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
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Prison Reform in the Late Ottoman Empire: The State's Perspectives

The 1850s constitute a very important transitional period for prison reform in the Ottoman Empire. As discussed in the Introduction and in Chapter 1, the convergence of British inspections of Ottoman prisons, the *Islahat Fermanı*, and the promulgation of the Imperial Ottoman Penal Code (IOPC) drew attention to many criminal justice related issues and prepared the ground for extensive prison reform efforts. First, the inspections revealed the dire state of the incarcerated and the need for state intervention to improve conditions. Second, the *Islahat Fermanı* announced an aggressive agenda to create, expand, and overhaul the Ottoman criminal justice system, including prisons. Finally, the promulgation of the 1858 IOPC transformed the empire's criminal justice practices by extensively delineating criminal behaviour and their associated punishments and outlawing corporal punishments including torture. This effectively circumscribed the discretionary punitive powers of local Islamic court judges and administrative officials. In so doing, the IOPC mandated incarceration as the primary punishment for criminal behaviour, thus making prisons the principal site for this newly standardised penalty.

Practical reasons for prison reform aside, Ottoman rulers and administrators also engaged in it for ideological purposes. Over the course of the nineteenth century the notion that prisons and punishment demonstrate a particular society's level of civilisation was adopted worldwide.¹ In fact, this association between civilisation and punishment dates back to the second half of the eighteenth century with Jeremy Bentham, Cesare Beccaria, and others.² By the mid-nineteenth century, Ottoman bureaucrats firmly linked nation-building and civilisation with criminal justice and prisons. The mutual association of these concepts entered the Ottoman intelligentsia's *mentalité* from both internal and Western European sources. One of the most influential was the long-serving British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Sir Stratford Canning.³ Canning devoted a great deal of time and energy to promoting reform

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within the empire and viewed its advancement in ‘European civilisation’ and ‘Christian civilisation’ as the only hope for solving the Near Eastern Question.⁴ According to Ambassador Canning, it was Britain’s ‘duty . . . [and] vocation . . . not [to] enslave but to set free’. Britain’s task was ‘to lead the way and to direct the march of other nations’, thus encapsulating British Orientalist and ‘White Man’s Burden’ views towards the Ottoman Empire.⁵

In Canning’s 1851 ‘Memorandum on the Improvement of Prisons in Turkey’, he clearly associates modern penal practices such as the moral rehabilitation of prisoners, proper health and hygiene, and crime prevention, with progress, reason, scientific advancement, and European ‘civilisation’.⁶ Reşit Pasha and Sultan Abdülaziz expressed similar views in the 1856 *Islahat Fermanı*: ‘Proceedings shall be taken . . . for the reform of the penitentiary system as applied to houses of detention, punishment, or correction . . . so as to reconcile the rights of humanity with those of justice.’⁷ The connection between prison reform and ‘the civilisation of a country’ was part of Ottoman imperial discourse and it continued to grow throughout the rest of the empire’s existence.⁸

In addition to civilisational uplift, Ottoman administrators also shared the world view that a centralised, standardised, and rationalised administrative state founded on the principles of what Foucault terms ‘governmentality’ was essential to the empire’s survival.⁹ Ottoman bureaucrats and rulers attempted to implement this administrative approach on all governmental levels. Imperial prison reforms were, therefore, carried out for both practical and ideological purposes.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the central administration’s prison programmes, philosophy, and ideology in order to establish the groundwork for understanding the developments, transformations, and realities of late Ottoman criminal justice and incarceration. It also discusses the broad themes associated with Ottoman prison reform: civilisational transformation, prisoner rehabilitation, increased administrative centralisation, standardisation, and rationalisation, order and discipline, and the creation and expansion of state patriarchy. In so doing, it argues that prisons act as effective windows into broader imperial transformation and the intricacies of Ottoman modernity. It was within the walls of prisons that many of the pressing questions of Ottoman modernity played out. Bureaucrats addressed issues related to administrative reform and centralisation, the rationalisation of Islamic criminal law and punishment, the role of labour in the rehabilitation of prisoners, economic development and industrialisation, gender and childhood, the implementation of modern concepts of time and space, issues

of national identity based on ethnicity and religion, social engineering, and the increased role of the state in caring for its population. In other words, prisons are microcosms of imperial transformation and exemplify a distinctive Ottoman modernity created by the spread of capitalist market relations and the application of modern methods of governance to a specific Ottoman context.

It also argues that prison reform and the transformation of Ottoman penal practice did not occur overnight or in a systematically progressive way, but the groundwork was laid in the 1850s for extensive Ottoman criminal justice reformation that included the empire's sprawling and dilapidated network of prisons, jails, fortresses, and other governmental structures used for incarceration. Each Ottoman administration (Tanzimat, Hamidian, and CUP) built on the previous regime's efforts, emphasising certain aspects so that by the time the CUP came to power, it was able to take full advantage of past reforms and implement them more fully according to its Positivist world view.

This chapter's discussion of prison reform is broken into two main parts. The first discusses prison reform during the Tanzimat and Hamidian eras (c. 1850–1908). The second section focuses on prison reform during the Second Constitutional Period until the empire's dissolution (c. 1908–22). This discussion further develops themes in Chapter 1 by beginning in the 1850s and includes the empire's participation in international prison conferences, drafting and adoption of detailed prison regulations, engaging in regular prison inspection routines, collecting extensive prison statistics, creating unified prison regimens that attempted to standardise practice and behaviour, professionalising the prison cadre, and constructing new prisons. Reforms culminated in the Second Constitutional Period as the CUP created the empire's first centralised Prison Administration and overhauled its prisons on an unprecedented level. The CUP continued these efforts throughout WWI by expending large sums of money, time, and effort. Prisons constituted an important facet of its programme to transform the empire into a powerful, centralised, and industrialised nation-state.

By providing this state-centric overview of prison reform, this chapter contextualises subsequent chapters that offer detailed studies of many of these reforms, how they were implemented, and how they affected local prison officials and inmates. These chapters, therefore, bring state- and people-centric histories together in order to complicate the picture of the late Ottoman Empire, particularly concerning crime, punishment, and incarceration.

***Prison Reform in the Tanzimat and Hamidian Eras
(c. 1850–1908)***

According to Canning's 1851 Ottoman prison report, health and living conditions were dreadful. Most prisoners had little access to fresh air, exercise, adequate food, or medical treatment. Prisons were makeshift structures usually located in local military compounds, fortresses, or in government building annexes. Inmates primarily depended on family, friends, or religious endowments for their meagre subsistence. All kinds of prisoners were incarcerated together: the accused with the convicted, the petty criminal with the felon, adults with children, and sometimes even men with women. According to Canning, immediate and extensive reforms were required for both Ottoman prisons and the imperial criminal code.¹⁰ As stated above, this report in combination with the promulgation of a series of penal codes and the *Islahat Fermanı* securely entrenched criminal justice and consequently prisons on the imperial reform agenda.

Just prior to the promulgation of the 1858 IOPC, the Ottoman administration hired Major Gordon, a British military officer, to direct prison reform in the empire. The Ottoman Government paid him a handsome sum and allocated a budget of more than 1,250,000 *kuruş* to administer and reform the empire's dilapidated network of prisons, jails, dungeons, and fortresses. Gordon complained profusely about how 'hellish' Ottoman prisons and dungeons were, and held up the Tersane Dungeon (*zindan*) as the epitome of brutality and neglect. He attempted, without much success, to introduce prisoner work discipline into the empire by adopting the British and American concepts of labour prisons. Idleness, however, continued to typify Ottoman prison life.¹¹

Gordon did have some influence on the delineation of crimes found in the 1858 IOPC. In a report he presented to the Ottoman Meclis-i Tanzimat (Tanzimat Council), Meclis-i Vükela (Ottoman State Cabinet), and Sultan Abdülmecid, Gordon successfully lobbied that the penal code adopt a four-part classification of criminal behaviour: accused (*zanlı*), misdemeanour (*kabahat sahiplerine*), less serious offence (*erbab-ı cünhaya*), and serious offence/felony (*mürtekib-i cinayet*).¹²

Notwithstanding Gordon's efforts, Ottoman bureaucrats were slow to invest a great deal of time and money in reforming prisons during the Tanzimat era, although they did commission, fund, and undertake some projects.¹³ For example, Ottoman administrators constructed a model penitentiary (*Dersaadet hapisane-yi umumisi*) in the Sultanahmet district of Istanbul in 1871.¹⁴ This prison was supposed to be replicated in each provincial centre of the empire, but it never came to fruition. It was located

next to the *At Meydanı* (Hippodrome) and near Sultanahmet Jail in the centre of the imperial capital. This penitentiary represents the fulfilment of a prison reform recommendation by Ambassador Canning in 1851.

Those [the prison reforms] which relate more directly to the building, to the construction of new or the improvement of old ones, require more time and a larger expenditure. Much, however, would be gained by adopting the whole as a system, and carrying it into practice gradually – If a single prison, by way of model, were established on sound principles in the Capital, for instance, where one of a better kind has already been formed under the Zaptie [police], the improvement confirmed by experience might be extended with ease throughout the empire according to local circumstances and the command of means.¹⁵

Perhaps it is difficult to substantiate the connection between a model prison constructed in 1871 and Canning's recommendation in 1851, but the construction did take place and the prison was designated a penitentiary (*hapishane-yi umumi*).¹⁶

Besides the obvious need for prison reform, another reason for building such an edifice was to procure greater political, judicial, and financial autonomy from European powers. Many late nineteenth century Ottoman officials hoped that such reforms would convince the Great Powers that the empire deserved equal status in the Concert of Europe and lead to the abolishment of exploitative capitulations.¹⁷ Despite the adoption of the 1858 IOPC and the creation of a model prison in the imperial capital, it was not until the Hamidian era that administrators began replicating this type of prison around the empire and penal reforms gained greater significance. As a result of these legal and judicial reforms, punishment and prisons became an issue of 'civilisation' among the rising Ottoman intelligentsia with a growing focus on rehabilitating prisoners (*'islah-ı nefis'*).¹⁸

Although these changes and activities mark very important steps in the direction of concrete penal reform, further developments did not take place until the Hamidian era (1876–1908). Sultan Abdülhamid II legislated and implemented penal reforms on several fronts – judicial proceedings in criminal matters, participation in international prison conferences, the construction of new prisons, new prison administrative regulations, and regular prison inspections. His successes, however, were founded on the efforts of his predecessor (Sultan Abdülaziz) who promulgated the 'Instructions for the Administration of the Provinces' on 21 February 1876. These instructions stipulated that district officials were required to supervise prisons, maintain prison population registers, and submit regular written reports to the Ministry of Justice. Not only did it delineate administrative responsibilities for prisons, but it also affected

their internal organisation by mandating the separation of convicted and accused inmates. Additionally, it contained provisions designed to combat arbitrary detentions.¹⁹

Building from Adbülaziz's efforts, Sultan Abdülhamid II issued the 1879 Code of Criminal Procedure and officially instituted the *nizamiye* court system (both of which were discussed in Chapter 1). Contemporaneous with these developments, Abdülhamid II ordered Müfettiş Pasha to conduct a comprehensive inspection of Ottoman prisons and submit his recommendations for improvement as part of a new prison reform campaign (*hapishane ıslahatı*). He was also given specific orders to find ways to rescue 'prisoners from their miserable conditions' (*mahbusların hâl-i sefâletten*). Müfettiş Pasha completed his inspections and submitted his report in December 1879. It contained scathing descriptions of the woeful prison conditions, complaints regarding the length of sentences, and recommendations for improvement. His most intriguing recommendation concerned the newly constructed (1871) *Dersaadet* penitentiary. He found it inadequate and in need of replacement after just eight years of use. He proposed that penitentiaries be separated from populated areas and, therefore, recommended that the *Dersaadet* penitentiary be relocated to a small island in the Marmara Sea just off the coast of Istanbul. This prison would house only criminals sentenced to fifteen or more years of hard labour.²⁰

Shortly after Müfettiş Pasha filed his report, the Ministry of Justice in May 1880 issued 'The Regulation for Prisons and Houses of Detention' (*Hapishane ve Tevkifhane Nizamnamesi*). The 1880 Prison Regulation contains six sections consisting of ninety-seven articles meticulously detailing the proper administration of Ottoman prisons in both the imperial centre and provinces. The regulation includes such items as standards for health and hygiene, living conditions, and the spatial separation of different types of prisoners based on gender, age, type of crime, and status as convicted or accused. It also stipulates the types of prison officials to be employed, such as wardens, clerks, doctors, and male and female guards, and their associated responsibilities. Regulations regarding the conduct of prison personnel and internal prison order and discipline are also clearly delineated. Additionally, it specifies the types and manner of prison labour and who should perform them.²¹

This regulation was the first of its kind in the empire. It was never, however, officially adopted by sultanic decree (*irade*). Regardless of its unofficial status, it represents a significant step in Ottoman penal reform for at least two reasons. First, it signifies the Ottoman process of appropriation and adaptation of European prison regulations. Ottoman prison reformers sifted numerous sources, including French and Prussian prison

administrative regulations, and adapted the measures best suited to the empire's specific needs and circumstances.²² Second, the 1880 Prison Regulation served as the template for prison reform and administration throughout the rest of the empire's existence.

Abdülhamid II attempted to implement the first article of the 1880 Prison Regulation, which states, 'Every district (*kaza*), sub-division (*liva*) and provincial centre shall possess a prison and house of detention [jail].'²³ In almost every provincial centre and in many administrative sub-districts, officials constructed either a prison (*hapishane*) or a jail (*tevkifhane*). Abdülhamid II also constructed a number of 'model' prisons, had pictures taken of them, and showed them off to the rest of the world. These 'model' prisons were built according to new architectural designs and furnished with the latest equipment. Unfortunately, the administration of the vast majority of Ottoman prisons did not follow the 1880 Prison Regulation.²⁴ This represents, however, a higher degree of penal reform implementation than during the Tanzimat era.

Beginning in the 1870s, Ottoman representatives first attended and then fully participated in international prison conferences. This participation brought prestige and provided a forum for discussing important reform policies. Ottoman representatives attended the first International Penal Congress in 1872 as observers, but it was not until 1890 that they participated as full members in the international prison conference held at St Petersburg, Russia. Prior to 1890, only 'civilised' European and North American countries could be full participants. The topic of Ottoman involvement produced a great deal of consternation among the Great Powers, but, in 1890, a formal invitation to participate was finally extended. This invitation marked an important step for Ottoman self-perceptions of the empire's own civilisational progress.²⁵

Ottoman representatives translated the proceedings of the conference and submitted them to the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*) to be debated and ratified. Most issues discussed at the conference, however, had already been addressed in the 1880 Prison Regulation. The empire continued to participate in international prison conferences until 1910, which was the last conference held prior to the outbreak of WWI.

Eighteen ninety-six was an important year for prison reform in the empire. Under the direction of Abdülhamid II, administrators reaffirmed legislation that was passed in 1879 that authorised provincial governors to appoint committees for preliminary inquiries into corruption, abuse of official power, health and hygiene concerns, and prisoner mistreatment. The membership of these appointed committees consisted of a president, a Muslim, and a non-Muslim. Each member possessed the authority to

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request information from the police and to release prisoners who were unjustly detained. This legislation also authorised governors to appoint both prison directors and guards.²⁶

In close association with this legislative reaffirmation, Abdülhamid II established 'The Commission for Expediting Initiatives and Reforms' (*Tesri-i Muamelat ve Islahat Komisyonu*) and placed it under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior. He charged it to conduct regular inspections in order to monitor the progress and hasten the implementation of imperial reforms. This commission spent a major portion of its time investigating health- and hygiene-related issues, particularly in prisons, hospitals, and major urban areas. The commission's efforts clearly align with Hamidan goals for the state to take greater responsibility for public health and hygiene, especially in the prevention and spread of communicable diseases such as cholera and syphilis.²⁷ During the time in which the commission operated (1896–1908), numerous reports detailed specific prison health concerns and described the general state of Ottoman prison disrepair. These reports provide a general picture of prison conditions in the empire, demonstrating that most prisons were not abiding by the hygiene directives issued by the Sublime Porte or to be found in the 1880 Prison Regulation.²⁸

Notwithstanding these efforts, prison reform was still hampered by administrative inefficiency. No single ministry or department possessed full responsibility for administering or financing the empire's sprawling prison network. The centralisation of bureaucratic responsibilities between the palace (Sultan Abdülhamid II) and the Sublime Porte (the Ministries of Justice, Finance, and Interior) were still in the process of being rationalised. The Ottomans had yet to create a central Prison Administration with the comprehensive powers to implement the 1880 Prison Regulation. Abdülhamid II's reign, however, did result in a greater level of bureaucratic streamlining than his predecessors had brought about. He also strengthened the connections between the concepts of civilisation, the centralisation of administrative power, and prison reform. Abdülhamid II's reforms also demonstrate the state's growing intervention into the daily lives of its subjects, especially in terms of health care and preventing the spread of infectious disease. His world view focused on centralising his power and the transformation of his empire. This left an important legacy and foundation for the CUP on which to base its own reform agenda. During the Second Constitutional Period, as imperial crises worsened and the authoritarian nature of the government increased, the CUP fully integrated prisons into its nation-state construction, economic development, and social-engineering programmes.

Prisons Reform in the Second Constitutional Period

The Ottoman Empire of the early twentieth century was anything but peaceful, prosperous, and stable. In the few years leading up to the 1908 Constitutional Revolution there were waves of strikes, popular protests, and riots throughout the empire as a result of dire economic hardships, crop failures, and new taxes. CUP revolutionaries planned, instigated, and fanned many of these protest actions.²⁹ During 1908 and 1909, the Ottoman administration and society experienced tremendous upheaval as a result of a *coup d'état* and counter coup, the reinstatement of the 1876 Constitution, the reintroduction of parliamentary rule, extensive territorial losses in the Balkans, an initial relaxation of press censorship, a general liberalisation of politics, and extensive bureaucratic and administrative reforms.³⁰

With the CUP's ascendance, there was an explosion in political activism, demonstrations, and the proliferation of printed materials throughout the empire. Various nationalist identities and ideologies competed for the hearts and minds of portions of the Ottoman population. From 1908 to 1913, vast stretches of Ottoman territory were lost, including Crete, the territories of present-day Libya, the Dodecanese Islands, and all of the Balkans, except for the eastern portion of Rumeli, resulting in a massive influx of Muslim refugees into the empire. The Ottoman world was literally 'turned upside down.'³¹

This context of social, territorial, demographic, and political crises helps illuminate the role that penal policy and reform played in CUP pragmatism and modern state construction. Police and prisons constitute key institutions for maintaining power and imposing order and discipline upon a population, especially during times of crisis. As early as 1909, the CUP clearly linked penal reform and prisons, in concrete terms, to social control and modern state formation. Penal reform also began playing a role in CUP ideology to bring civilisation, science, reason, progress, economic development, and administrative centralisation to the empire.

Shortly after coming to power, the CUP took drastic action to curb strikes and political protests, even though its members had originally promoted these activities, leading up to the 1908 Revolution. It brutally crushed these actions and passed legislation outlawing them.³² The CUP's inner circle possessed a healthy distrust of the masses according to Gustav Le Bon's (1841–1931) elitist and racist philosophy concerning crowd psychology. CUP members read Le Bon's *The Psychology of the Crowd*, first published in 1895, and adopted its principles as a foundation of their political ideology. They viewed themselves as an elite group leading the

nation to reason, science, progress, and civilisation. Le Bon was a Comtian Postivist and his views originated from the French Third Republic, whose elites believed that the French Revolution had gone terribly wrong during the Jacobin Reign of Terror.³³

The Young Turks, and especially the leaders of the CUP, attempted to promote themselves as inheritors of the ideals of the French Revolution. They continuously portrayed Sultan Abdülhamid II as a corrupt despot similar to Louis XVI of France and labelled the sultan's administration the '*ancien régime*'. The inner circle of the CUP mainly consisted of low-level bureaucrats and junior military officers who received European-style educations in the schools established by Abdülhamid II. Their frustration grew to revolutionary levels at what they viewed as the sultan's nepotistic and sycophantic style of rule. They claimed to possess the training and expertise to save the empire from dismemberment and collapse by raising the Ottoman populace to the level of a scientific society. To Le Bon, the Third Republic, and the CUP, the masses constituted a powerful yet fickle force that needed to be controlled, dominated, and directed for the good of the nation. As a result of the 1909 countercoup the CUP viewed the masses as a real threat to its rule, and thus it established a powerful penal institution to subdue, monitor, and control the masses.

In August 1909, just four months after the failed countercoup, the CUP-led government established the Directorate of Public Security (*Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdiriyeti*). It functioned as a CUP harbinger to consolidate power and control the population. For example, one of the directorate's functions was to monitor and control vagrants, vagabonds, and the unemployed.³⁴ This new directorate replaced the Ministry of Police (*Zabtiye Nezareti*), was attached to the Ministry of the Interior, and was allocated a considerable budget.³⁵ As early as 1910, the Directorate of Public Security collected and reported to the Ministry of the Interior detailed statistics regarding crime, riots, strikes, and general political issues from across the empire.³⁶

Prison reform during the Second Constitutional Period began almost immediately with the intent to exploit penal institutions for the purpose of social engineering. From 1909 to 1911, the CUP-led government, focused on developing a central prison policy. In order to develop its programmes, prison officials conducted detailed inspections from Yemen to the Balkans. It suspended all major prison construction and repair projects until a general prison architectural design could be developed. In formulating its policy, the CUP drew heavily from the 1880 Prison Regulation and further implemented Article 1, which mandated a central prison and jail in every administrative district throughout the empire. The CUP

utilised Hamidian prison regulations as the template for its own prison reforms and implemented the 1880 Prison Regulation at an unprecedented level, especially in areas associated with order, discipline, administration, and health and hygiene.³⁷

Simultaneous to these initial inspections, the Ottoman administration raised the funds necessary to implement its penal reform programme. After deposing Abdülhamid II, the new government wrested administrative power from the Hamidian bureaucracy, confiscated the sultan's property, auctioned it off, reformed the Ministry of Finance, and attempted to create a more accurate, transparent, and balanced budget.³⁸ Administrators devised various schemes to raise funds for prison reform. These included establishing a number of labour prisons in major population centres of the empire, such as Istanbul, Damascus, Ankara, Beirut, and Baghdad. These labour prisons engaged in manufacturing and their profits went to the directorate.³⁹ Officials also sold dilapidated prison facilities in order to finance new prison building projects based upon a unified architectural design.⁴⁰

In May 1911, just prior to the IOPC revisions, Ottoman legislators promulgated a regulation to reorganise the empire's prisons. This regulation called for investigations into particular prison practices aimed at disciplining and rehabilitating prisoners. It also led to the creation of the empire's second major penal institution, the Prison Administration (*Hapishane İdaresi*).⁴¹ Except for military and consular prisons, this office streamlined and consolidated the decentralised Ottoman system of more than a thousand different prisons and houses of detention into one bureaucratic administration and placed it under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior.

The CUP-led Ottoman Parliament then passed extensive legislation related to penal policy and practice. As discussed in Chapter 1, on 4 June 1911, the Ottoman Parliament heavily revised the 1858 IOPC aimed at centralising and expanding the bureaucracy's authority over the adjudication of crime and punishment. The reformed IOPC delineated new crimes, codified and standardised punishments, expanded state authority over the use of force, further circumscribed the autonomy of court judges and local administrators, increased the state's ability to intervene in familial matters, and augmented definitions regarding criminal culpability, particularly in relation to minors. These changes solidified the central administration's control over criminal legal matters and punishment. It also entrenched incarceration as the primary punishment for criminal activity. There are deep and important connections between these IOPC revisions and the prison reforms initiated and implemented from 1911–12, especially the 1912 prison survey.

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Having collected enough preliminary information, created a centralised Prison Administration, substantially augmented the IOPC, and secured the necessary funding the Prison Administration launched its first comprehensive prison census in January 1912. It distributed the survey to every province and administrative district throughout the empire and requested enormous amounts of information about the prison population and prison management. The 1912 prison survey requested details regarding crimes committed, sentences served, marital and familial status, occupation, education level, age, and the ethno-religious and national identity of each prisoner. It also collected information on prison expenditures, health care, deaths in prisons, rates of recidivism, and prison factories. Chapter 3 contains a detailed discussion of this survey and the information it yields regarding the empire's prison population.⁴²

The knowledge and power gained by this questionnaire and others like it not only shaped CUP penal reform, but it also fashioned the prison into a premier institution for social control, social engineering, and Ottoman nation-state construction, surpassed only by the police and military. Prisons became microcosms of the CUP's larger plans to meld the empire's population and administration into a modern nation-state. The programmes implemented in Ottoman prisons, such as education, administrative and organisational centralisation, social engineering, health and hygiene, labour, and economic development parallel those implemented empire-wide. Additionally, the Prison Administration also initiated another statistical campaign in 1912 concerning prison employees. This survey collected the names, titles, numbers, responsibilities, salaries, and dates of service of all prison employees. Combined, these two surveys provide the most detailed picture of the Ottoman prison population and administration ever compiled.⁴³

After completing these surveys and processing their results, the CUP initiated its first comprehensive prison reform programme in early 1912 aimed at bringing 'Ottoman prison standards and health and hygiene conditions in line with the Laws of Civilisation'.⁴⁴ Mandated reforms required every prison to have an outdoor courtyard for inmates and called for the hiring of qualified prison employees who were literate in penal laws and practices. Another reform made provisions for prisoner rehabilitation through education and labour. Additionally, every prison was either to be renovated or rebuilt according to modern architectural standards. After completing all of the research and initiating such an extensive programme in early 1912, the Ottoman Government suddenly suspended all of these reforms in the autumn of 1912. It has been argued that the Balkan Wars caused this discontinuance, but this is only partially correct.⁴⁵

In the summer of 1912, the CUP won an outright majority in the Ottoman Parliament and gained sole control of the government for the first time. Notwithstanding this major victory, the CUP quickly found itself expelled from power after being accused of using its Special Organisation (*Teşkilat-i Mahsusa*) to intimidate, spy upon, and assassinate political rivals in order to manipulate election results. The *Entente Liberal*, the CUP's main opposition party, was instrumental in bringing down the CUP Government. Its political platform advocated administrative decentralisation for the Arab provinces, economic liberalisation, free trade, and Great Power intervention in the empire's economic, administrative, and social problems.⁴⁶ It is important to note that until 1912 the CUP had never held direct political power, but had remained a clandestine society influencing Ottoman politics from behind the scenes through elected representatives. Intense political pressure caused by the 1912 electoral scandal, resulted in the CUP Government resigning and being replaced by the 'Great Cabinet'-led National Unity Coalition.⁴⁷

The 'Great Cabinet' quickly purged the government of CUP members, arresting many, executing some, and chasing others into exile. This new coalition government emasculated CUP military support in the Balkans by about 70,000 troops and demoted the military leadership loyal to the CUP.⁴⁸ Another apparent victim of the new government was the CUP's prison reform programme.

The First Balkan War did not start until 8 October 1912. As a result of the military purges of CUP officers and troops, especially in the Balkans, the Ottoman military was woefully unprepared and, therefore, soundly defeated. Edirne was on the verge of collapse, which would expose Istanbul to foreign invasion and conquest. On 28 January 1913 some members of the CUP stormed the cabinet office of the Sublime Porte, shot the Minister of War, overthrew the 'Great Cabinet' and for the first time consolidated political power firmly within their own hands. The new cabinet reconvened parliament, reinstating all the loyal CUP members who were elected in 1912.⁴⁹

In response to the general upheaval caused by the Balkan Wars and its temporary loss of power, the CUP attempted to consolidate its political control even further by restructuring the Ministry of the Interior. On 22 December 1913, Talat Pasha (Minister of the Interior) issued the 'Regulation for the Restructuring of the Ministry of the Interior' (*Dahiliye Nezareti Teşkilati Hakkında Nizamname*). It completely overhauled, streamlined, and increased the power of the ministry. Out of all the reforms enacted by the CUP during the Second Constitutional Period, none were more extensive than what took place in the Ministry of the Interior.⁵⁰

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The new 'central organisational core' of the ministry consisted of eleven directorates, including the Directorate of Public Security (*Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdiriyeti*) and the Directorate of Prisons (*Hapishaneler Müdiriyeti*). Although similar organisations had been created shortly after the failed countercoup of 1909 and in 1911, the 1913 regulation raised the profile of both directorates within the Sublime Porte and greatly expanded their responsibilities and powers. The Directorate of Public Security was charged with 'executing and pursuing all matters, issues, and affairs that concern the maintenance of public order, security, discipline, and the rule of law within all territories under [Ottoman] dominion'. The regulation also charged it to 'gather and analyse all intelligence dealing with its assigned duties' and to be 'responsible for maintaining and administering law enforcement'. For its part, the Directorate of Prisons (*Hapishaneler Müdiriyeti*) replaced the Prison Administration (*Hapishane İdaresi*). This constitutes an upgrade in status from being an 'administration' to that of a 'directorate' in the bureaucracy, thus making it on par with the other directorates within the Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, this directorate was given extensive new powers including 'maintaining, repairing, operating, constructing, and administering all prisons and gathering all necessary intelligence and information pertaining to any of the aforementioned responsibilities'.⁵¹ The powers and responsibilities given to these two directorates are indicative of modern penal institutions.

From December 1913, the prison increasingly became a focus of CUP administrative and societal reform. The CUP revived, resumed, and expanded the suspended 1911–12 prison reform programme. The conduct of prison surveys and reports shifted from annual to tri-annual reporting on prison officials and the incarcerated.⁵²

In 1914, the Directorate of Prisons initiated another comprehensive prison survey. Similar to the 1912 prison survey, it sent this questionnaire (*sual varakaları*) to every prison in the empire. The questionnaire requested information on the state and condition of each prison facility asking for detailed input from local prison administrators in the form of extensive written comments about the specific needs for their respective prisons.⁵³ To make their cases some wardens included photographs of their facilities that revealed the woeful conditions that prisoners were forced to endure.⁵⁴ Other prison directors included blueprints of the prisons that they wanted built.⁵⁵

The findings of this survey resulted in a massive prison renovation and construction programme similar to the one initiated in 1912. Administrators designed, funded, and initiated new prison construction projects around the empire, particularly in provincial centres. In its

continued adherence to the 1880 Prison Regulation, it appears that the Directorate of Prisons intended to build a prison in every administrative district in the empire.⁵⁶ Similar to the 1911–12 plans to raise the money for such a project, on 25 January 1914 the Directorate of Prisons issued a directive calling for the selling of ‘ruined existing prisons and vacant lands’ in order to finance the prison overhaul.⁵⁷

This revitalised building and renovation programme launched scores of new prison construction projects. Prison officials from around the empire submitted land surveys, building estimates, and expenditure reports to the Directorate of Prisons, which in turn approved and funded them with the assistance of the Ministry of Finance. There are literally thousands of prison architectural designs, building estimates, and expenditure reports held in the Ottoman archives that illustrate the massive scale of this operation.⁵⁸ Unlike in the Balkan Wars, the CUP did not suspend prison reform during WWI. In fact, prison reform continued to expand throughout the war. The effort, time, and resources expended on prison reform during this period clearly demonstrate the importance of penal institutions to the CUP’s imperial vision.

These penal reform efforts should not be attributed to pressure from Germany, its wartime ally. CUP interest and efforts regarding penal codes, practices, and institutions pre-dates its alliance with Germany and did not continue in order to curry German support. The Ottoman Empire was very successful in securing the loans and financial assistance it wanted from Berlin during the war. For the first time, a Great Power (Germany) needed Ottoman assistance more than the other way round. Germany was desperate to keep the Ottomans in the war. This gave the CUP and the Ottoman Minister of Finance (Cavid Pasha) enormous leverage over its German ally when it came to financial matters – even securing German financial assistance for the empire’s prison reforms.⁵⁹

On 6 May 1915 the Directorate of Prisons completed another statistical collection campaign. This survey did not deal with prison conditions, but focused on budgets and expenditures in relation to the number of inmates. Each province provided expenditures for the current year as well as previous ones and proposed its future budget.⁶⁰

The importance of prisons to CUP ideology and state formation is demonstrated no clearer than during WWI. Faced again with crisis, the Ottoman administration continued to place heavy importance on penal reform. During the summer of 1916 Ottoman foreign officials in Germany began interviewing potential candidates for the newly created position of ‘Inspector General of Prisons and Penitentiary Establishments for the Ottoman Empire’ (*Inspecteur Général des Prisons et Etablissements*

Pénitenciers de l'Empire Ottoman). Ottoman officials narrowed the candidates to Dr Paul Pollitz and M. Alexander Klein. Both Pollitz and Klein had extensive experience of directing German prisons. The successful candidate's main responsibility would be to continue to overhaul, manage, and reconfigure the empire's prisons.⁶¹ On 15 October 1916, the Directorate of Prisons had the Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin, Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, hire Dr Paul Pollitz as the empire's Inspector General of Prisons and Penitentiary Establishments. This hiring was approved by the highest echelons of the Ottoman Government including Grand Vizer, Mehmed Said Halim Pasha, and Interior Minister Talat Pasha.⁶²

Dr Pollitz was a private German citizen, a professional prison administrator, a reformer, and a criminal psychiatrist. According to his contract, Dr Pollitz received a substantial annual salary of 1,200 Turkish Lira and also received payments of 1,500 Francs upon his arrival to Istanbul and at his departure in order to offset travel expenditures. He was hired for a five-year term beginning on 1 November 1916.⁶³ Upon his arrival to Istanbul, Dr Pollitz expanded and intensified the already robust penal reform programmes initiated by the Directorate of Prisons and focused his efforts on greater administrative efficiency and oversight. Additionally, he expanded the construction of new prisons, improved health and hygiene conditions, and championed the plight of incarcerated minors.

Shortly after his arrival, Dr Pollitz began reviewing Ottoman penal regulations. On 28 December 1916, Pollitz submitted a draft proposal to the Ministry of the Interior for a new comprehensive prison regulation. This massive document more than doubled the size of the 1880 Prison Regulation. Some additions included standardising salaries for all prison employees based on position and experience, clearer guidelines regarding prison health and hygiene practices, daily prison routines and organisation, and, most significantly, placing greater importance on prison labour.⁶⁴ Debate regarding this proposal continued for several months, but it was never adopted due to budgetary concerns. On 24 April 1917, however, the CUP and Directorate of Prisons officially ratified the 1880 Prison Regulation and distributed it to every prison in the empire.⁶⁵ This was the first time in the Ottoman Empire's long history that any comprehensive prison regulation was officially adopted and made binding for every prison. Prison practice, at least on paper, was finally standardised for the empire.

Shortly after submitting his revised Ottoman Prison Regulatory Code, Dr Pollitz issued a statement outlining his comprehensive plans for penal reform, which included the reorganisation of the prison population according to the gravity of the crimes committed. For example, prisoners

sentenced to one to three months should all be incarcerated at the lowest administrative level (*kaza*) while perpetrators of more serious crimes should be incarcerated together at the provincial or sub-provincial level. Dr Pollitz, throughout his tenure as inspector general, championed the separation of the convicted and accused through the construction of many new jails (*tevkifhaneler*) for the better maintenance of prison order and prisoner protection. He also proposed restructuring the powers of provincial, sub-division and district governors regarding the administration of prisons on the local level.⁶⁶

Dovetailed with these programmes, Dr Pollitz also proposed and implemented new regulations governing prison finance. In January 1917, he ordered the compilation of prison budgets and expenditures for 1916. According to the data, the 1916 budget for the Directorate of Prisons totalled 314,474 Turkish Lira (TL).⁶⁷ The 1917 proposed budget replicated the amounts spent in 1916 for supplies, medicines, and salaries, but did not estimate future building costs.⁶⁸

The 1916 expenditures are quite remarkable considering that the empire was at war, even though the amount only represents 2 per cent of the total budget for the Ministry of the Interior in 1912. The Ministry of the Interior, however, was responsible for the maintenance and operation of all internal services, transport, infrastructure, and government administrations throughout the empire. The fact that the Ottoman prison population constituted less than 0.16 per cent of the total Ottoman population makes the amount of resources spent on prisons surprising.⁶⁹

As a result of these budgetary inquiries, Dr Pollitz proposed a set of new regulations for Ottoman prison budgets and expenditures (*Hapishaneler Nizamnamesi'nin hapishanelerin hesap muameleleri*). It consisted of ten articles focused on greater transparency, control, and accountability of the Directorate of Prison's expenses on all levels. His assistants wrote up the new proposal and submitted it to the Ministry of the Interior on 7 October 1917.⁷⁰

Dr Pollitz's agenda also included ascertaining prison conditions and managing the numerous building projects that were already under way. By 26 November 1916, he received a report detailing the current building projects for new jails (*tevkifhaneler*) within the empire. These projects included İzmir, Adana, Mersin, Beirut, Eskişehir, Samsun, İzmid, Kayseri, Yozgad, and Kala-i Sultaniye, in addition to projects already begun in Istanbul and Üsküdar. Each *tevkifhane* was to hold 400 prisoners separated into different quarters for men, women, and children. These houses of detention would also contain an infirmary, toilets, washrooms, a mosque, a morgue, and a kitchen. The estimated cost of each jail ranged

from 10,000 to 15,000 Turkish Liras. Just to reiterate, all of these projects pre-date Dr Pollitz's arrival.

As part of his broader inquiries into the condition of the empire's prisons, Dr Pollitz requested information on several additional items, divided into four categories: 1. the physical structure of the building – its size, capacity, and age; 2. general prison conditions – ventilation, light, and dampness; 3. health and hygiene – cleanliness, disease, the existence of a clinic, mentally ill prisoners, clothing, parasites, potable water, and toilets; and 4. food – type, quality, and quantity.⁷¹ These inquiries led directly to another massive statistical collection campaign (*izahat*) initiated on 28 December 1916 by Dr Pollitz. This campaign's design and implementation rivalled that of the 1912 prison survey in terms of size and scope.⁷² It possessed, however, very specific areas of statistical collection that came to define Dr Pollitz's tenure as the inspector general. It recorded the number of inmates eighteen years of age and under, each prison's food source, the names, locations, and types of every prison throughout the empire, the number of male prisoners and the number of female prisoners, the types of crimes committed (*cinayet*, *cünha*, and *kabahat*), number of working prisoners, the number and types of employees in each prison, and the number of prisoners who possessed expertise that would benefit the war effort, such as agricultural or road construction.⁷³ Many of these categories match the follow-up questions Dr Pollitz had asked just a month earlier about jails (*tevkifhaneler*) under construction in 1916 and 1917.⁷⁴ In fact, there is also a close correlation between the added emphasis he placed on prison labour in his proposed prison regulation (*nizamname*) and the new prison survey.⁷⁵

Dr Pollitz sent the questionnaires to every provincial governor and prison in the empire. The directive was issued jointly by the Directorate of Prisons and the Ministry of the Interior and signed (in Ottoman Turkish, no less) by Dr Pollitz. It stipulated that each of the provincial governors (*valiler*) was personally responsible for the completion of the survey in addition to supplying the requested information 'to the greatest degree (*en ziyade*) about the prison guards (*gardiyanlar*), prison officials (*memurler*), the prison board of directors (*heyet idaresi*), the prison directors (*müdürler*), and the general conditions of the prisons (*hapishanelerin ahval umumiyesi*)'. The provincial governors were also responsible for providing information regarding the number of prisoners being compelled to do agricultural work.⁷⁶ In the end, Dr Pollitz justified the survey by claiming that it would be the 'basis for the reorganisation (*teşkilat*)' of the empire's prisons.⁷⁷

By March 1917, the vast majority of local prison officials had completed and returned the questionnaires.⁷⁸ The Directorate of Prisons

compiled the results into a meticulously organised master copy.⁷⁹ These statistical tabulations became the basis of Dr Politz's reform campaigns for the rest of his tenure. His campaigns focused on improving prison health and hygiene conditions, relieving prison overcrowding, constructing new prisons, prison repairs, the plight of juvenile delinquents, developing programmes to rehabilitate prisoners, especially through labour, and bringing greater order and discipline to prison regimes.⁸⁰

Dr Pollitz spent a great deal of his time inspecting prisons and verifying that reforms were being implemented. His peregrinations took him throughout the empire from Rumeli to the Aegean and throughout Anatolia and the Arab provinces.⁸¹ This continued until he was relieved from duty in 1919 and prison reform in the empire came to a screeching halt. The post-CUP Ottoman Government slashed prison budgets as a result of losing WWI and the *Entente* occupation of Istanbul. Without the CUP in power, prison conditions quickly deteriorated as demonstrated by the British prison inspections conducted in late 1918 and in early 1919. The inspection reports described horrifying conditions including widespread corruption, abuse, and death due to poor hygiene, disease, and malnutrition. It appears that the only reforms carried out in the empire's prisons during the Armistice Period (*Mütakere Dönemi*) and the allied occupation of Istanbul occurred as a result of *Entente* pressure.⁸² A comparison of achievements during the tenures of Major Gordon and Dr Pollitz as the directors of Ottoman prison reform seventy years apart, demonstrates the empire's increased commitment to prisons and penal institutions over the course of the nineteenth century.

Conclusion

As this brief state-centric overview of Ottoman penal reform demonstrates, prisons were important sites of imperial transformation in the late Ottoman Empire. These modifications represent a coherent and internally developed system of reforms by Ottoman bureaucrats to centralise power within the hands of the state and enter more fully into the lives of the empire's citizens. These transformations do not represent a rupture from the past or a discarding of long-held beliefs and practices in some sort of secularising and Westernising mission. This transformation represents a clear example of the development and execution of a unique Ottoman modernity that consciously adapted new methods of governance to existing structures in the empire, thus creating a new dynamic distinctive to the empire's historical, ideological, and cultural development. Notwithstanding CUP claims that the *ancien régime* was gone, it clearly

built on existing programmes and furthered them in an attempt to create a modern state.

This chapter also demonstrates the central government's clear intention to increase its intervention into the lives of its population at all levels of state and society, particularly the prison. Similar programmes and processes being implemented throughout the empire were simultaneously happening within prison walls, thus making the prison a microcosm of Ottoman modernity and transformation. These programmes and policies included administrative centralisation, the streamlining and standardisation of regulation and procedure, information gathering, employee professionalisation, improving public health and hygiene, economic development, and the rehabilitation of prisoners through productive work.

Subsequent chapters juxtapose particular reform efforts with the actual experiences of inmates and prison officials to investigate how these interactions affected prison reform efforts and everyday life. These include prison surveys and the prison population, prison organisation and everyday life, the professionalisation of the prison cadre and the realities of corruption and prisoner abuse, and juvenile delinquency and incarceration. These chapters further several themes discussed in this overview and go into greater detail about state intentions, ideology, implementation, and their effects on prison life as local administrators and prisoners appropriated, resisted, and/or ignored these attempts. They also continue the other intersecting themes woven throughout the book that include transformation through continuity and change, a focus by reformers on prisoner rehabilitation, administrative centralisation and governmentality, order and discipline, and the creation and expansion of Ottoman state patriarchy in which the government increasingly assumed greater amounts of responsibility for the welfare of its population.

Notes

1. There are numerous nineteenth-century examples of links being drawn between prisons and civilisation in literature, political writings, and governmental treatises. The most famous example may be Fyodor Dostoevsky's assertion that the, 'degree of civilisation in a society can be judged by entering its prisons' (Dostoevsky, *House of the Dead*). For a careful study of nineteenth-century intellectual associations between civilisation and punishment, see Pratt, *Punishment and Civilization*.
2. Bentham, *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*; Beccaria, *Crimes and Punishments*; and Howard, *State of Prisons in England and Wales*, and *Account of the Principle Lazarettos*.

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3. For biographies of Ambassador Canning, see Lane-Poole, *Life of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe*; and Byrne, *Great Ambassador*.
4. For more on the Ottoman Empire and the Near Eastern Question, see Brown, *International Politics and the Middle East*, pp. 21–81.
5. Quoted from Cunningham, ‘Stratford Canning and the Tanzimat’, p. 245. For a detailed discussion concerning Canning’s influence on nineteenth-century Ottoman prison reform, see Yıldız, *Mapusane*, pp. 110–61.
6. BNA, FO 195/364, pp. 1–32.
7. Hurewitz, pp. 315–18.
8. In 1910, as British Home Secretary, Sir Winston S. Churchill stated that ‘the mood and temper of the public with regard to the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the unflinching tests of the civilisation of a country’. As quoted by Jenkins, *Churchill*, p. 180.
9. According to Foucault, ‘governmentality’ is the administrative and ruling philosophy that typifies the modern era. A country’s population becomes the state’s object of rule. The state views it as its primary resource to be managed and harnessed for the common good through the implementation of new methods of governance, such as comprehensive censuses, military conscription, public education, promulgating new laws, and creating powerful penal institutions, resulting in the ‘totalisation’ and ‘individuation’ of the population. This process enables the state to know each citizen individually and to simultaneously organise and mobilise the population for the benefit of the nation-state (Foucault, ‘Essays on Governmentality’).
10. BNA, FO 195/364.
11. Şen, *Osmanlı’da Mahkum Olmak*, pp. 18–26; and Yıldız, *Mapusane*, pp. 172–225.
12. Yıldız, *Mapusane*, p. 179.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 172–261. This section of *Mapusane* contains a comprehensive discussion of prison reform activity and its successes and failures during the Tanzimat era.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 267–93.
15. BNA, FO 195/364, pp. 1–32.
16. A *hapishane-yi umumi* or penitentiary was a new designation in the Ottoman Empire and represented a prison dedicated to housing serious offenders (*cinayet*) with a sentence of at least five years. These prisons were to be located in provincial and imperial city centres. This prison, built in 1871 and located in the Sultanahmet district of Istanbul’s old city, represents the first of its kind within the Ottoman Empire. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10; and Yıldız, ‘Osmanlı Devleti’nde Hapishane Islahatı’, pp. 190–3.
17. Yıldız, *Mapusane*, pp. 182–8.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 184–5.
19. Young, ‘Instructions sur l’administration des vilayets’, 21 Feb 1876, *Corps de Droit Ottoman*, vol. I, pp. 88–91; and Gorman, ‘Regulation, Reform, and Resistance’, p. 100.

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20. For Müfettiş Pasha's report, see BOA, YEE 72/37.
21. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10; and Yıldız, *Mapusane*, pp. 188–204.
22. Yıldız, 'Osmanlı Devleti'nde Hapishane Islahatı', pp. 192–4.
23. BOA, DHMBHPSM 1/2, doc. 10, Article 1.
24. See Hamidian era prison photographs from the Istanbul University Library Photograph Album Collection under the following headings: *Hapishane* (Aydın) 90601/12; *Hapishane* (Dedeağaç) 90418/17; *Hapishane* (Edirne) 779–40/7; *Hapishane* (Edirne) 90455/17; *Hapishane* (Gümülçine) 90418/51; *Hapishane* (Halep) 90754/79; *Hapishane* (Kırşehir) 779-58/11; *Hapishane* (Rodos) 90807/4,13–90808/2,18; *Hapishane* (Sakız Adası) 90802/5; *Hapishane* (Sultanyeri) 90412/8; *Hapishane* (Trabzon) 90441/21; *Hapishane* (Urfa) 90430/13; *Hapishane* (Yanya) 91104/2; and *Hapishane-Koğuşu* (Dimetoka) 779-40/10.
25. Demirel, '1890 Petersburg Hapishaneler Kongresi', pp. 11–14.
26. Young, 'Code of procédure pénale', 26 June 1879, *Corps de Droit Ottoman*, vol. VII, pp. 226–8 and 295–300, and Young, 'Iradé sur les Réformes', *Corps de Droit Ottoman*, vol. I, pp. 99–103; and Gorman, p. 100.
27. For a discussion on health and hygiene reform programmes during the Hamidian era, see Yıldırım, 'Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Koruyucu Sağlık Uygulamaları'; Kalkan, 'Medicine and Politics'; and Kranzler, 'Health Services'.
28. Findely, *Bureaucratic Reform*, p.253 and the introduction to the BOA, DHTMIK catalogues, which have hundreds of inspections, reports, and recommendations conducted and produced by this commission. It operated from June 1896 to July 1908 and provides rich background information on the prison conditions inherited by the CUP.
29. For more details on the unrest across the empire, see Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance*; and Kansu, *Revolution of 1908*, pp. 29–72.
30. Turfan, *Rise of the Young Turks*; Kansu, *Revolution of 1908*, and *Politics in Post-revolutionary Turkey*; Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance*, 'Economic Climate', and '1908 Young Turk Revolution'; Ahmad, *Young Turks*; Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*; Brummett, *Image and Imperialism*, and 'Dogs, Women, Cholera, and Other Menaces'; Arai, *Turkish Nationalism*; Ramsaur, *Young Turks*; and Hanioglu, *Young Turks in Opposition and Preparation for a Revolution*.
31. This phrase is taken from Hill, *World Turned Upside Down*.
32. Kansu, *Revolution of 1908*, pp. 24–71.
33. Hanioglu, *Young Turks in Opposition*, pp. 16–26; and Le Bon, *Psychology of the Crowd*.
34. Ergut, 'Policing the Poor' and 'State and Civil Rights'.
35. Findely, pp. 291–337.
36. These reports and statistics are found in the Directorate of Public Security's catalogue BOA, DHEUMTK.

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37. BOA, DHMBHPS 142/38, 142/54, and 143/3. The guidelines contained in the 1880 Prison Regulation and its implementation is discussed extensively in Chapters 4 and 5.
38. Findely, p. 333.
39. Chapter 4 discusses prison labour.
40. BOA, DHMBHPSM 2/117, and DHMBHPS 35/4.
41. *Düstur, İkinci Tertip*, vol. 3, p. 467, no. 156. 7/6/1329.
42. BOA, DHMBHPSM 8/3, doc. 10/b.
43. Examples of these records are BOA, DHMBHPSM 2/49, 2/75, 2/78, 2/108, 2/112, 2/113, and 2/114. Chapter 5 contains a detailed analysis of Ottoman prison employees.
44. BOA, DHMBHPS 145/31.
45. Gönen, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hapishaneleri', p. 175.
46. See Kayalı, 'Elections and the Electoral Process' concerning Ottoman elections in the Second Constitutional Period. For more on the *Entente Liberal*, see Hanioglu, *Preparation for a Revolution*, pp. 289–311.
47. Ahmad, *Young Turks*, pp. 92–120; and Zürcher, *Turkey*, pp. 112–14.
48. Yakut, 'Exertions for the Depoliticisation'; and Turfan, pp. 155–65 and endnote 115.
49. Ahmad, *Young Turks*, Chapters 5 and 6.
50. Findely, pp. 309 and 313–14.
51. *Düstur*, 2nd series *İkinci Tertip*, vol. VI, p. 131–2.
52. BOA, DHMBHPS 149/45 and 73/58, docs 5 and 7.
53. The general directives for this survey are contained in BOA, DHEUMTK 13/11 and 54/4; DHMBHPSM 9/59; and DHMBHPS 72/46. Each province and independent administrative sub-division returned these completed questionnaires. Some examples include DHMBHPSM 11/84 (Adana); DHMBHPSM 10/19 (Beirut); DHMBHPSM 9/94 (Çatalca); DHMBHPS 149/6 and 149/9 (Edirne); DHMBHPSM 10/40 (Halep); DHMBHPSM 9/96 (Istanbul); DHMBHPSM 10/14 (Karesi); DHMBHPSM 10/52 (Sivas); DHMBHPSM 11/25 and 18/62 (Trabzon); DHMBHPS 149/36 (Van); and DHMBHPSM 11/24 (Zor).
54. BOA, DHMBHPSM 10/14, docs 12–15.
55. BOA, DHMBHPSM 9/103 and 11/84.
56. BOA, DHMBHPS 72/30 and 73/11; and DHMBHPSM 31/82. Article 1 of the 1880 Prison Regulation refers to the building of prisons in every administrative district of the empire.
57. BOA, DHMBHPS 72/30.
58. The catalogues of the Prison Administration and the Directorate of Prisons (BOA, DHMBHPS and BOA, DHMBHPSM) contain thousands of documents related to prison repair, construction, and maintenance. Many of these construction projects were initiated in 1912, suspended after the CUP lost power, and revived in 1914. For one list of several construction projects in 1914, see BOA, DHMBHPSM 15/42.

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59. For Germany and the Ottoman Empire's financial relationship during WWI, see BOA, DHMBHPS 119/23; Trumpener, *Germany and the Ottoman Empire*, pp.271–351 and 'Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire', pp.111–39.
60. BOA, DHMBHPS 58/48.
61. BOA, DHMBHPS 92/18 contains the curriculum vitae of each candidate as well as deliberations about each candidate.
62. BOA, DHMBHPS 92/57, doc. 4.
63. BOA, DHMBHPS 92/18, 92/44, 92/46, and 92/57, doc. 5 concern Dr Pollitz's hire and include his employment contract.
64. BOA, DHMBHPS 158/27.
65. Ibid.; DHMBHPS 160/78; and DHMBHPSM 31/82. There are several drafts of a new and expanded version of the 1880 Prison Regulation dating to 1917. See DHMBHPS 74/66, 158/8, 158/27, 159/41, and 160/78; and DHMBHPSM 31/82.
66. BOA, DHMBHPS 76/31 contains Dr Pollitz's comments on existing prison regulations.
67. The budget included 113,500 TL for supplies (food and materials), 4,000 TL for medicines, 40,213 TL for employee salaries, 20,350 TL for repairs, 3,311 TL for prison rentals, 4,100 TL for the transport of prisoners, 110,000 TL for the construction of new prisons, and an additional 13,000 TL and 6,000 TL for the construction of two new prisons in Istanbul and Üsküdar (BOA, DHMBHPS 158/29, docs 2–4).
68. BOA, DHMBHPS 76/31.
69. Shaw, 'Ottoman Expenditures', pp.373–8.
70. BOA, DHMBHPS 159/41.
71. BOA, DHMBHPS 158/8, doc. 1.
72. '*İzahat*' literally means 'explanations' (Redhouse, *Redhouse Sözlüğü*, p.568).
73. BOA, DHMBHPS 76/20, doc. 3.
74. Compare BOA, DHMBHPS 158/8, doc. 1 with DHMBHPS 76/20.
75. Compare BOA, DHMBHPS 158/27 with 76/20.
76. BOA, DHMBHPS 76/20, doc. 2.
77. Ibid.
78. Examples of the returned questionnaires include: DHMBHPSM 27/24, 27/31, 29/65, and DHMBHPS 158/38 (Ankara); DHMBHPSM 23/29, 26/68, 26/70, 27/5, 27/14, 27/20, 28/4, 28/29, 31/31, and 53/11 (Beirut); DHMBHPSM 29/66 (Diyarbakir); DHMBHPSM 26/59, 27/3, 27/28, 29/69, and DHMBHPS 12/49 (Hüdavendigar); DHMBHPSM 26/47, 26/49, 27/15, and 27/25 (Istanbul); DHMBHPSM 26/63 (İzmid); and DHMBHPSM 27/39 (Jerusalem).
79. BOA, DHMBHPS 143/93.
80. Documents related to Dr Pollitz's Ottoman prison reform agenda include BOA, DHMBHPS 76/27, 76/31, 76/36, 76/60, 78/26, 78/47, 79/38, 80/2, 92/57, 123/26, 158/8, 158/27, 158/29, 158/42, 159/8, 159/41, 160/2, 160/78, 161/46, and DHMBHPSM 31/82.

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81. BOA, DHMBHPS 76/36, 159/8, 160/2, 78/26, 78/47, 78/59, 161/46, 79/30, 123/26, 79/38, and DHMBHPSM 33/60. Also see DHMBHPS 79/38, docs 95–7.
82. BNA, FO 608/52/13, pp.235–43; BNA, FO 608/114/4, pp.118–88; and BNA, FO 608/103/3, pp.269–72. For a description of crime and prisons in Istanbul during the *Entente* Powers' occupation (1918–21), see Yıldıztaş, 'Suç Unsurları ve İstanbul Hapishanleri'.