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Aquinas on Virtue

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Published by Georgetown University Press

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Aquinas on Virtue: A Causal Reading.

Georgetown University Press, 2017.

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CHAPTER 11

Rethinking Infusion

Suggested reading: *Summa Theologiae* I.II 5.5, 65.3, 68.1, 110.2; II.II 24.6, 24.12; III 62.1, 69.6.

Virtue's infusion by God is integral to Aquinas's theological ethics and is, in light of contemporary virtue theories, something distinctive and surprising. For some the infusion of virtue promises a welcome paradigm shift in virtue theory; for others the idea is disconcertingly problematic. An attempt will be made to do justice to both intuitions by identifying a core idea to be valued and associated ideas that today need critical examination. A causal approach can help in the rethinking of theological controversies that have, in the Thomistic tradition, proved remarkably resistant to resolution.

INFUSION AS GIFT

“Infusion” (*infusio*) is a useful metaphor, but a limited one. The image is of pouring liquid into a container.¹ Bernard of Clairvaux uses the idea to contrast the way a good angel can urge us to good things but only God can directly produce good things in us: “The Angel is in us, suggesting good things to us, but not placing them in [the soul]. It is in us, encouraging us to the good, not creating the good. God is in us in such a way that He affects [the soul], and infuses it [with what is good]. Or, rather, He Himself is infused and makes it participate in Himself.”² The metaphor succeeds in conveying the idea that virtues are sheer gift from God; in other respects it is a limited image, as virtue is not much like a pourable liquid.

That gifting is at the heart of Aquinas's idea is confirmed by his attempt to distinguish the seven “gifts” of the Holy Spirit from the moral and theological virtues (I.II 68.1; see also 55 pr). Aquinas finds this in the Vulgate Bible: “And the spirit of the Lord will rest on him: the spirit of wisdom and understanding,

the spirit of counsel and fortitude, the spirit of knowledge and piety. And he shall be filled with the fear of the Lord” (Isaiah 11:1–2). The Latin Fathers, such as Augustine of Hippo and Pope Gregory the Great, saw these seven “gifts” or “spirits” or “virtues” as special qualities given to Christ and the Church’s members by the Holy Spirit.

Although sharing names with some of the virtues, Aquinas distinguishes the gifts from the moral, intellectual, and theological virtues. How to accomplish this? It is not enough to say that the “gifts” are given freely by God, whereas the virtues are not: “Nothing prohibits that which arises from another as a gift to be perfective of someone for acting well, especially since, as we have seen, certain virtues are infused in us from God. Whence, employing this method, gift cannot be distinguished from virtue” (I.II 68.1c).³ The term “gift” refers to the causal origin of something. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are gifts, but then so are the infused moral and theological virtues. Perhaps the only reason Aquinas customarily uses the language of “infused” virtues rather than “gifted” virtues is simply that he does not want to confuse the theological and moral virtues with the seven gifts found in the Book of Isaiah.

Aquinas does sometimes refer to supernatural virtue as gifted virtue (*virtus gratuita*), and he talks of gifted prudence, fortitude, temperance, hope, and charity.⁴ *Gratuita* is contrasted with *naturalia* (the natural) to refer to the sheer gift of what comes with supernatural grace, without denying that even natural things are gifts of God’s love. For, “All gifts, both natural and gratuitous, are given to us by God through love, which is the first gift.”⁵ The core insight of the idea of virtue’s infusion is simply that the virtues that lead us to God are themselves free gifts of a gracious God. Infused virtue is gifted virtue.

Aquinas observes that a person’s excellence “he does not have from himself, but this is, as it were, something divinely inspired in him. And therefore, for this reason, the honor is due principally, not to him, but God” (II.II 131.1).⁶ To view God, not our own effort, as virtue’s origin effects a welcome Copernican revolution. As Robert Adams observes, “We may well have a richer as well as less self-centered view of virtue if we regard it largely as a gift.”⁷ The recognition of virtue as primarily gift is a decentering one, assigning praise to the divine source of all that is good in us.

The Augustinian interpretation of Aquinas acknowledges a genuine paradigm shift from Aristotle. According to Alasdair MacIntyre, Aquinas’s recognition that we are *dependent* rational animals contrasts sharply with Aristotle’s ideal of self-sufficiency. This contrast is especially noteworthy, as MacIntyre suggests, when Aquinas’s ethical vision is compared to Aristotle’s “magnanimous man.”⁸ Aquinas does not reject magnanimity as a virtue; nevertheless, his own account puts Aristotle into dialectical tension with Christian humility (II.II 129, 3 arg 4, ad 4; 161.1; 2 arg 3, ad 3; 4 arg 3, ad 3). This means

that Aquinas must do some creative accounting to reconcile Aristotle's claim that the magnanimous man "needs nothing" with an anthropology that recognizes not only relationality but even dependence as part of what it means to be human: "For every human, in the first place indeed, needs divine help, but secondly, even human help, because a human is naturally a social animal, since he is not sufficient of himself for life" (II.II 129.6 ad 1).⁹ The paradigm shift is masked only by Aquinas's charitable mode of interpretation that refuses to contradict Aristotle outright. Aquinas saves Aristotle's text by distinguishing between an unhelpful neediness from which the virtuous are free, and the need that every human—including the virtuous—has of divine and human help (*auxilium*). A human needs divine help "in the first place indeed" (*primo quidem*). Within this new paradigm we cannot attain the end without ongoing divine help (I.II 5.5), and the virtues that lead us to this end depend on God's ongoing giving as the illumination of the air depends on the sun (II.II 24.12c).

FACILITY

While the core idea of virtue's infusion, that the supernatural virtues are gifts from God, is theologically indispensable, associated claims in Aquinas's account are worthy of critical examination. The first is the idea that the infusion of moral virtue does not confer the same kind of facility as acquired moral virtue bestows. Since the exercise of virtue is characterized by ease, delight, and promptness, facility in virtuous action is therefore the sign of virtue (*signum virtutis*) in that indicates that it is performed from a well-rooted habit. This is not merely a philosophical claim. The graced life of Christian existence should be characterized by a sweetness and promptness in performing those actions that lead to eternal beatitude (I.II 110.2). Indeed, it is axiomatic for Aquinas that "it is not fitting that God should provide less for those he loves that they may possess the supernatural good, than for creatures whom he loves that they possess a natural good" (110.2).¹⁰ It would be incongruous if God had so arranged things that the joy characteristic of natural virtue is lacking in supernatural virtue.

The claim that infused moral virtue does not confer facility in the same way as acquired virtue arises from an empirical observation combined with a thesis about virtue. The empirical evidence is that the newly converted often find it difficult and painful to act prudently, justly, bravely, or temperately even when they succeed in doing so; the thesis is that the moral virtues are infused along with grace at the moment of baptism. It follows from these that it can be difficult and painful to exercise infused moral virtue (65.3 ad 2; *On the Virtues* 1.10 ad 14–16).¹¹

Michael S. Sherwin helpfully illustrates the idea with the case of Matthew Talbot, an Irish laborer and alcoholic who underwent a conversion, gave up drink, and dedicated his life to prayer and service of the poor.¹² While he “radically reoriented his life towards God,” it remained true that “he still retained, especially in the beginning, a strong desire (and inclination) to continue drinking and to return to his former way of life.”¹³ In Aquinas’s viewpoint, Sherwin suggests, Talbot has the infused virtue of temperance but finds it difficult to act temperately.

Aquinas therefore seems caught in a bind. If new converts find morally virtuous action difficult, and moral virtues are infused with grace, then either we question virtue’s infusion at baptism or we have to account for the anomaly of moral virtues that lack the facility ordinarily characteristic of virtue:

He who has virtue, does the works of virtue with facility, and they are pleasing to him for their own sake, whence also “the sign of a habit is the delight that arises in the work,” as is said in the *Nicomachean Ethics* II. But many have charity, free from mortal sin, who nevertheless suffer difficulty in the works of the virtues, nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, but only insofar as they are referred to charity. (I.II 65.3 arg 2)¹⁴

Aquinas replies that the infused moral virtues do possess a facility, but of a different kind. Let us examine his account in his three major theological treatments of virtue.

The fundamental position is laid down in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, where Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of facility that we may term *habituated facility* and *agonistic facility*.¹⁵ Habituated facility arises from preceding habit or custom; it is characteristic of acquired moral virtue. Agonistic facility belongs to infused moral virtue from its generation; it arises from a strong attachment to virtue’s object. For Aquinas the latter kind of facility is compatible with difficulty in acting virtuously due to the hangover from a previous life of sin—that is, the “habits of vices” that have been impeded or diminished but not totally taken away.¹⁶ This is “agonistic” facility because it involves countering strong contrary dispositions.

The two types of facility can be illustrated by adapting an example proposed by Louis Billot (1846–1931):¹⁷ Bob finds it difficult to take his cholesterol medication because he is not yet accustomed to it, but he does so reliably because of his intense desire to avoid a heart attack. Bill, on the other hand, is used to the same medication regime and because it has become easy for him, he reliably keeps to it, although having a less intense desire to be well than Bob. The two men have contrasting kinds of facility in obeying their doctors’ instructions: the first arises from a strong adherence to good health, the second

simply from the accustomed ease with which medication is taken. Bob's facility is analogous to the agonistic facility of infused moral virtue, whereas Bill's corresponds to the habituated facility of acquired moral virtue. In the case of Matt Talbot, Sherwin suggests, "At the moment of his conversion, the infused virtues empowered him to live soberly, even as he continued to feel a burning desire to drink."¹⁸

In *On the Virtues* Aquinas defends this viewpoint by observing that there is at least one case of virtuous operation that is not delightful—namely, brave action (1.10 ad 15). If it is not necessarily delightful to act from fortitude when risking one's life on the battlefield, for example, then surely the lack of delight in acting according to newly infused virtue is not contrary to virtue's nature. In the *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas points out that often someone may possess a habit and yet not experience delight and complacency in its act due to an extrinsic obstacle (I.II 65.3 ad 2). A scientist may have difficulty in understanding because he is sleepy or physically sick. Aquinas concludes, "And similarly, the habits of infused moral virtues sometimes suffer difficulty in operating, due to certain contrary dispositions remaining from preceding acts."¹⁹

The analogies Aquinas offers to demonstrate that agonistic facility is sufficient for virtue are not convincing. The exercise of fortitude lacks delight because of an external threat it is virtuous to fear: the danger of injury or death. In contrast, the obstacle to enjoyment in exercising newly generated infused virtue is an acquired interior disposition contrary to virtue (65.3 ad 2). Similarly, sleepiness or sickness is, as Aquinas notes, a supervenient external impediment (*ibid.*); the inclination to sin, on the other hand, is something disordered within a person's soul. It does not make obvious sense to say that one has a virtue while suffering strong interior inclinations in the opposite direction. The ascription of agonistic facility to temperance is especially problematic: temperance collapses into continence, or the ability to act virtuously despite strong appetitive inclinations to the contrary.

Aquinas's distinction between the agonistic facility proper to newly infused moral virtue and the habitual facility proper to acquired virtue is unhelpful. Since facility involving promptness, ease, and joy is the sign of virtue, the lack of such facility in the new convert is not a sign that infused moral virtue lacks such facility. Rather, it is a sign that she does not possess infused virtue in its complete form. If a person finds difficulty and pain in exercising moral virtue, then, lacking that facility (the sign of virtue), it is more reasonable to conclude she is not yet, simply speaking, morally virtuous. In the case of Matt Talbot, it is more plausible to say not that he possesses infused temperance yet still experiences the inclination to sin but rather that he possesses continence or self-control.

GRADUALNESS

The problem of facility indicates the need for a more developmental perspective. Aquinas, however, claims that the supernatural virtues are all infused simultaneously with the grace of justification at the moment of repentance, which “opens the door to the virtues” (III 85.6 ad 3).²⁰ Referring to faith, hope, and charity, Aquinas says, “[These] habits are infused at the same time” (*habitus simul infunduntur*) (I.II 62.4c). Nor is this a matter of the theological virtues alone: “The moral virtues are infused simultaneously with charity” (65.3).²¹ For Aquinas the normal locus for the infusion of the virtues is baptism: “By Baptism, a person receives grace and the virtues” (III 69.4).²²

Why is it necessary that all the virtues be infused simultaneously? Aquinas argues: “Charity is generated simultaneously with the other virtues, not because it is indistinguishable from them, but because the works of God are perfect. Hence, when charity is infused, he infuses all those things that are necessary for salvation” (*On the Virtues* 2.5 ad 11).²³ To say that God does not give all the virtues simultaneously would be a slight on the perfection and love of God.

Aquinas recognizes that the simultaneity thesis is difficult to reconcile with human experience. There is the case of the new convert who finds it difficult to act virtuously. Another apparent counterexample is the newly baptized infant, who has grace yet is unable to exercise prudence (II.II 47.14 arg 3). Aquinas concedes that the infant will lack acquired prudence since she lacks the requisite experience, time, and opportunity for exercise. He claims, however, that since the virtues flow from grace, baptized infants do possess infused prudence, at least in habit if not in act (*secundum habitum, sed non secundum actum*) (ad 3). Elsewhere, he explains this view as follows:

Some of the ancients thought that infants were not given grace and the virtues in Baptism. . . . The reason for their error was that they did not know how to distinguish between habit and act. And so, seeing infants incapable of acts of the virtues, they believed that they have no virtues at all after Baptism. But this impotency of operating does not happen to infants because of the lack of habits, but from a bodily impediment, just as people sleeping, although they may have the habits of virtues, are nevertheless impeded from acts because of sleep. (III 69.6c)²⁴

The distinction between possessing a virtue *in habit* and having it *in act* does make sense. A person who is sleeping has no opportunity to exercise her virtue but would characteristically do so if awake and the opportunity presented itself. However, Aquinas’s comparison with the sleeping adult is unconvincing since the “impediment” to acting virtuously is much more fundamental for a

baby than for an adult.²⁵ To say that a baby possesses prudence in habit rather than in act is to imply the baby *would* characteristically exercise prudence under certain circumstances. But in what circumstances *could* a baby do so? Presumably only in circumstances in which it ceases to be a baby and acquires a different set of capabilities.

Does nothing change with baptism? A newly baptized baby is now explicitly part of the Christian community that mediates God's grace and so is on the path toward infused virtue. Or the baby possesses virtue *in germ* rather than *in habit*. (On the idea of germinal virtue, see chap. 9.) Something similar could be said of the newly converted Christian: Matt Talbot has a new commitment and relationship to God and so will have a new motivation to be prudent, just, brave, and temperate, but it is premature to say that he is such already.

The idea that the virtues arrive all at once in the soul by infusion, as if a light switch has been turned on, does not correspond to a meaningful narrative of the ordinary process of moral development.²⁶ Baptism is not like Robert Nozick's "transformation machine" that makes us instantly virtuous.²⁷ Baptized infants are not yet prudent, just, or temperate. Once baptized, adults still struggle, still fall, and take time to attain to the virtues. The simultaneity thesis, as Aquinas states it, fails to do justice to the gradualness of spiritual growth.

The simultaneity thesis can be rethought and made more consistent with the ordinary narrative of spiritual growth if we attend to Cajetan's neglected but intriguing interpretation (in I.II 62.4). Cajetan thinks that someone persisting in mortal sin after baptism could well have received faith and hope but still lacks charity: the mortally sinful acts of the convert prevent the generation of charity in the soul by infusion. Whatever we make of the plausibility of this case, it nevertheless provides Cajetan the occasion for making a valuable distinction between the *infusion* of the virtues, which in the strict and formal sense is an activity of God, and their *reception*, which is something that may happen in the soul as a consequence of God's action but only on condition that the person is appropriately disposed. Cajetan therefore restates the simultaneity thesis this way: the habits of theological virtues are infused at the same time "*on the part of the one infusing and by the rationale of infusion*, although the opposite may happen *from the disposition of the one receiving*" (emphasis added). In other words, infusion *as infusion* of all the virtues happens simultaneously since God does not hold back on His gifts; yet one or other of the virtues may fail to be generated or increased because of a person's lack of openness to this infusion.

Cajetan's distinction between infusion and reception is not without its basis in Aquinas's thinking:

Charity, since it is an infused habit, depends on the action of the one doing the infusing, namely, God, who stands to charity's infusion and preservation as the

sun does to the air's illumination. . . . And therefore, just as the light would immediately cease in the air were some obstacle to the sun's illuminating, so also charity would cease at once to be in the soul, through some obstacle being placed to the inflowing of charity into the soul. (II.II 24.12c)²⁸

God's action is ongoing, like the illumination of the sun, even when the disposition of the recipient prevents it from working its proper effect—that is, the generation and maintenance of charity and the other virtues in the soul. Aquinas thinks of this in unduly binary terms: either a person is open to infusion or she is not, and the virtues are generated or they are not. A person can “open the door to the virtues” to a greater or lesser degree, hence the generation of virtue can be gradual, beginning with germinal virtue, and eventually being perfected in complete virtue.

Aquinas does offer two reasons for saying that the virtues are infused at the moment of baptism, even in infants (III 69.6c). The first is that children, as members of Christ's body, must receive from the head “an influx of grace and virtue” (*influx gratiae et virtutis*). However, the gradual generation of infused virtue is no slight on God's goodness or Christ's efficacy. As the sun continues to shine whether the shutters are open or not, so God continues actively to offer the gift of the supernatural virtues to all through Christ; due to immaturity or sin the person may be indisposed to receive this infusion fully.

The second reason Aquinas gives for infusion at the moment of baptism is that infants who die after being baptized would not arrive at eternal life if they did not possess the virtues at least in habit (*ibid.*). However, on the story of gradual generation, baptized infants possess, in addition to grace, the germinal supernatural virtue that is fitting for their stage in life and which marks the beginning of eternal life.

Cajetan's distinction between infusion and reception opens a way to a more plausible developmental account of virtue's infusion that respects the theological concerns.²⁹ As William McDonough puts it, “Though grace effects a complete new beginning in an instant, its work through the whole of the human person is not instantaneous.”³⁰ When we note that, for Aquinas, the theological virtues of faith and hope may exist in an imperfect and germinal state (I.II 65.4), there seems no obstacle to understanding infusion as the gift of God, and, on our part, as a gradual process.

MEDIATION

According to Aquinas, the infused virtues are “caused immediately by God” (*immediate a Deo causari*) (I.II 63.3 ad 1). In contrast to the acquired virtues,

God generates, increases, and maintains the supernatural virtues without mediation of human action or other secondary causes. The most that human agency can contribute is consent and, in the case of infused virtue's increase, dispositive and meritorious causation, but not cooperation. This is the third thesis associated with Aquinas's account of infusion that can fruitfully be examined critically.

Aquinas's theology of grace might suggest a more positive role for human cooperation in the generation, increase, and maintenance of infused virtue.³¹ Aquinas opposes an occasionalist view of causation, according to which, for example, "It is not fire that heats, but God in the fire" (I 105.5).³² On the contrary, God works in things without thereby taking away their own agency; indeed, their active power is due to God Himself (*ibid.*). Actions issue simultaneously from created beings (as secondary causes) and from God (the primary cause) (I 105.5 ad 1). On this "concurrentist" understanding, grace and free human action are seen as complementary rather than competitive. The claim that God infuses virtue immediately may seem to run against the grain of Aquinas's theology of grace by taking away human agency in becoming more virtuous. Yet the more we attribute to our own agency, the greater the danger we undermine the core insight of the doctrine of infusion: that the virtues are more gifts than attainments.

There are other reasons for questioning the immediacy of infusion. Human beings in some way contribute to their own justification and sanctification. Aquinas quotes Augustine: "He who created you without you will not justify you without you" (I.II 55.4 arg 6).³³ Again, tensions exist: to ascribe too much to human agency risks a Pelagian eclipse of the primacy of God's grace in our justification and sanctification.

Florence Caffrey Bourg brings out a more practical consideration: "There is a tension between that part of the developing theological tradition which considers Christian families or domestic churches as schools of virtue, and that part of the tradition which has insisted that the supernatural virtues are caused by God alone through sacraments of baptism and penance."³⁴ Bourg is dissatisfied with the idea that our contribution to the cultivation of virtue lies purely in dispositive causation, since this perspective fails to do justice to the rich variety of ways God's grace can be mediated to us through community and sacrament. She proposes a rethinking of the causal role of human agency in the attainment of evangelical virtue: "Human agency may be understood as a secondary, instrumental, ministerial, or mediating cause enlisted by God in formation of supernatural virtue—comparable to the role Aquinas assigns to sacraments and their ministers as causes of grace."³⁵ Bourg's practical perspective urges us to see the extent to which human agency can be said to cooperate in the attainment of supernatural virtue. She proposes that our causal

contribution to the generation and increase of infused virtue goes beyond mere dispositive causation and genuinely “mediates” God’s grace. How tenable is this viewpoint?

The central theological challenge is being able to hold a tension. The first pole of this tension is the core insight in the doctrine of supernatural virtue’s infusion: that such virtue is gratuitous since we can only be oriented to, and begin to participate in, eternal life by the sheer gift of a gracious God; the second is that God’s gift is mediated in manifold ways—through creation, the Church, and even human agency—since, as the doctrine of the Incarnation most clearly shows, God chooses not to bypass the created world or human freedom in communicating His grace. How may we describe the relation between grace and human agency in virtue’s infusion without either undermining the giftedness or underestimating the agency? Progress can come from examining two parallel cases in which secondary causes mediate grace or infusion in more than a merely dispositive way.

The first analogy concerns the causality of the sacraments and their ministers, as Bourq suggests. In the early text of the *Commentary on the Sentences*, Aquinas says it is necessary to say that the sacraments are in some way the cause of grace, but he shows a concern to discern what this causal role is.³⁶ He makes two distinctions. One is between the principal agent (*agens principale*), who is the first mover, and the instrumental agent (*agens instrumentale*), which is a moved mover. By assigning sacrament to the category of instrumental cause, Aquinas preserves the theological insight that God alone is the origin of grace: the water of baptism, for example, causes grace only because it is used for that effect by God. So a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace.

However, Aquinas makes an important further distinction between two kinds of instrumental cause: disposing (*disponens*) and completing (*perficiens*). The latter causes a form but the former only directly causes the *disposition* or readiness for that form. A saw used to produce a stool is an example of a perfecting instrumental cause: the saw produces an effect that goes beyond what it can produce of itself, as with all instrumental causes, but when it is used by the principal agent it really does bring about the stool, making it a *completing* instrumental cause. A disposing instrumental cause, in contrast, merely produces the material on which the principal agent can freely bestow the form. The example Aquinas gives is of the begetting of a human child: the material elements provide the substratum into which God infuses the immortal human soul.

Which kind of instrumental cause is a sacrament? Crucially, in this early text, Aquinas says it is a merely disposing rather than perfecting instrumental cause of grace. In this way he is able to preserve the gratuity of grace, as it is God Himself who completes its conferral. Yet, since disposing causes produce

only a readiness for a form, Aquinas thereby limits the extent to which a sacrament can truly be said to mediate grace.

Reginald M. Lynch, following Cajetan, argues for a development in Aquinas's view that goes beyond the cautious teaching of the *Commentary* and assigns completing instrumental causality to the sacraments.³⁷ In the *Summa Theologiae* Aquinas repeats the basic point that God is the principal agent of grace: "The principal [agent] operates in the power of its form, to which its effect is made to be like, just as fire by its heat heats. And in this manner [of causation] nothing can cause grace except God, because grace is nothing other than a certain participated likeness of the divine nature" (III 62.1).³⁸ However, he says that just as an axe is a secondary and instrumental cause of the building of a couch, so the sacraments cause grace by divine institution (*ibid.*). While Aquinas does not use the language of completing instrumental causation, the analogy with the axe and couch implies that the sacraments are not merely disposing causes of grace. Nor does this violate God's sovereignty in producing grace, since the instrumental cause acts not in virtue of its own form but by the motion originating in the principal agent, God. "And so the effect is not made to resemble the instrument, but the principal agent" (*ibid.*).³⁹

As Lynch highlights, Cajetan illustrates this idea with the image of a musician playing a harp (in III 62.4 n.4). In disposing causality, there are two steps: the instrument first produces an effect that is then perfected by the principal agent. The completing cause, in contrast, participates much more integrally in bringing about the effect. Even though the principal and the completing cause both operate, there is only one motion or one event. Of itself the harp can produce only sounds; in the hands of a musician it really does produce music, not merely sounds that then can be made into music. When played in this way the harp is the subject not merely of a "motion" but of an "empowered motion" (*motus virtuosus*).⁴⁰ Similarly, in Cajetan's interpretation, a sacrament can be a completing cause of grace through an empowered motion without thereby undermining the understood principle that, in a sense, nothing can cause grace except God. Only God can cause a human to participate in his own life and form. Could the same not be said about human agency in generating supernatural virtue? In this case our own virtuous acts would be a harp, as it were, by which God effects a "music" of which we are not capable on our own: the generation and increase of supernatural virtue. A distinction between the infusion and acquisition would be preserved since in the former human agency generates and increases virtue only in virtue of a graced empowerment; the virtues therefore remain sheer gift rather than acquisition.

Another analogy lies in the begetting of the child. Pope Pius XII states, "The Catholic faith obliges us to hold that souls are immediately created by God."⁴¹ Karl Rahner, in a well-known discussion, points out that it is also true that

parents really do beget their own children. How do we reconcile these two truths? Rahner says: “The statement that God directly [immediately] creates the soul of a human being does not imply any denial of the statement that the parents procreate the human being in his unity. It makes the statement more precise by indicating that this procreation belongs to that kind of created efficient causality in which the agent by virtue of divine causality essentially exceeds the limits set by his own essence.”⁴² Rahner is expressing something that parents say they themselves experience: no matter how important their role, they intuitively recognize that the new person is not something they themselves could produce or make of themselves. This new human being is both their child and a sheer gift of God. A Thomistic approach that attempts to rethink our role in virtue’s “immediate” infusion would have to say something similar: that whatever the role of human agency in increasing supernatural virtue, it accomplishes this only by mediating a gracious gift that transcends its proper effectiveness. In this way it may be possible to assign a greater causal role to human action in the attainment of infused virtue without undermining its giftedness. While our own agency might be said not only to dispose to but really to generate supernatural virtue through divine help, as the harp produces music in the hands of the musician, it remains that gratuitous virtue comes to us *primo quidem et principaliter, per gratiae donum*: in the very first place and principally by the gift of grace (II.II 161.6 ad 2).

MORAL VIRTUE

Another element of Aquinas’s account of infused virtue, and theologically the most controversial, is his claim that infused and acquired moral virtue “differ in species” (I.II 63.4). This generates two problems, one intrapersonal (explaining the relationship of infused and acquired prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance within the same person) and the other interpersonal (understanding the kind of moral virtue, and possibly also theological virtue, possessed by non-Christians).

Adams, in a different context, rightly warns of the danger of using virtue language to make interpersonal comparisons between groups of people: “It would be hard to defend talk of virtues and vices if that must mean dividing humanity into purely good guys and unmitigatedly bad guys. That aggravates conflict, and also dulls moral discernment. I think it is virtually always factually unjustified.”⁴³ It is reasonable to think that Aquinas understands that “pagans” are capable of connected, acquired moral virtue (virtue that is perfect and unqualified virtue within the natural order). Nevertheless, his recognition of pagan moral goodness is highly qualified; he claims that in the state of fallen

nature, no one can avoid mortal sin without grace. Cajetan points out that a single act of mortal sin is not inconsistent with the habitual possession of moral virtue, and so a pagan could still be morally good (in I.II 65.2). While Cajetan is more generous than Osborne in recognizing the connected virtue of the pagan, the “pagan” may not find much consolation in the thought that she may be morally virtuous but cannot avoid mortal sin, and so, unless she converts to Christianity, is damned anyway.

In this area it is important to acknowledge the gap between Aquinas’s (or Cajetan’s) day and our own. In today’s pluralist world, the question of how Christians should relate to people of other faiths and those who have none becomes more urgent. The Church teaches that grace is present in the hearts of all people of good will and the Holy Spirit works “in a manner known only to God” (*Gaudium et Spes* 22). Are we then to countenance the possibility of infused virtue, even beyond the realms of explicit Christian faith? Theologians range from a strong affirmation (William McDonough) to an affirmation that acknowledges theological difficulties (Jean Porter) to a cautious consideration (Michael Sherwin).⁴⁴ It would not be tenable to hold a position that automatically excludes the majority of the human race from the possibility of salvation, since that is not to honor the goodness of the God we know.

What about the intrapersonal question of the relationship between infused moral virtue and its acquired counterparts? There are three main positions on this tangled issue. The first is ascribed to Aquinas: that the two sets of moral virtue can exist in graced union; the infused moral virtues relate to the acquired moral virtues as commanding to eliciting, and so as form to matter. While this may be a plausible interpretation, and the one that became the traditional Thomistic viewpoint, it risks duplicating virtues beyond necessity, as Aquinas himself worries (I.II 63.3 arg 1, arg 2). The second is Mattison’s interpretation, that the Christian possesses only the infused moral virtues. While this eliminates the two-tier structure within a single Christian, the dividing line problematically is shifted from an intrapersonal to an interpersonal one: Christians are separated from the rest of humanity by a different set of moral virtues. Plus there is another problem. It is axiomatic for Thomism that grace perfects nature without destroying it (*gratia perficit naturam, non tollit*).⁴⁵ Mattison faces the difficulty of explaining the *non tollit* of the axiom: the acquired moral virtues are not perfected but rather they are replaced with a whole new set of virtues.

The third is the Scotist solution, according to which it suffices for Christian prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance that the acquired moral virtues fall under the command and direction of the theological virtues; there is no need for a distinct species of moral virtue infused by God.⁴⁶ Is this not more promising? After all, a moral virtue is specified by its formal object or target

(*finis operis*) rather than its overall end (*finis operantis*) (60.1 ad 3). Yet to ditch infused moral virtue without speaking to the core issue that the concept was meant to address may be to employ Occam's razor too enthusiastically. For McKay Knobel it would be to propose "a relatively unimaginative appropriation of the Aristotelian theory of virtue, with faith, hope and love spliced somewhat awkwardly on top."⁴⁷ Thomists have always rightly seen the Scotist view as problematic. A difference in overall end indicates a difference in target since prudence determines the target precisely by due proportion to the overall end (*On the Virtues* 1.10 ad 9). It is difficult to see how the end can fail, at least indirectly, to be specifying and distinguishing. Indeed, "It is from the end that it is necessary to take the rationales of what is ordered to the end" (I.II pr).⁴⁸ The Scotist solution glosses over the difference made to the more proximate aims of the moral life when oriented by a revealed vision of its ultimate end.

Can causal analysis shed light on this contested question? First, it helps to question the problematic vocabulary of "infused" and "acquired" moral virtue. Aquinas acknowledges that God could infuse a virtue directed only to finite goods, just as He may miraculously produce health without its normal secondary natural causes: "Sometimes, to show his power, [God] infuses in a human even those habits which can be caused by a natural power," as when He gave knowledge of tongues to the apostles (I.II 51.4; cf. 63.4).⁴⁹ We may conceive of a kind of virtue that cuts across Aquinas's distinction: a moral virtue that is infused yet is, of itself, only directed to a natural end. The reason for this confusion is that "infused" and "acquired" point not to the formal cause of certain virtues but rather to their efficient cause, which is extrinsic and accidental to the nature of a virtue in a way that the formal and final causes are not. The efficient cause does not enter into the formal definition of a virtue, since the efficient cause as such explains what brings a virtue into *existence* rather than saying anything about its *essence* (see chaps. 2 and 5).

Cajetan sees the problem and attempts to improve on Aquinas's vocabulary by distinguishing virtue infused *per se*—that is, virtue of such a nature that it can be generated only by God's immediate action—from virtue infused *per accidens*, which is the kind of virtue that is normally acquired by human action but in this case happens to have been generated by God's immediate intervention (in I.II 63.4). Cajetan's terminology seems to work for theological virtue since, as Aquinas argues, a virtue that is intrinsically and essentially directed to a supernatural object and end must have a supernatural cause (I.II 51.4, 62.1; *On the Virtues* 1.10). Yet it remains to be shown that moral virtues directed to a supernatural end need to be so directed essentially and intrinsically.

We seem caught in a dilemma. Either moral virtue within the Christian is *intrinsically* ordered to the supernatural end, in which case we seem to have an essential difference in target and therefore species, or moral virtue is

extrinsically ordered to a supernatural end by the command of the theological virtues, in which case we lack a virtue with a supernatural target. Either position has its weaknesses.

A tentatively proposed fourth approach, which mediates between the Thomistic and Scotist solutions and has not yet been considered, is that moral virtue is neither intrinsically nor merely extrinsically related to a supernatural end; it is only “conditionally” and “obliquely” related so. This distinction can be derived from the Salamancans’ discussion of the virtue of fortitude.⁵⁰

The Salamancans discuss how to define the target of fortitude. One might say that the proximate end of fortitude is to stand firm even when in mortal danger. But this is not a morally good target (*finis operis*) unless it is referred further to some further good (*finis operantis*). To voluntarily risk death without adequate reason is not an act of virtue. As Aquinas says, “To suffer death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only insofar as it is ordered to some good, which lies in an act of virtue, for example, to faith, and to the love of God” (II. II 124.3).⁵¹ It is necessary to define the proper object of fortitude, not simply as standing firm in mortal danger but rather, as the Salamancans say, “to face danger according to reason insofar as there is need.” Note, however, that this way of defining the proper object of fortitude, and hence the virtue of fortitude itself, does not intrinsically and directly include any particular good remote end in the definition or specification of fortitude; it only defines it obliquely or “as a condition”:

To face danger even unto death, which is the principal object of fortitude, speaks no goodness unless it is added that it be in order to a higher end, for example, of faith, of justice, of charity, and so on. And so if someone were to expose himself to danger without such an end, he would sin. However, this end does not concur to constituting a good object for fortitude directly and as a formal rationale, but only as a condition.⁵²

In other words, the Salamancans offer a somewhat indeterminate definition of the proper object of fortitude since they recognize that true bravery can be motivated by any number of different worthy ends. This partly defined, partly vague proper object of fortitude—any good worth dying for—is “determined” or “specified” differently in differing circumstances.

How might this apply to the question of infused and acquired moral virtue? The dilemma is whether to acknowledge that a difference in overall end signals a difference in object and target. If it does, we face the problem of the superfluous duplication of supernatural and natural virtues. If it doesn’t, we fail to recognize the difference that the ultimate end of eternal life makes to the more proximate goals of the moral life. However, the Salamancans’ account of

fortitude brings an alternative into view: the proper object of moral virtue is defined with a certain amount of indeterminacy; the object can be constituted in view of different remote ends. For example, it is essential to fortitude that there be some further good that motivates one to stand firm in mortal danger; what that further good is, provided it be some good greater than the preservation of a single human life, is accidental to fortitude's proper object. As Aquinas himself says, "That the brave person acts bravely for the good of fortitude, this is not a circumstance [of the brave act]; but [it is a circumstance] that he act for the liberation of the city, or for the Christian people, or something of this kind" (I.II 7.3 ad 3).⁵³ It seems to follow that pagan and Christian fortitude differ, and yet are not different *in species*. The brave pagan is ready to die for the good of the city; the brave Christian is ready also to die for Christ. These are not virtues differing in species, since they share the same proper object or target: to face the danger of death for some greater good according to reason. The Occam's razor objection has no unnecessary duplication to eliminate. However, this proper object gets "determined" or "specified" differently for pagans and Christians, and so the objection to the Scotist solution—that it fails to recognize the difference an overall end makes to the proximate ends of the moral life—also finds no purchase here.

The alternative view, generalized from the example of fortitude, is that a moral virtue's specifying target is somewhat indeterminate and capable of being filled out either naturally or supernaturally. A moral virtue is related to a natural or supernatural end neither intrinsically and directly (as for the traditional Thomist position) nor extrinsically (as for the Scotists) but only "as a condition." For example, natural and supernatural temperance do not differ in species, since they both consist in moderating emotional attractions for the sake of bodily, relational, and moral goods. But these goods get specified differently by unaided human reason and reason informed by faith.

What does this fourth possibility imply about moral virtue's efficient cause? Such virtue, in this view, is indeterminate between infusion and acquisition: it can be either acquired by human action or infused by grace (with or without mediation of the completing instrumentality of human action), or both. The efficient cause is accidental. This seems more consonant with ordinary experience, which indicates that acting prudently, bravely, temperately, or justly increases our inclination toward prudent, brave, temperate, and just acts, for the Christian as well as for others. At the same time, these dispositions are undoubtedly increased in us by the Holy Spirit, as when a martyr finds, by grace, a more than human bravery.

The advantage of this tentative solution is that it preserves distinction while avoiding dichotomy. Thus it is in overall continuity with Aquinas's own trajectory in the context of the discussion of his day. If it is inadequate, a fifth

approach is always possible: to allow that the mysterious relation between human agency and God's grace in the attainment of moral virtue eludes us still.

LOVE

James Keenan has highlighted the need to rethink a classicist understanding of virtue in the light of a more relational anthropology.⁵⁴ Nel Noddings claims that we do not grow into virtue in isolation. Virtue, she says, "is built up in relation. It reaches out to the other and grows in response to the other."⁵⁵ These insights may require not so much a rethinking of Aquinas as rethinking of our interpretation of him. Could it be said that infused virtue is virtue that is built up in relation to, and in response to, God? Andrew Pinsent has suggested that the key to this kind of "paradigm shift" lies in Aquinas's account of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.⁵⁶

Aquinas distinguishes the seven gifts from the moral and theological virtues. While the gifts are virtues in a broad sense, they also are distinctive in that they perfect a human "insofar as he is moved by God" (68.1 ad 1).⁵⁷ As "spirits" bestowed by God they enable us to be "inspired" or moved by God more promptly (68.1c). In sum, "the gifts are certain perfections of a human, by which a human is disposed to this: that he follows the divine impulse well" (68.2c).⁵⁸

Causally, what is the difference between the virtues and gifts? Aquinas does not see the matter of the gifts as distinctive (68.1 arg 2, ad 2). Pinsent says that since the gifts and virtues share the same matter, they must share the same form.⁵⁹ This cannot be right, since if gifts and virtues have the same form and matter, then they are the same habits. Cajetan is more precise: "Although gifts are not about any other objects, they are about them by a different mode: for they are about them in such a way that their acts originate from the impulse of the Holy Spirit" (in 68.1 n.2). While their subject, material object, target, end, and agent will be the same, generically speaking, their mode differs. The gifts, Aquinas says, surpass the virtues in their *modus operandi* insofar as they are moved by God (68.2 ad 1). The key to understanding the gifts, then, is to unpack the gift's characteristic mode.

The gift's mode is not the same as that of a moral virtue (the mode of reason) but is a receptivity to the movements of a divine and interior impulse (*instinctus*): "Even the Philosopher recognizes, in the chapter 'On Good Fortune' [*Eudemian Ethics* VII, 8], that those who are moved by a divine impulse do not need to be counselled by human reason, but that they follow an interior impulse, because they are moved by a principle better than human reason" (68.1c).⁶⁰ The question is how to understand this "impulse" and "movement."

This is where Pinsent can help us. He points out that we are in danger of being misled by the modern mechanistic connotations of “impulse” and “movement”: the movement essential to the gifts is not a coercive push. Rather, Aquinas conceives of this movement as happening in an intensely personal context by which a person learns to participate in God’s stance toward an object. For example: “By the gift of piety, we are moved to regard other persons as God regards them, namely as potential or actual children, and thereby our brothers and sisters.” . . . By the gift of counsel, we are ‘directed as though counseled by God,’ implying that we take on God’s stance towards possible courses of action.”⁶¹ Similar analyses can be given of the other gifts. Pinsent concludes, then, that the “movement” characteristic of the gifts is a kind of “joint attention” in which we learn to share in God’s stance toward some object.⁶²

How does this perspective of “second-person relatedness with God” and “joint attention” enable us to understand the infusion of virtue? Joint attention, or sharing the stance of another, is possible only in the context of personal relationship. Employing joint attention as a “metaphor” by which to interpret Aquinas, Pinsent argues that the theological virtues, which unite us with God, precede the gifts and enable us to be moved through joint attention; these in turn precede the infused moral virtues, which are understood as “virtues of shared stance.”⁶³ Indeed, Aquinas claims that in the order of perfection, the theological virtues come first, followed by the gifts, followed by the infused moral virtues (68.8 ad 2).

Pinsent makes two contributions: he accents the second-personal perspective in Aquinas’s account of the virtues and he offers an illuminating account of the gifts as virtues of shared stance. However, he overstates the degree to which “joint attention” provides an interpretation of Aquinas on virtue’s infusion. While it makes sense to see the gifts as flowing from the theological virtues, it is less clear that Aquinas thinks the infused moral virtues flow from the gifts. While the gifts precede the infused moral virtues in the order of perfection, in the order of generation the opposite is the case: “The moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, because by being well disposed in his own reason, a human is disposed to being well disposed in order to God” (68.8 ad 2).⁶⁴ There is a problem in seeing the moral virtues purely as virtues of shared stance, as doing so underestimates the role of human agency in their attainment. Furthermore, since gifts flow from the theological virtues, we still need an account of the former’s infusion.

The interpretive key to a more relational Thomistic account of infused virtue in general lies not so much in contemporary research on joint attention as on the primacy of the virtue of charity within theological ethics.⁶⁵ For Aquinas charity is understood in terms of the mutual communication of friendship: “Charity signifies, not only the love of God, but even a certain friendship

towards him, which indeed adds to love a mutual return with a certain mutual communication” (65.5).⁶⁶ There is, however, an asymmetry in this mutual communication since we are drawn into it only by God’s loving initiative. God’s love for us comes first; only then are we empowered to love Him in return. As Aquinas explains, charity is a love founded on God’s communication (II.II 23.1c). Unlike human friendship, charity “is not founded on human virtue, but on divine goodness” (23.3 ad 1).⁶⁷ This is indisputable Christian doctrine and experience: God loved us while we were sinners, and God’s gracious love comes first, empowering us to love. As Aquinas puts it, “All gifts, both natural and gratuitous, are given to us by God through love, which is the first gift.”⁶⁸

Charity, generated in response to God’s communication, in turn is the context in which the other supernatural virtues and gifts are generated and increased, as Pinsent himself observes. Indeed, all the virtues are in some way dependent on charity (II.II 23.4 ad 1). Just as the moral virtues are connected through prudence (I.II 65.1), so all the infused virtues are connected through charity (65.2, 4). Charity orients a person to the virtues’ ultimate end in God.

Virtue is built up in relationship. As David Decosimo puts it, even to have the capacity for virtue is “to have others do for oneself and on one’s behalf that for which one can take no credit.”⁶⁹ The supernatural virtues are generated and increased in us when we are transformed by the friendship God draws us into. This is what virtue’s “infusion” is at its heart: becoming more like God in response to God’s loving self-communication. As Aquinas claims about our good works, so it is in regard to our virtue: all of it is from God, *totum est a Deo*.⁷⁰ All is gift.

NOTES

1. Roy J. Deferrari, *A Lexicon of Saint Thomas Aquinas* (Baltimore, MD: Catholic University of America Press, 1948), 555.

2. Bernard of Clairvaux, “De consideratione,” in *Patrologia Latina*, ed. J. P. Migne, vol. 182, book 5 (Paris: Migne, 1862), 12:795. I owe this reference to Terence O’Reilly.

3. I.II 68.1c: “Nihil autem prohibet illud quod est ab alio ut donum, esse perfectivum alicuius ad bene operandum, praesertim cum supra dixerimus quod virtutes quaedam nobis sunt infusae a Deo. Unde secundum hoc, donum a virtute distingui non potest.”

4. For example, II.II 47.14 ad 3; 124.2 ad 1; *De Veritate*, q. 14 a. 2 arg 3; q. 17 a. 2 ad 8.; *On the Virtues*, q. 5 a. 4 ad 2.

5. *Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 18 q. 1 a. 3 ad 4: “omnia dona et naturalia et gratuita, dentur nobis a Deo per amorem, qui est primum donum.”

6. II.II 131.1: “non habet homo a seipso, sed est quasi quiddam divinum in eo. Et ideo ex hoc non debetur principaliter sibi honor, sed Deo.”

7. Robert Merrihew Adams, *A Theory of Virtue: Excellence in Being for the Good* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 165.

8. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues* (London: Duckworth, 1999), xi.

9. II.II 129.6 ad 1: “Indiget enim omnis homo, primo quidem, divino auxilio, secundario autem etiam auxilio humano, quia homo est naturaliter animal sociale, eo quod sibi non sufficit ad vitam.”

10. 110.2: “non est conveniens quod Deus minus provideat his quos diligit ad supernaturale bonum habendum, quam creaturis quas diligit ad bonum naturale habendum.”

11. *Super Sent.*, lib. 4 d. 14 q. 2 a. 2 ad 4, 5.

12. Michael S. Sherwin, “Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice: A Test Case for the Thomistic Theory of Infused Cardinal Virtues,” *The Thomist* 73 (2009): 36.

13. *Ibid.*, 37.

14. I.II 65.3 arg 2: “qui habet habitum virtutis, de facili operatur ea quae sunt virtutis, et ei secundum se placent, unde et ‘signum habitus est delectatio quae fit in opere,’ ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed multi habent caritatem, absque peccato mortali existentes, qui tamen difficultatem in operibus virtutum patiuntur, neque eis secundum se placent, sed solum secundum quod referuntur ad caritatem.”

15. *Super Sent.*, lib. 4 d. 14 q. 2 a. 2 ad 5.

16. *Ibid.*, ad 4.

17. Louis Billot, *De Virtutibus Infusis* (Roma: Gregoriana, 1905); Prolegomenon (I–II, QQ. 49–61, para. 2, 2), 35.

18. Sherwin, “Infused Virtue,” 51.

19. I.II 65.3 ad 2: “Et similiter habitus moralium virtutum infusarum patiuntur interdum difficultatem in operando, propter aliquas dispositiones contrarias ex praecedentibus actibus relictas.”

20. III 85.6 ad 3: “poenitentia aperit aditum virtutibus.”

21. 65.3: “cum caritate simul infunduntur omnes virtutes morales.”

22. III 69.4: “per Baptismum aliquis consequitur gratiam et virtutes.”

23. *On the Virtues* 2.5 ad 11: “caritas simul habet generationem cum aliis virtutibus, non quia sit indistincta ab aliis, sed quia Dei perfecta sunt opera; unde infundens caritatem simul infundit omnia illa quae sunt necessaria ad salutem.”

24. III 69.6c: “quidam antiqui posuerunt quod pueris in Baptismo non dantur gratia et virtutes. . . . Causa autem erroris fuit quia nescierunt distinguere inter habitum et actum. Et sic, videntes pueros inhabiles ad actus virtutum, crediderunt eos post Baptismum nullatenus virtutem habere. Sed ista impotentia operandi non accidit pueris ex defectu habituum, sed ex impedimento corporali, sicut etiam dormientes, quamvis habeant habitus virtutum, impediuntur tamen ab actibus propter somnum.”

25. Florence Caffrey Bourg, “God Working in Us without Us? A Fresh Look at Formation of Virtue,” Yamauchi Lecture Series, Loyola University, New Orleans, November 7, 2004, 13.

26. See Nicholas Austin, “Spirituality and Virtue in Christian Formation: A Conversation between Thomistic and Ignatian Traditions,” *New Blackfriars* 97, no. 1068 (March 2016): 202–17.

27. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic, 1974), 44. See the discussion in Linda T. Zagzebski, *Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 116–25.

28. II.II 24.12c: “Sed caritas, cum sit habitus infusus, dependet ex actione Dei infundentis, qui sic se habet in infusione et conservatione caritatis sicut sol in illuminatione aeris, ut dictum est. Et ideo, sicut lumen statim cessaret esse in aere quod aliquod obstaculum poneretur illuminationi solis, ita etiam caritas statim deficit esse in anima quod aliquod obstaculum ponitur influentiae caritatis a Deo in animam.”

29. “Rather than the rapidity of acquisition, or even the mode, ‘infusion’ points to the source from whence the theological virtues come, namely by a special act of God which brings us into relation with God, not only forming but utterly transforming our character.” Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Robert Pinches, *Christians among the Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 68–69.

30. William McDonough, “‘Caritas’ as the ‘Prae-Ambulum’ of All Virtue: Eberhard Schockenhoff on the Theological-Anthropological Significance and the Contemporary Interreligious Relevance of Thomas Aquinas’s Teaching on the ‘Virtutes Morales Infusae,’” *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 27, no. 2 (2007): 105.

31. Nicholas Austin, “Is the Concept of Infused Moral Virtue Really Necessary?” (Licentiate Thesis, Boston College School of Theology and Ministry, 2010).

32. I 105.5: “ignis calefaceret, sed Deus in igne.”

33. I.II 55.4 arg 6: “qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te.”

34. Bourq, “God Working in Us,” 5.

35. Bourq, “God Working in Us,” 8–9.

36. *Super Sent.*, lib. 4 d. 1 q. 1 a. 4 qc. 1c.

37. Reginald Lynch, “Cajetan’s Harp: Sacraments and the Life of Grace in Light of Perfective Instrumentality,” *The Thomist* 78, no. 1 (2014): 65–106.

38. III 62.1: “Principalis quidem operatur per virtutem suae formae, cui assimilatur effectus, sicut ignis suo calore calefacit. Et hoc modo non potest causare gratiam nisi Deus, quia gratia nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo divinae naturae.”

39. III 62.1: “Unde effectus non assimilatur instrumento, sed principali agenti.”

40. Lynch translates *motus virtuosus* as “artistic motion”; I prefer “empowered motion.” See Lynch, “Cajetan’s Harp,” 89n74.

41. Pius XII, *Humani Generis*, August 12, 1956, 36. English translation available on the Vatican website: <http://w2.vatican.va/content/vatican/en.html>.

42. Karl Rahner, *Hominisation: The Evolutionary Origin of Man as a Theological Problem* (London: Burns & Oates, 1965), 99.

43. Adams, *Theory of Virtue*, 231.

44. McDonough, “‘Caritas’ as the ‘Prae-Ambulum’”; Jean Porter, *Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), 396–98; and Michael Sherwin, *By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 233–35.

45. See, e.g., I.1.8 ad 2: “Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat.” Also *Super De Trinitate*, pars 1 q. 2 a. 3 co. 1.

46. On Scotus’s view, see Bonnie Kent, “Rethinking Moral Dispositions: Scotus on the Virtues” in *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 352–76.

47. Angela McKay Knobel, “The Infused and Acquired Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy” (PhD dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2004), 2.

48. I.II pr: “ex fine enim oportet accipere rationes eorum quae ordinantur ad finem.”

49. I.II 51.4: “quandoque, ad ostendendam suam virtutem, infundit homini illos etiam habitus qui naturali virtute possunt causari.”

50. *Cursus Theologicus*, Tract. 11, *De Bonitate et Malitia Humanorum Actuum*, Disp.3, Dub.1, nn.14–17 (6:70–72); Tract. 13, *De Vitiis et Peccatis*, Disp.9, Dub.4, n.64 (7:280).

51. II.II 124.3: “Quia tolerare mortem non est laudabile secundum se, sed solum secundum quod ordinatur ad aliquod bonum quod consistit in actu virtutis, puta ad fidem et dilectionem Dei.”

52. *Cursus Theologicus*, Tract. 11, *De Bonitate et Malitia Humanorum Actuum*, Disp.3, Dub.1, n.15 (6:70).

53. I.II 7.3 ad 3: “quod fortis fortiter agat propter bonum fortitudinis, non est circumstantia; sed si fortiter agat propter liberationem civitatis, vel populi Christiani, vel aliquid huiusmodi.”

54. James F. Keenan, “Proposing Cardinal Virtues,” *Theological Studies* 56, no. 4 (December 1995): 709–29, esp. 722–23.

55. Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 80–81.

56. See also Eleonore Stump, “The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas’s Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions,” in *Faith, Rationality, and the Passions*, ed. Sarah Coakley (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 91–106.

57. 68.1 ad 1: “inquantum est a Deo motus.”

58. 68.2c: “dona sunt quaedam hominis perfectiones, quibus homo disponitur ad hoc quod bene sequatur instinctum divinum.”

59. Andrew Pinsent, “Aquinas: Infused Virtues,” in *The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics*, ed. Michael Slote and Lorraine Besser-Jones (New York: Routledge, 2015), 148.

60. 68.1c: “Et philosophus etiam dicit, in cap. de bona fortuna, quod his qui moventur per instinctum divinum, non expedit consiliari secundum rationem humanam, sed quod sequantur interiorem instinctum, quia moventur a meliori principio quam sit ratio humana.”

61. Andrew Pinsent, “Aquinas and the Second Person in the Formation of Virtues,” in *Aquinas, Education, and the East*, ed. T. Brian Mooney and Mark Nowacki (New York: Springer, 2013), 52.

62. *Ibid.*, 54.

63. Andrew Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics: Virtues and Gifts* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 67, 69, 77, and 83.

64. 68.8 ad 2: “virtutes morales et intellectuales praecedunt dona, quia per hoc quod homo bene se habet circa rationem propriam, disponitur ad hoc quod se bene habeat in ordine ad Deum.”

65. See Matthew B. O’Brien, review of “The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics: Virtues and Gifts,” by Andrew Pinsent, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (December 2010).

66. 65.5: “caritas non solum significat amorem Dei, sed etiam amicitiam quandam ad ipsum; quae quidem super amorem addit mutuam redamationem cum quadam mutua communicatione.”

67. 23.3 ad 1: “non fundatur principaliter super virtute humana, sed super bonitate divina.”

68. *Super Sent.*, lib. 1 d. 18 q. 1 a. 3 ad 4: “Omnia dona et naturalia et gratuita, dentur nobis a Deo per amorem, qui est primum donum.”

69. David Decosimo, *Ethics as a Work of Charity: Thomas Aquinas and Pagan Virtue* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 269.

70. *Super Io.*, cap. 3 l. 3. See also *ibid.*, 252.