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Index

Page numbers in italics indicate references to figures.

 

  • Abatement costs, 231–232
  • Affordable Care Act, 79
  • Afforestation, 85
  • Air pollution
    • damages from coal plants, 25–27, 29n10
    • from motor vehicles, 27–28
  • Ambition, 3–4, 181, 196
    • aligned self-interest and, 33–34
    • carbon pricing rewarding, 81
    • declines with free-riding, 8
    • -science gap, 211–212
    • upward spiral of, 7
  • Barrett, Scott, 61
  • Beccherle, J., 180
  • Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 184
  • Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), 153
  • Burden sharing, 100
    • common and differentiated responsibilities, 106–107
    • costs of adjustment and, 102–103
    • flexibility in making commitments, 104–106
    • Kyoto Protocol problem and, 101–102
    • partial versus general equilibrium in, 103–104
    • price targets and, 159–160
    • principle, 54–55
    • voluntary versus enforceable agreements, 104
  • Business-as-usual (BAU) emissions, 231–232, 237
  • California cap-and-trade system, 51
  • Cancún agreement, 212–213
  • Cap-and-trade system, 7, 46–47, 229–230. See also Kyoto Protocol
    • Chinese permit shortage (1999)
    • compared to carbon pricing, 173–176
    • failures, 176–178
    • freestyle negotiations ending in deadlock, 74–75
    • global, 50–52
    • for greenhouse gases, 92–93
    • modified, 137–141, 146n18
    • not pricing carbon emissions, 72–73
    • opportunity costs with permits, 72
    • potential time inconsistency, 193–194
    • prediction-error trading risk, 66
    • problems with, 40–41
    • profits from permits, but not for countries, 72
    • risk of, 65–70
    • successes and shortcomings, 71–76
    • transparency, 237
    • treaty negotiation problems, 73
    • volatility under, 192–193
  • Carbon, social cost of, 174–175
  • Carbon capture and storage (CCS), 153
  • Carbon convergence, 213–215
  • Carbon leakages, 167
  • Carbon pricing
    • add-on mechanism based on carbon-capture potential, 85
    • ambition and aligned self-interest in, 33–34, 81
    • central role in Climate Clubs design, 118–120
    • as cheap, 48–49
    • climate externalities and, 13
    • common price target for, 157–159
    • compared to other mitigation instruments, 28n1, 173–176
    • computing the right price signals in, 173
    • cooperation and, 31–35
    • domestic environmental considerations and, 14–20
    • in effective climate policy, 154–156
    • efficiency gains from, 16–17
    • eliminating huge trading risks, 80
    • emissions, 50
    • enforcement, 44–46, 61–65, 77–78, 190–192
    • EU countries and, 84–85
    • fairness in, 54–55
    • fiscal considerations for individual nations, 20–21
    • flexibility of, 10, 105–106
    • frequently asked questions about, 82–85
    • global commitment, 10, 41–43, 52–54
    • governance, 33, 56, 62, 86n2
    • for greenhouse gases, 93–96
    • history of climate negotiations and, 126–128
    • as ideal basis for common commitment, 4–5, 7–8
    • inequality and, 171–172
    • interaction with climate fund, 58–59
    • international floor arrangements, 13–14, 22–23, 24
    • legal process, 200n20
    • misconceptions about, 24–25
    • monitoring and corruption, 228–229
    • multilevel pricing, 86n8
    • narrow self-interest and, 31–33, 43
    • nationally efficient price levels, 18–20
    • necessity of uniform, 170–179
    • negotiating quantities versus, 128–133, 141–144
    • one-dimensional negotiation, 181–184
    • "pledge and review" approach, 9
    • potential time inconsistency, 193–194
    • preventing too low, 55–56
    • price versus quantity, 60, 128–133, 145n6, 145n9, 189–190, 226–228
    • pricing carbon emissions, 80
    • problems with, 76–80
    • reasons for correct, 47–50
    • resilience to shocks, 200n19
    • rewarding environmental ambition, 81
    • risk reduction through, 230–232
    • simple global climate model for
    • simplicity of, 81
    • stopping free-riding, 81
    • theory of negotiating uniform, 133–137
    • volatility under, 192–193
    • welfare gains from, 15–16
  • Carrot-and-stick approach to enforcement, 194–195
  • Certainty equivalent model, 70
  • Clean Air Act Amendment of 1990, 184, 185
  • Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 172
  • Climate change
    • coal renaissance and, 152–153
    • effective policies, 154–156, 202n29
    • free-rider problem with, 7, 8, 113
    • as global commons problem, 91–92, 99–101, 165–170
    • greenhouse effect and, 149–150
    • mitigation as costly in the short run, 168–170
    • negotiations (See Negotiations, climate)
    • nonprice policies, 191–192
    • policy (See Policy, climate)
    • reasonable climate protection targets and, 153
    • self-interested response to, 1–3
  • Climate Clubs, 110
    • central role of carbon prices in, 118–120
    • description of, 114–115
    • elements of treaties and, 116–117
    • free-riding as key obstacle for climate-change treaties and, 113
    • games and international behavior, 115–116
    • global public goods, federalism, and the Westphalian dilemma and, 111–112
    • illustrative results, 121–122
    • as mechanism to overcome free-riding, 113–114
    • modeling, 120–121
    • nature of global public goods and, 110–111
    • sanctions for international agreements about global public goods, 117–118
  • Climate justice, 212–213, 215–216
  • Coalition-DICE (C-DICE) model, 120
  • Coalition of willing, 104
  • Coal power, 152–153, 154–155
  • Coase, Ronald, 135, 145n11
  • Command-and-control approach, 170–171
  • Commonality of common commitment, 4
  • Common commitment, 8–9
    • carbon pricing, 4–5
    • costs of adjustment and, 102–103
    • defining global price, 225–226
    • enforcement, 44–46, 61–65
    • flexible (See Flexible commitments)
    • formula failure for quantities, 75–76
    • monitoring and corruption, 228–229
    • necessity of, 4–5
    • as not national policies, 225
    • promoting international agreement, 221–222
    • protection against free-riding, 9
    • realistic treaty design, 55–59
    • real-world coalitions, 62–63
    • reciprocity of, 4, 33–34
    • treaty enforcement, 44–46, 61–65
    • waiting game with, 233
    • without instruments, 212
  • Common price targets, 157–159
  • Commons
    • commitment game, x–xi, xiii
    • cooperation in, ix, xi
    • Elinor Ostrom on, ix, 4, 33
    • negotiation design and, x
  • Compliance and carbon charges
  • Convergence, carbon, 213–215
  • Cooper, R. N., 41, 226
  • Cooperation, xi, 3–4, 8
    • ambition and aligned self-interest in, 33–34
    • enforcement and, 232–233
    • free-riding and, 34–35, 38–39
    • narrow self-interest and, 31–33, 43
    • pledge-and-review approach, xii, 7, 8, 9, 39–40
    • problem and solution, 38–43
    • simple global climate model and, 43–44
    • treaty enforcement, 44–46
  • Copenhagen agreement, 9, 99–101, 179, 210–211. See also Flexible commitments
    • climate justice and, 212–213
    • Kyoto Protocol problem and, 101–102
  • Corruption, 228–229
  • Countervailing force property of carbon pricing, 136
  • Cramton, P., 38, 54, 57, 74, 182, 183, 186, 187, 226
  • Deniers of free-riding, 35
  • De Perthuis, C., 187
  • Domestic environmental benefits of carbon pricing, 14–20
  • Durban Conference (2011), 211–212
  • Effective carbon prices, 23, 24
  • Electricity taxes, 29n15, 87n14, 171
  • Emission rights, 101–102
    • auctioned, 105
  • Enforcement, treaty, 44–46, 232–233
    • cap-and-trade, 61–65, 192
    • carbon pricing, 77–78, 190–192
    • carrot-and-stick approach to, 194–195
  • Equity transfers, 78–80, 83–84
  • Ethics-based justice, 216
  • EU Emissions Trading System, 50–51, 52, 160–161, 175, 178–179
  • European Energy Tax Directive, 29n12
  • European Space Agency (ESA), 192
  • Fairness, 54–55
  • Federalism, 111–112
  • Figueres, Christiana, 33
  • Fiscal considerations in carbon pricing, 20–21
  • Flexibility mechanisms, 208–209
  • Flexible commitments, 99–101, 104–106, 107–108
    • common and differentiated responsibilities, 106–107
    • costs of adjustment in, 102–103
    • failure of current approach to, 101–102
    • partial versus general equilibrium, 103–104
    • voluntary versus enforceable agreements, 104
  • Fossil fuels pricing, 78, 151–152
    • coal power and, 152–153
    • local externalities and, 191
  • Frankel, Jeffrey, 66–68, 75–76, 78
  • Free-riding, 3, 7, 8, 38–39, 99
    • carbon charges for greenhouse gases and, 96–97
    • carbon pricing stopping, 81
    • Climate Clubs as mechanism to overcome, 113–114
    • common commitment protection against, 9
    • cooperation and, 34–35
    • deniers of, 35
    • as key obstacle for climate-change treaties, 113, 126
    • by one country causing breakdown in total cooperation, 35–36
    • participants' fears of being "suckers" due to, 36
    • US opposition to, 37–38
  • Freestyle negotiations, 74–75, 187
  • Fund, climate. See Green Climate Fund
  • Fundamental scarcity problem of the atmosphere, 150–152
  • Gasoline pricing, 78
  • Global Burden of Disease project, 26
  • Global commission on the Economy and Climate, 213
  • Global emission targets, 181–184
  • Global positioning systems (GPSs), 110–111
  • Global public good(s)
    • federalism, and the Westphalian dilemma, 111–112
    • global environment as, 99–100
    • global warming as externality of, 125
    • nature of, 110–111
    • sanctions for international agreements about, 117–118
  • Global warming gridlock, 126, 144n3
  • Gollier, Christian, 40, 57, 74, 230, 232, 233, 235
  • Gore, Al, 38
  • Governing the Commons, 36
  • Green Climate Fund
    • flexible financing of, 106–107
    • formula, 56–58, 59–60, 234–237
    • interaction with carbon price, 58–59, 159–160
    • transfers, 78–80, 83–84, 234
    • transparency considerations
  • Greenhouse effect, 149–150
    • fundamental scarcity problem of the atmosphere and, 150–152
  • Greenhouse gases (GHGs), 91, 149
    • benefits of reducing, 166–167
    • burden sharing and, 100
    • carbon charges for, 93–96
    • compliance with carbon charges for, 96–97
    • economic approach versus command-and-control for, 170–171
    • fundamental scarcity problem of the atmosphere and, 150–152
    • international cap-and-trade system for, 92–93
    • nonprice policies and, 191–192
  • Green Paradox effect, 160
  • Group reciprocity, 64–65
  • Gruber, Jonathan, 79
  • Harberger triangles, 15, 16, 102–103
  • Heine, D., 17, 18, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28–29n8
  • Herfindahl index, 197–198n1
  • Hiding of transfers, 78–79
  • Hollande, François, 206
  • Hot-Air AAUs, 185, 223, 239n4
  • Hotelling's rule, 173
  • Hume, David, 116–117
  • Incentives, carbon pricing, 77, 209–210
  • Inclusiveness, 209
  • Individual commitment
    • game, x
    • treaty, 44–45
  • Inequality, income and wealth
  • Intake fractions, 26
  • Integrated assessment models (IAMs), 120
  • Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), 2, 39
  • Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 165–166, 174
  • International Energy Agency (IEA), 77, 207, 213
  • International Monetary Fund (IMF), 77, 96, 195, 197, 214
  • Jouvet, P.-A., 187
  • Justice, climate, 212–213, 215–216
  • King, Martin Luther, Jr., 165
  • Kyoto Protocol, ix, 3, 7, 9, 37, 39, 47, 60, 80, 126, 205, 207, 210, 216–217nn3–5, 230. See also Cap-and-trade system
    • based on "emission rights," 101–102
    • Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 172
    • failures of, 109–110, 139, 176–177, 196, 208, 222–223
    • formulas, 75
    • freestyle negotiations, 74–75
    • legacy of, 223–225
    • legally binding emissions reductions, 126–127
    • as model for global cap-and-trade, 50–52, 71
    • no global government with, 71–72
    • not pricing carbon emissions, 72–73
    • safety of business-as-usual targets and, 66–67
  • Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 194
  • Li, S., 18, 25, 26, 27, 28–29n8
  • Liability system, 198n3
  • Lis, E., 18, 25, 26, 27, 28–29n8
  • Market Stability Reserve mechanism, 202n29
  • Merkel, Angela, 206
  • Mitigation as costly in the short run, 168–170
  • Monitoring, carbon pricing, 77–78, 228–229
  • Mortality rates, 26, 29n17–18
  • Motor vehicles
    • emissions, 27
    • externalities, 27–28
  • National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), 192
  • Nationally efficient carbon prices, 18–20
  • N-dimensional negotiation, 184–185
  • Negotiations, climate, 141–144. See also Policy, climate
    • ambition-science gap and, 211–212
    • brief history of, 126–128
    • building carbon convergence and, 213–215
    • design, x
    • freestyle, 74–75, 187
    • Kyoto's legacy for, 223–225
    • legally weak agreements, 210–211
    • modified cap-and-trade, 137–141, 146n18
    • n-dimensional, 184–185
    • one-dimensional, 181–184
    • prices versus quantities, 128–133, 145n6, 145n9, 189–190
    • reducing the dimensionality of compensation, 185–189
    • renewing commitment to, 196–197
    • theory of negotiating uniform carbon price and, 133–137
    • unflattering carbon footprint of, 207–210
    • waiting game, 233
  • 1999 International Energy Outlook, 67
  • Nonbinding agreements, 212
  • Noncooperative (NC) game theory, 115–116
    • elements of treaties and, 116–117
  • Nonexcludability, 110–111
  • Nonprice policies, 191–192
  • Nonrivalry, 110–111
  • Nordhaus, W., 56, 174, 222, 226, 229
  • Obama, Barack, 79
  • Ockenfels, A., 182, 186, 187
  • One-dimensional negotiation, 181–184
  • Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 171, 230
  • Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 48
  • Ostrom, Elinor, ix, 4, 34, 36, 38, 43, 86n4, 167
    • on common-pool governance, 33, 56, 62, 86n2
    • on necessary central core, 63
  • Pareto superior arrangements, 100
  • Paris agreement, ix, 75, 126–128, 127, 134, 139–140
    • climate policy challenge and, 156–157
    • collective goals and inequality in individual contributions, 1–3, 38, 205–207
    • enforcement, 9, 37
    • lack of ambition in, 3–4, 196
    • as legally weak, 210–211
    • omission of built-in reciprocity, 34
    • pledge-and-review approach adopted at, xii, 7, 8, 9, 39–40, 179–181
    • transparency and, 184–185
  • Parry, I. W. H., 17, 18, 21, 25, 26, 27, 28–29n8
  • Pledge-and-review approach, xii, 7, 8, 9, 39–40, 179–181, 223–225
  • Policy, climate. See also Negotiations, climate
    • burden distribution in, 159–160
    • common price target in, 157–159
    • as costly in the short run, 168–170
    • effective, 154–156
    • enforcement (See Enforcement, treaty)
    • EU ETS, 50–51, 52, 160–161
    • international commitments as not national, 225
    • Paris and, 156–157
    • reasonable climate protection target and, 153
    • recommendations for, 161–162
    • renaissance of coal and, 152–153
  • Posner, E., 171
  • Prediction-error trading risk, 66, 73–74
  • Q global cap, 40–41, 42
  • Quantity versus price instruments, 60, 128–133, 145n6, 145n9, 189–190, 226–228
  • Realpolitik, 187
  • Reciprocity of common commitment, 4, 33–34
    • common price target and, 157
    • enforcement and, 63–65
    • equity transfers, 79–80
    • group, 64–65
  • Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 51, 177–178
  • Renewable energies, 152, 155–156
  • Rosenfeld, Art, 48
  • Sanctions for international agreements about global public goods, 117–118
  • Schelling, Thomas, 134, 135, 145n10
  • Science-based efficiency, 215
  • Self-governance, 33, 56, 62, 86n2
  • Self-interest, narrow, 31–33, 43
  • Shocks, resilience to, 200n19
  • Social cost of carbon, 174–175
  • Solar power, 171
  • Stiglitz, J. E., 103, 222, 223, 226
  • Stoft, S., 38, 41, 54, 57, 74, 182, 183, 186, 187, 226
  • Subsidies of carbon-emitting industries, 103
  • Symposium on International Climate Negotiations, 213
  • Taxes, carbon, 20–21, 48–49, 87n16, 128–133, 145n6, 198n5. See also Carbon pricing
  • Tax swaps, 48–49
  • Technology, 4, 201n22
    • improvements and carbon emission goals, 107
  • Tirole, Jean, 40, 57, 74, 180, 194, 230, 232, 233, 235
  • Tragedy of the commons, 182
  • Transactions cost, 135, 145n11
  • Transfers, climate fund, 78–80, 83–84, 234
  • Transparency, 79, 184–185, 209
  • Treat design, realistic, 55–59
  • Treaties. See Negotiations, climate
  • Undersupply, 99
  • United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), ix, 39, 42, 56, 95, 132, 179, 208
  • Veung, C., 17, 21
  • Victor, David, 144n3
  • Volatility, carbon price, 192–193
  • Voluntary versus enforceable agreements, 104
  • Weisbach, D., 171
  • Weitzman, M. L., 38, 74, 187, 199n7, 222, 226
  • Westphalian dilemma, 111–112
  • Wind power, 152, 154, 171
  • World Bank, 33, 77, 213
  • World Climate Assembly (WCA), 131–132, 137
  • World Health Organization (WHO), 26
  • World Trade Organization (WTO), 77, 96, 195, 197

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Acknowledgments

Additional Information

ISBN
9780262340380
Related ISBN
9780262036269
MARC Record
OCLC
1053193568
Launched on MUSE
2018-09-19
Language
English
Open Access
Yes
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