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Memory

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
Published by Fordham University Press

Radstone, Susannah and Bill Schwarz.

Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates.

Fordham University Press, 2010.

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Notes

Introduction: Mapping Memory Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz

1. For one of the earliest accounts of contemporary Western culture as mnemonic, see Andreas Huyssen, *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia* (New York: Routledge, 1995).

2. A key text here is Fredric Jameson, *Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991).

3. Proponents of this view may trace their pessimism concerning the accelerated erosion of memory by digitization back to Plato's view that writing separates the knower from the known, producing what Aleida Assmann has termed a "memory ersatz"; Assmann, "Canon and Archive" in *Cultural Memory Studies*, ed. Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008). For a study of the relations between cultural memory and digitization see José Van Dijck, *Mediated Memories in the Digital Age* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007).

4. For a skeptical discussion of the stretching of broadly psychological understandings of memory to fields beyond those of personal memory, see Kerwin Lee Klein, "On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse," *Representations* 69 (Winter 2000): 127–50.

1. How to Make a Composition: Memory-Craft in Antiquity and in the Middle Ages Mary Carruthers

1. There are many studies of medieval memory and history. One might begin with Janet Coleman, *Ancient and Medieval Memories* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Patrick Geary, *Phantoms of Remembrance* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). These do not deal at all with *artes memorandi*. There is some connection of these arts with commemoration practices, through their shared emphasis on the importance of place and on their use of images of situate recollection: see Mary Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 7–59. See also the pioneering study of Maurice Halbwachs, *La topographie légendaire des Évangiles en Terre Sainte* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971, orig. 1941) and the multi-volume study of French history directed by Pierre Nora, *Les lieux de mémoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984–92).

2. For further reading on these topics, see Mary Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), and *Craft of Thought*; Lina Bolzoni, *The Gallery of Memory*, trans. Jeremy Parzen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001, orig. 1997) and *The Web of Images*, trans. Carole Preston and Lisa Chien (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2004, orig. 2001); Paolo Rossi, *Logic and the Art of Memory*, trans. Stephen Clucas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000, orig. 1983); Frances A. Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London: Routledge, 1966); and two

collections of essays edited by Jörg-Jochen Berns and Wolfgang Neuber which are devoted to late medieval and early modern mnemotechnics and logics, *Ars memorativa: Zur kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung der Gedächtniskunst 1400–1750* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1993) and *Seelenmaschinen: Gattungstraditionen, Funktionen und Leistungsgrenzen der Mnemotechniken vom späten Mittelalter bis zum Beginn der Moderne* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2000). Some key texts from the twelfth through fifteenth centuries are available in *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, ed. Mary Carruthers and Jan Ziolkowski (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). Berns and Neuber have also edited an anthology of early modern texts in Latin, English, and French (with Latin translated into German), *Das enzyklopädische Gedächtnis der Frühen Neuzeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1998). An ancient technique is described notably in the pseudo-Cicero, *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.28–40, translated by Harry Caplan in the Loeb Classical Library (London: Heinemann, 1954) and another, related method in Quintilian, *The Orator's Education (Institutio oratoria)* 11.2, translated by Donald A. Russell in the Loeb Classical Library, 5 vols. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001). Two influential methods from late antiquity, briefly described by the fourth- to fifth-century rhetoric masters Consultus Fortunatianus and Julius Victor, are translated in *Medieval Craft of Memory*. On the complex history of the later dissemination through teaching of Ciceronian rhetoric, including the arts of memory, see John O. Ward and Virginia Cox, eds., *The Rhetoric of Cicero in Its Medieval and Renaissance Commentary* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

3. Ezekiel is commanded to remember and then write down all he sees for the benefit of the people of Israel—to place what he sees in his heart (*pone cor teum in omnia*, “set your heart upon all these things”) as the Vulgate says (Ezek. 40: 4), with a play upon the Latin verb *recordari*, “recollect.” On the significant role played by memory/recollection in our very ability to conceive and plan a future, see Yadin Dudai and Mary Carruthers, “The Janus Face of Mnemosyne” *Nature* 434 (March 31, 2005): 567. Dudai has published a helpful dictionary of concepts in neuroscience relating to the various aspects and activities of memory; see his *Memory from A to Z* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

4. “Lectioeque assiduo, et meditatione diuturna, pectus suum bibliothecam fecerat Christi”; Jerome, *Epistulae* 60.10, *Patrologia latina* 22.595.

5. “Hic tantos auctores, tantos libros in memoriae suae bibliotheca condiderat, ut legentes probabiliter admoneret, in qua parte codicis quod praedixerat invenirent”; Cassiodorus, *Institutiones* 1.5.2. I have used the edition of R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937). Cassiodorus mentions the example of Didymus the blind expositor in this same passage. In his *Life of St. Anthony*, an essential book of early monasticism, St. Athanasius remarked on Anthony’s well-stocked memory, which served him instead of books: see chapters 2 and 3. As a boy, St. Anthony refused to learn to read and, according to his *Life*, learned his vast store of Scripture entirely by oral means. The impression this story made on St. Augustine precipitates the crisis he described in *Confessiones*, Book VIII.

6. I have described Aristotle’s analysis in *Book of Memory*, chap. 2; see my notes there for further references.

7. An important authority was Albertus Magnus in his commentary on Aristotle’s work *Liber de memoria et reminiscencia*, tractatus 2, c. 3. Recollection is defined as rational investigation (that is, investigation that consciously uses a method or scheme) and distinguished from *iterato addiscens* or repetitive learning. A translation of this treatise can be found in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, eds., *Medieval Craft of Memory*, 118–52.

8. This numerical limit was confirmed by modern psychological experiment by G. A. Miller, “The Magic Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information,” *Psychological Review* 63 (1956): 81–97.

9. “Ita, quamlibet multa sint quorum meminisse oporteat, fiunt singula conexas quodam choro [ne erre]nt coniungentes prioribus consequentia”; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 11.2.20; cf. 11.2.37–38, where similar advice is given. In this essay, I have cited the Latin edition of Michael Winterbottom for Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Oxford: University Press, 1970), except in this instance, a notorious crux, where I have given the reading of the corrected fifteenth-century manuscripts. See Russell’s note to his translation of this passage.

10. One should recall that *meditatio* was the word used in Latin rhetorical treatises for the stages of composition: see, for example, Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* 10.6. “Premeditation” of one’s subject matters was considered essential to successful oratory, and Quintilian notes that it depends entirely on the strength of one’s memory. I have discussed at length some of the ways in which rhetorical training and early meditative practices influenced one another in *Craft of Thought*.

11. “Memoria est firma animi rerum ac verborum ad inventionem perceptio”; Julius Victor, *Ars rhetorica*, cap. 23, in *Rhetores latini minores*, ed. Carolus Halm (Leipzig: Teubner, 1863), 440.

12. *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, s.v. *lego*² and *A Greek-English Lexicon*, s.v. “λεγω.”

13. I have discussed examples of all these organizing figures in *Craft of Thought*; they include works by Hugh of St. Victor (Noah’s Ark), Bede (the Temple of Solomon), Gregory the Great (Ezekiel’s Temple), Richard of St. Victor and Adam of Dryburgh (the Tabernacle), and a number of monastic writers who wrote about the “orchards” and “gardens” of the soul. One example particularly stands out. Richard of Fournival (d. about 1260), a canon of the cathedral at Amiens, discussed a reading curriculum or library, organizing his topics as a garden of books arranged as though they were planted in beds (see *Craft of Thought*, 273–74). Several of these figures are described and explained in the medieval works translated in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, eds., *Medieval Craft of Memory*.

14. For further discussion of this treatise, together with a translation of the text, see Carruthers and Ziolkowski, eds., *Medieval Craft of Memory*, 83–102. On the development of the diagram itself, see Lucy Freeman Sandler, *The Psalter of Robert de Lisle in the British Library* (London: Harvey Miller, 1983). The evident use of the diagram in his preaching by San Bernardino da Siena is demonstrated by Bolzoni, *Web of Images*, 119–35.

15. On the development of the glossed book format in Paris and an assessment of this manuscript, see Christopher F. R. De Hamel, *Glossed Books of the Bible and the Origins of the Paris Booktrade* (London: Boydell and Brewer, 1984).

16. I have relied on the account of Ockham’s life and writings by Jürgen Miethke, *Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969).

17. All citations are from Ockham’s *Dialogus de imperio et pontificia potestate*; for the Latin texts, see Miethke, *Ockhams Weg*, 121–25, and Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 196–99, and their respective notes. There is no modern edition of Ockham’s *Dialogus*; I used the 1494 edition of Badius, printed by Treschel in Lyons (facsimile, London: Gregg Press, 1962).

18. Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 196–97.

19. There are a number of good accounts of Wyclif’s life and thought, including Anthony J. P. Kenny, *Wyclif* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), and Anne Hudson, *The Premature Reformation: Wycliffite Texts and Lollard History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).

20. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, 11.2.32; the translation is Russell’s for the Loeb Classical Library.

21. See Harry Caplan, *Of Eloquence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), 196–246, and Jocelyn P. Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind* (London: Routledge, 1997). This persistent feature is perhaps related to the physiology of human sight, for the eye does not see continuously but in “jumps,” or saccades, a function of changes in gaze and focus controlled not in the eye but in the

brain; see Alain Berthoz, *The Brain's Sense of Movement*, trans. Giselle Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, orig. 1997).

22. From Hugh of St. Victor's preface to a chronicle of Biblical history, quoted from my translation in *Medieval Craft of Memory*, 38.

23. My translation from Jacques Legrand, *Archiloge sophie*, ed. Evencio Beltran (Paris: Champion, 1986), 145.

24. *Institutio oratoria* 11.2.32. In Carruthers, *Book of Memory*, 342. It is not possible that Hugh knew Quintilian's text directly, a fact that underscores both the longevity of ancient pedagogy and the importance of practical technique, rather than written sources only, in accounting for its survival and adaptations.

25. Quotations from Bernardo Gui, "The Life of St. Thomas Aquinas," chapters 15–16 and 32, translated in Kenelm Foster, ed., *Biographical Documents for the Life of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Blackfriars, 1949), 50–51, 37.

26. Dante Alighieri, *Vita nuova*, 1.1 (my translation from the edition of Domenico de Robertis [Milan: Ricciardi, 1980]). Dante's remark about words written in his memory "under larger paraps" is at the end of section 2.10. Paraps mark major divisions in medieval manuscripts but do not necessarily correspond to what we now call paragraphs.

2. The Reformation of Memory in Early Modern Europe

Peter Sherlock

1. *The Triumphs of Petrarch*, trans. Ernest Hatch Wilkins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 110.

2. Kerwin Lee Klein, "On the Emergence of *Memory* in Historical Discourse," *Representations* 69 (2000): 127–50.

3. For a brief review of the evolution of the word *mémoire* in a French context, see Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992; orig. 1977), 84–85.

4. Quoted in Frances Yates, *The Art of Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 133.

5. *Ibid.*, passim; Patrick Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1993), 29–32.

6. Daniel Woolf, *The Social Circulation of the Past: English Historical Culture 1500–1730* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 267–71.

7. Yates, *Art of Memory*, 131–34.

8. "Atque indicia de Interpretatione Naturae complectuntur partes in genere duas; primam, de educendis aut excitandis Axiomatibus ab Experientia; secundam, de deducendis aut derivandis Experimenis novis ab Axiomatibus. Prior autem trifariam dividitur; in tres nempe Ministrationes; Ministrationem ad sensum; Ministrationem ad Memoriam; & Ministrationem ad Mentem, sive Rationem"; Francis Bacon, *Novum organum* (London, 1620), 165, aphorism X.

9. This is not to deny the significance of eighteenth-century thinkers such as the Neapolitan historian Giambattista Vico, who did indeed understand memory, not reason, as the locus of interpretation, whereby humans linked and made sense of both past and present. See Hutton, *History as an Art of Memory*, 32–51.

10. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 56–59.

11. David Owens, "A Lockean Theory of Memory Experience," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 56 (1996): 319–32.
12. Timothy Reiss, "Denying the Body? Memory and the Dilemmas of History in Descartes," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 57 (1996): 587–607.
13. Diarmaid MacCulloch, *The Reformation* (New York: Viking, 2004), 531–32.
14. Stuart Clark, *Thinking with Demons: The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 403–7.
15. David Loades, ed., *John Foxe and the English Reformation* (Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar Press, 1997). Foxe's memory-making was so effective, it is really only in the last two decades that his creativity in weaving a narrative and his diligence in research has been unpicked and understood by David Loades, Tom Freeman, and all those associated with the John Foxe Project at the University of Sheffield. For further information, see <http://www.hrionline.ac.uk/foxe/index.html> (accessed March 31, 2006).
16. Eamon Duffy, *The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400–1580* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992), 412 and pl. 131–32, 136.
17. MacCulloch, *Reformation*, 201.
18. Quoted in Lee Palmer Wandel, *Always Among Us: Images of the Poor in Zwingli's Zurich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
19. Jonathan Finch, "A Reformation of Meaning: Commemoration and Remembering the Dead in the Parish Church, 1450–1640" in *The Archaeology of Reformation 1480–1580*, ed. David Gaimster and Roberta Gilchrist (Leeds: Maney, 2003), 442. See also Jacques Le Goff, *The Birth of Purgatory*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984).
20. Craig Koslofsky, *The Reformation of the Dead: Death and Ritual in Early Modern Germany* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1999), 19–39.
21. Susan Karant-Nunn, *The Reformation of Ritual: An Interpretation of Early Modern Germany* (London: Routledge, 1997), 149.
22. On Lutheran funeral ritual, see Koslofsky, *Reformation of the Dead*, 81–114. For English funerals and funeral sermons, see Ralph Houlbrooke, *Death, Religion, and the Family in England, 1480–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 255–330.
23. Carlos Eire, *From Madrid to Purgatory: The Art and Craft of Dying in Sixteenth-Century Spain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 529–30.
24. I am indebted for these observations to conversations with Charles Zika. For comments on these in an English context, especially the phenomenon of ghosts in post-Reformation England, see Peter Marshall, *Beliefs and the Dead in Reformation England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
25. These phrases are taken from William Dugdale, *The Antiquities of Warwickshire* (London, 1656), 349, and John Thorpe, *Registrum Roffense* (London, 1769), 1034.
26. John Bridges, *The History and Antiquities of Northamptonshire*, ed. P. Whalley, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1791), 1:67–68.
27. On brasses and the Reformation, see Richard Rex, "Monumental Brasses and the Reformation," *Transactions of the Monumental Brass Society* 14 (1990): 376–94.
28. Andrew Butterfield, "Monument and Memory in Early Renaissance Florence" in *Art, Memory, and Family in Renaissance Florence*, ed. Giovanni Ciapelli and Patricia Lee Rubin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 135–60.
29. Sharon Strocchia, *Death and Ritual in Renaissance Florence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 115–20.

30. For insights into Petrarch's significance and the idea of "future memory," I am indebted to Elise Grosser at the University of Melbourne. We await her forthcoming PhD thesis on Renaissance conceptions of fame.
31. Peter Burke, *The Renaissance Sense of the Past* (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), 55–58.
32. An extraordinary example of this is Thomas Lyte's genealogical chart presented to King James following his accession, now housed in London, British Library Additional MS 48343.
33. See for example John Weever's condemnation of Polydore Vergil in his *Ancient Funerall Monuments* (London, 1631), 298.
34. James Grubb, "Memory and Identity: Why Venetians Didn't Keep *Ricordanze*," *Renaissance Studies* 8, 1994, pp.375–87.
35. Lawrence Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558–1641* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965); Felicity Heal and Clive Holmes, *The Gentry in England and Wales 1500–1700* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1994).
36. Graham Parry, *The Trophies of Time: English Antiquarians of the Seventeenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
37. *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, s.v. "Lydiat, Thomas (1572–1646)" (by Peter Sherlock), <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/17239> (accessed March 31, 2006).
38. Charles Zika, "The Reformation Jubilee of 1617: Appropriating the Past through Centenary Celebration," in his *Exorcising Our Demons: Magic, Witchcraft, and Visual Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 197–236.
39. *Ibid.*, 211.
40. David Cressy, "National Memory in Early Modern England," in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 61–73; David Cressy, *Bonfires and Bells: National Memory and the Protestant Calendar in Elizabethan and Stuart England* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989).
41. Peter Burke, "History as Social Memory," in *Memory: History, Culture and the Mind*, ed. Thomas Butler (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 97–114:109.
42. Le Goff, *History and Memory*.

3. Memory, Temporality, Modernity: *Les lieux de mémoire*

Bill Schwarz

With thanks to Susannah Radstone.

1. Marc Bloch, *Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940*, trans. Gerard Hopkins (New York: Norton, 1999), 118.
2. D. H. Lawrence, *Women in Love* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1971), 460, 8.
3. Andreas Huyssen, *Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia* (London: Routledge, 1995).
4. Nicholas Dirks, "History as a Sign of the Modern" *Public Culture* 2.2 (1990): 25–32.
5. For an extended discussion, Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, trans. Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), and, for the specifically French case, Matt Matsuda, *The Memory of the Modern*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). I should add that I don't address here the vast analytical literature on the Holocaust, which Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer review in Chapter 26.
6. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" in Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1973), 263. And see Bill Schwarz, "'Already

the Past': Memory and Historical Time," in *Regimes of Memory*, ed. Susannah Radstone and Katharine Hodgkin (London: Routledge, 2003), republished as *Memory Cultures: Memory, Subjectivity and Recognition* (Somerset, N.J.: Transaction, 2006).

7. J. H. Plumb, *The Death of the Past* (London: Macmillan, 1969), 11–17, 26, 102, 24.
8. Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 3.
9. Carl Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), xvii, xix.
10. *Ibid.*, xxiii.
11. Carl Schorske, *Thinking with History: Explorations in the Passage to Modernism*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3–4.
12. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*, xxxiv.
13. Richard Terdiman, *Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
14. Pierre Nora, ed., *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past*, ed. Lawrence D. Krutzman, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996–98); and *Rethinking France: Les lieux de mémoire*, trans. Mary Trouille and David P. Jordan, vol. 1–4 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001–2010).
15. Perry Anderson, "Dégringolade," *London Review of Books*, September 2, 2004, and "Union Sucrée," *London Review of Books*, September 23, 2004. The French translation—*La pensée tiède: Un regard critique sur la culture française*, trans. William Oliver Desmond (Paris: Seuil, 2005)—carries a response from Pierre Nora, "La pensée réchauffée," which, in biting prose, principally takes issue with Anderson's contention that *Les lieux de mémoire* was unequivocally ideological in intent, but doesn't stop there.
16. See Eric Hobsbawm, "Age of Extremes Defies French Censors," *Le Monde diplomatique* (English edition), December 1999; and for Nora's defense, "La pensée réchauffée."
17. The most helpful of these I've found to be Nancy Wood, *Vectors of Memory: Legacies of Trauma in Postwar Europe* (New York: Berg, 1999), chap. 1; and Peter Carrier, "Places, Politics and the Archiving of Contemporary Memory in Pierre Nora's *Les lieux de mémoire*," in *Memory and Methodology*, ed. Susannah Radstone (New York: Berg, 2000).
18. In what follows I will be concentrating only on Nora's own contributions to the various volumes.
19. Pierre Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History," in *Realms of Memory*, 1:9.
20. Pierre Nora, "Introduction," in *Realms of Memory*, 3:x.
21. Pierre Nora, "General Introduction," in *Rethinking France*, 1:x.
22. Pierre Nora, "The Era of Commemoration," in *Realms of Memory*, 3:614, 3:631.
23. *Ibid.*, 3:609–37.
24. Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History," in *Realms of Memory*, 1:1.
25. *Ibid.*, 1:2 and 1:7.
26. Pierre Nora, "The Reasons for the Current Upsurge in Memory," *Transit* 22 (2002), <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2002-04-19-nora-en.html> (accessed online July 4, 2007).
27. Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History," in *Realms of Memory*, 1:7, 1:15.
28. *Ibid.*, 1:7.
29. Nora, "General Introduction," in *Rethinking France*, 1:xiv.
30. Nora, "The Era of Commemoration," in *Realms of Memory*, 3:614.
31. Nora, "General Introduction: Between Memory and History," in *Realms of Memory*, 1:6.
32. *Ibid.*, 1:5.

33. Ibid., 1:1. Indeed, Nora is keen to emphasize that the slow collapse of rural society explains the theorizations of Bergson, Freud, and Proust: “The disintegration of the traditional French image of memory as something rooted in the soil and the sudden emergence of memory as something central to individual identity were like two sides of a single coin, as well as the beginning of a process that has today reached an explosive stage.” Ibid., 1:11.
34. Ibid., 1:2.
35. Nora, “Current Upsurge in Memory.”
36. Nora, “General Introduction,” in *Rethinking France*, 1:xi.
37. Ibid., 1:xi.
38. Ibid., 1:xii; and François Furet, *Interpreting the French Revolution*, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; orig. 1978).
39. Nora, “General Introduction,” in *Rethinking France*, 1:xiv.
40. Nora, “The Era of Commemoration,” in *Realms of Memory*, 3:611; and see Pierre Nora, “Generation” in Nora, *Realms of Memory*, 1:498–531, which offered him the excuse to malign the *soixante-huitards*.
41. Nora, “General Introduction,” in *Rethinking France*, 1:xvii.
42. Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History,” in *Realms of Memory*, 1:13.
43. Nora, “General Introduction,” in *Rethinking France*, 1:xviii.
44. Ibid., 1:xvii; and for Proust, Nora, “General Introduction: Between Memory and History,” in *Realms of Memory*, 1:20.
45. Pierre Nora, “From *lieux de mémoire* to Realms of Memory: Preface to the English-Language Edition,” in Nora, *Realms of Memory*, 1:xxi, 1:xxiv.
46. Pierre Nora, “Gaullists and Communists,” in Nora, *Realms of Memory*, 1:205–40.

4. Bergson on Memory

Keith Ansell-Pearson

1. Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, ed. James Strachey (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1976), 770ff.; in an essay of 1922 Bergson writes, “My idea of integral conservation of the past more and more found its empirical verification in the vast collection of experiments instituted by the disciples of Freud.” Bergson, *The Creative Mind*, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, and Co., 1965), 75.
2. Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbera Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), chap. 3.
3. Sebastian Gardner, “The Unconscious Mind,” in *The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1945*, ed. Thomas Baldwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 112.
4. Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 222.
5. Jean Hyppolite, “Various Aspects of Memory in Bergson” (1949), trans. Athena V. Colman, in Leonard Lawlor, *The Challenge of Bergsonism* (London: Continuum Press, 2003), 112–27.
6. Ibid., 223.
7. Ibid., 151–52.
8. This is very much in line with how neuroscientists frame consciousness today: “Consciousness reflects the ability to make distinctions or discriminations among huge sets of alternatives.” Gerald M. Edelman, *Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenological Gift of Consciousness* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), 141.

9. Hyppolite, "Various Aspects of Memory," 113–14.
10. Henri Bergson, *Mind-Energy*, trans. H. Wildon Carr (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), 8. This volume of essays now exists as a critically annotated edition published by Palgrave Macmillan (2007).
11. Edward S. Casey, *Remembering* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 310.
12. For insight into Bergson's theory of images see Jean-Paul Sartre, *Imagination*, trans. Forrest Williams (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962, orig. 1936); and more recently, F. C. T. Moore, *Bergson: Thinking Backwards* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Edward S. Casey, "Image and Memory in Bachelard and Bergson," in *Spirit and Soul: Essays in Philosophical Psychology*, 2nd ed. (Putnam, Conn.: Spring Publications, 2004), 101–17.
13. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 33.
14. *Ibid.*, 73.
15. *Ibid.*, 79.
16. Patrick McNamara, *Mind and Variability: Mental Darwinism, Memory, and Self* (London: Praeger, 1999), 37.
17. *Ibid.*, 38.
18. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 84.
19. *Ibid.*, 95.
20. *Ibid.*, 101.
21. *Ibid.*, 148.
22. *Ibid.*, 127.
23. *Ibid.*, 106.
24. *Ibid.*, 170.
25. *Ibid.*, 171.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Bergson, *Mind-Energy*, 160–61.
28. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 135.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Bergson, *Mind-Energy*, 165.
31. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 139.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. Bergson, *Mind-Energy*, 160.
35. *Ibid.*, 175.
36. *Ibid.*, 177.
37. *Ibid.*, 151.
38. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 133–34.
39. *Ibid.*, 135.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, 166.
42. *Ibid.*, 165.
43. *Ibid.*, 165–66.
44. For a critique of Hume's early associationist account of memory, see H. O. Mounce, *Hume's Naturalism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 30; cf. Gilles Deleuze, *Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory of Human Nature*, trans. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 93ff.; and John Biro, "Hume's New Science of the Mind," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hume*, ed. David Fate Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 50.

45. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 149.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., 150.
48. Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 54.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 117.
51. See Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness*, ed. Martin Heidegger, trans. James S. Churchill, based on lecture courses 1893–1917 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964); Husserl, *Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1973); and see the remark Deleuze makes on Bergson's relation to Husserl's phenomenology in the afterword to the English translation of his *Bergsonism*. 115–18.
52. Emmanuel Levinas, *Time and the Other*, trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1989, orig. 1945); Merleau-Ponty, *The Incarnate Subject: Malebranche, Biran, and Bergson on the Union of Body and Soul*, trans. Paul B. Milan, lecture course given at the Ecole Normale Supérieure, 1947–48 (New York: Humanity Books, 2001); Jean-Paul Sartre, *Imagination; Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (London and New York: Routledge, 1989).
53. Merleau-Ponty, *Incarnate Subject*, 89–90, Sartre, *Imagination*, 39–40.
54. Jean-François Lyotard, *Phenomenology*, trans. Brian Beakley (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991).
55. See, for example, Ann Game, *Undoing the Social: Towards a Deconstructive Sociology* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991).
56. Emmanuel Levinas, "Beyond Intentionality," in *Philosophy in France Today*, ed. Alan Montefiore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Hyppolite, "Various Aspects of Memory," 121–25.
57. Levinas, *Time and the Other*, p. 132.
58. Walter Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Collins, 1973), 159.
59. Ibid., 186.
60. Max Horkheimer, "On Bergson's Metaphysics of Time," trans. Peter Thomas, *Radical Philosophy* 131 (2005): 9–20 (originally published as "Zu Bergsons Metaphysik der Zeit," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* 3 (1934): 321–43); on Bergson and the idea of "historical duration" see also Hyppolite, "Various Aspects of Memory," 114.
61. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: Continuum Press, 1989), 82–83.
62. Oliver Sacks, *A Leg to Stand On* (London: Picador, 1991), 178.
63. Patrick McNamara, *Mind and Variability*, 23.
64. Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 430–31.
65. Ibid., 440.
66. Ibid.

5. Halbwachs and the Social Properties of Memory

Erika Apfelbaum

1. Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994, orig. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1925). In general, quotations are from *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A.

Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), but as the English edition is abridged, some passages are translated from the French original.

2. Maurice Halbwachs, *La mémoire collective* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950).
3. See J. Israel and H. Tajfel, eds., *The Context of Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment* (London: Academic Press, 1972); and Erika Apfelbaum, "Some Teachings from the History of Social Psychology," *Canadian Psychology* 33 (1992): 529–38.
4. See L. Muchielli, "Maurice Halbwachs et les sciences sociales de son temps," *Revue d'histoire des sciences sociales* (1999): 103–40; and J. C. Marcel and L. Muchielli, "Un fondement du lien social: La mémoire collective selon Maurice Halbwachs; Technologies, idéologies, pratiques," *Revue d'anthropologie des connaissances* 13.2 (1998): 63–88.
5. Pierre Nora, "Faire de l'histoire les nouveaux objets," in *Faire de l'histoire*, ed. Jacques Le Goff et al., (Paris: Gallimard Bibliothèque des histoires, 1974).
6. J.-M. Alexandre, "Maurice Halbwachs (1887–1945)," in Halbwachs, *La mémoire collective*, second edition (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952).
7. Erika Apfelbaum, "Origines de la psychologie sociale en France: Développements souterrains et discipline méconnue," *Revue Française de sociologie* 22 (1981): 397–408.
8. A. Becker, *Maurice Halbwachs: Un intellectuel en guerres mondiales 1914–1945* (Paris: Vientot, 2003).
9. See Gabriel Tarde, *Les crimes des foules: Troisième congrès international d'anthropologie criminelle; Biologie et Sociologie* (Brussels: F. Hayez, 1892), 63–88; and Gustave Le Bon, *La psychologie des foules* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1895); see also Erika Apfelbaum, "Désordre individuel et désordre social," *Hermès* 6–7 (1990): 35–42.
10. Apfelbaum, "Désordre individuel et désordre social."
11. Jorge Semprún, *L'écriture ou la vie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994).
12. See Erika Apfelbaum, "Some Teachings from the History of Social Psychology," *Canadian Psychology* 33 (1992): 529–38.
13. Erika Apfelbaum, "And Now What, after Such Tribulations? Memory and Dislocation in the Era of Uprooting," *American Psychologist* 55 (2000): 1008–13.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 182.
16. *Ibid.*, 182–83.
17. *Ibid.*, 37.
18. *Ibid.*, 38.
19. Apfelbaum, "Désordre individuel et désordre social," 35.
20. Apfelbaum, "Origines de la psychologie sociale."
21. See Tarde, *Les crimes des foules*.
22. Guy Saunders, "Holding and Moving: Articulating Psychology and the Visual Arts," paper for the Conference of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology, Sydney, Australia, April 25–28, 1999.
23. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 38.
24. *Ibid.*, 183.
25. Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux*, 38–39.
26. Erika Apfelbaum and Ana Vasquez, "Les réalités changeantes de l'identité," *Peuples méditerranéens* 24 (1984): 83–100.
27. Luis Vargas, *Le Monde*, December 11, 1998.
28. Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux*, 126.
29. Quoted in A. Wieworka, *L'ère du témoin* (Paris: Plon, 1998).
30. Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 67.

31. Halbwachs, *La mémoire collective*, 167.
32. Dori Laub, "Truth and Testimony: The Process and the Struggle," in *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 69.
33. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 173.
34. Boubacar Boris Diop, *Murambi: Le livre des ossements* (Paris: Stock, 2000).
35. Semprún, *L'écriture ou la vie*.
36. Cathy Caruth, "An Interview with Robert Jay Lifton," in *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 128–50.
37. Romain Gary, *Promise at Dawn*, trans. John Markham Beach (New York: New Directions, 1961).
38. Hannah Arendt, "Seule demeure la langue maternelle," in *La tradition cachée*, ed. Hannah Arendt (Paris: Christian Bourgeois, 1987, orig. 1964), 221–56; Eva Hoffman, *Lost in Translation* (London: Penguin, 1989); Erika Apfelbaum, "The Impact of Culture in the Face of Genocide: Struggling Between a Silenced Home Culture and a Foreign Host Culture," in *Culture in Psychology*, ed. C. Squire (London: Routledge, 2000), 163–74.
39. Apfelbaum, "And Now What, after Such Tribulations?" 1010.
40. Erika Apfelbaum, "Restoring Lives Shattered by Collective Violence: The Role of Official Public Narratives in the Process of Memorialising," in *Telling Wounds: Narrative, Trauma and Memory; Working Through the South African Armed Conflicts of the 20th Century*, ed. C. van der Merwe and R. Wolfwinkel (Stellenbosch, South Africa: Van Schaik, 2002), 9–20.
41. Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux*, 89. The passage appears in truncated form in Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 47.
42. Erika Apfelbaum, "The Dread: An Essay on Communication Across Cultural Boundaries," in "Under the Covers: Theorising the Politics of Counter Stories," special number of *International Journal of Critical Psychology* 4 (2001): 19–35.
43. Zahia Rahmani, *Musulman* (Paris: Sabine Wespieser, 2005).
44. Apfelbaum, "Restoring Lives Shattered by Collective Violence."
45. Maurice Halbwachs, *Les cadres sociaux*, 135.
46. Ruti Teitel, *Transitional Justice* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000).
47. Maurice Halbwachs, *La topographie légendaire des Évangiles en Terre sainte: Étude de mémoire collective* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1971, orig. 1942). The conclusion of this text appears in translation as "The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land," in Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 193–235.
48. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 172–73.

6. Memory in Freud

Richard Terdiman

NOTE: Some of the material in this essay is drawn from Richard Terdiman, *Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), chapters 7 and 8. More detail on many of the points raised can be found there.

1. Unless otherwise indicated, quotations from Freud are taken from *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, et al., 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–74), hereafter abbreviated SE. The passage cited is from Freud's *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895), SE 1:299.

2. Freud's most thoughtful reflections on the analytic situation as a system of *two* will be found in "Constructions in Analysis" (1937), *SE* 23:257–69.

3. See *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1901), *SE* 6:143–44 and Peter Gay, *Freud: A Life for Our Time* (New York: Anchor, 1988), 126–27 and n. See also Freud, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (1937), *SE* 23:245.

4. It was Signorelli. *SE* 3:290ff.; cf. *SE* 6:2ff. Sebastiano Timpanaro's analysis of Freud's analysis of this lapse is a classic of anti-Freudian critique; see *The Freudian Slip: Psychoanalysis and Textual Criticism*, trans. Kate Soper (London: NLB, 1975), chap. 6.

5. Freud repeated this doctrine concerning the cause of hysteria regularly throughout his career, even as late as "Constructions in Analysis" (1937; *SE* 23:268).

6. Consider this passage from the "Dora" case where Freud comments on how easy it proves to understand what patients want to keep hidden and yet almost obsessively betray: "He that has eyes to see and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he chatters with his finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore" ("Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" [1905], *SE* 7:77–78).

7. For the image, see David Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 252.

8. In Freud's period this debate took the form of an argument over what neurologists termed "localization," the argument that specific memory storage locations could be mapped within the brain. Freud was opposed to such literalist notions. Psychoanalytic interpretation supposes an unconstrainable *variability* and *mutability* of psychic representations. Any doctrine that tends to normalize such representations, or subject them to a criterion of simple fidelity to preexisting contents, would inevitably have impoverished such a theory to the point of abolishing its field altogether. The effect would have been to undermine Freud's concept of memories as *representations* and turn them into nothing more than *reproductions*.

9. For an account of Freud's reasons for abandoning the seduction theory, see William McGrath, *Freud's Discovery of Psychoanalysis: The Politics of Hysteria* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), chaps. 4–6. In 1924, Freud republished "The Aetiology of Hysteria" (originally published in 1896) which summarized his "seduction theory." Upon the article's republication, he added the following note to his wrenching description of the pain that accompanied his psychoanalytic patient's recollection of infantile sexual abuse: "All this [the emotion patients experienced in recounting these memories] is true, but it must be remembered that at the time I wrote it I had not yet freed myself from my *overvaluation* of reality and my *low valuation* of phantasy" (Freud's emphasis; *SE* 3:204 n. 1).

10. For Freud, consciousness itself has *no* capacity for the retention of anything. "Our memories—not excepting those which are the most deeply stamped on our minds—are in themselves unconscious" (*Interpretation of Dreams* [1900]; *SE* 5:539). "Becoming conscious and leaving behind a memory-trace are processes incompatible with each other" (*Beyond the Pleasure Principle* [1920]; *SE* 18:25).

11. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), Freud introduced the abbreviations *Ucs*, *Cs*., *Pcs*., etc. to designate the parts of the psyche—the unconscious, consciousness, the preconscious respectively; see *SE* 5:540ff.

12. For numerous other statements dating between 1900 and 1937 of Freud's undeviating position on this point, see Terdiman, *Present Past*, 274–76.

13. Derrida, "Freud and the Scene of Writing," in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 210.

14. See particularly Élisabeth Roudinesco, *Jacques Lacan & Co.: A History of Psychoanalysis in France*, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

15. Paul Ricoeur termed this fundamental hermeneutic attitude “suspicion.” See *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1970), 33. Freud himself wrote that “psychoanalysis is justly suspicious”; *Interpretation of Dreams* (1900; SE 5:517).

16. In his attack on Freudianism, Ludwig Wittgenstein posed the same problem: “This procedure of free association and so on is queer, because Freud never shows how we know where to stop—where is the right solution. Sometimes he says that the right solution, or the right analysis, is the one which satisfies the patient. Sometimes he says that the doctor knows what the right solution or analysis of the dream is whereas the patient doesn’t: the doctor can say that the patient is wrong”; “Conversations on Freud: Excerpt from 1932–33 Lectures,” in *Philosophical Essays on Freud*, ed. Richard Wollheim and James Hopkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 1. From the beginning of his career Freud struggled with this difficulty. In 1897 he wrote somewhat defensively to Fliess, “All this is not entirely arbitrary.” Dec. 22, 1897; *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887–1904*, trans. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 288; cf. SE 1:273.

17. For more analysis of these points, see Terdiman, *Present Past*, 331–38.

18. The question arose as early as *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), and Freud’s response had been unequivocal: “It is in fact never possible to be sure that a dream has been completely interpreted” (SE 4:279). It recurred in the *Three Essays on Sexuality* (1905): “It is not always possible to trace the course of . . . connections with certainty” (SE 7:155). In “‘Wild’ Psycho-Analysis” (1910) he says this: “One may sometimes make a wrong surmise, and one is never in a position to discover the whole truth” (SE 11:226). And finally, in “Constructions in Analysis” (1937), he acknowledges that “every . . . construction is an incomplete one” (SE 23:263).

7. Proust: The Music of Memory

Michael Wood

1. “Le souvenir n’est pas inventif.” Marcel Proust, *À la recherche du temps perdu* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987–89), 4:135; Proust, *The Fugitive*, trans. Peter Collier (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 2002), 520. Collier translates *inventif* as “creative.”

2. “Et personne ne saura jamais, pas même soi-même, l’air qui vous poursuivait de son rythme insaisissable et délicieux.” Marcel Proust, *Contre Sainte-Beuve* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 312; Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve and Other Essays*, trans. John Sturrock (London: Penguin, 1988), 102.

3. *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 865.

4. Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve*, 101–2; *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 312.

5. Marcel Proust, *The Way By Swann’s*, trans. Lydia Davis (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 2002), 185; Proust, *À la recherche*, 1:182.

6. Georges Poulet, *L’Espace proustien* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), 133.

7. See Elizabeth Jackson, *L’évolution de la mémoire involontaire dans l’oeuvre de Marcel Proust* (Paris: Nizet, 1966); and Samuel Beckett, *Proust* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1931), 17: “A man with a good memory does not remember anything because he does not forget anything.”

8. See, for example, Roger Shattuck, *Proust’s Binoculars* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1964), 37; Joyce N. Megay, *Bergson et Proust* (Paris: Vrin, 1976), 91.

9. Malcolm Bowie, *Proust among the Stars* (London: HarperCollins, 1998), 65: “Applying it as a key to understanding Proustian time is rather like looking at the working day from the viewpoint of weekends and holidays, or at the lives of plain-dwellers from the neighbouring mountain-tops.”

10. Walter Benjamin, "The Image of Proust," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 202.
11. Joshua Landy, *Philosophy as Fiction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 110.
12. See *Ibid.*, 7, citing Shattuck, *Marcel Proust* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), 144.
13. Marcel Proust, *Lettres* (Paris: Plon, 2004), 636, my translation.
14. "que ce n'est guère qu'aux souvenirs involontaires que l'artiste devrait demander la matière première de son oeuvre." Proust, *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 558–59.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Marcel Proust, *Jean Santeuil* (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 897–98.
17. *Ibid.*, 537.
18. Marcel Proust, *Sodom and Gomorrah*, trans. John Sturrock (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 2002), 379–80; Proust, *À la recherche*, 3:373–374.
19. Proust, *Sodom and Gomorrah*, 380–81; *À la recherche*, 3:374; translation slightly modified.
20. Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve*, 3; *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 211, 216; translation slightly modified.
21. Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve*, 8; *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 216.
22. Proust, *Fugitive* 391; *À la recherche*, 4:7.
23. Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve*, 3; *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 211; translation slightly modified.
24. Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve*, 4; *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 212.
25. Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve*, 6; *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 214.
26. Marcel Proust, *Finding Time Again*, trans. Ian Patterson (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 2002), 195; Proust, *À la recherche*, 4:465.
27. Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve*, 6; *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 214.
28. Marcel Proust, *In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower*, trans. James Grieve (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 2002), 298–99; Proust, *À la recherche*, 2:78–79.
29. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 189; *À la recherche*, 4:459.
30. Proust, *Way by Swann's*, 47–50; *À la recherche*, 1:44–47.
31. Proust, *Way by Swann's*, 47; *À la recherche*, 1:44.
32. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 176; *À la recherche*, 4:447.
33. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 176, 174; *À la recherche*, 4:447, 4:445; translation slightly modified.
34. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 185; *À la recherche*, 4:456.
35. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 175; *À la recherche*, 4:445.
36. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 186; *À la recherche*, 4:456–57.
37. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 181; *À la recherche*, 4:451.
38. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 183; *À la recherche*, 4:454.
39. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 229; *À la recherche*, 4:499.
40. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 358; *À la recherche*, 4:625.
41. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 192, 191; *À la recherche*, 4:462, 4:461.
42. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 192; *À la recherche*, 4:462–63.
43. Proust, *Finding Time Again*, 191–92; *À la recherche*, 4:461–62.
44. Proust, *Sodom and Gomorrah*, 158; *À la recherche*, 3:153.
45. Proust, *Sodom and Gomorrah*, 159; *À la recherche*, 3:153–54.
46. Proust, *Sodom and Gomorrah*, 161, 162; *À la recherche*, 3:156, 3:157.
47. Proust, *Sodom and Gomorrah*, 160, 161; *À la recherche*, 3:155, 3:156.
48. Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve*, 5; *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 213.
49. Proust, *Against Sainte-Beuve*, 3; *Contre Sainte-Beuve*, 211.
50. Proust, *Way by Swann's*, 39–40; *À la recherche*, 1:36–37.

8. Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin: Memory from Weimar to Hitler Esther Leslie

1. Siegfried Kracauer, "Straße Ohne Erinnerung," in Kracauer, *Gesammelte Schriften* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2000), 170.
2. *Ibid.*, 72.
3. *Ibid.*, 73.
4. Walter Benjamin, "Experience and Poverty," in Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, ed. Michel W. Jennings, et al., 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996–2003), 2:731–35. See also the essay "Theories of German Fascism" in the same volume, 2:312–21.
5. Kracauer, "Straße Ohne Erinnerung," 172.
6. For further reflections on a veritable cult of surface in Weimar Germany, see Janet Ward, *Weimar Surfaces: Urban Visual Culture in 1920s Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).
7. Ernst Bloch, *Erbschaft dieser Zeit* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985), 33–35.
8. Siegfried Kracauer, "Photography," in Kracauer, *The Mass Ornament*, trans. Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 56.
9. *Ibid.*, 48
10. *Ibid.*, 49.
11. *Ibid.*, 54.
12. *Ibid.*, 49–50.
13. *Ibid.*, 50.
14. *Ibid.*, 57.
15. *Ibid.*, 59.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, 56.
18. *Ibid.*, 62.
19. Some vignettes included in *Berlin Childhood around 1900* appear in various versions. The version of "The Little Hunchback" referred to here appeared in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on August 12, 1933 and can be found in Walter Benjamin, *Berlin Childhood around 1900*, in Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, 3:344–413:384–85.
20. Walter Benjamin, *A Berlin Chronicle*, in Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, 2:634–35.
21. Benjamin tells this story four times in *A Berlin Chronicle* and in *Berlin Childhood around 1900*: see *A Berlin Chronicle*, 2:632–33, 2:635, and *Berlin Childhood around 1900*, 368, 389–90.
22. Walter Benjamin, "Little History of Photography" in Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, 2:507–530:512.
23. This phrase appears in the file of notes labeled "N" in Walter Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*, ed. Roy Tiedemann, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 464.
24. Benjamin, *A Berlin Chronicle*, 2:634.
25. Benjamin refers *passim* to his failure: essentially it is the inability to be assimilated into bourgeois society.
26. T. W. Adorno, "Nachwort," in Walter Benjamin, *Berliner Kindheit um neunzehnhundert* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1950), 177.
27. Benjamin, *Berlin Chronicle*, 2:602.
28. Adorno, "Nachwort," 180.

29. Quoted in Walter Benjamin, *Briefwechsel, 1933–1940* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980), 17; *The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, 1932–1940*, trans. Gary Smith and André Lefevere (New York: Schocken, 1989), 9–10.

30. See Walter Benjamin, “Aus einer kleinen Rede über Proust, an meinem vierzigsten Geburtstag gehalten” (1932), in Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 7 vols. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 2.3:1064.

31. Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, 173–74.

32. See *Ibid.*, 320.

33. Walter Benjamin, “Central Park,” in Benjamin, *Selected Writings* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 4:190.

34. *Ibid.*, 4:182.

35. Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, 211. The ellipsis covers a passage from Proust’s *À la recherche du temps perdu* about the joy of the collector who stumbles by chance upon the other half of a pair.

36. Walter Benjamin, “The Destructive Character,” in Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, 2:541–42:542.

37. Benjamin, “Experience and Poverty,” 2:734.

38. Walter Benjamin, “Commentary on Poems by Brecht,” in *Selected Writings*, 4:215–50:232–33.

39. See the editors’ notes in Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 6:799.

40. Walter Benjamin, “Paralipomena to ‘On the Concept of History,’” in *Selected Works*, 4:406.

41. Benjamin, “Paralipomena,” 4:406. The first and the last sentence here appear, etched in several languages, on the glass of Dani Karavan’s memorial to Walter Benjamin, erected in Port Bou, Spain, in 1994.

42. See Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Briefe*, 6 vols. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995–2000) 5:494–95.

43. Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, 471.

44. See Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” in Benjamin, *Selected Writings*, 4:389–400.

45. Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, 388–89.

46. See Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” 4:394.

47. This refers to Himmler’s Posen speech to SS leaders on October 4, 1943, in which, pronouncing on the extermination program, he said, “we will never speak about it publicly. . . . This is a glorious page in our history, and one that has never been written and can never be written. . . . Later perhaps we can consider whether the German people should be told about this. But I think that it is better that we—we together—carry for our people the responsibility . . . and then take the secret with us to our graves.” Quoted in Richard J. Evans, *Rereading German History, 1800–1996* (London: Routledge, 1997), 162.

48. Gretel Adorno and Walter Benjamin, *Correspondence 1930–1940* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 287.

9. Adorno on the Destruction of Memory

Brian O’Connor

1. Theodor W. Adorno, “The Meaning of Working Through the Past,” trans. Henry W. Pickford, in *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 89–103:91; Theodor W. Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, 20 vols. (Frankfurt:

Suhrkamp, 1970–80), 10.2:555–72:557. Subsequent references are taken up into the text, using the abbreviation *WTP*, with English page numbers first, followed by the German.

2. Lambert Zuidervaart considers Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason as a remembrance of nature in *Social Philosophy after Adorno* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 112–24. My contention is broader: that the idea of memory is central to the ways that Adorno deals with reification, reconciliation, and social progress. See also Andreas Huyssen, *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 122–37.

3. Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), xx; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 6:10. Subsequent references are taken up into the text, using the abbreviation *ND*, with English page numbers first, followed by the German.

4. For an account of Adorno’s development of the Hegelian model of experience see Michael Rosen, *Hegel’s Dialectic and Its Criticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 153–78, and Brian O’Connor, *Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical Rationality* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 29–37, 76–81.

5. Theodor W. Adorno, “Introduction,” in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, trans. Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976), 11; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 8:291.

6. Theodor W. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: New Left Books, 1974), §33; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 4, §33.

7. As Adorno writes: “Such a rigid and invariant basis contradicts that which experience tells us about itself, about the change that occurs constantly in the forms of experience, the more open it is, and the more it is actualized. To be incapable of this change is to be incapable of experience.” (*ND*, 388/380.)

8. Theodor W. Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” in *Prisms*, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), 32; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 10.1:27.

9. Herbert Schnädelbach, “Dialektik als Vernunftkritik: Zur Konstruktion des Rationalen bei Adorno,” in *Adorno-Konferenz 1983*, ed. Ludwig von Friedeburg and Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983), 70.

10. Theodor W. Adorno, *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 176; Adorno, *Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft” (1959)*, in Adorno, *Nachgelassene Schriften*, Part IV, vol. 4 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995), 267.

11. Adorno, *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 176; Adorno, *Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft,”* 268.

12. Adorno, *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 176; Adorno, *Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft,”* 268.

13. Adorno, *Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, 177; Adorno, *Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft,”* 269.

14. Adorno was committed to understanding this idea in as concrete a way as possible, as is evidenced by his involvement with the “studies on authority” project during his time in the United States. The outcome of this project was published as *Studies in the Authoritarian Personality*, in collaboration with Else Frenkel-Brunswick, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford (New York: Harper and Row, 1950); Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 9.1. Later, the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, of which Adorno was a key member, undertook a comprehensive, somewhat prosecutorial, and certainly controversial, study of postwar German guilt, entitled *Schuld und Abwehr (Guilt and Denial)*, in Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 9.2.

15. Theodor W. Adorno, “Culture Industry Reconsidered,” trans. Anson G. Rabinbach, in *The Adorno Reader*, ed. Brian O’Connor (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000), 36; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 10.1:343.

16. Theodor W. Adorno, "Education after Auschwitz," in *Critical Models*, 200; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 10.2:685.
17. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), 230; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 3:263.
18. Axel Honneth, *Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 57.
19. Quoted in Joseph Gabel, *False Consciousness: An Essay on Reification*, trans. Margaret A. Thompson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), 148.
20. Theodor W. Adorno, *History and Freedom*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 91; Adorno, *Zur Lehre von der Geschichte und von der Freiheit*, in Adorno, *Nachgelassene Schriften*, Part IV, vol. 13 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001), 134.
21. Christoph Demmerling, *Sprache und Verdinglichung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994), 155–56.
22. Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, trans. Robert Hullot Kentor (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 234 (italics added); Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 7:348. Subsequent references are taken up into the text, using the abbreviation AT, with English page numbers first, followed by the German.
23. See Norbert Rath, *Adornos Kritische Theorie: Vermittlungen und Vermittlungsschwierigkeiten* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1982), 84–96, for a systematic treatment of this idea.
24. Peter Uwe Hohendahl, *Prismatic Thought* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 83.
25. Theodor W. Adorno, "Arnold Schoenberg, 1874–1951," in *Prisms*, 150; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 10.1:153.
26. Christoph Menke, *The Sovereignty of Art*, trans. Neil Solomon (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), 161.
27. See Roger Foster, *Adorno: The Recovery of Experience* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007) 139–66, for a comprehensive treatment of Adorno's philosophical appropriation of Proust.
28. Theodor W. Adorno, *Notes to Literature*, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991–92), 2:316; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 11:674.
29. Adorno, *Notes to Literature*, 2:316; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 11:674.
30. Adorno, *Notes to Literature* 2:317; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 11:675.
31. Theodor W. Adorno, "Valéry Proust Museum," in *Prisms*, 181; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 10.1:189.
32. Adorno, *Notes to Literature*, 2:317; Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, 11:675. See Martin Jay, "Is Experience Still in Crisis? Reflections on a Frankfurt School Lament," in *The Cambridge Companion to Adorno*, ed. Tom Huhn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 129–49.
33. Herbert Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Enquiry into Freud* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), 140.
34. *Ibid.*, 142.

10. Acts of Memory and Mourning: Derrida and the Fictions of Anteriority Gerhard Richter

1. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Briefe*, ed. Karl Robert Mandelkow, 6 vols. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1988), 1:99. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own.
2. Jacques Derrida, "'Dialanguages,'" an interview with Anne Berger, in Derrida, *Points . . . Interviews, 1974–1994*, ed. Elisabeth Weber, trans. Peggy Kamuf et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 132–155:143–44.

3. David Farrell Krell, *The Purest of Bastards: Works of Mourning, Art, and Affirmation in the Thought of Jacques Derrida* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 146.
4. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 15 vols. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 430.
5. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, part 3, in Hegel, *Werke*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, 20 vols. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), 10:282.
6. Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), e.g., 91–92. Compare Derrida’s remarks on the question of learning how to inherit responsibly, that is, aporetically, in his reply to various critics of *Specters of Marx*, “Marx & Sons,” trans. G. M. Goshgarian, in *Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida’s Specters of Marx*, ed. Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1999), 213–69.
7. Rodolphe Gasché, *Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), 20–21.
8. Jacques Derrida, *Memoires: For Paul de Man*, revised edition, trans. Cecile Lindsay, Jonathan Culler, Eduardo Cadava, and Peggy Kamuf (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 11. Subsequent references will be given in the text, using the abbreviation *Memoires*.
9. Friedrich Hölderlin, “Die Titanen,” in Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*, ed. Michael Knaupp, 3 vols. (Munich: Hanser: 1992–93), 1:390–94:391.
10. Jacques Derrida, “Rams: Uninterrupted Dialogue—Between Two Infinities, the Poem,” in Derrida, *Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan*, ed. Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 135–63:163.
11. Derrida, “Rams,” and Derrida, “Aus den Fugen,” trans. Sigrid Vagt, in *Heiner Müller Archiv* (Berlin: Kulturstiftung der Länder, 1998), 17–18.
12. Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida, *Jacques Derrida* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
13. Jacques Derrida, “The Taste of Tears,” in Derrida, *The Work of Mourning*, ed. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 105–10:107.
14. Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, 10:282.
15. A general account of Hegel’s engagement with memory can be found in Martin Donougho, “Hegel’s Art of Memory,” in *Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger*, ed. Rebecca Comay and John McCumber (Evanston Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999), 139–59. For a nuanced reading of the distinction between the two modes of memory, *die Erinnerung* and *das Gedächtnis*, within the framework of Hegel’s system, see David Farrell Krell, “Of Pits and Pyramids: Hegel on Memory, Remembrance, and Writing,” in Krell, *Of Memory, Reminiscence, and Writing: On the Verge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 205–39. Together with Edward Casey’s far-reaching *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study*, second edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), Krell’s book also is one of the most consistently illuminating guides in the vast sea of recent studies concerning the theoretical debates over the history of Western thinking about memory, from Plato via Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke to Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, and Derrida. An important supplement is Maurice Halbwachs’s classic account, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), originally published in French in 1950, five years after the author’s death in Buchenwald.
16. Derrida’s notions of the past that has never been present, that is, the past that “is” only in the passing of the trace, should also be thought in terms of his understanding of an “absolute past,”

a past without a real past conceived as presence, in other texts, such as *Of Grammatology*. See especially David Farrell Krell's chapter on this aspect of the *Grammatology*, "Mourning Ultratranscendence," in his *The Purest of Bastards*, 103–16.

17. Martin Heidegger, *Übungen für Anfänger: Schillers Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, Wintersemester 1936/37*, transcribed by Wilhelm Hallwachs, ed. Ulrich von Bülow, with an essay by Odo Marquard (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 2005), 9.

11. Deleuze and the Overcoming of Memory

Keith Ansell-Pearson

1. Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, trans. R. Howard (London, Continuum Press, 2000), hereinafter abbreviated *PS*.

2. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* trans. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchill (London: Verso, 1994), 167.

3. Gilles Deleuze, "Boulez, Proust, and Time: 'Occupying without Counting,'" *Angelaki* 3.2 (1998): 69–74:71.

4. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. B. Massumi (London, Continuum Press, 1988), 186.

5. Deleuze, "Boulez, Proust, and Time," 71.

6. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 168.

7. Freud's *der Todestrieb* was translated into English by James Strachey not as "death drive" but as "death instinct." In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze refers to the "Freudian conception of *de l'instinct de mort*." The clue to Deleuze's choice is to be found in his definition of drives as bound excitations; this suggests that for him the death instinct is the primary movement of life because it denotes unbound energy. For further insight into this issue see Richard Boothby, *Death and Desire: Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan's Return to Freud* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 229 n. 1, 29–30, 69–70, 71–72, and 83–84. I concur with Boothby that the primary function of the death drive in Freud is not biological: "As a radical force of unbinding, the death drive must be interpreted psychologically. The death drive designates the way the bound organization of the ego is traumatized by the pressure on it of unbound instinctual energies" (84).

8. The category of forced movement comes from Aristotle and features in his treatment of different kinds of movement, natural and unnatural. See Aristotle, *The Physics* 4.8 and 8.4. Deleuze's *Proust and Signs* was first published in 1964 and then republished several times throughout the 1970s. It is the 1970 expanded edition that first includes the added segment on "The Literary Machine." A further edition of the text was published in 1976 that included at the very end a piece written in 1973, entitled "Presence and Function of Madness: The Spider."

9. For Deleuze, it is important to appreciate that the "search" is not simply bound up with an effort of recall but, as *recherche*, is to be taken in the strong sense of the term, as one would speak of "the search for truth" (*PS*, 3). This point has recently been emphasized by Roger Shattuck in *Proust's Way* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 2000), 209.

10. Deleuze holds the essences of art to be superior to those found in the sensuous signs, such as the signs of involuntary memory. See Deleuze, *PS*, 61–65. In essence, Deleuze's argument is that sensuous signs, unlike the signs of art, cannot separate themselves from external and contingent determinations. As such, they "represent only the effort of life to prepare us for art and for the final revelation of art" (*PS*, 65). See also chapter four, "Essences and the Signs of Art," (*PS*, 39–51). In

Deleuze's text, "essence" is bound up with "internal difference" and functions as a principle of individuation.

11. Marcel Proust, *Remembrance of Things Past*, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and T. Kilmartin, 3 vols. (London: Penguin, 1983), 3:902; compare also the initial reawakening of the past in 1:47–48. The work is hereinafter abbreviated *SLT*, as I have favored the more literal translation *In Search of Lost Time*.

12. Roger Shattuck translates the verb *miroiter* as "flashes back and forth" and notes that it also means "to glisten" and "to shimmer." He describes this passage as the most important one on memory in the novel, and explains the experience the narrator is describing, which is akin, Shattuck says, to a "trick" or "subterfuge," as like having "two probes in time the way we have two feet on the ground and two eyes watching space." Moreover, what "would otherwise be a meticulous analytic explanation is suddenly set in motion and brought to life by the verb *miroiter*," so that the sensation of time "becomes iridescent, like a soap bubble, like the plumage of certain birds, like an oil film on water. This enlarged double vision of the world projected in time embodies a parallax view: it provides a sense of depth resulting from a displacement of the observer." See Shattuck, *Proust's Way*, 124.

13. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: Athlone, 1989), 81.

14. On time that is neither empirical nor metaphysical but transcendental see *ibid.*, 271.

15. *SLT*, 3:1107; see Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 39, and Deleuze, "Boulez, Proust, and Time," 73.

16. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. P. Patton (London, Continuum Press: 1994) 84–85, 122 (hereinafter abbreviated *DR*); Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* 167–68.

17. On the event in Deleuze, see *What is Philosophy?*: "The event is immaterial, incorporeal, unlivable: pure *reserve*. . . . It is the event that is a meanwhile [*un entre-temps*]: the meanwhile is not part of the eternal, but neither is it part of time—it belongs to becoming. The meanwhile, the event, is always a dead time; it is there where nothing takes place, an infinite awaiting that is already infinitely past, awaiting and reserve" (156, 158).

18. See Henri Bergson, "Memory of the Present and False Recognition," in Bergson, *Mind-Energy*, trans. H. Wildon Carr (New York: Henry Holt, 1920), 134ff.

19. On the seriality and repetition of love, see Proust, *SLT*, 1:404, 1:674, 1:890, 1:955.

20. On the virtual object, see the important and precise treatment in Deleuze, *DR*, 98–103. A number of points are worth noting: first, that virtual objects are incorporated in real objects and can correspond to parts of a subject's body, to another person, and to special objects such as toys and fetishes; second, that virtual objects belong essentially to the past, in particular, the formation of the pure past (so virtual objects exist, says Deleuze, as "shreds of pure past"); third, that these peculiar kinds of objects exist only as fragments of themselves in which they are "found" only as "lost" and exist only as recovered; fourth, and perhaps most decisively, that they are implicated in the amorous game and play of repetition. This means that Thanatos is immanent to the movements of repetition and to the displacement and disguise of the virtual object.

21. Samuel Beckett, *Proust* (London: John Calder, 1999, orig. 1931).

22. Georges Bataille, "Digression on Marcel Proust and Poetry," in Bataille, *Inner Experience*, trans. L. A. Boldt (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988).

23. Julia Kristeva, *Time and Sense: Proust and the Experience of Literature*, trans. R. Guberman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

24. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 272.

25. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. Robert Hurley et. al. (London: Continuum Press, 1984), 43, 318.

26. Ibid., 129.
27. Ibid., 333.
28. Ibid., 330.
29. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 115.
30. Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), 155.
31. Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, trans. G. Collins (London: Verso, 1997), viii.

12. Memory and the Unconscious

Roger Kennedy

1. Sigmund Freud, "The Aetiology of Hysteria" (1896), in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, et al., 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953–74), 3:191–221:204. This edition will hereinafter be abbreviated *SE*.
2. Ibid., 212.
3. W. R. Bion, *Attention and Interpretation* (London: Tavistock, 1970), 26ff.
4. Roger Kennedy, *Psychoanalysis, History and Subjectivity* (London: Routledge, 2002).
5. Jean Laplanche, *Essays on Otherness*, ed. J. Fletcher (London: Routledge, 1999), 148.
6. Joseph. Breuer and Sigmund Freud, *Studies in Hysteria* (1895), in *SE 2:9*.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., 221.
9. Ibid., 162.
10. Sigmund Freud, "Fragments from an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria" (1905) in *SE 7:1–122:18*.
11. Sigmund Freud, "Constructions in Analysis" (1937), in *SE 23:255–70:257–58*.
12. Ibid., 259.
13. Ibid., 260.
14. Laplanche, *Essays on Otherness*, 151.
15. Freud, "Constructions in Analysis," 265.
16. Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism* (1939), in *SE 23:3–140:129*.
17. Sigmund Freud, *The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess*, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Masson, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 207.
18. Sigmund Freud, "Screen Memories" (1899), in *SE 3:300–322:322*.
19. Sigmund Freud, "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (1918), in *SE 17:3–124:45n*.
20. "The Greening of Psychoanalysis: André Green in Dialogues with Gregorio Kohon," in *The Dead Mother: The Work of André Green*, ed., Gregorio Kohon, (London: Routledge, 1999), 10–58:28.
21. See Kennedy, *Psychoanalysis, History and Subjectivity*, 151ff.
22. Roger Kennedy, *The Elusive Human Subject* (London: Free Association Books, 1998), 3.
23. Sigmund Freud, *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895), in *SE 1:283–398:299*.
24. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, trans. D. Nicholson Smith (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1973, orig. 1967).
25. Jacques Derrida, "Freud and the Scene of Writing," in Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. A. Bass (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1978, orig. 1967), 196–231.
26. Ibid., 201.
27. Green, "The Greening of Psychoanalysis," 28–29.
28. Sigmund Freud, "A Note on the 'Mystic Writing-Pad'" (1925) in *SE 19:227–34*.

29. Riccardo Steiner, "'Et in Arcadia Ego . . . ?' Some Notes on Methodical Issues in the Use of Psychoanalytic Documents and Archives," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 76 (1995): 739–58.
30. Sigmund Freud, "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through" (1914), in *SE* 12:145–56.
31. *Ibid.*, 150–52.
32. Wilfred. Bion, "Attacks on Linking," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis* 40 (1959): 308–15.
33. Donald Winnicott, "Fear of Breakdown," *International Review of Psychoanalysis* 1 (1974): 103–7.
34. Freud, "The Aetiology of Hysteria," 205.
35. Mary Target, "The Recovered Memories Controversy," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 79 (1998): 1015–28.
36. Herbert Rosenfeld, *Impasse and Interpretation* (London: Tavistock, 1987).

13. Memories Are Made of This

Steven Rose

1. Eleanor A. Maguire, Richard S. J. Frackowiak, and Christopher D. Frith, "Recalling Routes around London: Activation of the Right Hippocampus in Taxi Drivers," *Journal of Neuroscience* 17 (1997): 7103–10.
2. D. O. Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior* (New York: Wiley, 1949), 62–63.
3. T. V. P. Bliss and T. Lømo, "Long-Lasting Potentiation of Synaptic Transmission in the Dentate Area of the Anaesthetized Rabbit Following Simulation of the Perforant Path," *Journal of Physiology* 252 (1973): 331–56.
4. Eric R. Kandel, *In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind* (New York: Norton, 2006).
5. Steven Rose, *The Making of Memory*, 2nd ed. (London: Vintage, 2003). See also Rose, *The 21st Century Brain: Explaining Mending, and Manipulating the Mind* (London: Vintage, 2006).

14. Memory and Cognition

John Sutton, Celia B. Harris, and Amanda J. Barnier

NOTE: Our warm thanks to Ed Cooke, Rochelle Cox, Paul Keil, Doris McIlwain, Charlie Stone, and Rob Wilson for their contributions to the framework developed in this chapter, and to the editors for their patience and encouragement.

1. Jeffrey Olick, "'Collective Memory': A Memoir and Prospect," *Memory Studies* 1 (2008): 23–29:27.
2. John Sutton, "Representation, Reduction, and Interdisciplinarity in the Sciences of Memory," in *Representation in Mind*, ed. Hugh Clapin, Philip Staines, and Peter Slezak (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2004), 187–216.
3. Daniel L. Schacter, *Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past* (New York: Basic Books, 1996); Susan Engel, *Context is Everything: The Nature of Memory* (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1999); Daniel J. Siegel, "Memory: An Overview, with Emphasis on Developmental, Interpersonal, and Neurobiological Aspects," *Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry*

40 (2001): 997–1011; David Middleton and Steven D. Brown, *The Social Psychology of Experience: Studies in Remembering and Forgetting* (London: Sage, 2005).

4. Maurice Bloch, *How We Think They Think: Anthropological Approaches to Cognition, Memory, and Literacy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997); Jeffrey Olick, “Collective Memory: The Two Cultures,” *Sociological Theory* 17 (1999): 333–48; Katherine Nelson, “Self and Social Functions: Individual Autobiographical Memory and Collective Memory,” *Memory* 11 (2003): 125–36; Harald Welzer and Hans J. Markowitsch, “Towards a Bio-Psycho-Social Model of Autobiographical Memory,” *Memory* 13 (2005): 63–78.

5. Daniel L. Schacter and Endel Tulving, “What Are the Memory Systems of 1994?” in *Memory Systems 1994*, ed. Daniel L. Schacter and Endel Tulving (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), 1–38.

6. William Beecher Scoville and Brenda Milner, “Loss of Recent Memory after Bilateral Hippocampal Lesions,” *Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry* 20 (1957) 11–21, reprinted in *Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience* 12 (2000), 103–13. See also Philip J. Hills, *Memory’s Ghost* (New York: Touchstone, 1996), and Schacter, *Searching for Memory*.

7. Endel Tulving, “Episodic Memory: From Mind to Brain,” *Annual Review of Psychology* 53 (2002): 1–25.

8. See Teresa McCormack “Attributing Episodic Memory to Animals and Children,” in *Time and Memory: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology*, ed. Christoph Hoerl and Teresa McCormack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 285–314.

9. See, for instance, Nelson, “Self and Social Functions.”

10. Endel Tulving, “Memory and Consciousness,” *Canadian Psychology* 26 (1985): 1–12:3.

11. John Sutton, “Memory,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, <http://plato.stanford.edu/> (Summer 2004 ed.).

12. Mary Susan Weldon, “The Memory Chop-Shop: Issues in the Search for Memory Systems,” in *Memory: Systems, Process or Function?* ed. Jonathan K. Foster and Marko Jelicic (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 162–204.

13. Henry L. Roediger III, Randy L. Buckner, and Kathleen B. McDermott, “Components of Processing,” in *Memory: Systems, Process or Function?* ed. Foster and Jelicic, 31–65.

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15. Physiological Memory Systems

Howard Caygill

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Memory.” For a recent comprehensive and provocative account of Warburg’s work, see Georges Didi-Huberman, *L’image survivante: Histoire de l’art et temps des fantomes selon Aby Warburg* (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 2002).

2. A. R. Luria, *The Working Brain: An Introduction to Neuropsychology*, trans. Basil Haigh (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1973), 280.

3. Edelman won the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine in 1972 for his contribution to immunology and Kandel in 2000 for his experimental work on the synapse. For a recent and sustained philosophical inquiry into the concept of plasticity and its use in the neurosciences, see Catherine Malabou, *What Should We Do with Our Brain?* trans. Sebastian Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008).

4. For a fascinating account of Broca’s discovery and its consequences see Denis Forest, *Histoire des aphasies* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005).

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16. Memory-Talk: London Childhoods Sally Alexander

NOTE: This chapter is taken from chapters in a project in progress, “*Skin of the Day*”: *Women in London Between the Wars*, partly funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council. Thank you to Bill Schwarz for thoughtful editing.

1. Marc Bloch, *The Historian’s Craft* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1954), 194.

2. Bloch, *Historian’s Craft*, 194–9, 151. Bloch did not complete the book. Lucien Febvre published in his preface the brief notes that survived. Under the idea of cause they included the following note: “The ‘destruction’ of cause and of motive (the unconscious)”; this is immediately followed by the words: “The idea of chance” (xvi).

3. Bloch, *Historian’s Craft*, 3–12. For some of the ways in which being and time were being explored in relation to each other in phenomenology, modernism and psychoanalysis after the First World War in European thought, see Bill Schwarz, “‘Already the Past’: Memory and Historical Time,” in *Regimes of Memory*, ed. Susannah Radstone and Katharine Hodgkin (London: Routledge, 2003), 135–51, which is republished as *Memory Cultures: Memory, Subjectivity, and Recognition* (Somerset N.J.: Transaction, 2006).

4. Bloch, *Historian’s Craft*, 27. The historian is usually a “he”: Natalie Zemon Davis, “Women and the World of the *Annales*,” *History Workshop Journal* 33 (1992): 121–37.

5. Bloch, *Historian’s Craft*, 166.

6. Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory*, trans., Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Claman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), xiii–xiv, xvii for memory as the “raw material of history”; see also Frank Kermode, “Palaces of Memory,” *Index on Censorship* 30 (2001): 87–96, on the “memories that count.”

7. Annette Kuhn, *An Everyday Magic: Cinema and Cultural Memory* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), 20 and throughout. See also Virginia Woolf, *A Room of One’s Own* (London: Granada, 1984, orig. 1929), 85; Marie Stopes, *Mother England* (London: John Bale and Danielsson, 1929), 178; Ford Maddox Ford, *The Soul of London: a Survey of a Modern City* (London: J. M. Dent, 1995, orig. 1905), 42.

8. For enduring voluntary tradition see Kate Bradley, "Poverty and Philanthropy in East London 1918–1959" (PhD diss., Centre for Contemporary British History, University of London, 2006).
9. Peter Hennessy, *Never Again: Britain in 1945–51* (London: Vintage, 1993).
10. Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 4–5, describes the indestructible memory of twentieth-century lives. Le Goff, *History and Memory*, 96, argues with Raphael Samuel's claims for the proximity of history and memory.
11. William Wordsworth, *The Prelude, or the Growth of a Poet's Mind* (1805 version), ed. Ernest de Selincourt, with Stephen Gill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 11.258. Wordsworth makes "spots of time" sources of virtue.
12. Sigmund Freud, "Thoughts for the Times" (1914), in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, et al., 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, London, 1953–74), 14:273–302. This edition is abbreviated *SE* hereafter.
13. Oral histories and autobiographies cited in this essay were compiled and written between the 1960s and 1990s. For some account of that moment, see the articles by Ken Worpole and others in Raphael Samuel, ed., *People's History and Socialist Theory* (London: Routledge, 1981). I've used three archives of London oral histories: my own interviews from the 1970s and 1980s; the Island History Trust (IHT), focusing on the period since the 1870s; and the Making of Modern London archive (MML) compiled 1980s, in the Museum of London. My chapter owes a good deal to John Burnett's unsurpassed portrait of the architecture, process, and content of autobiographical childhood memory. Early memories, Burnett discovers, are shaped by "unhappy experience," by turning points in consciousness of the self; they recall moments of philosophical awakening and imagination, fear of death, shame, authority, and violence (John Burnett, *Destiny Obscure: Autobiographies of Childhood, Education and Family from the 1820s to the 1920s* [Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1984], 23–65). Burnett argues that modernization (higher living standards and reduced birth rate) introduced improvements in family life among the poor, encouraging the growth in affection; civilized notions of family life and affection, he argues, had filtered down from the upper and middle classes to the lower middle and artisan classes via education, industrial legislation, and so on by 1914. My emphasis—partly inspired by Burnett's own sensitive interpretations of the texts—is on the impact of working people's needs and aspirations on legislation and culture, and I work from the belief that the capacity for affect, while mitigated by economic conditions, is not produced by them. David Vincent discusses the relationship between economic lives and emotion in *Bread, Knowledge and Freedom: A Study of Nineteenth-Century Working Class Autobiography* (London: Methuen, 1981), chap. 3.
14. The recollection given precedence or that introduces the individual's life, usually "holds the key to the secret pages of his mind"; Sigmund Freud, "A Childhood Memory of Goethe" (1917), in *SE* 17:149.
15. Doris M. Bailey, *Children of the Green* (London: Stepney Books, 1973), 5–11; see also IHT tape 25, Mr. French, interviewed by Eve Hostettler, 1980.
16. Vykje Sparkes, "Women and the Beauty Industry Between the Wars," unpublished special subject long essay, Goldsmiths College, University of London, 2005.
17. Rose Gamble, *Chelsea Child: An Autobiography* (London: Ariel Books, 1979), 130–33.
18. Lily van Duren, interview with Anna Davin, October 1980. Lily van Duren is the subject of a previous essay, Sally Alexander, "Memory, Generation and History," in Alexander, *Becoming a Woman and Other Essays in 19th and 20th Century Feminist History* (London: Virago, 1994), 231–42.
19. Lily van Duren, interview with the author, September 1977.
20. *What About the Children? 200 Years of Norwood Child Care 1795–1995* (London: The London Museum of Jewish Life and Norwood Child Care, 1995), 35–36.

21. Lily van Duren, interview with Anna Davin, October 1980. There were five suicides a day in the County of London during the interwar years, the numbers rising from previous years, as too were the proportion of women committing suicide; Robert Sinclair, *Metropolitan Man: The Future of the English* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1937), 44–47.

22. See Jewish Women in London Group, *Generations of Memories: Voices of Jewish Women* (London: Women's Press, 1989), 5–17; see p. 17 for identity as modified by time, chance, and “cumulative loss.” See also Miss Henrietta Adler, “Jewish Life and Labour in East London,” in Hubert Llewellyn Smith, *The New Survey of London Life and Labour*, 9 vols. (London: P. S. King, 1930–35), vol. 6:268–98. This work is hereafter abbreviated *NSL*.

23. Sixty thousand men from the County of London had been killed during the war, and thousands more were wounded and died a slow death; the influenza epidemic that swept Europe twice, in 1918 and in 1919, killed thousands more. Ill health was endemic and maternal mortality was rising in the thirties. See Robert Sinclair's doom-laden account of London's “C3 population” in *Metropolitan Man*, chap. 2, based on the London statistics.

24. Celia Wilmot, interview with the author, November 1981.

25. Thirty percent of Londoners in the County of London lived three or more families to a house into the 1930s; *NSL*, 1:39–41.

26. May Jones, interview with the author, February 1977.

27. Jim Wolveridge, “Ain't It Grand” or “This Was Stepney” (London: Journeyman Press, 1976), 10–12.

28. See Kuhn, *An Everyday Magic*, 253, for a list of named films. Clara E. Grant *From “Me” to “We”*: *Forty Years on Bow Common* (Bromley-by-Bow, London: Fern Street Settlement, n.d.), 16; Clara E. Grant, *Farthing Bundles* (Bromley-by-Bow, London: Fern Street Settlement, n.d.), 123; Angela Rodaway watched *The Kid* at Donald Soper's twopenny cinema for children in Islington City Hall in the 1920s; Angela Rodaway, *A London Childhood* (London: Batsford, 1960), 60. Robert Murphy, “Fantasy Worlds—British Cinema Between the Wars” *Screen* 26.1 (1985): 9–20. Ben Thomas records potato and vegetable peeling in *Ben's Limehouse: Recollections* (London: Ragged School Books, 1987), 43; for lip-reading, see Rose Lowe, *Liz: The Story of Two Girls Growing Up in Hoxton Between the Wars* (Hoxton, London: Rose Lowe, 1982), 6.

29. Gamble, *Chelsea Child*, 13–14; stories included Grimm's fairy tales, Little Nell, Sherlock Holmes, and school prizes.

30. Compare, for instance, *Way Down East* (1920), directed by D. W. Griffith and starring Lillian Gish, which tells of a seduced girl, a dead infant, and public exposure, includes a life threatening chase, and is well worth watching.

31. Gilbert Seldes, “I Am Here Today,” in *The Essential Chaplin: Perspectives on the Life and Art of the Great Comedian*, ed. Richard Schickel (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006, orig. 1924), 112.

32. Charlie Chaplin recalling the London of his childhood at the turn of the twentieth century: “From such trivia I believe my soul was born” (Charlie Chaplin, *My Autobiography* [Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1966, orig. 1964], 14).

33. Celia Wilmot, interview with author, July 1984.

34. “Jane Smith,” interview with the author, October 1977. See also Richard Church, *Over the Bridge: An Essay in Autobiography* (London: Heinemann, 1955), 43–48.

35. Ida Rex, “School Teacher,” in *Working Lives, Volume One, 1905–45: Twelve Accounts of Work, What It Was and What It Meant, by Men and Women Living in Hackney, East London* (London: Hackney Autobiography, n.d.), 29.

36. The proportion of illegitimate births in London fell from 4,727 in 1900 to 3,641 (approx. 4% of all births in the County) in the early thirties, as a result of increasing access to and knowledge of

birth control through local clinics, maternity and child clinics, and some general practitioners; *NSL*, 9:292–96.

37. See nineteen-year-old Rebecca West's witty indictment of the "The White Slave Traffic Bill" in *The Young Rebecca: Writings of Rebecca West, 1911–1917*, ed. Jane Marcus (London: Virago, 1982), 119–123.

38. *MML* series 1, 45.8. Mrs. M. Welsh, who had been a shop assistant at Whiteley's in the twenties. Freud's "Family Romance" (1909), in *SE* 9:237–41, describes the child (usually a son, the girl's imagination being in this respect "weaker") unconsciously envying and growing hostile toward his father, as well as wishing to exalt him. In these powerful workings of feeling and the imagination, Freud sees the origins of myth.

39. Church, *Over the Bridge*, 61–62.

40. See Rosie Kennedy, "Children and the Impact of the First World War" (PhD diss., Goldsmiths College, University of London), chap. 1, for memories of the First World War in the aftermath of the second.

41. Bailey, *Children of the Green*, 13.

42. *Ibid.*, 13–14. Angela Rodaway recounts how she woke from dreams as a child and young adult shouting in fear "and must have been born a thousand times as I waited for the birth of my child"; Rodaway, *A London Childhood*, 13.

43. See, for example, Helen Fletcher, *Bluestocking* (London: Pandora, 1986), 30.

44. Births in Bailey's household (and neighborhood) were home births, attended perhaps by the doctor, or by the local woman; Bailey, *Children of the Green*, 24, 27.

45. Gamble, *Chelsea Child*, 7–8; Doris Knight, *Millfield Memories* (London: Centreprise, 1976), 17.

46. Lisa Tickner, *Modern Life and Modern Subjects: British Art in the Early Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 25. See V. S. Pritchett, *A Cab at the Door: An Autobiography; Early Years* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1968), 70–1, for stories of Jack the Ripper, a terror that "began to be whispered about our school" in Camberwell just before the First World War.

47. Quoted in Burnett, *Destiny Obscure*, 313; see also Leonora Eyles, *The Ram Escapes: The Story of a Victorian Childhood* (London: Peter Nevill, 1953), 1, for memories as "pictures in my mind."

48. Sigmund Freud, "Screen Memories" (1899), in *SE* 3:303–22.

49. Bailey, *Children of the Green*, 24, 29.

50. *Ibid.*, 13, 81, 108, 119, and 120. For Freud's much criticized feminine wish, see Sigmund Freud, "Femininity" (1933), in *SE* 22:133.

51. Compare shame as a source of social injustice in Bailey with David Vincent's discussion of the same process of development in nineteenth-century radical autobiographies, in *Bread, Knowledge and Freedom*, 93.

52. Knight, *Millfield Memories*, 24; William Goldman is among many who testifies to the vulnerability of domestic servants, "pouring in from the derelict mining areas of Wales . . . young, lonely, inexperienced and simple in their needs"; Goldman, *East End My Cradle: Portrait of an Environment* (London: Robson, 1988, orig. 1940), 68.

53. Sinclair, *Metropolitan Man*, 17, 162.

54. *The Autobiography of Goethe: Truth and Poetry from My Own Life*, trans., John Oxenford (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1848), 1–2.

55. For eighteenth-century plebeian speech, see, for example, Tanya Evans, *Unfortunate Objects: Lone Mothers in Eighteenth-Century London* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 109–17.

56. Joan Riviere, "The Inner World as Seen in Literature," in *The Inner World and Joan Riviere: Collected Papers, 1920–1958*, ed. Athol Hughes (London: Karnac, 1991), 317.

57. Paul Thompson, "The Pull of Family Ties: Intergenerational Relationships and Life Paths," in *Between Generations: Family Models, Myths and Memories*, ed. Daniel Bertaux and Paul Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 12–13.

58. Grace Foakes, *My Part of the River: Memories of People and Places in the East End of Edwardian London* (Aylesbury: Futura, 1976), 88–89.

17. Affect and Embodiment

Felicity Callard and Constantina Papoulias

NOTE: We are most grateful to Ruth Leys, Susannah Radstone, and Bill Schwarz for their careful readings of, and comments on, earlier versions of this chapter.

1. Lawrence E. Hedges, "Listening Perspectives for Emotional-Relatedness Memories," *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 25.4 (2005): 456.

2. William E. Connolly, *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 10.

3. There is now a wealth of literature that exemplifies this turn; a partial list includes: Sara Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004); Charles Altieri, *The Particulars of Rapture: An Aesthetics of the Affects* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003); Jill Bennett, *Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005); Lauren Berlant, ed., *Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Teresa Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004); Julie Ellison, *Cato's Tears and the Making of Anglo-American Emotion* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999); Anna Gibbs, "Contagious Feelings: Pauline Hanson and the Epidemiology of Affect," *Australian Humanities Review* 24 (2001); Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*, Post-Contemporary Interventions, ed. Stanley Fish and Fredric Jameson (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002); Brian Massumi, "Fear (The Spectrum Said)," *Positions* 13.1 (2005): 31–48; Elspeth Probyn, *Blush: Faces of Shame* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003); Rei Terada, *Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the "Death of the Subject"* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001); Nigel Thrift, "Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect," *Geografiska Annaler* 86B.1 (2004): 57–78.

4. Clare Hemmings, "Invoking Affect: Cultural Theory and the Ontological Turn," *Cultural Studies* 19.5 (2005): 548–67.

5. Sylvan Tomkins, the maverick psychologist who is currently much favored by cultural theorists is an exception: for him, "discrete emotions" are primary. Nonetheless, most cultural theorists tend to see emotions as secondary, socialized versions of bodily forces. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick led the way for a rethinking of Tomkins's work; see Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, eds., *Shame and Its Sisters: A Sylvan Tomkins Reader* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995).

6. It can be argued that the turn to affect replays some motifs in the similarly celebrated turn to memory, in cultural studies at least. Kerwin Lee Klein, in an important article that analyzed the fascination of memory for both scholars and the larger socius, argued that the work that we wish memory to do is "to re-enchant our relation with the world and pour presence back into the past"; Kerwin Lee Klein, "On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse," *Representations* 69 (2000): 145. Affect too is about presence (the lived, "fleshed" experience) and ultimately about re-enchantment.

7. Mark B. N. Hansen, *New Philosophy for New Media* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004), 7–8.
8. Mark Hansen, “The Time of Affect, or Bearing Witness to Life,” *Critical Inquiry* 30 (Spring 2004): 601.
9. Mark Hansen, *Embodying Technesis: Technology Beyond Writing* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 4.
10. Hansen, *New Philosophy for New Media*, 266.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Hansen tends to use the term *affectivity* rather than *affect*; he borrows here from the philosopher Gilbert Simondon.
13. Hansen, for example, cites the researchers Joseph LeDoux, Antonio Damasio, and Daniel Stern, all of whom we shall discuss later in the chapter. Connolly, similarly, cites Damasio and LeDoux.
14. We should point out that our own use of the term *representation* usually implies this hegemonic meaning.
15. A note of caution is in order here: In this chapter, we are preoccupied with how a very particular privileging of affect as embodied memory has been crystallizing across different disciplinary domains since the 1990s. However, in neuroscience and developmental psychology in particular, the currency of research based on experimental findings arguably has a shorter life than in the humanities. We do not claim here to be keeping pace with the latest research in this area (not least because new experimental findings can reorient scientific debates in a matter of months rather than years). Rather, we are concerned with the following: first, with how a particular series of texts and emerging conceptual apparatuses originating in a particular scientific habitus became transferable and communicable to the humanities and to social theory within a particular discursive juncture; second, with the extent to which this cross-disciplinary attention to “embodied memory” is being presented as a certain overcoming of psychoanalytic conceptualizations of memory and of subjectivity more generally.
16. Indeed, it is clear—though the reasons for why this is the case would require extensive analysis—that Freud is frequently a touchstone, if sometimes an unacknowledged one, for those exploring memory, affect, and the body from a committedly non-psychoanalytic position. In other words, it sometimes seems as though it would be impossible to explore affect and the body without positioning oneself, explicitly or implicitly, in relation to Freud.
17. Connolly, *Neuropolitics*, 41.
18. *Ibid.*, 47.
19. This interpretation plots Freud’s own writings and is also indebted to the French school of Freudian commentary and practice, particularly that of Jean Laplanche. However, there are a number of contemporary psychoanalytic practitioners who, since the 1970s at least, have attempted to align psychoanalytic theory with the findings of developmental psychology and, more recently, with neuroscience. For a characteristic example that bears specifically on the relationship between memory and affect, see the special issue of *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 25.1 (2005) entitled “Exploring Emotional Memory: Psychoanalytic Perspectives.”
20. The most striking essay to interpret the relations between these terms is Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, “Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality,” *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* 49 (1968): 1–18.
21. Sigmund Freud, *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895), in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–74) 1:283–398:354. This edition is abbreviated *SE* hereafter.

22. *Ibid.*, 356.
23. Sigmund Freud and Joseph Breuer, “On the Psychological Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communication” (1893), in *SE* 2:6.
24. *Ibid.*, italics in original.
25. Affect is a notoriously slippery word in Freud’s oeuvre. Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis define it as “the qualitative expression of the quantity of instinctual energy and its fluctuations” (Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith [New York: Norton, 1973], s.v. “affect”), thereby pointing to its dual qualitative and quantitative characteristics. André Green describes affect as “a moving quantity, accompanied by a subjective tonality” (André Green, *The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse*, trans. Alan Sheridan [London: Routledge, 1999], 70). In the early psychoanalytic paper “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence,” Freud described “a quota of affect or sum of excitation—which possesses all the characteristics of a quantity . . . which is capable of increase, diminution, displacement and discharge, and which is spread over the memory-traces of ideas somewhat as an electric charge is spread over the surface of a body” (Freud, “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence” (1894), in *SE* 3:60). It is important to note that Freud was indebted to Darwin’s formulations on affect (Charles Darwin, *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, 3rd ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, orig. 1872]); in *Studies on Hysteria*, Freud and Breuer note that “sensations and innervations” belonging to the field of “The Expression of the Emotions” comprise “actions which originally had a meaning and served a purpose” (Sigmund Freud and Joseph Breuer, *Studies on Hysteria* (1895), in *SE* 2:181). This statement, incidentally, as well as framing the close relationship that affect has to physiology, sees affect as in itself a kind of memory—the carrying over into the present of actions that once, deep in the prehistoric past, had specific purposes.
26. Freud’s strongest formulation regarding this division occurs in “The Unconscious”: “Strictly speaking . . . there are no unconscious affects. . . . The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes—basically of memory traces—whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings”; Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious” (1915), in *SE* 14:178.
27. This is, of course, to push to one side the vexed place that war neuroses and trauma hold in Freud’s thought and the intractable challenge they posed to his libido model and its attendant conceptualizations of memory and affect. However, as Ruth Leys has shown, it is far from clear—on both conceptual and empirical grounds—that trauma can be separated out from sexuality and fantasy; Ruth Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
28. Jean Laplanche, *The Unconscious and the Id*, trans. Luke Thurston with Lindsay Watson (London: Rebus, 1999), 18.
29. Jean Laplanche, *Essays on Otherness* (London: Routledge, 1999), 120.
30. Freud, “The Unconscious,” 178.
31. Adam Phillips makes clear the affective complexity of, for example, worry, boredom, and composure in terms of their ability to contain manifold diverse attitudes and feelings about oneself, others, and the world around one; Adam Phillips, *On Kissing, Tickling, and Being Bored: Psychoanalytic Essays on the Unexamined Life* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
32. Nico H. Frijda, *The Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 310.
33. Robert M. Yerkes and John Dillingham Dodson, “The Relation of Strength of Stimulus to Rapidity of Habit-Formation,” *Journal of Comparative Neurology of Psychology* 18 (1908): 459–82.
34. J. A. Easterbrook, “The Effect of Emotion on Cue Utilization and the Organization of Behavior,” *Psychological Review* 66 (1959): 183–201.
35. Roger Brown and James Kulick, “Flashbulb Memories,” *Cognition* 5 (1977): 73–99.

36. Eugene Winograd and Ulric Neisser, eds., *Affect and Accuracy in Recall: Studies of Flashbulb Memories* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

37. Technological and discursive changes in psychology and psychiatry certainly played a significant part in these changes. The emergence of new medical imaging technologies, for example, enabled a new mapping of the mind onto the brain, as particular neurochemical processes could be said to make feeling and remembering visible. The development of psychotropic drugs meant that mental problems could be associated with the dysregulation of chemical substances between the brain's neurons. See Allan Young, *The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Joseph Dumit, *Picturing Personhood: Brain Scans and Biomedical Identity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); and David Healy, *The Anti-Depressant Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).

38. For a useful selection of current psychological writing focusing on the relationship between memory, affect, and emotion, see Daniel Reisberg and Paula Hertel, eds., *Memory and Emotion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

39. The impact of LeDoux and Damasio is certainly attributable in part to the publication of "crossover" books that allowed their central ideas to reach a much wider audience than that accessing scientific journals; see Joseph E. LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Avon, 1994); Antonio Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness* (London: Vintage, 2000); and Antonio Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain* (London: Vintage, 2004). Two of LeDoux's scientific papers that centrally engage the question of emotional memory are: Joseph E. LeDoux, "Emotional Memory Systems in the Brain," *Behavioural Brain Research* 58 (1993): 69–79; and Joseph E. LeDoux, "Emotion Circuits in the Brain," *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 23 (2000): 155–84. The work of van der Kolk was engaged by the deconstructionist critic Cathy Caruth in her influential work on trauma: Cathy Caruth, ed., *Trauma: Explorations in Memory* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); and Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). Caruth's writings disseminated van der Kolk's ideas to a wider audience in the humanities.

40. American Psychiatric Association, *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1980).

41. Young, *Harmony of Illusions*.

42. A good example is Cathy Caruth's interdisciplinary edited book, whose very title, *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, points to the energy that the category of trauma gave to inquiries into the function (and dysfunction) of memory.

43. For a powerful critique of both van der Kolk's and Caruth's formulations concerning the manner in which trauma resists representation, see Leys, *Trauma*. See also, for a discussion of van der Kolk's work, Young, *Harmony of Illusions*.

44. Bessel A. van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart, "The Intrusive Past: The Flexibility of Memory and the Engraving of Trauma," in *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 172.

45. Bessel A. van der Kolk, "The Body Keeps the Score: Memory and the Evolving Psychobiology of Post Traumatic Stress," *Harvard Review of Psychiatry* 1 (1994): 253–65.

46. Bessel A. van der Kolk and Rita Fisler, "Dissociation and the Fragmentary Nature of Traumatic Memories: Overview and Exploratory Study," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 8.4 (1995): 505–25.

47. Elsewhere, van der Kolk likens this traumatic isolation of memory to a momentary regression of the traumatized person into infancy.

48. Key texts in which this debate is played out include those by Caruth and van der Kolk, as well as Leys, *Trauma*. Elspeth Probyn, in analyzing shame, cites van der Kolk when wondering whether “feelings lie quietly at the back of the mind” or are “slotted away in the body’s filing system”: “some mental representation of the experience is laid down by means of a system that records affective experience, but that has no capacity for symbolic processing and placement in space and time.” Probyn goes on to praise the complexity of “what the body does habitually”; Probyn, *Blush*, 65.

49. Caroll E. Izard “Four Systems for Emotion Activation: Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Processes,” *Psychological Review* 100 (1993): 70.

50. In the use of such “stories” about the brain by scholars in the humanities, the terminological and conceptual disjuncture between disciplines is frequently disavowed. For example, it is unclear how scholars in the humanities ought to interpret LeDoux’s claim that the amygdala responds to a sensory cue from the thalamus; in what sense are such cues both based on perception and nonrepresentational? To what extent can an image or a sound be perceived directly? Since it is not only snakes but also snake-like (wriggling) objects that can generate fear, how far can we talk about perceiving formal similarities in objects without invoking the term *representation*? And does it make sense to claim (as LeDoux and others do) that such formal similarities are universally perceived?

51. Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza*, 53.

52. LeDoux, *Emotional Brain*, 250.

53. Damasio, *Feeling of What Happens*, 133–67.

54. Allan N. Schore, *Affect Regulation and the Origin of the Self: The Neurobiology of Emotional Development* (Hillsdale, N.J.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1994), 537.

55. Stern is perhaps one of cultural theorists’ most favored psychologists. His work is cited in the writings of Brian Massumi and Mark Hansen and figures prominently in the emerging body of writings on affect in cultural geography. Affective resonance as a concept originates with the psychologist Silvan Tomkins in his multi-volume opus *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness* (New York, Springer, 1962–92). Tomkins’s account of the primacy of the emotions in communication was partly conceived as a polemic against Freud’s privileging of the drive.

56. Daniel N. Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 161.

57. Schore, *Affect Regulation*, 30.

58. *Ibid.*, 498.

59. *Ibid.*, 542.

60. The feminist philosopher Teresa Brennan has produced a remarkable if problematic retheorization of sexuality through affectivity in her posthumous book *The Transmission of Affect*. Brennan, in a vitalistic recasting of Freud, reconceives libido as a life force (living attention) that is passed from the mother to the infant through what Stern called attunement. Tellingly, Brennan argues that conflict, fantasy, and psychic distress are a byproduct of the blocking of such energy and concludes that “disorder is not inherent in the body or the flesh, which loves regulation”; Brennan, *Transmission of Affect*, 155. Brennan’s insistence on the wisdom and orderliness of the body is shared by many writings in the turn to affect and merits further study.

61. Robert B. Clyman, “The Procedural Organization of Emotions: A Contribution from Cognitive Science to the Psychoanalytic Theory of Therapeutic Action,” *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 39 (1991): 349–82.

62. These terms are not equivalent, though in unison, they have come to oppose explicit or representational memory.

63. Claparède’s commentary was brought to prominence through Ruth Leys’s provocative discussion of it in her book *Trauma: A Genealogy*. It has since been taken up in various ways by other

writers interested in the relationship between memory and affect; see Jill Bennett, “Insides, Out-sides: Trauma, Affect, and Art,” in *Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art*, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 22–45; and Jan Campbell, *Psychoanalysis and the Time of Life: Durations of the Unconscious Self* (London: Routledge, 2006).

64. Edouard Claparède “La question de la mémoire affective” (1911), quoted in Leys, *Trauma*, 96.

65. For LeDoux’s discussion of Claparède see Ledoux, *Emotional Brain*, 180–82.

18. Telling Stories: Memory and Narrative

Mark Freeman

NOTE: This chapter draws on material in Mark Freeman, *Hindsight: The Promise and Peril of Looking Backward* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

1. Frederic Bartlett, *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, orig. 1932).

2. John Updike, *Self-Consciousness* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), xii.

3. Emily Fox Gordon, “Book of Days,” *American Scholar* 72 (2003): 24.

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*

6. See especially Eva Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge: Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). Hoffman writes extensively about being a member of the “second generation”—in her case, the child of Holocaust survivors—and the “paradoxes of indirect knowledge” that accompanied her status. As she notes, “The formative events of the twentieth century have crucially informed our biographies and psyches, threatening sometimes to overshadow and overwhelm our lives. But we did not see them, suffer through them, experience their impact directly. Our relationship to them has been defined by our very ‘post-ness,’ and by the powerful but mediated forms of knowledge that have followed from it” (25). See also Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981). “Memory,” Shils writes, “is furnished not only from the recollections of events which the individual has himself experienced but from the memories of others older than himself with whom he associates. From their accounts of their own experiences, which frequently antedate his own, and from written works at various removes, his image of his ‘larger self’ is brought to include events which occurred both recently and earlier outside his own experiences. Thus, his knowledge of his past is furnished by the history of his family, of his neighborhood, of his city, of his religious community, of his ethnic group, of his nationality, of his country and of the wider culture into which he has been assimilated” (51).

7. Ernst Schachtel, “On Memory and Infantile Amnesia,” in Schachtel, *Metamorphosis* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 287.

8. *Ibid.*, 291.

9. *Ibid.*, 296.

10. Gordon, “Book of Days,” 24–25.

11. Frank Kermode, *The Sense of an Ending* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 7. See also Paul Smith’s notion of “claustrophilia” in *Discerning the Subject* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

12. Kermode, *Sense of an Ending*, 138.

13. *Ibid.*, 140.

14. Lauren Slater, *Lying* (New York: Penguin, 2000), 164.
15. Michael Gazzaniga, *The Mind's Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 2.
16. *Ibid.*, 26–27.
17. *Ibid.*, 138.
18. Michel Leiris, *Manhood: A Journal from Childhood into the Fierce Order of Virility* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 22.
19. Georges Gusdorf, “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography,” in *Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical*, ed. James Olney (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), 42.
20. Mary McCarthy, *Memories of a Catholic Girlhood* (New York: Berkley Publishing Company, 1963), 153.
21. Philip Roth, *The Facts: A Novelist's Autobiography* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1988), 7.
22. See especially Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroad, 1975).
23. Of special note in this context is Helen Keller's autobiography, *The Story of My Life* (New York: New American Library, 1988, orig. 1902), in which, after having discovered that she had unwittingly plagiarized a short story, Keller writes that she “cannot be quite sure of the boundary line between my ideas and those I find in books. Perhaps this is so,” she ventures, “because so many of my impressions come to me through the medium of others' eyes and ears” (48). “It is certain,” she adds, “that I cannot always distinguish my own thoughts from those I read, because what I read becomes the very substance and texture of my mind. Consequently, in nearly all that I write” (including, of course, the autobiography that contains these very sentences), “I produce something which very much resembles the crazy patchwork I used to make when I first learned to sew” (53). See also chapter 3 of my own *Rewriting the Self: History, Memory, Narrative* (London: Routledge, 1993), as well as my “Worded Images, Imaged Words: Helen Keller and the Poetics of Self-Representation,” *Interfaces* 18 (2000): 135–46. For another exploration of the Keller case, see Roger Shattuck, “A World of Words,” *The New York Review of Books*, Feb. 26, 2004: 21–24.
24. See, for example, Mark Freeman, “Rethinking the Fictive, Reclaiming the Real: Autobiography, Narrative Time, and the Burden of Truth,” in *Narrative and Consciousness: Literature, Psychology, and the Brain*, ed. Gary Fireman, Ted McVay, and Owen Flanagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 115–28.
25. See Mark Freeman, “Too Late: The Temporality of Memory and the Challenge of Moral Life,” *Journal für Psychologie* 11 (2003): 54–74. See also Mark Freeman, “Life ‘on Holiday’? In Defense of Big Stories,” *Narrative Inquiry* 16 (2006): 131–38.
26. See Mark Freeman, “The Burden of Truth: Psychoanalytic *Poiesis* and Narrative Understanding,” in *Strategic Narrative: New Perspectives on the Power of Personal and Cultural Stories*, ed. Wendy Patterson (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2002), 9–27. See also my “Wissenschaft und Narration” (Science and Story), *Journal für Psychologie* 15.2 (2007), <http://www.journal-fuer-psychologie.de/jfp-2-2007-5.html>, retrieved, Oct. 15, 2007.
27. Gordon, “Book of Days,” 25.
28. *Ibid.*, 25.
29. *Ibid.*, 26.
30. *Ibid.*, 27.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*, 28.
34. For instance, Daniel L. Schacter's edited volume *Memory Distortion* is subtitled *How Minds, Brains, and Societies Reconstruct the Past* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).

35. Freeman, "Too Late."
36. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 265.
37. *Ibid.*, 264.
38. Gordon, "Book of Days," 30.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*, 30–31.
41. Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge*. See also Mark Freeman, "Autobiographische Erinnerung und das narrative Unbewusste" ("Autobiographical Memory and the Narrative Unconscious"), in *Warum Menschen sich erinnern können (Autobiographical Memory in Interdisciplinary Perspective)*, ed. Harald Welzer and Hans J. Markowitsch (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006), 129–43; also, "Charting the Narrative Unconscious: Cultural Memory and the Challenge of Autobiography," *Narrative Inquiry* 12 (2002): 193–211. By "narrative unconscious," I refer to "those culturally-rooted aspects of one's history that remain uncharted and that, consequently, have yet to be incorporated into one's story" (193). As I also suggest, we become aware of the existence of this unconscious "during those moments when our own historical and cultural situatedness comes into view" (200). While Hoffman uses different language to deal with this issue, her own process of self-discovery and self-realization is very much in keeping with the idea of the narrative unconscious.
42. See Philippe Lejeune, *On Autobiography* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).
43. There are many works that have explored this set of issues. Especially useful are David Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); Anthony Paul Kerby, *Narrative and the Self* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); and not least, Paul Ricoeur, "Narrative Time," in *On Narrative*, ed. W. J. Mitchell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 165–86; and Ricoeur "Life in Quest of Narrative," in *On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation*, ed. David Wood (London: Routledge, 1991), 20–33. See also my own "Death, Narrative Integrity, and the Radical Challenge of Self-Understanding: A Reading of Tolstoy's *Death of Ivan Ilych*," *Ageing and Society* 17 (1997): 373–98, as well as my "Mythical Time, Historical Time, and the Narrative Fabric of the Self," *Narrative Inquiry* 8 (1998): 27–50.
44. See Owen Flanagan, *Self-Expressions: Mind, Morals, and the Meaning of Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). See also Ian Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Freeman, "Burden of Truth."
45. Schachtel, "On Memory and Infantile Amnesia," 296.
46. Paul Ricoeur's monumental *Time and Narrative*, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984–88), represents the most comprehensive treatment of this set of issues. Also useful is Paul Brockelman, *Time and Self: Phenomenological Explorations* (New York: Crossroad, 1985), as well as Genevieve Lloyd, *Being in Time: Selves and Narrators in Philosophy and Literature* (London: Routledge, 1993).
47. Carr, *Time, Narrative, and History*, 60.
48. Yves Bonnefoy, *The Act and the Place of Poetry* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 164. Also relevant in this context is Richard Kearney, *On Stories* (London: Routledge, 2002). See especially his discussion of mimesis, "a creative redescription of the world such that hitherto unexplored meanings can unfold" (12).
49. Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1971). Also significant in this context is Heidegger's essay "Science and Reflection," in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (New York: Harper, 1977), 155–82.
50. Of special interest in this context is Patricia Hampl, *I Could Tell You Stories: Sojourns in the Land of Memory* (New York: Norton, 1999). Appearances notwithstanding, the work of memory,

Hampel suggests, is closer to poetry than to fiction: “The chaotic lyric impulse, not the smooth drive of plot, is the engine of memory.” In memoir and other such autobiographical ventures, this impulse may be “domesticated” into narrative, but the driving passion behind it derives from “the wild night of poetry” (224).

51. Herbert Marcuse, *The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), 7–8.

52. *Ibid.*, 9.

53. Schachtel, “On Memory and Infantile Amnesia,” 296.

54. Gordon, “Book of Days,” 31.

55. *Ibid.*, 31.

19. Ritual and Memory

Stephan Feuchtwang

NOTE: I thank Nicolas Argenti and Harvey Whitehouse for suggesting some very necessary revisions, without holding them responsible for the result. I also thank Amit Desai for searching out much of the relevant anthropological literature.

1. *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), s.v. “Ritual” (by Edmund Leach).

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11. See the chapters by Roger Kennedy, John Sutton et al., and Mark Freeman in this volume.

12. Alfred Gell, *The Anthropology of Time: Cultural Constructions of Temporal Maps and Images* (Oxford: Berg, 1992), 320–21.

13. *Ibid.*, 314.

14. See Anne Christine Taylor, “The Soul’s Body and Its States: An Amazonian Perspective on the Nature of Being Human,” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 2.2 (1996): 201–15:203–4.

15. Anne Christine Taylor, "Remembering to Forget: Identity, Meaning and Memory among the Jivaro," *Man: The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 28.4 (1993): 653–78: 669, 674–75.
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17. Michael Rowlands, "Remembering to Forget; Sublimation as Sacrifice in War Memorials," in *The Art of Forgetting*, ed. Adrian Forty and Susanne Küchler, Materialising Culture (Oxford: Berg, 1999), 129–45.
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19. Fernando Santos-Granero, "Writing History into the Landscape" *American Ethnologist* 25.2 (1998): 128–48.
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33. Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
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20. A Long War: Public Memory and the Popular Media

Paula Hamilton

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2. Kendall R. Phillips, "Introduction," in *Framing Public Memory*, ed. Kendall R. Phillips (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 3–10.
3. Barbara A. Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering* (Milton Keynes, U.K.: Open University Press, 2003), 13.
4. Wulf Kansteiner, "Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective Memory Studies," *History and Theory* 41 (2002): 179–97; and Kerwin Lee Klein, "On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse," *Representations* 69 (2000): 127–50.
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6. Joan Beaumont, "Prisoners of War in Australian National Memory," in *Prisoners of War, Prisoners of Peace*, ed. Bob Moore and Barbara Hatley-Broad (Oxford: Berg, 2005), 185.
7. See Karl Hack and Kevin Blackburn, *Did Singapore Have to Fall? Churchill and the Impregnable Fortress* (London: Routledge, 2003).
8. The Australian prime minister Paul Keating often used the memory of Singapore to shore up the idea of an independent Australia against the British colonial heritage. His biographer and former speechwriter, Don Watson, claims that next to John Curtin, the prime minister of Australia in 1942, Keating made more speeches on the war than anyone else. See Don Watson, *Recollections of a Bleeding Heart* (Sydney: Vintage Australia, 2002); and, on the fiftieth anniversary of the fall of Singapore, Paul Keating, "John Curtin's World and Ours," July 5, 2002, John Curtin Prime Ministerial Library (JCPML 00746/1).
9. Stephen Garton, "*Changi* as Television: Myth, Memory, Narrative and History," *Journal of Australian Studies* 73 (2002): 233 n. 15.
10. For Sturken, "cultural memory" is a refinement of the idea of collective memory that particularly engages with cultural production; see Marita Sturken, *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic and the Politics of Remembering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 3–5.
11. Winter, *Remembering War*, 6.

12. Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of the Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5. See also Eviatar Zerubavel, *Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

13. Susan Rubin Suleiman, *Crises of Memory and the Second World War* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006).

14. Alison Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Ashavai Margalit, "Epilogue: Toward a Radical Practice of Memory," in Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory*, (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), 141–55.

15. Vivian, "A Timeless Now," 205.

16. For some steps in this direction, see Barbie Zelizer, *Covering the Body: The Kennedy Assassination, the Media and the Shaping of Collective Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Kendall R. Phillips, ed., *Framing Public Memory* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004); Andrew Hoskins, *Televising War: From Vietnam to Iraq* (London: Continuum, 2004); and Andrew Hoskins, "Television and the Collapse of Memory," *Time and Society* 13.1 (2004): 109–27.

17. Landsberg, in *Prosthetic Memory*, was not the first to articulate the notion of prosthetic memory but her account is the most comprehensive. See also Robert Burgoyne, "Prosthetic Memory/Traumatic Memory: *Forrest Gump* (1994)" <http://www.latrobe.edu.au/screeningthepast/firstrelease/fr0499>.

18. Tony Stephens, "A War Widow's Long Fight," *Sydney Morning Herald*, April 10, 2007, 9.

19. "Australians and the Past National Survey," University of Technology, Sydney; transcript of interview SG/30 (in possession of the author).

20. Interview with Ivy Luscombe by the author, February 15, 2007, at Bondi Junction, Sydney.

21. See Stephen Garton, *The Cost of War: Australians Return* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Kevin Blackburn, "Commemorating and Commodifying the Prisoner of War Experience in South-East Asia: The Creation of Changi Prison Museum," *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* 33 (2000), <http://www.awm.gov.au/journal/j33/blackburn.htm>; and Peter Williams, "Representation and Affect in Australian POW Drama," *Southerly* 65.2 (2005): 71–85.

22. Robin Gerster, "No Man is a Naked Island: The Australian POW story," *Southerly* 65.2 (2005): 44–59.

23. Garton, "Changi as Television," 85.

24. Beaumont, "Prisoners of War," 185–94.

25. Garton, "Changi as Television," 79.

26. 25. Other commentators included the historians Joy Damousi and myself; Garton, "Changi as Television," 80–81.

27. *Sydney Morning Herald*, The Guide, October 1, 2001.

28. Transcripts of *Backchat*, November 12, 2001, <http://www.abc.net.au/backchat/s415348s.htm>.

29. Guestbook, *Changi* Internet forum, Vic O'Callaghan, October 28, 2001.

30. Guestbook, *Changi* Internet forum, Kelly, November 18, 2001; Graham, October 14, 2001; see also Sian, October 20, 2001.

31. Guestbook, *Changi* Internet forum, Diana, November 18, 2001; Maree Trakes, November 19, 2001; see also W. G. Sebald, *On the Natural History of Destruction*, trans. Anthea Bell (London: Penguin, 2003), ix.

32. Guestbook, *Changi* Internet forum, Gazza, "Father Would be Proud" (post 368); Phil (post 338) was hostile; and Shane (post 295) reiterated the common saying that it was impossible to "forgive and forget," all on October 14, 2001. (Later participants did not have post numbers.)

21. Sites of Memory

Jay Winter

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2. Pierre Nora, ed., *Les lieux de mémoire*, 7 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1984–92). For discussion of Nora, see Bill Schwarz's chapter in this volume.
3. Antoine Prost, "The Algerian War in French Collective Memory," in *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 161–76.
4. Kerwin Lee Klein, "On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse," *Representations* 69 (2000): 127–50.
5. Pierre Nora, "L'ère des commémorations," in *Les lieux de mémoire*, ed. Pierre Nora, 7 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1984–92), 3:618.
6. Charles S. Maier, "A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections on History, Melancholy and Denial," *History and Memory* 5 (1993), 136–51; see also Charles S. Maier, "Hot Memory . . . Cold Memory: On the Political Half-Life of Fascist and Communist Memory," paper delivered at a conference on "The Memory of the Century," Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna, March 9–11, 2001.
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9. John MacKenzie, ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986); Terence Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
10. Adrian Gregory, *The Silence of Memory* (Leamington Spa, U.K.: Berg, 1994); Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
11. Adrian Gregory, *The Silence of Memory* (Oxford: Berg, 1992), 132.
12. Dolores Hayden, *The Power of Place* (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1992).
13. David Lloyd, *Battlefield Tourism: Pilgrimage and the Commemoration of the Great War in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia* (Oxford: Berg, 1992).
14. Catherine Merridale, "War, Death and Remembrance in Soviet Russia," in *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 61–83.
15. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, "Setting the Framework," in *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–40.

22. Cinema and Memory

Susannah Radstone

1. Gore Vidal, *Screening History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 11.
2. For a wide-ranging and illuminating study of the cinematic flashback and its relations to memory see Maureen Turim, *Flashbacks in Film: Memory and History* (New York: Routledge, 1989).

3. See Christian Metz, *Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier* (London: Macmillan, 1975). For a view of the cinema's relation to memory written by psychoanalytic clinicians, see Harvey Roy Greenberg and Ken Gabbard, "Notes on the Cinematic Depiction of Memory," *PsyArt: An Online Journal for the Psychological Study of the Arts*, 1999, http://www.clas.ufl.edu/ipasa/journal/1999_greenberg02.shtml.
4. Douwe Draaisma, *Metaphors of Memory: A History of Ideas About The Mind*, trans. Paul Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 4.
5. *Ibid.*, 3.
6. *Ibid.*, 104.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Sigmund Freud, "A Note upon the 'Mystic Writing Pad'" (1925), in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, et al., 24 vols. (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953–74), 19:227–32. This edition is hereafter abbreviated *SE*.
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10. Draaisma, *Metaphors of Memory*, 134.
11. Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell, (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover, 1998), 306.
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13. *Ibid.*
14. Annette Kuhn, "A Journey Through Memory," in *Memory and Methodology*, ed. Susannah Radstone (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 179–96.
15. Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
16. Aleida Assmann, "Ghosts of the Past," unpublished paper presented at the "Remembering and Forgetting" colloquium, Department of European Studies, Bath University, February, 27, 2007.
17. See Turim, *Flashbacks in Film*.
18. Richard Terdiman, *Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
19. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Esther Leslie's contribution to this volume.
20. Walter Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," in Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1972), 152–96:182.
21. *Ibid.*, 171.
22. Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, (London: Fontana, 1972), 211–44:229.
23. See, for instance Miriam Hansen, "Benjamin, Cinema and Experience: 'The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology,'" *New German Critique* 40 (Winter 1987): 179–224; and Jodi Brooks, "Between Contemplation and Distraction: Cinema, Obsession and Involuntary Memory," in *Kiss Me Deadly: Feminism and Cinema for the Moment*, ed. Laleen Jayamanne (Sydney: Power Publications, 1995), 77–90.
24. Victor Burgin, *The Remembered Film* (London: Reaktion Books, 2004), 21.
25. Fredric Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," in *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture*, ed. Hal Foster (Port Townsend, Wash.: Bay Press, 1983), 111–25.
26. Andrew Higson, "The Heritage Film and British Cinema," in *Dissolving Views: Key Writings on British Cinema*, ed. Andrew Higson (London: Cassell, 1996), 232–49:233.
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29. Raphael Samuel, "Heritage Baiting," in Samuel, *Theatres of Memory*, (London: Verso, 1994), 259–73.
30. Ibid., 259.
31. Ibid., 271.
32. Ibid., 267.
33. Ibid., 266.
34. Ibid., 266–67.
35. Ibid., 271.
36. Vivian Sobchack, "Introduction: History Happens," in *The Persistence of History: Cinema, Television, and the Modern Event*, ed. Vivian Sobchack (New York: Routledge, 1996), 1–14:5.
37. Ibid., 7.
38. Quoted in Benjamin, "On Some Motifs in Baudelaire," 157.
39. Hayden White, "The Modernist Event," in *The Persistence of History: Cinema, Television, and the Modern Event*, ed. Vivian Sobchack (New York: Routledge, 1996), 17–38:20.
40. Ibid., 24; see also Janet Walker, *Trauma Cinema* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
41. White, "The Modernist Event," 22.
42. Walker, *Trauma Cinema*, 20.
43. Texts that have particularly influenced the development of theories of culture, film, and trauma include Cathy Caruth, ed., *Trauma: Explorations in Memory* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); and Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History* (New York: Routledge, 1992).
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45. Alison Landsberg, "Prosthetic Memory: *Total Recall* and *Blade Runner*," in *Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk: Cultures of Technological Embodiment*, ed. Mike Featherstone and Roger Burrows (London: Sage, 1995); Alison Landsberg, *Traumatic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).
46. Tom Gunning, "The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde," *Wide Angle* 8.3–4 (1986): 63–70.
47. Steven Shaviro, *The Cinematic Body* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1993).
48. See Donna Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York: Routledge, 1991); and Mike Featherstone and Roger Burrows, eds., *Cyberspace/Cyberbodies/Cyberpunk Cultures of Technological Embodiment*, (London: Sage, 1995).
49. Ben Roberts, "Cinema as Mnemotechnics: Bernard Stiegler and the Industrialization of Memory," *Angelaki* 11.1 (April 2006): 55–63:56.
50. Ibid., 59.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid. 60.
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54. Robert Burgoyne, *Film Nation: Hollywood Looks at U.S. History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 107.
55. Annette Kuhn, "Journey Through Memory," 186–87.

56. Annette Kuhn, *Family Secrets: Acts of Memory and Imagination* (London: Verso, 1995), 107.
57. Sigmund Freud, "Screen Memories" (1899), in *SE* 3:301–22.
58. Burgin, *Remembered Film*, 68.
59. *Ibid.*, 68.
60. D. W. Winnicott, "Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena," in Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (London: Routledge, 1971), 1–25.
61. Burgin, *Remembered Film*, 65, quoting Winnicott (emphasis in orig.).
62. *Ibid.*, 70.
63. *Ibid.*
64. Kuhn, *Family Secrets*, 112.
65. Sigmund Freud, "Family Romances" (1909), in *SE* 9:235–41.
66. Sigmund Freud, "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (1918), in *SE* 17:7–122.
67. Kuhn, *Family Secrets*, 118.
68. See also Kuhn's later research on memories of British cinema-going in the 1930s, published as Annette Kuhn, *An Everyday Magic: Cinema and Cultural Memory* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002).
69. Burgin, *Remembered Film*, 70.
70. Kuhn, *Family Secrets*, p.112.
71. Felicity Collins and Therese Davis, *Australian Cinema After Mabo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) p.144.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
73. The film earned AUS\$1.2 million in its first week of screening; *ibid.*, 133.
74. *Ibid.*, 139.
75. *Ibid.*, 149.
76. *Ibid.*
77. *Ibid.*, 135, quoting Becker Entertainment, *Rabbit-Proof Fence Media Kit*, 11.
78. For the complete text of the speech, see http://www.aph.gov.au/house/Rudd_Speech.pdf.

23. Machines of Memory

Steve Goodman and Luciana Parisi

1. F. Kittler *Literature, Media, Information Systems*, trans. J. Johnston, (New York: Routledge, 1997).
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3. William Bogard, "Distraction and Digital Culture," *Ctheory* (October 5, 2000), <http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=131>.
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5. Katherine N. Hayles, *How We Became Posthuman* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
6. John von Neumann, *The Computer and the Brain*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000, orig. 1958), 61–62.
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8. *Ibid.*, 67–68.
9. *Ibid.*, 63–94.

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12. Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, *The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding* (Boston: New Science Library, 1987), 169.
13. Alexander Riegler, "Constructive Memory" (2005), <http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/people/riegler/papers/riegler05memory.html> (accessed March 26, 2005).
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15. Aaron Lynch, "Units, Events and Dynamics in Memetic Evolution," *Journal of Memetics: Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission* 2.1 (1998), http://jom-emit.cfpm.org/1998/vol2/lynch_a.html (accessed, February 12, 2006).
16. Matthew Fuller, *Media Ecologies: Materialist Energies in Art and Technoculture*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), 116.
17. Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). See also Dawkins, "Viruses of the Mind," in *Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind*, ed. Bo Dalhborn (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1993), 13–27, available online at <http://cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/Dawkins/viruses-of-the-mind.html>.
18. Daniel C. Dennett, *Darwin's Dangerous Idea* (London: Penguin, 1996).
19. Robert Aunger, *The Electric Meme* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 213.
20. *Ibid.*, 179.
21. Interrogating this nexus between genetic and cultural memory, memeticist Susan Blackmore argues for a process she terms "memetic driving" to emphasize that we must think the "coevolution" between genetic and memetic replicators: "The past history of memetic evolution affects the direction that genes must take to maximise their own survival. We now have a coevolutionary process between two quite different replicators that are closely bound together. To maximise their success the genes need to build brains that are capable of selectively copying the most useful memes, while not copying the useless, costly or harmful ones. To maximise their success the memes must exploit the brain's copying machinery in any way they can, regardless of the effects on the genes. The result is a mass of evolving memes, some of which have thrived because they are useful to the genes, and some of which have thrived in spite of the fact that they are not—and a brain that is designed to do the job of selecting which memes are copied and which are not." She concludes, "If memes are truly replicators in their own right then we should expect things to happen in human evolution which are not for the benefit of the genes, nor for the benefit of the people who carry those genes, but for the benefit of the memes which those people have copied." (Susan Blackmore, "Evolution and Memes: The Human Brain as a Selective Imitation Device," <http://www.susanblackmore.co.uk/Articles/cas01.html> [accessed, February 12, 2006], originally in *Cybernetics and Systems* 32.1 [2001]: 225–55.)
22. Aunger, *The Electric Meme*, 190.
23. *Ibid.*
24. A. Clark, "Where Brain, Body and World Collide," in "The Brain," special issue, *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences* 127.2 (1998): 257–80.
25. *Ibid.*
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27. *Ibid.*, 93–94.
28. Antonio R. Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza* (Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt, 2003).
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31. *Ibid.*, 146–47.
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34. *Ibid.*, 38.
35. *Ibid.*, 36.
36. *Ibid.*, 78–84.
37. *Ibid.*, 44–45.
38. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomilson and Roberta Galeta (London: The Athlone Press, 1989), 79.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Whitehead, Alfred North, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: The Free Press, 1967, orig. 1933), 191–92.
41. *Ibid.*, 192.
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43. Whitehead, *Adventures in Ideas*, 191.
44. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 129.
45. Whitehead, *Adventures in Ideas*, 195.
46. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, 178.
47. *Ibid.*, 215.
48. Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
49. Brian Massumi, “On the Autonomy of Affect,” in Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002), 23–45.

24. Slavery, Historicism, and the Poverty of Memorialization

Stephan Palmié

NOTE: I would like to acknowledge the comments and criticism offered by Bobby Hill, Ira Berlin, the participants in New York University’s Atlantic History Workshop, and the students in my “Anthropology of History” graduate seminar at the University of Chicago.

1. Andrew Salkey, *Havana Journal* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1971), 166–85.
2. Miguel Barnet, *Biografía de un cimarrón*. (Havana: Instituto de Etnología y Folklore, 1966). Henze, who met Montejo in 1969–70, went on to compose a work for baritone, guitar, flute, and percussion, set to a libretto of Enzensberger’s adaptations of Barnet’s text that premiered two years before Montejo died in 1973, at the approximate age of 113. As Henze later recalled, Montejo “was then 107 years old, tall as a tree, walked slowly and upright, his eyes were lively, he radiated dignity and seemed well aware that he was a historical personage”; Hans-Werner Henze, *Music and Politics* (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), 174.
3. Salkey, *Havana Journal*, 185.
4. A fact that, as William Luis argues, Montejo himself may well have been aware of; Luis, “The Politics of Memory and Miguel Barnet’s *The Autobiography of a Run Away Slave*” *MLN* 104 (1989): 475–91:480.

5. See Suzanne Miers, *Slavery in the Twentieth Century: The Evolution of a Global Pattern* (Walnut Creek, Calif: Altamira, 2003), and Kevin Bales, *Disposable People: The New Slavery in the Global Economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). But see also Samuel Martinez, "Indifference Within Indignation: Anthropology, Human Rights, and the Haitian Bracero," *American Anthropologist* 98 (1996): 17–25, for a trenchant analysis of the politically as well as epistemologically problematic nature of conceptualizing contemporary forms of hyperexploitation as "neo-slavery."

6. Miguel Barnet, *The Autobiography of a Runaway Slave, Esteban Montejo*, trans. Jocasta Innes (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968); Barnet, *Biography of a Runaway Slave*, trans. W. Nick Hill (Willimantic, Conn.: Curbstone Press, 1994). While all Spanish editions known to me (whether published in Cuba, Spain, Mexico, or Argentina) avoided the term *autobiografía* (though some recent editions are more ambiguously entitled "Historia de un cimarrón"), beginning with the 1968 Pantheon and 1970 Penguin editions, all English translations published before 1994 billed the book as Montejo's autobiography, thereby arguably assimilating it to the North American genre of the slave narrative that was experiencing a belated republication-boom with the rise of Black Studies in American academia.

7. Alberto Moreiras, "The Aura of Testimonio," in *The Real Thing: Testimonial Discourse and Latin America*, ed. Georg M. Gugelberger (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), 192–224.

8. Barnor Hesse, "Forgotten like a Bad Dream: Atlantic Slavery and the Ethics of Postcolonial Memory," in *Relocating Postcolonialism*, ed. David Theo Goldberg and Ato Quayson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 143–73.

9. Reinhardt Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 206. See James Olney, "'I Was Born': Slave Narratives, Their Status as Autobiography and as Literature," in *The Slave's Narrative*, ed. Charles T. Davis and Henry Louis Gates, Jr. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 148–75, for an exceptionally lucid discussion of this moment in the published slave narratives. For an overview of the issues involved in the contemporary debate over the *testimonio* genre see the contributions to Georg M. Gugelberger, ed., *The Real Thing: Testimonial Discourse and Latin America* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996), and Arturo Arias, ed., *The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).

10. See Miguel Barnet, *La fuente viva* (Havana: Editorial Letras Cubanas, 1983).

11. Of course, this is essentially but a version of the epistemological quandaries historians encounter in dealing with what Marc Bloch called "intentional evidence" (Bloch, *The Historian's Craft* [New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953]). It is likewise a problem that has not only always bedeviled the genre of anthropological life histories (Sidney W. Mintz, "The Sensation of Moving while Standing Still," *American Ethnologist* 16 [1989]: 175–85) but similarly plagues contemporary attempts to ethnographically "give voice" to the "native." For a thought-provoking interpretation of the fundamentally heteroglossic nature of Barnet/Montejo's *Biografía* see Luis, "Politics of Memory."

12. William Andrews, "Introduction to the Scholarly Bibliography of Slave and Ex-Slaves Narratives" (2004), <http://docsouth.unc.edu/neh/biblintro.html>.

13. And taking also his recollections of less-than-admirable pursuits in the service of local politics Montejo documentably engaged in after the turn of the twentieth century, and over which Barnet and the historian Michael Zeuske fought a pitched battle in the pages of the journal *New West Indian Guides* (Barnet, "The Untouchable Cimarrón," *New West Indian Guide* 71 [1997]: 281–89; Zeuske, "The Cimarrón in the Archives: A Re-Reading of Miguel Barnet's Biography of Esteban Montejo," *New West Indian Guides* 71 [1997]: 265–79). For further information concerning the context of the production of Barnet's book, see Luis, "Politics of Memory."

14. Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313.
15. George Rawick, *The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography*, 19 vols. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972).
16. For the history of the production of the twentieth-century slave narrative collection and its changing assessment by American historians see Benjamin Botkin, *Lay My Burden Down: A Folk History of Slavery* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), ix–xiv; Norman Yetman, "The Background of the Slave Narrative Collection," *American Quarterly* 19 (1967): 534–53; Norman Yetman, "Ex-Slave Interviews and the Historiography of Slavery," *American Quarterly* 36 (1984): 181–210; John W. Blassingame, "Using the Testimony of Ex-Slaves: Approaches and Problems," *Journal of Southern History* 41 (1975): 473–92; John W. Blassingame, ed., *Slave Testimony: Two Centuries of Letters, Speeches, Interviews, and Autobiographies* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977); Paul Escott, *Slavery Remembered: A Record of Twentieth-Century Slave Narratives* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979); David Thomas Bailey, "A Divided Prism: Two Sources of Black Testimony on Slavery," *Journal of Southern History* 44 (1980): 381–404; and David Henige, *Oral Historiography* (London: Longman, 1982). For a recent reevaluation of the methodological problems involved in the use of these documents see Saidiya V. Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 10–14.
17. Blassingame, "Using the Testimony of Ex-Slaves," 490.
18. David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).
19. Ira Berlin, Marc Favreau, and Steven Miller, eds., *Remembering Slavery: African Americans Talk about Their Personal Experiences of Slavery and Emancipation* (New York: The New Press, 1998).
20. Dwight A. McBride, *Impossible Witnesses: Truth, Abolitionism, and Slave Testimony* (New York: New York University Press, 2001).
21. That Rawick gave his edition of the WPA narratives the title *The American Slave: A Composite Autobiography* is not insignificant for the present considerations.
22. Joan W. Scott, "The Evidence of Experience," *Critical Inquiry* 17 (1991): 773–97.
23. See Arthur Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), for a sustained discussion of the problems presented by the "past" as an object of knowledge and Steven Knapp, "Collective Memory and the Actual Past," *Representations* 26 (1989): 23–49, for a provocative argument concerning the logical irrelevance of the "actual past" to socially authoritative narratives about it.
24. Geneviève Fabre and Robert O'Meally, eds., *History and Memory in African American Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
25. Pierre Nora, "Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*," *Representations* 26 (1989): 7–25.
26. See Kerwin Lee Klein, "On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse," *Representations* 69 (2000): 127–50.
27. See Laurence Mordekhai Thomas, *Vessels of Evil: American Slavery and the Holocaust* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); Seymour Drescher, "The Atlantic Slave Trade and the Holocaust: A Comparative Analysis," in *Is the Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide*, ed. Alan S. Rosenbaum (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 65–85; Ralph Austen, "The Jewish Holocaust as a Model for African-American Slave Trade Discourse: History, Politics, and

Memory” (paper presented at a conference on “The Atlantic Slave Trade in African and African American Memory,” University of Chicago, May 24–25, 1997); Thomas McCarthy, “*Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in the USA: On the Politics of the Memory of Slavery,” *Political Theory* 30 (2002): 623–48.

28. See Knapp, “Collective Memory and the Actual Past”; Ian Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ian Hacking, “Memory Sciences, Memory Politics,” in *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory*, ed. Paul Antze and Michael Lambek (London: Routledge, 1996), 67–87; Paul Antze and Michael Lambek, “Introduction: Forecasting Memory,” in the same volume, xi–xxxviii; Allan Megill, “History, Memory, Identity,” *History of the Human Sciences* 11 (1998): 37–62; and Walter Benn Michaels, “‘You Who Never Was There’: Slavery and the New Historicism, Deconstruction and the Holocaust,” in *The Americanization of the Holocaust*, ed. Hilene Flanzbaum (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 181–97.

29. This is an ideological move, we might say, that Miguel Barnet had apparently been able to perform even while Esteban Montejo was still speaking to him: for Barnet, “el cimarrón” had already become a metonym of pasts on which he himself aimed to leave his interpretative stamp in the name of the Cuban revolutionary national project. Luis, who provides the most sensitive reading of the text in regard to this moment, suggests that there are traces of textual evidence that support the assumption that Montejo may *not* have shared Barnet’s vision of history and instead remained skeptical, if not outright disillusioned; Luis, “Politics of Memory.”

30. The literature on the American reparations debate has grown by leaps and bounds in recent years. For useful introductions to its history see Martha Biondi, “The Rise of the Reparations Movement,” *Radical History Review* 87 (2003): 5–18, and John Torpey, “Paying For the Past? The Movement for Reparations for African-Americans,” *Journal of Human Rights* 3 (2004): 171–87; for its larger international context, see Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), and Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices* (New York: Norton, 2000). Some of the major positions are outlined in Roy L. Brooks, *Atonement and Forgiveness: A New Model for Black Reparations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004); Randall Robinson, *The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks* (New York: Dutton, 2000); Charles J. Ogletree Jr., “Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America,” *Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review* 38 (2003): 279–320; and Michael C. Dawson, Michael and Rovana Popoff, “Reparations: Justice and Greed in Black and White,” *DuBois Review* 1 (2004): 47–91; but see also Lawrie Balfour’s thoughtful response, “Reparations After Identity Politics,” *Political Theory* 33 (2005): 786–811, to critiques of identity politics and the juridification of politics (e.g., Wendy Brown, *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995]), and Robert Westley’s reading of the legal conceptions of value, temporality, and “standing” that militate against the effective resolution of claims to reparations in current American law (Westley, “The Accursed Share: Genealogy, Temporality, and the Problem of Value in Black Reparations Discourse,” *Representations* 92 [2006]: 81–116).

31. Surveyed by Jean-François Véran, “Quilombos and Land Rights in Contemporary Brazil,” *Cultural Survival Quarterly* 25 (2002): 20–25, and Hebe Mattos, “‘Remanescentes de Quilombos’: Memory of Slavery, Historical Justice, and Citizenship in Contemporary Brazil,” (presented at the conference “Repairing the Past: Confronting the Legacies of Slavery, Genocide, and Caste,” Yale University, New Haven, Conn., October 27–29, 2005), www.yale.edu/glc/justice/mattos.pdf; and exemplified by Caros Vogt and Peter Fry, *Cafundó: A África no Brasil* (Campinas: UNICAMP, 1995), and Richard Price, “Scrapping Maroon History: Brazil’s Promise, Suriname’s Shame,” *New West*

Indian Guide 72 (1998): 233–55. For ongoing research, see the website of the Laboratório de História Oral e Imagem of the Universidade Federal Fluminense in Niterói, Rio de Janeiro <http://www.historia.uff.br/labhoi/modules/xccgal/>.

32. Michael Lambek, “The Past Imperfect: Remembering as a Moral Practice,” in *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory*, ed. Paul Antze and Michael Lambek (London: Routledge, 1996), 235–54; Paul Ricoeur, “Memory and Forgetting,” in *Questioning Ethics*, ed. Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (London: Routledge, 1999), 5–11.

33. Simon Harrison, “Identity as a Scarce Resource,” *Social Anthropology* 7 (1999): 239–51.

34. Lambek, “Past Imperfect.”

35. Balfour, “Reparations After Identity Politics”; Westley, “The Accursed Share.”

36. See, for example, Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); Hesse, “Forgotten like a Bad Dream”; Saidiya V. Hartman, “The Time of Slavery,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 101 (2002): 757–777; Stephan Palmié, *Wizards and Scientists: Explorations in Afro-Cuban Modernity and Tradition* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002); Colin [Joan] Dayan, “Legal Slaves and Civil Bodies,” in *Materializing Democracy: Toward a Revitalized Cultural Politics*, ed. Russ Castronovo and Dana D. Nelson (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002), 53–94; and Colin [Joan] Dayan, “Legal Terrors,” *Representations* 92 (2005): 42–80.

37. See Knapp, “Collective Memory and the Actual Past.” On the legal question of how restitutionary claims based on personal injury might be rendered “descendible” see Westley, “The Accursed Share.”

38. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon, 1995); Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Abortive Rituals: Historical Apologies in the Global Era,” *Interventions* 2 (2000): 171–86. Cf. Richard Handler, “Who Owns the Past? History, Cultural Property, and the Logic of Possessive Individualism,” in *The Politics of Culture*, ed. Brett Williams (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Press, 1991), 63–74; Handler, “Is ‘Identity’ a Useful Cross-Cultural Concept?” in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 27–40; Antze and Lambek, “Introduction: Forecasting Memory”; Harrison “Identity as a Scarce Resource,” and, for a different, but equally pertinent perspective, Stuart Hall, “Introduction: Who Needs Identity?” in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul DuGay (London: Sage, 1997), 1–17.

39. The logic becomes obvious in the American legal form of the class action suit, in which the plaintiffs are treated as collectivities composed of instances of wronged persons rather than as groups.

40. Balfour, “Reparations After Identity Politics,” 803.

41. Hence perhaps Charles Maier’s worry that the global trend toward “revisiting . . . collective victimization and catastrophe” at the end of the twentieth century may less reveal a genuine concern to transcend such pasts than reflect “our current incapacity to entertain transformative political projects for the future and hence to invest our collective resources in contesting the past”; Charles S. Maier, “Overcoming the Past? Narrative and Negotiation, Remembering and Reparation: Issues at the Interface of History and the Law,” *Politics and the Past*, ed. John Torpey (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 295–303:303.

42. Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom* (New York: Norton, 1975).

43. Named so after Christine Taubira, a delegate from French Guyane who had originally introduced the bill—no doubt in the sincere belief that it might lead to genuine political reflection.

44. “Speech by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, Marking the First Commemorative Day in Metropolitan France for Remembering Slavery and Its Abolition,” Présidence de la République, May 10, 2006, http://www.elysee.fr/elysee/elysee.fr/anglais/speeches_and_documents/

2006/speech_by_the_president_of_the_republic_marking_the_first_commemorative_day_in_metropolitan_france_for_remembering_slavery_and_its_abolition.50223.html.

45. Wendy Brown, *Politics Out of History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 165.

46. As Christine Chivallon puts it in regard to the rush to commemorate the slave trade that seems to have gripped the city of Bristol under the impact of Britain's newly discovered "multicultural" agenda in the late 1990s, "the boom in memory was only translating the excess that marks the instrumentalization of all signs that serve to accredit a social vision in which the acceptance of difference must be viewed as already achieved," rather than as a woefully incomplete project (Chivallon, "Bristol and the Eruption of Memory: Making the Slave-Trading Past Visible," *Social and Cultural Geography* 2 [2001]: 357).

47. Trouillot, *Silencing the Past*; Trouillot, "Abortive Rituals"; Hartman, "The Time of Slavery."

48. Proof of the pudding is that—pace Aristotle, and with the significant exception of Count Tolstoy—few *modern* claims upon the past have ever explicitly been made in the name of "poetry." See Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Knapp, "Collective Memory and the Actual Past"; Michael Lambek, *The Weight of the Past: Living With History in Mahajanga, Madagascar* (New York: Palgrave, 2002); Koselleck, *Futures Past*.

49. See Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*; Danto, *Analytical Philosophy of History*; and Knapp, "Collective Memory and the Actual Past," for the illogicality of such a view, and Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Palmié, *Wizards and Scientists*, 1–20 et passim; Lambek *The Weight of the Past*; Koselleck, *Futures Past*; Constantin Fasolt, *The Limits of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 3–45; Constantin Fasolt, "History as Ritual," unpublished manuscript (2005); and Eric Hirsch and Charles Stewart, "Introduction: Ethnographies of Historicity," *History and Anthropology* 16 (2005): 261–74, for discussions of the historicity and cultural specificity of western historicism.

50. Elizabeth A. Povinelli, *The Cunning of Recognition: Indigenous Alterities and the Making of Australian Multiculturalism* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002).

51. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).

52. Trouillot, "Abortive Rituals."

53. See Ralph Austen, "The Slave Trade as History and Memory: Confrontations of Slaving Voyage Documents and Communal Traditions," *William and Mary Quarterly* 58 (1999): 229–44, for details on the controversy, and Paula Ebron, "Tourists as Pilgrims: Commercial Fashioning of Transatlantic Politics," *American Ethnologist* 26 (1999): 910–32; Jennifer Hasty, "Rites of Passage, Routes of Redemption: Emancipation Tourism and the Wealth of Culture," *Africa Today* 49 (2002): 47–76; and especially Hartman, "The Time of Slavery," for searching reflections on the antinomies of "roots tourism" that expose the triviality of Curtin's misgivings.

54. Curtin had already incited considerable controversy earlier that year, when, in an article in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, he charged that American academic hiring practices in African history favored less qualified black applicants over white ones and warned of an impending "ghettoization" of that field (Philip D. Curtin, "Ghettoizing African History," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, March 3, 1995, A44).

55. The speech can be accessed at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030708-1.html>.

56. One needs to note an additional layer of irony here: for it was arguably the work of historians of the Atlantic slave trade like Curtin that, by empirically assessing its scope and authoritatively

inscribing it into the Western historical imagination, makes possible statements like the foregoing (or, indeed, the entire controversy). I thank Fred Cooper for this observation, though I do not think that it has much bearing on the present argument. Compare Steven Feierman, “African Histories and the Dissolution of World History,” in *Africa and the Disciplines*, ed. Robert H. Bates, V. Y. Mudimbe and Jean O’Barr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 167–212, on the non-additivity of historical knowledge.

57. Michael Ralph, “At Play in the Postcolony” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2006).

58. This is not to say that the “memories” fostered by “roots tourism” are unproblematic. As Paulla Ebron argues in her analysis of a McDonald’s-sponsored “African American homeland tour” to Gorée Island, not only does contemporary corporate “identity marketing” aim to domesticate oppositional expressions of difference. It also effectively disarticulates the vision of a shared transatlantic history of oppression central to mid-twentieth-century forms of political Pan-Africanism by replacing it, on both sides of the Atlantic, with “the pragmatism of free-market wealth generation” (Hasty, “Rites of Passage,” 58). In the case Ebron describes, the “McDonald’s tour . . . brought participants into an identity journey that blocked out much of collective politics, both African and American, even as it gave us a sense of connection” (Ebron “Tourists as Pilgrims,” 928; cf. Hartman, “The Time of Slavery”). Nonetheless, to compare these two modes of mnemonic practice coinciding at the Maison des Esclaves risks mistaking the profit-driven manipulation of authentic desire to connect with and mourn a tragic past with the staging of commemorative rituals designed to render such connections irrelevant in and for the present.

59. These range from Representative Tom De Lay’s accusation that President Clinton treasonously criticized the United States on foreign soil in delivering (what arguably was not) an apology for slavery, to the much publicized “genomic exposure” of Thomas Jefferson’s paternity of one of his slave Sally Hemings’s sons, to the last-minute decision of the Library of Congress not to open its “Back of the Big House exhibit” (which soon after surfaced at the District of Columbia’s Martin Luther King Public Library), to the belated discovery that Philadelphia’s Freedom Bell exhibit was to be housed on the grounds where George Washington kept his slaves during his presidency, and on to scuffles that broke out during the Colonial Williamsburg Museum’s reenactment of a slave auction, or—apparently even most disturbing for Berlin—the interruption of scholarly dialogue by an unruly lay audience during a 1998 Omohundro Institute for Early American History and Culture conference on the merits of a newly unveiled CD-ROM database on the transatlantic slave trade (David Eltis, Stephen D. Behrendt, David Richardson, and Herbert S. Klein, eds., *The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Database on CD-ROM* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999]). For more on such controversies see the contributions to James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, eds., *Slavery and Public History: The Tough Stuff of American Memory* (New York: The New Press, 2006).

60. Ira Berlin, “American Slavery in History and Memory and the Search for Social Justice,” *Journal of American History* 90 (2004): 1251–68; 1259.

61. *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*, 1262.

63. *Ibid.*

64. *Ibid.*, 1262–63.

65. *Ibid.*, 1266.

66. *Ibid.*

67. *Ibid.*, 1266ff.

68. For instance, Bernard Bailyn, “Considering the Slave Trade: History and Memory,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 58 (1999): 245–52.

69. Berlin, “American Slavery,” 1268.

70. And these might include not only descendants of victims of slavery, but—in all fairness—disgruntled white supremacists and “neo-Confederates” in the U.S. South as well.

71. Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul*; Antze and Lambek, “Introduction: Forecasting Memory.”

72. Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge* (New York: Pantheon, 1980).

73. W. E. B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America, 1860–1880* (New York: Russel and Russel, 1935).

74. Though Peter Novick, in *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity” Question and the American Historical Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), does not phrase matters in such terms, his still unsurpassed social history of North American historiography can, in fact, be read as a veritable catalog of instances of the operation of this logic. If unwittingly, Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacobs, in *Telling the Truth About History* (New York: Norton, 1994), attest to its continuous salience. Cf. Chakrabarty on what he calls the emergence of “subaltern pasts” as a function of the operation of historical reason in the production of “minority histories” (*Provincializing Europe*, 97–113).

75. Koselleck, *Futures Past*.

76. Compare here Fasolt’s doubly sacrilegious comparison between the Eucharist as the major ritual of Catholicism, and contemporary historians’ ritual of producing evidence: in both cases (the body of Christ and the historical past), we are arguably dealing with an ultimately unsubstantiable “reality” that must be represented, and rendered socially binding, through ritualized procedures. As Fasolt argues, the sacredness (in Durkheim’s sense) of evidence, central as it is to such rituals, arises out of and in turn stabilizes liberal visions of personal freedom and accountability—two key components of a credo at the very core of modern historiographical praxis (Fasolt, “History as Ritual”).

77. Hirsch and Stewart, “Introduction: Ethnographies of Historicity,” 268.

78. David Scott, *Refashioning Futures: Criticism After Postcoloniality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

79. J. G. A. Pocock, “The Origins of the Study of the Past: A Comparative Approach,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 4 (1962): 209–46.

25. Soviet Memories: Patriotism and Trauma Catherine Merridale

NOTE: I presented a version of this chapter at the University of Southampton’s Memory Research Group in May 2006. I am grateful to the participants for inviting me and for their helpful comments in discussion.

1. The debates of the late 1980s are summed up in articles such as Alec Nove’s “Victims of Stalinism: How Many?” and S. G. Wheatcroft’s “More Light on the Scale of Repression and Excess Mortality,” both in *Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives*, ed. J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. Manning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 261–74, 275–90. For problems of accessibility and the early impact of glasnost, see R. W. Davies, *Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1989).

2. The first book, concerning death and memory, was my *Night of Stone: Death and Memory in Russia* (London: Faber and Faber, 2000). On the war veterans, see my *Ivan’s War: The Red Army, 1939–1945* (London: Faber and Faber, 2005). I am grateful for the support of the Economic and Social Research Council in both cases, and also for research leave funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Board.

3. The discourse on trauma, and on memory and repression where trauma is concerned, dates back to Freud. For a sympathetic discussion, see John P. Wilson, Zev Harel, and Boaz Kahana, eds., *Human Adaptation to Extreme Stress: From the Holocaust to Vietnam* (London: Plenum, 1988). For a more approachable study of memory in general, see Alan Baddeley, *The Psychology of Memory* (London: Harper and Row, 1976).

4. For a discussion of the hazards of recalling and of listening, see Dori Laub, “Bearing Witness, or the Vicissitudes of Listening,” in Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History* (London: Routledge, 1992), 57–74.

5. The remark was picked up by Derek Summerfield in his “The Psychological Legacy of War and Atrocity: The Question of Long-Term and Transgenerational Effects and the Need for a Broad View,” *Journal of Nervous and Medical Disease* 184.1 (1996): 375–77.

6. See Merridale, *Night of Stone*, 304–5.

7. Solzhenitsyn’s *Gulag Archipelago*, published in English in 1974, resulted in his expulsion from the USSR. Like earlier “revelations,” it served to ensure that the European Left could not turn to the Soviet Union for comfort at a time of political crisis, but like earlier publications (notably Viktor Kravchenko’s *I Chose Freedom*), it was unwelcome in such political circles.

8. The best account is Anne Applebaum, *Gulag: A History of the Soviet Camps* (London: Allen Lane, 2003).

9. See Edwin Bacon, *The Gulag at War: Stalin’s Forced Labour System in the Light of the Archives* (Houndmills, U.K.: Macmillan, 1994).

10. See Merridale, *Ivan’s War*, 174.

11. After Stalin’s death, the Gulag was gradually liquidated, initially on the instructions of Lavrenti Beria and then as part of Nikita Khrushchev’s program of de-Stalinization.

12. See *Ivan’s War*, p.307.

13. The extensive literature on primary groups begins with the famous article by Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, “Cohesion and Distintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12 (1948): 280–315.

26. The Witness in the Archive: Holocaust Studies/Memory Studies

Marianne Hirsch and Leo Spitzer

NOTE: This chapter appeared in *Memory Studies* 2.2 (2009): 151–70. We thank Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz for their invitation to write this article and the challenging question they posed to us: What has Holocaust Studies brought to Memory Studies and how, conversely, has Memory Studies inflected Holocaust Studies? We are also grateful to members of the Columbia Cultural Memory colloquium and the Seminar on the Age of the Witness at CUNY Graduate Center for their excellent suggestions on earlier versions of this article.

1. Shoshana Felman, *The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 106. As the author, with Dori Laub, of *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History* (New York: Routledge, 1992), Felman has been a primary voice in defining what Annette Wieviorka has called “the era of witness.” See her *L’Ere du témoin* (Paris: Plon, 1998), translated by Jared Stark as *The Era of Witness* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006).

2. Among other possible trajectories we could have chosen, are visibility and especially photography as privileged media of memory; the acute interest in museums and memorials as media of

history and memory; and the challenges of intergenerational transmission of traumatic histories, or what we have termed “postmemory.” Each of these trajectories would have led us to explore the connections between Holocaust studies and the larger field of memory. Certainly a key factor motivating our choice of testimony as the topic to pursue is its important role in the new truth commissions that have increasingly come to serve as vehicles of transitional justice in the aftermath of catastrophe on a global scale. For a related argument about Holocaust testimony, see chapter 3 in Dominick LaCapra’s recent study *History and Its Limits: Human, Animal, Violence* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2009).

3. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, revised ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 223.

4. *Ibid.*, 229.

5. *Ibid.*

6. In his *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, Agamben distinguishes between two kind of witnesses: one, emerging from the Latin notion of *testis* (based on the third party, *terstis*), is one who observes but does not live through the event; the other, the *superstes*, is the one who has lived through something and bears witness to it; Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone Books, 1999), 17. Our discussion of witnessing in this article concerns the *superstes*, the survivor-witness.

7. Felman, *Juridical Unconscious*, 127.

8. Quoted in Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 260.

9. Gideon Hausner, *Justice in Jerusalem* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 292.

10. Felman, *Juridical Unconscious*, 123.

11. Felman objects to Susan Sontag’s provocative reference to the Eichmann trial as “the most interesting and moving work of art of the past ten years,” arguing: “There is at least one crucial difference between an event of law and an event of art . . . : a work of art cannot sentence to death. A trial, unlike art, is grounded in the sanctioned legal violence it has the power (and sometimes the duty) to enact”; Felman, *Juridical Unconscious*, 152–53. For Sontag’s remark, see her “Reflections on *The Deputy*,” in Eric Bentley, ed. *The Storm Over “The Deputy”* (New York: Grove Press, 1964), 118.

12. Quoted in Felman, *Juridical Unconscious*, 148.

13. Haim Gouri, *Facing the Glass Booth: The Jerusalem Trial of Adolf Eichmann*, trans. Michael Swirsky (Detroit: Wayne State Press, 2004), 129.

14. Felman, *Juridical Unconscious*, 143.

15. Gouri, *Facing the Glass Booth*, 129.

16. Felman, *Juridical Unconscious*, 153.

17. Annette Wieviorka, “On Testimony,” in *Holocaust Remembrance: The Shapes of Memory*, ed. Geoffrey Hartman (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), 24. See also Wieviorka, *Era of Witness*.

18. Wieviorka, *Era of the Witness*, 88.

19. Geoffrey Hartman, “Learning from Survivors: The Yale Testimony Project,” in Hartman, *The Longest Shadow: In the Aftermath of the Holocaust* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 142, 138.

20. Jean-François Lyotard, *The Differend: Phrases in Dispute*, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988). 9

21. Jacques Derrida, “The Poetics and Politics of Witnessing,” in Derrida, *Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan*, ed. Thomas Dutoit and Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005) 75.

22. Thomas Trezise, "The Question of Community in Charlotte Delbo's *Auschwitz and After*," *Modern Language Notes* 117.4 (September 2002): 7. See also the distinction between "bearing witness" and "giving testimony" made by Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard Glejzer in *Between Witness and Testimony: The Holocaust and the Limits of Representation* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2001).
23. Charlotte Delbo, *Days and Memory*, trans. Rosette Lamont (Marlboro, Vt.: The Marlboro Press, 1990), 2–3.
24. For a provocative discussion of the structure of the "I" testifying to Holocaust trauma, see Thomas Trezise, "Unspeakable," *The Yale Journal of Criticism* 14.1 (Spring 2001): 57ff. See especially his discussion of Charlotte Delbo's paradoxical statement, "I died in Auschwitz *but no one knows it*" (59).
25. Felman and Laub, *Testimony*, 80.
26. *Ibid.*, 81.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Claude Lanzmann, *Shoah* (Les Films Aleph, 1985; DVD: New Yorker Films Artwork, 2003) and *Shoah: An Oral History of the Holocaust; The Complete Text of the Film by Claude Lanzmann* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985).
29. Primo Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved*, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 52.
30. Marc Chevie and Hervé Le Roux, "Site and Speech: An Interview with Claude Lanzmann," trans. Stuart Liebman, in *Claude Lanzmann's "Shoah": A Casebook*, ed. Stuart Liebman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 37–50.
31. Lanzmann, *Shoah*, 112–13.
32. *Ibid.*, 114.
33. *Ibid.*, 116.
34. *Ibid.*, 117.
35. Claude Lanzmann, seminar at the Museum of Jewish Heritage, New York, September 23, 2005.
36. See Patricia Yaeger on the disjunction between speech and the body in testimony in her "Testimony Without Intimacy," *Poetics Today* 27.2 (Summer 2006): 399–422:416–22.
37. As Sidra deKoven Ezrahi has written, these debates revolve around questions of authority and authenticity. In the dominant desire to get as close as possible to the heart of the abyss, the "black hole" of Auschwitz, certain voices, certain sites, and certain genres have gained greater authority over others. In what Ezrahi terms the "static or absolutist" approach to representing the Holocaust, as opposed to a more "dynamic or relativist" one, the Holocaust is conceptualized as a series of concentric circles with Auschwitz and the gas chamber—unreachable, immobile, and ultimately incomprehensible—at the center; Sidra deKoven Ezrahi, "Representing Auschwitz," *History and Memory* 7.2 (1996–97): 120–53.
38. In contrast, witnesses invariably apologize for breaking down during their testimony. Most try hard to maintain composure, to tell stories, provide information and, indeed, "truth."
39. Laurence Langer, *Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), esp. 39–76. Bernard-Donals and Glejzer echo this formulation in *Between Witness and Testimony*.
40. Giorgio Agamben, "The Muselmann," in Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, 41–86. For a critical discussion of the term "Muselmann" in Agamben, see Gil Anidjar, *The Jew, the Arab: A History of the Enemy* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 140–49.
41. Primo Levi, "Shame" in Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved*, 83–84.
42. For a critique of Agamben's "Muselmann" argument, see Dominick LaCapra, *History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 160–67.

See *ibid.*, 144–94, for a more encompassing critique of *Remnants of Auschwitz*. See also the critique by Philippe Mesnard and Claudine Kahan, *Giorgio Agamben à l'épreuve d'Auschwitz* (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 2001).

43. Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, 150.

44. For Agamben, the notion of the archive needs to be redefined to accommodate the “unsayable.” See *Remnants of Auschwitz*, 144.

45. See Derrida’s distinction between “bearing witness” and “proof” in “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing,” 75.

46. Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, 12.

47. Charlotte Delbo, *Auschwitz and After*, trans. Rosette Lamont (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995), 1; Delbo, *Days and Memory*, 4.

48. Donald P. Spence, *Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis* (New York: Norton, 1982), 31.

49. Spence, *Narrative Truth and Historical Truth*, 32.

50. For an example of this conflict, see the chapter “Narrative Desire: The ‘Aubrac Affair’ and National Memory of the French Resistance,” in Susan Rubin Suleiman, *Crises of Memory and the Second World War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 36–61.

51. Felman and Laub, *Testimony*, 59. In a recent critical reading of Laub’s essay, Thomas Trezise cites the actual testimony, and in his response, Laub concurs with the accuracy of Trezise’s version: “The men, we saw the gates, yes, the gates open, men running from there and the four crematoria at one time blew up.” See Thomas Trezise, “Between History and Psychoanalysis: A Case Study in the Reception of Holocaust Survivor Testimony,” *History & Memory* 20.1 (Spring/Summer 2008): 39. See also Dori Laub, “On Holocaust Testimony and Its ‘Reception’ Within its Own Frame as a Process in Its Own Right: A Response to ‘Between History and Psychoanalysis’ by Thomas Trezise,” *History & Memory* 21.1 (Spring/Summer 2009): 127–50.

52. Felman and Laub, *Testimony*, 60. As Janet Walker comments on this testimony and its interpretation: “Laub’s unconventional point is that the register of reality testified to here is not just empirical but abstract. Mistaken memories also testify, here to the ‘breakage of the frame.’” See Janet Walker, “The Traumatic Paradox: Autobiographical Documentary and the Psychology of Memory,” in *Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory*, ed. Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone (London: Routledge, 2003), 108–9.

53. In this regard, see especially the work of James Young on “received history” and of Dominick LaCapra on “transference.”

54. Felman and Laub, *Testimony*, 59.

55. *Ibid.*, 63.

56. *Ibid.*, 67.

57. *Ibid.*, 71.

58. In his critical analysis of Laub’s debate with the historians, Thomas Trezise takes Laub to task precisely for his reliance on the lens of clinical psychotherapy, which leads him to “selective listening,” “exaggeration,” and “mythmaking.” After watching three testimonies on which Laub’s analysis might have been based, Trezise finds that none of them project the extreme change of affect highlighted in Laub’s interpretation. In his response, Laub claims as a form of interpretive evidence the psychoanalytic process of countertransference that emerges in the “intimate dialogue” of testimony and thus his own counter-transferential responses and recollections. These led him, in this case, to “replac[e] the manifest text (of the testimony) with its latent meaning.” Laub thus insists on testimony as a psychoanalytic encounter, whereas Trezise sees testimony as a “generic hybrid”

that “requires for its reception a plurality of interpretive frameworks”; Trezise, “Between History and Psychoanalysis,” 31; Laub, “On Holocaust Testimony.”

59. See Dominick LaCapra’s useful discussion of “empathic unsettlement,” as opposed to “surrogate victimhood,” in *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994) and *History and Memory after Auschwitz* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). See also Kaja Silverman’s distinction between idiopathic and heteropathic identification in *The Threshold of the Visible World* (New York: Routledge, 1996) and Marianne Hirsch on postmemory as a nonappropriative form of identification in “Projected Memory: Holocaust Photographs in Personal and Public Fantasy,” in Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe, and Leo Spitzer eds., *Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1999), 3–23.

60. For her elaboration of this call, see Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, esp. 261–79.

61. “It is necessary that our youth remember what happened to the Jewish people. We want them to know the most tragic facts in our history”: Arendt quotes the Israeli David Ben Gurion’s comment about the function of the Eichmann trial; Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 10.

62. See Daniel Levy and Natan Sznajder, *Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2006), 4.

63. *Ibid.*, 32; Pierre Nora, *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past*, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996–98).

64. Levy and Sznajder, *Holocaust and Memory*, 32.

65. *Ibid.*, 4.

66. *Ibid.*, 11–12.

67. See Michael Rothberg’s recent book *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009). See also recent work on how the invocation of a transnational Holocaust memory can serve as a screen memory in local scenes of catastrophe, for example, Neil Levi, “‘No Sensible Comparison’? The Place of the Holocaust in Australia’s History Wars,” *History and Memory* 19.1 (Spring/Summer 2007): 124–56.

27. The Long Afterlife of Loss

Eva Hoffman

1. Dan Bar-On, *Fear and Hope: Three Generations of the Holocaust* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 3.

2. Dina Wardi, *Memorial Candles: Children of the Holocaust* (London: Routledge, 1992).

3. Sigmund Freud, “The ‘Uncanny’” (1919), in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1953–74), 17:217–56.

4. Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia” (1917), in *The Standard Edition*, ed. Strachey, 14: 237–58.

5. Adam Zagajewski, “Try to praise the mutilated world,” trans. Renata Gorczynski, in Zagajewski, *Selected Poems* (London: Faber and Faber, 2004). The poem was included on the back cover of the *New Yorker*’s post-9/11 memorial edition.

6. W. H. Auden, “September 1, 1939,” *New Republic*, October 18, 1939. The first version of the poem, written in response to Germany’s invasion of Poland, included the line “We must love one another or die.” Auden subsequently altered this line to “We must love one another and die.”

28. Migration, Food, Memory, and Home-Building

Ghassan Hage

NOTE: This essay is a revised version of a text that appeared in Helen Grace, Ghassan Hage, Lesley Johnson, Julie Langsworth, and Michael Symonds, *Home/World: Space, Community and Marginality in Sydney's West* (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1997).

1. The inclusion of some Arabic throughout the text is meant primarily for Arabic-speaking readers who would appreciate the expression in its original form, given the layers of meanings it is capable of expressing and that are sometimes lost in the process of translation.

2. Hamid Naficy, *The Making of Exile Cultures: Iranian Television in Los Angeles* (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xiii.

3. Émile Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society* (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 239–51.

4. While I realize that this definition of home is stated as if it were an a priori certainty, in fact it is the end result of both my empirical investigation and my extensive reading in the substantial literature already available on the subject. In particular, I would like to recognize the important influence of a highly stimulating issue of the journal *New Formations*, no. 17, Summer 1992, titled “The Question of ‘Home.’”

5. If I get up at night, “my feet” can take me to the toilet or to the fridge without having to “really” wake up and think where to go. Home is a space of maximal bodily knowledge.

6. Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1991).

7. This is empirically true for both men and women. The point is important to our purposes, for among migrants, both men and women who bury themselves at home and do not succeed in opening up to the host society are frequently pathologized and their houses considered unhomely.

8. For a critical interaction with such a literature see the stimulating article by Sneja Gunew, “Home and Away: Nostalgia in Australian (Migrant) Writing,” *Island in the Stream: Myths of Place in Australian Culture*, ed. Paul Foss (Sydney: Pluto Press, 1988), 35–46. But see also, Fran Bartkowski, “Travellers vs. Ethnics: Discourses of Displacement,” *Discourse* 15.3 (Spring 1993): 158–76, for examples of travelers, as well as ethnics, writing excellent literary narratives of their experience of displacement.

9. What is good for Edward Said (“Reflections on Exile,” in “After the Revolution,” special issue of *Granta* 13 [1984]: 159–72) or Salman Rushdie (*Imaginary Homelands* [London: Granta/Viking, 1991]) is taken as if it represents a universal condition. The point is not that Said’s and Rushdie’s experiences of nostalgia are unimportant in explaining other forms of nostalgia but that the sociological specificity of the subject is ignored. Interestingly, Said and Rushdie deploy nostalgia to make lives for themselves in the West, where they actually live.

10. See, for example, Mirjana Lozanovska, “Abjection and Architecture: The Migrant House in Multicultural Australia,” in *Suburban Dreaming*, ed. Louise C. Johnson (Deakin, Melbourne: Deakin University Press, 1994), chap. 13.

11. See Gunew, “Home and Away,” 38.

12. All interviews cited in this chapter were conducted by the author in the suburbs of western Sydney in 1993.

13. It is important to note that, for international migrants, such spaces of homely feelings from within the new country are only national spaces (Lebanese, Greek, Vietnamese, etc.). That is, if in a village in Lebanon, a woman marries someone in the same village, she will experience homesickness when she moves to her husband’s house. The spatially-yearned-for “back-home” in this context is her prior home in the village. If they both move from the village to Beirut searching for

work, she will also experience homesickness, but in this case the yearned-for back-home becomes “the village.” It is only when she migrates to Australia that back-home becomes Lebanon. In all these cases, the sphere of actual experience is much more limited than the spatial category (house, village, city, nation) used to refer to it.

14. *El-Telegraph*, February 12, 1986.

15. Kristeva’s notion of the semiotic can be helpful here for characterizing the affective potential of such homely songs; see Julia Kristeva, *The Revolution in Poetic Language*, trans. Margaret Waller (New York, Columbia University Press, 1984).

16. *Sydney Morning Herald*, January 26, 1993, Good Living, 22. Although they capture an important aspect of the process, these descriptions are clearly romanticized, for such articles aim at more than just describing: they construct migrant eateries as desirable places for consumption by non-migrants.

17. *Sydney Morning Herald*, May 23, 1972, 8.

18. I do not want to leave the impression that these practices of traveling back-home in order to engage in home-building in the present leave people entirely satisfied. There is a whole dialectic of lack, which as one woman put it “leaves a bitter taste” after each event of this sort. It takes you back-home but not quite, and you are left lacking. Despite its importance, I have chosen not to concern myself with this dialectic here, since it is a generalized “existential” condition well analyzed in psychoanalysis.

29. The Seventh Veil: Feminism, Recovered Memory, and the Politics of the Unconscious

Janice Haaken

1. *The Seventh Veil*, dir. Compton Bennett, with James Mason, Ann Todd, and Herbert Lom, U.K., 1945.

2. Judith L. Herman, *Trauma and Recovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1992). Herman offers one of the most clearly articulated and influential views of this position. See also Judith Lewis Herman with Lisa Hirschman, *Father-Daughter Incest* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

3. Diane L. Hoeweler, *Gothic Feminism: The Professionalization of Gender from Charlotte Smith to the Brontes* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 3.

4. Ellen Bass and Laura Davis, *The Courage to Heal* (New York: Harper, 1988). This text was widely cited in the incest recovery movement of the late 1980s and '90s.

5. Janice Haaken, *Pillar of Salt: Gender, Memory, and the Perils of Looking Back* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1998), and Janice Haaken, “The Recovery of Fantasy, Memory and Desire: Feminist Approaches to Sexual Abuse and Psychic Trauma,” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 21 (1996): 1069–94. See also Erica Burman, “False Memories, True Hopes and the Angelic: Revenge of the Postmodern in Therapy.” *New Formations* 30 (1996/7): 122–34, for feminist analysis of this debate.

6. For discussion of psychoanalytic social theory, see Rosalind Minsky, *Psychoanalysis and Culture* (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 1998); Jacqueline Rose, *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* (London: Verso, 1986); Michael Rustin, *The Good Society and the Inner World: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Culture* (London: Verso, 1991).

7. Herman, *Trauma and Recovery*, and Jennifer J. Freyd, *Betrayal Trauma: The Logic of Forgetting Childhood Abuse* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
8. For discussion of the role of practitioners in concealing prevalence of wife battering, see Lenore Walker, *The Battered Woman Syndrome* (New York: Springer, 1984).
9. Herman, *Trauma and Recovery*; Freyd, *Betrayal Trauma*; Bass and Davis, *Courage to Heal*. These works stress recovering and validating childhood memories of abuse as vital to recovery.
10. For critiques of the recovered memory debate, see Elizabeth J. Loftus and Katherine Ketchum, *The Myth of Repressed Memories: False Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994); and Kenneth Pope, "Memory, Abuse and Science: Questioning Claims about the False Memory Syndrome Epidemic," *American Psychologist* 51 (1996): 957–74.
11. Mark Pendergrast, *Victims of Memories: Sexual Abuse Allegations and Shattered Lives* (Hinesburg, Vt.: Upper Access, 1996).
12. For discussion of feminist analysis of the False Memory Syndrome Foundation, see Haaken, *Pillar of Salt*, chap. 1.
13. Ian Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality Disorder and the Sciences of Memory* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
14. Bessel van der Kolk was a leading influence in the recovered memory movement, particularly in establishing the line of clinical reasoning linking trauma and dissociated memory. See Bessel van der Kolk and Onno van der Hart, "Pierre Janet and the Breakdown of Adaptation in Psychological Trauma" *American Journal of Psychiatry* 146.12 (1989): 1530–40; and Bessel van der Kolk, Alexander C. McFarlane, and Lars Weisaeth, eds., *Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body, and Society* (New York: Guilford Press, 1996).
15. For discussion of the affinity between emotion and the female body, see Arlie Hochschild, *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); and Radhika Mohanram, *Black Body: Women, Colonialism, and Space* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
16. Ellen L. K. Toronto, "The Feminine Unconscious and Psychoanalytic Theory," *Psychoanalytic Psychology* 8 (1991): 415–38. See also Rose, *Sexuality in the Field of Vision*, for discussion on associations between the feminine and the unconscious in Western discourses of mind.
17. See Franz Fanon *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, 1967), for an early use of psychoanalysis in theorizing the politics of intrapsychic conflict.
18. Adrienne Rich, "It's the Lesbian in Us," *Sinister Wisdom* 3 (1977): 3.
19. For literary analysis of the affinity between femininity and the unconscious, see Jean Wyatt, *Reconstructing Desire: The Role of the Unconscious in Women's Reading and Writing* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).
20. Morris Eagle describes key differences between the cognitive and the psychoanalytic concepts of the unconscious in Morris N. Eagle, "The Psychoanalytic and the Cognitive Unconscious," in *Theories of the Unconscious and Theories of the Self*, ed. Raphael Stern (Hillsdale, N.J.: The Analytic Press, 1987): 155–89. See also Elizabeth J. Loftus and Mark R. Klinger, "Is the Unconscious Smart or Dumb?" *American Psychologist* 47 (1992): 761–65, and Roger C. Schank and Robert Abelson, *Knowledge and Memory: The Real Story* (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1995).
21. Bessel van der Kolk. "The Body, Memory, and the Psychobiology of Trauma," in *Sexual Abuse Recalled*, ed. Judith Alpert (New York: Citadel Press, 1995), 29–60.
22. For discussion of the history of post-traumatic stress disorder among American veterans, see Alan Young, *The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).
23. See Herman, *Trauma and Recovery*, and Judith Alpert, ed., *Sexual Abuse Recalled* (New York: Citadel Press, 1995).

24. For a review of clinical literature on trauma and dissociation, see David Spiegel, ed., *Dissociative Disorders: A Clinical Review* (Lutherville, Md.: Sidran Press, 1993).

25. Herman, *Trauma and Recovery*.

26. Jerome L. Singer, ed., *Repression and Dissociation: Implications for Personality Theory, Psychopathology, and Health* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

27. Research on memory supports both the concepts of dissociation and repression as systems of defense, although the repression model is more consistent with findings that fluctuating and current mood states influence autobiographical recall. See, for example, Gordon H. Bower, "Mood and Memory," *American Psychologist* 36 (1981): 129–48. For distinctions between the repression and dissociation models of divided consciousness, see Ernest R. Hilgard, *Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action* (New York: Wiley, 1977); Singer, ed., *Repression and Dissociation*; and Haaken, *Pillar of Salt*.

28. Donald P. Spence, *Narrative Truth and Historical Truth: Meaning and Interpretation in Psychoanalysis* (New York: Norton, 1982).

29. Haaken, *Pillar of Salt*. Many MPD experts draw on contemporary developments in neuropsychology and memory research, particularly research in multiple systems in memory and divided consciousness. See for example, Bennett G. Braun and Edward J. Frischholz, "Remembering and Forgetting in Patients Suffering from Multiple Personality Disorder," in *The Handbook of Emotion and Memory: Research and Theory*, ed. Sven-Ake Christianson (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1992): 411–27.

30. For discussion of historical parallels between MPD and earlier female diagnoses, see Haaken, *Pillar of Salt*, and Hacking, *Rewriting the Soul*.

31. Colin A. Ross, *Multiple Personality Disorder: Diagnosis, Clinical Features, and Treatment* (New York: Wiley, 1989); Bennett G. Braun, ed., *Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder* (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 1986).

32. See Hilgard, *Divided Consciousness*, for discussion of amnesia and differential diagnosis.

33. George K. Ganaway, "Alternative Hypothesis Regarding Satanic Ritual Abuse Memories" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, August 1991, San Francisco).

34. Ernest Hilgard, "The Hidden Observer and Multiple Personality," *International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis* 32 (1984): 252. Clinicians in the MPD field drew extensively on the research on hypnosis carried out by Hilgard, particularly his concept of the "hidden observer."

35. For discussion of gender dynamics of the film noir genre, see Foster Hirsch, *Film Noir: The Dark Side of the Screen* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1981), and E. Ann Kaplan, *Women in Film Noir* (London: BFI, 1980).

36. For a history of Satanic abuse movements, see David Frankfurter, *Evil Incarnate: Rumors of Demonic Conspiracy and Satanic Abuse in History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006).

37. Martha Baldwin, *Beyond Victim: You Can Overcome Childhood Abuse . . . Even Sexual Abuse* (Highland City, Fla.: Rainbow Books, 1988); Craig Lockwood, *Other Alters: Roots and Realities of Cultic and Satanic Ritual Abuse and Multiple Personality Disorders* (Minneapolis: ComCare, 1993).

38. Ross, *Multiple Personality Disorder*.

39. For symptoms of "disguised presentation" of abuse commonly included in checklists for clinicians, see Bass and Davis, *Courage to Heal*.

40. Debbie Nathan and Michael Snedeker, *Satan's Silence: Ritual Abuse and the Making of a Modern American Witch Hunt* (New York: Basic Books, 1995).

41. For further elaboration of this argument, see Haaken, *Pillar of Salt*, chap. 10, and Frankfurter, *Evil Incarnate*.

42. Judith Spencer, *Suffer the Child* (New York: Pocket Books, 1985).
43. *Ibid.*, 19–20.
44. Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (New York: Praeger, 1966).

30. The Gender of Memory in Post-Apartheid South Africa Annie E. Coombes

NOTE: This chapter is dedicated to the many courageous women who were imprisoned for their challenges to the apartheid state and whose sacrifices made the new South Africa possible. In particular I wish to thank the ex-detainees from the Sizoya Sibuye (SiSi) organization who generously shared their time and memories with me while I was conducting my research on the Women's Jail: Yvonne Ntonto Mhlauli, Patricia Alarm, Joyce Dipale, Maggie Nozi Makhudu, and Maleshane (Mally) Mokoena. Jubu Mayet (a former political prisoner) describes one of SiSi's main aims as making "Number Four [another name for the Old Fort Prison complex, which also houses the Women's Jail] as famous as Robben Island, because it seems that the world at large forgets that many women played an important part in achieving democracy for our country"; *Mapping Memory: Former Prisoners Tell Their Stories; An Exhibition Created by Lauren Segal, Clive van den Berg and Churchill Madikida*, (Johannesburg: Constitution Hill, 2006), 8. Many thanks to Shula Marks for her careful reading of an earlier version of this chapter. It has benefited from the insights of many colleagues around the world where I have presented versions as keynotes and lectures (including Oxford University, Harvard University, and Göteborg and Norrköping Universities). Thanks to my colleague at Birkbeck College, Hilary Sapire, for inviting me to speak at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies Workshop on Cultures and Memories of Confinement in Southern Africa and for her comments and those of the other participants. Thanks also to Clive van den Berg and especially to Lauren Segal for generously providing insights into the curatorial process at the Women's Jail and for facilitating my access to transcripts of the ex-prisoner and ex-warder workshops.

1. Njabulo Ndebele, "Memory, Metaphor and the Triumph of Narrative," in *Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa*, ed. Sarah Nuttall and Carli Coetzee (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1998), 19–28.

2. Neville Alexander, *An Ordinary Country: Issues in the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002), 120–21.

3. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, opening address, Human Rights Violation Commission hearing, East London, reported on South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) 2 TV, April 15, 1996, my emphasis. See also, "The Mandate," in *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, 5 vols. (Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998), 1:48–102. Henceforth the reports will appear as *TRC*.

4. Richard A. Wilson, *The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Legitimising the Post-Apartheid State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 112.

5. See Charles Villa-Vicencio, "Getting on with Life: A Move Towards Reconciliation," in *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*, ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press; London: Zed Press, 2000), 199–209. Although Villa-Vicencio, who was the director of research for the TRC, is one of the most measured and ultimately supportive commentators on the TRC, he puts his finger on the crucial demand made of the victim: "The victim is asked to give priority to his or her obligations as a *citizen* rather than a *violated person* in the creation of a new and different

kind of society—within which the bigger picture of national unity and reconciliation is promoted” (201, his emphasis).

6. See for example, Colin Bundy, “The Beast of the Past: History and the TRC,” in *After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa*, ed. Wilmot James and Linda Van de Vijver (Athens: Ohio University Press; Cape Town: David Philip, 2000), 9–20. While highly critical of aspects of the TRC, Bundy calls for a recognition of the TRC’s “emotional, cultural and symbolic power” and, above all, of “the potency and intensity of the testimony it elicited. . . . The cumulative account provides an explicit and terrible record of violence, vindictiveness and brutalisation” (9). For comparative views on the validity of truth commissions and war tribunals in South Africa and in Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Eastern and Central Europe see, Priscilla Hayner, “Same Species, Different Animal: How South Africa Compares to Truth Commissions Worldwide,” in *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*, ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press; London: Zed Press, 2000), 32–41; and P. B. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity* (London: Routledge, 2001). Also: Alex Boraine, Janet Levy, and Ronel Scheffer, eds., *Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa* (Cape Town: Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 1994); and Alex Boraine and Janet Levy, eds., *The Healing of a Nation?* (Cape Town: Justice in Transition, 1995). For more critical accounts of the effects of such commissions, see “Wounded Nations, Broken Lives: Truth Commissions and War Tribunals,” special issue, *Index on Censorship* 5 (1996).

7. Bundy, claims that “it goes without saying that the TRC was charged with writing an official history”; Bundy, “Beast of the Past,” 13.

8. Alexander, *Ordinary Country*; Deborah Posel, “The TRC Report: What Kind of History? What Kind of Truth?” in *Commissioning the Past: Understanding South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, ed. Deborah Posel and Graeme Simpson (Johannesburg: Witswatersrand University Press, 2002), 147–72:164–65.

9. Alexander, *Ordinary Country*, 122.

10. Posel, “The TRC Report,” 165–66.

11. Fiona C. Ross, *Bearing Witness: Women and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2003).

12. See Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2003), and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Translator’s Preface and Afterword to Mahasweta Devi *Imaginary Maps*,” in *The Spivak Reader*, ed. Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean (New York: Routledge, 1996), 267–86.

13. Fiona C. Ross, “Speech and Silence: Women’s Testimony in the First Five Weeks of Public Hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” in *Remaking a World: Violence, Social Suffering and Recovery*, ed. Veena Das, et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 253. The statistics she cites are instructive. In the first five weeks of the hearings, 204 testified about 160 cases of human rights violation. Out of these 58% were women, but only 13% of the women testified directly about violations against women. Most of my citations of Ross are from this article, but the fuller account of her research can be found in her wonderful monograph, *Bearing Witness*.

14. Pamela Reynolds, *The Ground of All Making: State Violence, the Family and Political Activists* (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1995).

15. Ross, “Speech and Silence,” 262.

16. *Ibid.*, 259.

17. Antjie Krog, *Country of My Skull* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1999), 192–93.

18. Ross, "Speech and Silence," 263.
19. The film won the Grand Jury Prize of the 2000 Sundance Film Festival, and was nominated for an Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. It focused on the cases of the Cradock Four, the killing of Amy Biehl, the bombing of Robert McBride, and the murders of the Guguletu Seven.
20. Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, 36.
21. *Ibid.*, 38.
22. The Ugandan Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, which sat between 1986 and 1994, held public victim hearings, but these were considerably fewer in number than in South Africa; see "Wounded Nations, Broken Lives," 148–50, for a list of truth commissions and war tribunals held internationally between 1971 and 1996. See also Hayner, "Same Species, Different Animal," esp. 35.
23. See Archbishop Desmond Tutu, "Foreword" *TRC*, 1:19–20, where he singles out the South African media for special thanks and explains the reason for welcoming their participation: "We are particularly grateful for the work of SABC radio, which communicated in all our official languages to ensure that even the illiterate did not miss out. We want to mention, too, the special television programme that was broadcast on Sunday evenings—giving a summary of the previous week's events at the Commission and a preview of the coming week's events. No wonder these television and radio programmes won prestigious awards—on which we congratulate them. The media helped to ensure that the Commission's process was as inclusive and as non-elitist as possible."
24. Nkosingithi Biko, "Amnesty and Denial" in *Looking Back Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*, ed. Charles Villa-Vicencio and Wilhelm Verwoerd (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press; London: Zed Press, 2000), 193–198:197.
25. For developments of this criticism, see Benita Parry, "Reconciliation and Remembrance," *Pretexts* 5.1–2 (1995): 84–96; Brent Harris, "Confessing the Truth: Shaping Silences Through the Amnesty Process," *Kronos* 26 (2000): 76–88; Brent Harris, "'Unearthing' the 'Essential' Past: The Making of a Public 'National' Memory Through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1994–1998" (masters thesis, University of the Western Cape, 1998); and Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver, eds., *After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press; Cape Town: David Philip, 2000).
26. Ross, "Speech and Silence," 252.
27. Elaine Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). Ross, "Speech and Silence," 71, makes this point.
28. Ciraj Rassool, Leslie Witz, and Gary Minkley, suggest that Lungile Maninjwa and another artist similarly commissioned by a local authority were "seen as rooted in their respective communities and as having the ability to express the sentiments and respond to the sensibilities of the community." Clearly, the mothers of those commemorated by the monument held a different view. See Ciraj Rassool, Leslie Witz, and Gary Minkley, "Burying and Memorialising the Body of Truth: The TRC and National Heritage," in *After the TRC: Reflections on Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa*, ed. Wilmot James and Linda Van de Vijver (Athens: Ohio University Press; Cape Town: David Philip, 2000), 124.
29. In 2005 another monument was erected by Donovan Ward in collaboration with Paul Hendricks; it consists of seven silhouettes representing the seven murdered youths set into plinths containing a bronze plaque with a portrait and information about each individual. I do not know if this has found more favor with the victims' mothers.
30. For more details of the commission of the monument and its local response, see Annie E. Coombes, *History after Apartheid: Visual Culture and Public Memory in a Democratic South Africa*

(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003; Johannesburg: Witswatersrand University Press, 2004), 107–11. See also Rayda Becker, “The New Monument to the Women of South Africa,” *African Arts* 33.4 (Winter 2000), 1–6.

31. See Coombes, *History after Apartheid*, chap. 2, “Robben Island: Site of Memory/Site of Nation,” particularly 105–15, which explores the dearth of representations of women’s participation in the liberation struggle in public commemorative culture in South Africa and women’s response to the opening of Robben Island.

32. Fatima Meer, however, on seeing the site, had other things to say about the planted grass and the new buildings: “Terrible to see all this thing pushed up and the prison gone. I mean if this is a historical monument, then you don’t go around making it all pretty. I would much rather see the cells. Cells as they were and the cells in Winnie’s yard were even more terrible”; transcript, Constitution Hill Project, Workshop of Political Prisoners at the Women’s Jail, September 27, 2003, 25. See also Lauren Segal, Clive van den Berg, and Churchill Madikida, eds., *Mapping Memory: Former Prisoners Tell Their Stories*, (Johannesburg: Constitution Hill, 2006), which was an exhibition devoted to collecting both men and women’s prison memoirs at the Old Fort complex in Johannesburg.

33. Constitution Hill Project, Oral History Workshop 1 at the Women’s Jail, August 13, 2004, tape 4, pp.12–13.

34. Jeannie Noel, unpublished interview with Terry Kurgan in Durban, July 29, 2002, p. 5.

35. TRC, 4:298.

36. Nolundi Ntamo, unpublished interview with Karen Schoonbee, n.d., p. 14.

37. Malishoane Mokoena, transcript, Constitution Hill Project, Workshop of Political Prisoners at the Women’s Jail, September 27, 2003, 39.

38. See also Jill Bennett, *Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005).

39. Cecilie Palmer: “Go into women’s struggle, there is a period where things like the terrorisation of the Transvaal . . . are not even mentioned. You can forget, you can forget. They stand on platforms . . . then they talk about the march in ’56, the banning of the ANC and then they talk about . . . exile” (ibid., 49).

Unidentified speaker: “There are a lot of people who are not appreciated and there are a lot of people who are depressed, who can’t find jobs, who are . . . you know, nobody. . . . Some of them were detained and some are from exile and nobody appreciates them and there are a lot of people now who are telling lies . . . who are saying they were underground, and some of them we knew were never involved” (ibid., 48).

Lolo Tabane: “Maybe we need to say to ourselves and to the world, particularly to the world, . . . that there was a certain period in our lives which has been lost and that period needs to be told and needs to be appreciated and needs to be connected from the past to the future” (ibid., 54).

40. Jeannie Noel, ibid., 3–4.

41. Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, 76–77.

