Launching the Last Phase of the Expedition
As early as December while he awaited the customary invitations to accept power, Chiang again began setting in motion the expeditionary apparatus. In late December 1927 he dispatched Lu Ho-sheng into hostile North China as a secret agent empowered to persuade warlord leaders and their subordinates to defect from the Ankuoehün. As was by then a common practice of Chinese revolutionaries, Lu was to make his base of operations in a foreign concession of a treaty, port—this time Tientsin. Chiang also began promoting a new Central Military Academy at Nanking, from whose graduates he might replenish the badly thinned ranks of the officer corps. This kind of school, which created military specialists indoctrinated in KMT ideals, had, earlier at Canton, been a boon both to the Party and to Chiang, Whampoa’s superintendent at that time. Once the new academy was created, Whampoa would become one of several preparatory schools.1
Party reconstruction moved apace in January of 1928. Once again the KMT went through the already familiar process of smoothing over the group’s ruffled feathers and jerry-rigging patches over the widely publicized divisions. Accepting portfolios at the official ceremony at Nanking on January 4 were: Sun Fo who was named Minister of Construction after his participation in the Wuhan government, and T. V. Soong who resumed his place as Finance Minister after his adventure in Wang Ching-wei’s Canton movement. The old Revolutionary Base of Kwangtung reverted to the control of Li Chi-shen and Huang Shao-hsiung, both true to Nanking in their fashion.
152The Party quickly resumed operations on January 7 with proposals emanating from what was called the Standing Committee of the CEC. Beside setting up committees to work on Party Affairs, such as the pending Fourth Party Congress, the Standing Committee felt confident enough to censure several members of the KMT, including Wang Ching-wei. In telegrams to CEC and Central Control Committee members, the Standing Committee ordered them to return to Nanking for assignments without delay.
The CEC that met on February 7 reconstructed the Party organization by reshuffling the membership of the key councils. Restored was the Central Political Council, which included Hu Han-min, T’an Yen-k’ai, Chu P’ei-teh, C.C. Wu, Sun Fo, T.V. Soong, and Chiang, and to which were added Yi P’ei-chi and Yü Yu-jen. Yü was former dean of Shanghai University and Party Representative to Feng Yü-hsiang. The CEC appointed a new Standing Committee comprised of Chiang, T’an Yen-k’ai, Yü Yu-jen, Tai Chi-t’ao, and Ting Wei-fen. T’an Yen-k’ai became chairman of the National Government Committee. Chiang regained his chairmanship over the seventy-three-man Military Council with its high-ranking Standing Committee of Generals Li Tsung-jen, Li Chi-shen, Pai Ch’ung-hsi, Chu P’ei-teh, Ch’eng Ch’ien, Ho Ying-ch’in, T’an Yen-k’ai, Feng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and Admiral Yang Shu-chuang.2 Noteworthy there were the Kwangsi generals and the two defected northern warlords—Feng and Yen. The Party membership discussed in vain the prospects of electing a Fourth Party Congress—which Chiang declared must decide on the finalization of the break with Russia, on the return from Communist ideology to the Three People’s Principles, and on whether these principles would be followed in the union and peasant movements so that no one class would be dominant.3
Along with reconstructing the new government went the process of centralizing its powers. Chiang began his effort by providing financial support to the conglomeration of armies vowing loyalty to Nanking. Earlier at Canton, the success of the Central Bank under T.V. Soong had attracted the support of generals and their troops concerned with practical realities. At Nanking, Soong worked to apply the methods proven in the Revolutionary Base to the financial problems of the larger National Government and its proliferated NRA. Revenue control was always an important phase of consolidation of power in China, and first to be examined were the provinces closest to Nanking’s influence—Chiang’s Chekiang and Soong’s Kiangsu. Soong announced on January 7 that the revenue systems of those two provinces were to be organized so that his ministry would see a monthly revenue of over C$10 million to more than match the expenditures—a significant collection increase over the C$3 million per month realized up to then.4 Soong was hamstrung in increasing his range of collection by the lack of direct control over politics outside the lower Yangtze—a problem never solved by the Nationalist government.
After January’s feverish reconciliation and reconstruction, Chiang felt secure enough to turn from the mundane affairs of Nanking to the more 153romantic prospect of finishing the Northern Expedition. On February 9, 1928, Chiang took the members of his headquarters’ general staff on board a train bound for the front near Hsüchou. There they inspected the preparations in process for the spring campaign. The lines had been relatively stationary since mid-December, in the midst of the bitter cold that prevailed out of frigid Mongolia. During the inspection, on February 11, the National Government wired C-in-C Chiang and the Military Councilmen an order to complete the plans for the final campaign to take North China.5 The plans called for a quick, three-month campaign to sweep from north Kiangsu to Peking.
From Hsüchou, Chiang and his party traveled by the Lung-Hai Railroad to meet with Feng Yü-hsiang at his Kaifeng headquarters. On February 16, Chiang and Feng discussed their cooperation in the final campaign to take North China.6 The meaning of national “unification” was rather ambiguous considering the existing nominal loyalties of Kwangtung, the southwestern provinces, and Hunan-Hupei. Even before the conquest of North China, Nanking’s ties with its provinces were mindful of the ancient federations or the first Han emperor’s control over his fief-holding generals. Provincialism would die hard after dominating China since the Taiping rebellion. But, given China’s natural divisions, there was a tendency for prospective rulers to use any means to secure, however loosely, the provincial relationships to the hegemon, and then turn to the long struggle to centralize real power.
During February, Chiang had to prove that he did, indeed, represent the hope for pulling the disordered military camp back into an operable whole. In meetings with Feng and in correspondence with Yen Hsi-shan, Chiang had to allow these regional commanders considerable autonomy and status. Both controlled highly defensible bases: Feng ran Shensi, that ancient bastion “within the passes” from which so many dynasties had conquered China, and Yen held the mountain fortress of Shansi. If dissatisfaction with Nanking’s treatment drove them into a temporary collaboration with the Ankuochün, they could frustrate the KMT take-over of North China. Even their neutrality would have greatly slowed the expedition. Nanking’s compromise was typical: in return for nominal subordination to Nanking and cooperation in the expedition, Feng and Yen would gain material aid and the status of near equality with C-in-C Chiang. Status could never be ignored in Chinese political relationships, as in most other relationships for that matter. Where Chiang in 1926 and 1927 had headed an NRA of some forty army corps, in the new military structure he coordinated four Collective Armies of corresponding magnitude. (Collective Army will be abbreviated CA; Collective Armies CAs.)
The Collective Armies represented the real division of power in Central and North China. Guarding the lower Yangtze basin was the First Collective Army, including the forty army corps of the earlier NRA. Controlling Shensi, Honan, and parts of the near northwest was Feng’s Second Collective Army. Holding pivotal Shansi overlooking the North China Plain was Yen Hsi-shan’s Third Collective Army; and astride Kwangsi, Hunan, and 154Hupei was the Fourth Collective Army of Li Tsung-jen (and the Kwangsi clique). Li had himself become entrenched after forcing out T’ang Sheng-chih. Although these four commands were relatively equal, Chiang and Nanking held the purse string, which made them suzerain. If Chiang could get these four commanders to synchronize their efforts in a massive assault on the North China Plain, a quick victory would be assured. On February 18, 1928, Nanking’s Political Council settled on and announced Chiang’s new title—C-in-C of all Northern Expeditionary forces of the Revolutionary Army. His associate Ho Ying-ch’in received the title of chief of staff for the four Collective Armies.7
Closely related to the restructuring of a satisfactory military system was the political power that emanated from the Collective Armies. The KMT had to fit these various military leaders in their regions into the Party apparatus and Party government so that status and political prestige would be assured to all—including the KMT. By 1928, the KMT was the largest single political force in China, and the only source left to confer national political legitimacy on Chinese leaders craving titles to match their real power. With his powers of coordination over the NRA, Chiang’s influence among members of Nanking’s hierarchy was such that he could gather the political status needed to support his military role. He did not want to be dependent on a covey of fractious politicians for the political support he needed as C-in-C—that much he had learned through his experience with the Wuhan government. On March 7, 1928, the Political Council appointed Chiang as its chairman.
The Political Council then divided up political authority among the other four commanders by region, with Li Chi-shen as chairman of the KMT branch in Canton, Li Tsung-jen chairman of the Wuhan branch, Feng Yü-hsiang over the Kaifeng branch, and Yen Hsi-shan over the T’aiyüan branch. Later appointments filled the branch committees with appointees both of Nanking and the respective branch chairmen. The Political Council also designated the provincial power holders as chairmen of their new KMT-style provincial government committees.8 Rather than imposing its leadership on the various regions of China, all the KMT could attain was its legitimization of those power holders with which it could coexist. Since Chiang was to be preoccupied in coordinating the four CAs, he had T’an Yen-k’ai made acting chairman of the Political Council. In the spring of 1926, T’an had supported Chiang in the March 20 Coup against the CCP and in the launching of the expedition. Again in early 1928, Chiang and T’an cooperated in order to speed up the military reunification of China.
In northern Kiangsu in late March, the First CA gathered for the resumption of the expedition after the mid-winter halt. Paralleling the east-west Lung-Hai Railroad, it faced a rested and reinforced Ankuochün. Now Chang Tso-lin’s troops coordinated with Sun Ch’uan-fang and Chang Tsung-ch’ang to the north in Shantung,9 and again there was the threat posed by the Japanese. In a March 17 interview in the Party newspaper, Chiang had admitted that the Party had been considering the danger of another Japanese intervention in Shantung. Therefore, the “Foreign 155Ministry had been delegated the authority to deal with the problem basing its policy on a spirit of equality.” By preventing the intervention, the Foreign Ministry would be supporting the expedition, as would the rest of the National Government agencies. To this end on April 1, 1928, Chiang requested that the Political Council order the provinces of Kiangsi and Anhui to begin collection of a monthly quota of 7 million catties of rice to feed the armies.10
As First CA leaders gathered at the Hsüchou headquarters on April 1, 1928, to receive their final orders, Feng and Yen were already engaged against the Ankuochün—north of the Yellow River in Honan, along the Peking-Suiyüan Railroad, and in Shansi’s mountains bordering the North China Plain. Another portion of Feng’s Second CA was poised facing Shantung alongside Chiang’s sector.
At the Hsüchou meeting were leaders of the new political branch of the NRA. Symbolizing the change of complexion of the NRA from 1926 to 1928 was the General Political Training Department directly under the C-in-C. Although the value of political work among the KMT’s soldiers and with civilians could not be denied, the old Political Departments had been infiltrated by CCP members and followers. Heading the new political organ created at Chiang’s suggestion on January 18 was Tai Chi-t’ao, a devout anti-Communist, Party ideologist, and allegedly an ex-Communist himself.11 The Nanking KMT’s view of the mass organizations had soured through its experiences in 1926 and 1927, and, thus, in April 1928, the Political Training Department’s goal was turned inward and directed toward keeping NRA elements correctly indoctrinated and motivated.
Commencing with the required flourish, the Party CEC announced from Nanking on April 7 the launching of the Northern Expedition. At a ceremony Chiang pledged that:
On this struggle depends whether the Party and nation will exist or die, whether principles will win out or fail, whether the people are to prosper or suffer, and whether our comrades flourish or fade. Comrades, from all our armies and people, be of one heart. Observe discipline strictly, follow orders, do not sacrifice wrongly, but do your best, stir up your spirit, and accomplish what is needed. We must swear to remove the Fengtien [Manchurian] and Shantung warlords, complete the national revolution, and implement the Three People’s Principles. Do not hold back in your love of country and the salvation of the people. Never turn your backs on the hopes of the people, but rather satisfy the souls in heaven of the Tsung-li [Sun Yat-sen] and those soldiers who have already died.12
That oath and the order that commenced the general offensive went out to the commanders at the front by telegraph—certainly exemplifying the interrelationship of nationalism and the Industrial Age.
Once again, as the offensive gained momentum, the value of unity and cooperation was obvious. While the First CA rolled north into Shantung along the Tientsin-P’uk’ou Railroad, Feng’s Second CA pressed in from the west. By the following week, on April 16, the First CA had progressed 156nearly fifty miles to Tenghsien, and the Second CA had moved toward the Yellow River taking Yünch’eng on April 13 and Chiahsing on the Grand Canal on the fifteenth. Seeing these pincers closing on the key city of Yenchou, Sun Ch’uan-fang hurled his forces against both fronts. Although he managed to push the First CA back nearly to the Lung-Hai Railroad, his western counterattack suffered during a flanking maneuver of the Second CA, which killed nearly 4,000 of Sun’s force. Meanwhile, the First CA quickly recovered its poise and by April 18 had thrown Sun back before he could fortify his gain. Besides exhausting his forces in the two-front counterattack, Sun then found his vital rail link to the north threatened by the Second CA at Chining. As might be expected, Sun pulled back along the railroad toward Tsinan on April 21, rather than risk having to retreat on foot into the Shantung highlands.13
Receiving information of the failure of Sun’s April 17 counterattack, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka and his Kwantung Army advisors decided to reinforce the foreign business quarter of Tsinan, the provincial capital of Shantung.14 Within two days, on April 19, Japanese marines were on the move by rail for Tsinan from Tsingtao. Some of these first Japanese units had landed as early as April 10, possibly without Tanaka’s approval. Arriving at Tsinan on April 20, the 475-man Japanese vanguard was followed by over 4,000 troops who had landed at Tsingtao.15 Had the Ankuochün generals invited the intervention of the Kwantung Army? In view of the surging anti-Japanese passions then loose in China, and the subsequent deleterious effect of that intervention on Ankuochün morale, an invitation seems less likely a statement of events than tacit acceptance. Certainly Chang Tso-lin was not the willing “running-dog” of the Japanese any more than Mao Tse-tung was later a puppet of the Russians. However, these allegations made good propaganda in a China where at least the xenophobic antiforeign element of nationalism was at high tide.
Sun Ch’uan-fang’s second line of defense was strung along the mountainous backbone of the Shantung peninsula. To the north of that spine, Sun defended the railroad from Tsinan out along the peninsula to the port of Tsingtao. When First CA units dashed over the range and flanked the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad on April 27 at Lung-shan station, the Ankuochün lost control of Shantung’s defense. After a two-day battle at Lung-shan, the First CA units of the Twenty-sixth Army and Ch’en T’iao-yüan cut off the Ankuochün’s use of the rail line out along the peninsula. Again, employing overland mobility and speed, the NRA had successfully evaded the enemy’s superior rail-borne artillery, and had threatened from the rear the loss of his rail communications.16 The NRA moving west along the railroad would take the Yellow River rail bridge before arriving at Tsinan; thus, Ankuochün forces around the capital region faced the prospect of being isolated on the south bank of the river—a situation not different from Sun’s dilemma at Shanghai preceding his retreat in March 1927. To prevent an Ankuochün retreat out onto the peninsula along the railroad, a battalion of engineers of the First CA sabotaged the line with explosives. In its rush to flee west, Sun’s force defeated at Lung-shan left behind over thirty boxcars of food and ammunition, and 300 soldiers.17 157
Once the NRA blocked the Ankuochün from retreating by rail out onto the Shantung peninsula, the rail bridge across to the Yellow River’s north bank remained the last avenue of escape. As Feng advanced along the south bank, which tightened the noose around Tsinan, the decision was made to evacuate the Ankuochün to the north bank. These units began to cross over the bridge on April 29, 1928; but as the general retreat sounded, order broke among the troops hurrying to escape across the bridge. Back in Tsinan, violence and looting erupted—characteristic of retreating Chinese troops. Defending the barricaded perimeter of the Japanese commercial and residential quarter, the tough Kwantung Army troops prepared themselves against any threat from the disorderly retreaters.
On April 30, 1928, the Chinese press reported a scuffle in Tsinan between Japanese and Chinese in which a Chinese had died of stab wounds.19 Since NRA engineers had sabotaged the railroad to Tsingtao on April 28, they most likely had come into contact with Japanese patrols. Tensions mounted as Japanese reinforcements continued to land at Tsingtao and proceed to Tsinan. The idea spread among the Chinese that the Japanese had found another pretext to seize Shantung, as they had in 1914. Attuned to the public outcry swelling against the Japanese “invasion,” which was linked to saving the Ankuochün from the NRA, Chang Tso-lin protested the action to Japan’s ambassador in Peking. By this time there were at Tsinan over 3,000 crack Kwantung Army troops with heavy artillery guarding an alleged 2,000 Japanese civilians, and another 2,000 Japanese soldiers patrolling the rail link with Tsingtao.20
The first NRA element to enter Tsinan was a large plainclothes force, which filtered in without fanfare, in accordance with the usual procedure. To encourage civilian cooperation and to gather intelligence, this vanguard probably included propaganda units from the new Political Training Department.21 Moving through Tsinan, on May 1 the vanguard secured the bridgehead on the north bank of the Yellow River after combat at Sang-tzu-tien.22 Reported by telegraph was the eyewitness observation of a resident American missionary, who witnessed that “the Southerners have occupied Tsinanfu without trouble. The situation at present gives no cause for concern.” After the Nanking Incident, foreigners were most anxious over the entry of the NRA. Disseminated by Reuters News Agency, this observation was apparently the last report out of Tsinan from nonofficial Japanese or KMT sources.23 Following this release, the press reported that an official Japanese radio (presumably of the Kwantung Army) was the “sole source” of news from Tsinan. Foreign press coverage that followed originated from Tokyo news agencies.24
159The First CA had approached Tsinan with apprehensions. The KMT’s Foreign Minister and his negotiator at Shanghai had been in contact with Japanese counterparts since January 1928, at least. (Chiang may also have discussed the safety of Japanese nationals in the path of the expedition during his autumn stay in Japan.) On May 2, the second day of the NRA occupation, Chiang guaranteed that order would be maintained in Tsinan. However, on May 3, full-scale conflict erupted between the Japanese at their barricades and Chinese troops, which the Japanese press reported to be units of Feng Yü-hsiang.25 The Japanese report was that undisciplined units or soldiers thereof had “run amok” robbing and massacring Japanese civilians.
Negotiations probably began immediately, but on May 4 the Japanese charged that their negotiator, Colonel Sasaki, was saved from being robbed and beaten to death only by the intervention of a staff officer from Chiang’s headquarters, and that an agreement with Chiang to clear all Chinese soldiers from the commercial district had not yet been honored.26 Thereupon, Major General Tatekawa Yoshiji of Japan’s Peking mission declared that “it is necessary for Japan to chastise the lawless Chinese soldiers in order to maintain Japan’s national and military prestige.”27 In light of the later claims of the Kwantung Army at the occasion of Chang Tso-lin’s railroad “accident” the next month and then the Chinese “provocations” on September 18, 1931, there is a strong temptation to disregard the Kwantung Army version of the Tsinan Incident. During the first week of May, Japanese reinforcements continued to enter Tsinan along the railway, despite the destruction of a portion of it by the NRA. Apparently, on the night of May 3, a Japanese unit en route from Tsingtao came as far as possible by train and then in a fast night march crossed the last fifty miles to Tsinan.28
Understandably, the Chinese version of Tsinan differed, but anti-imperialism had been a major ingredient welding diverse Chinese elements into a nationalistic whole. The abstract concept of imperialism may have become translated in the Chinese mentality as antiforeign feelings or xenophobia. Having not yet come into contact with the “foreign imperialists” before Tsinan, could Feng Yü-hsiang’s soldiers have lost their restraint? The Japanese already considered Feng to be outspokenly hostile to them.29 The Shanghai press quoted Feng as having asked permission at Tsinan to fight the Japanese “… to his last breath.”30 If indeed his troops did “run amok,” the Kwantung Army officers were quite eager to accept any challenge.
C-in-C Chiang found his worst fears about to be realized at Tsinan. During 1926 and 1927, Chiang appears to have spoken loudly against the “imperialists” while actually avoiding any provocation that they could have used as a pretext for military intervention. Antiforeignism was mainly a convenient political tool. Chiang at Shanghai had quieted the foreigners there following the antiforeign murders at Nanking. Chiang was mainly interested in the reunification of China as basic to defending China against foreign threats, and thus concluded at Tsinan that the NRA must not allow 160the Japanese to distract or divert it from completing the expedition. On May 2, the day before hostilities commenced in earnest, Chiang had ordered the main force of the NRA to proceed quickly through Tsinan so that their presence would not present the Japanese with a pretext for hostilities.31 Apparently on May 4, the second day of the incident, Chiang ordered all Chinese troops to cease returning the fire of the Japanese.32
Despite the distraction of the Japanese intervention, the Northern Expedition did continue north—probably faster than it might have otherwise. Once again the surge of “patriotism” that sprang from an encounter with foreigners acted as adrenalin in the Chinese body politic. Not only did the NRA soldiery feel an ideological boost, but the Ankuochün troops suffered a depression in their morale. Stirring their readers with gory pictures, tales of 3,000 Chinese killed, and untold soldiers and civilians wounded by the Japanese,33 the Chinese press exemplified the role that the press in general can play in nation building. The civilians of North China responded with sympathy for the NRA, who had earlier been referred to as the “Southerners,” and pondered the rumors of Ankuochün-Japanese collusion. Evidence that the Ankuochün suffered because of the Tsinan Incident can be seen in Chang Tso-lin’s effort to disassociate himself in the public eye from the Japanese. Not only did he disavow the alleged collaboration, he urged that the KMT drop its quarrel with him and unite North and South in a struggle against Japan. On May 9, he issued a public telegram stating that “… in view of the situation I have ordered my troops to cease hostilities to save the country.”34 The situation then was, in some respects, similar to that less than a decade later when Mao urged Chiang to cease fighting the CCP and join in the resistance against the Japanese.
In the CCP attack on Chiang in early 1927, rumors had been spread of his involvement with the Japanese, and in May 1928 the device was again used by the CCP to criticize Chiang for not righting the Japanese. In Hong Kong, British authorities kept check on a Communist campaign against Chiang led by the local branch GLU (outlawed in KMT territory), which accused Chiang of “uniting the nation only to surrender it to the Imperialists.” This propaganda went on to say that having lost the support of the peasants and workers and having forgotten the spirit of the Hong Kong Strike, the KMT cooperated with the imperialists in killing Chinese. The slogans in the campaign were:
Overthrow Chiang Kai-shek Who Has Betrayed Our Country and Killed Our People!
Oppose the Five Demands of the Japanese Imperialists which Have Been Accepted by the KMT!35
Thus, when the same device was used in the 1930s, it had already been tested during the previous decade, as had been many of the political means later perfected by the CCP. Actually, in China’s vast body of historical literature, there are numerous precedents of rulers who had been too distracted by internal division to deal with the menace of the northern 161barbarians, or who, in going off to suppress the nomads, found themselves overthrown at home. The question of priority is still quite relevant with regard to internal unity over national defense.
Chiang chose the attainment of internal unification as more vital than concern with any foreign menace. China’s vast spaces and teeming millions could prevent a sudden engulfment. (Perhaps the logic is not dissimilar to Mao’s when he opted to give the Cultural Revolution precedence over a confrontation with Russia.) On May 1, 1928, when the NRA vanguard had secured the north bank of the Yellow River at Sang-tzu-tien, it halted its advance until the main body could catch up. To avoid Tsinan where the Japanese used their artillery to bombard NRA positions and the nearby approaches to the rail bridge, Chiang ordered his First CA to detour south of the city and march upstream to fording points rather than to risk movement by train through Tsinan.36 The largest fording operation began at Tung-a.37 Some foreign press observers were not aware of the maneuver and claimed that the Japanese had succeeded in blocking the First CA from its movement north.*
As the NRA regrouped on the north bank, the Ankuochün set up a new defense line from south of Tehchou to Hsün-teh. Although during the first week in May, Peking put out peace feelers, Wu Chih-hui declared for the KMT that, rather than combine with Chang Tso-lin and the Manchurian clique, “the Northern Expedition will be continued and completed in the shortest possible time.”38 Following the Japanese intervention and with the succession of NRA victories, the KMT at Nanking enjoyed unprecedented public support and could afford to drop the earlier practice of first seeking the defection of warlord leaders. It was only after the Peking campaign that Nanking once again turned to diplomacy to win over Chang Hsüeh-liang, the son of Chang Tso-lin, rather than fight its way past Shan-hai-kuan into the Manchurian basin, where the NRA could provoke massive Japanese intervention.
1. N. Exp., vol. 4, pp. 14-28. TSKY, vol. 2, p. 570.
2. Ta-shih chi, p. 285.
3. MacNair, p. 132.
4. Ta-shih chi, p. 281.
5. Ko-ming wen-hsien, vol. 18, p. 13, quotes the public announcement from Nanking to Hsüchou.
6. Ta-shih chi, p. 287.
7. TSKY, vol. 2, p. 571. History of Political Work, vol. 1, p. 333.
8. Kuowen (April 8, 1928), n. p.
9. Ibid., p. 10.
10. Ibid. cites the Chung-yang jih-pao [Central daily news], Shanghai, KMT, 1928.
11. History of Political Work, vol. 1, p. 351.
12. Ibid., p. 344.
13. N. Exp., vol. 4, pp. 1227-1229.
14. TSKY, vol. 2, p. 575; Hugh Borton, Japan’s Modern Century (New York: The Ronald Press, 1955), pp. 312, 319.
15. U.S. military attaché, Peking, report of May 2, 1928 (National Archives MRD file 2055-2622(82).
16. N. Exp., vol. 4, pp. 1262-1265.
17. N. Exp., vol. 4., p. 1265.
18. Ibid., pp. 1246-1250.
19. Kuowen (May 6, 1928), n. p.
20. Kuowen (April 29, 1928), n. p.
21. History of Political Work, vol. 1, pp. 370-371. SCMP (May 2, 1928), p. 12.
22. SCMP (May 5, 1928), p. 12, cites the Shanghai Hua-ch’iao jih-pao [Overseas Chinese daily] of May 4.
23. SCMP (May 2, 1928), p. 12.
24. SCMP (May 7, 1928), p. 12.
25. Ibid., and SCMP (May 16, 1928), p. 11.
26. SCMP (May 7, 1928), p. 12. David Bergamini in Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972, p. 381) concludes that Japanese agents provoked the outbreak.
27. SCMP (May 8, 1928), p. 12.
29. Donald G. Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province 1911-1940. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 109. Hereafter cited as Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan.317
30. SCMP (May 9, 1928), p. 12, cites a Shanghai release of May 7.
31. History of Political Work, vol. 1, pp. 381-382, quotes report from a Foreign Ministry official returned from Tsinan, published in Chung-yang jih-pao (May 19, 1928). See Ko-ming wen-hsien, vol. 19, p. 5661. David Bergamini (p. 381) claims that the Japanese wanted to slow the NRA but that Chiang bypassed Tsinan and agreed to give Japan Manchuria.
32. SCMP (May 5, 1928), p. 14.
33. Kuowen (May 13, 1928), n. p. SCMP (May 18, 1928), p. 12.
34. SCMP (May 11, 1928), p. 10, which uses a Reuter release from Peking of May 10.
35. SCMP (June 2, 1928), p. 16, cites evidence used in a Hong Kong sedition trial.
36. SCMP (May 22, 1928), p. 10.
37. Pei-fa chien shih, p. 265.
38. SCMP (May 15, 1928), p. 10, cites Shanghai’s Hua-ch’iao jih-pao of May 14.
* George Sokolsky’s press report seems to have gained wide currency and stated that the First CA “sits in Hsüchou and holds Feng’s rear.” The fact that Chiang and the First CA headquarters did remain in the Hsüchou-Tsinan sector until late in May probably confused the issue.