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Art from a Fractured Past

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
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ART FROM PERU'S FRACTURED PAST

In *Adiós Ayacucho* [Farewell Ayacucho] Julio Ortega recounts from the perspective of Alfonso Cánepa, a community leader from the department of Ayacucho, the travails of finding postmortem justice in a country that offers little justice for the living. When he was accused of being a terrorist—rather than a peasant leader—the military mutilated his body and threw what was left of it into a pit, leaving out many of his bones and thus denying him the possibility of a proper burial and eternal peace. Since his death Cánepa has worked to reconstruct his body, trying to get a sympathetic hearing from the president of the Republic in the hope that the head of state will return his bones to him. Rejected, he climbs into the tomb of the conquistador Francisco Pizarro and takes some of Pizarro's bones to complete his own skeleton. Written in 1986, this novella evokes the tragedy and brutality of the war in highlands Peru, the racism and indifference that lay at the heart of the conflict, and the long-standing historical violence dating back to the arrival of the Spanish.¹

Alfonso Cánepa's story, though fictional, recalls the experience of hundreds of thousands of Peruvians whose lives from 1980 until the mid-1990s were convulsed by an internal war.² According to the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which studied the years from the launch of Shining Path's "People's War" to the fall of the Fujimori government in 2000, over 69,000 people were killed or disappeared, some 4,600 clandestine burial sites pockmark the country, over 40,000 children were left orphans, over 20,000 women were left widowed, and some 600,000 internal refugees migrated to the cities in search of safer lives.³ The scale of the destruction, loss of family and loved ones, personal suffering, and fracturing of life trajectories and social bonds

impedes comprehension. Yet the internal war of Peru necessitates reflection and historicization.⁴

Art—such as Ortega’s short story—offers a powerful means for recounting the past and for reaching a kind of understanding. The ability of art to speak about atrocity has been debated since Theodor Adorno famously remarked that to write poetry after Auschwitz was “barbaric.” His aphorism has often been interpreted to mean that it is impossible, both actually and morally, to represent the Holocaust, and perhaps more broadly any atrocity, via art.⁵ Yet Adorno later in life acknowledged poetry as an important means of communication for “perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to scream.”⁶ Over the half century since the Holocaust, a plethora of artworks has emerged to broach the difficult—in the meanings of both sensibility toward and comprehension of—thus allowing us decades later to move beyond the taboo of representing and giving expression to shameful and horrific pasts.⁷ Art may express what formal language cannot.⁸ We should recognize the significant role art can play in making difficult pasts comprehensible, even if only in part. Thus, in a reworking of Adorno’s famous words, Steve J. Stern suggests that to *not* produce art in the aftermath of suffering would be to allow barbarity to reign unchecked.⁹

Indeed, in Latin America, one of the intended aims of art in response to atrocity seems to be this: to contest the barbarity committed and to restore the humanity of citizens who have been harmed. In the transition from state violence to democracy and the post-transitional period, issues of representation and memory have come to the forefront of political and cultural analyses and debates about conflict and repression in Latin America. Protest art against authoritarian regimes and violence has made way for memorial art. In Argentina, for instance, *siluetazos* (silhouettes), which stood out as silent protests and evocations of missing citizens, now adorn memory sites dedicated to the *desaparecidos* (disappeared). Yet art may maintain continuity in its role regardless of regime type: whether under dictatorial or democratic rule, art contests any totalizing vision of state power. During dictatorships, to make art could be an act of resistance, as when Chilean women stitched picture *arpilleras* (appliqués) whose imagery denounced the Pinochet regime’s human rights abuses.¹⁰ So, too, in post-conflict democracies, art reminds audiences of the ongoing tensions of

the unresolved past in the present. For instance, post–civil war novels in Central America reference the violence of earlier decades in the context of today’s insecurity;¹¹ and the creativity of the *escrachés* (public denunciations of perpetrators) by Argentine and Chilean youth “remind us that while the dictatorships and even democratic regimes have tightly controlled our understanding of the real, cultural practices constantly subvert that discursive order.”¹²

Art may help to achieve a fuller expression and better understanding of difficult and contested pasts. In a conversation between the historian Gonzalo Sánchez and the artist María Elvira Escallón, who made a photography exhibition after a bombing of a social club in Bogota, Sánchez reflects on the limits of written texts in recounting the Colombian violence: “a text cannot say everything about the pain that covers our daily tragedies. We need to turn to images, and the multiple possibilities of artistic language.”¹³ Art may help not only those who have gone through traumatic events to put shape and give meaning to their experiences—to express something about the pain, to paraphrase Sánchez—but art may also help those who have not directly experienced such events to come closer to a sympathetic awareness of them. As Kyo Maclear has written in the context of post–atomic bombings Japan, art can move viewers “emotionally and intellectually toward the unknown.”¹⁴ For some survivors, art came out of necessity and a desire to record what happened for future generations: “even now [thirty years later] I cannot erase the scene from my memory. Before my death I wanted to draw it and leave it for others,” said Iwakichi Kobayashi, a seventy-year-old survivor of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.¹⁵ Thus, art also asks contemporary and future others to bear witness to the artists’ acts of witnessing.

It is this combination of telling, witnessing, and drawing others toward the unknown by representing it through artistic means that is explored here. This book considers the role of literary, visual, oral, and performance arts in the sharing of individual and collective memories as a means to complement our historical understanding of Peru’s fractured past. This combination of artistic forms of expression is of fundamental importance, for it allows a much broader swath of society to participate in the reconstruction and re-presentation of the past—often marginalized groups who would otherwise be excluded from mainstream media and modes of communication.¹⁶ In societies where the written word may impede the narration of their experiences, and in the wake of severe

violence when the ability to speak may be blocked,¹⁷ art may be one of the few modes by which people can recount the past. Thus, the compilation of artworks in this book represents a call for an expansion of the archive to include other repositories of memory and history, beyond state-produced, written records and the collection of oral testimonies that emerge through official inquiries like truth commissions and trials.¹⁸

From the Internal Conflict to Memory Battles

Much of the art studied in this book is in dialogue with or takes as its point of departure the work of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación; CVR), a formal body assigned to investigate Peru's internal conflict of 1980–2000. While artists had been producing art during this period, the emergence of a truth commission in 2001 broadened the public sphere for discussing this past by other means.

After the sudden fall of Alberto Fujimori in November 2000, the option of a truth commission—an established mechanism used by other countries in the post-Cold War era—stood out as one of the ways that Peru's government could mark regime change.¹⁹ Unlike Latin American truth commissions that had investigated periods during military and authoritarian regimes, Peru's commission addressed violence that had occurred mainly under the stewardship of democratically elected governments: those of Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980–1985), Alan García Pérez (1985–1990), and Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000, with the suspension of Congress in 1992). In addition, whereas other truth-seeking mechanisms in the Southern Cone had named state forces as primary perpetrators, Peru's truth commission found the armed group the Communist Party of Peru–Shining Path (*Partido Comunista del Perú—Sendero Luminoso*) largely responsible. Furthermore, the Peruvian truth commission held a wider mandate than those of its neighbors. For instance, the CVR's scope was considerably broader than that of the first Chilean truth commission, known as the Rettig Commission, which at the time could investigate only the cases that led to death and disappearance.²⁰ In Peru, the CVR investigated assassinations and kidnappings, disappearances, torture and other serious wounds, harm against collective rights of Andean and native communities, and other grave violations of people's rights.²¹ The CVR's mandate was to determine the responsibility for

abuses and violations, identify and report on the experiences of victims, and develop proposals for reparations and reforms. The CVR sent out investigative teams to collect testimonies from remote regions. Furthermore, the CVR held public hearings (*audiencias públicas*) wherein local community members could participate, unique among Latin American truth commissions and perhaps a modified form of South Africa's sessions for victims and their families.²² As part of their attempt to make the past accessible, the CVR's documentation is openly available in an archive constructed especially to house it.²³ Internationally, the Peruvian truth commission is considered successful because of the depth and breadth of their investigation, which was based on almost seventeen thousand testimonies in Peru's twenty-four departments, collected, compiled, and analyzed by a staff of over five hundred members.²⁴ In addition, the CVR forwarded forty-seven cases to the Office of the Prosecutor General to pursue.

In the case of Peru justice and truth were both goals of the CVR, thereby breaking with the expected framework of previous transitional justice scholarship of the 1980s and 1990s that assumed states could pursue only one at the expense of the other. After the strong civil society protests against Fujimori's third five-year mandate, which contributed to his sudden resignation, the subsequent interim president, Valentín Paniagua, took on parallel projects of accountability and truth-seeking. Paniagua's transitional government returned Peru to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights while also establishing an ad hoc state and civil society committee to consider forming a truth commission. Human rights groups, who for years had been coalescing under the umbrella of the National Human Rights Coordinator (*Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos*), played a key role in both the broad societal efforts to topple Fujimori and in establishing an agenda for public truth-seeking.²⁵ A series of pivotal events further combined to create a propitious environment for a truth commission. First, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that the Peruvian state was responsible for the deaths of residents of Barrio Altos in 1991 and repealed the 1995 amnesty laws protecting security forces from prosecution for any abuses committed since 1980. Second, videos were leaked that incriminated opposition parties, the armed forces, and businessmen in the Fujimori government's web of corruption. These events, in particular the damning videos, weakened the political and military elites and bolstered their resolve

to publically distance themselves from the Fujimori regime and to support the new democracy.²⁶ As Carlos Iván Degregori noted, in Peru the truth commission, unlike those of other countries in the region, emerged not from a “pacted transition” but from the auspicious political vacuum left by the “collapse of the authoritarian regime.”²⁷


Despite this favorable setting for a broad-reaching truth commission, and despite having the benefit of other countries’ experiences with truth commissions, the CVR nevertheless faced constraints: it had a confined period of twenty-four months to conduct investigations into the previous twenty years, limited resources, and difficulties with translating from Quechua and other indigenous languages into Spanish.²⁸ Furthermore, the public, though openly embracing the return to democracy, had a mixed reaction to a call for a truth commission. Some survivors and groups distrusted this newer manifestation of the state that had previously harmed them; some evangelicals chose to move on, not look back; and people questioned such expenditures of money; among other concerns.²⁹ With the change of president from Paniagua to Alberto Toledo, “reconciliation” was added to the commission’s tasks, which had originally focused on truth-telling alone, thus perhaps laying the groundwork for frustrated expectations and fears of impunity and amnesty.³⁰ The CVR itself was a compromise, bringing together different sectors of society, including members from Peru’s diverse political spectrum. The appointed commissioners came from various political parties and societal groups, including a retired air force general, a former Fujimorista congresswoman, academics, members of church and human rights groups.³¹ This compromise, however, was not as marked as those of other countries in transition had been: since Shining Path and the Revolutionary Movement of Túpac Amaru (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru; MRTA) no longer posed a threat, the interim government did not need to negotiate with an armed movement, nor did the government need to make large concessions, such as a blanket amnesty, to the political and military elites, since they had been weakened by scandal.

The CVR’s *Informe final* (*Final Report*), made public August 28, 2003, attempts to give both an account of the violence, of what happened, and an explanation of the violence, of why it happened.³² Looking at this period of conflict from 1980 to 2000 (including the years from the capture of Shining Path’s leader, Abimael

Guzmán, in 1992 to the end of Fujimori's authoritarian regime in 2000), the CVR's *Final Report* presents searing data of the nation's suffering, whose extent had been much greater than had been imagined at the time.³³ The many conclusions of the CVR added up to a historical narrative that evinced the long-standing problems of racism against the nation's indigenous population, centralization of power in the hands of the predominantly coastal mestizo-white elite, and implementation of "rule by abandon" whereby the state was largely absent in large swaths of national territory.³⁴ Three out of every four victims were speakers of Quechua or other indigenous languages, many of whom had not finished primary school and were poorly literate, lived in rural regions, and were engaged in agricultural production.³⁵ The regions hardest hit were small, isolated villages in the Peruvian highlands (in the departments of Ayacucho, Huánuco, Huancavelica, Apurímac, Junín, and San Martín), representing 85 percent of the victims. Many were literally *pueblos perdidos*, small forgotten villages and hamlets with only difficult access to urban centers. The violence affected victims differently as to not only region and ethnicity but also age and gender: over 55 percent of the victims were men (most between the ages of twenty and forty-nine) targeted by Shining Path and state armed forces alike; most of the women who died (nearly 20 percent of all ages) were the victims of indiscriminate violence and massacres leveled against communities.³⁶ Almost all cases of sexual violence reported to the CVR were committed against women, mainly rural.³⁷ It was these profound class, ethnic, and gender cleavages which ultimately explained why, according to the president of the CVR, Dr. Salomón Lerner, "tens of thousands of citizens can disappear without anyone in integrated society, in the society of the nonexcluded, noticing a thing."³⁸

In their findings, the CVR spread the blame widely for the violence and its escalation. While the commission condemned the armed group Shining Path as the main perpetrators of violence (in 54 percent of cases of death and disappearance) and to a much lesser extent the urban-based MRTA (1.5 percent), the commission also placed responsibility in the hands of successive governments (Belaúnde, García, and Fujimori) and the political parties who had abdicated authority to the armed forces (found responsible for 29 percent of the deaths and disappearances), and police (7 percent).³⁹

Thanks to the work of the CVR, we now have more testimonies, statistics, and case studies that contribute to our awareness of the conflict's hard facts



MAP 1. Deaths and disappearances (1980–2000) according to Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, *Informe final* (Lima: Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, 2003), vol. 1, 157. Reproduction by Bill Nelson.

and historical truths.⁴⁰ The Peruvian truth commission was the main national effort to reconstruct what had happened and create a new (potentially national) narrative about the internal conflict. Yet, probably as in all post-conflict regions, the history remains contested, far from any kind of consensus or single version. The difficulty comes perhaps in trying to give an explanation of why events happened and to string together the years of violence into a coherent historical narrative, one with a beginning, middle, and end. According to Lerner, the human rights violations suffered during this period “exceed the amount of human loss suffered by Peru in all the external and civil wars that have happened in its 182 years of independence,” thus making comprehension difficult.⁴¹

Yet, despite the lack of a single, coherent narrative, most Peruvians would probably agree on a vague outline of the internal conflict: that the nation underwent a wave of violence that affected predominantly highland and Amazonian communities, and that by the early 1990s this violence could be felt in Lima (especially after the July 1992 car bombing on Tarata Street in Miraflores, an affluent neighborhood in Lima). Nevertheless, much heated debate is fueled by competing versions of details of the conflict (and even of what to call it—conflict/war/political violence) and, particularly, of who was responsible for the violence and to what extent. These memory battles continue to rage today.

It would be too simple to say that there is an official versus a nonofficial version of the conflict, since a plethora of camps exists, each with their own experiences and memories. That said, the two most prominently circulating narratives of this period can be characterized as “salvation memory” and “human rights memory.”⁴² In “salvation memory,” espoused mainly by the armed forces and neoliberal elites, human rights violations were committed by a few rogue elements in the armed forces, Fujimori’s heavy hand and disregard for human rights was the price paid for breaking Shining Path, Shining Path as instigator was thus solely responsible for the violence, and “we” in Lima did not really know the extent of what was going on (and with this lack of knowledge comes a kind of absolution). This narrative presents Fujimori as the economic and physical savior of Peru: he saved Peruvians from García’s hyperinflation, captured Abimael Guzmán, thus effectively decapitating Shining Path, and he later crushed the last of the much smaller guerilla group MRTA, in a dramatic resolution to a nearly four-month hostage crisis.⁴³

The “human rights memory” narrative, held by many human rights groups and organizations of affected family members, does not portray the end of the internal conflict as a victory over terrorism but situates the violence as an extension of ongoing legacies of social and political inequalities of which Shining Path was a symptom and on which Shining Path was able to build its movement. Shining Path, the main perpetrator of violence, launched a conflict that was exacerbated by the armed forces’ “dirty war” tactics, which did not respect the rule of law.⁴⁴ In this narrative, the role of civil society, the self-defense patrols (*rondas*), and individual acts of heroism are highlighted. The “human rights memory” narrative further points to what the “salvation memory” effaces: Fujimori’s failure to root out the causes of Shining Path’s strength (endemic poverty, racism, unequal access to economic and social resources and the benefits of inclusion within the nation-state). This narrative clearly allocates blame for the escalation of violence to two competing forces—Shining Path and the state—yet tends to focus more on the violence committed by the state and perpetuates the image of Peruvians as caught between these “two fires.” This focus on responsibility is slightly different from that of the CVR’s *Final Report*, which emphasizes Shining Path’s violence and acknowledges the armed forces’ human rights abuses but also points a finger at the nonviolent actors in Peruvian society in general for having produced a “grammar of violence”⁴⁵ that fostered the injustices that lay at the heart of the violence.

The *Final Report* of the CVR is the closest thing Peru has to an official version of the conflict. Yet, even though the CVR was government mandated, no administration has claimed it as their own, thus, eschewing any self-reflection by the state that would bring about the changes recommended within the *Final Report*. The work of the CVR—whose impact continues as a reparations program slowly advances, cases come before the judiciary, and a proposed national memory museum (Lugar de la Memoria, la Tolerancia y la Inclusión Social [Place of Memory, Tolerance and Social Inclusion]) takes shape—has occurred in the context of antagonistic relationships with subsequent administrations. Thus it is not quite accurate to refer to the CVR’s *Final Report* as “la historia oficial”; it is an “official” history with which most officials are ill at ease.

Domestically, the commission faced serious challenges in the diffusion of their findings, particularly from the political party Alianza Popular Revolucionaria

Americana (APRA), Fujimoristas (supporters of Fujimori), some high-level church officials, and the armed forces, all of whom were named as responsible for facilitating the violence. A campaign to discredit the commission's findings led to accusations of conflicts of interest among commissioners, claims of malfeasance, and the use of the appellation "lie commission."⁴⁶ The Office of the Prosecutor General seemed reluctant to pursue the criminal cases forwarded to them by the commission, making public statements that potentially undermined the public reception of the commission's work overall.⁴⁷ Importantly, the statistical findings, while most likely giving general indicators of tendencies, remain in question.⁴⁸ The *Final Report* held the limelight for a relatively short time after its publication. Indeed, it may have spurred more debate prior to its actual publication than immediately after.⁴⁹ After the report's release, the media quickly turned to issues of the nation's economy.

Former members and advocates of the commission have found it difficult to engage the public in a sustained way or get the *Final Report* adopted as *the national* account of the conflict years, despite their efforts to disseminate the CVR's findings through public hearings, photography exhibitions, workshops, and the publications of a book-length version of the *Final Report*, *Hatun Willakuy*,⁵⁰ and a forty-page bilingual summary, among other initiatives. Nevertheless, the commission's work and memories of this recent past have continued to take center stage, abruptly at times, in the national media—as happened during Fujimori's trials, on the occasion of the vandalizing of the memorial to the nation's victims *El Ojo que Llorá* (*The Eye That Cries*) in Lima, and when the political wing of Shining Path (Movimiento por Amnistía y Derechos Fundamentales) attempt to register as an official political party.

Memory of the war years in Peru does not seem at risk of becoming "inert historical memory"⁵¹ in national public discourse or of just emerging episodically in the form of "memory irruptions."⁵² Since the publication of the *Final Report* in 2003, memory work for a human rights narrative has been advancing in fits and starts, and major breakthroughs have occurred in promoting public discussion of the past: the sentencing of Alberto Fujimori to twenty-five years in prison for crimes against humanity, the Berlin Golden Bear award for the film *The Milk of Sorrow* (*La teta asustada*, renamed *Fausta*) about the intergenerational effects of violence, and President García's reluctant acceptance of the German

government's donation of funds to build a memory museum in Lima. Steadily, a new generation of Peruvians are active in the creation of intellectual forums for the discussion of the past, for example international conferences, working research groups, and Internet blogs.

And there is a boom in cultural production by individuals and groups affected by the violence, concerned citizens, and NGOs; this book only touches on some of them. This cultural output expands beyond statues of fallen soldiers and the traditional memorial art of plaques and monuments to victims, and includes a range of creative engagements with the past. The *Scarf of Hope* (*Chalina de Esperanza*), more than a kilometer long, incorporates knitted names and images, scraps of clothing, and at times the favorite colors of women's disappeared loved ones.⁵³ Young artists and activists, mainly from Lima, travel the country setting up their portable exhibits as part of the Itinerant Museum: Art for Memory (*El Museo Itinerante Arte por la Memoria*).⁵⁴ *El Ojo que Lloro* in Lima has been successfully used as a space to commemorate and serve as a meeting point for families of victims and human rights groups. "Little eyes" (*ojitos*) and memorial art more broadly have sprouted up in the highlands in remembrance of communities' dead and disappeared.⁵⁵ And Peru has joined the international boom to construct memory museums, even if the one in Lima advances slowly. Affected groups and communities have built regional museums, many with the help of human rights organizations and international financial assistance, in Ayacucho (Huamanga), Huancavelica, Huanta, Putacca, Totos, Lucanamarca, Huamantiquia, Pampachacra, and elsewhere. These *casas de memoria* (memory houses) curate Peru's difficult history through the display of ceramics, textiles, paintings, wax figures, *retablos* (three-dimensional boxes), clothing, testimonial excerpts, letters, photographs and more in their exhibition spaces, adorning their buildings with murals, and placing sculptures in gardens of reflection.⁵⁶

Yet the question remains to whom all this memory work is speaking, and how effectively this message is getting across to those who wish not to know or to see things otherwise. Successful attempts to bring a human rights account of the past into the present are dampened by counter-narratives and opposing memories. One example of continued maneuvers to erase or rewrite the past was the failed 2010 bid to pass a legislative decree (Decree 1097) that would have granted *de facto* amnesty to individuals from the military and police being



FIGURE I.1. Sculpture by Ayacuchan artist Wari Zárate in the “Memory Park” in front of the Museo de la Memoria of ANFASEP (the National Association of Kidnapped, Disappeared and Detained Relatives of Peru), Ayacucho. Photograph by María Eugenia Ulfe.

processed in Peruvian courts for human rights violations committed prior to 2003.⁵⁷ In a similar spirit, on the ninth anniversary of the CVR’s *Final Report*, President Ollanta Humala proposed a law that could have led to an eight-year prison term for “publicly expressing approval for, justifying, denying or minimizing” acts of terrorism committed by Shining Path. Congress adopted a watered down version of the proposed law.⁵⁸ Other attempts to narrow public discussion over the recent past are the continuing acts of defacement against one of the few national memorial sites dedicated to the victims of the armed conflict, *El Ojo que Lloro*.⁵⁹ Reemerging conflict zones—such as those in the coca-producing Apurímac-Ene River Valley (VRAE) and mining sites like Conga in Northern Peru—and the state response to them spawn worrisome flashbacks



FIGURE 1.2. *El Ojo que Lloro* (*The Eye That Cries*) memorial by Lika Mutal, Lima, defaced in September 2007. Photograph by Yael Rojas.

to the previous decades.⁶⁰ That is, discussions of past violence sit uncomfortably alongside its legacies and continuities.

Truth-Telling by Other Means

Members of the CVR were aware of the importance of a cultural engagement with their findings beyond the publication of their *Final Report*. For the commission, visual representation played a central role in recounting a national narrative. According to Lerner, the use of audiovisual means to represent events necessitates a reconsideration of the relationship between seeing, knowledge, and power. A knowledge that arises from seeing calls on “intuition, senses, and emotions that are not necessarily irrational or unscientific, but rather expand the

realm of our understanding.”⁶¹ The commission drew on established grassroots organizations and groups previously engaged in visual and artistic expression to promote a reflection on this past. For instance, the photography exhibition *Yuyanapaq: In Order to Remember* tried to appeal to civil society by displaying images familiar to the public, who had seen them in national newspapers. This artful curation of photographs interspersed among draped white gauzy sheets, housed in the crumbling ruins of a once affluent home, was meant to evoke the healing nation.⁶² The commission also employed the theatre troupe Yuyachkani, who had been actively making political and social critique since the late 1970s, to assist in informing Lima residents (Limeños) and highland communities of the commission’s work and to encourage people to attend the public hearings.⁶³

The CVR understood implicitly that the social opening accorded to it also extended to the public sphere more broadly—to nongovernmental and grassroots organizations, artistic groups, and individuals who had long expressed truth narratives and alternative jurisprudence in various forms.⁶⁴ Truth-telling by other means than official inquiries flourished in the shade of the commission: for instance, in visual and performance art, memory sites, cinema, stories, humor, rumor, and song.⁶⁵ The emergence of the commission signaled new opportunities to speak more openly about the past, giving important legitimacy to previously shunned or muted experiences. That is, “truth-telling” became part of the public domain, even at times at the national level, rather than an affair of individuals or groups.

The turn to art was not new. Art has been a means for contesting local abuses by authorities since the colonial period. One only has to think of Guaman Poma’s depictions of the brutality of Spaniards and their impact on local cultures in his letter to the king as an example of early uses of art to speak truth to power.⁶⁶ In the context of Peru’s internal war, protest art has represented victims’ realities since the early 1980s.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, while local cultural forms of knowledge have always been present—for instance, in regional artistic traditions such as painted wooden *retablos* and *tablas* (painted panels) by Ayacucho and Sarhua artists depicting violence, or the lyrics of folk songs (such as *huaynos* and *pumpin*) that give testimony to abandonment of natal lands and the disappearances of loved ones—such forms carried a new saliency and immediacy and attained public recognition at a national level after the launching of the CVR.

Scholars of Peru and elsewhere are increasingly employing visual and audible representations in their analysis of the past.⁶⁸ A turn toward including art—broadly defined here as cultural practices of aesthetic representation—in our investigations is all the more pressing for social groups for whom the written record may exclude or limit the expression of their experiences. Moreover, the written record is closely linked to the state and in many Peruvian highland communities the presence the state was weak, and the state itself may have been an aggressor. Thus, the essays in this book seek to trace some of the ways Peruvians utilize artistic means to describe their past, to understand it, and, in some sense, to bring about alternative justice, social repair, and a historical account.

As Gisela Cánepa has aptly noted, the Peruvian public sphere is exclusionary: Quechua, for instance, is not a language used in formal politics but is recognized as valid in the sphere of cultural production.⁶⁹ One of the striking aspects of the artworks studied here is the way art may break down the barriers between formal politics and cultural production. That is, art can be both a forum for and a form of political expression.⁷⁰ Indeed, spheres of representation are prominent in Peru's ongoing memory negotiations precisely because of the CVR's limited political impact and the commission's inability to pass on their findings as Peru's collective memory.⁷¹

It is difficult to situate neatly many of these visual representations that emerge from the political conflict within the field of art: are they “folk art,” are they “popular art,” are they “artisanal,” are they “art”? Such efforts to label and categorize the work may merely reproduce the very hierarchies that are at the root of Peru's injustices. These artforms do not represent traditional versus modern epistemologies, nor are they fixed in time or place. They circulate in the global era, are sold to foreigners and collectors, and are displayed in private homes and in museums.⁷² The artists themselves travel and import other genres, such as Chilean *arpilleras*, to Peru.⁷³ And the artists, like many of the survivors of violence, may have left their natal lands to rebuild their lives in regional capitals, Lima, or abroad. As William Rowe and Vivian Schelling have written, dichotomies of traditional/contemporary, rural-folk/urban-mass culture are no longer useful for analyzing artworks in general, principally because artistic media (mobile *retablos*, CDs, stories, paintings, the Internet, etc.) and their creators and performers easily move across geographical and social boundaries.⁷⁴

Bearing Witness through Creation: An Aesthetic Pursuit of Truth

The essays that follow are only a selection of the many and various modes Peruvians are making use of to bear witness to their past: drawings, paintings, film, commemorative acts and sites, literature, music, performance, and regional art forms. Yet art as a means to bear witness, and in so doing shape contemporary cultural perceptions of the past, faces different challenges from the ones involved in nonartistic processes of historical clarification such as the CVR's writing of its *Final Report* and gathering of oral testimonies. Oral testimonies might hold a privileged place as evidence, since they are considered closer to the body of the sufferer, whereas art seems more distant and removed by dint of the process of production.⁷⁵ In other words, the truth value of art (the truth or falsity of its depictions) is brought into question by the very medium of expression—the fact that art is born from the imagination. For art to bear witness to the past, it must be seen to possess authenticity and accuracy, exigencies perhaps unrealistic considering the passage of time and the act of creation.

Even when direct witnesses themselves generate art, does art witness accurately? Artworks are, after all, made, fabricated, created and are not direct traces or artifacts of the past. In our era when photographs are regarded by the distrustful eye of everyday viewers whereas they once held a privileged trust as direct observation—what Virginia Woolf described as “crude statement[s] of fact addressed to the eye”⁷⁶—today a created representation is under pressure to prove its veracity or factual worth, if its maker wishes it to serve as an expression of empirical knowledge. Can we “trust” art and images to recount the past? Yes and no. The vicissitudes of memory are present in artistic representations, just as they are in oral testimonies. The well-known debate over historical truths recounted by the psychologist Dori Laub is illustrative. In a testimony recorded in the Yale Holocaust Testimonies, a woman narrated her witnessing of a rebellion in Auschwitz, which, according to her recollection of events, resulted in the explosion of four chimneys. In fact, only one chimney was blown up, not all four. In this debate, scholars questioned the historical validity of this survivor's testimony because she remembered specific facts incorrectly. In contrast, Laub stressed the importance of respecting what the witness did not know (or could not know) and what she felt she “*knew*.”⁷⁷ A similar debate erupted over the

veracity of Rigoberta Menchú's assisted autobiographical account of the Guatemalan genocide: she was taken to task for inconsistencies in her story and her accounts of events that she herself had not witnessed but recounted as though she had been present.⁷⁸ Such strident demands for accuracy ignore her use of an inclusive "we" in her efforts to offer a collective testimony. Like that Auschwitz survivor, Rigoberta Menchú recounted what she *knew* as someone who had survived to tell what had happened. As Dori Laub argues, what is important is not the number of chimneys but "the reality of an unimaginable occurrence,"⁷⁹ the breaking of the framework of the concentration camp so as to enable a narrative of "resistance, to the affirmation of survival, to the breakage of the frame of death."⁸⁰

Like oral testimonies, art may break old frameworks and build new ones. Because art is perhaps less tethered to the past and to facts than other media of truth-telling, art makes the "unimaginable" imaginable and provides new frames—*marcos* or *cuadros*—with which to construct new narratives. Art does not necessarily result in a singular narrative or even a coherent one. Rather, art may inscribe and promote multiple memories and meanings and implicitly counters the homogenizing tendencies of institutional memories.⁸¹ As Jelin and Longoni note, it is through words and images that the traces of horror overcome the limits of expression, even if incomplete or fragmented. It is through these traces that art becomes "the triumph of the word over the silence of absence."⁸²

Despite their importance, the essays in this book are not directly concerned with the truth value of art and the production of coherent narratives. Rather, the authors have at the heart of their common inquiry the multiplicity of interpretations and narratives, the myriad ways of seeing, knowing, and relating that are inscribed within the artforms under discussion. While most of the authors here explicitly or implicitly treat artistic representations as sources of evidence—of events ranging from specific experiences to generalized violence—they are aware of the pitfalls of memory, the molding that takes place as a result of an artist-survivor's intention to tell a story a certain way, the aesthetic of creative inspirations and impetus. Furthermore, many of the artworks studied here move beyond the tyranny of the war years and speak to historical truths that are not reducible to recent conflict alone, and thus to observable experience alone. Yet these artworks do recount experience: they are acts of witnessing

and remembrance and as such are valid, indispensable sources of historical clarification.

Why are these artists creating and for whom? The potential audience may be central to these works' very production. The artists might hope that their works promote awareness, inspire empathy, and create a sense of obligation among viewers. Their representations demand that we look, that we bear witness in turn to the artists' acts of witnessing and remembrance.⁸³ Art may seek to reach listeners and viewers otherwise distant from the experiences depicted and thus serve as catalysts for change in the audience's perception, knowledge, and actions.⁸⁴ An artist's initial objective might be to preserve an account of the past for fear that it will disappear, as is suggested in the drawings of Edilberto Jiménez (chapter 2). In addition, artists might be creating for themselves, for members of their community, and/or for an external audience, for example a jury panel overseeing reenactments of battles between community members and Shining Path (chapter 7), judges of an arts competition (chapter 1), or cheering local peers at *pumpin* song contests (chapter 9). Artworks may reach national and international audiences, for example the wooden *retablos* by the Jiménez family (chapter 2), Palito Ortega's films, which are produced and shown in Ayacucho, Lima, and abroad (chapter 6), and Yuyachkani's Peruvian, European, and North American performances of *Sin Título, Técnica Mixta (Untitled, Mixed Media)* (chapter 8).

Some artists might create these representations also with the hope of recounting the past to someone as well as perhaps to seek some kind of justice or social repair. For instance, the artworks produced for the *Rescate por la Memoria (Recovering/Rescuing Memory)* contests speak of the past violence, the present poverty, the need to rebuild and move on. Almost all participants forward the cry, at least implicitly, of "Never Again," yet very few of the entries seem to propose reconciliation as a possibility (chapter 1). Ortega's more sociopolitical films point to the limits of the extant efforts at truth-telling; in particular, *El rincón de los inocentes (The Innocents' Corner; filmed in 2005)* offers an alternative narrative of the violence years and a critique of the CVR's missed opportunity to engage affected communities, what the historian Ponciano del Pino articulately calls "a metaphor for the nation's botched encounter" (chapter 6). Víctor Vich's study of *La hora azul (The Blue Hour)* suggests that the novel's author, a Lima resident,

is trying to come to terms with his and his fellow Limeños' complicit role in the violence and the nature of subsequent generations' responsibility (chapter 4). The collective involved in the creation of *Rupay* addresses (and intends perhaps to teach) the same Limeño audience by illustrating the past via a patchwork of comic strips, art, testimony, newspaper clippings, and photographs (chapter 5). Similarly, Miguel Rubio and Yuyachkani's post-CVR production *Sin Título, Técnica Mixta* question the nationalistic impetus behind the jingoistic narrative of the late nineteenth-century War of the Pacific and seek to unravel this tale that was taught to several generations of Peruvian schoolchildren. The play shows how the social exclusions that resulted in Peru's earlier ignominious defeat lay at the heart of the later Shining Path conflict (chapter 8).

Many of the efforts discussed in this book focus on the highlands, Ayacucho in particular. This focus on Ayacucho reflects in part the rich cultural expressions of the region, and the concentration of NGOs especially in the conflict's wake. Ayacucho is where Shining Path chose to launch their "People's War" and accounts for 40 percent of the ensuing victims. Yet, it also reflects the predominance of Ayacucho in extant literature on the conflict as though the region represented the country as a whole, which it did not. In part, this emphasis on Ayacucho reveals the difficulties of reaching a more inclusive national reflection on the years of violence. As a new generation of scholars emerges, and as new studies are produced, the diverse histories of the conflict are more fully coming to light.⁸⁵

Most of the artworks studied here are not from the perspective of those who speak on behalf of the "silenced," such as the work of some professional artists who present an aesthetic of suffering in the hope of documenting, educating, and preventing reoccurrence.⁸⁶ Indeed, much of the literature on art and trauma to date focuses on the work of professional artists, many of whom hold international renown. Rather, the essays that follow do not make a distinction among the artworks along the lines of professional or "high" art versus other kinds. Rather, the focus is on the artist-survivors' representations: artwork produced by individuals and collectivities who lived through the experiences themselves and thus are direct witnesses, and who are engaging in art as a means "to give testimony" (*dar testimonio*)—a use of art that both I and Jonathan Ritter explore (chapters 1 and 9). As Palito Ortega Matute says in his interview, "having lived



MAP 2. Department of Ayacucho. Cartography by Bill Nelson.

this experience so closely myself, I think it gives me the power to tell these stories as they were. It is my duty. My conscience compels me to tell these stories without manipulation, without machination, without elaboration: this is the history that happened in Ayacucho” (chapter 6). Edilberto Jiménez’s chapter presents an interesting overlap of testimonials/alteration: Jiménez is from Víctor Fajardo yet his work presented here is part of a larger collection of visual ethnographic accounts of distant Chungui (also in the department of Ayacucho). His drawings are a unique collaborative effort between himself as an artist, ethnographer, and regional neighbor who also witnessed the war’s devastation and Chungui residents. The work of Lima-based artists such as Yuyachkani and the authors of *La hora azul* and *Rupay* may reflect their own experiences and feelings about the conflict years, perhaps a sense of collective remorse for having lived parallel lives, or a desire to understand what occurred during those years at a scale that was unconceivable to them prior to reading the cvr’s *Final Report*. Almost all of the artists discussed in this book seem to wish to ignite empathy among those who did not directly experience the internal war for those who did. And perhaps by the former coming to understand the different subject positions of the latter, such empathy might bring about a kind of societal understanding, as unsettling as it may be to previously held perceptions of the past and individual responsibilities.

While the intentionality of the artists in their work is difficult to ascertain, even more illusive is audience reception. One cannot assume that these works are able to speak for themselves. What are the potential interpretations of these works? How are they received? In the absence of deep ethnographic observation of audience reception, the impact and understanding of these works by different social actors is difficult to access. As Deborah Poole and Isaías Rojas-Pérez rightly note in the case of the photography exhibit *Yuyanapaq*, displayed at the time of the cvr’s publication of their *Final Report*, one cannot assume that viewers across regional, ethnic, and temporal divides will interpret images the same way.⁸⁷ For instance, who bought and read post-cvr novels like *La hora azul* or the graphic novel *Rupay*? Who was likely to attend Yuyachkani’s performance of *Sin Título, Técnica Mixta*? Are the metaphors found in the paintings of a *Rescate por la Memoria* contest obvious to only regional audiences or can national audiences

comprehend them? Is there a difference between urban and rural reception of Ortega's films, as he suggests in his interview, such that urban audiences prefer films that directly address the conflict (what he calls "social interest films") and rural audiences prefer horror films based on mythical figures that indirectly hint at the years of violence? An important next step in using artistic representations as a means to historical clarification is to consider their impact on and uses by Peru's diverse audiences.

Remembering through Art: the Limits of Empathy and Truth

Art has the potential to help us, the audience, get closer to an understanding of what happened. Perhaps it is the only medium that allows us to hold in the same frame many of the complexities of this tragedy. Yet *art is not bound to truth*. It is a medium in which competing claims to the past emerge and are recounted. The stakes for cultural productions over the past are high. The images and narratives of the past presented through popular media may be more important for establishing collective or, potentially, a national memory of the past than even a truth commission, programs for reparations, and court cases. In Peru, cultural forms of (re)presenting are the present-day battleground for memory narratives. One of the reasons why Adorno's quote about poetry after Auschwitz remains salient today is that it points to the importance of culture in memory battles.

Whether a dung-adorned Madonna in a Brooklyn art gallery⁸⁸ or a quiet memorial tucked away in a public park, art may provoke debate, all the more so when contested memories are in question. Art can elicit empathy, but it can also incite the opposite.⁸⁹ Public art may disturb as well as commemorate.⁹⁰ The uses and abuses of the memorial *El Ojo que Lloro* in Lima's Campo de Marte (Champs de Mars) illustrate this dynamic well: while the father of a disappeared and a mother of a fallen soldier might find common solace at this memorial, and come to recognize each other's mutual suffering as parents, the memorial has also evoked visceral negations by vandals of victims and their families' right to remembrance.⁹¹ Art in public spaces does not necessarily promote a collective memory; indeed, art may highlight such memory's fragmentation. Yet *El Ojo que Lloro* fulfills a common function of art: to promote reflection and discussion. Even at moments of great controversy, such as the memorial's defacement,

efforts to shut down conversation only served to spark debate and thus further remembrance of the events that gave rise to this memorial site.⁹²

It must also be acknowledged that not all art is necessarily “good” art in the sense of serving a public function of remembrance—that is, the uses rather than the abuses of a shared past. As editor of this compilation, I have chosen to highlight artistic endeavors that engage a human rights narrative in Peru and to place at center stage the multiple creative ways of seeing and recounting the past that contest forgetting or a “salvation” narrative. But I could have included artistic representations of salvation memory, as put forward by the “forces of order” and Peruvian neoliberal elites, or even memories as held among Shining Path militants.⁹³ Indeed, such studies are necessary if we want to understand more fully the cultural realm of memory battles.⁹⁴

In Peru, memory is not synonymous with human rights. “Memory” has become the trope used by individuals and groups who wish to promote a heroic narrative for the armed forces, and culture has become the battlefield where they contest the meaning of “memory” with those who fail to see their heroism. For instance, armed state actors construct their own “museums of memory.” The military perform an annual reenactment of their rescue of hostages whom the MRTA held in the Japanese ambassador’s home in 1997.⁹⁵ Screenings are promoted in international film festivals of the movie *Vidas Paralelas* (*Parallel Lives*), which casts the military as untarnished heroes defending the vulnerable highlands people.⁹⁶ These efforts to write and to promote through cultural media a different account of the war years offer an alternative (sometimes subtle) narrative to the one presented by the CVR: yes, this narrative seems to affirm, there was an atrocious political conflict that cost many innocent lives and was a national tragedy. Yet this narrative offers few lessons to be learned, other than not to repeat. The quasi-denialist rewriting of the war era reaffirms the role of the armed forces in it without seeking to reform the institution. This narrative pretends a democracy and a peace, without acknowledging the thousands of common graves on which Peruvians walk or the root causes of poverty, racism, and exclusion that perpetuate continued discontent.

It is this rewriting of the past that the artworks presented here are working against. As the Peruvian sociologist Félix Reátegui Carrillo has eloquently said

in response to what he sees as widespread efforts to ignore Peru's fractured past, "Are we supposed to forget this? It is possible, but it impoverishes us and is obscene. Our public dialogue demands fiction. We need to be able to imagine in order to understand."⁹⁷

Notes

1. Ortega, *Adiós Ayacucho*.

2. The date for the end of the internal war changes depending on the importance given to specific events: on September 12, 1992, the leader of Shining Path, Abimael Guzmán, was captured, followed by several high-ranking members. In 1993, Guzmán proposed a "peace accord." In 1997, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) was eradicated after having held hostages for several months in the Japanese ambassador's residence. In 1999, the last member of the Shining Path leadership who had rejected the peace accord, Feliciano (Óscar Ramírez Durand), was captured. In 2000, Alberto Fujimori, who had become the symbol of authoritarian rule, resigned from the government. The continued presence of Shining Path—though greatly diminished—in the coca-producing regions puts into question the idea of a clear "post"—Shining Path era.

3. The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission gave a specific figure, 69,280, as an estimate for the dead and disappeared caused by the internal armed conflict, based on statistical equations used in Guatemala and Kosovo. The range is between 61,007 and 77,552. See Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), *Informe final*, annex 2, 13. The numbers for widows and children come from CVR, *Hatun Willakuy*, 385; on internal refugees see CVR, *Hatun Willakuy*, 386.

4. This project finds its genealogy in Steve Stern's call for a historical understanding of the episodic rendering of the internal conflict in "Beyond Enigma." A new generation of researchers has responded to the need to historicize Shining Path as something other than enigmatic or "out of step." See, for instance, dissertations by del Pino, "En busca del gobierno"; Scarritt, "The Rattle of Burnt Bread"; Yezer, "Anxious Citizenship." Published works include González, *Unveiling Secrets of War in the Peruvian Andes*; Heilman, *Before the Shining Path*; La Serna, *The Corner of the Living*; Ritter, *We Bear Witness With Our Song*; Taylor, *Shining Path*; and Theidon, *Entre projimos and Intimate Enemies*.

5. Adorno, *Prisms*, 34. On the decontextualization of Adorno's quote, see Huysen, *Present Pasts*, 124, and on the various (mis)understandings of Adorno, see Friedlander, *Probing the Limits of Representation*, especially the introduction, and Rothberg, *Multi-directional Memory*, 112–113. For a thoughtful discussion of the importance of Adorno's dictum in a Latin American context, see Stern's afterword here.

6. See Koch, "The Aesthetic Transformation of the Image of the Unimaginable," 15.

See also the juxtaposition of positions related to art in the shadow of the Holocaust in the works of H. G. Adler and Theodor Adorno in Franklin, "The Long View."

7. Studies of artistic representations after the Holocaust are many. To cite but a few: Alphen, *Caught by History*; Farmer, "Going Visual"; Friedlander, *Probing the Limits of Representation*; Hirsch, *The Generation of Post-Memory*; Huyssen, *Present Pasts*; LaCapra, *History and Memory after Auschwitz*; LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma*; Young, *The Texture of Memory*; and Young, *At Memory's Edge*; Zelizer, *Visual Culture and the Holocaust*.

8. Scarry, *The Body in Pain*; Friedlander, *Probing the Limits of Representation*, 5.

9. Stern, "Las paradojas de la verdad."

10. Arpilleras became part of a social movement against the dictatorship and internationally recognizable as human rights art. See Agosín, *Tapestries of Hope*, and Adams, "Art in Social Movements."

11. For instance, Jelin and Langland, *Monumentos memoriales y marcas territoriales*; Jelin and Longoni, *Escrituras, imágenes y escenarios ante la represión*; Gómez-Barris, *Where Memory Dwells*; Lazzara, *Chile in Transition*; Longoni, *El Siluetazo*; Masiello, *The Art of Transition*; Moodie, *El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace*; Richard, *Fracturas de la memoria*.

12. Masiello, *The Art of Transition*, 7.

13. Sánchez and Escallón, "Memoria, imagen y duelo."

14. Maclear, *Beclouded Visions*, 24.

15. Japanese Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), *Unforgettable Fire*, 105.

16. Brett, *Through Our Own Eyes*; González, *Unveiling Secrets of War in the Peruvian Andes*; Milton, "At the Edge of the Peruvian Truth Commission"; Strassler, "Children as Witnesses of History in Post-Suharto Indonesia."

17. Scarry, *The Body in Pain*.

18. The incorporation of images and artforms into historians' and other social scientists' methodologies has gained credibility since the 1980s debates on representations as historical documents that allows us to see the past from different perspectives to be taken into account with written and oral texts. For considerations of alternative sources and an expansion of historians' archives see Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*; Stern, *Remembering Pinochet's Chile*; LaCapra, *History and Memory after Auschwitz*; Coronil, "Seeing History"; Gómez-Barris, *Where Memory Dwells*.

19. Greg Grandin and Thomas Klubock, in their "Editors' Introduction," situate truth commissions as a product of post-Cold War reckonings with the past that served political and institutional ends. On truth commissions see Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths*, and on extended periods of reckoning see Collins, *Post-transitional Justice*.

20. In 2003, the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture, known as the Valech Commission, investigated human rights abuses against people who had survived the Pinochet dictatorship.

21. Article 3 of Decreto Supremo no. 065-2001-PCM.

22. The cvr held eight public hearings with victims or family members, seven public assemblies, and five theme-based hearings (on subjects such as “antiterrorist” legislation, displaced persons, universities, women, and teaching). From these public hearings, the cvr gathered over four hundred testimonies about over three hundred cases of gross human rights violations.

23. Aguirre, “¿De quién son estas memorias?”

24. González, “The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Challenge of Impunity,” 70.

25. González, “The Contribution of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Prosecutions,” 56–57.

26. On this transitional period, see González, “The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Challenge of Impunity,” 71–75.

27. Degregori, “La palabra y la escucha,” 95. “Transition by collapse”—whereby economic and military elite are less able to control the process—may more likely lead to criminal prosecutions. This was the case for Fujimori who in April 2009 received a twenty-five-year sentence for grave human rights violations, a feat that was attained in part because of the documentation gathered by the cvr. Burt, “Guilty as Charged.”

28. While Quechua has been one of Peru’s official languages since 1993, no program of studies in translation had been in place, and therefore there were no trained professionals as part of the commission. As Carlos Iván Degregori pointed out, long-standing socioeconomic, linguistic, and gender divides were recreated in the composition of the commission itself: among the cvr commissioners, only one spoke and understood Quechua, while another partially understood, thus maintaining a strong linguistic gap between the mainly middle-class, male (except for two women), Lima-based commissioners and the 75 percent Quechua- and other indigenous language-speaking victims. Carlos Iván Degregori, “Heridas abiertas, derechos esquivos,” 82, n. 2.

29. Coxshall, “From the Peruvian Reconciliation Commission to Ethnography”; Milton, “At the Edge of the Peruvian Truth Commission”; Yezer, “Who Wants to Know?” 286, n. 10, 278.

30. González, “The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Challenge of Impunity,” 78.

31. The original composition included seven commissioners in 2001; President Toledo added another five commissioners and one observer. The retired air force general later distanced himself from the cvr’s work, signing his name, with other retired military officers, on a public statement questioning the cvr’s conclusions.

32. Regalado de Hurtado, *Clío y Mnemósine*. For early summaries of the cvr’s work for an international audience, see González, “The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Challenge of Impunity”; Sánchez, “*Hatun Willakuy*, importancia del relato en la política.”

33. Prior to the CVR's conclusions, NGOs, such as the Peruvian Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, estimated around 25,000 victims of the internal conflict.

34. This expression comes from Heilman, *Before the Shining Path*; the theme of neglect and racism is also central in studies by de la Cadena, *Indigenous Mestizos*, and Méndez, *The Plebeian Republic*. The key earlier works on Shining Path are Manrique, *El tiempo del miedo*; Poole and Rénique, *Peru*; Stern, *Shining and Other Paths*; Degregori, *El surgimiento de Sendero Luminoso*; Degregori, *Que difícil es ser Dios*; Palmer, *The Shining Path of Peru*.

35. On the war and education, see García, *Making Indigenous Citizens*. Sixty-eight percent of victims had no secondary schooling, as opposed to the national average of 40 percent. Seventy-nine percent of victims were from rural regions, and 56 percent were agriculturalists (whereas in the 1993 census only 29 percent of Peruvians lived in rural regions, and of the national population only 28 percent were engaged in agriculture). CVR, "Conclusiones generales del Informe final de la CVR."

36. CVR, *Hatun Willakuy*, 52–55.

37. Women provided most of the testimonies before the CVR. CVR, *Informe final*, vol. 8, 89.

38. Lerner, *La rebelión de la memoria*, 147. Drinot also cites Lerner as advancing the historical argument of exclusion, *The Allure of Labor*, 237.

39. The remaining 7 percent of violence was attributed to unknown actors. Please note that these figures come from CVR, "Conclusiones generales del Informe final de la CVR" and from CVR, *Informe final*, vol. 2, 232. Even within the *Final Report* these numbers vary depending on the dataset analyzed. For instance, CVR, *Informe final*, vol. 2, 232 states that Shining Path was responsible for 53.68 percent of deaths and disappearances, the armed forces were responsible for 28.73 percent, and police forces 6.6 percent, versus annex 2, which attributes 46 percent Shining Path, 30 percent state agents, and 24 percent other actors and circumstances (self-defense groups, MRTA, paramilitaries, nonidentified agents, and others who died in combat) as responsible for deaths and disappearances; see CVR, *Informe final*, annex 2: 13, 17. In *Hatun Willakuy*, the violence committed by "state agents—the military and police" is grouped with self-defense groups (*rondas*) and paramilitary to account for 37 percent of deaths and disappearances, of which "the armed forces are responsible for a little more than three quarters of the cases"; see *Hatun Willakuy*, 10.

40. On the basis of his experience as a member of the Peruvian truth commission, Eduardo González describes the internal debates over the choice between seeking out "judicial truths," or evidence that could be used by courts, and "historical truths" that would help build a new narrative about the violence that would serve to undermine the Fujimori version that denied crimes committed. Without making a specific decision, the commission sought to prepare and provide as much information as possible for the courts to pursue; González, "The Contribution of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Prosecutions," 61–63.

41. CVR, “Conclusiones generales del *Informe final* de la CVR.”

42. These categories of “salvation memory” versus “human rights memory” correspond roughly to Steve J. Stern’s “heroic memory” and “dissident memory” in Stern, *Remembering Pinochet’s Chile*. Paulo Drinot extrapolates two key versions in circulation in the national discourse of why the violence occurred: one camp sees Shining Path as singly responsible for the violence because Senderistas are inherently violent; the other camp sees the most recent eruption of violence as an extension of the structural violence that is inherent in Peruvian society and that had given rise to Shining Path and the exacerbating response by the state, elite and middle-class citizens. Drinot, “For Whom the Eye Cries,” 24–27. See also Theidon, “Disarming the Subject,” and Degregori, “La palabra y la escucha.”

43. One example of several publications forwarding this salvation memory is retired coronel Morán Reyna’s *Complot contra los militares: Las falcedades de la C.V.R.*, a book published in 2006 in defense of “my comrades who acted legally, and today are obligated to prove their innocence” (n.p.).

44. The use of the narrative tropes borrowed from the Southern Cone countries—dictatorship to democracy, and dirty war—can be misleading in the Peruvian context. The Peruvian experience is not one of redemption—from dictatorship to democracy (though there is a bit of this) and does not involve a “dirty war” waged by an authoritarian state against its civilians, since most of the violence happened during democratically elected governments (except for the period of Fujimori’s “self-coup” by which he dissolved Congress). In Peru there was initially a real threat from armed groups; thus, at least until the capture of Abimael Guzmán and the later putting down of the MRTA, the state did not need to invent or exaggerate an armed opposition. Nevertheless, the armed forces did act in ways that replicated other countries’ dirty war tactics against fellow citizens. For a discussion of the meaning of “dirty war” see Stern’s afterword here and Rénique, “People’s War, ‘Dirty War.’”

45. Drinot, “For Whom the Eye Cries,” 26.

46. Milton, “At the Edge of the Peruvian Truth Commission,” 13–15.

47. González, “The Contribution of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Prosecutions,” 85, 91–92. The political scientist Jo-Marie Burt, who has been closely monitoring the cases before the Peruvian judiciary, has noticed that the number of prosecutions with sentences have dropped radically since the initial successes of holding perpetrators to account that culminated in the sentencing of Fujimori in 2009. Burt, “The Paradoxes of Accountability.”

48. Much immediate post-CVR debate asserted that the statistics inflated the military responsibility for death and disappearance. Yet, in the ten years since the CVR, there seems to be a general feeling among researchers and human rights groups that the scale of the military violence was underestimated in the *Final Report*. This latter observation

is based on my conversations with several researchers and members of Peruvian NGOs, as well as my own research into representations of the violence, discussed in my chapter here. See also Leiby's recoding of CVR testimonies in "Digging in the Archives," 84, 91.

49. Degregori, "Heridas abiertas, derechos esquivos," 84.

50. The CVR printed twenty thousand copies of *Hatun Willakuy* (2004), a 477-page abbreviated version of the nine volumes and the annexes of the *Final Report*.

51. This expression comes from Laplante, "The Peruvian Truth Commission's Historical Memory Project," 444-445.

52. Wilde, "Irruptions of Memory."

53. González, "Scarf of Hope as a Warm and Performative Memorial for the Disappeared in Peru."

54. Website available at <http://arteporlamemoria.wordpress.com>, accessed July 10, 2013.

55. As one of the few memorial sites designed for a national audience, *El Ojo que Llora* in Lima has received significant attention from families of victims and other stakeholders, from vandals, from politicians, and from academics. See Drinot, "For Whom the Eye Cries," Hite, *Politics and the Art of Commemoration*, 42-62; Milton, "Defacing Memory," and Moraña, "El Ojo que Llora."

56. Milton and Ulfe, "Promoting Peru"; Weissert, "Entre dos fuegos"; Feldman, "Exhibiting Conflict."

57. Jo-Marie Burt, "1097: La nueva cara de impunidad" (1097: the new face of impunity), *NoticiasSER*, August 9, 2010, www.noticiasser.pe, accessed July 15, 2013, and unknown author, "La ONU advirtió que el DL 1097 tiende a que violadores de derechos humanos queden impunes," *El Comercio*, September 8, 2010.

58. Human Rights Watch, "Peru: Reject 'Terrorism Denial' Law," April 9, 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/09/peru-reject-terrorism-denial-law>, accessed May 23, 2013.

59. While aspiring to be a memorial for the nation, it was not a national government project. *El Ojo que Llora* is a private initiative by the artist and architect with support of NGOs and municipal government.

60. On coca production and links to Shining Path in the Upper Huallaga Valley, see Kernaghan, *Coca's Gone*.

61. The CVR published the photography exhibition as a book *Yuyanapaq: Para Recordar*.

62. Milton and Ulfe, "Promoting Peru," 213-216; Lane, "Spatial Truth and Reconciliation."

63. On the role of Yuyachkani in contesting violence during the war years and in reconstruction during the post-conflict period, see Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire*, 190-211; and A'ness, "Resisting Amnesia." See also Garza's chapter here.

64. Laplante and Theidon, "Truth with Consequences."

65. These eight modes of unofficial "truth-telling" are discussed for various countries

(such as South Africa, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina, Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, and former Yugoslavia) in Bilbija et al., *The Art of Truth-Telling about Authoritarian Rule*. See also Jelin and Longoni, *Escrituras, imágenes y escenarios ante la represión*; Bickford, “Unofficial Truth Projects.”

66. In his book on Peruvian “popular art,” the art historian Pablo Macera includes one chapter on protest art, a study of sixteenth-century *mates burilados* (painted gourds) that depict scenes from the conquest. Macera, “El mate de la Conquista: ¿Arte protesta?” See various protest art from the 1980s in Billie Jean Isbell’s Andean Collection at Cornell University Library, <http://isbellandes.library.cornell.edu/protest.html>, accessed July 10, 2013.

67. Isbell, “Violence in Peru,” 287. Professional artists such as Juan Acevedo, Carlos Tovar, Claudia Coca, Natalia Iguíñez, Claudio Jiménez Quispe, Luz Letts, Alfredo Márquez, Claudia Martínez Garay, Jorge Miyagui, Cuco Morales, Piero Quijano, Santiago Quintanilla, Hebert Rodríguez, Eduardo Tokeshi, Ángel Valdez, and Ricardo Wiesse are just some of the many Peruvian artists who made protest art directed specifically at the war years. Some of their works, and those of other artists, appear with reflections on the role of art in remembering the violence in the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, *Revista Argumentos* 3, no. 4 (2009), esp. 30–51. Peruvian curators, most notably Gustavo Buntinx, have built several exhibitions addressing Peru’s conflict: for instance, his exhibitions *Mallki: La exhumación simbólica del arte peruano, 1980–2000* (*Mallki: Symbolic Exhumation of Peruvian Art, 1980–2000*), 2002; *Carne viva: Partes de guerra 1980–2003* (*Raw Flesh: Fragments of War 1980–2003*), 2003; and *País del mañana: Utopía y ruina en la guerra civil peruana, 1980–2000* (*Country of Tomorrow: Utopia and Ruin in the Peruvian Civil War, 1980–2000*), 2004. Buntinx also directs the Micromuseo, www.micromuseo.org.pe, accessed July 10, 2013, an alternative museum project that holds small-scale exhibitions, many of which have addressed specific events during the conflict (such as the bombing on Tarata Street and the killing of nine students and one professor from La Cantuta University).

68. In addition to the chapters by Ulfe and Ritter here, see Lemlij and Millones, *Las tablas de Sarhua*; González, *Unveiling Secrets of War in the Peruvian Andes*; Ritter, “Complementary Discourses of Truth and Memory” and *We Bear Witness With Our Song*; Saona, “The Knowledge that Comes from Seeing”; Vich, *El canibal es otro*, Ubilluz, Hibbet, and Vich, *Contra el sueño de los justos*, and the work of several emerging scholars. On artforms as witnessing history, see Burke, *Eyewitnessing*; and Loew, “Traumatic Identity in Contemporary Catalan Testimonies,” 24. See also note 11.

69. Cánepa, “The Public Sphere and Cultural Rights.”

70. Take for instance the massive civil society participation in the 2000 performance of “lava la bandera” (washing the flag) whereby participants washed corruption out of the Peruvian flag, thus cleaning the nation. Vich, “Lava la bandera.”

71. Drinot, "For Whom the Eye Cries," 20.

72. Olga González's study of *Pirqa Causa*, a set of Sarhua *tablas* in the private collection of Peter Gaupp, illustrates well how art travels across borders and media. Gaupp commissioned the works, which were made in a Lima workshop by artists who had fled the violence, and moved the works to his home in Costa Rica. The works have been exhibited abroad. González brought the *tablas* back to the artists' home community of Sarhua as photocopies. Now the *tablas* are reproduced in color plates in her book *Unveiling the Secrets of War in the Peruvian Andes*. Anyone can order this book through the Internet.

73. On the importation of Chilean *arpillera* techniques by women's groups in Peru, see Isbell, "Violence in Peru," 287.

74. Rowe and Schelling, *Memory and Modernity*.

75. Part of our mistrust of art and images is the primacy that we have granted the written and spoken word in the act of bearing witness. As Guerin and Hallas have pointed out, "it is true that words are more frequently considered closer to the communication of feeling and experience. Words, particularly those of oral testimony, are still connected to the body of the sufferer while the material image implies a separation (spatial, temporal or both) from that which it captures." Guerin and Hallas, *The Image and the Witness*, 7.

76. Cited in Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, 26.

77. Laub, "Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Listening," 61.

78. Arias, *The Rigoberta Menchú Controversy*.

79. Laub, "Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Listening," 60.

80. Laub, "Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Listening," 62. The veracity of *testimonio* is broached differently in subsequent efforts by scholars to offer more participative coauthored testimonials, such as that between Rosa Isolde Reuque Paillalef and Florencia Mallon in *When a Flower Is Reborn*. Nevertheless, scholars might still try to question *testimoniantes* about silences in their remembrances, thus challenging what they state as knowing. See for instance, Lazzara, *Luz Arce and Pinochet's Chile*, 78–80, 90–91.

81. Multiple narratives might be especially present in the case of public art such as monuments and memorial sites whereby art addresses a heterogeneous audience. See Young, *The Texture of Memory*, 6; and Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, 138–139.

82. Jelin and Longoni, *Escrituras, imágenes y escenarios ante la represión*, xvii–xviii.

83. On various efforts to curate pasts as promoting witnessing, see Lehrer and Milton, "Witnesses to Witnessing."

84. Isbell refers to the "dialogic breakthrough" that takes place between performers and listeners; see "Violence in Peru," 284.

85. For instance, the Asháninka, though singled out by the CVR as a having had a particular experience of the political conflict, often slip out of larger conversations about the war years. The Instituto de Estudios Peruanos's Memory Group (Grupo Memoria)

promotes regional studies by young scholars. See www.iep.org.pe/grupomemoria.html, accessed July 10, 2013. See also Rénique, *La batalla por Puno*.

86. Many professional artists not discussed here witnessed and experienced the war years directly. An insightful documentary, *Against the Grain: An Artist's Survival Guide to Peru* by the Japanese-American director Ann Kaneko examines the art and practices of art-making during and after the war years through the work of four Lima-based artists: Claudio Jiménez Quispe (originally from Ayacucho), Alfredo Márquez, Eduardo Tokeshi, and Natalia Iguíñiz.

87. Poole and Rojas-Pérez, "Memories of Reconciliation."

88. The work mentioned here is by British artist Chris Ofili, *The Holy Virgin Mary* (1996).

89. While important for reaching an understanding, empathy can also lead to over-identification. LaCapra, *Writing Trauma, Writing History*, esp. chap. 3; Bennett, *Empathetic Vision*.

90. Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness*, 142.

91. Hite, *Politics and the Art of Commemoration*, 54–55.

92. Milton, "Defacing Memory."

93. An entryway into these Shining Path memories is through the testimonies gathered and analyzed by Rénique in *La voluntad encarcelada*.

94. In this regard, the publication by the military of their account of the internal conflict, *En Honor a la Verdad: Versión del Ejército sobre su participación en la defensa del sistema democrático contra las organizaciones terroristas* (In Honour of the Truth: The Army's Version of Its Participation in the Defence of Democracy Against Terrorist Organizations), with other sources such as memoirs by state actors, are useful for the elucidation of different versions of this shared past. The recent memoir by Lurgio Gavilán indicates the difficulty of separating memories neatly into categories of those of a hero/perpetrator/victim, among others. Gavilán recounts his childhood as a Senderista, then adolescence as a soldier—both periods in which he inflicted harm upon others and in which he himself seemed to suffer—and ends with his adult years as a Franciscan monk turned anthropologist.

95. To mark the fifteenth anniversary of the April 22, 1997, liberation of MRTA prisoners—and the death of all the MRTA hostage-takers—a special homage was performed and broadcast on state television, in addition to the annual reenactment of the rescue, known as "Chavín de Huántar." For the 2012 homage, in the presence of Japanese residents, former hostages, and state representatives, the military reenacted the successful rescue with explosives, gunfire, and much drama. The case of the extrajudicial killings of MRTA members in the state operation "Chavín de Huántar" is presently before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. For a recent foray into state armed actors'

uses of culture, in particular museum exhibitions and historical reenactment, see Milton, "Curating Memories of Armed State Actors in Peru's Era of Transitional Justice."

96. Milton, "Parallel Lies?" On the armed forces and their memories in the face of human rights discourses, see Hershberg and Agüero, *Memorias militares sobre la represión en el Cono Sur*.

97. Reátegui Carrillo, "Violencia y ficción," 449.