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Perception in Aristotle's Ethics

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
Published by Northwestern University Press

Rabinoff, Eve.

Perception in Aristotle's Ethics.

Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2018.

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NOTES

Introduction

1. Translations of *Nic. Eth.* taken from Bartlett and Collins (2011), occasionally modified.

2. Moss (2011), 205, cites Cooper (1975), 64; Hardie (1968), 213; Broadie and Rowe (2002), 49; McDowell (1998), 30; Joachim (1951), 218; Greenwood (1909), 51; and Irwin (1975), 578.

3. Gendler (2008), 642.

4. There is recent work that attempts to soften the opposition between Aristotle and Kant. Korsgaard (1996) argues that Kant has a similar concern with emotions that Aristotle does, and that Aristotle's notion of acting for the sake of virtue itself is similar to Kant's account of moral worth.

5. Even Adam Smith, for whom morality is largely manifest in one's sentiments and emotions, the privileged perspective is that of the "impartial spectator" (*The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, III.i.2).

Chapter 1

1. Moss (2012) argues that Aristotle is an empiricist concerning practical life in the same way that he is an empiricist concerning theoretical learning. In both cases, perception is the source of the principles from which thinking and reasoning happen. This is a very promising way of interpreting Aristotle's thinking about the role of perception in human life. I would like to add to this thesis the corollary that for ethical life, perception continues to serve as a necessary and irreducible component of cognition. One will not be able to reason and act well unless the particulars with respect to which one acts are perceived *as* calling for action.

2. Jennifer Whiting, "The Locomotive Soul" (2002); Klaus Corcilius and Pavel Gregoric, "Separability vs. Difference: Parts and Capacities of the Soul in Aristotle" (2010); and the third chapter of Thomas Johansen's *The Powers of Aristotle's Soul* (2012).

3. Whiting (2002) takes the parts of the soul to be separable *both* in *logos* and in magnitude, by virtue of being realized in different "nonoverlapping" parts of the (single, unified) body (152); Corcilius and Gregoric (2010) reject this and instead understand separability in magnitude to require independently existing magnitudes. According to Corcilius and Gregoric, different capacities realized in, say, the heart and the brain do not mean that they are *separable* in magnitude, only that they are different (114–16). Johansen (2012) takes Corcilius and Gregoric to task on the question of *why* these capacities are parts of the souls of which they are parts, and complements their reading by considering the relationship of the part to the whole (see 57n31). Johansen argues that the parts *are* parts by virtue of distinguishing different *kinds* of soul—plant, animal, human, divine (59–62).

4. See Whiting (2002), 142–45; Corcilius and Gregoric (2010), 96–103; and Johansen (2012), 54–59.

5. Translations of *De anima* II–III are taken from Hamlyn (1968), occasionally modified slightly.

6. Translations of *De memoria* are taken from Sorabji (1972), occasionally slightly modified.

7. Corcilius and Gregoric (2010), 100.

8. *Ibid.*, 95–108.

9. Johansen (2012), 56–59.

10. Whiting (2002) takes a different position. She takes separability in magnitude to be the distinguishing feature of the parts of the soul, and separability in definition to distinguish the basic from the derivative powers housed in a part of soul (152–55). As a result, she takes the *locomotive* capacity to be a part of the soul, consisting of the capacity for desire (*to orektikon*), the capacity for perception (*to aisthētikon*), and the capacity for *phantasia* (*to phantastikon*). Although her argument is quite ingenious, the position is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it seems to make the bodily makeup of an organism prior to and determinative of the nature of the parts of the soul, whereas Aristotle says that the soul is the ruling element of the body (*De anima* 410b11–13). Second, it seems more difficult to disentangle the bodily system that supports nutrition and reproduction from the systems that support perception than it might at first seem. If the capacity for perception is ultimately located in the heart (as Aristotle claims at, e.g., *De somno* 455b34–456a6), it is located in an organ that is also a part of the nutritive system (*De partibus animalium* 647a24–31). Rather than take the nutritive part and the perceptual part of the soul to be separable *both* in place *and* in account, as Whiting does, I take it that they are separable *only* in account from one another, and that what distinguishes the relationship between the parts of the soul from the relationship between the powers of a single part of soul is that the powers of the part of soul are *not* separable even in account, but are merely different in account. See Corcilius and Gregoric (2010), 114–18, for other criticisms.

11. Whiting (2002), 145.

12. Johansen (2012), 54–55.

13. There is some controversy concerning exactly what the common sense (*aisthēsis koinē*) referred to here amounts to. See Everson (1995 and 1997), 148–57; Modrak (1987); and Gregoric (2007).

14. As Hamlyn (1968) says, “Commentators usually object to the notion of seeing that something is sweet, but there can be no valid objection to speaking in this way; the objection presumably stems from the prejudice that there must be an intrinsic connexion between sight and its objects if we are to speak of seeing at all. The phenomenon in question is no doubt a product of learning or experience, but this does not make it any the less a case of seeing” (118–19).

15. Modrak (1987) makes a similar point (70).

16. See Everson (1997), 187–93.

17. See Merleau-Ponty (1962), “Introduction.”

18. Citing *De insomniis* 458b31–459a3 on perceptual error, “to see or hear incorrectly can only happen to one who sees or hears something real, although not what he supposes” (Everson’s translation), Everson argues that “here, the subject does not perceive what he takes himself to perceive. What he does actually perceive he does not recognize—so recognition cannot be a condition for it to be true that someone perceives an accidental sensible” (191). But to misrecognize is to misperceive—*some* incidental perceptible must enter into the content of the perception in order to be a *mis*perception—and the real thing

one perceives may refer to the special sensibles. Similarly, one may mis-see that the white is sweet—sweet enters into the content of the perception—and this is only possible when one sees what is really white.

19. Translations of *De insomniis* taken from Hett (1936).

20. Modrak (1987), 69.

21. Cashdollar (1973), 168–70.

22. I discuss incidental perception in Rabinoff (2015a).

23. Reference to a unified perceptual faculty is found four times in *De anima* (425a30–31, 426b21, 427a9, and 431a20), three times in a long passage in *De sensu* (449a7, 449a14–16, 449a17–18), three times in a passage in *De memoria* in which Aristotle is identifying the faculty to which memory belongs (450a10–11, 450a11–12, 450a14; summarized at 451a15–18), and three times in a passage in *De somno* (455a15–16, 455a19, 455a20).

24. For the former, Modrak (1987), 62–65; Johansen (2005), 271; for the latter, Everson (1997), 144–57; Grgoric (2007).

25. As do Kahn (1966), 67; Kosman (1975), 517–18.

26. In construing the question of perceiving that we perceive as a question of awareness, I am following Kosman (1975) and Caston (2002), who construe the argument of *De anima* III.2 as concerning perceptual consciousness. Johansen (2005) criticizes both these positions, and he particularly criticizes Kosman's position that perceiving that we perceive accounts for the awareness that distinguishes the *perceptual* effect that (for example) an odor has on a perceiver from the nonperceptual effect that the same odor has on an inanimate object that becomes stinky (507–8). Johansen argues that it "is implied by Aristotle throughout Book II that first-order perception is a form of awareness (*aisthanesthai*) of its object," and at issue in the question of perceiving that we perceive "is the different question by what faculty we are aware of our first order perceptions. This is a question not about perceptual awareness as such; it is specifically a question about our awareness of our own perceptual processes" (257). (See also Osborne [1983], 405, although she takes the question of III.2 differently than Johansen.) It surely *is* implied in book II that the perception of sensible objects is a way of being made aware of them, but it is not *explained* there (as Kosman [2005], 279, also says, in his reply to Johansen). In other words, one can read III.2 as making explicit what was implied all along: that perception is a mode of awareness. The opening of III.2 explains how. This sequence of topics accords with Aristotle's methodological principle, articulated in II.4: one must first speak of the objects of perception, then the activity, and only then the capacity. *De anima* II.6 concerns perceptual objects; II.7–11 focuses more specifically on one kind of object, special perceptibles; and II.12 discusses the activity of perception, namely, the reception of the perceptible form without the matter, and raises the question of what makes this activity specifically *perceptual*. This question, as Kosman asserts, is answered in III.2. (Caston [2002] offers a very compelling "activity reading" of the III.2 passage, wherein Aristotle is concerned not with the capacity of perception, but with instances of active perceiving. Johansen [2005] vigorously defends the "capacity reading," wherein Aristotle is concerned with explaining how the perceptual capacity afforded by the five senses accounts for higher-order perceptions.)

I take Aristotle to be concerned in III.2 with first-order perceptual awareness, not second-order perceptual awareness. For one thing, he takes *perceiving* that we see and hear to be an obvious phenomenon, and (as it seems to me) it is much more obvious that we are (first-order) perceptually aware in general than that we are *perceptually* (second-order) aware of our perceptions. Osborne argues that the question Aristotle is asking in

the opening lines of III.2 is “how we are aware that we are seeing (as opposed to hearing, for example) or hearing (as opposed to tasting, for example)” (406). However, later in the chapter he *argues* that it must be by perception that we distinguish seeing from hearing (e.g., *De anima* 426b14–15), which seems to indicate that he has a different concern at the chapter’s opening. Caston argues that “Aristotle opts for a more basic form of awareness” in part because “we are not constantly undergoing a kind of double vision” (772). I have something similar in mind here.

27. Why this follows is discussed in Caston (2002), 763–73; Johansen (2005), 241–44. Osborne (1983) considers Aristotle to be surveying possibilities here, notes that this consequence follows from both options (seeing that one sees by sight or by another sense), and doesn’t take it to be an immediate problem (401–2).

28. See Caston (2002), 773–75, for a different articulation of the assumptions underlying the regress argument. He identifies two (774): (a) “A perception of a perception is also of what the earlier perception is of,” to block the possibility of perceptual loops, and, more substantially, (b) “Whenever we have a perception, we have a perception of that perception,” to get the regress started. The way I’ve construed it, the regress gets started because, if the initial perception of an object does not explain awareness, no subsequent perceptual activity of the same kind will explain it, either. The question just gets pushed back to the new act of perception: what makes the perception of perception *awareness* of that perception?

29. Though Johansen (2005) takes the issue in this argument not to be general perceptual awareness, but specifically higher-order awareness of the change undergone in perceptual awareness. See pp. 249–50.

30. Perhaps Johansen’s formulation, referred to above, captures some of this: there is a difference between receiving a perceptual object (seeing color) and monitoring whether or not such an activity is happening at all. It would be odd to say that what is perceived in the discernment of darkness, either darkness itself or the *inactivity* of the sense of sight, is an object. Whatever form this monitoring takes, it must differ from the object-oriented form of perceiving, for example, red.

31. See Gregoric (2007), 99–111, for a detailed analysis of this passage. He also takes *koinē aisthēsis* in this passage to refer to the primary perceptual faculty.

32. Trans. Hett (1936).

33. Translations of *De sensu* are taken from Hett (1936).

34. Kahn (1966), 67.

35. Kosman (1975), 518.

36. In his discussion of incidental perception, Everson (1997) distinguishes between perceiving an object and *recognizing* that object, and argues that something is incidentally perceived “because it forms an accidental [i.e., incidental] unity with some special sensible which does act on the sense organ. Just as the special sensibles are *kath’ hauta* causes of the change in the organ, and hence the perception, so the accidental sensibles are accidental causes of perception” (188). If, however, awareness is inherent to the perceptual system, this distinction cannot be upheld. To perceive an incidental sensible is to become aware of it.

37. Trans. Ross (1984).

38. See Caston (2004) and Sisko (2004) for opposing interpretations of this “by the way.”

39. See Tuozzo (1996), Block (1961), and Kahn (1966) on this issue.

40. Kosman (1975), 518–19.

41. Moss (2012) has recently and brilliantly argued for the central importance of *phantasia* in ethical action and thinking, and while this is right in many significant respects, since *phantasia* is essentially dependent upon the more basic perceptual powers, it is of utmost importance that one first of all learn to *perceive* well.

42. See also Everson (1997), 158, which interprets the passage similarly. Modrak (1987), 82–87, holds a similar position.

43. Caston (1996), 46–52.

44. Moss (2012) offers a similar account, as does Everson (1997), 175; and Lorenz (2006), chaps. 9–11.

45. See Wedin (1988), chap. 3, and discussions there.

46. So Wedin (1988), Everson (1997) (arguing that Aristotle uses *phantasia* in a broad and a technical sense, 184–85), Modrak (1987), and Moss (2012), 51–57, all argue that Aristotle offers a single account of *phantasia* that covers all the features he attributes to it and the functions it serves.

47. See Schofield (1978). Everson (1997) defends a modified form of Schofield's position: *phantasia* is introduced to account for features of perceptual experience that fall outside what the perception strictly speaking can accomplish—and he takes perception strictly speaking to be the effect of the special and common perceptibles on the sense organ. This does not imply, however, that *phantasia* has a primarily skeptical function (Modrak [1987], 86, makes a similar point), nor that it operates only when perception strictly speaking either is not or is not operating well (see 165–86).

48. See Wedin (1988), chaps. 2–3; for a clear statement of the contrast between perception *sans phantasia* as falling short of awareness and perception with *phantasia* as including awareness, see 41–42. In some moments, Modrak (1987) seems to attribute a similar role to *phantasia*, but at others she seems to give it a role closer to the one Schofield (1978) argues for; see 83 for the former, 87, for the latter.

49. See Nussbaum (1978).

50. Everson (1997), 165–78; Moss (2012), 51–57.

51. See Moss (2012), chap. 3.

52. In general, however, I find Nussbaum's account problematic because the interpretive function she attributes to *phantasia* makes the perception of incidental perceptibles redundant—these are already interpreted perceptible objects (see Everson [1997], 158–65, for a similar criticism; see also Wedin (1988), chap. 2, for a thorough refutation of the view). Wedin's (1988) position (and Modrak's [1987], insofar as she defends the same point) that *phantasia* is necessary for awareness of an object seems problematic for a similar reason: Aristotle *also* attributes perceptual awareness to perception itself. Schofield's position is problematic for teleological reasons: *phantasia* is necessary for animal motion and the animal's successfully avoiding predators and attaining prey. If *phantasia* were primarily a skeptical operation, it would not be able to successfully guide an animal's motion. See Wedin 65–71 and Everson 165–72 for other critiques of Schofield's position.

53. Caston (1996), 48–52.

54. *Phantasia* is also said to be true or false in the context of being distinguished from *epistēmē* and *nous*. Because these latter are not false in *any* sense, that *phantasia* is false in the sense established by the contrast with veridical perception is enough to distinguish *phantasia* from these two things.

55. Schofield (1978), 108–10, offers a similar reading of this passage, as does Everson (1997), 178–79 (despite the differences in their interpretations).

56. This is not to say that *phantasia* need accompany *all* perception, only that it *may* be concurrent. Schofield (1978) espouses a similar position. See Nussbaum (1978) for the alternative position that *phantasia* is involved in every perception of an object *as* something (259), and Wedin (1988, 51–57), who argues that *phantasia* accompanies *all* perception.

57. See similarly Lorenz (2006), chaps. 9–11.

Chapter 2

1. See Vasilou (1996), 777, who argues that the first principles of ethics are “the that” with which ethical reasoning begins (rather than a general principle), and suggests that, for this reason, it is necessary to develop a perceptual capacity to see “the that.”

2. See Cashdollar (1973) and Modrak (1987), who argue similarly. See Kahn (1992) and Everson (1997) for opposing accounts.

3. See Cashdollar (1973), note 22: “That moral principles are sometimes gained through aisthesis (EN 1098 b 21) surely presupposes incidentally perceiving x as good, just, bad, unjust, etc.” (165). Incidental perception will be further addressed in section 2 of this chapter. Moss (2012) devotes an original and intriguing study to this question, arguing that it is by *phantasia* that the good is apprehended.

4. *Post. An.* 86a30: “Universal demonstrations are objects of thought [*dianoia*], particular demonstrations terminate in perception”; *Post. An.* 100b12: “There will be a comprehension [*nous*] of the principles”; *De anima* II.6 417b21–23.

5. Of course, Aristotle frequently comments that thinking requires *phantasia* (*De anima* 431a17) and that there is no learning without perception (427b16–17, 432a7–8). But the manner in which he conflates these two powers in the following passages does not suggest merely a relationship of dependence of one faculty on another.

6. Trans. Barnes (1993). In this case, it is clear that Aristotle means to refer to the perceptual faculty, although not any specific perceptual power. *Post. An.* II.19 addresses the question of prior “knowledge” that makes possible knowledge in the robust sense, and identifies perception as the faculty that houses this prior “knowledge.” That this is a literal use of perception is clear: Aristotle introduces perception as that which is shared with animals, and mentions various secondary perceptual powers (99b34–100a9).

7. Translations from the *Nicomachean Ethics* are from Bartlett and Collins (2011), occasionally modified. I take *aisthēsis* here to be meant in the same sense as in *Post. An.* II.19, above. In *Post. An.*, perception contains the universal in the particular that is its object, and this is what makes it possible to come to know. In this *Nic. Eth.* passage, similarly, the universals arise from the particulars of which there is perception. Because of this similarity—the universal in the perception—I take *aisthēsis* in the *Nic. Eth.* passage in a literal unspecified sense, that is, referring to the activity of perception generally, not a specific perceptual power. The difference between these two passages is that in the *Post. An.* passage Aristotle is addressing the acquisition of universals, whereas in this passage he is addressing the developed capacities (*hexeis*) that apprehend the particulars of action. Rather than *nous* acquiring the universal *from* perception, as in the *Post. An.* passage, here *nous/aisthēsis* is apprehending the particular.

8. Translations of *Metaphysics* taken from W. D. Ross in Barnes, ed. (1984), modified.

9. Charles Kahn (1992) notices a similar ambiguity, distinguishing four senses of perception: broader and narrower senses of *aisthēsis* both on the objective and subjective sides (365). He argues that the broader conceptions of *aisthēsis* are informed by noetic elements—human *aisthēsis*. My intention is to supplement and support this conception

of *aisthēsis* with an argument about the priority of the whole soul to the part, and then to draw out the consequences of this conception with regard to ethics.

10. Humans are distinguished from nonhuman animals precisely by the presence of *nous*, the capacity for thinking (*dianoia*), or reason. Aristotle places the difference between kinds of living things in the configuration of soul: plants have only the nutritive power, animals have perception in addition, and some animals (i.e., humans) also have the capacity for thought and reason (*De anima* 415a2–14). Both *dianoētikon* and *logistikon* are associated with *nous* in *De anima*, for example, at 414b18–19 (“Some things have in addition the faculty of movement in respect to place, and others, e.g. men and anything else which is similar or superior to man, have that of thought and intellect”) and at 432b26 (“the calculative part [*to logistikon*], which is called mind [*nous*]”), respectively. See Johansen (2012), chap. 3, for a discussion of the parts of the soul as the differentia of species of living thing.

11. Similarly, perception is often contrasted with things that are properly human: with the acquisition of virtue through habit at *Nic. Eth.* 1103a25–30; with deliberation at 1112b34–1113a1; the vice that renders one most animal-like, dissipation, is an excess concerning the pleasures of the sense touch (1118b1–2); it is ruled out as a source of action (*praxis*) by virtue of its being shared by animals (1139a17–20); animal-like people are identified as those who lack reason and live by perception alone at 1149a9–11.

12. The sense of *aisthēsis* in these passages *could* be taken to be metaphorical—one simply sees in the sense of understanding how far of a deviation from the mean is blameworthy. However, the contrast with what can be determined by *logos* challenges this. Aristotle generally identifies two capacities that supplement what can be determined by *logos*, *aisthēsis* and *nous*, and generally *aisthēsis* is the capacity concerned with particulars, *nous* with first principles. For this reason, it is best to read *aisthēsis* here as, again, referring to the perceptual capacity in an unspecific way.

13. Similarly, perception is identified as one way of grasping first principles (*Nic. Eth.* 1098b5); the verb *aisthanesthai* is used at 1100a20 as that faculty which can grasp good or evil; at 1126a5–6 as that faculty which grasps proper occasions for anger; most importantly, it is closely associated with *phronesis* at 1142a26; and with *nous* at 1143b6; in the practical syllogism at 1147a26 and 1147b10; associated with a kind of knowledge at 1147b17; with understanding (*sunesis*) at 1161b25; at 1170a17, human life is defined by the powers of thinking (*noēsis*) and perception.

14. Charles Kahn (1992) articulates a similar position when he says, “More generally, our perceptual experience is penetrated through and through by conceptual elements derived from *nous*. This is a point which Aristotle frequently takes for granted but rarely discusses in any detail” (365). However, Kahn means by this that perception strictly speaking must be accompanied by *nous* smuggled in through what is incidentally perceptible (369). I differ from Kahn in that I take the incidental perceptibles to be genuine objects of perception, and perception to be *informed by* intellect, rather than supplying data for intellectual operations. Kahn goes too far in his insistence upon the special perceptibles being the *only* things given by perception, and I side with Deborah Modrak (1987) on the issue of the complexity of the perceptual capacity, because animals without reason also perceive meaningful wholes that are incidentally perceptible.

15. Modrak (1987), 119.

16. *Ibid.*, 123.

17. For example, Modrak (1987), 35–37.

18. Kahn (1966) calls the analytic treatment of the five special senses as independent of each other a “methodological fiction” (63); I will be making a similar claim with regard to the parts of the soul. Their independence, too, is a methodological fiction. See Johansen (2012), chaps. 2–3 for a quite different but in many ways complementary account of the structure of the soul. My position is similar to the position Pavel Gregoric (2007) defends when he remarks, “in reality there is only one soul in each case, which is what ensures integration and co-operation of various parts or aspects of the soul, as when perception helps an animal to take nourishment or move about. Thus the soul is responsible for all the activities that a living being with this soul manifests” (38–39).

19. Translations of *De anima* I are taken from Shiffman (2011), occasionally modified.

20. Polansky (2007) rightly explains the importance of deciding whether the account of the whole or the account of the parts is to be addressed as an issue of metaphysical priority, that is, whether the parts are dependent on the whole (individual) soul or whether the parts are independent of any individual or species soul (46–47). I address this issue in this and the following subsections.

21. See Whiting (2002), 146.

22. Tuozzo (1996) offers a similar interpretation of parts of a body.

23. It seems to me that the placement of this argument, following as it does upon laying out the sequence of powers, invites wariness about the presumption that parts of the soul are the same regardless of the kind of soul they are parts of. The question of the relationship between parts is complicated by this succession because what is in some cases a whole soul—the nutritive soul of the plant—is in other cases a part of soul. With the argument of *De anima* 413b11–414a1, Aristotle distinguishes between kinds and parts of soul, and this should caution his audience against treating the parts as if they were kinds, that is, independent of the whole and of the other parts.

24. To be separable means to be, in *some way*, independent. Corcilius and Gregoric (2010) distinguish three kinds of separability for Aristotle: to be separable *simpliciter*, separable in place/magnitude (*topōi* or *megethei*), and to be separable in account/being (*logōi* or *tōi einai*). To be separable *simpliciter*, they argue, means to be capable of separate existence. Something is separable in place/magnitude when “*x* can have a location independent of the location of *y*, i.e., *x* can be found at a place at which *y* is not found.” Similarly, something is separable in *logos* when “the account of *x* is independent of *y*, i.e., there is an adequate definition of *x* which makes no reference to *y*.” Corcilius and Gregoric take this to be the same as to be “separable in being,” namely, “what it is to be *x* is independent of what it is to be *y*, so the *x* can be adequately defined without *y*” (section 4). See Whiting (2002) and Johansen (2012) for discussions of separability. See the previous chapter for a discussion of the parts of the soul.

25. Polansky (2007) comes to the similar conclusion that the evidence of the divided insect establishes that the soul is a unity of parts, and that the unified soul is the organizational principle of the parts (179–80). See also Brentano (1897, reprint 1977), 36–37.

26. This kind of priority of the whole to the parts corresponds to one of the senses of priority that Aristotle identifies in *Met.* V.11. This sense of priority is characterized as a kind of independence: “Some things then are called prior and posterior in this sense, others in respect of nature and substance, i.e., those which can be without other things, while others cannot be without *them*” (1019a1–4). The whole soul must be prior to its parts in this sense—the parts of the soul cannot be separated in such a way that they could subsist without the whole; but, as the plant and divine souls show, whole souls can exist without

particular parts. If the parts of the soul *were* separable in place or *simpliciter*, this priority would not attain.

27. Kosman (1987) eloquently discusses numerical identity and difference in being or account, in the context of distinguishing accidental being from substance (369–71).

28. Aristotle often remarks that a body part ceases to be what it is when severed from the whole: *Met.* 1035b23, 1036b30; *De anima* 412b21–23; *Part. an.* 641a3–4; *Pol.* 1253a20–25. Whiting (2002) similarly takes the relationship between the parts of the soul to the whole soul on the model of the parts of the body to the whole body.

29. See also *Parts of Animals* II.9. Ackrill (1972–73) seems to take the parts of the body to be similar to other sorts of parts that may function differently in different contexts (128), suggesting that Aristotle “recognize as a possibility the re-use of severed organs and the re-activation of dead bodies.” Charlton (1980) raises problems with Ackrill’s interpretation of *dunamis* and *entelecheia* that lead him to this point. Ackrill’s point seems to me to contradict Aristotle’s insight that souls belong to bodies of particular kinds (*De anima* I.4 407b13–26)—soul is not the sort of thing that can be *applied* to a body, it is the sort of thing that essentially *determines* what a body is. See Kosman (1987) and Brentano (1867, reprint 1977) for such an account, and Bos (2010) and Everson (1997), 69–78, for alternative accounts of the relation between soul and body.

30. Tuozzo (1996) sees a similar kind of functional incompleteness of parts in wholes in teleologically unified entities: the parts of a body have functions that are only fully intelligible with respect to a single higher function to which they are subordinate, analogous to the hierarchy of crafts (148–51). I would like to emphasize a corollary of this incompleteness of the parts, namely, that what ultimately is operating is the body (or soul) as a whole; it is only when conceived in isolation from the body that it is true to say that the hand alone grasps, or the eye alone sees. Rather, it is the body that grasps by means of the hand, and the soul that sees by means of the eye. As Tuozzo notes (154–55, and citations there), some commentators see a tension in Aristotle between the idea that there is an ultimate organ of perception and the idea that perception operates through various parts. I agree with Block (1961) that “the attribution of an activity to a complex body as a whole is not incompatible with the claim that one part of that body is more directly the cause of the activity than another” (53). See also Kahn (1966), especially 56, for a similar view about the common sense power.

31. I take this to be similar to Kahn’s (1992) claim that, regarding the hierarchy of natural bodies, living things, sentient animals, and rational animals, “since each level is qualitatively distinct, each calls for its own autonomous level of understanding and explanation” (360).

32. Johansen (2012) notes that ultimately Aristotle seeks an integrated view of the parts of the soul and that *De anima* takes steps in that direction, but argues that definitionally the parts are prior to the whole and make no reference to it (71–72).

33. Discussions of the common account of soul given in *De anima* II.1 can be found in Ackrill (1972–73), Bolton (1978), Charlton (1980), Whiting (1992), Menn (2002), Polansky (2007), and Johansen (2012), chap. 1.

34. Matthews (1992) addresses the variety and unity of these life activities, arguing that what unifies these senses of “life” is that they are necessary for the perpetuation of particular species (191); Bolton (1978) offers a related discussion about how the definitions of soul mark off living things appropriately; Johansen (2012) rejects the idea that there is a general notion of life (51).

35. Kahn (1966) similarly notes, with respect to the figure–soul analogy, “Even in the case of animals, which are by definition sentient and must therefore possess a sensory *psuchē*, this faculty is not concretely separable from their sheer capacity to live” (47–48).

36. In this passage (*De anima* 414b28–32) Aristotle uses the adjectives *proton*, *aisthētikon*, and *threptikon* substantially, without specifying whether he means these as parts, souls, or simply powers. The comparison with the sequence of geometrical figures suggests that he means souls, since the triangle and the quadrilateral are both *kinds* of geometrical figures, and it would not be natural to take the triangle to be primarily a part of the quadrilateral. However, Aristotle might have intended to maintain the ambiguity, given that what are in some cases kinds of soul (nutritive, perceptive) are in other cases parts of soul.

37. This analogy between the sequence of figures and the sequence of souls is often interpreted in light of questions about whether or not there is a genus of soul that can be the subject of a definition properly speaking. See, for example, Ward (1996) and citations there. My concern is not with the definition of soul per se, but rather with the internal complexity of souls, and as a result, I take from this passage a description of the relationship of parts of soul within a complex soul. This approach is consistent with concerns about definitions, and I am persuaded by Ward’s argument that there is no proper definition of soul over and above the kinds of soul. Just as there is no “life” over and above kinds of life, so there is no “soul” over and above kinds of soul. See Johansen (2012) for an alternative account of the definition of soul (chaps. 1–2, esp. pp. 62–63).

38. Ward (1996) makes a similar point (124), although in the end she thinks that Aristotle has not explained what unifies a soul (127). Johansen (2012) also makes a similar point (69), although he sees the potentiality of the part in two ways: as providing the potentiality for the higher capacity—there is no perception without nutrition—and as potential because it is a part of a soul defined by the higher capacity. And, contrary to Ward, he sees the unity of the soul accomplished in the figure–soul analogy when the parts of the soul are understood on the model of matter (potentiality) to form (actuality) (70).

39. Relying on an analogy to interpret Aristotle’s views concerning the structure of the soul will have its limitations—it is, after all, only an analogy, with the limitations that analogies carry with them. However, necessity dictates arguing this way here—it is here that Aristotle discusses the internal complexity among the parts of the soul. We may also be sure that he is serious that the parts of the soul are present potentially because he reiterates this thought in *Met.* 1040b6–15, discussed above. Moreover, Aristotle discusses the ways that mathematical objects are potentially within others (which I will point out). Furthermore, the nature of the soul is generally analogous to mathematical objects insofar as both are nonmaterial but are inseparable from bodies. In the absence of any definitive statement concerning the relationship between the parts of the soul, it is justified to mine this analogy in answering the question of the structure of the soul.

40. Contrary to Brentano (1897, reprint 1977), 42.

41. This is consistent with Johansen’s (2012) understanding of potentiality (*dunamis*) as a way of being that does not in itself “make one exercise that capacity” (20). I will argue that the activity of a subordinate part of the soul is mediated by the higher and defining part, and similarly Johansen argues that “the reason why a capacity is not in itself sufficient for its own exercise is that other factors are required, such as one’s desire and the opportunity to exercise the capacity in the case of active capacities, or external agents or prompts in the case of passive capacities” (20).

42. See Brentano (1897), 44.

43. Distinguishing between efficient cause and final cause may be helpful here. Gotthelf (1987) offers compelling reasons for accepting that the final cause (that-for-the-sake-of-which), the form (soul or life in this case) is not reducible to its material elements, the efficient cause, elements that are nonetheless necessary for the form's realization. I extend this principle to the subordinate life processes of an animal: such processes as breathing and a beating heart are necessary for the life of the organism, but necessary in the sense of being an efficient and not a final cause, for what it is to be an animal is not reducible to the nutritive functions. Similarly, in Gotthelf's argument, the material elements of an organism do not sufficiently account for it (220–22). See also Tuozzo (1996) for the incompleteness of parts. See also Kosman (1987) for an account of the instrumentality both of the body and the parts of the body as being for the sake of the whole (376–37). Similarly, I argue, the parts of the soul are for the sake of the whole, and the whole is defined by the highest capacity. For opposing views, see Ackrill (1972), 126–28; Bos (2010), who argues that the instrumental bodies are the four elements, not the organized body; and Everson (1997), 60–69, who argues that the soul is the soul of the bodily organs that are the loci of capacities, not the body as a whole.

44. See chapter 1. See also Modrak (1987), 81; Wedin (1988), 61n48; and Gregoric (2007), chap. 3.

45. Lorenz (2006) makes a similar point (197–99).

46. Similarly Kahn (1992) asks: "We are sentient in virtue of our hylomorphic soul. Are we rational animals in virtue of two distinct souls, the one that makes us animals and 'a different kind' that makes us rational? Is human nature constituted by one essence or two?" (361). Of course, my thesis is that the perceptive faculty *does* change, that the virtuous person is not merely an animal with extra powers—that humans are constituted by a single, if fractured, essence.

47. Parts of what follow appear in or inform Rabinoff (2015b).

48. See Russon (1996). In a certain way this point is intuitive. What it means to be aware of some object is to have some distance from it and some freedom in relating oneself to it. In Aristotle's account of perception, then, the passivity of the perceptive power (being *receptive* of the form of the perceptible object and in a certain way determined by it) is the condition for a more fundamental agency. In being so effected by the perceptible object, the animal is given some initiative in responding to it, fleeing or pursuing it, for example.

49. Aristotle makes the point most clearly with respect to perception in the narrow sense, but the point can be extended to the perceptual faculty as a whole, which is also characterized as a mean (*De anima* 431a20).

50. Trans. Sachs (2001).

51. A note must be made regarding what it is that is happening in the event of perceiving. Sorabji (1992) famously argues that the sense organ literally takes on the qualities (red, round, etc.) that are perceived. Similarly, Slakey (1961), and more recently Everson (1997) offer literalist accounts of sense perception. Burnyeat (1992), at the other extreme, argues that there is no physical change accompanying perception. Lear (1988) takes a middle ground, arguing that there is a physical change in the organ of sense, but that it does not literally take on the quality being perceived; instead, the perceptible form, which is "an irreducible reality," is transmitted by means of some physical change, such as the air hitting the eardrum (113); and Bradshaw (1997) follows his lead in developing "dual-*logos* theory" in which perception is defined both by a fixed ratio of elements in the sense organ and a flexible ratio that takes on the *logos* of the object of sense. This is a difficult question,

but I find Bradshaw's and Everson's accounts most compelling; although they might disagree on some details, I find their accounts quite similar. The important thing to explain is how the power of perception which has no magnitude is related to the change in the sense organ (*De anima* II.12), and Bradshaw's dual-*logos* theory provides the resources for such an explanation, while Everson's account of the material change in the sense organ leaves room for such an explanation.

52. Moss (2012), 22–29, argues that the perceptions themselves are pleasant or painful, and that this is what it means to perceive a pleasant or painful object. Her account is based on the physiological underpinnings of motivation for motion (the heating and cooling of the area around the heart, for example) expressed in *De motu animalium*. Similarly, Johansen (2012) conceives of “appetite as the emotive side of the perception of pleasure, withdrawal or repulsion as the emotive aspect of the perception of pain. The emotive and the cognitive are here two sides of the same coin, one in number” (249). This seems to me to be a good way of understanding Aristotle's claim that pleasure and pain are activities of the perceptual part of the soul with respect to the good or bad as such. Hamlyn (1968), on the other hand, claims “the assertion that the existence of sense-perception necessarily implies the existence of pleasure and pain has no claim to conceptual necessity” (90).

53. I leave aside the problematic case of the “imperfect” animals (*De anima* 433b31) without locomotion that receive nourishment “from the source from which they have been born” (434b1–2). Polansky (2007) argues that animals that lack locomotion “are merely shortchanged in bodily endowment” (509). Whether or not this is the right explanation of such animals, it seems clear that Aristotle thinks of the animal with locomotion as the paradigm animal.

54. I say “merely” because, of course, some aspects of animal physiology *are* constituted like the plant—my skin also absorbs vitamin D whether or not I take pleasure in sun-tanning. But the nutritive functions most necessary for the continuance of life—eating, drinking, sleeping, reproducing—are constituted differently than the plant's are; these functions invoke and require some degree of voluntary action on the basis of what is or appears good or pleasant.

55. *De anima* III.9 clearly considers the discussions of perception and intellect to be concluded: “The soul of animals has been defined by reference to two potentialities, that concerned with discernment, which is the function of thought and perception, and secondly that for producing motion in respect of place. Let so much suffice about perception and the intellect; we must now inquire what it is in the soul that produces movement” (432a15–20).

56. The “good or bad as such” (*De anima* 431a12) that the perceptive part is in relation to when it perceives pleasure or pain transforms into “either the good *or* the apparent good” when we are considering *all* creatures with perception, both those that have and those that lack intellect. I interpret this shift to mean that the intellect opens up possibilities that are not available to the animal that lacks it, that is, the possibility to transcend the limits of one's own perspective—to have access to the good as such, rather than the good in relation to oneself.

57. That is, it brings the *orektikon* into activity.

58. Moss (2012), 104–5, characterizes the passage similarly; see also Richardson (1992) and Johansen (2012), 250–51.

59. Two competing interpretations of this passage are represented by Kahn (1992) and Modrak (1987): Kahn argues that the perceptive faculty *only* perceives the hot and the cold, not the flesh itself and its *logos*. As a result, it is either by the perceptual faculty or

nous differently disposed that we discern the compound flesh (370). By contrast, Modrak (1987) argues that, rather, because the perceptible object is on a continuum with the noetic object, what discerns the essence, *nous*, is the same faculty, perception, differently disposed (119). Hamlyn (1968) similarly takes this passage to show that “the intellect by which one judges essences, ‘what it is to be F,’ is not after all utterly distinct from the senses” (138). I end up siding more with Modrak/Hamlyn. Based on Aristotle’s insistence that essences do not exist anywhere separate from the concrete individuals of which they are the essence, while not being identical to them, it seems to me that intellect and perception are, in a very real sense, concerned with the *same* object, considered in different ways. Polansky (2007) makes the point that, just as what distinguishes the special perceptibles must be one, so too what distinguishes flesh from being-flesh must be one (447). I also reject Kahn’s restriction of perception to merely the special perceptibles.

60. Modrak (1987) employs a similar strategy for interpreting the relationship between the noetic and perceptive faculties (117–24). She comes to a different yet, I believe, compatible interpretation. She considers the perceptual faculty to operate as the material cause of the noetic—the noetic faculty works on the object of the perceptual faculty, abstracting the essence from the particularizing elements of the perceptual object (123). Johansen (2012), 228–29, takes a similar stance. I conclude that perceptual experience is affected by the very possibility of performing such an operation.

61. Bradshaw (1997) puts the point well: “The picture presented here is that of a sense as inherently a mean between sensible extremes, but one capable of adjusting itself to match whatever deviations from the mean are presented to it. Strictly speaking, what it perceives are these deviations; that is why “we do not perceive (*ouk aisthanometha*) what is equally hot and cold or hard and soft. As has often been noted, by ‘equally’ Aristotle must mean equally to us (or to our sense organs), rather than equally in itself (i.e., tepid or moderately hard)” (146).

62. The difference between the way the plant is affected from the way the sense is affected is sometimes taken as support for a nonliteralist interpretation of the way the sense takes on the perceptible form (e.g., Burnyeat [1992], 21–22; Modrak [1987], 59n15). Everson (1997), 86–89, argues that it is evidence for the literalist interpretation, because the bodies of plants are not even such as to take on the perceptible form at all—plants do not take on heat, for example, but come to feel hot to touch.

63. See Modrak (1991b). I address this issue more fully in the next chapter.

64. Similarly Johansen (2012): “I take the comparison of perception with a bent line and *nous* with a straight to be that it is by *nous* that you can see how long the line really is” (228).

65. This is how Sachs interprets the perplexing passage 429b11–23. He says in a footnote to his translation of the passage: “This rich and difficult paragraph implies that intellect pervades all human experience . . . The same perceptible form that acts incidentally on the various sense organs acts directly on intellect, but is not the only sort of form that the intellect takes on” (141). Modrak (1987) similarly emphasizes the inherence of the intellectual object in the sensible particular, but focuses not on the bodily component, but on the continuity between the perceptible object and the noetic object, on the one hand, and between the perceptual faculty and the noetic on the other (119).

66. I take this perceiving-as to be included in the perception of incidental perceptibles, discussed in the previous chapter as perceiving-that. These two locutions (perceiving-as, perceiving-that) amount to the same thing: to say one perceives that the tall brown cylin-

der is a tree trunk is the same as saying that one perceives the tall brown cylinder *as* a tree trunk. See below for more discussion of incidental perceptibles.

67. *De anima* 429a5–7 confirms that animals live according to *phantasia*, and 433a10–21 confirms the connection between *phantasia* and desire, by the analogy set up at the beginning of the chapter between *phantasia* and *nous*.

68. Modrak (1987) makes a similar point (100) by means of Aristotle's description of *phantasia* as a kind of thinking.

69. At *De anima* 433b30 he calls it *logistikē* and at 434a *bouleutikē*.

70. Kahn (1992), 369.

71. Modrak (1997), 69–71.

72. Everson (1997), 187–93, distinguishes between the question of how such objects as the son of Diaries is *perceived* and how such objects are *recognized*, dismissing the latter as not what Aristotle is concerned with in the project of *De anima* of explaining how perception works. But it seems to me that if Aristotle is concerned to explain *life*, he must explain how perception serves the life of animals, and the perception of the special perceptibles without their being articulated into recognizable wholes seems insufficient to support that life. See Cashdollar (1973), who argues that incidental perception is as important to Aristotle's account of perception as the special and common perceptibles are.

73. Kahn (1992), 367–69.

74. *Ibid.*, 367–68.

75. See Corcilius and Gregoric (2010) for the argument that these capacities are not themselves *parts* of the soul, but functions of the perceptual part. For an alternative account that reaches compatible conclusions, see Johansen (2012), chap. 2.

76. Modrak (1987) makes a similar argument (70), and gives a compelling argument for attributing the perception of incidental perceptibles to the common sense power.

77. Kahn (1992), 369n17.

78. See Heidegger's *Being and Time* distinction between the present-to-hand and the ready-at-hand.

Chapter 3

1. See *De anima* III.4 429a27–29: “Those who say, then, that the soul is a place of forms speak well, except that it is not the whole soul but that which can think, and it is not actually [*entelecheia*] but potentially [*dunamis*] the forms.”

2. I do not mean to say that the individual is identical to its form, but that insofar as it is anything at all, as opposed to a mere heap (*Met.* VII.16 1040b9), it *is* its form.

3. See also *De anima* II.4 415a26–b7.

4. Trans. A. Platt in Barnes (1984).

5. Except, perhaps, in the case of things like health. This is perhaps the reason that Aristotle favors health and sickness as a metaphor for virtue and vice (e.g., *Nic. Eth.* III.5 1114a11–19).

6. The status of this statement is the subject of much discussion; see Barnes (1971–72), Ackrill (1972–73), Bolton (1978), Ward (1996), and Johansen (2012). My argument here does not rely on whether this constitutes a definition or not.

7. Russon (1995) gives an insightful account of the soul as the governing principle and expression of life.

8. To my knowledge, Aristotle does not use this phrase. It is, however, implied by the nature of virtue, which is the excellence at being what one is. Virtue names excellence of form.

9. See MacIntyre (1999) for a similar characterization of human nature (68–69); and Irwin (1988), 374–75, for a discussion of virtue completing human nature.

10. See also *De anima* 429b3–9: “But when intellect thinks something especially fit for thought, it thinks inferior things not less but rather more. For the faculty of perception is not independent of the body, whereas intellect is separable. When the intellect has become each thing in the way that one who actually knows is said to do so (and this happens when he can exercise his capacity himself), it exists potentially even then in a way, although not in the same way as before it learned or discovered; then it can think by itself.” Both of these passages show that intellect is what “has” the forms. See also *Metaphysics* IX.5: intellect is a rational potentiality, capable of bringing about contrary effects.

11. This is a tension that is widely acknowledged. Modrak, for example, writes: “Aristotle seems to be fully cognizant of the tension between the two tendencies in his theorizing about the human soul—(a) the desire to give a unified treatment of all the faculties of soul such that the internal unity of the soul and the unity of the living being who is an ensouled body is assured, and (b) the desire to give an account of the intellect that captures its uniqueness and divinity. The first desire issues in the attempt to encapsulate the core concept of soul in the general definition and the second in the attribution of separability to active *nous* in 3.5” (Modrak [1991b], 758). See also, for example, Wedin (1988), Sisko (1999), and Broadie (1997).

12. Kahn (1966) writes that perception is “any capacity possessed by living animals for obtaining information concerning the outside world—for entering into contact with, and hence responding to, their food, their enemies, their mates, their offspring” (46).

13. Caston (1999) eloquently expresses Aristotle’s hesitancy with respect to this kind of problem in terms of whether or not intellect falls under the study of natural science (206–7).

14. See *Nic. Eth.* book X.7.

15. Lear (1988), 165.

16. As Barnes (1971–72), 104 and n4 puts it: “‘X is separate’ is an incomplete expression, and its sense will depend upon the intended completion ‘separate from r.’ Talk about the separation of psychic elements is not always talk about the relation between soul and body,” citing *De anima* 413b14–414a3 as an example of separation from other parts of the soul.

17. See Wedin (1988), 186–87, and Politis (2001) for a similar thought about the unlimitedness of intellectual objects implying lack of a bodily structure. Gerson (2004), 358 offers a different account.

18. Caston (1999) offers a compelling case for the former, Gerson (2004) for the latter.

19. Kosman (1992), 353.

20. Coho similarly argues (2013) that, unlike perception, intellect’s objects are not spatiotemporal, and neither is understanding/thinking (349, 372).

21. *De anima* I.1 403a3–15, I.5 411b17–18; II.1 413a4–7, II.2 413b24–27, II.3 415a11–13; III.4 429a10–13, 429a24–26, 429b3–5, 429b15–17, 429b20–22, III.5 430a 21–25, III.7 431b18–19.

22. See also *De mem.* 450a6–15, where Aristotle describes the necessity to think, for example, of a triangle by means of a finite magnitude even though in thinking of the triangle as such the magnitude is irrelevant. He goes on to attribute the image of the finite triangle to the primary sense faculty (*prōton aisthētikōn*).

23. See Modrak (1991b) for a detailed argument that shows that human intellect is inseparable from the body, and that discusses many possible attributes or activities thought to belong to the intellect independently of the body. See also Wedin (1988), Politis (2001), and Broadie (1998), who points out that Aristotle finds many physical features of the human body suited for intellectual life (168). For various dualism arguments, see Barnes (1971–72), Heinaman (1990), Robinson (1983), Shields (1988), and Sisko (1999).

24. See Miller (1999).

25. See Bronstein (2012).

26. On the way that experience emerges from memory, see Engberg-Pedersen (1983), 145–50, and Gregoric and Grgić (2006).

27. Trans. Barnes (1993).

28. So Modrak also argues (1991), 759.

29. D. Frede (1992) argues similarly at 288–90.

30. D. Frede (1992), 291.

31. *Ibid.*, 292.

32. Caston (2009), 325. See also Caston (1998) and Wedin (1988), 136–41.

33. Wedin (1988), 106–9.

34. Broadie (1998) takes this question to be primarily concerned with separation from other parts of the soul, not the body. She takes this to be a question of whether there is a *type* of soul consisting of intellect alone.

35. Politis (2001) makes a similar point (378).

36. See Caston (1999) for a recent and compelling defense of this interpretation.

37. Wedin (1988), chaps. 5 and 6, offers this interpretation.

38. See, for example, Barnes (1971–72), Modrak (1991b), and M. Frede (1992) for expressions of this problem.

39. This charge is leveled by, for example, Gerson (2004), 348–49. Caston (1999) argues that it is not out of place to invoke divine intellect because divine intellect is ultimately the cause of all thinking (217).

40. See Wedin (1988) and Modrak (1991b) for answers to this kind of difficulty.

41. Caston (1999), 206.

42. Gerson (2004), 362n7.

43. Wedin (1988), 160–61.

44. *Ibid.*, 192.

45. *Ibid.*, 192. Sisko (1999), 252n10 identifies two problems with this suggestion: (1) that *De anima* III.5 does not say “as-if” separable and eternal, and (2) that active intellect is an efficient cause of thought. Answers to both problems can be found in Caston (1999) (although not in defense of Wedin): (1) Aristotle describes things in terms of being divine when he means that they are derivatively divine (216), and (2) active intellect is a final not efficient cause of thought (219–22).

46. Wedin (1988), 193–94.

47. Caston (1999), 214.

48. Wedin (1988), 194.

49. Gerson (2004), 356–57.

50. *Ibid.*, 356.

51. *Ibid.*, 370.

52. Kosman (1992), 370.

53. Caston (1999), 222–23.

54. Wedin (1988), 168, Kosman (1992), 353, and Gerson (2004), 360. Barnes (1971–72), 111 sees one of the functions of *De anima* III.5 as resolving the question of the separability of intellect from the body.

55. I set aside the question of how intelligible objects are *acquired*, despite Aristotle's reminder at *De anima* 429b3–5 that intellect has two stages of potentiality, because Aristotle's method dictates that he address what is actual prior to what is potential, and so he seems to be doing here.

In reading *De anima* III.5 to contribute to the explanation of how human thinking happens, I follow Wedin (1988), Kosman (1992), and Gerson (2004). Wedin argues that the active and passive intellects in *De anima* III.5 are introduced “to account for the fact that S is able to think of its (in principle) unlimited objects *autonomously and spontaneously*” (185). Gerson similarly sees *De anima* III.5 as advancing an “explanation of how the intellect is acted upon in order for there to be intellection” (360). Kosman argues that maker mind is responsible for explaining how potential knowledge and what is potentially knowable become actual knowledge and actually known (354–56). Even Caston (1999), although he is a proponent of the divine intellect reading, offers an account of the role that divine intellect plays in thinking that ends up sounding similar to Kosman's. Kosman says: “The paradigm of this *activity* of mind is that divine mind whose substance is *energeia*, and specifically the *energeia* of *theōria*—*noēsis noēseōs noēsis* as it is called in the *Metaphysics*: thinking thinking thinking. It is finally, I suggest, that active thinking, thinking as *theōria*, which maker mind makes, a thinking most fully exemplified in the unremittingly active thinking of the divine mind” (356). Similarly Caston: “But if the Divine Intellect makes only a cameo appearance in *De anima*, it is nevertheless a significant one for Aristotle. For a complete explanation of thought (or indeed any actualization) will ultimately make reference to God when pushed to its furthest limits: the heavens and all of nature depend upon God as a principle or source of change (*ek toiautēs archēs ērtētai*, *Metaph.* 12.7, 1072b13–14). In this sense, God can correctly be described as a ‘mover,’ as something that is responsible for change taking place” (217). For both Kosman and Caston, then, the active intellect that is named in *De anima* III.5 is the ultimate principle of thinking, that which serves as the perfect instantiation of thinking (and, as Caston points out, living in general). The difference is that Kosman sees active intellect in *De anima* III.5 as the principle of *human* thinking primarily, which implicitly refers to and is derived from the perfect thinking of divine mind, whereas Caston sees it as divine mind, which is ultimately a necessary explanatory principle.

56. Caston (1999), 220–21. Caston cites *Metaphysics* VII.7.

57. *Ibid.*, 206. See also Broadie (1998).

58. Kosman (1992), 347.

59. *Ibid.*, 348.

60. *Ibid.*, 349.

61. *Ibid.*, 350.

62. *Ibid.*, 353–54.

63. *Ibid.*, 355.

64. *Ibid.*

65. Compare Gerson (2004), 356.

66. Kosman (1992), 356.

67. *Ibid.*

68. *Ibid.*, 353.

69. Gerson (2004) argues, similarly, that intellect itself (distinct from human soul) is “the entity with which each individual is ideally identical. So, for a composite individual, access to intellect is possible only because that individual is ideally intellect” (356–57). I prefer Kosman’s interpretation because it seems that divine intellect fits well with what Gerson wants intellect itself to do, and the principle of parsimony would dictate avoiding the introduction of a third term when two will do.

70. Caston (1999), 220–21.

71. Gerson (2004), 355.

72. See Gerson (2004), 356.

73. Kosman (1992), 356.

74. *Ibid.*, 355.

75. Trans. Sachs (1999).

76. Aristotle makes a similar point in the first book of *De anima* (403a24–403b16), where he notices that anger (for example) has both a physical explanation (boiling blood around the heart) and a formal explanation (desire for revenge).

77. See Caston (1999), 215–16, for a similar understanding of this passage.

78. Trans. Hamlyn (1968).

79. See Bolton (1978) for an argument showing how Aristotle’s definition of soul can include divine, nonembodied intellects.

80. Trans. Shiffman (2011).

81. That Aristotle is speaking in his own voice here, rather than expressing one side of an *aporia*, is indicated by the fact that he takes these things to disprove the position that gave rise to the *aporia* (408b30–31): “From these things it is clear that the soul is not such a thing as to be moved.”

82. Compare Gerson (2004), 350–51.

83. See, for example, Broadie (1991), 91, citing *Nic. Eth.* 1152a30–33; and McDowell (1998), 192. Vasilou (1996) is especially clear in his development of this idea.

84. Choice is distinctive of rational animals (*Nic. Eth.* 1111b12–13), and deliberation is a kind of reasoning (*logos*) and thought (*dianoia*) (1112a15–16).

85. *Phronēsis* is one of the intellectual virtues, and it is concerned with right action.

86. Similarly, Aristotle distinguishes between good deliberation and mere cleverness, with the difference being that the former is “able to attain to the good” whereas the latter is correctly deliberating about whatever one decides upon, whether good or bad (*Nic. Eth.* 1142b16–22).

87. See also *De anima* 414b1–6.

88. *De anima* II.3 413b21–24, 414b1–6; III.7 431a8–14, 431b8–12; see also III.10 433a28.

89. Trans. Hett (1936).

90. *De anima* III.8 431b20–432a3.

91. As I discussed in chapter 2 earlier, the natural relation of the parts of the soul is such that the part that is lower in the hierarchy is present *potentially* in the higher one, but the case of the relation between the perceptive part and intellectual part does not easily conform to this relation.

92. When I speak of perception in this section, I refer to the perceptual part of the soul and its activity when apprehending a current particular object. As we saw in the first chapter, this is the perception of incidental objects of perception (which includes perceiving special and common objects), as influenced by memory and *phantasia*. The problem

that the akratic suffers from is that this part of the soul operates independently of the intellectual—the akratic perceives objects just as nonrational animals do. This is a problem because, unlike nonrational animals, the apparent and true good are not naturally aligned for humans. The perceptual part of the soul apprehends the apparent good, and if this is to align with the true good, this part of the soul must be harmonized with the intellectual part.

93. Destrée (2007) and Moss (2012) adopt similar strategies. Destrée justifies this move with Aristotle's invocation of the *phusikos* explanation at 1147a24 (148, 151).

94. Moss (2009) and Destrée (2007) use the former term, Charles (2007) the latter.

95. For example, Robinson (1977) and Grgić (2002).

96. For example, Dahl (1984).

97. In this camp, see Destrée (2007), Charles (2007), and Moss (2009).

98. Moss (2009, revised and reprinted as chapter 5 in her 2012) argues persuasively for the compatibility of these two characterizations. Destrée (2007) similarly argues for the compatibility of the explanation of *akrasia* in terms of a conflict of desire and the explanation from ignorance.

99. Though, as Moss (2009) points out, it is also clearly present in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Moss cites I.13 1102b13–25.

100. Moss (2012) argues, similarly, that all desire—rational or nonrational—depends upon an evaluative cognition, that is, finding something good. See chapter 1 for the argument that desire depends upon evaluative cognition, and chapter 2 for the distinction between rational and nonrational desires. So, similarly, does Destrée (2007), 150.

101. Moss (2012), 18, similarly reads this as distinguishing between the good, which is grasped by intellect, and the apparent good, which is grasped by some other faculty.

102. Moss (2012), 6, citing Irwin (1990), makes a similar point. To apprehend something as good requires the operations of the intellectual capacity, and for creatures without such a capacity, the good is simply the pleasant, that is, what appears good.

103. See Wiggins (1980) for an argument that the meaning of “choice” (*prohairesis*) is the same in both *Nic. Eth.* III and VII.

104. With Rorty (1980), 270, I take this *not* to describe the epistemic state of the akratic in particular, but only to show one ordinary case in which a person can be said to act contrary to his knowledge. I take it that this is not the akratic's epistemic state, first, because this describes a case of acting out of ignorance of the particular, which Aristotle characterizes as an involuntary act and therefore deserving of pity instead of blame (*Nic. Eth.* III.1 1111a2–21). But *akrasia* is blameworthy, and therefore voluntary. Moreover, in Aristotle's account of *akrasia*, he remarks specifically that the minor premise is active, that is, the knowledge of the particular—“this is sweet”—is active. Second, Aristotle marks a shift in account when he begins to describe the state of the akratic (1147a17–18: “It is clear, then, that those lacking self-restraint must be said to be in a state similar to such people”), saying, “Further, another way of having science, different from those just now mentioned . . .” (1147a10–11).

105. Contra Burnyeat (1980), who sees no answer in *Nic. Eth.* VII.3 to why the better knowledge is overcome: “The treatment of knowledge pinpoints what is to be explained. It is not itself the explanation” (85). Burnyeat instead finds an answer in the overeager spirited part of the soul that Aristotle discusses in *Nic. Eth.* VII.6. But it seems that Aristotle himself thinks that he has found a solution in *Nic. Eth.* III.3.

106. Rorty (1980) suggests that the abstract way in which the akratic “knows” what is good is a result of forgetting oneself: “To forget what sort of man one is can be to forget

how one's character embeds one's ends. This is compatible with remembering those ends, but remembering them abstractly" (273).

107. Moss (2009), 132; see also Lorenz (2006), 197.

108. That the two accounts are complementary is indicated by the way Aristotle introduces the second account. Aristotle introduces the second account by saying, "Further, someone might also look at the cause of the lack of self-restraint in terms of nature [*phusikōs*], as follows" (*Nic. Eth.* 1147a24–25). The *phusikōs* here indicates that Aristotle will articulate the cause of *akrasia* from a new perspective, not that he will provide an alternative and competing explanation. (See also *De anima* I.1 403a24–b16. Here he offers two compatible explanations of anger, one of which is the explanation that the natural scientist gives; the other is that which the dialectician will give, and one who studies the soul must take both into account. A multiplicity of perspectives produces a multiplicity of complementary explanations.)

109. In this sense, the akratic behaves like a child or a nonrational animal. See MacIntyre (1999), 70–71.

110. Cooper (1975) offers a quite different interpretation of these passages. He argues that appetite prevents the avoidance of the sweet because it prevents the recognition "this is chocolate" (49–50). This seems to render the akratic *too* ignorant of his own action—how can a person *not* know that what he is eating is chocolate? Anyone who has experienced an akratic moment will attest that she *knew* that she was eating chocolate. What she is ignorant of is, rather, her own investment in not eating chocolate.

111. See McDowell (1998), 46–48, and Burnyeat (1980), 83, for similar points. See Wiggins (1980b) on the difference between the akratic and the enkratic's knowledge and perception.

112. As Moss (2012), 39, points out, Aristotle considers the vicious person's pleasure in base things "as a kind of malfunctioning of the pleasure-taking apparatus, akin to ordinary perceptual error," citing *Nic. Eth.* 1173b20–25. The vicious person's perceptual soul is in a bad state; similarly, although less extremely, so is the akratic's, for taking pleasure in the wrong things. See also Lorenz (2006), 198–201.

113. See Moss (2009), who argues that *akrasia* is parallel to perceptual illusion: that when the akratic behaves akratically, her intellect is "covered over" and is unable to apprehend the difference between the perceived good and the true good. Intellect is compromised such that *choosing*, that is, deliberately desiring, is no longer available to the akratic agent.

114. This dual aspect of *akrasia* also explains why the akratic's lack of knowledge of the particular does not render the act involuntary. The akratic is responsible for the ignorance of the particular because he is responsible for being the sort of person who is easily overcome by passion. The parallel case is the person who acts in ignorance while drunk: he is responsible for his action because he is responsible for his drunken condition (*Nic. Eth.* III.5 1113b30–1114a3). Similarly, the akratic is ultimately responsible for the state of passion that overcomes him because he has made himself the sort of character who is vulnerable to such fits (as I will argue below).

115. Moss (2009) emphasizes the physiological underpinnings of *akrasia*.

116. See Kosman (1980) for an account of the habituation of passion. Burnyeat (1980) offers an account of moral development generally. He views *akrasia* as a stage in the development of virtue, before one's habits have made internal what one has learned is good (84–86).

117. Aristotle does not consider our bodily conditions to be merely natural. We are responsible for the “vices of the body” (*Nic. Eth.* 1114a21–23) that arise due to our behavior. Correlatively, it would seem, we are responsible for the good condition of our bodies, and also molding them to *be* good conditions for virtuous action.

Chapter 4

1. I limit myself to discuss the *orthos logos*, and not the *horos* (boundary, standard) to which the person with reason looks. The *horos* in this introductory passage seems to name the boundary of the range of actions that, in one situation or another, constitute the middle action or passion of virtue. I am interested here in the specific middle action/passion that the *phronimos* determines. For an account of the *horos*, see Peterson (1988) and Gómez-Lobo (1992).

2. Specifically, the action (and passion) that hits the middle course is undertaken “when one ought and at the things one ought, in relation to those people whom one ought, for the sake of what and as one ought” (*Nic. Eth.* 1106b21–23).

3. The comments here at the opening of *Nicomachean Ethics* II pick up on earlier comments in I about method (1094b11–1095a3, 1098a26–b2), and there is a distinction to be drawn between arguments concerning ethics as a matter of study and arguments about what one ought to do or what the middle course is that one is aiming at. The distinction, however, is not a very sharp one; after all, we are studying ethics not for the sake of knowledge but for the sake of becoming good (1095a4–6, 1103b26–30). More importantly for my purposes here, Aristotle moves in this passage at the opening of II from referring to the imprecision of arguments about ethics as a matter of study to arguments about what a person ought to do. He begins the passage by referring back to the earlier methodological remarks (“just as we said at the beginning” [1104a2–3]), but adds a further imprecision due to the particularity of action (“And since such is the character of the general argument, still less precise is the argument concerned with particulars” [1104a5–6]), and as a result “those who act ought themselves always to examine what pertains to the opportune moment” (1104a7–8). The imprecision of ethics as a study rests in the imprecision of action generally and specifically the inability to provide an accurate *logos* for virtuous action.

4. Modrak (1991a) recognizes this problem in identifying the *orthos logos* (186). Her solution is that the *logos* is “the application of the correct general principle to the concrete situation . . . The special skill of the *phronimos* is the ability to recognize when the prescriptive principle should be put into play and when it should not.” However, the problem runs deeper than this solution suggests: in order even to decide whether a principle applies to a concrete situation, one must first of all see the situation in a certain way, as, for example, an occasion for courage (whether courage in this situation means standing one’s ground or running away). See Nussbaum (1990), chap. 2.

5. This is consistent with the general character of virtue as what “brings that of which it is the virtue into good condition and causes the work belonging to that thing to be done well” (*Nic. Eth.* 1106a15–17). *Phronēsis*, as an intellectual virtue, is what causes the work of practical thinking to be done well. See Lorenz (2009) for a similar point based on the analysis of adjectives ending in *-ikos* and with reference to *phronēsis* as a *hexis praktikē*.

6. Contrary to Broadie (1991), 203, I do not see Aristotle identifying *phronēsis* with good deliberation. Broadie cites *Nic. Eth.* 1140a25–26, but there, as elsewhere, what Aristotle says is that it belongs to the *phronimos* to be able to deliberate well (*dokei dē phronimou einai to dunasthai kalōs bouleusasthai*), not that deliberating well is *phronēsis*. Broadie

recognizes that deliberating well cannot be all there is to *phronēsis*, because good practical thinking also requires the ability to decide when deliberation is necessary (211), although she does not find this in Aristotle's account. We do find it, however, if we do not identify *phronēsis* with good deliberation, but with the condition or power for good deliberation. See Bostock (2000), 84–85, who draws a similar distinction between the deliberative aspect of *phronēsis* and the true apprehension of the end; and Schollmeier (1989), who distinguishes between an intuitive and a discursive function of *phronēsis*.

7. Perceiving particulars as ethically significant is, I take it, the same as what McDowell (1998) calls perceiving “action-inviting” features, and Nussbaum (1990) calls the discernment of perception, what Wiggins (1980a) calls situational appreciation, and what Loudon (1986) calls practical perception. It is similar but not identical to Moss's (2012) notion of evaluative perception. Moss considers evaluative perception to be the perception of pleasure and pain as such, whether or not there is intellectual input, and that this is the basis of ethical cognition. But this is the limit to what perception can do, on Moss's account. Perception, understood as the faculty sensitive to the present particular, must be the faculty receptive to the ethical significance of a particular, but it does this by virtue of operating within an intellectual context. See Loudon (1986) for a similar view of perception (especially 170).

8. David Wiggins helpfully expresses this gap between intention, preparation, and successful action in Aristotelian terms of having a *disposition*. One may have a disposition to do something, and that means that ordinarily one will accomplish it, but it does not guarantee that one will be successful. Wiggins (1980b), 244.

9. Purshouse (2006) explains Neoptolemus's circumstance as a conflict between a *phantasia* developed in the course of a foregone moral education, and a new conceptual scheme or worldview that has not yet altered the basic impression that Philoctetes makes upon him (213–16), parallel to the feelings a lapsed Catholic might have at the prospect of premarital sex (215). “If Neoptolemus acts on the basis of this emotion, he acts ‘for the sake of the noble’; at least, for the sake of what he once thought was noble and what still has, for him, a *phantasia* of nobility, as opposed to disgrace. We might also say his emotion is, in some sense, obedient to his reason, in that it follows a past element of his reasoning, albeit not the reasoned judgement he entertains at the time of action . . . Hence, his passion is linked not only with reason, but with right reason: an element of his rational mind that had judged correctly” (215). One reason to think that Neoptolemus's case is rather to be explained in terms of flexible sensitivity, as opposed to slipping back into a prior way of thinking, comes from Aristotle's remarks immediately preceding the invocation of Neoptolemus. In these remarks, Aristotle distinguishes the stubborn from the self-controlled (enkratic) on the basis that the former, but not the latter, are hard to persuade otherwise (*Nic. Eth.* 1151b4–10). Conversely, Neoptolemus, although he departs from his reasoned opinion on the basis of a passion, is not akratic for the reason that it is his passion, and not his opinion, that is good and true. This suggests that what is at stake here is sensitivity to the good—the stubborn person is not enkratic because she is insensitive to truth, and Neoptolemus is not akratic because he *is* sensitive to truth.

10. Cooper (1975) takes *kath' hekasta* to refer not to concrete particulars but to determinate kinds or species (28–32). But see Engberg-Pedersen (1983), 199n; and Loudon (1991), 164–67, for refutations of this view.

11. Engberg-Pedersen (1983) raises a similar question (202–4). His answer is that perception *becomes* rational by being used in a rational context, namely, deliberation, and

thereby being formulated universally. I answer this question differently because I adopt a broader notion of rationality than he does (see his chapter 5).

12. I take this proposal to be similar to Louden's (1986) proposal that practical perception (*aisthēsis*) (perception of ethically relevant particulars) is *phronēsis* applied to the level of particular situations of choice (169). I find, however, that Louden leaves obscure the precise relationship between intellect (*nous*) and perception (*aisthēsis*) as distinct psychological faculties. For example, he interprets Aristotle's comment at *Nic. Eth.* VI.8 1143b5 that *aisthēsis* is *nous* to mean that *nous* is a noninferential grasp of the particulars of action (173), which seems to elide the distinction between *aisthēsis* and *nous* entirely. I am indebted to Olmsted (1948) for drawing the close connection between the mean of perception and the mean of virtue, although the connection I draw is rather different than his.

13. Because of how cursory the discussions of the other intellectual virtues (scientific knowledge [*epistēmē*], art [*technē*], wisdom [*sophia*], and intellect [*nous*]) are relative to the discussions of *phronēsis*, I take Aristotle to introduce them for the sake of enumerating the virtues completely, but also for the sake of comparing and contrasting them with *phronēsis* (as he does many times in *Nic. Eth.* VI).

14. Engberg-Pederson (1983) points out that Aristotle uses *hupolēpsis* as a generic term to cover all rational states (144–45).

15. Trans. Sachs (1999).

16. Fortenbaugh (1964), 78, for example, argues that perceiving particulars correctly is the accomplishment of virtue of character (moral virtue), giving *phronēsis* an instrumental role in completing the process of deliberation (80). Fortenbaugh rightly emphasizes Aristotle's view that "what sort of character a man has determines what appears good to him" (81) and that only the virtuous person truly apprehends the practical good in its particularity.

17. Fortenbaugh recognizes these challenges, meeting the first by interpreting the passage at *Nic. Eth.* 1142a23–30 as identifying the commonsense power as necessary for practical reasoning, but not the work of *phronēsis* itself (85). This interpretation is problematic because it rests on identifying the mathematical perception of a triangle as the ultimate figure with the ordinary perception of a triangle. He meets the second challenge by claiming that Aristotle is not describing *phronēsis* accurately at 1144a29–30, but instead is making reference to a passage in Plato's *Republic* 533d (86). This, too, is a problematic response, both because it does not explain why Aristotle would make such a misleading reference, and also because it does not take into account the second instance of the characterization of *phronēsis* as the vision of moral virtue implicit in the passage at 1144b8–12.

18. McDowell (1998), 39, makes a similar point.

19. I return at the conclusion of the chapter to consider why *phronēsis* is insufficient without virtue in considering the much-discussed issue of whether virtue or *phronēsis* provides the end of action and choice.

20. I am not distinguishing between natural virtue and virtue of character. (See, for example, Bostock [2000], 87, for such a distinction.) The point I ultimately wish to make—that it is *phronēsis* that enables one to identify the middle course in any particular circumstance—holds whether or not natural virtue is distinct from virtue of character. Neither of these latter types of virtue is fully virtue, and both suffer from imprecision.

21. Nussbaum (1990), 71–72.

22. See also *Nic. Eth.* 1141a25–26: "they would assert that that which observes [*theōrein*] the good condition [*to eu*] for each thing is *phronimos*, and they would entrust such con-

cerns to this”; 1142b32–33: “good deliberation would be a correctness that accords with what is advantageous in relation to the end, about which end *phronēsis* is a true conviction.”

23. This passage also illustrates why virtue is necessary for *phronēsis*. Recall that *phronēsis* and virtue mutually require one another—virtue is only natural virtue in the absence of *phronēsis*, and *phronēsis* is not possible without virtue (*Nic. Eth.* 1144b30–32). *Phronēsis* provides the guiding sight of the particular to virtue, and virtue is a condition for such a sight because it removes the corrupting influence of pleasure and pain. See also Woods (1986).

24. Broadie (1991) refutes this idea (198–202); see Bostock (2000), 82–93, for a rebuttal.

25. See Nussbaum (1990), 70, and Wiggins (1980), 231 for similar discussions of the Lesbian rule passage.

26. I say “at least” because I am sympathetic to McDowell’s (1998) stronger conclusion that “practical wisdom is the properly molded state of the motivational propensities [provided by the virtues of character] in a reflectively adjusted form; the sense in which it is a state of the intellect does not interfere with its also being a state of the desiderative element” (40). This conclusion has the advantage of explaining why Aristotle considers virtue of character and *phronēsis* to be mutually dependent upon one another, and why Aristotle claims that if one has *phronēsis*, one has all the rest of virtue, too.

27. *Republic* 331c.

28. See Woods (1986), 146.

29. Although some scholars (e.g., Moss [2012], 41) take Aristotle to be using *aisthēsis* loosely when he likens *phronēsis* to it, there are also a number of scholars who take this claim literally. Among those who take Aristotle at his word when he likens *phronēsis* to perception are John Cooper (1975), John McDowell (1998), Martha Nussbaum (1990), Richard Sorabji (1980), Deborah Modrak (1991a), Troels Engberg-Pedersen (1983), and Robert Louden (1986). While these discussions are enlightening, I find that either they are mostly reticent with regard to how to understand this unusual power of perception (McDowell, Nussbaum, Louden), or they treat it as a perception that is subsumed under a universal (Sorabji, Modrak, Cooper). Nussbaum persuasively argues that this latter way of understanding the nature of practical thinking fails to accommodate the variability and unpredictability of concrete ethical situations (66–75). The task I aim to accomplish is to show the nature of phronetic perception and to explain how it may be *influenced* by intellect without thereby understanding it to be subsumed under a universal. Louden moves in this direction (172–74), but the relationship between intellect and perception remains unclear. My position is closest to McDowell’s, who argues that *phronēsis* is perception that is informed by one’s conception of the end (30).

30. Aristotle identifies shape as one of the objects of perception, a common sensible, and some commentators (as, for example, Modrak [1991a] and Engberg-Pederson [1983], 206) have identified this as the kind of perception invoked here. However, I think it is mistaken to identify the kind of perception spoken of here as perception of the common sensible, shape, because Aristotle does not liken *phronēsis* to the perception of a *triangle*, a perception available to nonrational animals, but of a triangle *as* the ultimate figure in mathematics.

31. Cooper (1975) and Louden (1986), 169 understand the triangle to be ultimate in the sense of being the first term in the construction of geometrical proofs, and, analogously, the ultimate object of *phronēsis* to be the conclusion of deliberation, which is the first step one must take in accomplishing one’s aim. Engberg-Pedersen (1983), 206 adds

that it is the last object of analysis in looking for a simple figure to serve as the basis for other geometrical constructions. (Compare Wiggins [1980], 235–36.) It does not seem to me to be necessary to interpret the analogy in this way, and, moreover, to interpret the analogy this way seems to obscure the point of the passage, which is to distinguish *phronēsis* from *epistēmē*. *Epistēmē* is knowledge that is the conclusion of a demonstration; on Cooper's reading, this passage makes *phronēsis* the conclusion of deliberation. On this interpretation, then, it seems that *phronēsis* is rather like *epistēmē*, not distinct from it. In a similar vein, Cooper does not address the seemingly nondiscursive nature of *phronēsis*, brought out in the comparison to *nous's* grasp of those things that have no *logos*. See Bos-tock (2000), 101 for other objections.

32. McDowell (1998), 27–30, argues similarly that *phronēsis* is “the perceptual capacity that determines which feature of a situation should engage a standing concern” (30). Engberg-Pedersen argues that it is “contextual perception” in the sense that it is the perception of a particular *as* relevant to a rational argument (207). This seems to be the other side of McDowell's coin: to perceive a particular *as* engaging one's concern may mean to perceive it *as* relevant to one's reasoning about what to do, or it may mean that it is the salient feature upon which to act.

33. Mostly in agreement with Cooper, this explains why mathematical perception is *more* perception than *phronēsis* is: *phronēsis* perceives something in light of some aim to be achieved, and this aim is not yet present to be perceived. The mathematician, presumably, actually *sees* triangles.

34. I say “perceptual awareness” to mark a distinction between the analysis of perception in abstraction from the life of the animal of which it is a part and the discussion of perception in its capacity of being of service to the living being. It is only in abstraction that we get perception of the proper perceptible *as* such, but in the broader awareness by which an animal lives, such things are always perceived as organized by the animal's aims and desires.

35. Lorenz (2006) argues that being able to comprehend for-the-sake-of relations distinguishes human practical thinking from the nonrational animal equivalent (174–85). This does not preclude that the perception of nonrational animals is informed by their goals, even if they are not aware of their goals *as* goals for the sake of which they act.

36. Owens (1991), 144.

37. *Ibid.*, 147.

38. Nussbaum (1990), 67.

39. By contrast, intellect is nothing before it thinks (*De anima* 429a24).

40. See Russon (1995).

41. The decisive remark occurs at *Nic. Eth.* 1113a32–b1: “the serious person is distinguished perhaps most of all by his seeing what is true in each case, just as if he were a rule and measure of them. But in the case of most people, a deception appears to occur on account of the pleasure involved, for what is not good appears to them as good.”

42. The whole passage reads: “Further, pleasure has been a part of the upbringing of us all from infancy; it is difficult to remove this experience, since our life has been so ingrained with it. We also take pleasure and pain as the rule of our actions, some of us to a greater degree, some to a lesser. It is on account of this that one's entire concern necessarily pertains to pleasure and pain, for taking delight and feeling pain make no small contribution to our actions' being well or badly done” (*Nic. Eth.* 1105a1–7). See also 1104b11–13 and X.1 1172a19–26.

43. “Thus one must be brought up in a certain way straight from childhood, as Plato asserts, so as to enjoy as well as to be pained by what one ought, for this is correct education” (*Nic. Eth.* 1104b11–13).

44. See the distinction between the unqualifiedly good and the good for some particular person drawn in the discussion of pleasure in *Nic. Eth.* VII.12.

45. Similar, perhaps, to reaching the right conclusion on the basis of a faulty middle premise (*Nic. Eth.* VI.9).

46. For animals, of course, “ethical” experience in the sense of distinguishing between good and bad *is* preprogrammed in the soul in the mean of perception.

47. Much has been written on the topic of the relationship between *phronēsis* and virtue of character with regard to means-ends. It is well documented in Moss (2011).

Conclusion

1. Trans. Simpson (1997).
2. Trans. Sachs (2009).
3. Trans. Benardete and Davis (2002).