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State of Ambiguity

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
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CHAPTER 7



Steeds, Cocks, and Guayaberas

The Social Impact of Agrarian Reorganization in the Republic

Imilcy Balboa Navarro

The image of the Cuban campesino that was spread and consolidated in the island in the first half of the twentieth century—as much in literature as in painting—promoted the stereotype of mounted men in white guayaberas who frequented the cockfight.¹ But the fact that this was the most common image does not make it accurate, for it confused the peasant farmer (or campesino) with the *colono*—the latter, as we will see, an extremely elastic social category—and the colono with the *colonia* (the agricultural estate). Because it blurred the distinction between large and small colonos, and between landowners and renters, the image obfuscated the real social relations of the countryside.² The republic born in 1902 needed new icons, and this conflated image was part of the new symbolic repertoire constructed by the elites in cahoots with the U.S. intervention authorities. It was convenient to represent the rural sectors in terms of a male campesino who was racially white, and who stood midway between the rural worker and the industrial sugar mill owners, with vestigial elements of the old *hacendado*. This fantastical hybrid ended up being identified with the colono. So the classic image of the Cuban campesino was forged, an all-encompassing figure in whom the new nation aspired to recognize its rural roots.

Take, for example, Carlos Loveira's 1922 novel *Los ciegos* (The blind). Introducing the character of Ricardo Calderería, owner of the Dos Ríos sugar mill in La Cidra, the author provided a double description of the external attributes that defined mill owners and colonos and contrasted their appearance. When he appeared in his city guise, Calderería was described as

a Cuban from head to toe insofar as he was always dressed to the nines, with a silky-smooth one-hundred-*duro* Panama hat and very tight-fitting, fine yellow ankle boots made to measure (factory-made boots did not have a high enough instep to accommodate such aristocratic Creole feet). He had a great love of good saddle horses, which during the afternoon carnivals allowed him to compete with the “banker” Magriñat himself in terms of how beautiful and well groomed his mount was, how luxurious his silver tack, and how elegant his stylish Creole riding.³

When he returned to the countryside and assumed the role of *colono*, that same well-dressed rider who rivaled the city’s bankers changed his “white civilian clothes for a peasant *guayabera* shirt, high leather gaiters, and a coarse panama hat of Mexican proportions.” His stay in the countryside meant “a folding cot, workers’ food, a convict’s chastity, and sylvan intellectual isolation.”⁴ He was faced with rural workers prepared to demand their rights. Ricardo’s “heroic” life on the *colonia*, marked by “horrendously early starts to go to the cane fields,” was punctuated by daily clashes which forced him to “battle with laborers who were more demanding and more aware of their worth since the revolution had awakened the conscience of the Creole population and goaded their dignity.”⁵

Loveira’s descriptions in 1922, made in the context of a fall in sugar prices on the world market the previous year and the bank crash that followed, shrouded the agricultural bourgeoisie (the large and medium-sized *colonos*) with the old ways of the *hacendados* (mill owners) which they yearned for and were loath to relinquish. His novel dresses the *colonos* in the attributes of the *hacendados* of the nineteenth century: their clothing, footwear, visits to the property, and so on. These are external attributes that the owners of the *colonias* themselves resisted abandoning precisely because they gave them a certain social recognition. It was this agrarian bourgeoisie—*colonos* disguised as vulnerable farmers—that saw itself as a threatened group during the second decade of the republic. The crisis of the “lean years” of the 1920s brought underlying class contradictions to the surface and with them a discourse in defense of the small-scale farming bourgeoisie whose greatest exponent was Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez, a twentieth-century intellectual who laid the foundations for modern Cuban historiography.⁶

Between May and August 1927, Guerra published a series of articles on the large landed estate system in a leading newspaper, *Diario de la Marina*, and these were eventually compiled in a book, *Azúcar y población en las Antillas* (Sugar and population in the Antilles). Guerra contrasted sugar cultivation

by the large estate system—the *latifundia*—with the farming methods of the peasant producer, but not just any peasant farmer. He reduced the sector to the so-called colonos, the sugarcane farmers, thus confusing what he argued was the truly national sector of agricultural production with an agrarian bourgeoisie associated with growing sugarcane and investing it with the folkloric virtues of the campesino. He also added a racial element, insofar as the image of the peasant that Guerra defended was that of the white colono. The workers and day laborers in the background of his agricultural panorama were at best represented as exploited victims in order to attack the latifundia system, at worst used to sustain a race-based classification of rural labor that excluded Afro-Cubans from the category of colono.

In attempting to explain the changes in agrarian structure as the consequence of the rise of the great estate, Guerra was taking up a debate that had begun in previous decades. The agrarian question, especially seen in terms of property relations, had acquired a certain protagonism at the beginning of the twentieth century with the advent of the republic, when the clarification of types of domination over and ownership of the land had been essential in the new economic conjuncture, given the island's dependent relationship with the United States.⁷ For the most part agrarian reorganization in the republic had been explained by way of study of the latifundia and its political and economic consequence, not only on agrarian structure but also as an agent of domination.⁸ Its social effects, according to Guerra, were felt primarily by one sector, the colono—or at least the type of colono he represented. What is missing in his work is any discussion of the working and living conditions of peasant farmers and agricultural workers that might clarify the social dimensions of the expansion of the latifundia system.

The following pages attempt to provide just such a contextualized examination by taking a deeper look at the elements that determined the structure of agriculture during the initial years of the republic and particularly the expansion of large estates. We also look at the social consequences of this process—the groups that acquired cohesion and those that were finally left out and the means of social and labor control. The objective is to understand how the colonos came to seek redress for their socioeconomic plight in the 1920s by joining the ranks of the nationalists—a process in which Guerra's text and discourse played a key role. Doing so will allow us to go beyond a body of historical work on the Cuban republic that reduces the problem of agrarian social structure—and by extension, of nationality—to the problem of the colono and to consider the significant role of other social actors,

whether owners or not, campesinos or colonos, day laborers or other kinds of agricultural workers.⁹

The Foundations of Agricultural Reorganization:

Expansion and Control

Colonos emerge on the agrarian stage in the period after the first war of independence (1868–78) with the beginning of the process leading to the abolition of slavery and the creation of the *central* (a more industrial sugar milling process getting product from a much greater extension of land, often including many different properties, as opposed to the *ingenio*, the old sugar mill). The rise of the central cemented the separation of the agricultural from the industrial phase of production and generated a new social division of labor that would play a shaping role in the island's destiny.¹⁰ The colono cultivated sugarcane and the mill processed it in return for a share of the colono's harvest. At the outset the colonos might be white campesinos or former slaves, though as time wore on they would be understood only as the former. The *colonato*—the colono regime—took on two guises. The first was an administrative version, whereby the colono managed the cultivation by wage laborers of lands belonging to the sugar mill. The second—the “classic” form—involved the transfer of land to the colono-grower through a rental agreement or through sharecropping.¹¹ What distinguished the colono regime above all was the double game between independence and dependence. Colonos were independent, it is true, but at the same time the majority of them depended on the central. An even more complex situation was faced by those who subleased from other landowners and so faced conditions of double subordination (both to the mill and to the principal leaseholder).

Independence reinforced these mechanisms. From 1899 onward, the agricultural policies introduced by the U.S. occupation governments endeavored first and foremost to further the agricultural transformation which had begun during the previous century.¹² The measures adopted benefited not only investors from the United States but also the island's large landowners who cooperated with the intervention authorities and acted as their partners in government. This last point, which is often ignored, set the interests of certain groups against those of others. However, it must not be forgotten that prominent figures from national political life also participated in the U.S. occupation governments overseen by John R. Brooke (1899) and Leonard Wood (1899–1902), and this line of action was continued by the Department of Agriculture, controlled by Cubans.¹³

The proposals of the authorities and those of the sugar mill owners concurred on one issue: continuity.¹⁴ Large landowners, grouped together in the *Círculo de Hacendados*, took up the main demands that had already been raised during the colonial period with regard to marketing and production, ensuring a sufficient supply of labor and making changes to the uses and control of the land. To that end, they requested a reduction in restrictions on access to the U.S. sugar market, the introduction of an immigration law that would guarantee the supply of a labor force, and the removal of obstacles that hindered access to landownership.¹⁵ The government did not try to alleviate existing social inequalities in the countryside by forcing the redistribution of property, and neither did it introduce efficient regulations in order to promote the reconstruction of ruined farms or resolve the problem of the lack of credit. However, more efficient mechanisms were put in place to liberalize the land market. Here it is worth highlighting Military Order no. 139 of May 27, 1901, and Military Order no. 62 of March 5, 1902.¹⁶ The first abolished the moratorium on mortgage repayments, thus making it easier to sell or transfer estates, while the second (of greater importance) established rules for the demarcation, division, and sale of *haciendas comuneras*, vast areas of shared cattle range, mostly in central and eastern Cuba, whose common status had, prior to the new edicts, excluded them from the land market.

As a result, large-scale agricultural estates became firmly established. The spread of these large estates occurred through the same basic mechanisms that had promoted the tendency toward bigger plantations in the latter third of the nineteenth century. Property was increasingly concentrated, and less efficient producers were eliminated. The supply of sugarcane to the large sugar mill was decentralized, with the *colono* system established as an alternative to small sugar properties with their own mills. The means of controlling small growers and laborers (immigration, railways, contracts, and wage labor) was perfected. From a spatial point of view, two major tendencies were clear. The sugar industry resumed its expansion toward the east, and political power became concentrated in the region of Las Villas where the phenomenon of patronage was strongly felt. The newest element in the system was the large injection of capital by U.S. investors that gave it control over the sector.¹⁷

The majority of the new estates (seventy-five in total), which also had the highest total area of island plantations (between 30,000 and 85,000 hectares),¹⁸ were set up in the provinces of Oriente and Camagüey, regions where elements at the core of the old agricultural structure had survived to the greatest extent (*haciendas comuneras*, crown lands, and state land). These

elements were opened to the land market as a result of Military Order no. 62. Likewise, investors were favored by the low price of land due to the destruction caused by the war or, as a result of this, the ruin of many landowners who were forced to sell all or part of their estates. All the above reasons were conducive to the establishment of large U.S. companies such as United Fruit, which owned the Preston and Boston sugar mills; the American Sugar Refining Company, which owned the Cunagua and Jaronú plants; the Cuban American Sugar Company, with the Mercedita and Tinguaro sugar mills; and the Rionda group, which acquired the Francisco sugar mill.¹⁹

The expansion of large estates involved not only controlling the surrounding land but also strengthening control over growers and laborers. The sugar mill played a major role in the whole production and commercialization process. It acted not only as the owner but also as moneylender, purchaser, and carrier. For those who worked on land provided by the sugar mill and for those who worked their own land, the central imposed contracts that determined the surface to be used for growing cane, the amount of land that could be used for other crops, the type of seeds to be used, and the method for eradicating pests. It also specified the day on which the cane had to be cut and reserved the “unlimited” right to inspect the colonias and to construct railways or any necessary infrastructure, in addition to having the right to take wood, water, and so on. The sugar mill also set the terms of payment, the interest to be paid, and any sanctions in case of breach of contract.²⁰

For colonos and tenant farmers it was difficult to avoid these conditions, since the railway and the land all around them belonged to the sugar mill. In addition, the sugar mill owners ensured their “loyalty” by other means, namely, through *refacción* (usually a short-term loan guaranteed by a portion of future harvest) and by threatening to cancel contracts.²¹ The sugar mill advanced the funds required for sowing and prohibited the colonos from requesting or accepting loans from third parties without their authorization. Any failure to comply with these conditions entitled the company to terminate the contract, and the sugar mills reserved the legal authority to cancel or transfer contracts without prior warning. Growing sugarcane in colonias involved a relationship of subjugation that left little margin for farmers to undertake their own initiatives. The fact that they depended on one source of employment (compared with other less lucrative options) placed them in a vulnerable position with regard to the demands of the owner.

Wages and immigration were used to ensure that sugar mills had control over the labor market. With regard to wages, workers were once again paid in vouchers or tokens, amid claims that it was “for the good of the

day laborer.” This was despite the penalties for such practices introduced by Military Order no. 213 of 1900 (a fine of up to five hundred pesos and up to six months’ imprisonment) and the fact that La Ley Arteaga (Arteaga Law) of June 23, 1909, outlawed the practice.²² Immigration policy was implemented in three stages: measures introduced by the U.S. intervention governments; changes made to the immigration laws according to the needs of the sugar industry, predominantly regarding projects for the introduction of European workers; and regulation of the entry of workers from the Antilles. Initially, the intervention governments attempted to introduce similar restrictions in Cuba to those that had existed in the United States since the 1880s, which limited the entry of convicts, lunatics, destitute people, prostitutes, and other so-called undesirables. Furthermore, section 3 of Military Order no. 155 prohibited drawing up contracts and making advanced payment for the journey to Cuba (which had been the usual method used by plantation owners to obtain labor during the sugar harvest). The order issued on May 15, 1902, shortly before the transfer of power to the republican government of Cuba, was a clear attempt by U.S. producers to safeguard their position, concerned as they were about competition from Cuban sugar, which could be produced using cheap labor, thus reducing costs.²³

However, immigration policy was soon adapted to the pressing needs of the industry. Just as in the past, the large plantations blamed the situation in agricultural areas on the “shortage or lack of men to do farming work” and on the fact that workers demanded “exorbitant wages.”²⁴ To solve the problem, they requested an increase in the number of workers in order to flood the market and thus reduce wages. Just one month after the immigration of whole families brought in to do agricultural work was authorized by Tomás Estrada Palma on July 11, 1906, La Ley de Inmigración, Colonización y Trabajo (Law on Immigration, Colonization, and Labor) was passed. The state subsequently provided 1 million pesos (80 percent for families and 20 percent for laborers) to meet the costs of traveling from mainland Spain and the Canary Islands, in addition to other European countries (“preferably” Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and northern Italy). Immigrants’ applications could be endorsed by individuals or companies. Immigrants were authorized to disembark in Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and Santiago de Cuba as well as Havana and even in other ports where a large number of applications had been made. The plantation owners, aware of the problems faced by their class, adapted the laws to fulfill two recurring demands, namely, that the state should meet the costs of immigration and that laborers should be allowed to disembark closer to the production areas. And although it shared rhetoric with the dis-

course used to promote family immigration, just as in the past the conditions contained in contracts left this type of immigration in the hands of the “plantation owners, landowners, and colonos,” and no program was introduced specifically to settle families.²⁵

The Law on Immigration, Colonization, and Labor was followed by a series of decrees that extended or specified the conditions under which that immigration would occur. In general, however, it can be said that during the first decade of the century immigration policy was left in the hands of the plantation owners. The justifications put forward, the projects presented and above all the fact that plantation owners, bankers, and traders joined together in the *Asociación para el Fomento de la Inmigración* (Association for the Promotion of Immigration), created in 1912, clearly showed that their aim was to get laborers for agricultural work and mainly for the sugar industry. In 1913, a further step was taken in this direction. In an attempt to solve the problem of the “lack of workers,” on January 10 the government of José Miguel Gómez signed Decree no. 23, which authorized the importation of laborers from the Antilles. Specific instructions were given to comply with Military Order no. 155 of 1902, which prohibited immigration under contract or the advance payment of travel expenses, in addition to the Law on Immigration, Colonization, and Labor of 1906, which promoted the entrance of Spanish and European workers. The plantation owners were granted freedom to bring the laborers they so desperately needed for the sugar harvest in exchange for defraying the costs of immigration and freeing the state from having to meet this expense.²⁶ In 1913, sugar production already exceeded 2.5 million tons. The volume of the island’s sugarcane harvest had grown constantly since the beginning of the century, above all after el *Tratado de Reciprocidad Comercial* (Treaty of Commercial Reciprocity) was signed in 1902. The island provided over half the raw material needed by U.S. sugar mills, which made Cuba their main supplier.²⁷

Together with immigration, the *bateyes* (company towns that grew up around the sugar mills) and repression played a role in perfecting the control mechanisms. The sugar mills turned the *bateyes* into veritable satellite towns that combined privileges (accommodation, wages, electricity, and water) with coercion (the threat of expulsion, security guards, and Rural Guard posts). The highest-ranking administrators were provided with free accommodation or very low rent. The brick or stone houses with tiled roofs, which generally had bathrooms and toilets, were occupied by the supervisors and elite employees. Mid-level workers lived with their families in wooden houses which were nevertheless spacious and had tiled roofs. Day laborers

continued to live in bunkhouses divided into small rooms with a door but no windows.²⁸

Even when the shops and services set up in the bateyes were nominally independent (typically including grocery stores, drugstores, tailors, barbers, and laundries), payment in vouchers or tokens limited workers' ability to pay for the services. At the same time, a system of private repression was introduced that used security guards (operating under license from the secretary of the interior) who could make arrests and turn over detainees to the courts. There was also the Rural Guard, which was created in 1899 and whose aim, just like other institutions of this type, was to defend property.²⁹ Neither must we forget the political clientele and hierarchies cemented, which originated during the war due to the chain of command or for affective reasons and were transferred to economic areas after the end of the war.³⁰

Expansion and Crisis: Triple Control over Land, Cultivators, and Day Laborers

The model presented here became even more firmly established as a result of international events. The First World War and the destruction of beet sugar fields in Europe increased the demand for cane sugar. As a result, prices shot up and the cane sugar industry increased production. The earnings generated marked the beginning of the period known as *La Danza de los Millones* (dance of the millions), in other words, the boom years. As had been the case with the sugar boom in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the sugar industry was prepared to take the next step. It had land and a well-controlled labor market. Industry leaders also had access to legislative and executive influence beyond what they had during the previous century when Cuba was a colony. The new government understood the problems of the agrarian bourgeoisie and acted accordingly. Just as the revolution in Haiti had provided the island of Cuba with the opportunity to become the world's largest sugar producer, now the war in Europe provided a boost in the same direction, and the island became once again the world's leading producer.

The urgent need to fulfill the needs of a market that offered huge, quick profits gave rise to a new phase of expansion. Once again, it was carried out via the same dynamic: greater concentration of land, the making available of more land through juridical reform and sale of public land, and the expansion of the rail network. North American investment increased in order to fund the whole project: not only to finance the sugar mills, but also to purchase land and build private railways.³¹ During these years, over forty sugar mills were built and fields of sugarcane spread across the island until

they took over the landscape. Loveira referred to the time as the “period of national diabetes,” with a rapid increase in the number of sugar mills and colonias that “invaded and swept away everything in their wake—woodland, groves of fruit trees, fields of livestock and crops, even the outskirts and streets of rural villages—all for the maddening illusion of 23 cents per pound of sugar.”³²

The provinces of Camagüey and Oriente continued to lead the expansion. This was no accident, given that both provinces still had a high proportion of unused land. There was no longer any crown land, that is true, but there were still forests, which were considered public land during the colony and were later inherited by the state and local administrations. At the beginning of the First World War, the two provinces accounted for 35 percent of the island’s total sugar production, yet by 1929 the figure had increased to 60 percent.³³ To meet the market demand, gigantic estates were built with enormous new sugar mills that incorporated the latest technology in order to increase production capacity. In addition, private railways were built to guarantee the supply of sugarcane. This private rail network had over nine thousand kilometers of track, double the amount available for public use.³⁴

Modern innovations bound the colono even tighter to the sugar mill. Stiffening the control mechanisms did not lead to a drop in the number of colonos. In fact, it would appear that their total number doubled during the first decades of the twentieth century. In 1899, there were some 15,000 colonos whereas by 1914 the figure had risen to over 37,000.³⁵ The sugar mills did not aim to eliminate the colonos, but rather to incorporate them into the latifundia system, thus reducing the colonos’ negotiating power and limiting their freedom of choice. Control of the land was consonant with extensive agriculture and allowed the sugar mill to impose its conditions and offer low prices for the cane. Contracts became “legal fiction,” which explains why they were preferred to sugarcane grown by the sugar mills themselves. The fact that it became commonplace to offer to pay a surcharge to obtain a tenancy agreement indicated that it was increasingly difficult to gain access to land. Ramiro Guerra reported that the tenants of small and medium-sized rural farms were unable to cover costs due to high rents and high rates of interest on refacción loans. He concluded that “the latifundia system is gradually strangling independent farmers, ruining and impoverishing them, lowering their standard of living, and creating conditions in which it is impossible for them to survive.”³⁶

Meanwhile, the working and living conditions of agricultural laborers became increasingly hard. These sectors “had to make the same effort as before

the checks with strings of zeros and the sacks of sugar pawned for hundreds of thousands began swirling around them.” Laborers still worked between ten and twelve hours per day and many sugar mills still paid wages in vouchers and tokens.³⁷ Neither did the profits have any effect on immigrants from the Antilles, except for the fact that their numbers increased. On August 3, 1917, a new law was enacted that extended the inflow of foreign “laborers and workers” for two more years.³⁸ It was no coincidence that the president of the republic at this time, Mario García Menocal, was among the founders of the Chaparra sugar mill and that during his years in the government he was one of the directors of the Cuban American Sugar Company. García Menocal combined political power with an understanding of the needs of his class, and during his eight years in power more than 81,000 Jamaicans and 190,000 Haitians entered the island.³⁹ This benefited the island’s producers, who had a larger number of workers at their disposal whose condition as people of color, speaking a language other than Spanish, and with limited knowledge of the country and its laws made them more vulnerable and easier to oppress. It also benefited those U.S. officials who were with the occupation authority in Haiti from 1915 to 1934 and who acted as agents for the recruitment of workers.⁴⁰

Sugar production doubled between 1914 and 1919 and sugar prices reached almost five cents per pound.⁴¹ The island’s wealth and prosperity were directly proportional to the sugar harvest. The model was functioning successfully, so why question the latifundia system, the aspiration and source of such prosperity? But the crisis was not long in coming. During the 1920s, the sugar industry had to contend with a period of prolonged instability. The recovery and increase in production exceeded the market possibilities, and prices began to fall. The situation was heightened by the world economic crisis beginning in 1929, and it did not improve (and then only temporarily and in line with the interests of the major producers) until 1934, when a new commercial agreement was signed with the United States that established a system of quotas and the reduction of tariffs.⁴² In the farming sector the crisis brought about changes in the latifundia model that led to a higher degree of perfection (if such a term may be used) by further streamlining the intrinsic elements—again, the trio of land concentration, increase of available land, and worker controls—that had originated at the end of the nineteenth century and become firmly established during the early twentieth.

Just as the war of 1895 had acted as a catalyst for the elimination of less efficient units, the financial crisis of 1921 eliminated the weaker units and acted as a natural selection mechanism. This had a double effect insofar as

each year it led to a decrease in the number of sugar mills while strengthening the overall latifundia system. The large estates tended to increase the number of hectares they had under production. Having large areas of land allowed the companies not only to control several colonos but also to withhold a considerable amount of land. This constituted a “reserve” in case other land was overused or expansion was required. As in the past, control of the factors of production played a key role, and as a result, in addition to increasing the amount of land under their aegis, they continued their policy of controlling the workforce.

There was a decrease in the number of independent colonos, those who owned their own land. At the beginning of the century, the land owned by independents made up 36 percent of the total land under sugarcane cultivation, whereas by 1930 this figure had dropped to 16 percent, and in 1933 such land barely represented 10 percent. Meanwhile, the number of colonias controlled by sugar mills increased from 33 to 63 percent in the earlier period and reached 64 percent in 1933.⁴³ It is precisely at this point that the voice of Guerra and the other defenders of the “colono” made themselves heard.

With regard to immigration, it is worth highlighting that during this period the laws that were enacted not only provided sugar mills with labor reinforcements but also enabled them to control any unruly workers. When the labor market was saturated as a result of the crisis, noneconomic reasons were used to justify the limitations placed on immigration. Thus in 1921, Decree no. 1,404 attempted to force the repatriation of Haitians and Jamaicans. The decree, signed on July 20 during a lull in sectoral activity, acknowledged that immigrant workers from Haiti and Santo Domingo had been “positive for the development of our sugar industry during the period of exceptional growth.” However, the drop in production meant that so many cutters were no longer required. So, although nominally the suppression was due to the “current adverse conditions,” it disguised the prohibition of immigration following the so-called threat to the nation’s health.⁴⁴ However, the interests of one group of landowners (above all, the big estates of Camagüey and Oriente) blocked the implementation of the decree. In fact, the entry of workers from the Antilles continued during the 1920s, although Decree no. 1,158 of June 17, 1921, which regulated the arrival of workers at ports in Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, Antilla, Nuevitas, and Puerto Padre, did come into effect. The repatriation of workers once milling had finished did not affect the large mills, and they actually benefited from the fact that workers were made to leave when work was scarce.⁴⁵

The immigration laws must also be seen as a response to the increase

in worker protests that periodically shook the country between 1917 and 1924. Above all, during the governments of García Menocal and Gerardo Machado, attempts were made to associate immigration with the increase in social unrest. García Menocal ordered the expulsion of “evil foreigners,” who were none other than labor leaders who were mainly Spanish anarchists. Machado’s policies were aimed at workers who carried out attacks using explosives; spread subversive propaganda; advocated the destruction of property, anarchy, and the overthrow of the state; and urged workers to carry out similar attacks.⁴⁶ To close the circle even more, one year later on August 21, Decree no. 1,331 was issued, obliging the sugar mills’ security guards to provide the secretary of the interior with all the information they could gather on propaganda distributed by anarchists, communists, and any other “labor agitators.” In addition, the sugar mills used detachments of the Rural Guard to keep the peace.⁴⁷ The custom of paying workers in vouchers or tokens, which had been banned since 1909 but which was still common practice, was legally sanctioned on December 6, 1929. The report issued by the Foreign Policy Association in 1934 acknowledged that the grocery stores had become a means of exploiting workers on two fronts, since the majority of workers were paid in vouchers that could only be exchanged in these stores, and they charged high prices for the products.⁴⁸

A Nation Tailor-Made for Colonos

The most direct attack on the latifundia system at the beginning of the twentieth century was led by Manuel Sanguily, who focused his denunciation on the foreign-owned portion. Sanguily, who felt that those who owned the land also owned the country, was alarmed by the growing number of foreigners who “are spreading around the island with the intention of taking ownership over the land.” He tabled a law in the Senate in March 1903 that would prohibit sale of land to foreigners, but it failed to win approval. One month earlier Emilio Arteaga, the representative for Camagüey (one of the provinces most affected by the phenomenon), proposed a similar law and also saw it defeated.⁴⁹ In his 1929 book, *Latifundia and the Cuban Economy*, Raúl Maestri emphasized the debate over large property holdings and its effects on the island. The work analyzed the latifundia system in its dual aspect, both economic and sociopolitical. He defended the benefits of large-scale sugar production, noting that medium-sized and small properties were “anti-economic” because they brought with them “a paralyzing social caste.” For Maestri the small and medium-sized owners impeded the introduction of technical advances and production gains because their principal con-

cern was simply to maintain their slice of land and “settle into a routine and humble existence that, due to deep-rooted inclination, resist any alteration or change even when they are inspired by the fairest concepts of equity.”⁵⁰ He nevertheless criticized the latifundio as a factor in the island’s dependence on the United States and blamed it for the structural deformation of the Cuban economy.

For the creole elite that assumed power in 1902 the republican ideal reproduced certain postulates that they had favored in the previous century, ones directed at creating a country with a majority white population that was synonymous with order, civilization, and progress. These intentions were reinforced by concepts that were held, in similar ways, by the U.S. intervention government. The U.S. authorities brought with them a series of rigorous racial distinctions and negative stereotypes that transcribed the island according to their obsession for whiteness and a clear separation of races.⁵¹ In this way, during the first years of the republic, nationalist ideologues found a favorable context in which to elaborate their archetypical *colono*.

The consequences of the sugar crisis and the reorganization of farming properties following the financial crash reopened the debate regarding large-scale properties and their effects on the island. Guerra and other such ideologues, in defending the *colonos*, attacked not the Cuban and Spanish *hacendados* but rather the Afro-Antillean laborers (in this sense their thinking was not so far from nineteenth-century reformers like José Antonio Saco or Ramón de la Sagra, who despite their differences agreed that the island needed to be whitened). They labeled Antillean immigration “undesirable,” pointed to Military Decree no. 155, signed by Wood in 1902, as a “sage piece of preventive legislation,” and ended up demonizing the latifundio because it relied on the “importing of low-priced labor.”⁵² Nowhere is this clearer than in Guerra’s identification, in *Azúcar y población en las Antillas*, of an “iniquity that affronts heavenly and human justice”: the fact that “while in the countryside millions and millions of tons of sugarcane planted by natives are left in the ground, unable to be milled due to limits on the harvest, Antillean workers are imported to perform labor required to cut a large portion of the cane that is milled in certain sugar mills.”⁵³

In short, the author supported a nationalistic policy. The sugar problem, he felt, was viewed from above and with no regard for the *colonos*. As a result of the 1926 policy that restricted the sugarcane harvest, the *colonos*’ “freedom” to grind their sugarcane in the mill of their choice was practically eliminated. Even so, ever since the nineteenth century this had been relative, since it depended on how close the sugar mill was and the means of commu-

nication. On this occasion it was not entirely due to the latifundia system. The state itself sealed the demise of this option with the decree of February 28, 1931, which obliged colonos to grind their cane in the same sugar mill as they had the previous year. At the same time, sugar mills ensured that recognition was given to the “normal sugarcane zone,” which assigned the nearby growers to them in advance. Perhaps this measure, even without intending to, worked in favor of the survival (albeit with limitations) of the figure of the colono in opposition to the option of company-grown cane.

It is important to mention another factor here that is generally ignored, namely, Ramiro Guerra’s participation in Machado’s government as presidential secretary (1932) and general school supervisor. Perhaps for that reason he trod gently and refused to criticize the state interventionism that characterized the period, while defending the policy of reducing the sugarcane harvest. In the epilogue to his book, he made a point of defending Machado’s economic policy and stated that subsequent governments did not bring about significant changes. Inaccuracy or oversight? During Grau San Martín’s period in office, sugar mills were required to purchase at least 20 percent of their cane from colonos. And for the 1935 sugarcane harvest, the Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government raised the figure to 30 percent. Furthermore, Grau’s government introduced one of the main measures of the period affecting colonos. Decree no. 16 of January 2, 1934, led to the creation of the Asociación de Colonos de Cuba, which included everyone involved in the sugar industry: owners, colonos, tenant farmers, subtenants, and sharecroppers. It also included those working under “any other temporary agreement,” and even so, its membership barely exceeded forty thousand.

Guerra’s analysis omitted three important factors determining the social dynamic in the sugar sector. First, there was the connection between the growing social instability and the workers’ response, in addition to the incorporation of workers from Haiti and Jamaica to the sector’s struggles during the period. Second, there was the response of the middle classes, who invested their political energies in educational and sanitary programs. Finally, there were the measures adopted by the state, which resumed the expulsion of “evil foreigners” and the repatriation of immigrants from the Antilles once the sugar harvest had ended. It must also be pointed out that the wage strategy applied by the owners constituted an instrument used to control the labor market that made no distinction between nationalities. In any case, immigrant workers from the Antilles who spoke a different language and who were unprotected by the law were more likely to be cheated when it came to negotiating or receiving payment for their work.⁵⁴ Neither should

it be forgotten that in 1929, payment in vouchers or tokens was against the law and a punishable offense. On the other hand, the wealthier colonos who used workers from Haiti and Jamaica to cut their sugarcane were exonerated, since (according to Guerra) they were forced into this situation by the contracts imposed by the latifundia system. It is therefore worth asking if the theory of low salaries did not apply to them.

Precisely which colonos was Guerra defending? There were perhaps not so many of them, but they were not without influence at different levels of national political life. For example, on historian Jorge Ibarra's list of forty plantation owners or large-scale colonos who became politicians during the first two decades of the century, twenty-one were colonos, six were sugar mill owners or co-owners, and ten were administrators, shareholders, and lawyers (the others were a plantation owner, a cattle farmer, and another in the business of importing and exporting sugar). Moreover, those classed as colonos produced between 500,000 and 35 million *arrobas* of sugar (between 5.75 million and 402 million kilos), which situated them among the major producers. Within this group there were twelve congressmen and two senators, while the others held the office of mayor in various towns. A further revealing element was that many of them had a past associated with the independence movement and not exactly as foot soldiers. Ibarra registered ninety-six officers in the Ejército Libertador (Liberating Army) linked to the sugar industry: large-scale colonos (seventy-seven), owners, sugar mill co-owners or shareholders (ten), managers (seven), and chairmen of sugar companies (two). Among these there were five generals, four brigadier generals, four major generals, one lieutenant general, twenty colonels, twenty lieutenant colonels, eleven commanders, twelve captains, six lieutenants, four second lieutenants, and one sergeant.⁵⁵

The interests of the sugar industry also reached as far as the president. General José Miguel Gómez was the owner of the La Vega and Algodones sugar mills. Major General Mario García Menocal was the administrator and an important colono of the Chaparra sugar mill, owner of the Palma sugar mill, and co-owner of the Pilar sugar mill. (All the family were involved in the business, and family members had shares in Menocal's sugar mills, appeared as colonos connected with other sugar mills, and held positions as senators and congressmen.) Brigadier General Gerardo Machado was the owner of the Carmita sugar mill together with his brother Carlos. And Colonel Carlos Mendieta, who served as president of the republic in 1934, was a colono of the Cunagua sugar mill. The group of officers from the Ejército Libertador who became colonos were not in the majority, but they were representative,

and they did have influence. These “colonos-libertadores” had close links with power and the possibility of passing legislation in the interest of this sector. Why, then, did they not do so?

According to figures from 1940, between 500,000 and 1 million arrobas of sugar (approximately 5.75 million and 11.5 million kilos, respectively) were produced by only 21 percent of the colonos. This percentage dropped to minimal levels (barely 1.5 percent) for production over and above this figure.⁵⁶ These large-scale colonos considered themselves to be plantation owners, given their past and their proximity to power. Throughout the twentieth century, it can be seen how landowners and colonos joined forces in farming associations, which is paradoxical given the apparent differences in interests. The colonos with the greatest resources took over the leadership of the associations (acting paternalistically in some cases but resorting to tyrannical methods in most cases) and eventually represented the entire sector. However, they did so only in the interest of large-scale producers.

This group used the same methods of labor exploitation and control as those used by the large estates. Cuco, the main character in Loveira’s novel *Los ciegos*, is surprised to discover the cane cutters working in the neighboring colonia living in “a large *shack* of the type referred to as *sticks in the earth*, with six, eight, and up to ten filthy, discolored hammocks hanging from the supports.” Outside the shack, near one of its corners, “two large, blackened iron caldrons boiled on large cooking stoves made using three stones.” He concludes by intoning, “Poor people! How they live! Imagine having to endure six months of this life on a sugar plantation in one of these shacks, in such isolation, eating what they eat!”⁵⁷

To return to our point of departure, the widespread images used to portray the campesino during those years—a white guayabera shirt, horses, cockerels—did not match the reality of the peasant farmer at all. The 1934 report of the Foreign Policy Association made a distinction between the living conditions of the colonos who lived on their land and the conditions of those who held other administrative positions such as foremen and field inspectors, who enjoyed better conditions. It later acknowledged that “those well-dressed horsemen who ride along the roads on Sundays and holidays on their way to cockfights and other forms of entertainment come from these classes; they are also the source of social trends which take the sons and daughters of these families to the *batey* or to the village in search of jobs which provide greater social prestige.”⁵⁸

The peasant in an immaculate guayabera shirt was an invention of the rural middle classes, who reinvented themselves by establishing a link be-

tween the land and the style of the plantation owners. It was an invention of great significance. Despite his poverty, Liborio, the caricatured figure who represented the Cuban peasant par excellence, continued to wear his white guayabera shirt, even if it was threadbare.⁵⁹ Guerra and the nation's ideologists used the concept of the colono in a self-serving and confusing way. They associated the colono with farming colonias without making any distinction between large and small producers or between landowners and tenants. They did not make any distinction because it was not in their interests to speak of a farming bourgeoisie, and they ended up hiding away a whole social class. It was not so much a nation of whites as a nation of white middle classes, of white landowners who had existed during the two decades of the republic despite the spread of North American capital. However, during the lean years they saw that their survival in agriculture was in danger more than ever before, hence their reaction and defense of the agricultural colonia and the colono system that proved effective while they managed to join forces with the large Cuban growers who dominated political office. It was a discourse that also benefited them politically. In the so-called republic of generals and doctors, the agricultural leaders were the large landowners and the voters were the owners of small farms.⁶⁰

Notes

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1. The guayabera is a loose-fitting, tunic-style short-sleeve shirt for men made of light fabric and worn untucked. Its origins are not only Cuban, but it has long been associated with the island. While the guayabera is often now worn for semiformal and even formal occasions, it has always been symbolic of rural life.

2. Among those who have tried to give some precision to the social category of "colono," José Antonio Piqueras has proposed a methodological division between the colono as agricultural producer and colonias as agricultural properties. He restricts the definition of a colono to those directly involved in growing sugarcane whose family production was of a medium scale, and so excludes landowners controlling large extensions and using salaried labor whom he classifies as an agrarian bourgeoisie. Piqueras also emphasizes how the colonos themselves, defined in these terms, originally distanced themselves from "los señores hacendados." See Piqueras, *Sociedad civil y poder en Cuba*, 186–90. Others who have tackled this figure are Guerra y Sánchez, *Sugar and Society in the Caribbean*; McGillivray, *Blazing Cane*; Martínez Alier, *Cuba: Economía y sociedad*; Dye, *Cuban Sugar in the Age of Mass Production*; Ayala, *American Sugar Kingdom*; and Santamaría and García Mora, "Colonos: Agricultores cañeros," 131–61.

3. Translated from Loveira, *Los ciegos*, 38.

4. Loveira, *Los ciegos*, 39.
5. Loveira, *Los ciegos*, 40.
6. On Guerra as historian, pedagogue, and economist, see Almodóvar Muñoz, *Antología crítica de la historiografía cubana (período neocolonial)*, 271–315; García Carranza, “Breve Biobibliografía del doctor Ramiro Guerra”; García Blanco et al., “Guerra y Sánchez, Ramiro”; and Instituto de Literatura y Lingüística de la Academia de Ciencias de Cuba, *Diccionario de la Literatura Cubana*, 397–400.
7. The agrarian holding that received most attention was the hacienda comunera-crown land that was used as commons. See Cancio, “Haciendas comuneras”; Gómez, *Historia, deslinde y reparto de haciendas comuneras*; Celorio, *Las haciendas comuneras*. Pichardo, *Agrimensura legal en la Isla de Cuba: Segunda edición corregida y aumentada* [1902], recently reissued, is another example of this tendency. U.S. authors also showed an interest in the island’s agrarian issues, among them Whitbeck, “Geographical Relations in the Development of Cuban Agriculture.”
8. Pichardo, *Documentos para la Historia de Cuba*, 2: 261–63, 325; Maestri, *El latifundismo en la economía cubana*.
9. This work was done as part of a research project supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (HAR2012–36481).
10. Piqueras, *Sociedad civil y poder en Cuba*, 185.
11. On the colonato, see Guerra y Sánchez, *Azúcar y población*, 62–68. A detailed study is McGillivray, *Blazing Cane*. An analysis on the second half of the twentieth century is Martínez Alier, *Cuba: Economía y sociedad*, 75–108.
12. For an analysis of the patrimonial issues of the period, see Balboa, “La herencia de la tierra,” 123–54. With regard to the economic policy introduced by the United States, see Le Riverend, *Historia Económica de Cuba*, 553–61. See also Torre et al., *La sociedad cubana en los albores de la República*.
13. José Antonio Piqueras, in “Ciudadanía y cultura cívica en la construcción de la República,” 24–53, highlighted that the survival of the old legislation made space for *caciquismo*, or political patronage, just like in colonial times. This space was occupied by patriots in office, while common pro-independence supporters became the clientele. He defined the period starting in 1902 as one of the “oligarchization of power,” in which the decision-making process was concentrated in a reduced sphere of beneficiaries of the anticolonial struggle, above all, civil and military leaders who had no interest in developing a true representative democracy that could deprive them of their recently acquired privileges. These arguments have now been revised in his work *Sociedad civil y poder en Cuba*.
14. For example, the Civil Code of 1889 and the Mortgage Law of 1893 were still in force. See Dorta, *Curso de legislación hipotecaria*; Cantón Blanco, *Conferencias de derecho de propiedad*.
15. *Revista de Agricultura*, no. 3, Havana, October 15, 1900 (special edition).
16. “On the Demarcation and Division of Estates, Ranches, and Corrals,” Havana, March 5, 1902, in Pichardo, *Documentos para la Historia de Cuba*, 2: 181–98.
17. According to Julio Le Riverend, *Historia Económica*, 576–77, U.S. capital invested

in the sector increased from \$30 million during the period between 1898 and 1902 to \$80 million between 1902 and 1906. On caciquism in Las Villas, see Zeuske, "1898: Cuba y el problema de la 'transición pactada,'" 131–47.

18. Zanetti and García, *United Fruit Company*, 79.

19. García Álvarez, "Estructuras de una economía colonial en transición," 195–210.

20. For the conditions of the contracts, see Guerra y Sánchez, *Azúcar y población*, 231–46, and McGillivray, *Blazing Cane*, 279–86.

21. The term *refacción* refers to short-term loans (usually paid in slaves or in kind) that were granted against the guarantee of future sugar harvests and under other specific obligations. See "Glosario de la manufactura esclavista," Moreno Friginals, *El Ingenio*, 646.

22. *La Lucha*, Havana, February 28, 1901; *La Ley Arteaga* in Pichardo, *Documentos*, 2: 327–29.

23. On the conditions of immigration to the United States, see Jones, *Historia de Estados Unidos, 1607–1992*, 301; Military Order no. 155 in Pichardo, *Documentos*, 2: 199–201.

24. *La Lucha*, Havana, September 13, 1899.

25. See Naranjo and García, *Medicina y racismo en Cuba*, 40.

26. Pichardo, *Documentos*, 2: 199–201, 273–75, 369–70; Pérez de la Riva, "Los recursos humanos de Cuba al comenzar el siglo," 7–44.

27. The United States bought 88 percent of Cuban sugar exports, and England was the second most important market, accounting for 10 percent of the total. Moreno Friginals, *El ingenio*, 3: 47; statistical appendix, table 9, in Instituto de Historia de Cuba, *Historia de Cuba. La neocolonia*, 3: 397.

28. Water was fundamental not only for human consumption but also for the work of the sugar mill and for watering plantations. The sugar mills took control of the water supply by setting up private systems of pipes and dams. See, for example, Zanetti and García, *United Fruit Company*, 285.

29. On conditions in the bateyes, see Foreign Policy Association, *Problemas de la Nueva Cuba*, in Pichardo, *Documentos*, 3: 477–81. On the Rural Guard and its functions, see Chang, *El Ejército Nacional en la República neocolonial*, 4–12; Uralde, "La Guardia Rural: un instrumento de dominación neocolonial (1898–1902)," 255–82. See also Piqueiras, "La individualización de la propiedad agraria en la transición al capitalismo," 7–24.

30. Relations between leaders and peasants were established during the war of 1895 and were strengthened in peace times given the "protective" role that military leaders (associated with the interests of the sugar mills and in many cases large landowners themselves) took on with regard to their former subordinates. Many of these generals provided employment or leased land to men who fought in their ranks. Likewise, middle-ranking officers who were granted lucrative tenant contracts acted as intermediaries and subleased the land to lower ranking soldiers. Zeuske, "Estructuras, movilidad afro cubana y clientelas en un hinterland cubano," 93–116.

31. Dye, *Cuban Sugar in the Age of Mass Production*, and Jenks, *Nuestra colonia de Cuba*.

32. Loveira, *Los ciegos*, 430.

33. Forests played a major role, not only in terms of the land which they provided—due to their extent and fertility—but also because of the possibility of making use of the wood to make houses, factories, sleepers, and private jetties. Funes, “El boom azucarero durante la Primera Guerra Mundial y su impacto sobre zonas boscosas de Cuba.”

34. Republic of Cuba, *Industria azucarera de Cuba, 1912–1914; Censo de la República de Cuba, año de 1919*; Zanetti and García, *Caminos para el azúcar*, 251–66.

35. The figures are contradictory, insofar as the 1899 *Census* recorded 15,521 colonos whereas the *Civil Report* only registered 892 sugarcane colonias. Ibarra, for his part, reported 1,365 counting the colonias that had been destroyed and those that were already in production. See *Informe sobre el Censo de Cuba, 1899: Cuba Gobernador Militar, 1899–1902 (Civil Report 1899–1900)*, 7: 295; Guerra y Sánchez, *La industria azucarera de Cuba*. Also Ibarra Cuesta, “La Sociedad cubana en las tres primeras décadas del siglo XX,” 164–66.

36. Ibarra Cuesta, *Cuba, 1898–1921*, 116–21. See also Celorio, *La refacción*.

37. Ibarra Cuesta, *Cuba, 1898–1921*, 170–73; Zanetti and García, *United Fruit Company*, 441–42; in their respective studies, they highlighted an average decrease in the real wage rate while the cost of food increased. The quotation is translated from Loveira, *Los ciegos*, 430. See also Pichardo, *Documentos*, 3: 481–82.

38. Pichardo, *Documentos*, 2: 421–22; Pérez de la Riva, “Cuba y la inmigración antillana, 1900–1931,” 27–31; Álvarez Estévez, *Azúcar e inmigración*.

39. On this subject, see McGillivray, *Blazing Cane*, 86–117.

40. Ibarra Cuesta, *Cuba, 1898–1921*, 156; Pérez de la Riva, “Cuba y la inmigración antillana, 1900–1931,” 2: table VIII-I.

41. Moreno Friginals, *El ingenio*, 3: 47. For the value of the sugar harvest between 1914 and 1920, see Ibarra Cuesta, *Cuba, 1898–1921*, 442; Zanetti, “El comercio exterior de la república neocolonial,” 76–78.

42. The Costigan-Jones Law (1934) divided up the U.S. sugar market among its regular suppliers through a system of quotas valid for three years. Cuba was due 29.4 percent of the market, which despite being higher than in previous years was not even half the amount exported during the 1920s. On the crisis, see Pino Santos, *El asalto a Cuba por la oligarquía financiera yanqui*; Santamaría, *Sin azúcar no hay país*; Toro and Collazo, “Primeras manifestaciones de la crisis del sistema colonial”; Chang, “Reajustes para la estabilización del sistema neocolonial,” 194–208, 337–38.

43. Ibarra Cuesta, *Cuba, 1898–1921*, 116–21, 448.

44. Decreto no. 1404, 1921, cited in Pichardo, *Documento*, 3: 22–23. See, for example, the analysis on contracting and returning of Antillean laborers during these years by the United Fruit Company in Zanetti and García, *United Fruit Company*, 216–23.

45. On July 17, 1928, the Haitian government prohibited workers from emigrating to Cuba, and although authorization was granted to companies that were given permission by Cuba, external difficulties combined with the new internal economic crisis meant that this option was used less and less until it practically disappeared. Finally in 1933, the government ordered “all foreigners who are out of work and all illegal im-

migrants” to leave the country. The legislation can be seen in Pichardo, *Documentos*, 3: 22–23, 614. See Robert Whitney’s chapter in this collection.

46. Decree no. 1601, June 27 and Decree of November 18, 1925, cited in Pichardo, *Documentos*, 3: 280–83 and 314–19, respectively. The anarchists were accused of “disturbing the peace,” “causing strikes” (a right which Cuban legislation did not recognize) or “provoking revolts.” They were also branded “Germanophiles” in accordance with the 1918 Law on Espionage. However, as Sánchez Cobos points out, the largest number of deportations coincided with periods when work was scarce. On the reorganization of labor and the role of anarchists, see Sánchez Cobos, *Sembrando ideales*; Toro y Collazo, “Primeras manifestaciones de la crisis del sistema colonial,” 216–27; Instituto de Historia del Movimiento Comunista y la Revolución Socialista de Cuba, *Historia de movimiento obrero cubano, 1865–1958*, 1: 219–22; and Tellería, *Los Congresos Obreros en Cuba*, 137–42.

47. Foreign Policy Association, *Problemas de la nueva Cuba*, in Pichardo, *Documentos*, 3: 478.

48. Foreign Policy Association, *Problemas de la nueva Cuba*, 3: 433–34, 480–81.

49. Pichardo, *Documentos*, 2: 261–63, 325.

50. Maestri, *El latifundismo en la economía cubana*, 60–64.

51. The whitening of the island was one of the central themes in the debate over the nation, one that had its expression in the polemic between the virtues of the “hispano” versus the “saxon.” Spanish immigration was valued while immigration from China or the Antilles was seen as harmful for the cultural development of the nation. See Naranjo and García, *Medicina y racismo*, 34–60. On the spread of racism, see Scott, “Relaciones de clase e ideologías raciales.”

52. Guerra y Sánchez, *Azúcar y población en las Antillas*, 15–16, 86–87, 109, 117, 183. For the reformist thought of the nineteenth century, see Saco, *Análisis de don José Antonio Saco de una obra sobre el Brasil intitulada, Notices of Brazil in 1828 and 1829 by Rev. Walsh, author of a Journey from Constantinople, etc.*, 203–4; Saco, *Mi primera pregunta*; and Sagra, *Cuba, 1860*. Military Order no. 155 is cited in Pichardo, *Documentos*, 2: 199–201.

53. Guerra y Sánchez, *Azúcar y población en las Antillas*, 84, 100, 167–74; citation from 174.

54. In this case the difference between Haitians and Jamaicans should be noted, since the Jamaicans had the backing of the British authorities and in a greater culture of collective defense of their interests, which was clearly visible during the expulsions of Antilleans in the 1930s. On this see McLeod, “Undesirable Aliens,” and Whitney (chapter 12 of this volume).

55. In eight cases the person’s rank could not be determined. Moreover, there is one who appears as a colono and landowner who has been included in the first group and two who appear as colonos and administrators who have been included in the second group.

56. Chang, “Reajustes para la estabilización del sistema neocolonial,” 359.

57. Loveira, *Los ciegos*, 441–42.

58. Foreign Policy Association, *Problemas de la Nueva Cuba*, in Pichardo, *Documentos*, 3: 482.

59. According to Ibarra Cuesta, *Nación y cultura nacional*, 175–85, this idyllic representation and the supposed delay in the representation of Cuba in paintings was due to the relationship between the artists and those who bought their pictures and demanded this type of images (white peasants, palm trees, roosters, partygoers, etc.).

60. See Piqueras, *Sociedad civil y poder en Cuba*, 184–90; Martínez Alier and Stolcke, *Cuba: Economía y sociedad*.