The Expedition Moves Eastward:
The Kiangsi Campaign
In northern Kiangsi, the attack moved up and over the passes and down the stream that washed the mountain flanks. Sun Ch’uan-fang’s main forces were still en route to Kiangsi as the NRA quickly descended toward the rich lowland plain that slopes to Poyang Lake. The provincial capital, Nanchang, was immediately threatened. Farther south the major city of Kanchou fell after three days of attack, along with most of southern Kiangsi. Victory there was sped by the defection of Lai Shih-huang, whose Kiangsi Army Fourth Division had been deployed to defend against an attack from Kwangtung.1 The fresh tide of offense was still in flow on September 19 when the center prong swept down on Nanchang, whose dazed defenders fled.2 The sweep to Nanchang was to attract Sun’s fresh troops pouring into northern Kiangsi from recently arrived Yangtze steamboats.
In the north near the Yangtze, the NRA offensive ground to a halt against the vanguard of Sun’s reinforcements. Sun’s new troops halted the invaders and hurled them back toward the Hupei border in a fierce three-day counterattack.3 As the NRA frantically drew reinforcements from all possible sources, the besieging troops 100 miles away at Wuchang dropped to a skeleton force over a week’s span from September 10 to 16.4 Although the NRA had not yet met a decisive setback, its position in the Yangtze valley was obviously still quite vulnerable.
Sun Ch’uan-fang steamed from Nanking upriver to Kiukiang, Kiangsi, to personally direct the reinforcements that accompanied him. Landing on September 21, Sun cleared the lowland heart of the province, including 84Nanchang, within days.5 Having regained much territory in Kiangsi, Sun reasserted his authority by rounding up and executing hundreds of students, teachers, and KMT members suspected of collusion with the enemy. Radical students, male and female, were singled out by means of their short “Russian” haircuts, and dripping heads impaled on stakes in the public places of Nanchang and Kiukiang warned would-be sympathizers.6 Sun recognized correctly the subversive influence of the students and their teachers—many of whom were actively supporting the revolutionary movement.
At the Kiangsi front, the tempo of combat heightened throughout September. In several sectors the status of the NRA was grim indeed. In late September, there were reports that Chu P’ei-teh’s Third Army had fallen back from central Kiangsi into Hunan.8 Even Wang Po-ling’s First Division of the prestigious First Army retreated, badly mauled, across the mountains.9 (This jibes with Wang’s dismissal and deportation to Shanghai.10) Sun tried to coordinate his counteroffensive with Wu P’ei-fu’s besieged enclave at Wuchang by an ingenious landing on Lake Tayeh inland from the Yangtze dikes east of Wuchang. The landing on September 25 initially forced the Fourth Army back toward Wuhan,11 and along the entire front the situation from mid-September through all of October was one of desperate defensive measures and reverses.
Sun’s position was not entirely secure: his five-province army was even more loosely welded than was the NRA and the loyalty of subordinates in his five provinces of Kiangsu, Anhui, Kiangsi, Chekiang, and Fukien was questionable. A Peiyang Academy man from Shantung, Sun had little appeal for the southern gentry he was forced to acknowledge as administrators. Their fellow provincials continually nagged him with peace proposals and plans for provincial autonomy under his federation.12
From his precarious position during the ebb of NRA fortune, Chiang managed to negotiate with Sun. Earlier in September, Sun had offered not to press his offensive into Hunan in exchange for peace between Canton and his five United Provinces. With Sun’s counterattack in gear, Chiang 86telegraphed him that the KMT had no wish to enlarge the war and that, if Sun withdrew his reinforcements from Kiangsi, the NRA would withdraw from the Kiangsi territories it still held.13 Sun countered with an offer to halt his offensive at the Hunan border if Chiang would withdraw all NRA forces from Kiangsi.14 Sun’s bargaining position seemed firm but his counteroffensive had reached its high tide in late September.
In early October, the NRA began to hold its positions and then fight back. By October 5, Sun’s thrust toward Wuchang had been foiled and his units reembarked on Yangtze steamers that took them back to Kiangsi.15 There, a stiffening NRA fought Sun’s troops back down to the lowlands where lay the Yangtze port of Kiukiang and the arterial railway south to Nanchang.16 On October 3, the NRA severed communications via that railway at Tehan.17 Sun countered with a fierce charge that retook the railroad town and threatened to flank the Seventh Army, which was holding that sector.18 On the seventh, a combined force of KMT armies futilely stormed a fortified hill that dominated the railway at Yanghsiu. Sun’s inner lines held and by the end of the day’s combat had forced the NRA hurriedly back up into the mountains.19
To the south at Nanchang, the conflict raged back and forth in mid-October with the capital won and lost several times. Pouring in reinforcements, both sides staked all in their efforts to hold the rich core of Kiangsi.
Republic Day, October 10, held a good omen for the KMT at Wuchang. With hope ebbing after Sun’s relief column failed and in desperate need of food, key units of Sun’s force defending the besieged city quietly opened the gates to the city walls and allowed the NRA to take the city that day.20 When the NRA had earlier negotiated the evacuation of the sick, the old, and the infants from Wuchang’s garrison, nearly 100 had been stampeded to death in the rush to leave. Unable to rally support, Wu impotently bided his time in Honan.
During the latter half of October, the pitch of combat lowered—the NRA licked its wounds and Sun looked to a threatening political situation to his rear. Causing him anxieties over his control of the lucrative, “golden” city of Shanghai was a rebellion that threatened to erupt throughout the lower Yangtze region. In Shanghai, from early October on, various Chekiang dissidents had met in the sanctuary of the foreign concessions to discuss with Shanghai coconspirators the secession of Chekiang from Sun’s United Provinces.21
The Chekiang Rebellion within Sun’s United Provinces
During the preceding month, these Chekiang elements had pestered Sun by telegram to block from entry into the United Provinces “aid” from the Manchurian and Shantung generals.22 Heading the All-Chekiang Association (Ch’üan Che Kung-hui) was Ch’u Fu-ch’eng who had ties with the provincial supporters of fellow Chekiangese Chiang Kai-shek. Coordinating their movement with the NRA attack going on before Nanchang, the association telegrammed Sun on October 15. They demanded that the Chekiang units fighting for Sun in Kiangsi be returned to duties in their 87home province and that Chekiang be allowed to rule itself. But did these Chekiang dissidents represent nationalistic aspirations? Within this movement for provincial autonomy, articulate gentry presented ideas ranging from traditional provincialism and the mistrust of Southern Chinese for Northern Chinese to the more modern nationalistic and social concerns of the Kuomintang.23 From Canton, Chiang’s supporters backed the rebellion of Hsia Ch’ao, Sun’s civil governor of Chekiang and the prime intermediary between overlord Sun and Hsia’s fellow provincials.
In Chekiang, provincial loyalties had been strong during the late Ch’ing when local gentry became notoriously resistant to the dictates of Manchu Peking. During the warlord era, three leading commanders of Chekiang military had become quite adept at conceding suzerain power to a succession of outside regional overlords while consolidating their own local autonomy. Their superiors, mainly northern militarists, had been forced to conciliate Chekiang independence movements, which erupted sporadically in 1916, 1917, 1922, 1924, 1925, and 1926. The Chekiangese, a microcosm of the Chinese, were badly divided by topography and local economy, and failed to unite effectively against the oppressive northerners. Wealthy and influential merchants of Ningpo felt stronger kinship with the expatriate magnates of Shanghai than with the rural gentry of the hinterland. The key leaders of Chekiang’s provincial forces, likewise, represented differences in background and perspective. Hsia Ch’ao, Chou Feng-ch’i, and Ch’en Yi were the Chekiang commanders whose defections to the National Revolutionary Army were so crucial to the conquest of that province and to warlord Sun Ch’uan-fang’s loss of the lower Yangtze valley.
All three had gained political influence in the province through their military power, derived from the modern military training they had received during the final decade of the Ch’ing. Although from different parts of Chekiang, Hsia Ch’ao and his protégé Chou Feng-ch’i had common school ties from the province’s military academy, the Chekiang Wu-pei Hsüeh-t’ang, and were close associates—both important ties in traditional terms.24 From there they had moved into military posts under a succession of military governors and had become identified with a clique of Chekiang officers called the Kung-huo Tang,25 and with a smaller faction, the Shih Hsiung-ti (Ten Brothers).26 In 1916 and again in 1919, Hsia had also used the national influence of the Anfu clique to rise above his local rivals to become chief of the Provincial Police, a key post in Chekiang’s hierarchy.27 Needing natives to act as middlemen, successive Anfu tuchüns (military governors) had allowed Hsia considerable local power and the expansion of his police force. In this manner Hsia’s personal force had grown from several thousand to over 5,000 by 1925.28 Hsia had helped Chou Feng-ch’i gain a brigade command in one of Chekiang’s three divisions, and both were in a position by 1924 to bargain with Sun Ch’uan-fang. Under their Anfu ruler from Shantung, Lu Yung-hsiang, the issue of provincial independence had been used as a means to increase Lu’s popularity in 1921, 1922, and 1924. The flurry of interest in 1921 resulted in the drafting of the Chekiang Constitution—a political form holding almost mystical power for 88Western-trained Chinese. In that same year, Sun Yat-sen at Canton, powerless but ambitious, promoted provincial rebellions in Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechwan, and Hunan that would remove oppressive overlords and open the way for cooperation in a federal republic under Sun.29
By 1924 the outsiders in the top ranks of the provincial hierarchy caused Hsia Ch’ao, Chou Feng-ch’i, and Ch’en Yi to feel politically frustrated. When a struggle erupted between their Anfu overlord and the Chihli Tüchun in neighboring Kiangsu, they saw a chance for change. From his vantage point in Fukien, another Chihli military governor, Sun Ch’uan-fang, saw an opportunity in the Chekiang-Kiangsu War for him to move into Chekiang on the pretext of aiding his Chihli brother in Kiangsu. By this circuitous process, typical of the warlord era, Sun Ch’uang-fang marched his Shantung troops into Chekiang after gaining the defection of the dissident Chekiang commanders guarding the border. Conspiring with Sun against their Anfu superior were chief of the Chekiang Provincial Police Hsia Ch’ao, and Brigade Commander Chou Feng-ch’i, joined by Brigade Commander Ch’en Yi.30 Easing Ch’en’s relationship with Sun was their common background at Tokyo’s Army Officers’ Academy, the Shikan Gakko. The three Chekiang officers profited well from Sun’s venture, which saw him add not only Chekiang to his domain but expand his interests into the lush lower Yangtze valley.
By the autumn of 1925, Sun had manipulated provincial feelings in the southeastern provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhui, and Kiangsi to the extent that he was able to lead a military confederation to halt and throw back an invasion by the hated northern mercenaries of the Manchurian faction. For their support in these victorious campaigns of 1924 and 1925, Sun promoted his Chekiang subordinates: Hsia became Chekiang’s civil governor as well as head of provincial police, Chou advanced from brigade to divisional commander of Chekiang’s Third Division, and Ch’en Yi moved up to command Chekiang’s First Division. Having set up the United Provinces with Nanking as his capital, Sun Ch’uan-fang then transferred Chou and his division there to stand garrison duty under his surveillance, and moved Ch’en Yi’s division to guard Kiangsu’s northern march at Hsüchou. In this manner, while apparently granting a degree of autonomy to Chekiang, Sun also removed Chekiang’s largest provincial military units from their home base. Given the prevailing standards of warlord politics, the Chekiang commanders had been well treated. With his Chihli faction in power during 1924, Sun had the Peking Government legitimize the promotions for his new Chekiang lieutenants.
Although Sun’s relationships with the Chekiang commanders were based on nothing firmer than the rewards that came with their new titles, the arrangements were mutually supportive. When a provincial independence movement broke out at Ningpo in October 1924, the rebellion was against Sun’s new provincial administration as much as it was against Sun. Therefore, Sun held Hangchow with his troops while he dispatched his Chekiang lieutenants to suppress the Ningpo rebels.31
89However, by October 1925, Civil Governor Hsia Ch’ao was disgruntled with Sun’s supervision and, when Sun moved victoriously to Nanking, Hsia assumed that Sun would turn Chekiang over to him. Thinking that Sun was safely distracted by the management of his United Provinces, Hsia and a new independence movement engineered a declaration of autonomy and another constitution,32 and sent out a call for Chekiang’s two divisions to return home. Sun responded by sending troops to squelch the bid for provincial autonomy and installed his own man from Shantung, Lu Hsiang-t’ing, as the military governor.33 Showing remarkable resiliency, Hsia conceded to Sun’s superior military power and actually extended his welcome to Sun’s new military governor when Lu arrived in Hangchow.
Hsia’s interests had remained those of provincial autonomy. His recalcitrance toward Sun as an “outsider” (wai-sheng-jen) was matched by his obstructionist efforts against Westerners trying to exploit Chekiang through their prior Unequal Treaties. His reputation with foreigners was of being “notoriously backward in recognizing foreigners’ rights,” which made it “… practically impossible for any foreigner to conduct business in Chekiang according to the treaties.”34
For Sun Ch’uan-fang, the year 1926, in which Chiang Kai-shek launched the Northern Expedition, was not a good one in which to win over the independence-minded Chekiangese. In the province, depressed economically by a poor harvest in 1925 followed by floods and drought, Sun had to compete with the Chekiang commanders for revenue.35 After over a year of effort to consolidate his influence in Chekiang, Sun did not enjoy a solid base of support from either the local gentry or from his provincial middleman, Civil Governor Hsia Ch’ao. It was in this unsettled situation that Canton’s KMT leadership became interested.
Even before the Northern Expedition invaded Sun’s territory in Kiangsi, Chiang Kai-shek had attempted to negotiate with Sun as a Shikan Gakko classmate and to open communications with other subordinates.36 Although the KMT had an active party branch at Hangchow and many distinguished provincial members, Chiang could also negotiate through his spokesmen as a fellow Chekiang provincial and as a fellow graduate with Hsia and Chou Feng-ch’i of the Chekiang Military Academy, and as a classmate of Ch’en Yi at the Shikan Gakko.37 The KMT also utilized the friendship between Party member Ma Hsu-lün and Civil Governor Hsia Ch’ao. Ma was a native who had become involved nationally in the Party and in the Peking Government as a Minister of Education. In approaching Hsia on the possibilities of joining the National Revolution, Ma played on the dissatisfaction that he knew Hsia felt toward the predominance in Chekiang of Shantung military men.38 Outwardly Hsia remained neutral toward the National Revolution and told an interviewer that he opposed any outside rule over Chekiang—be it northern or southern.39
But, Hsia Ch’ao could see by October the spectacular progress made by the NRA through Hunan and Hupei, which presented him with yet another incentive to defect from Sun. To the winner would go the rewards. Apparently the KMT agents offered Hsia a place in a future KMT-influenced 90 provincial regime if he would cooperate in a conspiracy to weaken Sun’s rear area and thus decide the bloody battle then raging over Kiangsi. His new title under the KMT would be the equivalent of the military governorship that he had coveted for so long—the chairmanship of the Provincial Military Committee. At Canton, a special KMT congress met in mid-October 1926 to approve the sort of division of authority between nation and province that had already been promised Hsia and T’ang Sheng-chih of Hunan.40 Rather than risk the resistance of the provincial autonomists leading provincial forces in defending their homes, the KMT felt constrained to attract their support through compromise. Therefore, the KMT appealed more to Hsia’s strong feelings of provincialism than to the abstract national goals of the KMT. It was reported at that time that Hsia had only been outside Chekiang twice, on recent trips to Sun’s Nanking headquarters where he bargained for autonomy.41 Hsia could identify with anti-imperialism (or antiforeignism), and trusted Chiang Kai-shek, the NRA’s commander-in-chief, as a fellow provincial and as a military man trained at his alma mater, the Chekiang Military Academy.
During the hard-fought battle for Kiangsi occurred some of the heaviest fighting of the civil war era, and it was in that context that Hsia Ch’ao defected. Before Hsia’s coup, he had appealed to Chou Feng-ch’i at the Kiukiang sector of the battlefront to bring his Third Chekiang Division back to Chekiang, but Chou could not extract himself. Some of his units were at Sun’s Nanking headquarters as hostages, and furthermore the way back to Chekiang would be through hostile territory commanded by Sun. Some have claimed that Chou predicted defeat for Sun in Kiangsi and thus had urged Hsia to break away.42 Chou was also pressed to cease fighting and return to Chekiang by the All-Chekiang Association, which passed through Kiangsi.43 On October 14, Chou’s reserves at Nanking did attempt to flee, but were surrounded and disarmed.44 Only a few small units managed to return through Chekiang’s western mountains on the pretext of a cross-country exercise.45
At Hsüchou, northern Kiangsu, Ch’en Yi with his division refused to aid Hsia against Sun, perhaps under a threat from the nearby anti-Red Manchurians in Shantung.46 But Ch’en was also ambitious for status in his home province and may have felt that his rival there, Civil Governor Hsia, could offer him nothing more than a position beneath Hsia.47 The point is that with the other two Chekiang militarists either unwilling or unable to support him, Hsia’s mid-October rebellion was a gamble. Hsia hoped that with the element of surprise he might not only take Chekiang, but capture Shanghai as well.
However, on October 16 when Hsia, as he had before, declared the independence of Chekiang and boarded his troops on the train to Shanghai, his plans had already reached Sun—possibly via an intercepted telegram from Hsia to Chou.48 Another allegation has been that Ch’en Yi leaked Hsia’s request for aid as a means of eliminating Ch’en’s most powerful provincial rival.49 Approaching Shanghai, Hsia’s unseasoned armed police found the track blocked and had to march toward prepared defenses. After 91only a brief skirmish on October 17, at Shanghai’s western suburbs, the Chekiang rebels withdrew back to Chiahsing in Chekiang. In the meantime, the promoters of autonomy gathered in Hangchow.
On October 18, 1926, at a KMT-style mass meeting, the political activists at Hangchow publicized Chekiang’s independence from Sun and pledged support to Canton’s National Government.50 A new slate of provincial officials gathered around Hsia Ch’ao who accepted from the KMT the titles of provisional chairman of the Provincial Government Committee and commander of the Eighteenth Army in the NRA—Canton’s redesignation of Hsia’s provincial force.51 As the northern officials departed in haste, Hsia and his government appointed native heads to eight departments and certified new hsien leaders.52 But, once again, the bravado of independence was untenable.
Forewarned, Sun transferred loyal troops from Nanking by rail to the Chekiang border. By the morning of October 20, his well-trained northerners were rolling across the boundary and pounding the flimsy defenses Hsia had thrown up at Chiahsing. Both had railroad cannon, but Hsia’s fire was ineffective. Governor Hsia managed to escape with a few guards, but left behind a 6,000-man force that was untrained and hopelessly outmatched. By evening Sun’s men had crushed the Chekiang independence movement and rounded up hundreds of Chekiang soldiers whom they machine-gunned in the moonlight.53 Hsia Ch’ao was tracked down in his motor car and seized. To further dramatize the lesson to any subordinates who might be contemplating treason, Sun had Hsia shot in the street and decapitated, and ordered his severed head delivered to Nanking as a grisly reminder of Sun’s justice.54
The Battle for Kiangsi Renewed
Chiang, hoping to remain on the offensive, had all uncommitted troops thrown into the Kiangsi sector. Included were the fourth class of officers graduated in October from Whampoa Academy and rushed north to lead new recruits from Hunan and Hupei.55 The revitalized NRA began to crack Sun’s rather demoralized defense and to move forward. First Sun’s southern line sagged under the assault of the Second Army and the Fourteenth, a unit that had defected from Sun early in the Kiangsi campaign. By October 27, Sun’s units from southern Kiangsi were in retreat north through Nanchang.56
As the campaign entered November, the NRA gathered along the Hsiu valley for a push against the Kiukiang-Nanchang line defending the railway. Reinforced by the Fourth Army’s Tenth Division under Ch’en Ming-shu, the Seventh Army again swept down on the lowland defenses at Tehan. When the line crumpled there, the NRA cut the arterial rail line, which isolated Sun’s troops south along Poyang Lake. The capture of the ports of Kiukiang and Huk’ou on the Yangtze further strangled the provincial capital of Nanchang. By November 9, Nanchang had fallen and Sun’s troops were in general retreat down the Yangtze valley.57 As the momentum of the NRA offensive swept Sun’s remnants from Kiangsi, Chiang again 92sent his agent to offer Sun a role in the revolution and the coming unification of China.58
In the Kiangsi campaign, both sides had thrown their best troops into the intense two-month battle; the casualties were among the highest incurred in the Northern Expedition. According to official KMT records, the final week’s push to take the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railroad cost the NRA 20,000 casualties and the enemy 40,000.59 The longer preceding period of bitterly contested setbacks for the NRA may have cost it another 100,000. Victory for the NRA had also meant the capture of large amounts of needed arms and ammunition, which greatly expanded its fighting potential. At Nanchang alone, although the NRA suffered nearly 4,000 casualties, it took 15,000 prisoners and 20,000 rifles—enough to arm an army corps.60 The victory had been won despite the lack of heavy artillery, and thereafter other warlords would face a larger, better-armed, and battle-hardened enemy.
1. Ta-shih chi, p. 221.
2. Kuowen (October 3, 1926), n. p.; SCMP (September 30, 1926), p. 9, and (October 20, 1926), p. 9.
3. Kuowen (October 3, 1926), n. p.; SCMP (September 22, 1926), p. 9.
4. SCMP (September 25, 1926), p. 9. HKDP (October 5, 1926), p. 7. N. Exp., vol. 2, pp. 455-456.
5. Kuowen (October 3, 1926), n. p. China Mail (October 5, 1926), p. 9. SCMP (October 21, 1926), p. 9. New York Times (September 28, 1926), p. 9.
6. SCMP (September 30, 1926), p. 9, and (October 20, 1926), p. 9.310
7. SCMP (September 25, 1926), p. 8, and (September 30, 1926), p. 8. HKDP (October 7, 1926), p. 5.
8. Kuowen (October 3, 1926), n. p.
9. HKDP (October 1, 1926), p. 7. China Mail (October 5, 1926), pp. 1, 9. Kuowen (January 2, 1927), “Diary from the Siege of Wuchang,” quotes Sun’s press releases.
10. SCMP (December 2, 1926), p. 9. Wang, a member of the Whampoa faculty, is considered to have been a friend of Chiang.
11. China Mail (October 5, 1926), p. 9. N. Exp., vol. 2, p. 456.
12. Kuowen (September 19, 1926), p. 2.
13. Kuowen (October 3, 1926), n. p. SCMP (September 17, 1926), p. 9, and (September 30, 1926), p. 9.
14. Kuowen (October 3, 1926), n. p.
15. N. Exp., vol. 2, p. 456.
16. China Mail (October 5, 1926), p. 1. HKDP (October 8, 1926), p. 7. N. Exp., vol. 2, p. 467.
17. HKDP (October 13, 1926), p. 7. N. Exp., vol. 2, p. 518.
18. New York Times (October 8, 1926), p. 9.
19. SCMP (October 19, 1926), p. 9.
20. Kuowen (January 2, 1926), “Diary from the Siege of Wuchang.”
21. Kuowen (October 10, 1926), n. p.
22. Kuowen (September 19, 1926), p. 2.
23. Kuowen (October 24, 1926), n. p.
24. Hsia Ch’ao was born in Ch’ing-t’ien about 1881 (Kuowen [Aug. 22, 1926]). Chou Feng-ch’i was born in either 1880 or 1882 in Chang-hsing, northeastern Chekiang, according to the Tang-tai chung-kuo ming-jen lu, p. 134, or Chung-kuo kuan-shen jen-ming lu, p. 230.
25. Edwin S. Cunningham, U.S. Consul-General Shanghai, “A Brief Historical Sketch of the Political History of Chekiang Province since the Year 1911,” (Shanghai, 1925), p. 11.
26. Ma Hsü-lun, Wo tsai liu-shih-sui i-ch’ien [My life sixty years ago] (Shanghai: Sheng-huo Book Store, 1947), p. 96. Ma was a provincial KMT member who was a friend of Hsia and worked to gain his defection in 1926. Hereafter cited as Ma Hsü-lun.
27. Chung-kuo kuan-shen jen-ming lu [Lives of Chinese officials and gentry] (Tokyo, 1918), p. 366. Min-kuo chün-fa ch’ü-hsien [Interesting anecdotes on the warlords of the republic] (n. p.: Hsien-tai Pub. Co., ca. 1937), pp. 195-197.
28. North China Herald (September 20, 1925), p. 452, reported from Shanghai that Hsia had 10,000 armed police, while the British Consul at Ningpo, Chekiang, H.F.H. Derry, in “Quarterly Report to the Foreign Office” April 31, 1925, states Hsia had 5,000 police, and in Ch’en Pu-lei’s Kuo-min ko-ming chün chan-shih [A history of the battles of the National Revolutionary Army] (Nanking, 1936), chap. 2, p. 9, the number is set at 15,000 in 1926.
29. British Foreign Office report, series 405/231 no. 180, April 1, 1921.
30. Ch’en was born ca. 1883 in Shaohsing hsien according to Boorman, vol. 1, pp. 251-253.
31. U.S. Shanghai Consul Edwin S. Cunningham, October 29, 1924 (893.00/5801).
32. Tung-fang tsa-chih (January 25, 1926), vol. 23, no. 2, publishes the entire constitution, which is dated January 1, 1926.
33. U.S. Shanghai Consul-General Cunningham to Peking Legation, January 26, 1926 (893.00/7108).
34. U.S. Shanghai Consul-General Cunningham, November 20, 1926 (893.00/5853).
35. Shen Pao (June 14 and later September 11, 1926). Tung-fang tsa-chih [Eastern miscellany], vol. 24, no. 16, p. 4, “The Situatiion with the Farmers of Ch’ü-chou, Chekiang.”
36. In an interview at Yangmingshan, Taiwan, 1966, Sun Fo emphasized the vital significance of the subversion of provincial commanders, work with which he had experience as an intermediary carrying the prestige of his father’s name. Hong Kong Daily Press (April 19, 1926), p. 5, reports Sun Fo’s visit to Sun Ch’uan-fang.
37. Hsin chung-kuo jen-wu chih: Fen-sheng [The record of the personalities of new China: by provinces], edited and published by Huang Hui-ch’üan (Hong Kong: 1930), p. 272. U.S. Nanking Consul J.K. Davis, October 30, 1926 (893.00/7913).
38. Ma Hsü-lun, pp. 95-96.311
39. State Department Diplomatic vol. 1237 on Chekiang Affairs, U.S. National Archives.
40. North China Herald (Shanghai) (October 23 and 30, 1926). Hereafter cited as NCH. Reuter reports from Canton dated October 19 and 23. SCMP (October 21 and 28, 1926), p. 8.
41. U.S. Shanghai Consul Cunningham to Peking Legation, November 2, 1926. U.S. National Archives (893.00/7876).
42. Ma Hsü-lun, pp. 96, 110. U.S. Shanghai Consul Gauss to Secretary of State, December 6, 1926. U.S. National Archives (893.00/7990).
43. Kuowen (September 19, October 10, 24, 1926), n. p.
44. U.S. Nanking Consul J.K. Davis, October 15, 1926, reported the “mutiny” firsthand from the neighboring consulate. Report to U.S. Legation, Peking, U.S. National Archives (893.00/7838).
45. Ta-shih chi, p. 228. Ch’en Pu-lei, Min-kuo ko-ming chün chan-shih [A history of the battles of the National Revolutionary Army], vol. 2, p. 103. U.S. Naval Intelligence Report, CO. of U.S.S. Isabel to Yangtze patrol at Shanghai, October 21, 1926, WA-7: Isabel, U.S. National Archives.
46. U.S. Nanking Consul J.K. Davis to F. Mayer at the Peking Legation, October 25, 1926, U.S. National Archives (893.00/7925).
47. Min-kuo chün-fa ch’ü-hsien [Interesting anecdotes on the warlords of the republic], p. 199, report of Shanghai Consul Cunningham, October 21, 1926. Shen Pao (October 20, 1926), p. 5. Story reported in Boorman, vol. 1, p. 252.
48. U.S. Nanking Consul Davis to Peking Legation, October 25 (893.00/7925).
49. Boorman, vol. 1, p. 252.
50. Shen Pao (October 22, 1926), p. 6.
51. Ta-shih chi, p. 228.
52. Shen Pao (October 20, 1926), p. 5. Ta-shih chi, p. 228, claims the Political Affairs Committee included the KMT’s contact, Ma Hsü-lun.
53. U.S. Shanghai Consul Cunningham to Peking Legation, October 17, 1926, U.S. National Archives (893.00/7755).
54. Min-kuo chün-fa ch’ü-wen [Interesting anecdotes about the warlords] (Shanghai, n.d.), pp. 201-202.
55. SCMP (October 30, 1926), p. 9. TSKY, vol. 2, pp. 534-535.
56. N. Exp., vol. 2, p. 551. SCMP (October 26, 1926), p. 9.
57. N. Exp., vol. 2, pp. 554-556.
58. History of Political Work, vol. 1, p. 296.
59. TSKY, vol. 2, pp. 528-529. SCMP (December 2, 1926), p. 9.
60. SCMP (November 19, 1926), p. 9, cites Chu P’ei-teh’s telegram to Canton.