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
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Disciplining the Disciplinarians: Combating Corruption and Abuse through the Professionalisation of the Prison Cadre

Usually when the topic of discipline and prisons is broached, the first items of discussion are Jeremy Bentham's prison panopticon and Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*. The panopticon was designed to provide prison guards with maximum surveillance over inmates, therefore facilitating the guards' ability to control, discipline, and rehabilitate the incarcerated. This design enabled prison officials to peer into every cell and continuously supervise prisoners while remaining hidden from view. This act of unseen surveillance was supposed to instil prisoner self-discipline. For Foucault, this act represented the ultimate example of the state's ability to control and dominate society through the implementation of new instrumentalities of governance. As discussed in Chapter 4, these new methods of prison governance included new regimens, prisoner organisation and divisions, improved hygiene and health conditions, better provisioning, constant surveillance, religious instruction, and 'rehabilitating' labour. Most importantly, prison guards became the linchpins in the implementation of these reforms. According to Foucault, prison officials and especially guards are the definitive representatives of state power to prisoners who, in turn, epitomise society's disorder, unruliness, and menace to the common good.¹

Foucault, however, fails to recognise very important aspects of the panopticon and the various roles played by guards. The panopticon's architectural design contains a dual disciplining purpose. In addition to disciplining prisoners, it is also designed to discipline the prison cadre. Foucault never acknowledges how corruption and collusion between guards and inmates adversely affects discipline and order. In other words, the state, as represented by the guards, also requires surveillance, thus breaching the supposedly impenetrable barrier and upending the unidirectional flow of power that Foucault drew between 'state' and 'society'.²

The origins of the panopticon can be traced to eighteenth-century Russia during the reign of Catherine the Great. Jeremy Bentham's brother,

Samuel, was the first to invent this design, but for a factory, not a prison.³ Samuel Bentham designed his factory panopticon to facilitate discipline, order, and efficiency through maximum surveillance of the ‘subject’. In addition to the workers, the ‘subjects’ of his panopticon also included the foremen. In fact, it appears that the supervision of the foremen was the primary purpose of his original design. If factory owners or managers could control and discipline the foremen, they could better control the labourer, thus improving factory order, productivity, and profits.⁴ Foucault misses this important aspect in his analysis of the intent, power, and purpose of Jeremy Bentham’s prison panopticon. He fails to see the negative affect that prison guards had on overall prison order and disorder and the need for prison guards to be supervised and disciplined as well.⁵

Disciplining the disciplinarians or the professionalisation of the prison cadre is a central aspect of prison reform that is often overlooked by penal scholars. It is, however, vital to understanding the CUP’s attempts at penal and imperial reform and state centralisation of power. The stipulations, sources, and legitimation of CUP attempts to professionalise its prison cadre together with other aspects of prison administrative reform demonstrate that prison guards acted as the foundation for Ottoman penal policy and modernisation. Disciplining the disciplinarians was seen as the means of putting an end to corruption, prisoner abuse, and guard–prisoner collusion that was so prevalent in Ottoman prisons. Properly trained prison cadre would facilitate the rehabilitation of criminals by fostering a disciplined and well-ordered prison environment. The CUP’s vision of the ideal prison guard also embodies its self-image as a group of elite technocrats or *savant* that would rescue the empire from ruin and destruction. The professionalisation of prison cadre and general administrative reform within Ottoman prisons also represent broader CUP attempts to centralise state power during the Second Constitutional Period and to continue the process of Ottoman modernity initiated by earlier regimes. How these reforms were formulated, legitimated, and implemented represent an Ottoman passage to modernity.

This chapter argues against a distinct rupture with the past that often pervades the discourse of modernity, be it unified, alternative, or multiple. There is much more continuity in these processes of transformation than is often acknowledged.⁶ The protection of the ‘weak’ from the abuse of state officials had been at the core of Ottoman sultanlic practice and legitimacy since the empire’s inception. The Sultan’s subjects from the lowest classes, including prisoners, had always been empowered to petition their ruler and expected their grievances to be heard and appropriately

addressed. This ‘Circle of Justice’ is not a modern concept and its ideal was central to the efforts exerted by Ottoman officials to ‘police’ their own.⁷ What is distinctly modern about these actions, however, is the level of standardisation of norms and procedures regarding the training, supervision, and requirements for the ideal prison guard. These standardisations also affect imperial oversight, inspection, and investigation of violations of these norms and practices. The goal of all of these reforms was to bring the Ottoman criminal justice system into ‘conformity with the laws of civilisation’. These actions created a distinct process of Ottoman socio-legal practice that is both modern and Ottoman.

Finally, this chapter focuses on the praxis between normative legal and administrative reform and its implementation among state authorities and prisoners from 1880 to 1919. In so doing, it builds upon previous chapters and continues to expand the analysis of prison reform and reality through the prism of imperial intention, daily prison life, and the complicated interactions between local prison administrators, staff, and inmates. Therefore, this chapter focuses on examples of corruption, prisoner abuse, guard–prisoner collusion, imperial efforts to fight these problems, the effectiveness of these reforms, and local reaction by both officials and inmates.

This chapter first discusses the specific qualifications and responsibilities of local prison officials and personnel as stipulated by the 1880 Prison Regulation. It then investigates Ottoman prison reformers’ vision of the role that prison officials, specifically guards, were to play in implementing the comprehensive overhaul of the empire’s prisons and in rehabilitating prisoners. Finally, this chapter looks at concrete steps that the Prison Administration took to combat corruption, prisoner abuse, and guard–prisoner collusion through the detailed analysis of a 1912–13 scandal at the Sinop penitentiary and its aftermath. The explication of this and other examples of guard–inmate interactions demonstrates the reality of prison life and illuminates the murky and porous boundaries between guards and inmates, continuity and change, and state and society.

Professionalising Prison Employees

Ideally speaking, prison guards are the front line of state power, authority, discipline, and justice against the incarcerated. Guards and prisoners, however, often become common bedfellows. Within prison culture and society there exists a long history of prisoner–guard collusion. Bribes, kickbacks, sexual favours, contraband, smuggling, assisted escapes, gambling, extortion, and so forth have been and still are common within

prisons around the world. Ottoman documents detail numerous incidents of rampant corruption among prison cadre, prisoner abuse, and extensive collusions between guards and inmates. These fraternisations and abuses of power blur the boundaries and moral distinctions between these seemingly oppositional entities.

As briefly described in Chapter 4, administrative corruption and official misconduct were rampant in Ottoman prisons during the nineteenth century as evidenced by guard-assisted prisoner escapes, weapons' smuggling, guard-run prostitution rings, and so on. There are numerous reports and investigations regarding the occurrence of these types of incidents involving guards and prisoners during the nineteenth century, some of which are discussed below.⁸ Ottoman authorities expended much time, energy, and resources attempting to fix these problems. This section begins with a detailed discussion of the 1880 Prison Regulation's delineations of the authority, responsibilities, and organisation of local prison administration. Prison officials utilised the 1880 Prison Regulation as the template for proper prison administration and reform throughout the rest of the empire's existence.

The 1880 Prison Regulation lists the offices and responsibilities of all prison personnel. According to Article 9, prison employees consisted of:

a director (*müdür*), a chief scribe (*birinci katib*), assistant scribe (*ikinci katib*), a chief guard (*ser gardiyan*), regular guards (*gardiyanlar*), gatekeepers (*kapıcılar*), a physician (*tabib*), launderer (*çamaşırıcı*), health personnel/nurse (*hastahane hademesi*), janitor/custodian (*işçi*), and an imam and/or clergyman (*imam ve iktiza eden memurin-i ruhaniyyeden*).⁹

Not every prison filled all of these positions. In fact, district-level prisons (*kaza*) often only had one guardian to run the entire prison, especially if the prison held only a few inmates. Most prisons located in provincial centres, however, were fully staffed.¹⁰

The Ministry of Justice appointed prison wardens (*müdür*) on the provincial, sub-division, and district levels. It was also responsible for their dismissal. Wardens were required to implement the entirety of the prison regulation by overseeing the organisation, order, security, finances, and administration of the prison. They were also in charge of organising work details, securing provisions and prisoner possessions, and overseeing prisoner admittances, releases, and discipline. The 1880 Prison Regulation also required them to submit regular reports to the respective ministries about the goings-on inside the prison and any changes to prison personnel. Wardens also had to wear special uniforms and be present twice a week for a general count of all prisoners.¹¹

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Prison clerks (*katib*) were responsible for keeping an accurate inventory of all prison materials, such as furniture, bedding, tools, prisoner belongings, prisoner wages and financial accounts, prison stores, provisions, and the number of prisoners. They were supposed to keep registers of all prisoners on a daily and weekly basis, something that was inspected regularly by the warden and chief guard. Additionally, they were to document prisoner behaviour and punishments, keep track of sentences, and see to it that inmates were released on time. Finally, they were ordered to regularly submit copies of their prisoner registers and bookkeeping to the Ministry of Justice, the Police Administration, and to provincial governors and judicial inspectors.¹²

Chief guards (*ser gardiyan*) were required to be literate, to know arithmetic, to be of 30 to 50 years of age, and to wear the appropriate uniform. They oversaw all guards and answered to the warden for any damage or misconduct by guards or prisoners should it not be reported immediately. They could not be employed in any other capacity outside the prison. Their responsibilities included supervision of the prison cadre, counting prisoners daily in the presence of the chief clerk, and maintaining general prison discipline, order, cleanliness, and appropriate prisoner behaviour. Additionally, they oversaw the proper storage and distribution of provisions and prisoner belongings. Chief guards were charged with conducting any investigations into prisoner or guard misconduct, wherein they would personally interrogate suspects, report their findings to the prison director, and write up any prescribed punishments. They were also responsible for the proper transfer of prisoners and for all the comings and goings at the prison. Everything and everyone entering or exiting the prison had to be inspected by the chief guard, including visitors, personnel, food stuffs, medicine, industrial products, and letters.¹³

Guards represent the front-line prison officials who interact with inmates and are subject to the supervision of the chief guard and warden. They oversee the day-to-day activities of the prison and prisoners, including basic discipline, order, and cleanliness. This was the same in Ottoman prisons. Any problems they encountered with prisoners had to be reported to their superiors or else they would be held responsible for any resulting consequences and damages. Similar to the chief guard, guards could not hold outside employment. Their families could not enter any portion of the prison or grounds where prisoners were present. Guards also could not allow any prisoners to enter their personal quarters. Male and female guards had the exact same responsibilities regarding their gender-specific charges. Guards distributed food, clothing, and other provisions as directed by the chief guard. They were responsible for supervising inmates

during transfers, while on work details, caring for their personal hygiene, and receiving approved visitations. Guards were to prevent unauthorised visitations, contact between vendors/contractors and prisoners, as well as the smuggling in or out of any goods or persons. Their personal interactions with prisoners were to be strictly professional. Thus any prisoner fraternisation, such as gambling, game playing, eating or drinking with prisoners or their visitors and relatives, talk or idle chatting, accepting gifts from them or their relatives and friends, or buying from or selling anything to prisoners was strictly prohibited. Guards were also forbidden to drink alcohol or use any kind of narcotic. If they violated any of these regulations they were subject to incarceration, fines, and dismissal from their jobs.¹⁴

Despite this legislation, Ottoman prisons continued to maintain the reputation as legendary bastions of corruption and prisoner abuse. Tales of sadistic torture and prison cadre venality fill numerous pages of Western travel volumes and foreign reports (the vast majority of which are, at best, second-hand accounts). For example, Vahan Cardashian claimed that, during Sultan Abdülhamid II's reign, should severe beatings and brandings of 'Christian' prisoners not produce the desired information regarding political secrets then their 'hair was shaved off, incision made, and vermin placed in the skull', adding that, 'thousands upon thousands of innocent men have undergone these fiendish tortures, in one or more forms'.¹⁵ Although the evidence is clear that many of the most salacious accounts are hyperbole – products of those with clear political agendas – corruption, prisoner abuse, and guard–prisoner fraternisation regularly occurred in Ottoman prisons. The Ministry of the Interior during the Hamidian era regularly replaced prison directors and guards for acts of misconduct (*yolsuz*), forcing them to forfeit their pensions.¹⁶ Still, corruption, bribe taking, and prison cadre-assisted escapes remained regular occurrences. Although not completely realised during the Hamidian era, the CUP did attempt to implement the 1880 Prison Regulation to its fullest extent, particularly concerning the qualifications, duties, and responsibilities of Ottoman prison officials and employees.

Disciplining the Disciplinarians

As discussed in Chapter 2, the CUP established the empire's first centralised Prison Administration (*Hapishane İdaresi*) in May 1911. This agency was attached to the newly restructured Ministry of the Interior and immediately began collecting statistics on every aspect of incarceration. Efforts to professionalise all of the empire's officials commenced imme-

diately with the Ministry of the Interior circulating the Regulation for the School of Civil Servants (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye Nizamnamesi*) to the Prison Administration on 14 August 1911. This regulation contains forty-two articles that stipulate the basic guidelines for conduct, character, and duties applicable to all state officials. It was the foundation of more job-specific regulations for prison personnel, such as the 1880 Prison Regulation.¹⁷

On 5 October 1911, the Prison Administration distributed an employee survey to each of the empire's prisons. According to the survey's directive, at the end of each month every prison had to report any changes in the employment status of its prison cadre. The information requested included the names, positions, responsibilities, dates of hire, and salaries of all prison personnel.¹⁸ This directive exemplifies Ottoman attempts to monitor prison employment practices. During the first quarter of 1912 most of the provinces and independent administrative sub-divisions (*liva* or *sancak*) returned their completed employment statistical forms to the Prison Administration.¹⁹

Mosul province exemplifies the general prison employment information gathered by this survey. Its central prison employed Muhammad Nuri Efendi as warden at a monthly salary of 750 *kuruş*, a chief clerk (Muhammad Sadik Efendi) at 400 *kuruş* a month, an assistant clerk (Mahmud Efendi) at 300 *kuruş* a month, a chief guard (Rakha Bey) also at a monthly salary of 300 *kuruş*, a physician (Haziyat Efendi) at 250 *kuruş*, and eight male prison guards all at the same salary of 150 *kuruş* a month. In addition to these personnel, the prison employed a nurse and a launderer. Twelve of the sixteen employees had been working at the prison for more than a year, whereas the other four had been hired quite recently.²⁰ The eight guards and one chief guard were responsible for supervising 592 inmates over the course of the year. This total number included convicted, accused, and serious and lesser offenders. Ninety-six inmates were convicted of serious crimes (*cinayet*), ranging from manslaughter and murder to severe assault and highway robbery. All of them were serving sentences of incarceration with hard labour ranging from three years to life. Four others received death sentences for highway robbery. A total of 199 inmates were convicted of lesser crimes (*ciinha* and *kabahat*), serving sentences ranging from twenty-four hours to three years of incarceration. This means that over the course of the year the guard-to-prisoner ratio could have been as high as 1:65 for Mosul's central prison in 1911. Most likely, the ratio was much lower, since not all of these prisoners were necessarily incarcerated simultaneously. A total of 156 prisoners served terms of three months or less and an additional 297 prisoners were awaiting trial.²¹

These employment records not only reveal very detailed information

about each prison employee, but they also demonstrate that there were discrepancies in pay between prison employees in smaller administrative districts and provincial centres, between male and female personnel, and between employees who worked in penitentiaries (*hapishaneler-i umumi*), prisons (*hapishaneler*), and jails (*tevkifhaneler*). It also appears that salaries had not yet been standardised.²² Except for the warden, all prison employees were appointed by the local municipal councils on the district, sub-district, and provincial levels. It appears that these councils decided the number, identity, and salary of those hired and, thus, possessed a great deal of local autonomy in terms of staffing prisons, especially since prison budgets came from local coffers.

A few examples illustrate these points. Most provinces only hired chief guardians for the central prison and jail in the provincial capital and on the sub-divisional level. In 1914, the province of Trabzon, however, had a chief guard for every prison and jail irrespective of whether it was at the provincial, sub-divisional, or district level. Each prison had at least two guards and one of them was always a chief guard; therefore, Trabzon employed three times more chief guards than any other province, seventeen in total.²³

Female prison guards were generally paid at least a third less than their male counterparts. In the provinces, especially at the district level (*kaza*), most male guards received a monthly salary in the region of 100 to 150 *kuruş*, whereas female guards generally received in the region of 50 to 100 *kuruş* per month.²⁴ Male guards who worked in some of the provincial capitals made an additional 50 *kuruş* a month. In general, prison employees who worked in the central prisons in the provincial and major administrative sub-districts received higher wages than their district counterparts. A comparison of prison personnel salaries in the provinces of Adana and Bitlis for 1914–15 illustrates this point. Adana's guard salaries were completely standardised throughout the province from provincial prisons to district jails. All male guards received 200 *kuruş* a month and female guards received 150 *kuruş*, whereas in Bitlis provincial centre and sub-division male guards received 150 *kuruş* a month, but district level male prison-guard salaries ranged from 100 to 150 *kuruş*. Discrepancies were even greater among female guards, who on the provincial level received a monthly salary of 100 *kuruş*, but on the divisional level, received pay ranging from 100 to 150 *kuruş*, which was similar to the male guards in the same sub-division (*muş*). On the district level, however, monthly salaries for female guards were very erratic, ranging from 40 to 80 *kuruş*. Since local municipal councils set salaries and hiring practices, large pay discrepancies existed from one province to another and even within the same

province.²⁵ Such low wages for employees often led to acts of embezzlement and prisoner extortion, as discussed below.

The Prison Administration and later the Directorate of Prisons constantly issued directives to prison employees defining acts of misconduct, warning against them, and delineating the punishments that violators would incur. These directives provide important insights into what types of misconduct and criminal behaviour prison officials were engaging. For example, stealing prisoners' food was one of the most prevalent kinds of misconduct committed by officials as attested to by numerous reports and eyewitness accounts.²⁶ Prison guards often stole state-allocated prisoner rations for their own personal gain, especially during wartime.²⁷ In 1915, a case of corruption involving prisoner bread came to the attention of the Directorate of Prisons. A combination of prison official negligence and private contractor corruption led to the purchase and distribution of spoiled bread in Jerusalem's central prison. The contractor was punished and prison officials were reprimanded for their actions.²⁸ Both the Prison Administration and the Directorate of Prisons repeatedly issued directives reasserting the official policy regarding proper food purchase, storage, and distribution. A 1911 directive specifically details the proper distribution of prisoner provisions with the unspoken purpose of preventing misappropriation of foodstuffs by prison cadre.²⁹ In 1916, 1917, and again in 1918 the Directorate of Prisons reissued the specific articles governing prisoner food found in the 1880 Prison Regulation.³⁰ Prison regulations also empowered several different commissions at different times to combat the issues of misappropriation of prisoner food, negligence regarding the purchase of food, and poor prisoner nutrition.³¹

Other examples of directives warning against corruption and misconduct include the ones issued in December 1912 and May 1913. Both reiterated official policy that prison-cadre misconduct must be properly investigated and could result in the loss of salary, pension, and employment.³² On 19 March 1914, the Directorate of Prisons issued another directive reaffirming the illegality of selling smuggled intoxicants and other items by government officials. These sorts of violations also had to be properly investigated, judged in a court of law, and given appropriate punishments.³³ Then in August 1916, the Ministry of the Interior reissued part of the prison regulation that discussed the fines and punishments meted out to employees who engaged in misconduct, such as embezzlement and dereliction of duty.³⁴ A similarly worded, but expanded, directive was reissued six months later in February 1917.³⁵

This continual dissemination of regulations and official policies regarding proper conduct and prison-cadre responsibilities reflect CUP inter-

ests in ending the rampant corruption occurring in the empire's prisons. Reminders of official policy and the consequences of its violation were not the only ways prison administrators addressed the problems of corruption and prisoner abuse. They also emphasised prison personnel professionalisation.

While the 1880 Prison Regulation discusses only rudimentary qualifications for the chief prison guard, such as an age requirement and the ability to read, write, and carry out basic computations, it is entirely silent concerning the qualifications of other prison officials. On 4 January 1912, the Prison Administration issued a directive entitled 'Concerning the Selection and Appointment of Prison Officials and Employees' (*Hapishaneler Memurin ve Mustahdeminin İntihab ve Ta'yini Hakkında*). This directive delineated in abundant detail the criteria, qualifications, and selection process for prison officials and employees.³⁶ The directive was also unambiguous about the source, goals, and justification of the newly announced standards.

The directive begins by extolling the virtues, efficiency, and discipline of European prison employees. According to the directive, European prison cadre paid careful attention to the social and spiritual welfare of their prisoners and preformed their duties with such exactitude, diligence, order, and discipline that they were able to transform 'vile and wicked' prisoners into individuals who possessed 'moral character' by the end of their incarcerations.³⁷ The directive also indicated that the Prison Administration shared the same goals as other European countries regarding prison conditions and prisoner rehabilitation. It clearly linked the employee's qualifications and attributes with the effective implementation of penal policy. The calibre of Ottoman prison cadre needed to match that of their European counterparts. If Ottoman prison guards did not possess the necessary qualifications or were found negligent in their duties, they would be discharged from service without a pension or any monetary compensation.³⁸

The directive clearly delineates the new selection process for prison employees and the necessary qualifications, characteristics, and skills ideal prison guards would possess. In addition to emulating the model European prison guard, the properly qualified Ottoman guard needed to possess the ability to read and write Ottoman Turkish, needed to have good oral communication skills, and needed to demonstrate an adequate knowledge of criminal law as assessed by an exam. Guards also had to possess the attributes of order, discipline, virtue, and good moral character, in addition to being ethical people with job-related experience. Ideal candidates, therefore, were former military and gendarme officers.

Finally, the directive concludes that prison cadre possessing these stipulated qualities would act as 'the foundation for the implementation of general Ottoman prison reform'.³⁹

This directive reflects the Prison Administration's view of the role that guards and other officials were to play in prison reform and prisoner rehabilitation. First, European prisons were seen as models of proper administration, discipline, and order. This, in turn, enabled them to rehabilitate their prisoners successfully.⁴⁰ It also demonstrates that one of the primary goals of CUP prison reform was to bring discipline, progress, and order to Ottoman prisons and facilitate the 'rehabilitation of the criminal's soul'.⁴¹ This would, in turn, make former prisoners productive members of society upon their release, because they would now possess good 'moral character'.⁴²

Additionally, the directive reveals ideological connections the CUP made between prisons and the military in terms of committee members' shared assumptions and practicality. As discussed in Chapter 2, Comtian Positivism was at the core of CUP ideology and the centralisation of power was its chief aim.⁴³ The Positivist members of the CUP identified themselves as the *savant* of the empire. Their self-identification was due to the fact that most of the CUP inner circle consisted of low-level bureaucrats and junior military officers educated according to European standards in the military and professional academies of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Preserving the empire and transforming it through the centralisation of its administration and bureaucracy was their chief priority.

Many CUP members had been military officers who planned and participated in the 1908 Constitutional Revolution.⁴⁴ This connection between the military and imperial reform has a long imperial tradition. Most reforms associated with defensive developmentalism focused first on the military. For these reasons it is natural that the CUP should want military officers to run its prisons. Former military personnel were ideal prison employees as a result of their training, discipline, and experience in a 'total institution' similar to the prison. Since the inception of the modern conscript army, it has been the military's responsibility to take untrained peasants and workers and turn them into disciplined soldiers. In the minds of CUP members, former military officers were the most qualified to train, supervise, discipline, and 'rehabilitate' society's miscreants.⁴⁵ Military and gendarme officers, trained according to European standards, were the prison guards of choice. The CUP considered them the advanced guard of administrative reform that would purge the Ottoman bureaucracy of Abdülhamid II's nepotistic, corrupt, and sycophantic cronies, thereby ensuring professional advancement based on merit and efficiency.

Since much of the top leadership of the CUP was trained in military academies and/or were former military officers, they wanted to use the best of their kind as the leaders of their penal reform programme. And since the prison was a microcosm of imperial transformation, the CUP wanted to place its 'best and brightest' in control of its prisons. By disciplining the disciplinarians, the CUP inserted the cream of the crop into the centre of their imperial reform programme. Former military officers were the Ottoman harbingers of modernity. They were the vital, front-line players who were supposed to bring order, discipline, progress, and reason not only to prisons, but to the entire empire. They were the key to imperial transformation, administrative centralisation, and prisoner rehabilitation.

There were more than a thousand prisons and houses of detention within the empire when the CUP created the Prison Administration in May 1911. In order to fulfil the requirements of this directive, the Prison Administration would need to hire an enormous number of guards with military experience. Also according to a documented exchange between the Istanbul penitentiary and the Prison Administration dated 10 and 15 January 1912 (just six days after the directive regarding prison-cadre qualifications was issued) the ratio of guards to prisoners was supposed to follow the European standard of roughly 1:7 or fifteen guards for every 100 prisoners.⁴⁶

Despite the ideology and the directives, this ratio was never achieved according to prison employment and prisoner statistics collected in 1915 and 1917.⁴⁷ The total prison population in 1914–15 was 28,773 inmates, but the total number of guards (including chief guards, male and female guards) was only 1,782. This makes the overall guard-to-prisoner ratio 1:16. The female guard-to-female inmate ratio, however, was significantly lower at less than 1:6. The male-guard-to-male-inmate ratio was 1:18, making this ratio significantly higher than what the 1912 directive mandated.⁴⁸ This stark difference in ratios between males and females can be attributed to the requirement that every prison employ a female guard, even if there were only a few female inmates. Since women only made up 3 to 6 per cent of the prison population, in many cases one female guard was supervising just a handful of prisoners.

The overall guard-to-prisoner ratio became even higher as WWI progressed. By 1917, the guard-to-prisoner ratio nearly doubled to 1:30. The prison system employed only 719 guards to supervise a prison population of 21,666 inmates. Unfortunately, the breakdown of male and female guards is not available, but the overall numbers are staggering. In just a couple of years, the prison population dropped by more than 7,000 convicts, while the number of guards plummeted by almost 60 per cent.⁴⁹

This sharp decrease in prison cadre and inmates can be attributed to wartime mobilisation efforts. Many prison guards were actually reserve military personnel who were activated for military duty during WWI.⁵⁰ Additionally, many prisoners were mobilised for military duty as part of an amnesty programme in 1917 that allowed male prisoners of good behaviour, convicted of lesser crimes (*cünha*), and with six months to a year left of their sentences to enter military service in lieu of completing their prison terms.⁵¹

Guard–Prisoner Relations: Breaking down the State–Society Divide

As mentioned above, officials exerted great amounts of effort and resources professionalising the prison cadre, fighting prisoner abuse, and preventing cadre corruption, with mixed results. While the Prison Administration and later the Directorate of Prisons never eradicated these problems, officials undertook extensive investigations into prisoner allegations; punished prison officials, cadre, and prisoners for misconduct; and standardised prison administration, oversight, and accountability to an unprecedented degree. This was all accomplished despite the numerous challenges the empire faced in its final decade of existence. In this case, Samuel Bentham's panopticon model acts as an effective double metaphor for Ottoman efforts to discipline both prisoners and prison cadre. The concrete reforms taken by the Prison Administration and Directorate of Prisons represent a form of surveillance over local prison officials and cadre. Together they enacted clear regulations concerning conduct and responsibilities; established and empowered inquiry commissions to oversee and investigate prison employee conduct, thus holding them accountable for their actions; and allowed inmates to petition central authorities with complaints of ill-treatment. Many of these petitions resulted in official investigations and disciplinary action.

While the archives provide numerous cases of corruption and abuse that Ottoman authorities investigated and attempted to resolve through punishments to both prisoners and prison officials, one stands out as epitomising administrative efforts and illustrating the dual metaphor of the panopticon. It also demonstrates the types of events and malpractices that characterised prison life and the interactions between prison cadre and inmates.⁵² In October 1912, the Prison Administration initiated an investigation into allegations of corruption and abuse against Sinop penitentiary's warden, Cemal Efendi, and his staff.⁵³

According to the investigative reports, on 28 October 1912 a male

inmate by the name of Ismail submitted a formal complaint (petition) to the Ministry of Justice claiming that the recently appointed prison warden (Cemal Efendi) had obtained his position through nepotism. (His brother was the vice-general prosecutor for the Kastamonu province.) The complaint accused the warden of poor character, of possessing no merit as an administrator, and that all of his decisions were based on self-interest. Ismail went on to allege that the warden was making a huge profit from his involvement in a prison-wide weapons' smuggling ring. He warned that if the ministry did nothing then the situation in the prison would worsen, because of the traffic in illegal weapons.⁵⁴

These allegations are very serious, but what is most significant about Ismail's petition is the language he uses in an attempt to move the ministry to action. He asserts that the warden's actions 'go against the age of prison reform wherein prisons are supposed to be schools of reform and places of rehabilitation'. Likewise, he asserts that 'in the end your ministry's clean conscience will never be content with this state of affairs and with my loyalty to the state, I humbly submit this information'. Finally, he signs the petition as 'Ismail from among the prisoners'.⁵⁵ Calling upon authorities to administer justice and to protect the weak while asserting one's loyalty is nothing new to Ottoman culture or politics. Nor is it unusual that petitioners would themselves appear as one of the masses ('Ismail from among the prisoners'). What is interesting is that as a convicted criminal he uses the language of prison reform to justify action against the warden. This indicates that the CUP's rhetoric of reform did not stay within the realm of the elite, but had reached the masses. Prisoners knew their rights, petitioned for them, and couched their complaints in the ideals and rhetoric of the day, thus demonstrating their exercise of agency by appropriating certain concepts for their own benefit. In the end, petitioning prisoners became part of the Prison Administration's system of cadre surveillance and assisted in disciplining the disciplinarians.

In response to these allegations, another prisoner, by the name of Cemal, wrote a letter of support for the prison warden to the Kastamonu provincial office of the Ministry of Justice dated 20 February 1913. He denied all of Ismail's accusations. In his petition he claimed that the penitentiary was being terrorised by a gang of tyrannical inmates who were intimidating the well-behaved prisoners and slandering the warden and guards. He requested that these 'bad' prisoners be transferred as a way to remedy the situation. Cemal also denied that guards were abusing these prisoners. He asserted that they only punished these prisoners according to regulations, because of their constant infractions. Interestingly, he also claimed to speak for all the prisoners.⁵⁶

The Ministry of Justice forwarded Ismail's petition to the Ministry of the Interior with instructions that the matter be investigated. The Ministry of the Interior took the allegations very seriously and assigned Behçet Bey, a state inspector (*mülkiye müfettişi*), to oversee the case. It charged him with conducting a thorough and meticulous investigation into the allegations.⁵⁷ This is exactly what he and Sami Bey (the other state inspector assigned to the case) did, judging by the documents they produced and the punishments carried out. In the end, this investigative team worked with local officials from the municipal council and other provincial offices to take depositions from numerous individuals including the warden, prison guards, gendarme officers, and several prisoners.⁵⁸ The way this investigation was conducted and its findings provide rich insights into prison life, reform, and administrative oversight in the late Ottoman Empire.

The first thing the investigative team did was contact the local municipal council to request the personnel file for Cemal Efendi (the warden) in order to ascertain his background and employment history. Personnel files usually included the employee's date of birth, place of origin, family history, education, and previous state appointments. It also contained information on past disciplinary actions or investigations taken against the employee. According to his file, Cemal Efendi was born, raised, and educated in Trabzon and had held various governmental positions including district governor (*kaymakam*) and tax collector. He had been previously under investigation for refusing to assume an assigned position as a village mayor (*nahiye müdürü*), but appeared to then have been appointed as warden of the Sinop penitentiary, instead, where he had served for the last four months.⁵⁹

The next portion of the investigation looked into the official records submitted by the Sinop prison cadre regarding disciplinary actions taken against the prisoners in question. The inspectors requested follow-up information about these cases from the warden and chief guard. According to the official records, several prisoners were punished for violating prison rules and engaging in dangerous behaviour. These violations included attacking guards, intimidating other prisoners, bad conduct, not fulfilling their responsibilities, making and smuggling weapons, and trying to escape. The first prisoner, Çorumlu Şakir, confessed to making skewers (*şişler*) from the legs of gas stoves in the prison in order to sell them to other inmates. As a result he was sentenced to twenty days of solitary confinement, according to Article 85 of the Prison Regulation.⁶⁰ The next two prisoners, Tikveşlü Hakkı and Arslan, hid behind a door in the third ward of the prison and attacked a prison guard (Bekir Çavuş) with clubs when he opened the door. The two prisoners claimed they had been angry

with the guard because he opened their ward late. These prisoners were punished with twenty-one days' solitary confinement, placed in chains, and fed reduced rations. Supposedly this punishment was in accordance with Article 81 of the 1880 Prison Regulation. Punishment with chains (*prangabendlik*), however, had been outlawed since the 1850s.⁶¹ Another prisoner, Kastamonulu Şükriü, was sentenced to forty-two days of solitary confinement in chains for stealing the iron from window frames and walls in order to manufacture weapons. Previously, he had stolen similar items from the prison factory, thus the harsher sentence.⁶² Sami Bey, the state inspector, summarised most of these actions in his own report and had it verified by the chief guard of the Sinop penitentiary, Ahmet Hamdi.⁶³

In addition to these inmate misdeeds and punishments, Sinop penitentiary records discuss three other important events that took place on 23 October 1912. All three are central to the investigation of the prison warden and his cadre, resulting from Ismail's petition. According to the official records, the first event concerns an attempted escape by several prisoners who allegedly broke the lock on the main door of the third prison ward and attempted to rush the main gate. It just so happened that this attempted escape coincided with a prison search conducted by the gendarme in the presence of the vice-governor, vice-prosecutor, and gendarme commander. The search resulted in the discovery and confiscation of eighty-three daggers (*kama*), knives (*bicak*), and files (*eğ̃e*) used for weapons making. All prisoners involved in the attempted escape were thrown into chains and sentenced to solitary confinement for 21 days.

The second event involved a prisoner by the name of İzmid'li Hasan Efendi who lost his position as prison teacher for not performing his duties and for suspicion of aiding and abetting the trafficking of weapons.⁶⁴ Finally, ten other prisoners of various religious, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds, such as nomadic, Kurdish, Shiite, Armenian, Sunni, and Albanian, were accused of planning to escape from the prison by building a ladder, breaking a hole in the ceiling, and fleeing through the attic of the prison's third ward. The accused were each sentenced to 21 days of solitary confinement in chains.⁶⁵

Finally, the warden Cemal Efendi submitted his own report stating his version of events. He simply reiterated what the official documents said about the prison search for weapons and punishments handed out to the prisoners involved. He also revealed that he took disciplinary action against seven of the prison cadre (five guards and two supervisors). They were all dismissed from their positions for weapons' smuggling and owing debts to prisoners (implying that they engaged in prisoner fraternisation and gambling).⁶⁶ This is a significant number of prison personnel to be

fired all at once, especially since at the time Sinop penitentiary incarcerated more than 700 prisoners and employed only thirty-one guards (that being one chief guard, eight supervisory guards, two gatekeepers, and twenty regular guards).⁶⁷

After investigating the official records and questioning the prison officials, the state inspectors began questioning some of the inmates. The interviews were recorded word for word, according to what the prisoner said in the first person, thus preserving colloquialisms, poor grammar, and so on. These interviews give a very different version of events. The main prisoners questioned were Fatsa'lı Hasan Ağa (Ismail of the original petition), İzmid'li Hasan Efendi, and Reşit Efendi. They claimed that there had been no attempt to escape the day of the prison inspection that uncovered the contraband weapons. In fact, they asserted that prisoners had gathered together (including the three of them) to protest the treatment of one of their own who they claimed had been unjustly punished by the cadre. This protest occurred after Ismail (Fatsa'lı Hasan Ağa) wrote his petition and submitted it to the warden who, in turn, purposefully delayed forwarding it to the Ministry of Justice until after the search for weapons had been conducted. The prisoners who congregated to protest were bound in chains and placed in solitary confinement for five days. The inmates denied that any of their friends were trying to escape through the ceiling of the third ward, but that they had somehow been framed by the warden and the guards and then falsely accused.⁶⁸ The warden denied that Fatsa'lı Hasan Ağa and İzmid'li Hasan Efendi had ever been placed in solitary confinement, but claimed that İzmid'li Hasan Efendi had been removed from his teaching position on suspicion of smuggling weapons and not performing his teaching duties.

Finally, Fatsa'lı Hasan Ağa, İzmid'li Hasan Efendi, and Reşid Efendi all claimed that the warden and the guards were the ones behind a weapons smuggling scheme. The warden had allegedly awarded a monopoly over the production and sale of prison-manufactured goods to a prisoner named İpsiz Recep. He was the only prisoner allowed to import raw materials to the prison, such as wood, mother of pearl, and fabric, and sell them to the prison factory craftsmen at high prices or on credit so that they could produce their goods. He was also permitted to monopolise the sale of these manufactured goods outside of the prison. In other words, Fatsa'lı Hasan Ağa, İzmid'li Hasan Efendi, and Reşid Efendi all claimed that the warden allowed İpsiz Recep to control the flow of goods in and out of the prison in order to get a cut of the profit. The latter came mainly from smuggling weapons into the prison and selling them to inmates at exorbitant prices. The three prisoners claimed that skewers and knives usually costing 10

kuruş at the local market were being sold to prisoners for 1 to 2 lira! They also contradicted the warden's story that only eighty-three weapons had been found during the inspection. Instead, they claimed that the guards actually uncovered more than 200 weapons, but only eighty-three had been reported and turned over to the gendarme commander. Their overall story implicitly claims that the search for weapons had been staged as a means to counteract Ismail's petition and cover up the prison cadre's corruption and prisoner abuse. They also claimed that the guards, gatekeepers, and chief guards were all complicit in the warden's corruption by not doing their duty and allowing these weapons to be smuggled into the prison.⁶⁹

As a result of this investigation, Kastamonu province, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Prison Administration took measures to restructure Sinop penitentiary's cadre. The situation had become so unruly that the gendarme was called in to restore prison order and aid in its reorganisation in May and June 1913. Additionally, the prison warden, Cemal Efendi, was relieved of his duties and replaced.⁷⁰ The above-mentioned ministries also authorised and implemented the complete restructuring of the prison personnel in order to streamline the chain of command and standardise prison positions and titles throughout the empire. In so doing, they increased the wages of all prison personnel with the exception of the warden. Prior to these changes, Sinop penitentiary employed a cadre consisting of a warden (salary: 1,000 *kuruş*/mo.), a clerk (300 *kuruş*/mo.), a chief guard (300 *kuruş*/mo.), eight guard supervisors/*gardiyân çavuş* (200 *kuruş*/mo.), two gatekeepers/*kapıcı* (160 *kuruş*/mo.), and 20 regular male guards/*gardiyân nefri* (150 *kuruş*/mo.). After the restructuring, it employed a warden (1,000 *kuruş*/mo.), a clerk (400 *kuruş*/mo.), a chief guard (400 *kuruş*/mo.), an assistant chief guard/*ser gardiyân maafi* (300 *kuruş*/mo.), two gatekeepers/*kapıcı* (250 *kuruş*/mo.), and 19 male guards/*gardiyân* (200 *kuruş*/mo.).⁷¹

By taking these actions and implementing change the Prison Administration attempted to improve prison discipline and organisation in order to stamp out corruption and prisoner abuse. The cooperation among various ministries on the imperial, provincial, and local levels to investigate this case and the concrete steps that were taken to rectify the situation all reflect the state's commitment to disciplining its disciplinarians. This commitment did have a real effect on order, discipline, and conditions throughout the empire's prisons. Despite these efforts, however, corruption, guard-prisoner collusion, prisoner abuse, and breakdowns in order and discipline still continued to occur.

The Sinop case also vividly illustrates the realities of prison life and the

interactions between prison officials and inmates and among the prisoners themselves. Rivalries, alliances, collusions, abuse, allegations, and exploitations abounded within Ottoman prisons causing serious problems for the Prison Administration in terms of order, discipline, security, and prisoner rehabilitation. Understanding the realities of prison life and administration clearly explicate the blurred boundaries between convict and cadre.

Conclusion

Professionalising the prison cadre was a central focus for the Ottoman administration, CUP, and prison reformers. These entities viewed the prison cadre as the linchpins to creating a progressive, modern, and civilised penal system that was standardised, disciplined, ordered, and able to rehabilitate and transform the empire's miscreants into productive moral citizens. This vision did not stay in the ethereal realm. Officials translated it into concrete programmes for improvement of prison administration, personnel supervision, and accountability.

Samuel Bentham's intended subject of his factory panopticon acts as an effective metaphor for Ottoman prison reforms intended to discipline the disciplinarians. As demonstrated by the central government's response to the Sinop penitentiary scandal, the Prison Administration took concrete actions to supervise and discipline its local prison personnel. These included taking prisoner petitions seriously, conducting robust investigations into corruption and abuse allegations, punishing guilty officials, and implementing real change concerning prison chains of command, wages, new standards of employment, and increased employee oversight. This vision and these actions, however, did not stamp out corruption, abuse, or collusion in the Ottoman prison system.

One of the most significant findings of this investigation into prison corruption and attempts to professionalise prison personnel concerns the porosity of the boundaries between state officials and societal actors, especially guards and prisoners. In other words, personal agency often blurs the rigid lines that social scientists tend to establish between the reified entities labelled 'state' and 'society'. This investigation also demonstrates the intricate interactions between ideal, reform, implementation, and reality. The involvement of so many individuals, from visionaries, officials, and reformers to local actors, such as cadre and inmates, disrupts and often upends the top-down methodology repeatedly used to describe late Ottoman reforms. Local realities and actors affected reform programmes much more than the scholarly literature often acknowledges.

Resistance to and appropriation of these visions of reform affected the

reality of prison life in many unexpected ways. The question should not be whether these reforms failed or succeeded, but how they affected the reality of lived experience. Ottoman visions of the well-ordered prison staffed by former military officers acting as harbingers of penal reform never came to full fruition. Its attempted implementation, however, did change the power dynamics within the prison as individuals, such as Ismail, other prisoners, and various prison personnel exercised their own agency to work within and against the system in an attempt to reshape it to their own advantage. The Ottoman prison provides a vivid illustration of this dynamic.

Continuing with this theme of reform and reality and the state's assumption of greater responsibility for its population, Chapter 6 investigates the situation of incarcerated children. It looks closely at the efforts of Ottoman legislators, governmental officials, and the Prison Administration and Directorate of Prisons to change the very definition of childhood and to care for the empire's most vulnerable segment of its population. These reforms and their implementation provide additional insights into late Ottoman views about childhood, punishment, law, criminal accountability, and state patriarchy.

Notes

1. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 195–230 and 'Essays on Governmentality', Chapter 4.
2. For an important critique on the debate regarding the artificially rigid divide between 'state' and 'society' created by Foucault and social scientists, see Mitchell, 'The Limits of the State'.
3. Werret, 'Potemkin and the Panopticon'.
4. Ibid. Similar to the penitentiary, military, hospital, and asylum, the factory can also be classified as a 'total institution', because it employs modern technologies of surveillance and discipline to control nearly every aspect of a person's life. 'Total institutions' are quintessential examples of the modern nation-state, whose development is essential to state consolidation of power (Goffman, *Asylums*, p. 4).
5. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 195–230.
6. See Anonymous, 'AHR Roundtable'.
7. Darling, pp. 157–87.
8. A sampling of these cases can be found in BOA, DHMBHPS 73/33, 105/9, 89/61, 73/15, 73/25, 106/35, 99/14, 81/66, 83/15, 85/15, 149/50, 94/64, 137/18, 134/64, and 131/24. DHMBHPS 131/24 is especially rich. It consists of more than 200 pages of investigations and reports concerning numerous cases of corruption within Ottoman prisons during the Second Constitutional Period.

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9. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10, Article 9.
10. BOA, DHMBHPS 154/14 contains the 1915–16 employment statistics for the Prison Administration.
11. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10, Articles 11–19 and 21.
12. Ibid. Articles 20–1, 84–5, and 94–7.
13. Ibid. Articles 14, 21–44, and 47.
14. Ibid. Articles 14, 23–44, 82–4, and 87.
15. Cardashian, *Ottoman Empire*, pp. 105–6.
16. See BOA, DHTMIK 42/3 for an example of action taken against a corrupt official during the Hamidian era. The warden of Sinop prison was dismissed from his duties, lost his pension, and was replaced for unspecified misconduct in the spring of 1903. Also see Yıldız, *Mapusane*, pp. 400–2.
17. BOA, DHMBHPS 53/6. In early 1917, after Dr Pollitz became Inspector General of the Directorate of Prisons, the Ministry of the Interior published a special directive entitled ‘Instructions for Departmental Directors and Personnel’ (*daire müdür ve müstahdemini hakkında talimatname*) that spelled out in five sections and thirty-two articles the responsibilities and duties of all directors and employees working in the various departments in the Ministry of the Interior (BOA, DHMBHPSM 25/73).
18. BOA, DHMBHPSM 8/3, doc. 10/b, 11/1, and 11/2.
19. This is a list of completed employment statistical forms for 1911–12: BOA, DHMBHPSM 2/108 (Adana); DHMBHPSM 3/30 (Ankara); DHMBHPSM 3/28 (Aydın); DHMBHPSM 3/16 (Basra); DHMBHPSM 5/25 (Bitlis); DHMBHPSM 5/18 (Canik); DHMBHPSM 4/16 (Cezair-i Bahr-i Sefid); DHMBHPSM 3/8 (Diyarbakir); DHMBHPSM 7/57 (Edirne); DHMBHPSM 8/11 (Halep); DHMBHPSM 4/3 (Hüdavendigâr); DHMBHPSM 3/20 and 4/16 (Istanbul); DHMBHPSM 2/112 (İşkodra); DHMBHPSM 3/18 (İzmid); DHMBHPSM 3/15 (Kaseri); DHMBHPSM 3/23 (Kosova); DHMBHPSM 3/34, 5/28, and DHMBHPS 86/29 (Mamürettilaziz); DHMBHPSM 2/114 (Manastır); DHMBHPSM 5/13 (Mosul); DHMBHPSM 2/89 and 3/11 (Selanik); DHMBHPSM 7/106 (Trabzon); DHMBHPSM 3/4 (Urfa); DHMBHPSM 5/29 (Van); and DHMBHPS 6/3 (Yemen).
20. BOA, DHMBHPS 5/13, doc. 2.
21. BOA, DHMBHPS 146/69, doc. 2.
22. See endnote 19 of Chapter 5.
23. BOA, DHMBHPS 154/14, docs 40–1.
24. ‘According to F.D.E., *Système des Mesures*, pp. 23–9, the basic unit of Ottoman coinage was the *piastre* or *kuruş*. The gold *lira* (*livre*) = 100 *piastres* (*kuruş*); the silver *medjidié* = 20 *piastres*; and 1 *kuruş/piastre* = 0.22 francs. This source noted that legally the *medjidié* = 19 *piastres* and 1 *piastre* = 38 *para*, but, for convenience sake, the convention was: 1 *medjidié* = 20 *piastres* (*kuruş*); a double *piastre* (*ikilik*) = 80 *para*; and 1 *piastre* = 40 *para*.’ The above is quoted directly from Brummett, ‘Dogs, Women, Cholera’, endnote 20.

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25. For a comprehensive comparison of the different salaries for every prison employee in the Ottoman Empire in 1911–12 see the references listed in endnote 19 of this chapter. For employment statistics for 1914–15 and 1916–17 see DHMBHPS 154/14 and DHMBHPS 143/93. Generally speaking, in provincial capitals, prison employees received the following monthly salaries: director (*müdir*) 1,000 *kuruş*, chief clerk (*katip*) 500 *kuruş*, physician (*tabib*) 250 *kuruş*, chief guard (*ser gardiyan*) 400 *kuruş*, male guard (*gardiyan*) 200 *kuruş*, female guard (*nisa gardiyan*) 150 *kuruş*, and various types of prison workers and servants, such as hospital attendants and janitors (*hademe*) 150 *kuruş*. Compare these salaries with employees who worked in jails (*tevkifhaneler*) and made significantly less than their prison counterparts, except at the lowest levels. They were paid according to the following scale: director (*tevkifhane memuru*) 350 *kuruş*, clerk (*katip*) 300 *kuruş*, chief guard (*ser gardiyan*) 300 *kuruş*, male guard (*gardiyan*) 200 *kuruş*, female guard (*nisa gardiyan*) 150 *kuruş*, and various servants (*hademe*) 150 *kuruş* (BOA, DHMBHPSM 7/57, doc. 35).
26. See Riggs, 'Adult Delinquency' and Forder, *In Brigands' Hands* about the frequency of prison officials appropriating prisoners' food.
27. BOA, DHMBHPS 71/51 discusses guard misappropriation of prisoner rations for their own personal gain during the Ottoman-Italian and Balkan Wars.
28. BOA, DHMBHPS 74/39.
29. BOA, DHMBHPSM 8/7 and 9/13.
30. BOA, DHMBHPS 160/14, 78/81, and 165/84.
31. BOA, DHMBHPS 71/51, 81/18, and 83/34.
32. BOA, DHMBHPS 8/59.
33. BOA, DHMBHPSM 11/59.
34. BOA, DHMBHPSM 25/50.
35. BOA, DHMBHPS 27/18.
36. BOA, DHMBHPSM 8/3, docs 19 and 23/a.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. and BOA, DHMBHPSM 17/35, docs 12/a and 12/b issued in 1913.
39. Ibid. This directive was subsequently reissued in 1913 with the same general stipulations and guidelines (BOA, DHMBHPS 8/13).
40. Of course research on nineteenth and early-twentieth-century European prisons has proven otherwise. For example, see O'Brien, *Promise of Punishment*, pp. 190–225.
41. See BOA, DHMBHPSM 8/3, docs 10/a, 25, and 26 regarding the importance the Prison Administration placed on rehabilitating prisoners.
42. The Ottoman phrase found in the directive concerning the selection of prison employees is '. . . ifayi vasıfa eden müstahdeminin mesa'i cediyesi semeresile hapishaneye dahil eden bir şahs-ı şerir bile hutam-ı müddet-ı mahkumiyetinde sahib ahlak ve sıfat olduğu halde huruç eylemektedir' (BOA, DHMBHPSM 8/3, doc. 19).

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43. Hanioglu, *Young Turks in Opposition and Preparation for a Revolution*. See also Gelvin, *Modern Middle East*, pp. 129–30.
44. For a useful study of the relationship between the military and Ottoman society and its development, see Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks*.
45. It must be noted here that the CUP did not necessarily want the *Alaylı* military officers to run the prisons or be prison guards. In fact, the CUP blamed them for many of the inefficiencies and overall ineptness of the Ottoman military. An *Alaylı* officer was one who rose up in the ranks from enlisted personnel and was not the recipient of a modern military education so crucial to the CUP's vision of a modern military force. Their training and discipline were substandard and they were unprepared to handle modern weaponry and military tactics. Their promotion from the ranks of enlisted soldier was supposedly based upon loyalty to the sultan and not due to merit, training, or ability. Subsequently the CUP purged a large number of these military officers from its ranks. Turfan indicates that out of an officer corps of 26,310 in December 1908 only 16,121 remained by January 1911. As a result of several purges and enacted laws over ten thousand *Alaylı* officers were expunged from the Ottoman Army (Turfan, pp. 155–65, endnote 115).
46. Regarding the January 1912 exchange between Istanbul's *hapislane-yi umumi* and the Prison Administration, see BOA, DHMBHPS 85/23, docs 1–2.
47. For the 1914–15 prison employee statistics broken down by province and prison, see BOA, DHMBHPS 154/14. See BOA, DHMBHPS 17/32 for the number of prisoners incarcerated in 1914–15 and for the total number of prison guards and the 1916–17 prison population, see BOA, DHMBHPS 143/93.
48. In 1915, 131 chief guards (all male), 1,480 male guards, and 171 female guards were employed in the empire's prisons.
49. BOA, DHMBHPS 143/93.
50. Even Dr Pollitz's personal assistant and translator, Nizar Bey, was called up for military duty during WWI. The Inspector General was successful in preventing his assistant from being activated for military service (BOA, DHMBHPS 80/22). Many prison employees were reserve military officers required to serve during the war as witnessed by the numerous archival documents discussing their military pay and leave requests. For examples see BOA, DHMBHPS 74/42, 74/44, 78/25, 91/1, 91/28, 91/32, 91/47, 93/20, 93/31, 93/34, 151/20, 151/34, 153/57, 154/60, 156/69, 157/49, DHMBHPSM 9/98, 12/54, 13/21, 14/68, 18/49, 18/51, 28/53, and 46/110.
51. BOA, DHMBHPS 79/38, doc. 71.
52. The Ottoman archives hold literally thousands of cases of abuse and corruption that various ministries investigated. BOA, DHMBHPS 131/24 alone contains more than 217 documents associated with investigations into cases of employee misconduct and corruption (*yolsuz ve suistimalat*) within the Prison Administration throughout the Second Constitutional Period.

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53. All of the documents relating to this case contained in the Ottoman Prison Administration's catalogues are BOA, DHMBHPS 147/5, 147/12, 147/16, 147/17, 147/18, 147/19, 147/21, 147/23, 147/24, 147/25, 147/26, 147/27, 147/28, 147/29, 147/30, 147/31, and 147/47.
54. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/5, doc. 2.
55. Ibid.
56. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/29.
57. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/5, doc. 2.
58. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/24.
59. BOA, DHMBHPS 87/44, doc. 6.
60. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/16, docs 1–2.
61. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/17. Concerning outlawing the use of chains in punishment (*prangabendlik*) see Saner, 'Osmanlı'nın Yüzlerce Yıl Süren'.
62. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/12, 147/23, and 147/30.
63. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/30.
64. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/21, 147/25, and 147/27, docs 1–3.
65. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/25 and 147/26.
66. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/21, docs 1–4 and 147/47, docs 1–3.
67. BOA, DHMBHPS 89/17, doc. 2.
68. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/19, docs 1–3.
69. BOA, DHMBHPS 147/19.
70. BOA, DHMBHPS 96/33.
71. BOA, DHMBHPS 89/17.