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Notes

Preface

1 The last American ambassador to Yugoslavia, before it fell apart, describes Sarajevo as "a haven for diverse ethnic groups . . . a city of chestnut trees and minarets, streetcars trundling along . . . and the swarming fifteenth century Turkish market." Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 197. But I arrived just after the Survival Guide was written, between 1992 and 1993. The book is a parody on the Michelin guides, complete with advice about how to collect water, find the best cemeteries, etc. A typical entry, under "Recreation," is in the paragraph on "Running," "That is the favorite sport, practiced by everyone in Sarajevo." Miroslav Prstojevic, FAMA: Sarajevo Survival Guide, 51.

2 Peter Galbraith, then on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and later the Clinton administration’s ambassador to Zagreb, concluded that America’s record in the face of the Serb onslaught was "sorry and sordid." He noted that there was not one addition to the staff of the Zagreb embassy in August 1992. The embassy would have been the obvious base from which to gather intelligence if a desire to do so had existed. Muslim refugees were fleeing, in large numbers, westward toward Croatia. "We did not want to know what was going on, did not want to confront it, and did not want to act," Galbraith said. "This was the last issue the Bush administration wanted to deal with in August 1992." Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 220–21.

3 "Biljana Plavsic, the former professor of biology from Sarajevo University, . . . liked to expound on the Muslims’ sexual proclivities. In September 1993, she wrote in the Belgrade newspaper Borba (Struggle) that ‘alas, rape is the war strategy of the Muslims and some Croats against the Serbs. Islam considers this something normal since this religion tolerates polygamy. Historically, during the five centuries of the Turkish occupation, it was quite normal for Muslim notables to enjoy jus primae noctis with Christian women. It should be stressed that Islam considers that the national identity of the child is determined by the father.’" Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 222. Plavsic turned herself in to the war crimes tribunal in January 2001, apologizing to the victims and pleading guilty to persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds. Mirko Klarin, "Plavsic Plea ‘Bolsters’ Reconciliations," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Tribunal Update, No. 294, January 8, 2003, http://www.iwpr.net (last accessed January 2004).

4 Plavsic relayed this with considerable sadness in a side conversation in my home in 1997. Karadzic’s anger at her not toeing his line led to threats against her safety. Indeed, according to Elizabeth Rubin, a joke in Republika Srpska had "Radovan Karadzic, the indicted wartime leader, pulling the trigger on his former comrade in arms, the Bosnian Serb President, Biljana Plavsic." Elizabeth Rubin, "The Enemy of Our Enemy," New York Times, September 14, 1997. Although a hard-liner during the war as Karadzic’s vice-president, Plavsic went on to be elected president of Republika Srpska in 1996, ";shed[ding] her image as his marionette, publicly accusing him and the ruling party bosses of state-sponsored corruption" (ibid).

5 Victor Jackovich was the first U.S. ambassador to Bosnia. Because of the danger in Sarajevo, I hosted the U.S. embassy to Bosnia in my embassy in Vienna—turning over to their tiny staff several rooms one floor above my office for about a year and a half. This is the only time in diplomatic history an embassy has been located in a third country. Although his time was divided between the besieged capital and Vienna, Vic was beloved by the people of Sarajevo, who felt empathy for and from him, given not only his commitment but also his Yugoslav parentage.

6 John Menzies was the second U S. ambassador to Bosnia. A man of extraordinary sensitivity and intelligent commitment, he lived in Sarajevo despite the siege. In the nonsensical distortions of government policy, although this conflict was devouring the time of Washington experts, the State Department assigned only a skeletal crew to the field. During much of his tenure, Ambassador Menzies had only one political officer, Karen Decker, for first-hand reporting on the evolving crisis.

7 Also present were the indefatigable Croat-American businesswoman Zdenka Gast, National Security Council European Director Jennone Walker, and aide to Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, Mira Barata.

8 For a detailed insider account of the events leading to the largest military action in NATO history up to that point, see Holbrooke, To End a War.

9 Pauline Neville-Jones headed the British delegation; the U.S. host group included no women.

10 The Rocky Mountain News published my five-part description of those meetings in January 1996.

11 Gutman won the Pulitzer Prize for international journalism for his reports in Newsday. He since has coedited with David Rieff Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know. Omarska is part of the story of Emsuda, in this book, CNN correspondent Amanpour was persistent in her coverage of Srebrenica, described later in this book by Kada.

12 Steiner went on to become Germany’s ambassador to the Czech Republic, then the primary foreign policy advisor to Chancellor Schroeder, and eventually the special representative for the UN secretary general in Kosovo.

13 Eventually, California attorney Mark Steinberg led the push to organize an "initiative for the missing" led by former Senator Bob Dole. Queen Noor of Jordan joined the effort in 2001. This eventual international response was laudable but out of sync with the urgency of the women’s pleas for help finding their men and boys, who they feared were in forced labor in Serbian mines.

14 Assistant Secretary of State (for Refugees, Population and Migration) Phyllis Oakley insisted that the fund be managed through the UN High Commission for Refugees, an affiliation that meant a slow, bureaucratic start. Still, the model was successful enough to be replicated by the UNHCR in Rwanda and Burundi, as well as Kosovo.

15 See "Bosnia-Herzegovina. Families Have the Right to Know about Relatives Unaccounted for," ICRC News 96/4, January 31, 1996 (available at http://www.icrc.org, last accessed January 2004); and David Rohde, Endgame, 344–45.

16 This project, along with many others in Bosnia, I funded from my private foundation, Hunt Alternatives Fund.

17 Through the Star Network, an American NGO, codirected by an extraordinarily committed Lael Steagell.

18 Leadership of the Mission to Bosnia was provided by Robert Frowick, then Robert Barry.

19 General Clark called for military intervention when "ethnic cleansing" began to be directed against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, whose Tito-granted autonomous status was revoked by Milosevic. Clark alienated Pentagon leaders not willing to "fight for the right," as he said. Although he won the war, in 2000 Clark was relieved three months early, according to official Pentagon statements. In fact, the forced retirement was years premature, based on historical tenures. A Washington Post editorial on July 29, 1999, lauded Clark’s performance as the Supreme Allied Commander during the Kosovo campaign and questioned the timing of the abrupt announcement of his retirement, concluding that Clark was perceived as being "too political. . . . Clark wanted to use his authority to actually accomplish something." In the final analysis, the only battle that defeated Clark was against the Pentagon power structure itself. See Waging Modern War for Wesley Clark’s account.

20 Charles and Wes, both White House Fellows, became friends when Wes was stationed in Colorado Springs, where Charles was the symphony conductor.

21 Although grievances between ethnic Albanian and Serb communities there date back much further, Kosovo was in a state of tension from the early 1980s. The Albanian language was disallowed, massive numbers of professional ethnic Albanians lost their public-sector jobs, health care and schooling were cut off, and a harsh system of apartheid was instituted. Rumors of vandalized Orthodox churches and graveyards fed Serbs’ fears that they were in danger. In 1998, the situation escalated into open war. The infamous warlord Arkan moved in his paramilitaries, and hundreds of thousands of Kosovars were expelled from their homes by Serb forces. As in Bosnia, the international community delayed intervention. Finally, rallied by Supreme Allied Commander Clark, in 1999 NATO bombed Serbia after Milosevic’s forces massed on the Kosovo border and every indication was that the carnage was about to be repeated.

22 NGOs are a new feature of Bosnian civil society since the demise of communism. During the war, when BOSFAM, a major humanitarian organization, decided to pull out because of risk to its employees, Beba Hadzic from Srebrenica was told they could allow a local person to take over the NGO. "I’ll run the NGO," she replied—then added, "What’s an NGO?" Repeatedly, I’ve seen Bosnian women assume responsibility for a future they can neither describe nor imagine.

23 NATO began seventy-eight days of air strikes on March 24, 1999, to counter Serbia’s actions against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. After the bombing stopped in the first week of June 1999, NATO soldiers moved in as Serb forces withdrew and Kosovar Albanians began returning, in massive numbers, to their homes. Despite NATO’s claim to have exclusively military intentions, a number of civilian targets were hit, among which were the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, "Zastava" auto factory, industrial and communication facilities, and bridges. Sixteen young people were killed the night Radio-TV Belgrade was hit. The NATO military campaign was not limited to Kosovo; Novi Sad, Yugoslavia’s second largest city, was repeatedly bombed. Its three bridges across the Danube were destroyed early in the war, but the bombing of economic targets in and around the city continued throughout the conflict.

24 "After university, Karadzic became a psychiatrist whose clients included the Sarajevo soccer team, which he tried to pull out of a slump by using group hypnosis. In his spare time, he was a poet whose talents were modest, at best, and he existed on the margins of Sarajevo’s rich cultural life. He was, according to some accounts, snubbed by the literary elite, and this, the theory goes, contributed to his desire to punish the city that turned its back to him. . . . In 1985, Karadzic spent eleven months in jail on fraud charges related to a home loan. After that, he dabbled in politics but was not known as a nationalist; he joined the Green party before taking charge, in 1990, of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)." Peter Maas, Love Thy Neighbor, 159.

25 Steven Erlanger, writing about the effect of the Kosovo bombing on Milosevic’s eventual downfall, quotes Milan Bozic, professor and politician in Belgrade: "If in 1996, the West had wanted to push harder, [Milosevic] would have been out." The article ends by reluctantly agreeing with Emsuda’s assessment of the value of a "radical response," with Bozic saying, "The war in Kosovo finally ended Milosevic’s symbiotic relationship with the West. It was an important leg of his stool and it was gone, and it helped unseat him." American leadership on Balkans matters has been spotty, at best, with policies waxing and waning according to U.S. perception of its own interest. Erlanger cites Dragor Hilber, a leading opponent of Milosevic, as concluding that "the Americans and the West, desperate to push out Mr. Milosevic, finally [in 2000]. . . provided much more help than before, pouring money into Serbia—to the opposition, the media, to student protesters, almost everyone who could claim to be anti-Milosevic." New York Times, December 25, 2000.

26 The last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, describing his interaction with Izetbegovic in the period leading up to the war, says, "I detected no inkling on his part of the massive aggression that the [Yugoslav National Army], together with Milosevic and Karadzic, was mounting against him." Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 191.


Introduction

1 Victims finding their voice is not simply a variation of the women’s movement, or "power to the people." It is an exquisitely sensitive psychological balancing of the need to forget and the need to remember, described by Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 4.

2 "Over eight thousand people had been killed in Sarajevo and more than fifty thousand injured. . . . Of the one million Muslims who once lived in the 70 percent of Bosnia controlled by the Serbs since the first months of the war, no more than fifty thousand remained by early 1995. Reams of United Nations resolutions and endless diplomatic minuets had not brought the parties noticeably closer to an agreement to end the war." Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 362.

3 While estimates on the percentage of women vary, in every informal reference I’ve heard from policymakers, women are figured to be substantially over 50 percent.

4 From the foreword in Janja Bec, The Shattering of the Soul, 9.

5 For an excellent discussion of Bosnian Muslim identity over centuries, see Francine Friedman, "The Bosnian Muslim National Question," in Paul Mojzes, ed., Religion and the War in Bosnia, 1–19.

6 The words "nation" and "nationalist" are confusing because "a nation refers to a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related. . . . Nationalism . . . does not connote loyalty to the state; that loyalty is properly termed patriotism. Loyalty to state is sociopolitical in nature, and is based in large part on rational self-interest. Loyalty to nation is intuitive rather than rational, and is predicated upon a sense of consanguinity." Walker Connor, from an address in Bonn, December 2000. "Nationalist" refers to chauvinistic attitudes toward an ethnic group, but the use of "nations" to refer to those groups is not used in this book, so as not to confuse readers (particularly Americans) who think of a nation as a sovereign state. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6–7.

7 See Cynthia Cockburn, Gender and Democracy in the Aftermath of War: Women’s Organization in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 7.

8 That solution creates its own problems: since a hundred years earlier "Bosniak" was used to denote all Bosnians (Irma insists on that broader usage still), the current use of the word exclusively for Muslims leaves open the possibility that nationalist Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats may happily distinguish themselves from "Bosniaks" and demand that the regions in which they are the majority be annexed by Serbia and Croatia, respectively.


Part I. Madness

1 Yugoslavia, and Bosnia in particular, had a thriving Jewish community until World War II, and Sarajevo was known around the world as the home of the "Sarajevo Haggadah," a fourteenth-century Spanish illuminated manuscript. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 112.

2 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 7.

3 For a detailed portrait, see Louis Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. George Bush’s secretary of state describes the Serb leader in mid-1992: "His whole life has been built on using the past to inflame the present. On first appearance, a friendly charmer in a well-tailored suit with a short-cropped haircut, Milosevic is at heart a tough and a liar. . . . At times, I felt I was talking to a wall with a crew cut." James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 481. See also the New Republic, April 12, 1999.

4 Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 183–84. In addition, Miomir Zuzul, Croatia’s ambassador to the United States, later named foreign minister in 2003, confirmed that "Tudjman would talk to whomever would listen about why Bosnia could not exist. . . . For him Muslims were only Croats of a different religion." Private conversation, Washington, June 2001.

5 See Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 90; Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 199; Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 98–99, 107.

6 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel, 37.

7 At the end of August, the movement was still strong; forty busloads—mostly mothers—arrived at the Yugoslav National Army headquarters in Belgrade. Demonstrations continued in Sarajevo, where the women interrupted a session of parliament to demand that their sons be discharged. Cynthia Cockburn, The Space between Us, 166. The story is retold by Brian Hall, who also describes the "mother’s movement": "Serb mothers had been invading the Serbian Parliament, Croat mothers the Croatian Parliament, each group chanting that nationalism was nothing to them compared to the lives of their sons. ‘Idiocy!’ they cried. ‘A men’s war!’ ‘Listen to the mothers!’" But speaking with one voice was a challenge: The Serb and Croat mothers decided to "descend on the Federal Parliament, an irresistible tide of black-clad women." They rented buses for the journey from Zagreb to Belgrade through battle zones, picking up mothers along the way. The convoy stopped after two hours; Serb and Croat mothers were fighting. They eventually resumed their journey—Serb mothers in one set of buses and Croat mothers in the other. Hall, The Impossible Country, 292.

8 Over the next four years, Croatia would quietly collect arms (some from their share of U.S.-approved covert arms shipments to Bosniaks) in spite of the UN-imposed embargo, so that in 1995 Tudjman and his forces, in a stunningly successful blitzkrieg, could regain the purged territory, driving out Croat Serbs.

9 Ramet, Balkan Babel, 244. See Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 28, for a map of ethnic majorities in 1991.

10 The question of why so many people standby in the face of evil is at the crux of Peter Maas’s Love Thy Neighbor.

11 Reports coming from refugees were gruesome: a son forced to eat his father’s testicles, mothers gang-raped in front of their children, a grandfather forced to eat his slain grandson’s liver. But a New York Times reporter adds a keen observation: "The Serb bombardment of Sarajevo looked like mindless barbarity in that, over more than three years, it took thousands of innocent lives and was a colossal public-relations disaster. In the early months of the conflict, however, it served one important purpose. It distracted the international community from the real business of the war." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 168.


1. Hell Breaks Loose

1 For an excellent window on rural life in Bosnia and a moving selection of ten transcripts of interviews with Muslim survivors of atrocities, see The Shattering of the Soul, by Janja Bec.

2 See Andras Riedlmayer, A Brief History of Bosnia-Herzegovnia, 1993, http://www.kakarigi.net/manu/briefhis.htm (last accessed January 2004); and United States Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, February 29–March 1, 1992" (prepared by the staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) (Washington: The Commission, 1992), microform.

3 Confronted with evidence of Arkan’s atrocities at the beginning of the Bosnian war, Milosevic said to the U.S. ambassador, "I’ve checked, and I’ve discovered that Arkan was in Bosnia only as a bodyguard for one of the Bosnian Serb politicians." Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 198.

4 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 224.

5 The White Eagles were a paramilitary group led by Vojislav Seselj, Serbian deputy prime minister and head of the Serb Radical Party, which had a branch in the Republika Srpska. (The Radical Party was banned by the OSCE in Bosnia in March 2000, citing its continued obstruction of the Dayton Peace Agreement.) During the war, the White Eagles and other groups like "Arkan’s Tigers" roamed Eastern RS with impunity—killing, ravaging, plundering, and raping, as they "ethnically cleansed" Bosnia and Herzegovina. "The entire region has been roasted alive on an open fire." Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 182.

6 A ski village, Pale had a mixed prewar population of 6,000 to 7,000 Serbs and Bosniaks. During the war it grew to nearly 14,000 Serbs exclusively. The Serbs built new offices for its government and used the rundown Panorama Hotel for meetings with representatives of the international community and the media during the early post-Dayton period. In 1997, Biljana Plavsic moved the capital of Republika Srpska to Banja Luka.

7 Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, is about a five-hour drive from Vienna. In April 1994, Peter Galbraith, the first U.S. ambassador to Croatia, hosted Charles and me as his guests for a dinner with local political figures. In addition to visiting nearby refugee camps with Peter, and viewing the damage on the front lines, I took the occasion to meet with about forty women leaders in his backyard, to hear about the important work they were doing in the midst of the conflict in their country.

8 Slavenka Drakulic, a well-known interpreter of the Balkans, was my guest several times in Vienna, and I was with her in New York at Gloria Steinem’s apartment in March 2000, for a meeting of the Network of East-West Women. Her account of becoming a refugee fleeing the violence in Croatia includes this powerful litany: "I know these symptoms of denial by heart now: first you don’t believe it, then you don’t understand why, then you think it is still far away, then you see war all around you but refuse to recognize it and connect it with your own life. In the end it grabs you by the throat, turning you into an animal that jumps at every piercing sound, into an apathetic being trudging from one side of the room to the other, into the street and to the office where you can do nothing but wait for something to happen, to hit you at last. You learn to breathe in death, death becomes your every second word, your dreams are impregnated by dismembered bodies, you even begin to picture your own end. In the morning you don’t recognize your face in the mirror, the sickly gray color of the skin, dark circles under the eyes and the pupils unable to focus on any one thing for longer than a second. The war is grinning at you from your own face." Slavenka Drakulic, The Balkan Express, 28–29.

9 A beautiful city, Mostar is "famous above all for its Ottoman architecture symbolized by the [now destroyed] old footbridge that arches high over the Neretva River." Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 158. Many of Mostar’s architectural beauty spots eventually took on the appearance of the previously destroyed Vukovar in eastern Slavonia, harkening back to Dresden and Stalingrad from the World War II era.

10 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 27.

11 According to Vjeko Saje, Irma’s father, most of the sixteen-year-old boys were killed, not because they were officially drafted, but as each street tried to defend itself against encircling tanks. All the men in Sarajevo had to dig trenches or go to the front. Irma’s father, an architect working in an engineering company, dug for one week, then worked at his office for three.

12 A popular resort town and ancient port city on Croatia’s Dalmatian Coast, Split became a destination spot for fleeing Bosnian refugees from the war and a key transport hub during the war. It is up the coast from Dubrovnik, where the affable mayor remarked to me in 1994, "I don’t understand why the tourists aren’t back. It’s safe now; we have all the big guns in place." He also complained that the hotels were all full—but full of refugees.

13 See Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way.

14 The Serb-led assault in Croatia’s industrial region of eastern Slavonia was brutal. Moving, although horrific, accounts of Vukovar and other sites of atrocities described by children who survived the invasion are found in Sunflowers in the Sand, by Leah Curtin, with pictures drawn by the children. "By the end of October [1991], it had been shelled from land and bombed from the air to such a degree that scarcely a building was intact. Vukovar assumed enormous symbolic importance to both sides. Without it, Serbia’s territorial gains in eastern Slavonia were threatened. To the Croats, the unexpectedly fierce defense of the town against overwhelming odds inspired hopeful, if unrealistic, talk of a ‘Croatian Stalingrad,’" Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, 256. Simultaneously, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) had begun its operations on Dubrovnik, encircling it and shelling the 12th century city on the Adriatic, the crown jewel of the former Yugoslavia. This act by the Serbs shocked all of Europe and set off alarms through Bosnia and Herzegovina. December 6, 1991, despite a local cease-fire agreement, "troops surrounding Dubrovnik . . . launched a merciless ten-hour attack on all parts of the port, including the historic buildings of the old town." Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, p. 135.

15 This area was strategically essential to the Serbs. Without control of this corridor, they would be cut off from the Eastern portion of their self-proclaimed "Republika Srpska," as well as the lands they had taken over in Croatia.

16 On a per capita basis, the Austrians took in more than twice the number of Balkan refugees as did Germany, which was the next largest host country. As the years went by, both governments initiated policies to return refugees to their homeland. Those policies were driven by domestic concerns, and refugees were sometimes sent back into destroyed villages. The Austrian experience contains several lessons. Of some 84,000, approximately 60,000 were integrated into the Austrian workforce. The GOA adopted a program in March 1997 to motivate the 10,700 Bosnian refugees still in government care to return home, and to help potential returnees start a new existence. The government gave each family $2,500 for support programs. In most of the cases, however, cash-in-hand was only part of a more complex program aimed at helping local Bosnian communities to which the refugees returned, in many cases linked with EU projects. Only about half of the refugees in government care made use of the offer. Summary of a March 1997 embassy cable to the State Department.

17 See Manfred Nowak’s report, "Mission für Sicherstellung von Beweisen," December 1992.

18 See Wolfgang Libal and Christine von Kohl, Der Balkan, 91.

19 Oliver Hoishen, "Wächst aus der Krise etwas Hoffnung?" Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, December 14, 1999; Südosteuropäischer Dialog, Balkan, Heft 3, 13.

20 Dan DeLuce, "Some Serbs Secretly Helped Moslems—Bosnian Mufti," Reuters, January 30, 1996.

21 Michael Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, 22.

22 Vesna Nikolic-Ristanovic, editor and author of the following listed pages (Borislav Radovic, trans.), Women, Violence and War: Wartime Victimization of Refugees in the Balkans, 41–83.

23 Ruth Seifert citing Rolf Pohl, "Mannlichkeit," in Stiglmayer, Mass Rape, 60.

24 See Südosteuropäischer Dialog, Balkan, Heft 2, 10; and also Seifert, "Mannlichkeit," in Stiglmayer, Mass Rape, 55.

25 Vera Folnegovic-Smalc, "Psychiatric Aspects of the Rapes," in Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape, 175–76;

26 Calling the Ghosts (an award-winning documentary by Women Make Movies), released in 1996, offers a gripping portrayal of a camp in Omarska, with actual footage from the camp. (The school in which Emsuda was held was Trnopolje, in the same area, and she witnessed and experienced much of the same brutality.) The hour-long documentary is narrated by attorney Jadranka Cigelj and civic judge Nusreta Sivac, who were among several dozen women incarcerated there, victims of and witnesses to horrific atrocities for two months. "Whatever we say is nothing compared to what we went through." The words of Emsuda (who is thanked in the film credits) should be read with that reminder. The difficulty of reporting on an experience such as hers is summed up as one of the women gathers critical, extensive testimony for the war crimes tribunal at The Hague: "To expose the crime, you violate the witness." See Gayle Kirshenbaum, "Women of the Year: Jadranka Cigelj and Nusreta Sivac," Ms. Magazine, January–February 1997, 64–68.

27 "Occupations in BiH have always been gender-typed . . . women workers were primarily concentrated in industry. This is significant in that the collapse of the economy due to the war has destroyed a significant part of this sector. Moreover, wages were lower in the predominantly ‘female’ sectors such as textiles and tobacco manufacturing, compared to predominantly ‘male’ sectors such as mining and the steel industry." International Human Rights Law Group, A National NGO Report on Women’s Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 155.

28 In camps like Trnopolje, "those . . . judged to have been leaders of the Muslim community . . . most of these were killed." Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation, 250–51.

29 Western recognition of Croatia and Slovenia has drawn much blame for causing the wars in the former Yugoslavia (for example, see Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 112). Others assert that this blame is misplaced, in that war had begun months before eo recognition. However, "once Western powers began an explicit attempt at mediation in May 1991, they sped up this process [of disintegration] by accepting the nationalists’ definition of the conflict. . . . The longer the fighting went on, the more involved they became, but they never stopped to alter their original reluctance, reduce their contradictory messages, recognize the role they were playing in the conflict itself, or formulate a policy." Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, 147.

30 Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 172.

31 Ibid., 242.

32 See Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape, 23–24.

33 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation, 274. See also Bisera Turkovic, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing World Order, 68–69, for a discussion of the UN authorization to use force to ensure UNPROFOR’S mandate, which included not only delivering aid but also deterring attacks against the "safe areas."

34 See especially Rohde, Endgame; and Jan Willen Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime. The UN critiques itself in its Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/55: The Fall of Srebrenica. See http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/un/unga53_55.html (last accessed January 2004).


2. Love in the Crucible

1 A Montenegran Serb notes how "in wartime, hope takes refuge in the body and in the unconscious; for the same reason it leaves them in peacetime. Physically as well as psychically, the man of peace and the man of war are absolutely different beings. In wartime the weaknesses and even illnesses of peace vanish. Bodies suddenly regain their youth. . . . The person you were before the war remains familiar but is becoming transformed into a stranger, who moves silently and inevitably away, creating inside you the unbearably painful atmosphere of a passionate parting." Stanko Cerovic, "How Does One Go To War?," in Autodafe, The Journal of the International Parliament of Writers 1 (Spring 2001): 127–28.

2 For a powerful account of a neighbor/rapist, see Julie Mertus et al, The Suitcase, 28–30.

3 For discussion of gender differences in this regard, see Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice, 62–63.

4 Gorazde was, for the Serbs, one of three "unwelcome ethnic stains on an otherwise pure Serb tableau." Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 257, also 324–25.

5 An award-winning film was made about this family, directed by Nadia Mehmedbasic, documenting the ordeal and subsequent birth of two more children.

6 A poor road down the mountain was the scene of numerous fatal accidents, including the overturned APC of three American diplomats in summer 1995, increasing the resolve for American intervention a few weeks later.

7 " ‘I am so tired of saying thank you,’ a woman named Amela Simic told me one evening in Sarajevo. ‘I think what I look forward to most in peacetime is never having to say thank you again . . . I think I will send my friends envelopes with money in them and boxes of chocolates . . . I will be myself again.’" David Rieff Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West, 134.


3. Reasons for the War

1 Although the ground offensive led by Croat and Bosnian forces was the most important factor in ending the war, there was plenty a committed United States could have done to move NATO and the UN to action. Instead, only after Srebrenica was overrun, "NATO planes flew 3,400 sorties and over 700 attack missions in the bombing campaign that started on August 30 and ended September 14. The use of force laid the basis for the end of the war. Would it have done so three years earlier, when the Serb camps were discovered and the Muslims of Bosnia were suffering genocide? I see no reason to believe that earlier bombing would not have been equally effective." Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 455. Warren Zimmerman agrees. Origins of a Catastrophe, 241–42.

2 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 39.

3 Ibid., 7. "As the Communist pterodactyl perished and left the nest empty, the eggs hatched an entire flock of birds of prey who are now viciously pecking at each other in the fight to dominate the nest or at least a segment of the nest." Paul Mojzes, Yugoslavian Inferno, 126.

4 Bisera Turkovic, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing World Order, 109ff.

5 From a small group conversation with Silajdzic in 1996. See also Paul Parin, "Open Wounds: Ethnopsychoanalytic Reflections on the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia," in Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape, 43–44. An eloquent treatment of these themes is also laid out by Bisera Turkovic, who served as the Bosnian ambassador to Hungary while I was representing the United States in Vienna; see Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing World Order.

6 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of A Nation, 26.

7 Wesley Clark, Waging Modern War, 68.

8 Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims, 159–68.

9 See Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, 9–10.

10 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 208, 218–19.

11 In addition to the Louis Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, for a particularly insightful, firsthand view, see Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, provides a detailed account. Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, and Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, are excellent scholarly sources. Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, also gives a strong on-the-ground account.

12 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 31.

13 Parin, "Open Wounds," in Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape, 45.

14 The Bosnian Serb was "like a punch-drunk fighter; [he] flailed about him with flurries of distortions and lies." Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, 202.

15 Psychologist Miomir Zuzul was key to negotiations I hosted (with Ambassador Chuck Redmond as negotiator) to stop fighting between the Croats and Bosniaks and to create the Federation in 1994. Zuzul subsequently became Tudjman’s ambassador to the United States. "For the biggest part of the war in Bosnia, Milosevic was united with his ‘brother in arms’ Karadzic, another obvious criminal. But in contrast to Milosevic’s pragmatism, Karadzic was a kind of romantic who believed myths from (Serbian) history, and who was ‘fighting the 600-year-old war for survival of Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church.’ For him and a surprisingly big number of Serbs both in Serbia and BiH, the war started with a battle at Blackbird Field (Kosovo Polje) at the end of the 14th century, when the Ottomans defeated the Serbs. For Karadzic and his supporters, Muslims were enemies whose existence endangered the survival of the Serbian nation. From that paranoiac perspective (I do not have any doubts that Karadzic can be diagnosed as a person with serious psychical disorders) there is no other way but to fight and eventually kill or expel all Muslims. So what we had in Bosnia was a combination of romantic nationalistic fantasy (almost a kind of collective madness) and pure pragmatism without any moral or human restrictions. To implement the . . . ‘sacred mission’ they needed somebody like Ratko Mladic, war criminal par excellence, a person who could kill in ‘cold blood’—and without any particular reason—a person, or a village, or an entire nation. Unfortunately for us Croats, Tudjman, who certainly did not belong to this group of notorious criminals, did not do enough to distinguish himself from them, their ideology, and their goals. To understand at least the basics of what was going on in Bosnia, one needs to add to this gallery of leaders at least one more—Alija Izetbegovic. He was somehow captured in between his own Islamic ideology and (in my opinion) personal inability to do anything concretely. I do not want to say that Alija is responsible for the tragedy in Bosnia, but he certainly was not a person who could prevent or stop that tragedy." From an e-mail dated August 4, 2001, quoted with Miomir Zuzul’s permission.

16 Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 175.

17 Ibid., 116.

18 In one particularly mundane scene, Tudjman, attending the fiftieth anniversary of the V-Day celebration in England, drew on his napkin his proposed partition of Bosnia for Paddy Ashdown, then the leader of the Liberal Democrat Party in Britain. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 25.

19 See Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 148–49.

20 See Wolfgang Libal and Christine von Kohl, Der Balkan, 89ff.

21 See Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 246.

22 Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 204–6; he also cites Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980–92, 50. Another particularly clear example of this theme is a collection of 256 poems, plays, short stories, excerpts from novels, epistles, war reports, essays, and travel accounts replete with dramatic passages: "The Turks used to impale them, trying for centuries to convert them to Islam . . . the Austrian-Hungarian Empire used to sterilize them, the Ustasha massacred them, they were sold cheap to communism at the Yalta Conference after being beheaded by the Croatian dictator Tito. . . . Philosophers, intellectuals, professional humanitarians; governments, the United Nations, the Hague Tribunal, are all pressuring the Serbs, killing or slandering them." Jean Ditour, "The Stigma of Virtue," in Damjanovic, Tomic, and Cosic, eds., Serbia in the Works of Foreign Authors, 246.

23 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel, 213.

24 Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 204.

25 The most glaring examples were in Croatia. "In 1969 Serbs, who made up 15 percent of the population in Croatia, occupied 54 percent of all positions in the police and composed 27 percent of the members in the Croatian party organization." Felix Niesmann, Im Spannungsfeld von Zentralismus und Selbstverwaltung, as cited in Stiglmayer, Mass Rape, 31. Similarly, "in 1961, the Serbs made up 42 percent of the population of Yugoslavia, but they represented 84 percent of the ministers, officials, and functionaries active in federal institutions, 8 percent of the federal judges, 70 percent of officers, and 65 percent of generals in the Yugoslavian Federal Army, as well as 57 percent of all party members." Robert K. Furtak, "Jugoslawien," and Othmar Nikola Haberl, "Parteiorganisation," as cited in Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape, 31. "The reasons for this were complex, but part of the explanation lies in the high percentage of Serbs in the Communist Party." Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 13.

26 "The Serbs, like members of other small nations, have a tendency to stretch their admirable history beyond its true dimensions. More than one Serb has told me, ‘My ancestors were eating with golden forks while the French were still using their fingers.’" Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 11.

27 Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 204.

28 Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 62.

29 Ibid., 98–99.

30 Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 273–74.

31 Turkovic, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing World Order, 8–21.

32 Former U.S. Foreign Service Officer Louis Sell argues strongly that such perceptions by Emsuda and Greta are indicative of postwar anti-Serb reaction. From a personal conversation, February 2003.

33 See Turkovic, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing World Order, 76.

34 Sabrina Petra Ramet speaks for many influential policymakers: "Since 1918, there has been a constant tension between Serbs and non-Serbs in this polyglot country. . . . This struggle . . . lies at the heart of the instability for which Yugoslavia was famous. . . . I was always pessimistic about Yugoslavia." Balkan Babel, 1, 3. In contrast, Ambassador Zimmermann insists, "The Yugoslav catastrophe was not mainly the result of ancient ethnic or religious hostilities, nor of the collapse of communism at the end of the cold war, nor even of the failures of the Western countries. . . . My most difficult task has been to convey the conviction that all Yugoslavs weren’t the bloodthirsty extremists so ubiquitously visible in Western news accounts." Origins of a Catastrophe, vii, xi.

35 Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, 13–14.

36 "On 28 June 1989 several hundred thousand Serbs assembled at the battlefield site of Gazimestan, outside the Kosovar capital, Prishtina, to celebrate the six-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. For many weeks a ferment of national feeling had been created inside Serbia; the bones of Prince Lazar, who died at the battle, had been on a tour of the country, becoming an object of pilgrimage wherever they were. . . . Milosevic told the crowd, ‘We are again engaged in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, but this cannot be excluded yet.’ The crowd roared its approval." Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 213. Meanwhile, in Bosnia, Karadzic was explaining to the U.S. ambassador, "‘You have to understand Serbs, Mr. Zimmermann. They’ve been betrayed for centuries. Today they can’t live with other nations. They must have their own separate existence. They’re a warrior race, and they can trust only themselves to take by force what is their due. But this doesn’t mean that Serbs can hate. Serbs are incapable of hatred." Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 203.

37 With heavy lobbying from the United States, an economic embargo was imposed by the UN against Yugoslavia in May 2000. James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 645–48. The sanctions had some effect: "Lord Owen insisted that Milosevic had been moved [to accept the Vance-Owen peace plan] by the international coalition that was lining up against him. . . . He knew how damaging the new package of sanctions would be to an economy already ruined by the cost of waging war. . . . ‘This was a clear economic decision’ Owen said later." In addition, "the Federal President, Dobrica Cosic, later complained that they placed rump Yugoslavia ‘in a kind of concentration camp whose borders are guarded by the NATO air force and fleet and the international police.’" Silber and Little, Death of a Nation, 277–78. Bosnian Serbs insisted on the lifting of sanctions first before they would accept a peace plan, in contrast to the Contact Group mediators who insisted on peace first, then the lifting of sanctions. Ibid., 337. Milosevic, speaking to representatives of the European Union in Geneva on December 9, 1993, attacked international trade sanctions on Serbia: "‘I do not know how you will explain to your children, on the day when they discover the truth, why you killed our children, why you led a war against three million of our children, and with what right you turned twelve million inhabitants of Europe into a test site for the application of what is, I hope, the last genocide of this century’" Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 169.

38 Marlise Simons, "Crossing Paths: Albright Testifies in War Crimes Case," New York Times, international ed., December 18, 2002.

39 See Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 117–22.

40 Committee to Protect Journalists, www.imcbih.org August 29, 2000 (last accessed January 2004). A majority of the radio and television stations were later licensed according to regulations instituted by the Independent Media Commission. For more about media behavior, readership surveys, and public opinions, see Ramet, Balkan Babel, 66–85.

41 In the fall 2000 presidential election, the tabloid Vacerni Novosti ran a "computer-distorted photograph of the crowd at Mr. Milosevic’s rally . . . clearly extended by at least a third of its length by adding another photograph of the same crowd taken at a different moment." Steven Erlanger, New York Times, September 22, 2000.

42 See Bringa, Being Bosnian the Muslim Way, 13–14.

43 Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia, 44, as well as conversations with Tanya Domi, former press spokesperson for the OSCE in Bosnia, August 2000, and Dejan Anastasjvic, journalist with Vreme, winter 2002.

44 See Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 174.

45 "In the battle over control of television, TV relay towers became much-sought-after prizes. Serb seizure of several key TV relay installations meant that Sarajevo TV could reach only a relatively small part of Bosnia by spring 1992. Yutel [European Satellite company] stopped broadcasting in mid-May when its transmissions were limited to the city of Sarajevo." Steven Burg and Paul Shoup, The War in Bosnia Herzegovina, 64–65. The war over transmitters continued without abatement after the signing of the Accords—well into the 1998 national elections—when the international community took its first steps to address the problem through the OSCE Media Experts Commission. The commission found overwhelming evidence of disproportionate coverage of the nationalist Croat party (HDZ) on Croatian Radio Television, in violation of the Bosnian election rules and regulations. Not until the establishment of the Independent Media Commission in 1998 did the international community have and enforce regulatory protocols for the frequency spectrum in accordance with international law. Independent Media Commission, press release, February 17, 2000. See also Kemal Kurspahic, PrimeTime Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace, 195.

46 "Throughout the war, there was a mirror at work in the Serb mind. Their psyche had become infected, like that of the policeman who has worked all his career on wiretaps and goes insane because he is convinced that people are listening to him at every moment." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 222.

47 The August 28 market shelling in Sarajevo was the "final outrage," coming immediately after the diplomatic shuttle tragedy on Mount Igman. The mortar shell killed at least thirty-five civilians, filling television screens with scenes of carnage. Bosnian Serbs accused the Bosnian Muslims of staging the incident to draw NATO into the war. Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, 91–93.

48 Catherine A. MacKinnon, "Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern Genocide," in Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape, 76.

49 "The Serbian media were central in the process of defining the Serbian nation as a community under threat in a variety of ways. Through the 1980s, but especially since late 1987, Serbian state- and Church-controlled media published and broadcast materials which stressed ‘the victimization of Serbs in Yugoslavia’ and ‘the danger faced by the Serbian nation if the Federation (Yugoslavia) continued to ignore its plight.’" Spyros Sofos, "Media and the Politics of Disintegration and Ethnic Division in Former Yugoslavia," in Tim Allen and Jean Seaton, eds., The Media of Conflict, 162–75.

50 Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia Herzegovina, 64–65.

51 "Serbs were brainwashed by television. Please do not be put off by the simplicity of this assertion: it is a reasonable explanation of how an entire nation composed of generally sensible citizens . . . would follow their leader into an abyss of war and ruin. . . . Milosevic controlled television absolutely, refusing to let independent stations have any national frequencies. . . . Milosevic, a well-trained Communist who understood the power and importance of propaganda, met or talked on a daily basis with the director of Radio-Television Serbia, whom he appointed and replaced as necessary. Newspapers and magazines were largely irrelevant because few people could afford to buy them anymore. The most amazing thing about the role of television was that it not only had the power to form people’s opinions, it could change those opinions overnight. . . . [For example,] at the start of 1993, Milosevic opposed the Vance-Owen peace plan, which would have split Bosnia into ten autonomous provinces, giving the largest amount of territory to the Serbs, but not in contiguous pieces. State television reported, ad nauseam, that the plan was unfair. In April 1993, opinion polls showed that only one third of Serbians favored it. However, Milosevic changed his mind when he sensed that America might intervene if Serbs in Bosnia refused the plan. Suddenly, Milosevic was in favor of it. Suddenly, state television was in favor of it. And suddenly, Serbians were in favor of it. Opinion polls showed that in early May nearly two thirds of Serbians supported Vance-Owen, virtually the reverse of what polls showed a month earlier. Milosevic, like a drill sergeant, could shout About face!’ over the airwaves, and his subj ects would turn on a dime." Peter Maas, Love Thy Neighbor, 227.


4. The Lie of Intractable Hatred

1 In addition to the physical destruction, sixty-two imams (Muslim religious leaders) were killed throughout Bosnia during the war. Robert Fisk, "One Candle in the Heart of Darkness," The Independent (London), October 27, 1996.

2 See Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, 4, 196–97.

3 "What the diplomats often failed to realize is that despite the appearance of chaos, the wars have been prosecuted with terrifying rationality by protagonists playing long-term power games." Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 27.

4 See Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 281. This was Franjo Tudjman’s favorite book (from a private conversation with Miomir Zuzul, Croatian ambassador to the United States, June 2001). The book was also praised by Croatian state-run media, for providing a rationale for nationalistic goals of ethnic purity. Huntington’s worldview included harsh criticism of U.S. political leaders in the 1990s who "have not only permitted but assiduously promoted the diversity rather than the unity of the people they govern" (306).

5 See Silber and Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 25.

6 See Kumar Rupesinghe, "What Is Co-existence?" in Paul van Tongeren, ed., People Building Peace, 69.

7 Milosevic knew how to tap into the nationalistic feeling of fraternity, calling for unity among Serbs. In his speech at the battlefield in Kosovo in 1989, he cited disunity as "pulling Serbia backwards" and making Serbs inferior. Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 272. "Milosevic and the ideologues of his Serbian revolution took their people back to the womb of their unreason. A place where defeat was victory, death a kingdom of heaven, suicide redemption, suffering vindication, and exile a homeland." This nationalism gave Serbs the "solace of a glorious past and their mirage of a glorious future." Ibid., 188.

8 UN Security Council Resolution 713. Bisera Turkovic, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing World Order, 42.

9 "An irony of the Bosnian war was that it broke out at a time when the end of superpower rivalry had opened new, fluid possibilities for limited intervention, but also at a time when the Gulf War had given new credence to the Powell Doctrine—the notion that the United States should act militarily only when its vital interests are clearly threatened and overwhelming force can be used, preferably with impunity." Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 242.

10 An inside view of Bush’s Balkan policy is found in the memoirs of Jim Baker, his secretary of state from 1989 to 1992. James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 634–51.

11 Private conversations with Warren Zimmermann, July 2001.

12 See Charles Lane, New Republic, April 12, 1999.

13 Bisera Turkovic, "US Response to the Bosnian Crisis," in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing World Order, 50–66.

14 In Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History, Robert Kaplan crafted a well-written travelogue in 1989 and 1990 that winds its way through the Balkans. Balkan Ghosts purportedly shaped President Clinton’s thinking on the limitations of intervention in the Balkans. "The President reportedly inferred from the book that the peoples of the region had never peacefully coexisted for very long." Michael T. Kaufman, New York Times, May 22, 1999. Kaplan says he never meant the book to be used as a policy tract and declared himself as an "unambiguous, public interventionist" [since 1992]. Robert Kaplan, New York Times, June 13, 1999. Along the same lines, Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified before Congress in May 1993 that "all sides" were responsible for atrocities in the Balkans. Michael Scharf, Balkan Justice, 31.

15 My data are more one-sided than that of cultural anthropologist Tone Bringa, who notes that "in the media coverage of the war there seem to be two approaches. The first is that the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina have always hated each other and whatever tolerance and coexistence there was had been imposed by the communist regime. The other is the idealized approach that Bosnia-Herzegovina, with its potent symbol Sarajevo, was the ideal example of a harmonious and tolerant multicultural society, where people did not classify each other in terms of ‘Serb,’ ‘Muslim,’ or ‘Croat.’ Neither of these approaches reflects the Bosnia I experienced during the five years before war broke out in April 1992. There was both co-existence and conflict, tolerance and prejudice, suspicion and friendship." Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, 3.

16 See Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy, 644–45. In the Clinton administration, Bob Frazure, deputy to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, referred to a Contact Group meeting as "kabuki theater," with each representative playing a completely predictable part. (From a private conversation in Vienna as we were going into a Contact Group meeting, soon before Frazure died in an accident on Mount Igman.)

17 "In Bosnia-Herzegovina consciousness of a ‘Yugoslav’ identity was strongest among generations who had been educated in the 1950s and 1960s." Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, 4.

18 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 194–96.

19 From a private conversation, Danis Tomovic, filmmaker (No Man’s Land), February 2003.

20 After hearing endless hours about why limited military intervention could not be effective in ’92, ’93, or ’94, I find these words ring true: "On August 30, [1995] NATO warplanes began the largest air attack in the alliance’s history, more than 3, 500 sorties in two weeks, wave after wave of the world’s most advanced . . . munitions. A salvo of Tomahawk Cruise missiles was even thrown into the assault. This was exactly the kind of intervention that, for more than three years, the West’s leaders had said would not work, could not work. Of course it worked." Peter Maas, Love Thy Neighbor, 271.

21 See Dzevad Karahasan, Sarajevo, Exodus of a City, 2–16.

22 See Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, 13.

23 The highway stretching from Zagreb to Belgrade was named by Tito the "Brotherhood and Unity Highway." Connecting two republics, it gave a physical reality to his philosophical and political ideal.

24 Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way, 8–10.

25 Spoken in the homes of Sarajevo’s Jews as late as World War II, Ladino, a blend of Hebrew and Spanish, was written with Hebrew characters. See also Karahasan, Sarajevo, Exodus of a City, 92–97.

26 Along the same lines, I was impressed that when I, as the U.S. ambassador to Austria, was asked to have a two-hour lunch with staff at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, the questions were not about the rising political right wing in Austria, but rather my understanding of what Muslims in Bosnia were experiencing. That being said, Jews internationally, in fact, did not rally their powerful forces to demand intervention to stop the genocide. An exception was Elie Wiesel, survivor of the Holocaust, Nobel peace laureate and writer. In an op-ed piece, Wiesel described his visit to the Manjaca camp, administrated by Serb forces outside Banja Luka. Although the commandant of the camp assured Wiesel that Manjaca was "in good order," he found the prisoners to be "living in deplorable conditions: crowded, 600 in a barracks, with no heat and poor clothing; they were lying on the ground, pressed against one another, like human shadows." Wiesel urged "an imaginative, spectacular gesture, from the international community." He suggested that President Clinton call for a summit in the heart of besieged Sarajevo and call Balkan leaders to join him, insisting that they not leave until an "agreement had been reached." New York Times, February 25, 1993.

27 Valeria Heuberger, in Südosteuropäischer Dialog, Balkan, Heft 2, 13.

28 There was great concern among the Western international community that the hardships of war would give Iranian extremists, operating under cover of humanitarian missions, a foothold in Bosnia, and, therefore, Europe. That fear wasn’t strong enough, of course, to make the Western powers do much to stop the war in the first several years. Turkovic, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing World Order, 91.

29 Fahrija is clear about her regret at leaving "this great, great organization we had created. They still send me letters from time to time, to let me know how things are going. They were recognized by President Clinton as the best-run humanitarian organization, and the First Lady held a reception for them."


Part II. To Heal History

1 Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 25.


5. Challenges

1 Jaroslava Moserova, vice president of the Czech senate, Vital Voices: Women in Democracy conference, Vienna, Austria, July 1997.

2 See International Human Rights Law Group, A National NGO Report on Women’s Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 170.

3 Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel, 319–20.

4 Shelley Anderson, from the Women Peacemakers Program of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, asks, rhetorically, "What is the exact difference between ‘peace time’ and ‘war time’ to a woman being beaten by her male partner or a girl being sold into prostitution?" Women Building Peace, 241–42.

5 Cynthia Cockburn, The Space between Us, 171.

6 As reported by Infoteka, a project within Medica Zenica, in To Live With (out) Violence: Final Report [on] Violence against Women [in] Zenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 61, and as described in International Human Rights Law Group, A National NGO Report on Women’s Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 169–72. See also the discussion of alcohol in Folnegovic-Smalc, "Psychiatric Aspects of the Rapes in the War against the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina," in Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape, 175. Other observers attributed the increase in beatings to men’s upset over disruption of the patriarchal system. See Cockburn, The Space between Us, 158.

7 Alma’s hometown, after the war: "The utter devastation of Mostar was stunning. Pockmarks in ruined buildings gave mute testimony to the violence—there was not one square foot undamaged. Most of the roads had craters surrounded by the stereotypical marks of rocket and mortars and bombs. . . . School buildings, apartments and many shops were rubble. . . . However, many people were out—some sitting under colorful umbrellas in outdoor cafes, chatting and drinking Turkish coffee and soft drinks." Leah Curtin, Sunflowers in the Sand, 66.

8 In addition to Richard Holbrooke’s detailed description of the Dayton process, in To End a War, a disheartening window into the ineffectual U.S. effort is provided in the memoirs of the secretary of state, Warren Christopher, in Chances of a Lifetime, 251ff.

9 Private conversation with John Menzies, 2002.

10 Wolfgang Libal and Christine von Kohl, Der Balkan, 80. Corroborated in conversations with Croat Ambassador Zuzul.

11 "[At Dayton], the leaders who had sent these people to premature graves and spread such misery were treated with respectful deference." Roger Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 461.

12 While "there are no obvious legal obstacles to women becoming economically independent. . . opening their own businesses . . . in practice, women encounter obstacles . . . due to their lack of adequate financial resources for start-up and inability to obtain credit. Twenty-four percent of those who experienced discrimination reported that they had been discriminated against in accessing credit." International Human Rights Law Group, A National NGO Report on Women’s Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 155.

13 Informal account from a Sarajevo journalist, July 2001; and ICG, After Milosevic, 137.

14 International Human Rights Law Group, A National NGO Report on Women’s Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 203.

15 UN High Representative Carlos Westendorp announced in fall 1997, as reported by Deutsche-Presse, that "an important part of international aid to Bosnia is disappearing into corrupt channels, including extremists who use it to purchase arms." In August 1999, Deutsche-Presse cited a New York Times article claiming that money that should have gone directly to purchasing agricultural equipment and feed was given by the mayor of Sanski Most to his brother to start a bank.


6. Women Transforming

1 "When we think of war, we do not think of women. Because the work of survival, of restoration, is not glamorous work. Like most women’s work, it is undervalued, underpaid, and impossible. After war, men are often shattered, unable to function. Women not only work, but they create peace networks, find ways to bring about healing. They teach in home schools when the school buildings are destroyed. They build gardens in the middle of abandoned railroad tracks. They pick up the pieces, although they usually haven’t fired a gun." Eve Ensler, Necessary Targets, xiv.

2 Hannah Arendt, in The Human Condition, speaks of action as being closely connected "with the human condition of natality; the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting" (9).

3 From 1987 to 1994, the percentage of women in parliament in Albania dropped from 28 to 6, in Romania from 34 to 4, and in Hungary from 21 to 11. Parliament was 33 percent female in the Soviet Union; in many of the newly independent states, that figure is now under 3 percent. The same trend exists for women in top ministerial posts: percentages in Albania, Romania, and Hungary declined from 6, 12, and 4, respectively, to o. Swanee Hunt, "Women’s Vital Voices."

4 Barbara Jancar, "The New Feminism in Yugoslavia," in Pedro Ramet, ed., Yugoslavia in the 1980s, 203, 204. See also Tanya L. Domi, "Advancing Women’s Political Rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Harriman Review 14 (November 2002): 36–46.

5New York Times, May 20, 1999. See also Swanee Hunt, "Raising their Voices: Women in the New Democracies," Ambassadors Review; also see Jennifer Griffin, Surviving Democracy: Where Women Fear Freedom.

6 See the International Crisis Group (ICG) report After Milosevic for an excellent discussion of the political scene.

7 In 1996 the League of Women Voters Education Fund opened a U.S. coordination office for absentee voting in the Bosnian elections. Through the "Bosnian Citizen Get-Out-The-Vote Campaign," the League worked with the OSCE to enfranchise Bosnian refugees and displaced persons residing in fifty-five countries around the globe for elections in 1996, 1997, and 1998. http://www.lwv.org/elibrary/pub/impact/impact00_02_2d.html (last accessed January 2004). See also Tanya L. Domi, "Bosnian Women Take Their Place at the Negotiating Table," OSCE Newsletter 9 (December 2002): 11–13.

8 The Red Crescent, federated with the Red Cross, is often sent into Islamic countries in place of the Red Cross. Their mission is "to improve the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of humanity." Among the many activities of the Red Crescent is refugee assistance, www.ifrc.org (last accessed January 2004).

9 George Soros took the lead in Bosnia among private philanthropists worldwide. A Hungarian American investor, with the implosion of communism he was quick to open offices throughout the former communist world to try to stabilize newborn democracies. Soros made a huge investment, not only financially but with time and attention. During the Bosnian war, he was utterly practical, funding projects like a water system to keep Sarajevans from being sitting ducks for snipers as they waited by public faucets. He gave $25 million from 1995 to 1999 through his cutting-edge Open Society Institute, focusing on education, women’s rights and leadership training, civil society building, media reform, arts and culture, economic reform, public administration, health and medical services, and the environment, among others. See Jakob Find, Annual Report, Soros Foundations Open Society Fund B-H, 1995–1999.

10 On May 7, 1993, the Ferhadija mosque was leveled by Bosnian Serb forces. Built 400 years earlier, it was one of the most beautiful examples of Islamic architecture in the Balkans. Eight years after its destruction, a ground-breaking ceremony was organized in Banja Luka to begin rebuilding the mosque. A violent mob of several thousand Bosnian Serbs protested, throwing rocks and setting buses and cars on fire. Over 600 Muslims and diplomats were trapped in an Islamic center for six hours. A smaller ceremony was planned six weeks later, on June 18, but it too was disrupted by violence.

11 Though the Serbs shelled Mostar, the majority of the destruction was at the hand of nationalist Croats.

12 Zelene Beretke (in English, "Green Berets") was a paramilitary organization founded in Sarajevo in early 1992. It was, along with a handful of other paramilitaries like the Patriots’ League and Bosnia 22, a predecessor to the official army of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Its allusion to the green color of Islam was intended to attract primarily a Bosnian Muslim population. From an informal conversation with Ivana Vuko.

13 That large discrepancy continued until 2000, when large numbers of Bosniaks began returning to Republika Srpska.

14 Kolo Srpskih Sestara, the Association of Serb Sisters (or Serb Sisters’ Circle), was founded in Belgrade in 1903 as a women’s voluntary, cultural, and educational association. Its primary role—to assist the Serb population in southern Serbia and in Macedonia after the failed rebellion against the Ottomans—was modified in subsequent years. From 1993 until 2000, the association was most active in organizing fundraising and in collecting donations of food, clothing, etc., primarily for Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia. Its Web site (http://www.arandjelovac.com/latinica/organizacije/sestre.htm) notes that members "cherish Serbian cultural heritage and traditions." Although registered as a humanitarian organization (1997 Directory of NGOs), the group is considered by many to be nationalistic. It supported the most right-wing parties, such as Seselj’s Radical Party, Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia, and Arkan’s Party of Serbian Unity, and its offices were on state premises. (From an informal conversation with Zorica Trifunovic, cofounder of the war-resisting organization Women in Black.)

15 The Open City program of the international community rewarded communities with funding. According to locals, the program ended in failure, with authorities, instead of the returnees, taking the money.

16 Richard Holbrooke’s To End a War makes no mention of the media as a negotiating issue.

17 Informal conversation with presidential aide Mirza Hajric, March 2001.

18 Emina, our interpreter (and Fahrija’s daughter), has similar memories: "I left Sarajevo in ’92, really days before the war started. Let me tell you about the textbooks. In our primer, if there was a Muslim name, let’s say Emir, he’s collecting hay. If it’s a Serb name, like Milan, Milan is reading a book. At school I was told I have an old-fashioned name. ‘Emina’ was too Muslin to be cool. That in itself is propaganda, starting somewhere, so, so far off, somewhere you think politics doesn’t penetrate the minds of little kids." From a private conversation, 2001.

19 Svetlana Broz, granddaughter of Tito, is writing a book on inter-ethnic couples who married during the war. Private conversation, spring 2001. She has also written Good People in an Evil Time: Participants and Witnesses, in which she brings together the stories of Bosniaks, Serbians, and Croats to demonstrate that the war in Bosnia was not caused by inter-ethnic hatred and to show that relationships within and among the different groups continued throughout the war.

20 Mostar’s troubles are long-lasting. On April 6, 2001, on peacekeepers and Bosnian police, backed by NATO troops, seized control of a major Croatian bank being used to finance illegal security forces of the hard-liners. A riot ensued. Dominion Post, April 7, 2001.


7. The Road to Reconciliation

1 ICG, After Milosevic, 136–37.

2 http://www.freemedia.at/Boston%20Congress%20Report/boston7.htm (last accessed January 2004).

3 Donna Pankhurst, "Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies," 239.

4 Adam Heribert, Royal Institute of International Affairs (January 1998): 5.

5 Reflecting on the Holocaust, Robert Coles speaks of "how often many of us who profess the Christian ethic of forgiveness succumb to smugness, arrogance, propentiousness, a cocky self-importance that is utterly incompatible with the kind of absolution and reconciliation implied in the act of forgiveness: no exculpation for wrong, but an acknowledgment that a long, tenaciously critical look inward justifies a wholehearted response of merciful grace, for which one prays." Robert Coles in Simon Wiesenthal, The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness, 128.

6 Heribert, Royal Institute of International Affairs (January 1998): 5.

7 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Implementing the Peace Accords: The War Crimes Tribunal," May 28, 1997, www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosnia_war_crimes.html (last accessed January 2004). The first indictment, in February 1995, was against two Serbs connected to the Omarska concentration camp, where Emsuda was held. In addition, in February 1998, the U.S. Institute of Peace created a joint Bosniak-Croat-Serb truth and reconciliation commission to establish consensus on abuses suffered by victims from all ethnic groups in the recent war. U.S. Institute of Peace, "Bosnia to Form a Single Truth Commission," February 1998, www.usip.org/pubs/PW/298/truth.html (last accessed January 2004). The commission was tasked not only with establishing culpability but also with documenting acts of heroism by ordinary citizens; no other truth commission in the world had incorporated this task. Meanwhile, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica established a truth and reconciliation commission in March 2001, regarded by outsiders as a whitewashing of Serb responsibility, but ostensibly to investigate war crimes in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The truth commission can be transformative: "When I witnessed victims reaching out to perpetrators who had shattered their worlds, and offering them forgiveness, I was filled with hope. It became clear to me that the . . . process had far-reaching consequences, not only for individual victims and perpetrators encountering each other . . . but also as a model for uniting groups of people struggling with a history of conflict." Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, "The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission."

8 Sven Alkalaj in Wiesenthal, The Sunflower, 102–3.

9 See Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 5.

10 See Gobodo-Madikizela, "The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission."

11 Estimates of the number of murdered men and boys range between 7,000 and 10,000. Almost seven and a half years later, two-thirds of the bodies unaccounted for had yet to be found. Daniel Simpson, "DNA Tests Help Some Families of Bosnia Victims, but Not Most," New York Times, international ed., December 23, 2002.

12 For a thorough account of the role of the Dutch on battalion in the Srebrenica massacre, see Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime; and David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica.

13 For an account of former chief prosecutor Louise Arbour’s energetic efforts to prosecute the military and political high command in Bosnia (and later in Kosovo), see Charles Truehart, "A New Kind of Justice," Atlantic Monthly, April 2000, 80–90. For a critique of the failure of Croatia, Yugoslavia, and the international community to meet their international legal responsibilities in arresting indictees and transferring them to the tribunal, see Laura Palmer and Cristina Posa, "The Best-Laid Plans: Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords in the Courtroom and on the Ground," 361.

14 The body of Kada’s husband was identified in October 2000.

15 On July 11, 1996, the anniversary of the slaughter in Srebrenica, I organized a campaign in which hundreds of international women leaders signed a full page ad in the International Herald Tribune, demanding that the survivors be allowed to return to their homes and given word of their missing men and boys. Human rights activist Bianca Jagger led a pressing campaign to bring the UN face to face with its own complicity in the disaster. A 125-page UN "Srebrenica Report" was published in 1998, wrestling with the question "How can this have been allowed to happen?" http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/un/unga53_55.html (last accessed January 2004).

16 On June 28, 2001, Milosevic was extradited to The Hague, after being imprisoned in Yugoslavia since April 1 on charges of corruption during his thirteen-year regime. Milosevic was originally indicted by the UN war tribunal in May 1999 for war crimes related to Kosovo, including murders, mass deportation, and persecution. After years of economic mismanagement, sanctions, and NATO bombing, the country was desperate for foreign aid. The United States, World Bank, and EU pledged millions of dollars the day after the extradition. In the wake of Milosevic’s extradition, the Bosnian Serb government indicated readiness to arrest top war criminals.

17 The indictment of Milosevic was announced during the 1999 NATO bombing as the Yugoslav army moved into Kosovo. The chief prosecutor, Louise Arbour of Canada, acted despite concerns by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, who was in delicate negotiations with Boris Yeltsin’s special envoy, Victor Chernomyrdin, and who "feared that an indictment might jeopardize a diplomatic end to the bombing. Others, like Richard Holbrooke, feared the bombing would fail to break Milosevic, and the United States would have to do a direct deal with the Serbian leader. "It was to forestall this possibility—a Houdini-like diplomatic escape by Milosevic—that Arbour brought down her indictment on May 27." Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, 124–25.

18 See Richard Goldstone’s foreword in Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, ix–xii.

19 The UN Commission on Refugees asserted as late as October 1992 that "there is no indication of systematic rapes; it is a matter of wandering gangs." Seifert in Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape, 67–68. See also Dorothy Thomas and Regan Ralph, "Rape in War: The Case of Bosnia," in Sabrina Petra Ramet, ed., Gender Politics in the Western Balkans: Women and Society in Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Successor States, 203–18.

20 Infoteka, To Live With (out) Violence, 69.

21 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established under the UN Security Council Resolution 808 on February 23, 1993. "On April 24, 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia made headlines by investigating the criminal responsibility of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, Bosnian Serb army commander General Ratko Mladic and a former political head of BS secret police, Mico Stanisic, for crimes ranging from genocide, ethnic cleansing, to the destruction of cultural and historical monuments. The abuses perpetrated as part of ‘ethnic cleansing’ constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and possibly genocide . . . [all] violations of international humanitarian law." Bisera Turkovic, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Changing World Order, 74–75.

22 "The primary threat to security is the continued corrosive political influence of indicted leaders like Karadzic." Payam Akhavan, "Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?," 796. See also Laura Palmer and Cristina Posa, "The Best-Laid Plans," 361–83, for an explanation of the political and security necessity of arresting war crimes indictees still at large in Bosnia.

23 A great strength of international criminal tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, has been the creation of a historical record of the violence convulsing their countries. Galina’s comments echo the importance that many thinkers have placed on remembering: "Forgetting the extermination is part of the extermination itself." Jean Baudriflard cited by Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, 118. See also Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson, eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions.

24 This policy was described to me by the military commanders themselves (including Admiral Snuffy Smith and General Bill Nash) as well as their subordinates on numerous visits to military installations in the two years following Dayton.

25 See Cohen, Hearts Grown Brutal, 192.

26 See Leah Curtin, Sunflowers in the Sand: Stories from Children of War.

27 The case of Drazen Erdemovic illustrates the dilemma inherent in Alenka’s distinction between "ordinary soldiers" and "criminals." In his early twenties, Erdemovic was an ethnic Croat whose pregnant wife was half-Serb; to earn money during the war, he served in armies on all three sides and profited by smuggling people across conflict lines. Erdemovic was serving in the Serb forces at the Srebrenica slaughter, in which he reluctantly (he says) performed "mop-up" operations to eliminate possible witnesses. He became a key witness to the massacre when he agreed to testify before the war crimes tribunal in exchange for his family’s safety, which had been threatened by his Serb commander, who doubted Erdemovic’s loyalty to the Serb cause. The tribunal sentenced Erdemovic to ten years in prison, following his guilty plea to one count of a crime against humanity. Erdemovic expressed remorse and sobbed while entering his guilty plea, providing this explanation for his actions: "Your Honor, I had to do this. If I ’d refused, I would have been killed together with the victims." Quoted in Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, Judgment, in the Appeals Chamber, October 7, 1997, http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgement/erd-aj971007e.htm (last accessed January 2004). See also David Rohde, Endgame, 128–29, 307–15, for a detailed account of the dilemmas facing Erdemovic.


Epilogue

1 Daniel Serwer, "The Successor States to Pre-1991 Yugoslavia: Progress and Challenges," U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs hearing, n.d.

2 Warren Zimmermann, private conversation, July 4, 2001.

3 In fact, at U.S. military briefings I witnessed during the war, mothers were described as hysterical agitators and troublemakers for threatening to physically block the road as on Protection Force soldiers tried to retreat from the "safe havens" they had been sent to protect. Later, talking to the women themselves, I came to see them as heroes, demanding that the international community live up to its word and defend communities where disarmed refugees huddled month after month as the shelling grew louder.

4 Carlotta Gall, in the International Herald Tribune, August 2, 2000, describes the return of 15,000 Serbs over an eighteen-month period to Sarajevo. That return could have been managed years earlier, had the international leadership (including military) been willing to put teeth behind the Dayton mandate. Five years later, even with Muslim refugees being evicted to allow Serbs to return to their Sarajevo homes, the nationalist Serbs, emboldened by lack of action by U.S. military, continued to refuse to allow refugees to return in similar numbers to the territory they occupy. And as of this writing, Bosnian Serb Nationalist leader Radovan Karadzic, indicted in July 1995, still roams free in the area of Bosnia patrolled by French troops, even though his general whereabouts are believed to be known.

5 Private conversation with American journalists and funders, in his Sarajevo office, fall 1996.

6 The only ironic exception was Karadzic tapping Biljana Plavsic to be his replacement as President, when he was banned from political office as an alleged war criminal. When she turned toward the West, he became her political enemy.


Profiles

1 I’ve not tried to write as a historian but rather to stay true to self-descriptions and my own immediate observations. Since our meetings occurred over several years, time-bound details such as ages of children, or the months or years since an event occurred, are only approximately and relatively correct.

2 Sunita Samarah, who staffed our office in Sarajevo, is a talented young lawyer who had worked during the war for Zena 21, a magazine for and about women, and had been an organizer of the conference a few months after the peace was signed, titled "Women Transforming Themselves and Society" (described later). From both experiences, she could identify outstanding women leaders determined to make a difference in their worlds.

3 Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., Mass Rape, 86.

4 "The prevailing attitude is that women in the former Yugoslavia enjoyed a high degree of equality with men. Relative to many western and southern (non-European) countries, this may be true, particularly in terms of education, rates of employment, and healthcare—and particularly in the cities and towns. But . . . ‘a glass ceiling’ existed—areas that despite the appearance of being open to all persons, in fact were inaccessible or less accessible even to qualified women. For example, in occupations and salaries, political life, and many positions of power and influence, women’s rights and interests were subordinate even in the former Yugoslavia. In addition, limits experienced by rural women in particular, and problems of domestic violence, for example, predate the war." From A National NGO Report on Women’s Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 138, compiled by sixteen Bosnian NGOs in cooperation with the International Human Rights Law Group BiH Project. "Even in those industries in which women predominate (e.g., textiles), there are few, if any, women in executive positions. Wherever profits and power are found, the positions are generally reserved for men." Ibid., 157. According to Cynthia Cockburn, under Tito, women were excluded from management or political authority. Even though a quota system ensured 30 percent of the parliamentary positions, few held ministerial positions in the 1970s and 1980s. The Space between Us, 158.


Closing Thoughts

1 My sister Helen and I made hundreds of grants through The Hunt Alternatives Fund.

2 See Cynthia Cockburn, The Space between Us, 2–3.

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9780822386063
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