibility of to legal attack, 152; sugar trust reorganizes as, 158

Holt, George C.: castigates New York Central R. R., 279; refuses to sustain conspiracy indictment against American Sugar Refining Co. and railroads, 279, 303

Idaho. See Utah; Utah-Idaho Sugar Company

Ingham, Ellery P.: prosecutes E. C. Knight case, 176–77; reopens case, 179; handling of case assayed, 185

International Harvester case: delayed by World War I, 21; causes delay in American Sugar Refining case, 316; history of, 317–19; importance of, 318

International Harvester Company: one of six largest U.S. industrial corporations, 265–66; formation of, 317; antitrust suit against, 317–19

Interstate Commerce Act: strengthening of, 18; reasons for passage of, 122n4; violation of conceded, 202–3. See also Elkins Act

Inventories: regulation of and costs, 112–13

Jackson, Howell B.: jurist in whiskey-trust prosecutions, 179; cited in E. C. Knight decision, 180

Jarvie, James N.: on Arbuckle Brothers’ frustration, 214; visited by Lowell Palmer, 215

Jay, John: heads customs-house investigation, 52

Justice Department. See Department of Justice, U.S.

Kidder, Peabody & Company: role of in sugar trust’s reorganization, 151

Knapp, James: as Henry Wise’s assistant, 303; gathers evidence against American Sugar Refining Co. in West, 303; outlines basis for out-of-court settlement, 314–15

Knickerbocker Sugar Refining Company: refinery built, 273; acquired by Adolph Segel, 288

Knight, E. C.: agrees to sell out to American Sugar Refining Co., 170–71

Labor relations: trust and, 108–9

Lead trust: and industrial-securities market, 99; reportedly organized, 124; reorganizes as holding company, 150

Legal environment: pools difficult to sustain in, 64; and trust device’s legal status, 141; as affected by E. C. Knight and Addyston Pipe cases, 152, 186–87; change in brings end to Great Merger movement, 264; with regard to “unfair” competition, 286; reflects changing attitude toward consolidation, 291, 298; effect of Northern Securities case on, 298, 305; reflects changing presidential attitudes, 298–99; effect of American Tobacco and Standard Oil cases on, 305–6; effect of United States Steel case on, 324

Livingston family: early involvement of in sugar refining, 29; retirement of from sugar refining, 30–31

Lloyd, Henry D.: and Atlantic Monthly article on Standard Oil Co. monopoly, 122

Louisiana cane: loses markets to East Coast refineries, 37–38; reaches production limits, 38–39; effect of Civil War on, 41–42; impact of on prices of refined sugar, 47, 66; harvesting season of, 254–55

Louisiana Sugar Refining Company: history of, 81; forms pool, 81; joins trust, 82; connected with Planters refinery, 115, 254

Management: early separation of from ownership in American Sugar Refining Co., 266; change in the American’s after Havemeyer’s death, 307–8; structure of the American’s in 1922, 325–28

Management techniques: as factor in Era of the Conglomerate, 24; of sugar trust, 105–6; introduced on West Coast, 153; in sugar beet industry, 249–50

Market, share of: independent refineries’ in immediate post-Civil War period, 44; sugar trust’s at its formation, 84; trust’s during winter months, 160; trust’s if Spreckels’ competition not met, 161; American Sugar Refining Co.’s after Philadelphia acquisitions, 172–73; the American’s reduced by entry of new firms, 190; beet sugar’s, 232, 248–49; the American’s if out-of-court settlement in trust suit agreed to, 314, 319; U.S. Steel’s declines, 323; the American’s after 1907, 328

—sugar: broadened during 1850’s, 36–38; as factor limiting monopoly, 97; growth of in West, 328

Market areas, sugar: increased by railroads, 36–38; as affected by railroads, 93–94; for Utah beet factories, 237–38; Missouri River points as dumping ground for surplus sugar, 244–45; of refining centers delineated, 251; agreed to under division-of-markets plan, 257–58

Market control, desire for: role of in Corporate Revolution, 7, 101; as motive in sugar consolidation, 84, 90, 119. See also Competition, “ruinous”; Price control

Marketing arrangements: between American Beet Sugar Co. and American Sugar Refining Co., 246–47; division-of-markets plan, 257–58

Markham, Jesse: on Corporate Revolution, 5

Marshall, F. Snowden: replaces Henry Wise as U.S. attorney for Southern District of New York, 313

Matthiessen, F. O.: trustee of Sugar Refineries Co., 78; seeks to end price war between trust and Spreckels, 163–64; thwarted in effort to gain control of American Sugar Refining Co., 164; approaches John Arbuckle about packaging-machine patent, 214–15; departure of from the American, 265; dies, 265

Matthiessen & Wiechers: second-largest sugar refinery in U.S., 73; agrees to join trust, 75; expanded, 114–15

McCahan, William J.: converts molasses house into sugar refinery, 189–90; on his relations with Franklin Sugar Refining Co., 210; at meetings to assure uniform sugar prices, 211

McCahan Sugar Refining Company: organized, 190; co-operation of with Franklin Sugar Refining Co., 210; role of high margins in firm’s entry, 213; quarter-interest in purchased by National Sugar Refining Co. of N.J., 224

Means, Garginer C., 1

Megacorp: representative oligopolistic firm, 2; emerges from Corporate Revolution, 18, 22–24, 331; operational costs of, 116; American Sugar Refining Co. as in 1907, 265–66; reason for emergence of, 332

Mertonian innovation, 125n15

Metropolitan Sugar Refining Company, 288

Michigan: beet sugar industry established in, 232; consolidation of beet factories in, 241; Havemeyer and American Sugar Refining Co. become involved with beet factories of, 241

Michigan Sugar Company: formed as consolidation of Michigan beet factories, 241; as area price leader, 262; American Sugar Refining Co. sells interest in, 312

Miller, William H.: criticized for policy of “cautious” antitrust enforcement, 174–76; on difficulty of enforcing antitrust law, 176; forced to prosecute American Sugar Refining Co., 176; his handling of E. C. Knight case, 176–77

Missouri River markets: disposal of West Coast sugar in, 90–91; dumping of surplus sugar in, 244–45, 253; dumping of surplus sugar creates need for co-ordination among, 254; plan for selling in, 257–58; prices in co-ordinated through brokers, 272

Modern corporation: emerges from Corporate Revolution, 1, 3, 18. See also Megacorp

Mogul Steamship case, 286 and n97

Mollenhauer family: converts molasses house into refinery, 190; ties of to American Sugar Refining Co., 208–9; effect of Havemeyer-Arbuckle price war on refinery of, 222; replaces Doscher family in management of New York Sugar Refining Co., 226

Moller, George: on willingness to join trust, 70–71; on North River stockholders’ unhappiness, 85; signs trust deed despite opposition, 86; testifies before Arnold committee, 128

Moller, Joe: on profits in sugar refining, 67

Moller, William: inventions of, 35; partner of Frederick C. Havemeyer, 40

Monopoly: result of Corporate Revolution, 18; and competitive tail, 19; transformed into oligopoly, 22, 188; goal of sugar trust, 91; economies of, 107–9, 116–17; role of assurances of in formation of trust, 117; benefits from, 118; public hostility toward, 120–22, 134; railroads viewed as, 120; Standard Oil Co. as new form of, 122; sugar trust described as, 137; trust’s power of diminished by Spreckels, 162; of sugar refining industry achieved by American Sugar Refining Co., 173; E. C. Knight decision viewed as denying that exists in sugar industry, 186; transformed into oligopoly in sugar refining, 188; no longer insisted upon, 228; on West Coast enjoyed by Western Sugar Refining Co., 251, 253

Moody, William H.: explains to Henry Stimson importance of office of U.S. attorney for Southern District of New York, 275; cites usefulness of unfavorable publicity as weapon against corporate abuses, 278–79, 282; agrees to out-of-court settlement in rebate cases, 282; appointed to U.S. Supreme Court, 300

Morey, Chester A.: heads Havemeyer-American Sugar Refining Co. interests in Colorado, 241

Morgan, J. P.: role of in Corporate Revolution, 3, 17–18, 97, 266; selects Elbert Gary to head U.S. Steel Corp., 323

Mormon Church: involvement of in Utah beet industry, 234, 239; begins buying out American Sugar Refining Co.’s interest in Utah and Idaho companies, 316

National Cordage Company: financial collapse of, 16, 189; insolvancy of depresses industrial stocks, 187

National Sugar Refining Company (N.Y.): established, 190; ties of to American Sugar Refining Co., 209; role of high margins in firm’s entry, 213; effect of Havemeyer-Arbuckle price war on, 222

National Sugar Refining Company of New Jersey: organized through consolidation of Mollenhauer, National (N.Y.), and New York refineries, 223–24; purchases quarter-interest in McCahan refinery, 224; working relationship of with American Sugar Refining Co., 224–26; Horace Havemeyer seeks to take over, 310; preferred shareholders in block take-over bid, 311; the American emerges as principal owner of, 311–12; attempts to buy the American’s holdings of its stock, 316; becomes the American’s chief rival, 330

Nelson, Ralph: on causes of Corporate Revolution, 4–9

New Orleans: refineries join trust, 81–82; refineries’ marketing area, 251; refineries affected by dumping, 254; refinery outside of, at Gramercy, 310; new American Sugar Refining Co. plant near, at Chalmette, 310

New York Central Railroad: grants secret rebates to American Sugar Refining Co., 197, 220; defendant in rebate cases, 278–82; found guilty and fined, 279

New York City: first sugar refinery in, 26; sudden increase in number of refineries in, 34; pre-eminence of among East Coast refining centers, 42; advantages of as refining center, 43; refineries attempt to limit output, 64–65; refineries agree to join trust, 81; extent of customs frauds among refineries in, 294; newspapers fail to publicize sugar fraud convictions, 297; newspapers pick up Outlook article, 297

New York State legislature: investigation of trusts, 126–30; antitrust legislation of, 133–35

New York Stock Exchange: growth of in 1880’s and 1890’s, 3; as affected by trust certificates, 16, 99–100. See also Capital markets

New York Sugar Refining Company: enters industry, 219; effect of Havemeyer-Arbuckle price war on, 222; becomes part of National Sugar Refining Co. of N.J., 223–24

New York Times: reaction of to trusts, 123–24; criticizes sugar trust’s secretiveness, 128–29; seeks state action against trusts, 132, 135; criticizes American Sugar Refining Co.’s Philadelphia acquisitions, 174; complains about handling of E. C. Knight case, 176

New York Tribune: reports customs frauds, 50, 52; reaction of to sugar trust’s formation, 126

North, Douglass C.: on role of demand in early American economic growth, 11n36

Northern Securities case: effect of on antitrust law, 20, 298

North River Sugar Refining case: renders trust form illegal, 16, 120; argued before courts, 136–40; decisions in, 139–40, 145–46

North River Sugar Refining Company: agrees to join trust, 75; forced to suspend operations, 75; stockholders imperil consolidation scheme, 84–87; plant shut down, 114; as focal point of state action against trusts, 135–40; charter annulled, 139–40

Number of competing firms: as factor in evolution of industry structure, 10; during Period of Imperfect Competition, 11; in mid-nineteenth century, 34; in immediate post-Civil War period, 43; reduced by low margins after 1873, 56; in 1887, 83; increased by coming of railroad, 95; advantages of increasing, 334

Oligopoly: emerges from Corporate Revolution, 22; price competition under temporary, 162; emerges in sugar refining, 188, 228; gives way to classical duopoly behavior during Havemeyer-Arbuckle price war, 227; acceptance of, 291; given judicial approval in United States Steel case, 324; acquiesced to in sugar refining, 329–31

Olney, Richard: views of on antitrust law, 178; role of in whiskey-trust suit, 178; presses E. C. Knight case, 179; appeals lower court decision in Knight case, 180

Osborn, William F.: acts to enlist support of wholesale grocers, 194; works with Thomas Riley, 205; at meetings to assure uniform sugar prices, 211

Output limitations. See Price-fixing

Overhead costs: as factor leading to “excessive” competition, 13, 101; impact of on competition in sugar refining, 50; economies in, 102–4; responsible for railroad abuses, 121; as factor causing breakdown of competition, 333

Oxnard, Henry T.: successfully grows sugar beets, 230; builds new factory in California, 244; sugar beet enterprises merged to form American Beet Sugar Co., 244; on nature of working arrangement with American Sugar Refining Co., 246; contacts California beet companies concerning the American’s offer to act as supervising selling agent, 247

Oxnard, Robert: trust representative on West Coast, 153; on working with Spreckels, 167; takes over American Beet Sugar Co.’s management, 250

Oxnard Brothers: agrees to join trust, 75; forced to suspend operations, 75; shut down, 114

Palmer, Lowell M.: role of in promoting trust, 74; and association with Havemeyers, 197; handles railroad affairs, 197–206; and cooperage business, 206–7; supplies American Sugar Refining Co. with other inputs, 207; as emissary to Arbuckle Brothers, 215; refers Wallace Willett to Henry Havemeyer, 233; forced out of the American, 265; member of committee to supervise sugar beet activities, 267

Palmer’s Dock: source of conflict with Pennsylvania Railroad, 201–2. See also Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal

Panic of 1873: ends first phase of Golden Age of Competition, 13–14; depression leads to decline in sugar margins, 56

Parsons, John E.: role of in drawing up sugar trust deed, 77–78; on control over trust members, 106; refuses to hand over trust deed, 127–28; and arguments in North River case, 136–37, 145; approaches Charles Harrison of Franklin Sugar Refining Co. on subject of selling out, 169–71; and formation of National Sugar Refining Co. of N.J., 224; still associated with Henry Havemeyer in 1907, 265; cites Mogul Steamship case, 286; explains American Sugar Refining Co.’s refusal to let Pennsylvania refinery operate, 287; indicated under Sherman Act, 302; prosecution of dropped, 312–13

Pennsylvania Railroad: and conflict with American Sugar Refining Co., 201–2

Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Company: organized to build refinery in Philadelphia, 283; forced to close down refinery as condition of loan, 284

Period of Imperfect Competition: nature of, 11–12; in sugar refining, 26–34

Petroleum industry: pioneer in consolidation techniques, 70; contrasted with sugar refining, 77. See also Standard Oil Company

Philadelphia: first refineries in, 27; sugar prices in during colonial period, 28–29; increase in number of refineries in during 1850’s, 34; largest refinery in, in 1887, 73; competition of refineries of against trust, 153, 159; Spreckels locates new refinery in, 156–57

Philadelphia Press: charges bribery by sugar officials, 180; reports on Treasury secretary’s role in tariff controversy, 183

Planters Sugar Refining Company: forms pool, 81; history of, 81; joins trust, 82; connected with Louisiana refinery, 115, 254

Political influence: of American Sugar Refining Co., 182–84, 294n8; brought to bear on Henry Stimson, 281

Pooling arrangements: among East Coast refiners, 50; between New Orleans firms, 81; among sugar beet companies, 258. See also Price-fixing

Post, James: encourages formation of new firms, 209; partner in B. H. Howell, Sons & Co., 209; cooperates with American Sugar Refining Co., 209–10; on difficulty of eliminating independent refineries, 212; on losses as result of price war, 222; promotes merger of independent refineries, 222–23; brings McCahan refinery into consolidation, 224; co-ordinates pricing with Henry Havemeyer, 225; persuades Havemeyer to invest in Cuban properties, 309

Price control: how exercised by trust, 105; economies of, 110; with independent refineries, 159; exercised by Havemeyer and American Sugar Refining Co., 212, 225, 229, 250–63; re-established in sugar refining, 227; marketing arrangements as means of establishing, 246–47; threatened by Henry Havemeyer’s death, 308–11; by government during World War I, 321, 328; by U.S. Steel, 323; American Sugar Refining Co.’s weakened but maintained, 328–30; desire for as fundamental cause of Corporate Revolution, 332–33; advantages of, 334. See also Market control, desire for; Price-fixing

Price-fixing: during Golden Age of Competition, 14; in sugar refining, 50, 59, 63–65, 67–68, 89–90; made difficult by common law, 64; by sugar trust, 105, 159; market-sharing plan agreed to in West, 271–72. See also Pooling arrangements

Price leadership: exercised by American Suger Refining Co., 210, 212, 227, 329; practiced by Henry Havemeyer, 261; by various beet sugar companies, 262; exercised by Elbert Gary in steel industry, 323; disadvantage of for the American, 328

Price maintenance: meetings to assure, 210–11; achieved in sugar refining, 262–63; weakened, 328–29

Prices, paid for refineries by sugar trust, 82, 85, 92

Prices, sugar: in colonial period, 28–29; in first decades of nineteenth century, 30; fall during 1840’s, 36; importance of margins in, 47–48; in post-Civil War period, 48–49; after Panic of 1873, 56; in 1880, 63; as result of 1882 fire, 65; in 1886, 67–68; those in West geared to those in New York, 89; upper limit on set by tariff, 96; limits on, 97; after trust formed, 118–19, 159; with Spreckels competing in East, 161–63; in 1890’s, 212–13; encourage new entry, 213; after entry of Arbuckle Brothers, 218, 221; after Havemeyer-Arbuckle price war ended, 227–28; after World War I, 329

Price war: on West Coast in 1886, 90; between Spreckels and trust, 152–55, 157, 162–65; avoided in East before 1890, 159–60; ended in East, 165; between Arbuckle and American Sugar Refining Co., 188, 218–22, 226–27; in coffee-roasting industry, 216–17; predicted but fails to occur in West, 270–71

Pricing policies: of trust, 159–60; Spreckels entry forces change in, 161; of independent refineries in 1890’s, 210–11; stay-out pricing practiced by Henry Havemeyer, 212; by Arbuckle Brothers in coffee, 217; fail to deter entry, 228; American Sugar Refining Co.’s posting of prices, 261

Private warehouses, system of: Havemeyers take advantage of, 40; abolition of called for, 55, 61–62

Product differentiation: as factor in evolution of industry structure, 10; during Period of Imperfect Competition, 11; during Golden Age of Competition, 12, 46; in first decades of nineteenth century, 30; brand name sugars, 35–36; as barrier to entry in sugar refining, 208; pressed by American Sugar Refining Co., 327

Production regularity: desire for as cause of Corporate Revolution, 6; and employment, 109

Profits, excessive: difficulty of determining, 7, 118; in sugar refining, 119

—sugar refining: in colonial period, 29; Civil War’s effect on, 41; squandered, 56; in 1880’s, 65–68; after trust formed, 118; price war in 1890 puts end to, 162; of American Sugar Refining Co. in 1890’s, 213; as result of Havemeyer-Arbuckle price war, 221–22

Progressive movement: as factor in Corporate Revolution, 19; effect of World War I on, 21; misguided emphasis of on antitrust approach, 330; fatal shortcomings of “trust-busting” program of, 334

Promoters: role of in Corporate Revolution, 3; role of in sugar consolidation, 97–99

Pryor, Roger: attacks sugar trust, 132–33, 135; seeks legal precedent against trusts, 136; arguments of in North River case, 136–39; on North River case’s implications, 141, 146; seeks to re-create competition in sugar, 147; forced to accept reorganized trust, 151

Public opinion: and trusts, 120, 123–26; aroused by Arnold committee testimony, 128; forces Congress to act, 142; and Philadelphia acquisitions, 174; and bribery charges, 184; American Sugar Refining Co. avoids criticism in consolidation of independent refineries, 226; Henry Havemeyer ignores, 267; as factor in rebate prosecution strategy, 278–79; as weapon against the American, 293; Henry Stimson disappointed over failure to arouse in customs-fraud cases, 297; Outlook article stirs, 297; puts pressure on Taft administration to prosecute the American, 298; change in toward big business as result of war, 320; guides U.S. Steel policies, 323

Railroads: role of in Corporate Revolution, 5–6, 93; alter interregional commodity flows, 37–38; strengthen competitive nature of sugar refining, 93–94; target of antimonopolist attack, 121–22; and American Sugar Refining Co., 188; importance of sugar traffic to, 195; competition among, 195–96; the American acts as “evener” for, 196–202; and rebate arrangements with the American, 197–203; concerned over violation of law, 203; sugar marketing areas defined by freight rates of, 251; marketing plan influenced by freight rates of, 257; attempt to conceal rebates, 277; defendants in rebate cases, 278–82; taught a painful lesson, 282

Real Estate Trust Company: Adolph Segel brings ruin to, 288–89

Rebates, railroad: in petroleum industry, 15, 18; Theodore Roosevelt’s attitude toward, 20; in sugar refining, 188, 195–206; received by Brooklyn Cooperage Company, 206–7; factor in Arbuckle-American Sugar Refining Co. conflict, 220–21; the American found guilty of receiving, 264; prohibition of helps end Great Merger movement, 264; outlawed by Elkins Act, 274; remain as most important barriers in sugar refining, 276; railroads attempt to conceal, 277; lead to prosecution, 278–82; end of seen as solution to trust problem, 280

Refineries, cost of: in 1850’s, 34; in immediate post-Civil War period, 44; on West Coast in 1884, 89; Spreckels’ Philadelphia plant, 157; by 1892, 207

—independent: and railroad rebates, 205–6; difficulty of eliminating, 211; accept American Sugar Refining Co.’s price leadership, 212, 262–63; merged, 222–26

—size of: in immediate post-Civil War period, 44; rebuilt Havemeyer & Elder plant, 65; Spreckels’ Philadelphia plant, 157; independent refineries in 1888, 159; by 1892, 207; of American Sugar Refining Co.’s New Orleans plant, 254

Refining techniques: in colonial period, 27–28; in 1830’s, 31–34; final-stage bottleneck in eliminated, 35; importance of waterfront site to, 40–41, 55; improved on West Coast, 153

Revere Sugar Refining Company: agrees to join trust, 74; reverses decision, 80; only independent refinery after 1891, 173

Rich Man’s Panic of 1907: marks end of first phase of Corporate Revolution, 18, 187, 264

Riley, Thomas P.: handles railroad matters for American Sugar Refining Co., 197–206; on cooperage rebates, 207; arranges meeting to assure uniform sugar prices, 211; takes evidence of rebating to Hearst’s New York American, 276–77; co-operates with Henry Stimson, 277

Rockefeller, John D.: as pioneer in consolidation techniques, 15, 70, 90; role of in Corporate Revolution, 17–18; portrayed as robber-baron, 122; rejects competition as norm, 125; appears before Arnold committee, 129.

Roosevelt, Theodore: attitude of toward “trusts,” 18, 20, 274; administration’s policies help bring end to Great Merger movement, 264; brings about change in role of government, 273–74; Hearst poses political threat to, 275–76; arranges to have Outlook publicize customs frauds, 297; succeeds in reviving Sherman Act, 298; reluctant to use antitrust approach, 298–99; administration brings suits under Sherman Act, 299, 305; administration refuses to prosecute American Sugar Refining Co., 300–301; antitrust policy of criticized by Wilson, 313–14; administration clears Tennessee Coal and Iron purchase, 323; wisdom of his approach to trust problem, 335

Roosevelt family: early involvement of in sugar refining, 29; retires from industry, 30

Root, Elihu: reaction of to rebate convictions, 280

St. Louis Globe-Democrat: reaction of to American Sugar Refining Co.’s Philadelphia acquisitions, 174

Schumpeter, Joseph: on dynamic competition, 229

Schumpeterian innovation, 125n15

Seager, Henry R., and Gulick, Charles A., Jr.: on causes of Corporate Revolution, 6; on economies of consolidation, 116

Searles, John E., Jr.: spokesman for William Havemeyer interests, 61; role of in 1886 output-limitation scheme, 67; asked to work for consolidation, 69; organizes trust, 70–76; trustee of Sugar Refineries Co., 78; approaches New Orleans refineries, 82; buys out North River stockholders, 86–87; asks Spreckels to sell out to trust, 90; his arguments for consolidation, 90–91; not an outside promoter, 97–98; on economies from consolidation, 102, 104, 110; boasts of power over Cuban growers, 108; on inventory management, 112–13; on shutting down inefficient plants, 113; avoids Arnold committee subpeona, 128; approaches Spreckels to end price war with trust, 165–66; criticizes younger Spreckels for cutting price, 168; negotiates sale of Philadelphia refineries, 171–72; secretly acquires control of Baltimore refinery, 173; refuses to testify in E. C. Knight case, 177; involved in 1894 bribery charges, 182–84; on American Sugar Refining Co.’s desire to protect distribution network, 192; organizes Brooklyn Cooperage Company, 206; forced out of the American, 265

Secrecy: of trust device, 77; need for in merger negotiations, 79–80; fans hostile reaction to trusts, 124, 128–29; surrounding Havemeyer-Spreckels understanding, 166–67; Havemeyer’s penchant for, 267

Securities market. See Capital markets

Segel, Adolph: career of as promoter, 282; builds refinery in Camden, 282–83; builds second refinery, 283; sells out to American Sugar Refining Co., 283, 285; and financial involvement with the American, 283–89; loan to forms basis of government antitrust suit, 303

Senff, Charles H.: partner in Havemeyer & Elder, 40; attitude of toward joining trust, 71–73; trustee of Sugar Refineries Co., 78; acquires interest in Mollenhauer refinery, 208–9; still with American Sugar Refining Co. in 1907, 265; indicted under Sherman Act, 302

Shareholders: dispersed nature of American Sugar Refining Co.’s, 266; lack of opposition to Henry Havemeyer’s leadership among the American’s, 268; Havemeyer’s troubles with minority, 216n101, 286, 288

Shares: of American Sugar Refining Co. widely dispersed by 1907, 266; Havemeyer family holds few in the American, 266–67

Sherman, John: antitrust bill considered by Congress, 141–44; responsibility of for antitrust law, 144; on revised measure, 144

Sherman Act: enacted, 16, 144; and holding-company device, 16, 152, 186–87; Theodore Roosevelt’s attitude toward, 20, 298–99; Taft’s attitude toward, 20, 299; Congress weighs, 142–44; immediate need for obviated, 144–45; purpose of defeated by E. C. Knight case, 186; discourages formal agreement ending Havemeyer-Arbuckle price war, 227; Roosevelt’s willingness to enforce helps end Great Merger movement, 264; American Sugar Refining Co. accused of violating, 291. See also Antitrust laws

Simons, Henry C.: on cause of Corporate Revolution, 2

Social control: problem of re-establishing, 334–35

Speculation: engaged in by trust’s organizers, 98; at time of American Sugar Refining Co.’s Philadelphia acquisitions, 173–74

Spreckels, Claus, Jr.: on Searles’s arguments for consolidation, 90–91; on competition in 1890, 163; meets with F. O. Matthiessen to end price war, 163–64; approached by Searles to end struggle, 165–66; resists outside direction, 167–68; quit’s father’s enterprises, 168; organizes Federal Sugar Refining Co., 228

Spreckels, Claus, Sr.: his background in sugar refining, 87–88, 89–90; comes to dominate Hawaiian cane industry, 88–89; output-limiting policy of, 89, 251–52; interest of in rival American refinery, 89–90; refuses to sell out to trust, 90–91; influence of used to annul rival’s charter, 140, 153–54; builds competing refinery in Philadelphia, 152, 155–57; and struggle with trust, 152–58, 161–65; viewed as defender against trust, 156, 161; denies plan to sell out, 157–58, 174; makes trip east to open new plant, 158; reaches accommodation with Henry Havemeyer, 166; proves difficult to work with, 167; forced to sell Philadelphia refinery, 168–69, 172; sale of refinery revealed, 174; successfully grows sugar beets, 230; beet sugar enterprises, 243–44; price leader in beets, 262. See also California Sugar Refining Company

Spreckels Sugar Refining Company: plant built in Philadelphia, 155–57; and competition with American Sugar Refining Co., 161–65; Havemeyers purchase minority interest in, 166; plant combined with Delaware Sugar House, 179; provokes increased railroad competition, 196

Standard Oil case: marks end of Corporate Revolution, 18; decision in handed down, 20, 305–6; causes delay in American Sugar Refining case, 304–5; importance of, 305; Taft administration’s handling of criticized, 313

Standard Oil Company: pioneer in consolidation techniques, 15–16; model for sugar refining industry, 70, 195, 276; leads to acceptance of trust certificates, 99; seen as new form of monopoly, 122; example condemned, 123; linked to other consolidations, 123–24; and railroad rebates, 195; one of six largest industrial corporations, 265–66; fine for rebating found excessive, 282. See also Rockefeller, John D.

Standard Sugar Refining Company: largest refinery in Boston, 73–74; joins trust, 74; expanded, 114–15

Stanley committee: and investigation of U.S. Steel, 308

Stigler, George J.: on causes of Corporate Revolution, 3

Stimson, Henry L.: named U.S. attorney for Southern District of New York, 274–75; prepares rebate cases, 277–78; strategy followed in rebate cases, 278; obtains convictions, 279–81; sees end of rebates as solution to trust problem, 280; reacts to political intrusion, 281; arranges out-of-court settlement, 281–82; accomplishes goal in rebate cases, 282; prosecutes customs frauds, 293, 295–97; and results of prosecution, 297; succeeded by Henry Wise, 302; on Wise, 313

Stock. See Shares

Stock values; effect of dissolution on, 21; factor in handling of sugar trust, 147; of American Sugar Refining Co., 213; question of raised, 318n86

Structure of American industry, evolution of: as four-stage process, 9–24; lessons to be learned from, 332–35

Stuart, Robert L. and Alexander: adapt steam power to sugar refining, 32–33; firm of prospers, 33–34; effect of Civil War on business of, 41; withdraw from sugar refining industry, 56

Stursberg, Julius A.: on winter losses, 66; joins and offers to promote trust, 71; trustee of Sugar Refineries Co., 78; on independence of trust members, 106; on economies of consolidation, 117

Sugar: as a luxury item of consumption, 28–30; market for broadened, 36–38; shortage of during World War I, 320

—adulteration of: charges of in 1870’s, 50, 58–59

Sugar beet companies: Havemeyer and American Sugar Refining Co. interest in, 229, 240–42, 247–48; agree to division-of-markets plan, 257–58; seek out-of-court settlement in antitrust suit, 314; the American eschews voting its stock in, 314–15; agree to maximum price during World War I, 321

Sugar beet factories: in Utah, 234–41; in Colorado, 241; in Michigan, 241–42; in California, 243–44; elsewhere, 242

Sugar beets: as threat to cane refiners, 228; early efforts to grow in U.S., 230; and tariff protection, 232; share of domestic sugar market of, 248–49; harvesting seasons of, 256–57; prices of geared to those of refined sugar, 261–62

—cost of processing: in 1901, 233; Havemeyer complains of execessive, 250

Sugar cane: early processing techniques for, 27–28; production limits of in Louisiana reached, 38–39; growing seasons of, 254–55. See also Sugar refining industry; Tariff, on raw sugar

Sugar Factors Association: organized by independent Hawaiian cane growers, 270; Western Sugar Refining Co. fails to reach agreement with, 271

Sugar importers: join forces with smaller refiners, 54, 60; bypassed by larger refiners, 60; eliminated by trust, 107–8

Sugar Refineries Company, The. See Sugar trust

Sugar refining, costs of: at new Havemeyer & Elder plant, 65, 71; as result of consolidation, 110–12; at American Sugar Refining Co. in 1890’s, 213; at the American’s plants in early 1900’s, 294–95n10

Sugar refining industry: role of in evolution of industrial organization, 24; during colonial period, 26–30; in Period of Imperfect Competition, 26–34; early production methods of, 27–28; early fortunes in, 29–30; in first decades of nineteenth century, 30; technological change in during 1830’s, 31–33; during first phase of Golden Age of Competition, 34–49; technological change in during 1850’s, 35–36; rapid expansion of in 1850’s, 39; Civil War’s effect on, 41–42; pre-eminance of New York firms in, 42–43; competitive character of, 43–49; during second phase of Golden Age of Competition, 50–69; racked by charges of customs frauds, 52–54; conflict between small and large refiners in, 54–56, 60–62; competition in after 1873, 56–69; attempts to gain export assistance, 57–58; complaints of product adulteration arise in, 58–59; first price-fixing scheme proposed in, 59; attempts at credit destruction in, 59–60; bypassing of importing merchants in, 60; and pooling arrangement of 1880, 63–64; and output-limiting scheme of 1881, 64–65; temporary relief from competitive pressures in brought by Havemeyer & Elder fire and New York strike, 65–69; other output-limitation agreements in, 67–68, 271–72; Golden Age of Competition in ends, 70; trust organized in, 70–92; price wars in, 90, 152–55, 157, 162–65, 188, 218–22; how affected by railroads, 93–94; necessarily confined to major seaports, 94; limitations on monopoly in, 97; role of promoters in consolidation of, 97–99; raw-sugar brokers eliminated from, 107–8; trust in declared illegal, 139–40, 145–46; trust in reorganized as holding company, 150; and E. C. Knight case, 176–77, 179–80; faces problem of entry, 188–90; and railroads, 195–96; community of interests in during 1890’s, 208–12; entry of new firms into, 214–19, 270–71, 273; merger of independent refineries in, 222–26; challenged by sugar beet industry, 229–350; Henry Havemeyer’s control over, 250–63; co-ordination of marketing in, 254–56; effect of Theodore Roosevelt’s policies on, 264; factor plans abandoned by, 276; rebates prosecution in, 278–82; Adolph Segel’s effect on, 282–89; discovery of customs frauds in, 290–98; antitrust suits in, 300–304, 306–7, 312–16, 319–20; effect of Havemeyer’s death on, 307–9; initial involvement of in Cuban land holdings, 309; co-operates with government during World War I, 320–21; consent decree in, 324–25; change in structure of, 328

Sugar trust: created, 78; formation of revealed, 84; threatened by North River Sugar Refining Co. stockholders’ withdrawal, 84; Spreckels refuses to join, 91; purchases American Sugar Refinery, 92; certificates of help create industrial-securities market, 99; organization of described, 104–5; and fixing of prices, 105; independence of members of, 106; its adjustment to long-run demand, 113; reorganized as New Jersey corporation, 120, 150; public reaction to formation of, 126; New York State investigation of, 126–30; U.S. House investigation of, 130–31; agrees to “deal” in North River suit, 135–36; social desirability of argued and answered, 137–39; Barrett and Finch decisions in New York State’s suit against, 139–40, 145–46; obtains Connecticut charter, 146; reorganization of thwarted by New York injunction, 147; ponders reorganization alternatives, 150; reorganizes as New Jersey corporation, 150; and struggle with Spreckels, 152–58, 161–65

Supreme Court, U.S.: and E. C. Knight case, 17, 184–86; and United States Steel case, 21–22, 324; mood of in 1890’s, 185; and Addyston Pipe & Steel case, 187; decision in American Tobacco and Standard Oil cases, 306

Tabor, Charles F.: pressed to act against sugar trust, 132; agrees to bring suit, 135; willing to change New York corporate law, 148; forced to accept reorganized trust, 151

Taft, William H.: attitude of toward industrial consolidation, 20–21, 299; pressure on administration to prosecute American Sugar Refining Co., 298; administration decides to bring suit against the American, 302; antitrust record of criticized, 313; orders prosecution of International Harvester Co., 317

Take-over efforts: by F. O. Matthiessen, 164–65; by Nash, Spalding & Co., 165; by Horace Havemeyer, 310–11

Tammany Hall: attacks sugar trust, 132

Tariff, on raw sugar: Civil War brings increase in, 41; controversy over uniform v. ad valorem duties, in 1870’s, 50, 55–60; changes in demanded to end customs frauds, 53–55, 60; legislation of stymied, 62; involved in bribery allegations, 181–82; encourages sugar beet production, 232

Tariff protection: role of in Corporate Revolution, 8, 95; as ameliorative for competition, 15; stimulates ante bellum Louisiana production, 38; extent of in sugar refining, 95–96; as factor in sugar consolidation, 95–97; sets upper limit on sugar prices, 96

Technological progress: exogenous force affecting evolution of industry structure, 10–11; effect of during Golden Age of Competition, 12–13, 26; during Era of the Conglomerate, 23–24; transforms sugar refining in 1830’s, 31–33; resistance to, 33; behind rapid expansion of sugar refining industry in 1850’s, 35–36; drives outmoded refineries from industry, 48–49; effect of telegraph and cable on refining industry, 69

Technology: of colonial sugar-making, 27–28; application of steam to sugar refining, 31–33; centrifugal machine developed, 35; causes breakdown of competition, 333

Thomas, Joseph B.: head of Standard Sugar Refining Co., 73; agrees to join trust, 74–75; trustee of Sugar Refineries Co., 78

Thomas, Washington B.: succeeds father as official of American Sugar Refining Co., 265; on reasons for deferring to Henry Havemeyer, 268; indicted under Sherman Act, 302; succeeds Havemeyer as head of the American, 307; inaugurates less-personal administration, 307; points out changes in management, 308

Transportation costs: role of in Corporate Revolution, 5–6; lowering of stimulates competition, 93

Transportation revolution: as cause of Corporate Revolution, 11; affects market for sugar, 36–38

Trust device: pioneered by Standard Oil Co., 15, 70; mechanics of, 15–16, 76–77; declared illegal, 16, 141, 145–56; organized in sugar refining industry, 70–92; public reaction to, 123–26; legality of argued, 136–40, 145; states take action against, 140–41, 153

Trust problem: end of rebates seen as solution to, 280; difficulty of dealing with, 291. See also Consolidation

United States Steel case: decision in, 21–22, 322–24; leads to acceptance of oligopoly, 291, 324; effect of consent decree in sugar case on feared, 319; ruling on issue of unfair competition in, 322–23; rule of reason upheld in, 324

United States Steel Corporation: as consolidation, 17, 322; one of six largest U.S. industrial corporations, 265–66; congressional investigation of, 308; antitrust suit against, 322–24

Untermyer, Samuel: retained by Adolph Segel, 287

Utah: beet sugar industry established in, 232, 234; beet factories consolidated, 239–41; beet factories agree to division-of-markets plan, 257–58

Utah-Idaho Sugar Company: antecedent history of constituent members of, 235–39; reasons for consolidation of, 239; organized, 239–41; Havemeyer and American Sugar Refining Co. interest in, 240, 309, 311; as price leader, 262; Mormon Church begins buying out the American’s interest in, 316

Valuation of property: creates problem at trust’s formation, 79

Wages: trust’s effect on, 108–9

Warner Sugar Refining Company: acquires Knickerbocker Sugar Refining Co. plant, 273n46; only New York refinery not involved in customs frauds, 294

Warren, Charles B.: heads Havemeyer-American Sugar Refining Co. interests in Michigan, 241

Watkins, Myron: on cause of Corporate Revolution, 7

Wells, David A.: on need for ad valorem duties, 55

West Coast refineries: only two left in 1887, 89; rivalry between increased by trust’s actions, 92; and Spreckels-trust conflict, 152, 166; marketing area of described, 251; agree to market-sharing plan, 271–72

Western Sugar Refining Company: organization of ends price war in West, 166; involves American Sugar Refining Co. in beets, 243; output-limiting policy of, 251–52; maintains West Coast monopoly, 253; and disposal of surplus sugar, 255; pressure from Hawaiian growers abated by, 268–69; cuts prices to meet competition of “washed” sugars, 269; unable to reach agreement with Hawaiian growers, 270–71; agrees to market-sharing plan, 271–72; the American sells interest in, 312

Whiskey industry: political scandal involving, 51

Whiskey trust: and industrial-securities market, 99; its formation revealed, 123; linked to Standard Oil Co., 124; antitrust suit against, 175

Wholesale grocers: on West Coast warned not to buy trust sugar, 153; and working arrangement with American Sugar Refining Co., 188, 191–95; competition among, 191; the American realizes it cannot eliminate, 192–93, 327; used as barrier to entry, 193–95; undermine the American’s rebate agreements with railroads, 200; become embroiled in Havemeyer-Arbuckle conflict, 219–21; as defendants in rebate cases, 278–82; profits in sugar voluntarily limited during World War I, 321; breach-of-contract suits against, 329

Wickersham, George: seeks to convict individuals responsible for customs frauds, 296; expresses regret over prominent men indicted, 302; instructs Henry Wise to prosecute American Sugar Refining Co., 302; agrees to end criminal suit against the American, 312–13

Willet, Wallace: promotes sugar beets, 232; approaches Thomas Cutler as Havemeyer emissary, 233

Wilson, Woodrow: antitrust policy of, 3, 20–21, 313–14; administration’s handling of American Sugar Refining case, 314–16; administration backs down from goals in International Harvester case, 319; administration still refuses consent decree in American Sugar Refining case, 319; supporters’ hopes for antitrust approach frustrated, 330

Wise, Henry A.: assists Henry Stimson in rebate cases, 277; succeeds Stimson, 302; and antitrust prosecution of American Sugar Refining Co., 302–4, 306, 308, 311–13

Wood, Fernando: heads customs-house investigation, 52

Woolson Spice Company: Henry Havemeyer purchases controlling interest in, 216–17; receives rebates, 220; replaced by American Coffee Co., 221

World War I: affects attitudes toward big business, 21, 291, 320–21; forces government to accept consent decree in International Harvester case, 318; American Sugar Refining Co.’s assistance to government during, 320; food controls during, 320; leads to postponement of American Sugar Refining case, 320; obscures decline in the American’s influence, 328–29

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Additional Information

ISBN
9781421430003
Related ISBN
9781421430836
MARC Record
OCLC
1120096009
Pages
365-388
Launched on MUSE
2019-09-20
Language
English
Open Access
Yes
Funder
Mellon/NEH / Hopkins Open Publishing: Encore Editions
Creative Commons
CC-BY-NC-ND
Creative Commons
CC-BY-NC-ND
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