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Dickens's London

Wolfreys, Julian


Published by Edinburgh University Press

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Dickens's London: Perception, Subjectivity and Phenomenal Urban Multiplicity.

Edinburgh University Press, 2012.

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Notes

1. Read's analysis of modern painting begins in 1840, with Constable amongst others. That modernity in painting is therefore attributable to an early nineteenth-century moment in its development might serve to suggest that, apropos a reading of a Dickensian phenomenology of the urban, Dickens belongs to a broader aesthetic and philosophically inflected endeavour – not necessarily conscious or concerted, but none the less underway as the belatedly read sign of an origin, the authenticity of which, in turn, signals its historicity – to 'renew', in Read's words, 'one's sensibility toward one's environment' (xiii).
2. Constantin Guys (1802–1892) is Baudelaire's 'painter' in the essay 'The Painter of Modern Life', an artist who worked as illustrator for the *Illustrated London News* from as early as 1843. When Baudelaire, in his essay, defines Guys a man of genius, defining this quality as the ability to recover childhood 'at will' (398), and to combine the adult capacity for reasoning and analysis with an all-consuming sensibility typical of childhood, he might well be describing Dickens's powers of narrative. When Baudelaire defines the *flâneur* as the 'passionate observer . . . in the throng, in the ebb and flow, in the movement, the fugitive and the infinite' (399), this commentary is undoubtedly applicable as an appreciation of the passage on Nickleby's return to London. Here, and below, the translations have been silently modified.
3. Throughout, I have given the page of the original, followed by the translation.
4. In the translation, the grammar and syntax are changed somewhat, for the purposes of rendering the sentence in a more idiomatic English. I have restored the original here, with my own translation, as the rhythms of the argument are central to what I have to say in the final paragraphs of the present essay: 'Car je ne le regarde pas comme on regarde une chose, je ne le fixe pas en son lieu, mon regard erre en lui comme dans les nimbes de l'Être, je vois selon lui ou avec lui, plutôt que je ne le vois' ['Because I do not look (at the painting) as one looks at a thing, I cannot fix it in its place, my gaze roams in it as in the auras of Being; I see according to or with it, instead of seeing it'].
5. The question of haunting is one addressed by Merleau-Ponty in the first section of the essay (9–15 / 121–3), specifically at a juncture in the

argument where Merleau-Ponty wishes to reconnect consciousness and perception to the body, against the scientific or intellectualised remote consciousness from which the gaze is directed towards objects, as if one's corporeality or being-in-the-world were of no relevance. (See 'Dickens, our Contemporary' on the distinction between a Husserlian phenomenology and that of Merleau-Ponty.) While scientific thinking, as Merleau-Ponty calls it, 'looks on from above', I am in the 'there is', which 'involvement' needs to be brought back to thinking inasmuch as, pre-theoretically, it precedes the separation of consciousness and world of things. (One might argue that the 'I' is only a 'there' in the there-is.) As a result of what Merleau-Ponty terms an associated corporeality (*corps associés*), there are others, I am not outside this world of association and the 'there is'; there are 'others who haunt me and whom I haunt; "others" along with whom I haunt a sole, present, and actual Being' (12–13 / 122–3).

6. If, as in the case of *David Copperfield*, narrator and subject are the same fictive persona, they remain different nevertheless by virtue of time and perspective. The former is a narrating narrator, recounting with the illusion of hindsight and memory; on which topics there might be much that has been said, and remains to be said, regarding this novel, especially given the various uncertainties that the older David professes, or those moments where he claims not to know or not to remember. But there is also the narrated narrator, that other, younger David, who, in the midst of an experience, is not yet re-presenting through the work of memory his younger self, and therefore, does not know what he does or does not know, as it were.
7. On the subject of dating the time of *David Copperfield*: although there is no direct dating in the text, some clues are available. In Chapter 11, in which David begins work at Murdstone and Grinby's at the age of ten, the older, narrating David recalls that his narrated, younger self's 'favourite lounging-place', between rising in the morning and visiting the Micawbers in the King's Bench Prison, was 'old London Bridge, where I was wont to sit in one of the stone recesses, watching the people going by, or to look over the balustrades at the sun shining in the water, and lighting up the golden flame on the top of the Monument'. In this location, the younger David would occasionally be met by the Orfling, who would tell 'some astonishing fictions respecting the wharves and the Tower'. 'Old London Bridge' refers to the medieval structure, more than 600 years old by the beginning of the nineteenth century, and was replaced by a bridge designed by John Rennie, the building of which began in 1824. King's Bench Prison, Southwark, the original buildings for which were constructed in the medieval era, remained in use until the 1860s as a debtors' prison, but had been renamed Queen's Prison in 1842.
8. Tambling helpfully reproduces the passage from *Copperfield* with Dickens's edits interpolated into the 'fictional' account. The autobiographical fragment, used by John Forster in his biography of Dickens, is appended to the Oxford World's Classics edition of the novel (856–69), the particular passage concerning Warren's Blacking Factory being 859–60. Any reference I have to this, above, is taken from here.
9. Andrew Sanders, 'Appendix A' (DC 856–7). Readers are also referred to Sanders's discussion of the distinction from his introduction to the Oxford edition of *David Copperfield* (vii–xx).

10. Dickens, 'Appendix A', 857.
11. In the most neutral of tones, David offers an aside at one juncture, that 'Hungerford Market [was] a very different place in those days,' referring to the time, immediately following the collapse of Betsy's finances, when David takes Mr Dick to a chandler's shop in the Market, in order to 'take possession' of a bed, 'which Mr. Peggotty had lately vacated' (DC 462). David remembers an old architectural feature, a 'low wooden colonnade before the door . . . which pleased Mr Dick mightily', this recollection presumably because, Hungerford Market having changed, the colonnade was no longer there at the time of David's writing. It is not enough to say that memory is always memory of loss, but that memory just is loss, absence, difference, or at least the trace of these effects, and the coming to mind, the apparition of such traces, by which the subject perceives itself as the subject of, produced by the trace.
12. Like the Adelphi or Old London Bridge in *David Copperfield*, the Temple Bar referred to here is the older structure, that barrier demarcating the City at the point where Fleet Street and the Strand converge. Though currently occupied by a monument erected in 1878, atop which is a griffin, the original architectural form designed by Christopher Wren was an arch, at which it was custom for any reigning monarch to halt, before being 'admitted' to the City by the Lord Mayor. The name 'Temple' comes from Temple Church, itself part of the area known as the Temple, once owned by the Knights Templar. There is thus to be read an implicit connection between fiction and history or, at least, a general, if submerged Orientalist discourse within, between or, at least, a general, if submerged Orientalist discourse within the relation between the real and the imaginary in the image, inasmuch as there is that acknowledgement of the *One Thousand and One Nights* and the idea of the Knights Templar, the Crusades and so forth. Given the convenience or accident of the architectural and topographical proximity between the Temple, Temple Bar and the idea of a Barmecide room, histories of crusading acquisition and banking practices suggest narratives of indirect relation, if not affiliation, which phantasmic analogical weave is teased further by the not unrelated image of the severed heads placed on Temple Bar. The refurbished Wren Temple Bar is now in Paternoster Square.
13. The walk would take somewhat less than twenty minutes. Noakes, we might suppose, proceeded south along what is now Gray's Inn Road, turning briefly west on High Holborn, then south again down Chancery Lane to Temple Bar where Fleet Street becomes the Strand.
14. On Dickens's time at the *True Sun*, see Slater (39, 101, 620), Douglas-Fairhurst (77, 100, 123); on the relationship between Leigh Hunt and Dickens, see Bodenheimer (42–6); on Leigh Hunt's influence on Dickens's representation of London, see Schwarzbach (36–7).
15. Hereafter, essays from the other three volumes of *Selected Writings* are referred to throughout and given as SW, followed by the volume number.
16. Douglas-Fairhurst observes of Dickens's time at the *True Sun* in 1832 that, working for this radical evening newspaper at the height of the 'Reform crisis', 'he would certainly have had more opportunities than before of blurring the line between "truth" and "literary work"' (77).

17. I am alluding here to Lacan's comparison of Freud's notions of *Verdichtung* (condensation) and *Verschiebung* (displacement) with Jakobson's analysis of metaphor and metonymy, which leads Lacan to his well-known observation that the unconscious is structured like a language (Lacan 1966, 47–81). Were one to pursue a psychoanalytic reading here, one might suggest that the skittles are what tumble, one knocking another down in succession until David recalls with painful immediacy his younger self.
18. For place to be given, there must be as a minimal condition of awareness, '*Touverture affirmative pour la venue de l'autre* [the affirmative openness for the coming of the other]' (Derrida and Steigler, *Échographies* [1996], p. 19). Thus, Jacques Derrida, but also Charles Dickens, or at least 'Charles Dickens', that machine by which memory becomes text, the city inscribed, *transcribed* from one materiality to another, and in that transcription the re-presentation of the authentic trace of historicity: on the one hand, the historicity of place, on the other, that of the subject, of that subjectivity that responds to the call of the other by giving place to the givenness of place and that which takes place in the relation between the subject and the other; this is determined by receiving, but also, importantly, perceiving place through the constellated phenomena that make it what it is, and no other, but which remains nevertheless as the remains of an untotalisable figure. The 'affirmative otherness' of which Derrida speaks, which must be the condition for the coming of the other, is written into the manner of narration, its modalities of reception and perception, in the Dickens text, the technology of which, in its reading / writing of London, not only affirms in its openness, its perception, but also remains open, to the other we call the reader, and readers to come. Yet, forcing translation, I would also like to render Derrida's remark as the 'affirmative openness for or towards, to, the venue of the other'. Venue names both place and the coming. The other's venue, then: a coming which takes place, and is thus temporal, but which also has place, which gives place to be apprehended and is apperceived in the subjectivity of the subject, 'subject' being given as that mode of apprehension and orientation to the world, and which, in taking place, is *just* place, taking and giving the place in which the subject finds oneself given in the world.

This phrase 'venue of the other' or the 'other's venue': this is a double genitive of sorts. On the one hand, the phrase remarks a place where the other's arrival is possible, the other's own ground, albeit a groundless ground, a utopian topos, as it were; on the other hand, it signifies this coming, as simply other, emplacement, place and taking- or giving-place simultaneously, as my play between French and English seeks to acknowledge. There is no other, no possibility of the other, the other's arrival, coming to pass, without place, and therefore time; and so, there is no possibility of a subjectivity not subject of or to the material and the historical. In this, apprehension of the relation between subjectivity and place, in accordance with the Derridean principle of the affirmative openness, we are given to hear the necessity for the ethics of reception, described by Nietzsche's phrase, '*ungeheuer unbegrenzte Ja*' (Nietzsche, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, in *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 4, p. 208) – which is to say, a 'monstrous illimitable yes'. This is what is found in Dickensian subjectivity, an immense limitless yes to the coming of London – the coming of modernity, no less.

I see the world. I am in the world. I tell the world I am in, and in my act of telling, I shape through narration, through image, perspective, experience and perception, not only what I call 'the world' but also my self, the self, on the one hand, that observes and tells, and the self, on the other hand, who acts in that world, and who narrates itself as an I narrated in that world, even on the minimal condition of my receiving, perceiving, experiencing and standing before that place in which I find myself and my consciousness taking place. My perception and experience, my consciousness of material experience is not, therefore, separate from the world. Consciousness and corporeality are different, but not separate; the dualism introduced by Descartes cannot hold, even though it is a model of thought that has maintained consciousness in its separation from the body quite convincingly, perhaps so that there might be an over-intellectualisation and a retreat into theoretical 'seeing' assumed to gaze from above the world in which the body takes part and is apart. This, undoubtedly, is what has led to the persistence of an empirical misapprehension of the self and the world, or the world as world of things, distinct from the self. However, there is a correlate between the corporeality and consciousness, in the event of perception. In order that I may transmit my perception, and the memory of experience, there is language. Perception as reading becomes then narrative as writing, in order that I relay to others that which I am in and before which I stand. In order to give the image of event and experience in translated form, words come into play. They are not, however, subservient to the image, a mere mode of transference or medium of transmission. They are, instead, the medium or media that, rather than coming between, constitute the between: between then and now, self and other, consciousness and place.

Words are thus found to be analogous with the painter's brushstrokes. Patterns are formed, rhythms imposed. The image thus invented through the projection of narration in this mediated form always pertains to the body's perceptual relationship to the materiality of the world, not as undifferentiated materiality, nor as things in themselves, but as the relationship between self and the constellated phenomena of the world, as language gives the image given, in narrated form. I do not, therefore, simply receive the world. Instead, through my being in the world, through my perception and re-presentation of that world, I maintain an openness to the world, whilst refiguring that perception in an active mode, through the agency of a narration that is always invention, part shaping, part response to consciousness of what is found, or given. As narration, as image-constituting medium, language does not represent things, it re-presents perception and experience in a form both proximal and distant to the initial corporeal-perceptive consciousness of Being *in* and *with* others, a Being which I find to be given place, in-formed by the narrating, narrated response of subjectivity to the call of the other.

The 'world of perception' is, then, a phrase that does double service. On the one hand, it names all the world that there is, over there, opposed to but involving an 'I' who remains open to that world. The world, in this case, is the world I perceive. On the other hand, all that I perceive is the world, the world to me; my perception is always of some world, produced through the agency of perceptual consciousness. In thinking the world merely as

objects, my 'thought' makes the fundamental mistake – or, let us say, is caught in a misapprehension, a miscognition – that my perception is just an event that takes place in the world, already made, and not subject to an endless making on the part of perception (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 207ff.). Language receives the world, of what is coming, and gives advent to the sense of the world, the sense I have of the world, and the world as received sense, that sense which is the world in which my perception is involved. Narrative is therefore always the transformation and transmission of perceptual agency and partakes primarily, not of 'history' but of memory. To speak of literature in terms of history (and, corollary to this, to fall into any facile assumption of text and context) is to fail to recognise the historicity of language, re-presentation, and memory given phantom, imaginary, apparitional form on the one hand; on the other, this is merely to seek to stabilise a certain relationship between the formal presentation of language as representation and the world misunderstood as objects rather than phenomena for consciousness. The ever-strident attempt to place literature and keep literature in its place through recourse to history is only the always increasingly desperate effort to subordinate the literary and forget the work of memory.

Literature or, let us say, with an economy that is as enigmatic as it is transparent, the *literary*, is always a singular reflection, but that singularity is always informed by condition of its having been generated at a given moment. That is to say, the singular act of the literary, a mediated form of anamnesiac or mnemotechnic re-presentation, is always already counter-signed by the traces that perception receives in its openness to the world of the historicity of phenomena. The literary as memory-archive does not belong to history but is instead a 'register of imaginaries' (Huyssen 2004, 4): a register, but also a revenant belonging to other modalities of registration that include, but are not limited to, painting and photography. To read a narrative, of London, for example, is to fall into another's memory, into the memorial re-presentation of the sense of the world, and thus to enter into different temporalities and spatial apprehensions.

19. Jean-Luc Marion points to the 'invisible' matter of sight, and by extension the spectral, within the visible, and with that the phenomenality of an object (2002a, 119; see also 125, and 117, where intuition is related to vision [*f. Latin: in + tueri, 'to look'*].)
20. I am drawing here on Marion's argument across a number of texts already cited. Marion's project, in part, is to rethink earlier models of phenomenology – specifically Husserl and Heidegger's – because both recuperate themselves into transcendental notions of Being. Marion seeks to move beyond this by arguing for a pure givenness to phenomena.
21. Such figures of the walking subject are common in Dickensian meditations on, and mediations of, London and are, in part at least, the trace of a Romantic urban subjectivity, such as is to be found most obviously in De Quincey or Wordsworth, but also Lamb, Southey, Hazlitt and other Romantic writers.
22. See the extended discussion of language from a phenomenological, specifically Merleau-Pontyan, perspective in 'Spring Evenings', below.
23. The particular building referred to in the narrative was the second church

on the site, replaced in 1877, and subsequently rebuilt and reconsecrated in 1882, following a fire in 1880. This church was destroyed during an air raid in 1840 and was not subsequently rebuilt. The location is now the site of the Altab Ali Park.

24. The allusion to 'omnibus cads' and the comparison between them and the Commissioners serves effectively, if cryptically, to date the passage, especially as *Pickwick* is set a decade or so before its publication, in 1828–9. George Shillibeer introduced the omnibus to London on 4 July 1829, having seen similar vehicles in Paris. The cad, as many readers will be aware, was the name given to the conductor, who collected the fares from passengers. Dickens had previously written on omnibus cads in *Sketches*, Chapter 17, 'The last Cab Driver and the first Omnibus Cad' (SB 142–50).
25. I am borrowing here, and further down the paragraph, on an argument put forward concerning testimony and literary criticism in an as yet unpublished book by Thomas Docherty (2012). I am very grateful to Thomas not only for his insightful and acute, necessary commentary, but also for permission to cite or allude to *Confessions* prior to publication.
26. Barthes continues in this passage, significantly, to describe de-piction as the unfurling of a carpet of codes (as he has it), where code does not refer to or signify a referent but to yet another code. This is what we witness at work in Esther's description / depiction: the 'visuality' and 'verbality' (Bal 1991, 27–8) of the extract exchange places, substituting and supplementing one another.
27. To those who would make claims of anachrony, postmodernity, 'theorisation' and a lack – apparently – of historical acuity or awareness, I can only cite the words of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: 'Even when it is possible to date the emergence of a principle which exists "for itself," it is clear that the principle has been previously present in the culture as an obsession or anticipation, and that the act of consciousness which lays it down as an explicit signification is never without a residue' (1964a, 41).
28. Poulet is drawing here on Coleridge's consideration of the imagination, as discussed in Chapter 13 of *Biographia Literaria*, 'On the Imagination, or Esemplastic Power' (1983, 295–306), and figured as a motivating force in 'Dejection: an Ode' (1997, 307–11).
29. Speaking about 'voice', and in this discussion about the working-class voice, it is necessary to qualify immediately by making it clear that I am not talking about the working-class voice in general, but only that which appears in singular instances. Thus, phonetically, while Sam Weller or Sloppy might be more closely related to Rogue Riderhood, Krook or Bill Sikes, rather than the 'northern' voices of John Browdie or Sleary, the Circus Master of *Hard Times*, the chance of shared location is the only thing that connects them, making it impossible therefore to talk of, or assume, a 'generalised' working-class voice. What Sloppy and Weller share, and share with Sleary, is the ability to entertain, to engage the imagination of their audience, and from their voices to project the fictive vision. It is extremely unlikely that Sloppy would have ever heard the voices he produces. Sloppy's is an inventive and a creative act, one of the imagination, which communicates to Betty. Of course, it is inaccessible; we never have an example, nor would one be representable. But is that not the point?

In what Betty hears, the papers come alive, and that does not necessarily need to be something specific to where one comes from but by being open to reception. Weller's voice is closely tied not only to those improper anecdotal moments, but also to a general sense of comic disordering, a puncturing of the serious. He is the court jester, the one who knows more than his master and turns the world upside down, displaying in the process a story-telling ability in all its uselessness, but which interrupts 'business as usual' with its power to entertain. Krook, Riderhood and Sikes may speak similarly, but they do not 'perform' in the same way. This may explain a connection between Sloppy and Sam, but also, crossing from London to what in Dickens is a largely undifferentiated representation of the north, to Sleary. The phonetic spellings of his speech not only indicate a lisp, but an, again, undifferentiated northern, certainly regional accent. And when, towards the conclusion of *Hard Times*, he advocates the necessity for fun, magic, entertainment, the circus, and other matters of fantasy and escape which, strictly speaking, are 'useless', other than the joy they deliver, he does so by telling Gradgrind, 'you muth 'ave uth, thquire'. The positive representation in Sam, who obviously comes before the villainous and negative figures already mentioned, is perhaps the sign, historically, of Dickens's affection for a London that is passing, the London of the 1820s and 1830s, the London of Pierce Egan's *Tom and Jerry*, of Leigh Hunt's 'townosophy', of Joseph Grimaldi's performances.

A still significant essay on 'voice' in Dickens is P. J. Keating's, on 'The Phonetic Representation of Cockney' (1971, 246–68). An interesting if limited consideration, it is somewhat too broad in its generalisations, too sweeping to be fully attentive to function and purpose in the Dickens text. There are at least two problems throughout the assumptions and argument that are pervasive. The first is that Dickens is seeking to portray a 'true picture' (he gets co-opted into the category of the 'slum novelist', however indirectly), and that 'Cockney' is a generic London patois, which it is not. Moreover, there is the overly easy association between 'Cockney' and the 'slums'. 'Cockney' pre-exists the 'slums' and is not exclusive to them. Furthermore, Keating undercuts his own argument by stating that phonetic variants are 'rarely consistent', though he does admit that Gamp and the Wellers are consistent. Taking the Wellers and Gamp: their 'consistency' has as much to do with the purpose of speech as it does with its locale, or place of origin, and is not exclusively a London phenomenon amongst Dickens's characters. In the somewhat undifferentiated materialist attention to a lumpenproletariat, Keating does not give necessary attention to the rhetorical orientation of forms of speech, nor their gestural disposition within the novels as novels. There is no real sense in Keating that accent is, or can be, merely a medium through which a certain form of commentary can be delivered, rather than it being a 'true' presentation of working-class argot, and it is, to repeat myself, that which distinguishes Weller (and Gamp) from other working-class figures. Both Sam and Mrs Gamp are anecdotalists – one might pause to consider Gamp's tale of her husband's alcoholic wooden leg, with its own machinic life, a comic Hofmannesque moment of music hall entertainment, and a form of comic exaggeration and displacement Dickens first develops in the letters home from his first

trip to the US, where person becomes object, object becomes exaggerated, and the surface, often surreal absurdity of the image (on this, see J. Hillis Miller 1970, 467–76). There is in the text of Dickens, through the agency and performance of voice, the distinction being made that the purpose is entertainment or a form of loquacious reflection that places one materially, regardless of where the character is from regionally. Often such deliveries serve as comic encomia, or are obscure, not to say allegorical, perorations. Venus and Sleary belong to this category of witty and informative discursive gesture. Characters such as Quilp, Wegg, Riderhood or Sikes are distinguished by the fact that they do not tell extended stories (or if they do, it is only rarely, and is always mendacious).

30. See 57, 208, 233–4, 426, 436, 437–8, 532, 535, 770, 774. All further references are given parenthetically as *AP*.
31. In *Minima Moralia* examples of kitsch, related ‘domestic monstrosities’ and the general existence of household ‘trash’ objects in all their ambiguous presence in our everyday lives are considered by Adorno, apropos ‘Balzac or Dickens’, whose ‘little wights’ the critic compares disturbingly with the ‘polychrome garden dwarf’. For Adorno, such objects are disquieting precisely because of their auratic possibilities, their capability to echo, as he puts it, the spectral in ‘the mightiest works of art’ (Adorno 1974, 225). I mention this because, though tangential to the principal discussion, Dickens’s placement of objects with no apparent purpose does have the power potentially, in those objects’ inutility, to haunt place and page, albeit in the most evanescent of fashions, by reminding the reader that the ‘souvenir’ is also the material embodiment of memory, and therefore capable of escaping or exceeding the materialist realm in which it is produced. Perhaps the question is whether Dickens, in advertising and apostrophising the useless, is seeking to recuperate, for aesthetic and phenomenal purposes, that within any commodity which is otherwise unavailable to commodification. If this sounds as though Dickens might be read as anticipating Marx’s concept of the commodity fetish, perhaps Dickens’s spectral aestheticism comes from the other side, as it were, ‘de-commodifying’ or, at least, dematerialising the materiality in order to open the reader to the sensible and phenomenal. This remains speculation, of course, a hypothetical on the edge of undecidability. What may be argued not too unreasonably, however, if only so as to retreat strategically from this strong reading – in order to visit it through the specific and singular examples to be discussed in the essays of the volume, rather than to generalise too broadly here – is that Dickens’s text, in its constant confrontation with the city in the nineteenth century stages in its representation of place, event, experience, object and phenomena in close relation the historicity of tensions between materialism and aesthetic or phenomenal reception. It is, perhaps, for such reasons that Benjamin refers to Dickens, confronting an experience of the aporetic in dialectical thought, without being able to resolve or pass this encounter.
32. *Polis* can signify not only the city but also the state or the body politic. Dickens often uses ‘London’ as a synecdoche for both.
33. Whether Dickens was aware that looking-glass was a slang synonym for chamber pot in the seventeenth century is unknown, but given his sense of humour, it is nice to think he might have been.

34. I am drawing here on formulations proposed by Merleau-Ponty (1964b/1993, 47ff./121–50).
35. See Merleau-Ponty's critique of the 'ingenuous' nature of intellectualism and its scientific turn to empiricism. *Contra* the veiled 'theoretism' here, Merleau-Ponty insists on a pre-theoretical experience and perception, whereby 'I would not know that I possess a true idea if my memory did not enable me to relate to what is now evidence with what was evident a moment ago, and, through the medium of words, correlate my evidence with that of others' (1962, 39).