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The Democracy Development Machine

Nicholas Copeland


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NOTES

Introduction

1. For a discussion of the violence and its effects on indigenous communities, see Carmack 1988; Manz 1988; Falla 1992; REHMI 1998; CEH 1999; and González 2002.

2. See Black, Jamail, and Chinchilla 1984; Smith 1990b; and Schirmer 1998. The patrolers worked in tandem with the military to pacify rural communities, committing countless human rights abuses and tightening military control.

3. See Simon 1987 and Jonas 1991 for a discussion of human rights activism during the democratic transition.

4. For analysis of the Pan-Mayan movement, see Bastos and Camus 1996, 2003; Fischer and Brown 1996; Cojtí Cuxil 1997; Warren 1998; Nelson 1999; and Fischer 2001, 2009.

5. For a discussion of alliances leading up to the peace accords, see Warren 1998.

6. See Jonas 2000 on the gains and limitations of the peace accords. Burrell (2013) describes how Mayan villagers in Todos Santos Cuchumatanes, Huehuetenango, expressed that peace could not change the past or their poverty.

7. Feminist organizations forged out of wartime transformations of gendered divisions of labor promoted women's rights and equality against public and domestic patriarchy. See Hernández Castillo 2008.

8. This included a Ladino leftist, a Quiché feminist journalist, a Mam linguist, and a Catholic priest.

9. In the most high-profile example of state violence, Archbishop Bishop Juan Gerardi, the director of the REMHI, was bludgeoned to death in the rectory of San Sebastián days after

releasing the REMHI report in April 1998. Ricardo Sáenz de Tejada Rojas (2012) speaks of a “democratic malaise,” and Edelberto Torres Rivas (2010) speaks of “bad democracies” that are characteristic of the Central America transition to neoliberalism, marked by top-down imposition, negative correspondence between political freedoms and reductions in poverty and inequality, increasing concentrations of power, and a tendency toward violence.

10. See Robinson 2000, 2003; USAID 2010; and Thomas, O’Neill, and Offit 2011. Of particular concern, the market-led agrarian reform program called for in the accords was underfunded and primarily benefited plantation owners. See Gauster and Isakson 2007.

11. Similarly, Ellen Moodie (2010, 2) describes how experiences of democracy in “post peace” El Salvador are shot through with anxiety and insecurity because of a rising crime rate commonly described as “worse than war.”

12. See Solano 2005; Reina 2008; Yagenova and Garcia 2009; Holt-Giménez 2008; Fulmer, Godoy, and Neff 2008; Dougherty 2011; CALDH y CONIC 2012; Rasch 2012; Bastos and de León 2013; Nelson 2015; Alonso-Fradejas 2015; and Fultz 2016.

13. Mayan Nobel laureate Rigoberta Menchú won only 3 percent of the vote in her 2007 and 2011 presidential runs with a leftist-indigenous coalition. For further discussion, see Fischer 2009, 92; Velásquez-Nimatuj 2008, 2013; Bastos and Brett 2010; and Vogt 2015.

14. A rupture in postwar power structures occurred in the anticorruption protests of 2015. See Copeland 2015b.

15. For electoral results, see *Tribuno Supremo Electoral* 2003, 2007, 2011. See Kate Doyle 2013 for declassified documents from the National Security Archive tracing Ríos Montt’s political career and actions during the armed conflict, and details about his genocide trial.

16. For example, Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz (2014) describes a long history of “populist imperialism” in the United States, in which mass violence is narrated as necessary for the expansion of freedom and democracy. David Harvey (2005, 2) defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and free trade.” Neoliberalism refers to the post-Keynesian economic consensus led by the Chicago School of political economy that became dominant in response to the inflation crisis of the 1980s and became hegemonic through Reaganism-Thatcherism.

17. See Escobar 1995.

18. See Paley 2002 and Copeland 2018 for a review of anthropological approaches to democracy.

19. Many have observed how corporate deregulation and the influx of money into US politics have empowered an oligarchy that tramples public interests. Sheldon Wolin (2008) argues that American democracy “inverted” into a totalitarianism of corporate control, anti-unionism, media self-censorship, and militarism through the cold war and the war on terror.

20. See Dean 2009; Arias and Goldstein 2010; and MacLeish 2013.

21. See Escobar 2016.

22. Wendy Brown (2015) sees liberal democracy as withering in the face of neoliberal reason, a political rationality that entails the radical redefinition of human liberty on individual and market terms and has reshaped policies, institutions, and social relations, steadily eroding the domains in which popular sovereignty can be exercised (the public) and the cultural and educational spaces through which the deliberative capacities of the people are formed.

23. Autonomous Marxists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2005) argue that the neoliberal empire is producing a decentralized, heterogeneous, democratic network united against corporate globalization, inequality, and “accumulation by dispossession” (see Harvey 2007).

In a similar vein, anarchist anthropologist David Graeber (2013) rejects electoral politics in favor of experiments with “horizontal” democracy such as the Occupy and the Zapatista movements. See also Zibechi 2010. Mark Purcell (2013, 2) calls for a “perpetual democratization” of experimentation and renovation to grapple with contemporary crises and concentrations of power. Latin America’s “pink tide” governments used “vertical” electoral strategies to counter neoliberalism and launch projects of redistribution and decolonization, with varying levels of success. Vergara-Camus (2014) argues for development alternatives against rigid antidevelopment positions. I combine Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983) insistence on the irreducible and multiple forms of desire within fascism and the possibility of their rearticulation with attention to the effects of political and economic violence on capitalist experiences of freedom and democracy.

24. David Gow (2008) describes the grassroots reappropriation of development as “counterwork.” David Nugent (2008) writes of “alternative democracies.”

25. See especially Schirmer 1998 but also Jonas 1988; Wilkinson 2004; Grandin and Klein 2011; Hale 2006b; and Way 2012. Schirmer conducted extensive interviews with General Hector Gramajo, the architect of the army’s project for strategic democracy in rural villages, to be inhabited by docile “Mayas *permitidos*.” Jonas (1988, 26) describes how the army made its intentions clear from the outset: “The ink was barely dry on the Central American Peace Accords signed in Guatemala City last August 7 when Guatemala’s top military officials declared that the accords ‘don’t apply’ to Guatemala. Five days later, in its first-ever public forum on ‘27 Years of Struggle against Subversion’ army officials reiterated their view that ‘politics is a continuation of war by other means.’ Both in the forum and in an accompanying multimedia exposition, the army took a pointedly hard ‘antiterrorist’ line, leaving no doubt of its determination to pursue its counterinsurgency war in Guatemala amid the efforts for peace in the Central American region.” Mona Bhan (2013) writes about democracy as counterinsurgency in Kashmir.

26. Similarly, Gramsci and Nowell-Smith (1971) described a transition from a war of maneuver on the battlefield to a war of position, a struggle for hegemony.

27. For a critical review of the various explanations of indigenous political alignments in the post-accords period, see Copeland 2007, 2014.

28. See Arias and Goldstein 2010.

29. Hale’s point is that recognition of collective indigenous rights is not antithetical to neoliberalism, even though the classic subject of liberalism is the individual.

30. For discussions of democracy as socially and historically configured, see Coles 2007; Nugent 2008; Paley 2008; and Copeland 2018.

31. See Star 2010 for a discussion of the boundary object concept in actor-network theory. This concept has been fruitfully applied to the anthropology of development as an interactive process involving multiple groups and technologies. See Mosse 2005. I examine how different forms of development act as boundary objects within the democracy assemblage.

32. Phillips and Ilcan (2004) discuss capacity building as neoliberal subject formation.

33. Paul Farmer’s (2005) conception of structural violence refers to conditions of material deprivation and inequality that create conditions for illness, death, rights violations, and political violence. For discussions of social suffering and the violence of everyday life in neoliberal Guatemala, see Benson, Fischer, and Thomas 2008; and Thomas, O’Neill, and Offit 2011. Protevi (2009) elaborates a theory of political affect and somatic politics.

34. For a discussion of the state as an ideological effect or reification produced through dispersed practices and in everyday encounters, see Abrams 1988; Gupta 1995; Gupta and Ferguson 2002; Coronil 1997; and Aretxaga 2000, among others. For a discussion of states as fetish objects that both repel and attract, see Brown 1995; Taussig 1997; Aretxaga 2003;

and Nelson 1999, 2009. For a discussion of sovereignty produced through performative enactments of violence on killable bodies, see Foucault 2012; Agamben 1998; Das and Poole 2004; and Hansen and Stepputat 2005, among others, who make the case for the continued relevance of sovereign violence in the contemporary political order.

35. Audra Simpson (2014) theorizes refusal of settler state sovereignty by Mohawks, who assert their membership in a polity that preexists the United States and Canada.

36. Anand (2011) describes a form of “hydraulic citizenship” produced in Mumbai as citizens pressure politicians to pull strings to increase their water pressure. My analysis extends beyond one infrastructural form to encompass how infrastructure operates as one element within a governing assemblage.

37. Berlant (2007, 757) moves away from a conception of sovereignty fixated on the drama of intentional acts of agency and toward “a shape made by mediating conditions of zoning, labor, consumption, and governmentality.”

38. See Auyero 2001; Auyero, Lapegna, and Page Roma 2009; and Ansell 2014.

39. See Patnaik 2010; Li 2014; and Ferguson 2015. Patnaik (2010, 37) argues for a “rights-based” approach to development, as opposed to a bourgeois means-based approach focused on economic growth: “The acquisition of ‘rights’ on the part of the people, including ‘rights’ to minimum bundles of goods, services and security, amounts therefore to winning crucial battles in the class war for the transcendence of capitalism.” He argues that establishing inviolable claims to basic resources is fundamentally antithetical to the spontaneous action of capital and argues for its place at the center of leftist politics. He views rights as “guarantors or welfare gains” that are not reversible, wholly distinct from “rights” that are intermittently and provided and withheld, and conditioned gifts from the bourgeois state. I found the latter in San Pedro.

40. I borrow the formulation of populism as a discourse that divides society into “the people” and the powerful from Ernesto Laclau (1977). His later work (2005) elaborates on the discursive constitution of the people and their demands through a process of articulation.

41. Laclau argues that conservative populism encounters an inherent limit because its ultimate aim is to absorb opposition to the political economic order, not transform it.

42. The department capital is also named Huehuetenango.

43. The hotels are used mostly by family members of hospital patients and occasionally state employees or development workers.

44. *Ladino* also means a swindler, a cunning and deceptive person. For a discussion of recent transformations of Ladino identity, see Hale 2006b.

45. Nearly 90 percent of Sampedranos live in poverty, 44 percent live in extreme poverty, and more than half are illiterate (SEGEPLAN, 2009).

46. I still return to San Pedro when I can, but I completed research for this book in 2014.

47. After the passage of CAFTA in 2005, Huehuetenango became a site of anti-mining protests. Sampedranos voted almost unanimously against mining in a community consultation in 2007.

48. See Hale’s (2006a) definition of activist research. Calls for politically uncommitted anthropology are one response to widespread criticisms of the irrelevance and unavailability of anthropological investigations from the typical subjects of this research: indigenous peoples. Indigenous activists increasingly lodge these criticisms directly and pointedly.

49. I presented Spanish translations of my initial findings and a history of town politics in San Pedro, and distributed copies. A local Ladino high school teacher used my early analysis of party politics as an example of how to write a “popular version” of a topic. As a result, dozens of teachers and students and community leaders read and discussed my analysis, and used it as a political reference.

50. Activist research focuses on alignment with groups with which one shares strong political affinities and their involvement in shaping the research questions (Hale 2006a). These methods can create productive collaborations but may present obstacles to engaged research in contexts where existing movements are deeply compromised, flawed, or nonexistent.

51. A number of scholars attempt to account for indigenous political participation in the FRG and other authoritarian movements without resorting to notions of false consciousness, binarized and essentialist conceptions of identity and culture, or universalizing teleologies while keeping violence and agency in the analytical frame and examining the contemporary relevance of long-standing political struggles. Garrard-Burnett (2010) emphasizes resonance between authoritarian and neoliberal discourses and changing worldviews in Mayan communities related to the rise of protestant religions, focusing particularly on Ríos Montt's reputation and rhetoric. Also focusing on religion, O'Neill (2010) suggests that a salvation-oriented Christian citizenship resonant with neoliberal ideologies has eclipsed wartime identities and political imaginaries. Hale (2002) and Nelson (2009) see democracy as a response to struggle and see Mayan engagement with democracy as strategic. Benson, Fischer, and Thomas (2008) attribute support for Ríos Montt and other hardliners to moralizing discourses about criminality that mystify structural violence.

52. See also Das and Poole 2004.

1. "They Committed No Crime"

1. My friends from Ceiba always found this story hilarious.

2. See Grandin (2013) for a summary of state-society relations in the rural highlands from the colonial era to the post-accords era, with their associated forms of political violence and their effects on ethnic identity and social relations. He documents the rise of intra-communal conflict dating from the late colonial period driven by the strain put on subsistence agriculture by population growth and the expansion of coffee plantation agriculture, and a corresponding sharpening of internal class divisions. He notes a dynamic in which increased community divisions "deepened appeals to ethnic solidarity" even as these divisions increased state power over communities (61).

3. See Handy 1984; McCreery 1994; and Taracena 1997.

4. See Grandin 2013, 63, on reformist politics and rural democratic movements in the 1920s.

5. See Forster 2001, 139, for a discussion of labor organizing prior to the Democratic Revolution of 1944. She argues that many indigenous workers viewed racism as the root of economic inequalities and pursued interethnic organizing.

6. See Handy 1994 on revolutionary processes in the countryside.

7. Events in San Pedro parallel regional processes that have been well documented. See, in particular, Falla 2001 [1978]; Brintnall 1979; and Warren 1989.

8. Pedro Morales, a union leader in San Pedro during the Revolution, was elected the first indigenous *alcalde* in San Pedro Necta in 1966, with the moderate Revolutionary Party (PR). Leading Catholic developmentalist Arturo Ramírez, an indigenous sacristan and a leader in the fight against *costumbre*, ran in 1974 with the center-left National Opposition Front (FON), a coalition that included the DC, the newly formed United Front of the Revolution (FUR), and the PR. FON's presidential candidate was Efraín Ríos Montt, then a young officer who had served as minister of defense under Arana Osorio. Ramírez won, but Ladinos prevented him from taking office. Francisco Domingo, an indigenous teacher from the village of Tecpán, confronted the Ladino *alcalde* to end the system of free indigenous labor. The brothers Jacinto and Alfonso Garcia led the fight to retain communal land and water titles. See Copeland 2007 for a more detailed discussion of town history.

9. The EGP was both a political and a military organization. Through a network of clandestine cells, the EGP raised consciousness and created supporter communities. ORPA was an exclusively military organization. Both groups focused recruitment efforts in the *finca* zones in the north of the township and in remote indigenous communities.

10. Understanding local presence and responses to guerrilla organizations was one of the central aims of my local historical research, but a difficult task for reasons I explore in this chapter. With persistence over several years of return visits, I was able to discuss this topic openly with more than a dozen individuals, mostly men but also women, both Mayas and Ladinos, who had firsthand knowledge of events during the revolutionary years. Most of these individuals identified as sympathizers, but one identified himself as a former combatant with ORPA. Like most of the village-level guerrilla leaders who had not been killed, he had fled with his family into Mexico. Others went to Canada.

11. CUC, the first Indian-led peasant organization, pushed for many of the same goals embraced by the cooperatives and made broader criticisms of conditions in the plantations and military power. See Grandin 1997.

12. The guerrillas were not responsible for other assassinations, kidnappings, or massacres of indigenous villagers in San Pedro.

13. ORPA, the more military-professional-oriented group, was increasingly dissatisfied with botched EGP military operations. Conversely, the EGP criticized ORPA's single-minded focus on combat and relative lack of interest in building support bases, which many thought left the communities behind.

14. The local candidate for *alcalde* was Jacinto García.

15. See Kobrak 2003. Sampedranos stayed informed of the guerrillas' military actions through radio, newspapers, and rumor.

16. Between March and April, the army killed seven in the aldea el Cable (CEH 1999, caso 5322). On August 2 in the aldea Ixnul, members of the army raped and executed six women, torturing two of them first, along with three other men from the village. A newborn infant, the son of one of the women, died shortly after of hunger (CEH 1999, caso 5052). On October 28, the army killed eleven people in the aldea Canoguitas. Two were tortured, and two were burned alive in their houses (CEH 1999, caso 5527). The García brothers were tortured all night long and killed the next day. Ten days afterwards, the army "disappeared" Tepán's Francisco Domingo, a leader of an Alcoholics Anonymous chapter suspected of being a front for guerrilla operations. Also in 1982, Arturo Ramírez was kidnapped while on a bus in Huehuetenango and was never seen or heard from again. Bodies of suspected guerrilla leaders, such as Natividad Ruíz Ramírez, were hanged under the bridge in Chimiche so that everyone could learn the fate of subversives. Abuses of power were built into the civil patrol system, the entire foundation of which was a human rights violation.

17. In the village of Niyá, the army, with the help of civil patrollers from the aldea, captured and tortured Olimpia Carillo and Yolanda Carillo for six days (CEH 1999, caso 5134).

18. See especially Krueger and Enge 1985 and Smith 1990b.

19. Their houses were often burned by the patrols or given to other villagers.

20. This was the situation in Aguacatán and Colotenango. See Kobrak 1997 and 2013, respectively.

21. See especially Hale 1997; REHMI 1998; CEH 1999; and Sanford 2003.

22. See Schirmer 1998.

23. Stoll (1993) reinforces the army's assertion that guerrilla commandos deliberately placed villagers in the line of fire.

24. See Arias 2001 for a compilation of perspectives on the Rigoberta Menchú controversy. See also Grandin 2010.

25. See Hale 1997.

26. See McAllister 2003; Konefal 2010; and Grandin and Klein 2011.

27. Sanford (2003) presents ample evidence that, in many cases, “Indian” meant “guerilla” to the army and calls for a nuanced understanding of Mayan political allegiances during the armed conflict beyond the army-guerrilla binary.

28. Hale (2006b, 87) explains that “each narrative frame rests on certain categories of political consciousness (for example, a distinction between Mayan cultural rights and popular or class demands) and certain political distinctions (for example, separating the Mayan movement from the Left), which later became to appear entirely self-evident, but which had not come to predominate during the volatile and heady years between 1976 and 1981.”

29. See especially Grandin and Klein 2011; Konefal 2010; and McAllister 2003.

30. This situation echoed Kobrak’s (1997) findings about community acceptance of the civil patrols in Aguacatán, Huehuetenango.

31. Victor Montejo’s (1987, 35) testimony describes the intense fear of living under military control in Tzalalá, Huehuetenango, and the excruciating emotional management required in a situation where “anyone can condemn to death their own neighbor with the slightest accusation or rumor.”

32. However, the situation was distinct from what was described by Matilde González (2002) in San Bartolomé, Jocotenango, where former civil patrol leaders still ran the town despite their role in the violence.

33. See Sanford 2003.

34. Even Sampedranos who were skeptical of the prospects of peace and democracy were glad that the peace accords had been signed and that the war had ended.

35. See Stoll 1990 and Garrard-Burnett 1998, 2010.

36. Garrard-Burnett 2010.

37. Nelson (2009) and Burrell (2013) describe a climate of historical uncertainty in the post-accords period.

38. Gill (2016, 223) writes about memories of “paramilitary takeover as peace” in Barrancabermeja, Colombia.

2. *Nos Falta Capacidad*

1. On the promotion of NTX by USAID as the cornerstone of rural development strategy in Guatemala in the 1980s, see Barham et al. 1992 and Fischer and Benson 2006.

2. I discuss these issues in more detail in chapter 3 and in Copeland 2015a.

3. Sol Tax (1953, 17) described Mayas in Panajachel, Sololá, and nearby regions as “penny capitalists” who participated eagerly in market activity and were steeped in the rational disposition and acquisition of services and resources according to cost-benefit ratios, “weighing choices in accordance with the economic principle,” and who were divided by class.

4. Ricardo Falla (2001 [1978]) offers extensive observations of the traits and characteristics of a new merchant class in San Antonio Ilotenango, Quiché, many of them leaders of Catholic Action. He described new consumption patterns, including increased interest in leisure items and luxury goods, especially associated with dress and personal hygiene. He organized his descriptions on class strata, based on levels of available capital. Nowhere in his extensive categorizations does Falla mention the term *capacidad*. This was not predominant in the lexicon at the time he was working as a priest and taking ethnographic field notes. Forty years later, this term is one of the most common ways that Sampedranos distinguish between people and identify themselves. See also Goldin 2011 on the relationship between work and cultural transformation in Mayan communities.

5. Similarly, Anagnost (2004) describes *suzhi* as a perceived quality of populations and persons in China related to development, education, and consumption patterns.

6. Evangelicals also talked about *capacidad* with their followers during this time period. Virginia Garrard-Burnett, personal communication.

7. Cooperative organizing repressed after the counterrevolution was slowly re-legalized between 1956 and 1959 by President Peralta Azurdia. Cooperatives thrived in the late 1960s in the limited political openness of the Montenegro presidency; there were nineteen in Huehuetenango by 1972. The national cooperative movement was left-leaning, progressive, and pragmatic.

8. The goal of training cooperative leaders was that “the campesino or the cooperativist worker will turn into a new man. Discover their own capacidades (capacity, capabilities) and work to liberate himself from traditionalism, demonstrating that he is capable of responsibly assuming the challenge that we all confront underdevelopment, ignorance, and misery” (Gaitan 1972, 58).

Cooperative ideas were presented as in harmony with indigenous culture, while at the same time voicing a strong criticism of certain elements of indigenous tradition.

9. Town Ladinos whose larger land holdings better situated them to benefit from economies of scale often took over cooperatives.

10. One of the first was the Society for Strengthening the Indigenous Economy (SFEI). SFEI promoters—there were three for the entire department—went from town to town in Huehuetenango from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s promoting chemical fertilizers and market agriculture. See Manz 2005. SFEI’s coverage was miniscule, however, covering perhaps 1 percent of the population.

11. See Ortiz and Meneses 1989 and Ortiz et al. 1991.

12. One Ladino reportedly complained angrily that these programs would take away his peons. Some denounced DIGESA as communist because villagers sometimes worked in groups.

13. These rates are changing with more youths graduating from high school and becoming teachers.

14. Kay Warren (1998) identified *superación* as a shared goal among Mayan movement activists.

15. For details about the *cofradía* system, see Smith 1984, Warren 1989, and Watanabe 2010.

16. Concepción and her sister, also unmarried, had previously raised one of their brother’s daughters, who had grown up to be a teacher.

17. For more detailed history of the emergence, activities, and ideologies of various Mayanist organizations up to and including the Pan-Mayan movement, and the changing economic and political situation that shaped them, see Fischer and Brown 1996; Cojtí 1997; Warren 1998; and Bastos and Camus 2003. Much Pan-Mayan activism occurred in urban centers (Quetzaltenango and Guatemala City) and among college-educated professionals, particularly a group at Rafael Landívar University.

18. These have been central concerns for Mayanist anthropologists for decades. See, for example, Wagley 1949 and Watanabe 2010.

19. See Fischer 2001.

20. In her preface, Warren (1989, ix) writes that she “never would have guessed that, along with successful careers in rural development and education, some of these questioning youths would become more, rather than less, active in indigenous cultural politics.”

21. See Cojtí 1997; Warren 1998; Nelson 1999; Fischer 2001; and Bastos and Cumes 2007. Fischer argues that neoliberal decentralization and foreign aid directed to indigenous communities and informed by indigenous-rights discourses opened up new space for local activists who made new uses of these ideas. Rather than “permitted Indians” (Hale 2002), he sees these identities and politics as tactical improvisations.

22. Pan-Mayan activists contest this constructivist conception of identity, emphasizing an enduring core of Mayanness (Warren 1998, 74–78).

23. She was identified as a Ladina, but I do not know how she self-identified.

24. Rachel Sieder (2011a, 23–24) observes that “the efforts of Maya-K’iche’ communal authorities to strengthen and ‘recover’ their own forms of law are primarily a response to insecurity, violence, and the structural exclusion and racism that impedes indigenous peoples’ access to justice. They also constitute part of wider political processes of ethnic revitalization which have occurred in Guatemala since the end of the war. These processes have generated new forms of communal government and justice, combining Mayan epistemologies with discourses and practices grounded in human rights.”

3. The Capacity for Democracy

1. See Foucault et al. 1991 and Rose 1996.

2. See especially Edelman 1999; Moore 2005; and Gow 2008.

3. See IDF 1968; USAID 1970; Fledderjohn 1976; and Copeland 2012.

4. See IDF 1968 and Copeland 2015a.

5. The Guatemalan army repressed even state-supported cooperatives. See Brockett 1990.

6. See Schirmer 1998.

7. The army attempted to resume “normal” life after the extreme violence, often through (largely symbolic and underfunded) efforts to promote economic development and build roads, houses, and schools, along with continued ideological indoctrination. See Krueger and Enge 1985, 29; Simon 1987; Smith 1990b; Nelson 1999; and Schirmer 1998.

8. Antulio Morales blamed this on the ANN’s failure to invest in the departmental campaign. He began looking for another party and was leaning toward the newly formed National Unity of Hope (UNE).

9. Faith in a development fix rationalized continued US military assistance by assuaging US qualms about state-supported death squads, tipping history toward genocide (Copeland 2012).

10. Even fewer efforts were made to challenge long-standing monopolies on commodity markets, both internally and for export (Copeland 2012).

11. Brintnall (1979, 149) writes that “the fall of the hierarchies, in short, represented more of a negative statement about the character of the new order than a positive one—the old will not dominate the young, nor the Ladinos the Indians, and the ethnic groups will not be united as in the past. In retrospect, it is clear that the churches actualized this new order only partially, and other institutions were soon to take root among the Aguacatecs, creating a new public framework for Indian social life.”

12. The concept of respect is important here because of its centrality within Mayan cosmivisions. See Ekern 2005. This quotation speaks to the way that respect became woven into counterinsurgency objectives.

13. See Copeland 2007 for a discussion of town politics in the 1960s and 1970s.

14. A friend of Antulio Morales told me he never intended to keep that promise because “the Ladinos would never permit a statue of an ex-guerrilla.”

15. See also Escobar 1995 and Chakrabarty 2009.

16. Given the individualist orientation, Mayan Sampedranos typically understood their personal development as entailing familial responsibilities. Many immigrants sent back money to support their families, including many who left long ago and had no intention of ever returning. Young professionals often helped their parents with emergency and mundane expenses. Many helped support their younger siblings’ education. Many used *capacidad* to help their village—for example, by coordinating with outside institutions and authorities or

serving on development committees. For their part, *superados* made a point of sharing wealth with family members.

17. Li (2014) describes a tragic situation in Indonesia, where the cacao boom led villagers to privatize communally held land. Some got wealthy and bought land and hired workers, but only through displacing and exploiting their neighbors. Her analysis speaks to a gap in modernizing narratives in which hundreds of millions of peasants do not advance into other fields but remain superfluous to the global market. She also contends that such concerns are invisible to indigenous-rights discourses that ignore contradictions between indigenous people and organizations.

18. This shows how the local power of the civil patrol was linked to the authority of local patrol leaders, who had obtained their power through assimilationist development programs and policed the boundaries of their authority through racism.

19. See also Fischer and Benson 2006. The association between free trade and mining was not clear to villagers in 2004.

20. Before the previous two elections, *Asociación Ceiba* led a *voto consciente* (conscious or informed-vote) campaign, which emphasized that the vote should remain secret, is an individual decision, and should not be sold. As Fernando suggests (indeed, Fernando might be paraphrasing from one of Ceiba's reunions), they say that votes are not for sale; that they are private, individual decisions; and that they need to be cast based on who a person thinks might be the best leader.

21. W. E. B. Du Bois (2017 [1935]) argued that freed Africans after the Civil War required education to become functional democratic citizens. However, he also believed that the black vote was urgent to prevent the reconstitution of a racist white power structure and could not wait for training.

22. See Carletto et al. 2010 on the disappointing long-term effects of NTX adoption.

23. See Camus 2008 for a discussion of migration in Huehuetenango.

4. Radical Pessimism

1. Nearby, I knew that two core FRG villages in Colotenango, Barranca Grande and Barranca Chiquita, had sided with the civil patrols against guerrilla-aligned villages during the war and were still bitter about a landmark conviction and incarceration of village patrol leaders for killing Juan Chanay during a protest against the patrol system (Kobrak 2013).

2. Philpot-Munson (2009) found exuberant agreement with the FRG among Pentecostal Ixil villagers in Nebaj who believed that Ríos Montt had saved them from the guerrillas and echoed his signature concoction of evangelical moralizing and counterinsurgency doctrine.

3. See Le Bot 1995; REHMI 1998; CEH 1999; Stoll 2003; Hale 1997; Zur 1998; Green 1999; and Remijnse 2002.

4. These expectations were shaped by my experience studying indigenous women's organizing in Colotenango with *Asociación Ceiba*. After the peace accords, Ceiba activists proudly, if painfully, remembered their revolutionary past and were eager to continue the struggle after the war by promoting human rights, democracy, women's equality, local health care, economic initiatives, and political organizing in the countryside.

5. See Green 1999 and Sanford 2003.

6. See Foucault 1980 and Rose 1999.

7. Poststructuralists question the commonsense view of the state as a seamless whole existing outside and above society and try to understand how this understanding is produced and what it accomplishes in distinct contexts. They point to the fragmented nature of institutions and view the perception of unification as one effect of decentered policies

and performances (Abrams 1988; Gupta 1995; Taussig 1997; Aretxaga 2000). Many see the state's peculiar magic as a product of the ways that it operates as a fetish and comes to be widely imagined as an object of fear and desire (Brown 1995; Taussig 1997; Coronil 1997).

8. See Nelson 1999, 2009; and Burrell 2013.

9. Nelson (2009) argues that the state's new role as a defender and protector of Mayan life, while coupled with the power to kill, opens new spaces for political agency that should not be discounted or treated as always already neutralized. She further contends that many Mayas have benefited individually and collectively from productive aspects of state power and that, as a result, many or most no longer understand themselves as living in opposition to an evil state. Rather than docile "indios permitidos" of "neoliberal multicultural governance" (Hale 2002), she views Mayas as creatively striving and producing new futures, with new resources, on a new terrain, despite the persistence of many old obstacles and new challenges. Writing about how Mayan Todosanteros turned to state authority in the wake of the lynching of a tourist, Jennifer Burrell (2013, 121) describes how "Todosanteros actively sought out and solicited the state's capacity to promote resolution. They did this because the state held an emergent and unrealized power—in that early moment of after-war promise—to exercise forms of authority that Todosanteros envisioned as potentially beneficial."

10. "Personal interest" is an ethnographic fact of immense concern throughout postwar Guatemala and in numerous post-conflict and postcolonial settings. See Smith 2009; Metz, Mariano, and Garcia 2010; and Nelson 2009.

11. See de Tejada Rojas 2004 for a discussion of the ex-PAC movement.

12. Few Sampedranos were in a position to export NTX crops.

13. This alliance ended when the leaders of the teachers' union made a pact with the Perez Molina government, after which they were considered sellouts by many leftist organizations.

14. Sampedranos have good reason to worry about baby thieves and adoption rings, as well as criminals and narco-traffickers. See Adams 1998 and Nelson 2009.

15. See Copeland 2014.

16. Simpson (2014) discusses Mohawk refusals of settler state sovereignty as an assertion of their own preexisting sovereignty.

17. This is similar to the way that Yonggom people in Papua New Guinea call the Ok Tedi mining company a sorcerer because, like a sorcerer, it hurts people and denies any responsibility (Kirsch 2006).

18. See Jonas 2000 and Robinson 2000.

19. See Guatemala's Decentralization Law, Government of Guatemala 2002b.

20. See Bastos and de León 2013; Grandia 2012, 2013; and Alonso-Fradejas 2015.

21. See Solano 2005 and Alonso-Fradejas 2015.

22. Patrollers opened fire on the protestors, killing an elderly man, Juan Chanay, seriously wounding two women, and injuring others. The Interamerican Court of Human Rights heard the case and ruled for the plaintiffs in a landmark decision that resulted in the removal of the civil patrols from most of the town. See Human Rights Watch 1994 and Kobrak 2013.

23. See Yagenova and Garcia 2009.

24. See Fulmer, Godoy, and Neff 2008; Dougherty 2011; CALDH y CONIC 2012; and Rasch 2012.

25. See Mérida and Krenmayr 2008; Reina 2008; Bastos and de León 2013; Nelson 2015; Alonso-Fradejas 2015; Fultz 2016; and Copeland 2019.

26. In 1978 striking miners from Ixtahuacán marched to the capital and found outpourings of support along the way.

27. See prensacomunitaria.org.

28. See also Klepeck 2012 and REDSAG 2014 on grassroots opposition to GMO maize.

29. See Bastos et al. 2015.
30. See Copeland 2015b.
31. See Copeland, forthcoming.
32. Tough-on-crime policies constitute another mechanism of authoritarian populism. See Benson, Fischer, and Thomas 2008.

5. Parties and Projects

1. Ladinos remain overrepresented in professional administrative positions such as secretary (treasurer) and justice of the peace, although this situation is also changing.

2. Stepputat (2001) sees a genuine openness to indigenous rights in state programs in Barillas. McAllister (2003) writes that the people of Chupol see no contradiction between a potable water project and their conscience. Nelson (2009) views development projects as products of struggle rather than counterinsurgency traps and see grassroots participation in the conservative parties that provide them as a strategic form of political engagement.

3. See Li 2014 and Ferguson 2015 about universal basic income programs in Africa. See also Patnaik 2010.

4. Ansell (2014, 194) describes how the anti-patronage component of Zero Hunger programs in Brazil conflicted with “intimate hierarchies,” an arrangement in which “mutual sympathy and vulnerability between the partners [of clientelist exchange] becomes the basis of a shared humanity that transcends structural hierarchy” with the potential to “socialize the political class towards the challenges of a region’s poor.” Auyero (2001) describes clientelism as a survival strategy among poor communities rather than as an imposition. Auyero, Lapegna, and Page Roma (2009) contend that clientelism is consistent with, and can be a driver of, collective action. Fox (1994) argues that “authoritarian clientelism”—the exchange of resources for votes—evolves as poor communities assert their rights.

5. See Grandin 2013.

6. Elaborating on Gramsci’s concept of the same name, Chatterjee (2004, 2005) develops the term “political society,” as opposed to civil society, to describe political interactions between subaltern and elite sectors that are not structured around bourgeois rights and norms but are driven by the need for resources, from below, and political expediency among state officials. In this domain of clientelism and economic coercion, Chatterjee contends that populations (not “citizens”) attempt to persuade leaders that they deserve resources, deploying distinct conceptions of democracy as they undergo a process of internal transformation.

7. See Auyero 2012 on the politics of waiting.

8. Child stealing rumors are prevalent in Mayan communities, fueled by a lawless and often predatory adoption industry. See Adams 1998 and Nelson 1999.

9. See Government of Guatemala 2002a.

10. The event lasted all afternoon. Halfway through, party affiliates handed out a few hundred *chuchitos* (tamales). The speeches were vague, with no reference to actual political matters, instead emphasizing Julio Ambrocio’s personal qualities: his honesty, his dedication to work for the town, and his commitment to promoting sport, which he claimed was an alternative to delinquency. A candidate for *diputado*, a Ladino from Huehuetenango, had joined Ambrocio on the caravan. In what was perhaps the main event, he took the microphone and expressed solidarity with the community, and said that Julio was a great leader and that Manuel Baldizón, a businessman from El Petén and the party’s presidential candidate, was committed to San Pedro Necta. He was there to reinforce the link between Julio Ambrocio and powerful individuals, and to generate name recognition. However, he rarely interacted with ordinary residents, but stayed in the small circle of local party leaders and

personal assistants. Meanwhile, Julio Ambrocio conversed with a long line of affiliates, hearing requests and making promises.

11. An indigenous activist who had worked in the *alcaldía* of Sololá, the capital of an indigenous-majority department in the central highlands, told me that outside institutions often required bribes and that construction companies routinely give them as a favor to *alcaldes* for awarding their company a contract, even if it was entirely legitimate. Once, he claimed, members of the national *controlaría* (auditor's office) demanded that the *municipio* buy them an expensive property on the shore of Lake Atitlan, the tourist Mecca, in order to approve plans for a new municipal building. Buying the land required going off the books. I heard many similar stories in San Pedro.

12. See, for example, Shah 2010.

13. Government of Guatemala 2002a.

14. Government of Guatemala 2002b.

15. Nelson (1999) described the post-accords Guatemalan state as a piñata.

16. Although Colotenango continued to receive funds, many still believed that the town had been disadvantaged as a result. Returned refugees resettled in Chaculá Nentón told me the *alcalde* bypassed them for projects because of their association with the guerrillas. This complicates the popular, stigmatizing perception that *retornados* are pampered by international organizations and have come to expect that things be given to them.

17. *Alcaldes* sometimes did projects in communities of nonsupporters, but these received less than original supporters.

18. See Fledderjohn 1976 and Copeland 2012.

19. This idea contrasts with Smith's (2009) description of ideological divisions between parties in Solalá.

20. While complaining about favoritism, one of Antulio Morales' close allies said, "Chepe was only interested in working on big projects, with contractors, so he could take out his percentage. If there was an administrative project—a necessity—he didn't want it."

21. This echoes Cattelino's (2008) description of the double bind of native sovereignty. In her analysis of Seminole gaming, she argues that the exercise of sovereignty leads to attacks on sovereignty.

22. Agamben (1998) contends that spectacles of sovereign violence against bare life, life that is not politically valuable and thus expendable, remain central to the constitution of biopolitical communities. See also Hansen and Stepputat 2005.

23. See also MacLeish's (2013) discussion of the power to kill or let live in the context of war.

24. Regarding MIFAPRO, the first cash-transfer program in Guatemala, Dotson (2014) argues that the discourse of transparency surrounding these programs contributes to the criticism of recipients' behavior by their "taxpaying" neighbors, who see themselves as possessing rights and responsibilities as auditors. See Sandberg and Tally 2015 for analysis of the programs' politicization.

6. Cruel Populism

1. "Huehuetenango: Ex-Pac frustran mitin con Ríos Montt," *Prensa Libre*, September 5, 2003.

2. See Garrard-Burnett 2010 for an in-depth description and analysis of Ríos Montt's rhetoric during regular radio addresses at the peak of the counterinsurgency.

3. The party was also accused of numerous acts of corruption and electoral malfeasances. Ríos Montt's eligibility to stand for election was a central concern. Guatemala's

constitution, ratified in 1985, prohibits anyone who has taken power by coup from becoming president, a law written specifically to block Ríos Montt.

4. In his testimonial description of living through the 1982 violence in the village of Tz'alalá, Huehuetenango, Victor Montejo (1987, 55) recalls thinking that “what Lucas García had left undone during his brutal term in office was now being completed by his successor Ríos Montt. In all my thirty years I had not known darker days than the present ones.” See Doyle 2013 for information about Ríos Montt’s genocide trial, his conviction, and its reversal.

5. Stoll (2009) makes this assertion.

6. Grandin (2013) argues that the reforms of the 1920s and the Partido Unionista, often ignored by historians, mark the entry of rural communities into progressive mass politics and heterogeneous political alliances far beyond their hometowns.

7. See Handy 1994.

8. See Webber and Carr 2012 for a discussion of the Latin American left.

9. As with most political figures and events, Guatemalans viewed Menchú through a cloud of mistrust. Nelson (1999) argues that the plethora of dirty and disparaging jokes about Menchú are reactions to the anxieties about the very presence of an Indian woman on the national stage. Conservatives dismissed her as a violent guerrilla who was still advocating a failed leftist agenda that would harm both the rural sector and the country as a whole. Leftists criticized Menchú for selling out by joining the Berger administration as the goodwill ambassador for human rights. Many Guatemalans called her an opportunist for investing in a *Farmacías Populares*, a pharmacy specializing in generic and discounted drugs. In Huehuetenango, leftist leaders in Colotenango accused her and Rosalina Tuyúć of unfairly appropriating state *resarcimiento* (reparations) payments for war victims, but they still voted for Winaq.

10. See “Guatemalan Election Becomes Vote on Former Dictator,” *New York Times*, January 7, 1996.

11. For a careful look at Portillo’s populist record that compares rhetoric to reality, see Baires Quesada 2015.

12. See Dotson 2014 for details about local criticisms of MIFAPRO as a corrupt and non-transparent drain on taxpayers.

13. Guatemalan antipopulism has a conservative bias. The most noted recent Guatemalan anti-populist is Gloria Alvarez, a political scientist at the Youth Parliament of Ibero-America, whose academic condemnations of populism and her telegenic appearance have made her the darling of Guatemalan elites. However, rather than criticize Ríos Montt for his populism, she has defended him from accusations of genocide and claimed to respect him. See Martin 2018.

14. Long derided by Ladinos as primitive Indian food, greens had been recently revalued as a part of a healthier traditional diet. I often heard stories of ancestors who never got sick, lived long lives, and were physically much stronger than people today who eat fatty junk food with chemicals instead of herbs.

15. Garrard-Burnett (2010, 13) writes that since 2003 Mayas have come to participate in “an alternative symbolic universe, framed around the reports of truth commissions, forensic reports, ‘recovered’ historical memory, and the exigencies of new constructions of racialized politics that have emerged within civil society since the war’s end.”

16. Precisely how violence turns into consent is a riddle unanswered by theories of hegemony. Furthermore, Garrard-Burnett’s description (2010, 11) of Ríos Montt’s “heretofore unchallenged claim to moral rectitude” seems to understate long-standing criticisms of his role in the violence, as existed in San Pedro. Her account also cannot explain significant Mayan support for the FRG through 2003, long after FRG’s corruption was abundantly clear.

17. See Human Rights Watch 2001 and Ruhl 2005.

18. See “El Pueblo Debe Juzgarme,” *Prensa Libre*, October 17, 2003.
19. Milagros Leiva Galvez, “Ríos Montt proclama sus verdades,” *La Nación*, October 26, 2003.
20. See “Ríos Montt, moralista y contra oligarquía,” *Prensa Libre*, November 2, 2003.
21. See “Zury Ríos justifica la política de ‘balas y frijoles,’” *Prensa Libre*, October 7, 2003.
22. See Human Rights Watch 2002.
23. See Adams 2009.
24. *Prensa Libre*, October 10, 2003, http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/Agreden-Rigoberta-Menchu_0_76794015.html. See also EMOL, “Condenan a cinco guatemaltecos por racismo contra Menchú,” 2005, <http://www.emol.com/noticias/internacional/2005/04/04/178089/condenan-a-cinco-guatemaltecos-por-racismo-contra-menchu.html>.
25. See “Ríos Montt es símbolo del genocidio,” *Prensa Libre*, November 20, 2003.
26. Garrard-Burnett (2010) argues that a new moral imaginary elaborated by Ríos Montt had shaped Mayan consciousness and captured genuine support since the 1980s but that by 2003 it had been supplanted by the new discourses from the peace accords and truth commissions. My findings suggest a more ambivalent relationship toward Ríos Montt that would remain invisible in opinion polls.
27. In the Liberal era, planter-class elites established rural Ladinos, who were poor and marginal, as a buffer class to help govern indigenous communities at a distance. See Smith 1990a.
28. Writing about the years after the 1999 FRG victory, Santiago Bastos (2009, 9) notes that “nevertheless, in those same years, the Accord on Identity and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was the accord that advanced the least. Mayan public figures were promoted to relatively high government posts—Ministry of Culture, Secretariat of Peace, General Directorate of Bilingual Education—and specific spaces were created for policy management for the Maya, managed by Maya” (my translation).
29. Guatemalan presidents can serve only one term.
30. Perez Molina went on to defeat Manuel Baldizón, a businessman from Petén who had founded the Líder Party.
31. Narco-trafficking had become a growing phenomenon in Huehuetenango ever since Andean shipments to the United States shifted from water to overland routes in the mid-2000s. The department was a prime location because of its distance from state authority, its rugged terrain, and its large and almost-impossible-to-police border with Mexico, as well as a cash-starved population willing to take risks: many of the same reasons that Huehuetenango was an ideal place to launch the guerrilla movement. See UNODC 2012. Drug gangs operate secretly, but signs (or suspected signs) of their cash are visible everywhere.

Conclusion

1. Accusations of self-interest are similar in this way to Harry West’s (2005) analysis of sorcery accusations among Muedans.
2. Cojtí (2007) notes the white supremacist and assimilationist biases of legislation, the scarcity of nonindigenous personnel, the lack of concern for or funding to meet the needs of indigenous people, and the racist attitudes of state workers, among other endemic problems.
3. See Englund 2008 and Auyero 2001.
4. See Geovanni Contreras, “Solo hay una entrega de Bono Seguro,” *Prensa Libre*, September 25, 2015, <https://www.prensalibre.com/bono-solo-hay-una-entrega>, accessed November 7, 2018; and Manuel Rodríguez, “Programas sociales siguen envueltos en clientelismo y corrupción,” *La Hora*, July 2015, <http://lahora.gt/programas-sociales-siguen-envueltos-en-clientelismo-y-corrupcion/>, accessed June 10, 2017.

5. See Nugent 2012 for a discussion of democratic temporalities.
6. For an analysis of indigenous sovereignty in Guatemala, see Sieder 2011a, 2011b.
7. See Scott 2009 and Zibechi 2010.
8. FUNDEBASE is the Foundation for the Strengthening and Development of Grass-roots Organizations.
9. Personal communication, 2017.
10. See Mora 2017 for a discussion of Zapatista autonomy politics.
11. Zibechi (2010) discusses horizontal organization among indigenous movements in Bolivia.
12. See Nelson 1999 and Hale 2011 on convergences between indigenous autonomy projects and decentralized neoliberal governance in Guatemala. See Stahler-Sholk 2007 for a discussion of this dilemma in Chiapas.
13. See Ardití's (2010) review of Laclau 2005.
14. See Green 2017 for one of many examples of this argument.
15. See Greenhouse 2008 on the fragmentation of political discourse.
16. On corporate strategies to sow doubt and resignation, see Benson and Kirsch 2010; Copeland and Labuski 2013; and Kirsch 2014.
17. See Hale 1994; and Bastos and Camus 2013.
18. See Warren 1998; Nelson 1999; Esquit 2003; Bastos 2009; and Vogt 2015.
19. See Granovsky-Larsen 2013.
20. See Laplante and Nolin 2014. By the time of this writing, the number had passed 100.
21. On connections between the defense-of-territory and food-sovereignty paradigms in Guatemala, see Alonso-Fradejas 2015 and Copeland 2019.