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Fairness, Globalization, and Public Institutions

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
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FURTHER THOUGHTS
Election Monitoring in Paraguay

A Personal Story of Globalization and Public Institutions

James Rosenau

ASIDE FROM many relevant experiences in my teaching career of some five decades, I have had one encounter that lasted ten minutes but that nevertheless reflects the convergence of globalization, public institutions, and fairness. Indeed, it proved to be a classic instance of my long-held contention that the boundary between international and domestic affairs has become even more porous!

The encounter occurred at 5:20 p.m. on May 9, 1993, in Asuncion, Paraguay. I was a member of a team led by former president Jimmy Carter to monitor the first open election in Paraguay's history. We arrived a few days before the election and were immediately photographed for the purpose of giving us identification badges that certified we were official International Election Monitors.

On the day of the election, May 9, the members of the team were split up and given a variety of monitoring tasks around the country. My unit's assignments were in Asuncion and included being present at a school at 5:00 p.m. to observe the opening of the balloting boxes and the counting of the ballots. But our driver got lost, and we did not get to the school until 5:20 p.m. The gate to the school had been closed and was under the guard of a large soldier with a gun dangling from his hip. With some trepidation I approached the gate and waved the ID badge hanging from my shirt pocket at the guard. He squinted at the card and then swung the gate open, at which point I crossed the boundary between international and domestic jurisdictions and entered the school.

It was an experience that has always lingered and was reinforced by the thought that here was globalization at its best in the sense that it compelled an authoritarian regime to accept external election monitors. Moreover, the monitoring process was administered by a public institution, namely the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as the Carter Center and numerous other transnational NGOs. No less important, it was an expression of fairness in the sense that it involved people who had never previously voted in an open election. They patiently stood in the very hot sun for hours to vote. It was obviously an important moment for them even though the polling places were not air conditioned. But the hot sun was hardly a negative dimension of this exhilarating and beneficial experience. It was not even a trade-off: no one has said that fairness has to occur under tolerable weather condition.

Notes

1. For an elaboration of the concept of fragmentation, see James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. 6.

2. Both the contents of table 6.2 and parts of the ensuing discussion of the eight sources of fragmentation are adapted from James N. Rosenau, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), chap. 3.

3. Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 75.

4. These data are from the National Geographic Society, *Millennium in Maps: Cultures* (Washington, DC, June 1999).

5. Scholte, *Globalization*, 75.

6. Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Clinton at University of Chicago Convocation Ceremonies," available from www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/html/19990612.html (June 12, 1999), 2.

7. *Ibid.*, 1.

8. Available from www.gltreach.com/globstats/index.php3.

9. *The New Yorker*, December 6, 1999, 96.

10. John Markoff, "Tiniest Circuits Hold Prospect of Explosive Computer Speeds," *New York Times*, July 16, 1999, A1. See also Kenneth Chang, "I.B.M. Creates A Tiny Circuit Out of Carbon," *New York Times*, August 27, 2001, 1.

11. To be sure, the benefits of the information revolution have been enjoyed by only a small proportion of the world's population, thus resulting in a huge gap between those who are rich and poor with respect to their access to information. However, there are reasons to anticipate that the gap will slowly narrow with the passage of time. New technologies will enable poorer countries to leapfrog some of the communications stages experienced by more advanced societies. To cite but one example, in 1999 China had nine million Internet addresses, and in 2000 the figure had grown roughly to twenty million. See William Jefferson Clinton, "China's Opportunities, And Ours," *New York Times*, September 24, 2000, section 4, 15.

12. See, e.g., Ulric Neisser, ed., *The Rising Curve: Long-Term Gains in IQ and Related Measures* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1998); James R. Flynn, "Searching for Justice: The Discovery of IQ Gains Over Time," *American Psychologist* 54 (January 1999): 5–20; William T. Dickens and James R. Flynn, "Heritability Estimates versus Large Environmental Effects: The IQ Paradox Resolved," *Psychological Review* 108.2 (2001): 346–369; and James N. Rosenau and W. Michael Fagen, "Increasingly Skillful Citizens: A New Dynamism in World Politics?" *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (December 1997): 655–686.

13. For a counter-argument with data interpreted as tracing a decline in organizational life in the United States, see Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).

14. David Bornstein, "A Force Now in the World, Citizens Flex Social Muscle," *New York Times*, July 10, 1999, B7.

15. "Sins of the Secular Missionaries," *The Economist*, January 29, 2000, 25–28.
16. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "A New Epoch—and Spectrum—of Conflict," in *In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, ed. J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997), 5.
17. Shashi Tharoor, "The Future of Civil Conflict," *World Policy Journal* 16 (Spring 1999): 7.
18. Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Clinton," 2.
19. National Geographic Society, *Millennium in Maps*.
20. "Boom in World Tourism Called Threat to Culture and Ecology," *International Herald Tribune*, July 12, 2000, 2.
21. National Geographic Society, *Millennium in Maps*.
22. "Now You Can Have 5,999,999,999 Friends," *New York Times*, September 19, 1999, section 4, 4.
23. Given the diversity and multiplicity of collectivities in the multicentric world, it would be logical to describe the emergent structure as an n-furcation rather than a bifurcation (with the "n" representing any number). However, I continue to use the bifurcation label in order not to unduly downplay the importance of the state-centric world.
24. For an extended discussion of the bifurcation of global structures, see James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), chap. 10.
25. See, e.g., G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (May/June 1996): 79–91.
26. Peter Evans, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," *World Politics* 50.1 (1997): 65.
27. An extensive elaboration of this perspective can be found in Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
28. Discussions of this assessment can be found in Joshua Cohen, *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996); and Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges of America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).
29. These processes of proliferating spheres of authority are probed at length in Rosenau, *Distant Proximities*, chap. 13.