When the KMT established on July 1, 1925, its “National Government” in opposition to Peking, it counted on several sources of power, which added up to an increasingly viable operation. Less dramatic than the Hong Kong Strike but vitally important were the jen ts’ai, men of ability, who came to Canton to help build a new China. Most noticeable among these were students returned from abroad with their newly acquired modern economic and political know-how. These urban elites were the rationalizers and systematizers who the KMT believed could build a modern national system. An example of the new technocrat was T.V. Soong whose role in creating a fiscal foundation was crucial.
He was born into the energetic Soong merchant family. Educated at Shanghai’s mission-run St. John’s College and then at Harvard in business administration, Soong then had gained experience by working for three years at the large International Banking Corporation of New York. He returned from New York to serve Sun Yat-sen as an English secretary and financial advisor.1 Soong’s credentials were enhanced by the family tie to Sun Yat-sen’s wife Soong Ch’ing-ling, also T.V.’s sister. Against nepotism as an evil of Chinese ways, Sun had hesitated in 1924 to appoint his talented brother-in-law to any post higher than that of head of Canton’s Central Bank. That post, however, for Soong at the age of thirty-four was a demanding and rewarding challenge.
The Central Bank soon exemplified to practical Chinese observers the soundness of the national revolutionary movement. Up to that point regional 14 militarists, like Wu P’ei-fu, with no education in rationalized finances solved financial problems by carting away the silver reserves of banks in their newly conquered territories. Sun Ch’uan-fang in the southeast and Chang Tso-lin in the northeast forced merchants to accept payments in overissued scrip. In contrast, at Canton the Central Bank was accumulating one of the largest silver reserves of any official bank in China of the 1920s. Backed by these reserves, Canton’s currency and fiscal integrity became increasingly respected by the treaty port elites. Carefully husbanded capital met payroll needs and underwrote the military machine that later was to roll north.
Soong accepted appointment as Finance Minister in the new National Government in September 1925. Backed by the Party and its army, the Finance Minister revamped and collected taxes with vigor and efficiency. The struggle to pull China back together again and oust the foreign powers could not be waged on antiforeign rhetoric or ideology alone. The Boxer’s attempt had proven this earlier. Soong and other technocrats helped provide a material base for the revolution. His rationalized procedures greatly curtailed traditional “squeeze” and official profiteering, thereby more than quadrupling Canton’s revenue from about C$800,000 for July 1925 to C$3,616,000 for October of that year.2
The selection of Kwangtung as a base for a national revolution was not surprising in that the city of Canton faced the sea, and the Cantonese had been among the first Chinese drawn into the trade-born currents of the modern world of nation states. According to reserved northerners, the Cantonese were considered rather impetuous and pushy, but certainly innovative. With the environs secure under the KMT military, the Party leaders moved the old city toward modernization. Other examples of the modern elite at Canton who aided the KMT would be the mayors who administered the municipal government in 1925 and 1926—Sun Fo, only son of Sun Yat-sen, and C.C. Wu (Wu Ch’ao-ch’u).
Sun Fo had studied municipal administration at Columbia University where he received a master’s degree in 1917 following his undergraduate work at the University of California.3 C.C. Wu was another returned student who served first as Sun Fo’s aide and then as mayor. Wu was the son of the famous diplomat and scholar, Wu T’ing-fang, and had been educated first in Washington, D.C., and then at Harvard. He had also earned a law degree in London in 1911. At twenty-six, quite familiar with the West, Wu gained experience with the Peking Government’s Foreign Ministry and then with the Constitutional Drafting Committee. Joining Sun Yat-sen’s movement in 1917, Wu participated as one of Canton’s representatives at the frustrating Versailles Peace Conference where the Western powers sold out China to an imperious Japan. By his mid-thirties Wu had served as Canton’s Vice-Minister and then full Minister of Foreign Affairs.4
Both Sun and Wu exemplified the energetic returned student eager to apply his modern training to China’s pressing needs. They were also sons of revolutionaries, the postrevolutionary generation coming into its own. 15However, as modern as they seemed, their status was also dependent to some extent on their family ties. Sun Fo promoted razing Canton’s ancient city walls and replacing them with paved boulevards despite considerable resistance from the residents. However, when property values rose along the new, wider thoroughfares, burghers came with petitions to widen other ancient, narrow streets. Once securely in power in Canton, such KMT leaders promoted programs for sanitation, road construction, flood control, dredging Canton’s waterways, social reform, and labor unionization. All these programs for urban modernization had to share a limited budget dominated by the needs of the expanding Party Army. Thus, it was mandatory that the leadership rationalize Canton’s finances, planning monthly expenditures and accounting for municipal revenues through both stringent daily and monthly audits.5 The experts with national aspirations who ran Canton could not afford the luxury of “squeeze.” These young leaders of Canton typified the modern elite of the treaty ports who were attracted to Canton by its aura of hope and accomplishment. Elsewhere in China hung the pall of frustration permeated by stagnation and regressive warlord leadership, which ignored modern skills and slowed China’s return to unity and an ability to defend herself. Inland from the modern ports were rural problems that were to test severely the new capabilities of the modern urban leaders—both KMT and CCP.
By 1925 much of the rapid rate of change at Canton could be traced to the tighter organization of the KMT after its restructuring and rationalization along Russian lines. “Democratic centralism” apparently supplied the political cohesion that Sun Yat-sen had found lacking. During China’s disappointing experiments with Western-style parliamentary democracy after the Revolution of 1911, Sun had observed that Chinese society was like a dish of sand—it needed something to bond it into a solid entity. Earlier KMT efforts at gathering popular support through labor unions had been slowed by warlord suppression and lack of coherent issues and ideology. After 1923, with the incorporation of Comintern experts and Chinese Communist Party organizers trained in organizational technique, the KMT labor movement expanded at a faster pace.6
In Kwangtung, the unionization of labor turned from the rather limited gathering in of skilled workers to one based on a broader industry-wide appeal. In Canton’s new National Government, the organizers created departments that dealt with workers, peasants, women, merchants, and soldiers. Significantly, the overseas Chinese, who had been long-time supporters of the revolutionary movement and the KMT, rated a separate department. The talent of the returned students and the modern-educated urban elite were very much in evidence within these agencies.
Heading the Workers’ and Peasants’ departments from late 1925 until his departure on the Northern Expedition in mid-1926 was Ch’en Kung-po. Although earlier an associate of the new CCP at Peking University, Ch’en apparently severed formal ties with that party before leaving China to enroll at Columbia University as a student of economics. His chosen field typified the emphasis placed by modern Chinese students upon the study 16of practical fields that would elevate China materially. Having earned a Ph.D., he joined the ranks of returned students when he came back to Canton following Sun Yat-sen’s death.7 There he became a protégé of Russian-oriented Liao Chung-k’ai and Wang Ching-wei, both closely associated with Sun and counseled by Michael Borodin of the Comintern.8 Ch’en and his associates in the KMT and CCP spurred on the organization of workers in Canton by means of strikes, interunion conflicts, and demands for higher wages. This approach was a cause of intraparty dispute since it strained the KMT theory of a “union of classes,” which stressed in some degree harmony between workers and their employers.
In the coming contest for China with the warlords, military leadership was to be crucial and, here again, the modern elites dominated Canton’s military. Sun Yat-sen and other Western-influenced followers had learned well, as they endured their odyssey of exile, that democratic institutions were quite vulnerable and defenseless in China, and that military power was needed if they were to grow. The military system of the KMT also emulated Russian models and received daily direction from hundreds of Russian military advisors assigned to Canton. The success of the Red Army during Russia’s civil war was proof that an army could mean life and death to political power.
The Party Army of the KMT, as it was first called, began to show promise in 1924 almost immediately after the creation of the officer’s academy at Whampoa, across the river from Canton. The graduates, cadets, and their enlisted trainees served as the model for an expanding number of “armies” led by militarists allied with the KMT movement. This nucleus was known also as the Student Army through its student membership and ties with the Whampoa Academy,9 and then as the First Army when the KMT began to gather military allies as newly numbered “armies” that were integrated into the National Revolutionary Army of the Northern Expedition. However, only the First Army could be labeled a truly Kuomintang army. Initially it had been formed by the KMT’s Military Council from units and regiments of Whampoa cadets; but by late 1925 preparatory branch academies at Huichou and Ch’aochou, Kwangtung, also fed into the First Army, and KMT agents recruited volunteers in Shanghai and other cities.
Manifesting the KMT’s enthusiasm for Whampoa and the Party Army was the use of high Party leaders as instructors in academy courses. Chairman Wang Ching-wei taught Party history, Hu Han-min taught the Three Peoples’ Principles, Finance Minister Liao Chung-k’ai was the administrator, and Chiang Kai-shek—Sun’s closest military follower—was the superintendent of the academy. The aim of the academy was to forge a zealous, politically indoctrinated force loyal to Sun’s ideals and obedient to Party discipline. Since it was to serve the new Chinese nation, the Party strove to recruit for its army on a nation-wide scale.
These efforts in army recruitment also reflected the rationalized, organized approach of the young leadership. Sun had set up a recruiting committee in 1923 and then committee branches, the first of which was in that sanctuary of revolutionary subversion, the foreign enclave of Shanghai. 17 Ch’en Kuo-fu headed the Shanghai operations,10 which drew in the first cadet recruits not only from the surrounding Kiangsu, Anhui, and Chekiang areas, but, surprisingly, twice as many from upriver in the Hunan-Kiangsi region.11
Farther north, recruiting was carried on through Party branch headquarters, such as the one in Peking where Lu Yu-yü contacted fellow Shantung provincials studying in various universities in the metropolis.12 Even Mongolian, Tibetan, and Thai party members brought in army recruits. Thus the national scope of the movement proved more attractive to potential recruits than did the regional orientation of its opponents. The inclusion of various ethnic elements also lived up to Sun’s ideal of integrating non-Chinese minority groups in the nation-to-be.
The success in recruiting both for the KMT’s civilian and military organizations involved capturing the imaginations of the young students of Chinese middle schools and universities. The propagandizing by teachers and professors won over many; others read of the movement in the writings of sympathetic or partisan journalists.13 Some Whampoa recruits gave Shanghai newspapers as their addresses in Shanghai.
The minds of many Chinese intellectuals were ripe for the nationalistic movement and KMT leadership. Modern colleges and universities had attracted the ambitious youth of a society in a state of degeneration. Public institutions, however, faced hard times as warlord administrations cut educational funds in order to pay military expenditures. At one point in the mid-twenties, Ts’ai Yüan-p’ei, president of prestigious Peking University, resigned over cuts in funding, and the nonpayment of coal bills nearly closed the institution. Faculties were underpaid and overburdened. The expanding student bodies, crammed into shoddy dormitories, seethed with discontent and frustration. Among the graduates, even the elite found their talents wasted in warlord bureaucracies or in the drudgery of translating for arrogant foreigners, or they were unemployed. The premodern, largely rural, economy of China could not absorb the skills of these graduates, a problem common to developing nations anywhere, but exacerbated by the effects of foreign economic exploitation in China. Naturally, many of these educated youths found themselves in agreement with the KMT’s goals of urban modernization.
Under the influence of KMT educators, some universities became centers of the national revolutionary movement. Shanghai University’s president and Party faithful, Yü Yu-jen, brought partisan intellectuals into the faculty and furthered recruitment of students for Whampoa and the movement in Canton.14 As modern as the movement may have appeared, its recruitment practices incorporated the timeless Chinese awareness of provincial ties. President Yü at Shanghai recruited students and youth from his native Shensi, just as some of those bound for Canton included students recruited by Mao Tse-tung entirely from his home province of Hunan. Other collaborators at Shanghai University included such famous Communists as Ch’en Tu-hsiu and Ch’ü Ch’iu-pai in the Sociology Department.15
18The partisan newspaper Min-kuo jih-pao [Republic daily] certainly aided the work of Ch’en Kuo-fu’s recruiting agency in Shanghai. The involvement of the press in Chinese politics was typified by its editor, Yeh Ch’u-ts’ang, who in 1925 was concurrently an administrator of the KMT-oriented Shanghai University, a member of the Party’s Shanghai Executive Committee, and a member of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) at Canton.16 Yeh’s ties reveal the common interaction in national movements among members of the press, universities, and political parties.
Thus, a variety of KMT-allied bodies in the Shanghai area gathered Party recruits and channeled the young talent of the vast Yangtze basin into Ch’en Kuo-fu’s recruiting agency, which then arranged for temporary lodging, stipends, and transportation to Canton. Northern Chinese, recruited through Party agencies in Peking, slipped past warlord police and out through the foreign concessions at Tientsin where they boarded Russian steamers, most of them bound for Canton via a screening process at the Shanghai office.17 Most of the zealous young modern elite went to officer training at Whampoa from educational institutions. Of those from lower socioeconomic levels who had flocked to Shanghai seeking any manner of employment, some were attracted by the NRA’s promise of regular meals and pay, as well as rapid promotions up through its ranks. Such operations at Shanghai processed over 5,000 recruits during 1925, the year preceding the Northern Expedition. There, too, the financial stability of Canton counted since each recruit cost the agency an average of C$21 for a steamship ticket, pocket money, and canned rations for the voyage, in addition to the bribes to local warlord officials and KMT informants.18
As vital as was recruiting work outside Kwangtung, some in the KMT who promoted a quick commencement of the Northern Expedition to reunite China could not wait for the trickle of individual volunteers to fill out the numbers needed in the Party’s military system. The decision was made to attract wholesale defections of units and to include defeated troops into KMT ranks. Earlier, in 1924, a KMT force had defeated near Canton a “merchant corps,” which was partially absorbed, as were units of Ch’en Chiung-ming and later the Yunnan-Kwangsi soldiers of the warlords Liu Chen-huan and Yang Hsi-min, who were defeated in June 1925. These were grouped into the Second Division of the First or Party Army.19 Thus, even within the purest partisan military unit, there were elements that had entered without politically correct motives. More defeated troops had swelled the ranks in October 1925 after the victories of the Second Eastern Expedition against Ch’en Chiung-ming and the conquest of southern Kwangtung. The KMT military leadership had come to feel that the sheer force of numbers would be crucial to success (an attitude common in Chinese armies throughout history). The inclusion of these forces would also deprive an opponent from fielding them against the NRA.
At Whampoa this concern with moving forward the start of the Northern Expedition caused Chiang to order that the academy’s entrance requirements be lowered, if necessary, to enroll enough officer candidates. The Whampoa graduates were in great demand to help indoctrinate and train 19the influx of newcomers, a task that continued into 1928. By late 1925, having drawn from various sources of soldiery, the KMT’s First Army had grown to a force of over 10,000, dominated by Whampoa’s superintendent, Chiang Kai-shek.20 Supporting this military army were other sources of KMT strength—political and administrative leadership, rationalized organization, and nation-wide efforts. The priority given to military means in the coming struggle for national power was evidenced in the KMT budget, the lion’s share of which in 1925 and 1926 went into military buildup. Even in Kwangtung, the KMT military had been vital in consolidating the province as the Revolutionary Base.
This expanding demand on the Party coffers to cover military expenditures heavily strained the resources of a single province. KMT resources had to cover the arms, ammunition, clothing, food, transportation, salaries, and a variety of equipment (even to aircraft) that made for a relatively modern fighting force. Expenditures stretched to the limit the innovative talents and efficiency of the Finance Ministry’s tax collectors. Overseas Chinese contributed to meet a part of the need. Despite their efforts, the young KMT administrators could not eliminate a partial dependence on foreign aid. Sun Yat-sen had been forced to solve this need earlier, first by seeking aid from the West, the United States in particular,21 and then by taking from Russia what was offered through the Comintern. The extent of this aid from 1924 to the break in KMT-Russian relations in 1927 is still open to speculation. Neither the KMT nor Kremlin archives on this period are available. The USSR is understandably reluctant to divulge its role in the KMT’s national revolution—the leadership of which it sought hard after but lost. Even during the alliance, Russia was discreet in sending aid to Canton so as not to provoke the anti-Communist warlords with which Russia was dealing, nor to incur a blockade of such aid by anti-Communist powers.
In October 1926, when Russian Ambassador L.M. Karakhan was pressed on the matter by Western reporters, he retorted that Canton had received “… not one ruble! … It is all talk!”22 However, Karakhan’s military attaché had earlier informed V. Galen (also known as Bluecher or Blyukher), the chief Russian military advisor at Canton, that the USSR had from 1924 to December 1925 delivered on credit to the KMT materiel valued at 2 million rubles.23 Thus, indeed, Canton may not have received any rubles. Contemporary Western observers in their anxiety over the revolutionary movement probably exaggerated Russia’s material involvement in it. Just months before the July 1926 launching of the Northern Expedition, the foreign press in the treaty ports alleged that Russian aid totaled $40 million, including $12 million credit to back Canton’s Central Bank.24 The account admitted, however, that “so far there are no exact figures in Kuomintang journals.” Part of this materiel aid was in the form of arms and ammunition sold on credit, the quality of which has been criticized by surviving KMT members. A similar credit arrangement between 20Russia and Canton allowed Cantonese purchase of oil at a low price; Canton’s National Government in turn retailed the oil products as a profitable monopoly.25 The Russian aid gave Borodin, as head of the Russian advisory mission, considerable leverage in influencing KMT decision-making.
The advisory effort was invaluable during and after the creation of Canton’s self-proclaimed National Government, formally instituted on July 1, 1925. In 1925 there were as many as 1,000 Russians in Kwangtung advising the KMT on programs that ranged from the organizing and leading of mass organizations to the teaching of aviation. Earlier, in 1923, Sun Yat-sen had dispatched Chiang Kai-shek to Russia to evaluate the Russian military system, after which Chiang requested that Moscow assign as an advisor to the KMT General Galen, who became for a time the head of the military and technical advisory effort.26 Between Chiang and Galen, Chiang’s junior by two years, there developed mutual respect and a valuable rapport.27 In their capacity as advisors and instructors at the Whampoa Academy, Galen and other Russians undoubtedly raised the military standards of both the academy and the expanding KMT military establishment.28 Ironically, that improved force was to be used within less than four years to prevent CCP dominance.
As the leader of the mission to Canton, Moscow had appointed Michael Borodin—an agent with a fascinating background in international intrigue and revolutionary activity on both sides of the Atlantic. Specifically, Borodin provided expertise in the organization of the masses, in propaganda, political work in the military, and the development of the Hong Kong Strike apparatus.29 Madame Borodin, an American, assisted in the active women’s movement of the KMT. The two “universities” in Moscow created to train selected Chinese students in political technique and Marxist history contributed to Canton’s pool of human resources.30 Borodin’s presence at Canton also represented Russia’s support to Canton’s National Government, a psychological and diplomatic asset for the KMT. Another intangible aid was the use of official Russian steamers in transporting KMT agents and recruits back and forth along the China coast in diplomatic immunity.31
Any listing of the resources available at Canton must include Canton’s arsenal. Although the KMT had to purchase arms and munitions abroad, in addition to the Soviet military aid it received, the Canton regime hoped to become self-sufficient. In the mid-twenties, the leaders of the various opposition regional regimes centered their armies around their arsenals. In 1925 the Canton Arsenal was one of the five major arms producers in China. Many of the arsenals could be traced back to the self-strengthening efforts of the late Ch’ing restoration leaders. Rebuilt in 1921 to incorporate new U.S. machinery, the Canton Arsenal publicly claimed to produce 700,000 bullets and 750 rifles monthly, but this was still obviously inadequate to meet the needs of a proliferating NRA seeking to conquer all the opposing warlords of China.32
The arsenal, too, gained from the KMT’s nation-wide recruiting efforts. 21Ch’en Kuo-fu’s Shanghai agency helped by hiring scarce experts, who worked alongside Russian advisors in the production of small field cannon and trench mortar, weapons which Canton was able to produce in limited numbers by 1925.33 These middle-range weapons were well suited to the NRA’s operations in the rugged ranges of South China, where weapons had to be carried by coolies along footpaths to circumvent the heavy firepower of the warlords’ railroad cannon in the valleys. Restricted as the KMT was to its Revolutionary Base in Kwangtung, it lacked the resources to expand the production of the arsenal to the point of self-sufficiency.
To the north in Hupei, Wu P’ei-fu’s British-patronized regime depended on its Hanyang Arsenal, which boasted an output triple that of Canton’s.34 In far-off Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin’s Mukden arms industry also flourished, supported in part by Japanese aid. By 1926, the dream of self-sufficiency in armaments first drew the attention of Chiang and other promoters of national military reunification to Wuhan’s Hanyang Arsenal and to the great Kiangnan Arsenal of Shanghai downriver. Although observers have made a strong case for Chiang’s attraction to Shanghai’s banks, the large arsenals there and at Nanking were equally prized.
1. Kuowen chou-pao (February 26, 1927), “Biography of the Week.” Hereafter cited as Kuowen. China Yearbook 1928, ed. by H.E.W. Woodhead (Tientsin, December 1927), p. 1157. Hereafter cited as China Yearbook 1928. Vincent Sheean, “Some people from Canton,” Asia 27(10):815-817. Hereafter cited as Sheean. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, ed. by Howard L. Boorman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), vol. 3, pp. 149-150. Hereafter cited as Boorman.
2. John M. Roots, “The Canton Idea,” Asia 27(4):285-288. Hereafter cited as Roots, “Canton Idea.” 1st Workers’ Movement, p. 165. This CCP study does not mention T. V. Soong 302but compliments “the ability of the finance officials” of the Canton government.
3. Boorman, vol. 3, pp. 162-165.
4. China Yearbook 1928, pp. 1155, 1178. Boorman, vol. 3, pp. 412-413.
5. Roots, “Canton Idea,” p. 346. The author cites his interview with Mayor Sun Fo.
6. From a 1966 interview with Sun Fo, who stressed that Russian advisory assistance was more valuable than was their aid in arms or money.
7. T’ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1930), p. 340. Hereafter cited as T’ang Leang-li.
8. Kuowen (July 25, 1926), “Canton Labor Unions,” pp. 9-10.
9. From a 1966 interview with General Ho Ying-ch’in, Taipei.
10. Ch’en Kuo-fu, Huang-p’u chien-chün shih-hua [Short history of establishing the army at Whampoa] (n.p.:1944). Hereafter cited as Ch’en Kuo-fu. Also included as a selection in Ko-ming wen-hsien, pp. 27-36.
11. From a list of entrance examinees for Whampoa’s first class, the photostat of which, showing the Kuomintang headquarters letterhead, is held at the National Military Historical Museum, Taipei.
12. From an interview in Taipei, 1966, with Lu Chün-yüeh, brother of Peking KMT leader Lu Yu-yü who was garroted by Chang Tso-lin after the raid on the Russian Embassy in April 1927.
13. From an interview in Taipei, 1966, with Liu Tsu-ch’iang who was a KMT student activist in Peking during the mid-1920s when he worked on a popular student newspaper.
14. Hsien-tai shih-liao [Contemporary historical materials], vol. 3 (Shanghai: Hai T’ien Publishing Society, 1934), p. 81. Hereafter cited as HTSL.
15. K’ang-chan yi-ch’ien-te Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an-tang [The Chinese Communist Party before the war of resistance] 2nd ed. (Chungking?: Sheng-li Publishing Agency, 1942), p. 26. Hereafter cited as CCP before the War.
16. CCP before the War, p. 26. At least as early as 1925, tension between the KMT-CCP collaborators was evident at Shanghai where Yeh Ch’u-ts’ang and CCP activists Ch’en Tu-hsiu, Ch’ü Ch’iu-pai, and Mao struggled for status in Shanghai University’s leadership and on the Shanghai KMT Executive Committee. See also HTSL, p. 81. Kuowen (May 15, 1927), “Biography of the Week.”
17. Interview in Taipei, 1965, with Liu Chü-ch’üan, head of the KMT’s Peking branch Women’s Department in 1926.
18. Ch’en Kuo-fu, passim.
19. Interview with General Leng Hsin, in Taipei, 1966, who studied and then taught in the Political Department at Whampoa from 1925 to 1926.
20. C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Sien-ying How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism, and the Soviet Advisors in China 1918-1927 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 191. Kisanka’s report on the KMT military from the documents seized in 1927 at the Russian Legation. Hereafter cited as Documents. See R. Landis, “Training and Indoctrination at the Whampoa School,” chapter in Nationalism and Revolution: China in the 1920’s, ed. by F.G. Chan and T. Etzold (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976).
21. Interview with Sun Fo.
22. HKDP (October 2, 1926), p. 1.
23. Documents, p. 169. Many additional reports of aid to Canton also in U.S. National Archives, Military Records Div. collection seized in the 1927 raid on the Soviet Embassy, MRD file no. 2657-I-281, items 20, 69, 79, 120 and others. See also U.S. Canton Consul Jenkins reports to State Department, such as May 29, 1925 (893.00/6393).
24. HKDP (April 6, 1926), p. 5.
25. Interview with Sun Fo, Yangmingshan, Taiwan, 1966, and in the HKDP (October 15, 1926), p. 5.
26. Documents, p. 150.
27. As late as 1938, as a wartime emissary to Moscow, Sun Fo was instructed by Chiang to request Galen’s return to China as an advisor. Initially, Stalin did not respond to that name until an aide remembered that General Bluecher had been known as Galen. Stalin then told Sun that Galen had been “liquidated” that year for allowing Far Eastern Army secrets to leak out via Japanese female spies who lived with him. See also Vera V. Akimova, Two Years in 303Revolutionary China, 1925-1927 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 223-225. Hereafter cited as Akimova.
28. Roderick L. MacFarquhar, “The Whampoa Military Academy,” Papers on China IX (August 1955), p. 157.
29. According to Sun Fo, this expertise was more valuable than Russia’s materiel aid.
30. Vincent Sheean, “Moscow and the Chinese Revolution,” Asia 27(6):468-486. Hereafter cited as Sheean, “Moscow.”
31. From an interview with Li Ch’ao-ying in Taipei, 1965, who traveled secretly in this manner for the KMT during 1925 and 1926. This is corroborated by the intelligence gathered by the U.S. military attaché in Peking, report dated September 9, 1926, in U.S. National Archives Military Records Div., file no. 2657-I-281(64).
32. China Yearbook 1928, p. 1283. By late 1925, Russian military advisor Kisanka reported to the Russian military attaché at Peking that the arsenal produced 125,000 cartridges weekly. From a translated document seized in the 1927 raid on Russian’s Peking Legation, Documents, p. 193.
33. Ch’en Kuo-fu, chap. 5.
34. China Yearbook 1928, p. 1282, includes data from 1926 and 1927.