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PART III

The Causal Analysis of Virtue

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CHAPTER 7

Rational Virtue

Suggested reading: *Summa Theologiae* I.II 55.4, 60, 61, 64, 85.3; II.II 27.6, 48, 128, 143, 161.1; *On the Virtues* 1.13c

Aquinas analyzes the Augustinian definition of virtue in terms of the four causes (I.II 55.4c): A virtue is:

a good quality	formal cause
of the mind	material cause
by which we live rightly and no one can use badly	final cause
which God works in us without us	efficient cause

So many anomalies emerge from this line of reasoning that it may seem that Aquinas is attempting to hammer an Augustinian round peg into an Aristotelian square hole. Yet his overriding goal is not exegesis; rather, it is to give an account of virtue in general. The result replicates neither Aristotle nor Augustine. Instead, it offers a third position that neither would have recognized and is all the worthier of attention for this reason.

In Aquinas's ordering, each of virtue's causes can be understood only in relation to the others. For the sake of exposition it is necessary to treat them individually in the hope that it will be meaningful to deal with parts that, finally, make sense only in terms of the whole.

The formal cause is what makes something what it is. *Forma dat speciem*: the form specifies (I.II 18.2). Aquinas states, then, "The formal cause of virtue, as also of anything, is taken from its genus and difference, when it is said [in the Augustinian definition, that virtue is] 'a good quality.' For virtue's genus is *quality*, and its difference is *good*. It would however be a more fitting definition if quality were replaced by *habit*, which is the proximate genus" (55.4c, emphasis added).¹ Thus the characterization of virtue as a good habit (see chaps. 2 and 3)

is incorporated into the causal account as providing virtue's formal cause. It is important to remember, then, that "good" in the definition of virtue refers to the moral or rational good (*bonum rationis*) (55.4 ad 2). Virtue's most formal element is the moral goodness that lies in its conformity with human agency's rule and measure—that is, divine and human reason.

Aquinas conceives of this formal cause of virtue in at least two distinct ways: as object and as exemplar. Since a virtue is a disposition or habit, it is good insofar as it is directed toward a good human action and object. So a virtue's goodness or its consonance with reason is derived from its object's goodness or consonance with reason. For example, the virtue of mercy, which inclines to acts that offer aid to the suffering, is good because its object (to give aid to the suffering when and in the manner it is fitting to do so) is consonant to divine and human reason. Also, a habit is good insofar as it participates in, or imitates, the divine goodness in some respect, albeit in a manner suited to human rather than divine nature. Both approaches to virtue's formal cause contribute to the causal theory of virtue.

VIRTUE'S OBJECT

Virtue theory must provide a way of specifying and distinguishing virtues.² Since Aquinas defines virtue causally, he specifies particular virtues causally as well. Moral virtues can be divided into those about other-regarding operations, such as justice, and those about the passions, like temperance; here virtues are divided on the basis of *objective matter* (60.2). The *subjective matter* is one way to distinguish the cardinal virtues: prudence is in the practical intellect, justice in the will, fortitude in the irascible power, and temperance in the concupiscible power (61.2). The *efficient cause* differentiates virtues acquired by habituation and those infused by God (63.4). Virtues disposing to perfect beatitude must differ from those disposing only to the imperfect beatitude of this life; this is distinction by means of *final cause* (51.4). There is also the distinction of virtues into different kinds based on degrees of similitude to the *exemplar cause* (61.5). Aquinas also distinguishes divine and human virtues as fitting for *diverse natures*: human nature and the superior nature of grace (54.3, 61.5, 63.4).

There is a serious question of interpretation to be addressed here. Are there multiple, conflicting principles? If so, the coherence of the virtue theory would be at risk. William Mattison focuses on three principles of division: efficient cause, ultimate end, and object. He claims that these three methods of "categorization" do "graft onto each other," but it is left unclear how they are related.³

The causal approach offers a solution. The formal cause is what directly specifies (*forma dat speciem*). Where different causes suggest different categorizations,

Aquinas prioritizes the formal (II.II 157.3 ad 2). The other causes specify virtue only indirectly and mediately and as indicating a different formal cause—namely, the object. As Aquinas puts it, “Just as the form gives species in natural things, so also in morals the object gives species to an act, and consequently to a habit.”⁴ He often repeats this principle (e.g., 54.2; 60.5; 72.1 ad 2), which unifies the diverse ways of specifying and distinguishing virtues under one grand principle: the object (*obiectum*), which is the extrinsic formal cause. How then does the object specify a virtue?

A VIRTUE’S MATERIAL OBJECT

As discussed earlier, different levels of formality and materiality inhere in the object. It helps to begin with a virtue’s material object, or “matter-about-which” (*materia circa quam*): “The *matter-about-which* is the object of a virtue. This could not be placed in the above definition, since it is through the object that a virtue is fixed to a species, whereas here we are supplying the definition of virtue in general” (55.4c).⁵ To what does this phrase, “matter-about-which,” refer?

Martha Nussbaum notes that Aristotle defines virtues by identifying “spheres of life” in which we may do well or badly. A virtue is a state that disposes us to choose and respond well in some sphere of experience.⁶ Similarly, Christine Swanton talks of a virtue’s “field”: “The *field* of a virtue consists of those items which are the sphere(s) of concern of the virtue, and to which the agent should respond in line with the virtue’s demands. These items may be within the agent, for example, the bodily pleasures which are the focus of temperance, or outside the agent, for example, human beings, property, money, or honors.”⁷ The corresponding term in Aquinas is not “sphere of life” or “field” but rather the “matter-about-which” a virtue disposes a person (55.4c). It is what the virtue is about. For example, justice is about exchanges with others; temperance is about the desires and pleasures of food, drink, and sex; and fortitude is about fear and daring in the face of the danger of death (61.3c).

From its constituent terms the concept of matter-about-which can be understood as the combination of two distinct concepts: *matter* (potentiality to receive some form) and *object* (that which an act, power, or habit is about). The material aspect implies the potential to receive some form from virtue. Since a moral habit is formally a virtue insofar as its act conforms to reason (58.2), the matter of the moral virtues is human acts, which of their nature ask to be conformed to the rule of reason.

Take, for example, a passion such as anger. Anger can be considered as morally good, morally bad, or neutral. Anger can be a disordered passion contrary to reason and virtue, as when someone is willfully enraged over a small slight.

Anger can be a well-ordered and entirely reasonable passion, as when someone is duly angered by an injustice. Finally, abstracting from both, anger can be considered as capable of being manifested either way.⁸ Anger considered thusly, as potentially either morally good or bad, is the matter of the virtue of gentleness: it is matter suited to and capable of receiving from virtue the form of rationality, just as a malleable but hard material like steel is matter fit to receive from the metalsmith the form of a sword. As Aquinas says, “The matter of each moral virtue is that about which [the virtue] imposes the mode of reason.”⁹

The second integral part of the concept of matter-about-which is that of object, or that which it is about. For example, the proximate matter of temperance is the greatest appetites and pleasures, whereas its remote matter is the objects of those passions—namely food, drink, and sexual intercourse.¹⁰ Or, the immediate matter of magnanimity is the hope for great honors, whereas the mediate matter is the object of the passion—namely, the great honors themselves (II.II 129.1).

Is the matter-about-which material or formal? In relation to virtue, the matter-about-which is a hybrid, since as matter it is material but as object it is formal. It is material as that which virtue “works on” since the operations are given a form by virtue through reason. Yet it is also formal as specifying a virtue since, as object, it is an exterior formal cause that defines the habit that is directed toward it. Aquinas explains, “The object is not the matter-out-of-which but the matter-about-which, and has in a way the rationale of a form, insofar as it gives species” (18.2 ad 2).¹¹ We can therefore term the matter-about-which either the “objective matter” or the “material object” of a virtue.

Peter Lombard’s definition contains no element corresponding to the material object, so Aquinas provides a rationale for its absence: a virtue’s matter-about-which, he says, fixes its species and so belongs to the definition of this or that virtue, not to virtue in general (55.4c). This is a weak post hoc rationalization because unqualified virtue, while it lacks *specific* matter, does possess *generic* proximate matter: the human passions and operations that participate to a greater or lesser degree in freedom and the potentiality to conform to reason. Aquinas even has a name for the generic matter of virtue: *agibilia et appetibilia*, or the doings and desirings that fall within the sphere of human agency (e.g., II.II 27.6c). Aquinas could have specified the material object of virtue in general; had he been constructing his own definition rather than relying on Lombard’s, he no doubt would have.

Is the Material Object Enough?

Aquinas claims that the material object determines the species of a virtue. Does this, then, solve the problem of specification? It is roughly the method

Nussbaum ascribes to Aristotle: first identifying a distinctive sphere of life in which it is possible to do well or badly; then defining a virtue as the state disposing us to do well in that sphere. Aquinas adopts a similar method. Virtue, like art, concerns “the difficult and the good”: “Art and virtue are about the more difficult matters in which we need to act well, which is what art and virtue dispose us to do. For in easy matters anyone can act well. But to act well in difficult matter belongs only to the one who possesses virtue and art.”¹² A moral matter, in contrast to a technical one, is a difficult matter in which we need to act well with a view to the overall end of human life. Wherever there is such a matter, there must be a virtue: “There can be a moral virtue about every [matter] that can be ordered and moderated by reason” (I.II 59.4c).¹³

However, the material object alone is not enough to specify the virtues. To understand a virtue we must know not merely how to identify its sphere of life but also what doing well in that sphere consists in. A virtue’s matter at best provides a “thin” account of that virtue, and the task of the ethicist is to find a “thick” specification of what constitutes choosing and responding well in each sphere.

Relying on the matter alone to specify virtues also fails to account for the possibility of overlap in two virtues’ material object. Take the moral matter of “appetite for a difficult good.” We need to be both humble (not desiring what is beyond us) and magnanimous (being willing to strive for great things in a reasonable way) in regard to this matter (II.II 161.1c). Because Aquinas recognizes the priority of form over matter as a principle of specification, the material identity of humility and magnanimity does not disconcert him. While humility and magnanimity share the same matter, they differ in rationale since “humility restrains the appetite, lest it tend to great things beside right reason, whereas magnanimity impels the soul according to right reason” (161.1 ad 3).¹⁴ For a full definition of a virtue one needs to identify not merely its material object but also its formal rationale.

Aquinas therefore rejects the view that J. O. Urmson once proposed in interpretation of Aristotle—namely, that virtues are individuated by emotion: one type of emotion, one type of virtue.¹⁵ Urmson’s thesis is doubly wrong: just as two virtues can concern the same passion, as with humility and magnanimity, so also one virtue can concern two or more passions, as fortitude holds back fear and moderates daring (123.3c). Aquinas states the reason in the following, characteristically terse statement: “The objects of the passions cause diverse species of passions insofar as they are related in different ways to the sensitive appetite; they cause diverse species of virtues insofar as they are related to reason” (I.II 60.5c).¹⁶ A moral matter specifies a moral virtue only *indirectly* by indicating its required form.

THE MOST FORMAL OBJECT: THE MODE

What, then, is the formal object of virtue? The object of virtue, formally speaking, is the good (I.II 56.3 arg 2, ad 2). (We will begin by examining the *most* formal object of virtue; the somewhat formal and somewhat material object will be considered when we examine virtue's final cause.) What makes a habit virtuous is precisely its orientation to good (*On the Virtues* 1.7c). Therefore the formal object of a moral virtue will be the good at stake in some specific moral matter or sphere: "The object of any virtue is the good considered in its proper matter. For example, the object of temperance is the good of pleasurable things in the desires of touch. The formal rationale of this object is from reason, which institutes the mode in these desires, whereas the material element is that which is on the part of the desires" (63.4).¹⁷ The material object of temperance is the desires of touch; its formal object, called the "mode" or "the mode of reason," is from practical reason. As Aquinas puts it elsewhere, "Habits are not distinguished by material objects, but by the formal rationales of objects. However, the formal rationale of the good to which moral virtue is ordered is one, namely, the mode of reason" (60.1 arg 2).¹⁸ The most formal object of virtue, then, is the mode.

The concept of the mode (*modus*) is a neglected but important concept in Aquinas's virtue theory. From Cicero onward, "mode" was especially associated with temperance, as a kind of "moderation." As Helen North explains, "The noun *modus* ("limit") and its numerous derivatives—especially *modestia*, a very ancient abstract noun, *moderatio*, *moderare* and *moderari*—expressed one of the central themes of sophrosyne [temperance] from the very beginning of Latin literature."¹⁹ There are remnants of this connection in Aquinas. For example, he distinguishes temperance from the other cardinal virtues because "temperance is a certain disposition of the mind that imposes the mode [= limit] on diverse passions or operations" (61.4).²⁰ However, Aquinas also extends this mode to all the moral virtues, just as Aristotle had done with the mean (e.g., 60.1 arg 2, ad 2). Since having a mode is characteristic of the good as such (I 5.5c), every virtue (moral, intellectual, or theological) must have a mode.

What, then, is a virtue's mode? For Aquinas, mode is almost synonymous with "measure" (*mensura*): "The good in the case of human passions and operations is that they attain the mode of reason, which is the measure and rule of all human passions and operations" (*On the Virtues* 1.13c).²¹ However, this concept of mode adds a new thought to the idea of rule or measure: application to a more specific sphere. Following Augustine, Aquinas's definition is that "mode signifies a certain determination of a measure" (I.II 27.3c).²² "Determination" here means a specification: if prudence is the measure of human acts, the mode is the determination, the specification, of this generic rule in a more

particular sphere. A moral virtue's mode is the prudential wisdom specific to some specific matter.

It is this note of specification or determination that makes mode important for virtue theory. As its *measure*, the mode is the most formal element of a virtue since it is by conformity to the mode that a habit becomes good and therefore a virtue. However, since the mode is more precisely the *determination* of a measure—that is, the measure as applied to a specific matter—the mode therefore specifies different virtues differently. How, then, do we identify the mode of each virtue?

Differentiating the Modes of the Virtues

The basic principle for identifying mode is this: as the form of a virtue, its mode is correlative to its matter. The principle is evident from an analogy Aquinas develops among and between the sciences, the arts, and the moral virtues. What is a mode, for example, fitting for ethics? Aquinas notes that, for Aristotle, matter and form are mutually proportional: “The mode of manifesting the truth in any science ought to fit what is treated as the matter in that science.”²³ This principle of mode-matter fit within science is explained by a comparison with the arts. A craftsman will employ a different method with wax, with clay, or with iron; similarly, the mode of ethics, which treats of contingent human actions, differs from the mode of mathematics, which deals with necessary things and so offers demonstration.²⁴

For Aquinas, the arts and sciences in turn provide an analogy for the virtues: “Just as in the sciences it is necessary to investigate the mode according to the matter, so also in regard to the virtues, as [Aristotle] says in *The Nicomachean Ethics* (Bk I).”²⁵ A moral or theological virtue's mode is therefore not a static form; it is more akin to a scientific or artistic *modus operandi* or method. But it is a method for establishing the good in some specific matter, not a way to produce an artifact or to determine the truth.

The Cardinal Virtues

How does this mode or method work out more concretely? Aquinas identifies four general modes of moral virtue, which constitute the “generic” cardinal virtues (I.II 61.2–4). Remembering that the material object is some sphere of “the difficult and the good,” the four generic cardinal virtues are responses to the generic moral matters and universal challenges we all must face in achieving the rational good. To act well in life we must rise to the challenge of

deliberating, judging, and deciding well what is to be done and desired—this is the office of prudence. In addition, one must learn to embody practical wisdom in one’s volitional and emotional life. Justice answers the challenge of rightly ordering one’s actions; fortitude responds to the emotional test of standing firm in the rational good despite dangers, toils, and sorrows; temperance responds to the challenge posed by the passions of attraction, which can tend to overrun their bounds, by modulating them. Discretion, rectitude, strength, and moderation: these generic cardinal virtues are the qualities we need in order to face the four universal challenges of living a good life.

For Aquinas these four challenges are not merely integral to human nature; they correspond to the four “wounds” that followed from original sin. Prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance correct the ignorance, malice, weakness, and concupiscence to which the post-lapsarian human is prone (85.3c). The generic cardinal virtues are healings as well as perfections of human nature.

This dividing of the mode of reason into four general modes results in four generic formal virtues. However, while they are “virtues” in a sense (61.2), Aquinas clarifies that, they are not such strictly speaking (61.4). Each virtue, as an operative habit, needs a determinate and proper act; a generic virtue is too general to count (*On the Virtues* 1.12 ad 27). The general modes operate together in specific virtuous habits and so are better regarded as constituents of virtues (I.II 61.4). Aquinas ingeniously identifies the four generic cardinal “virtues” with the necessary conditions of acting virtuously that Aristotle lays down.²⁶ To act virtuously one needs to know what is to be done (prudence), act from choice and not mere passion (temperance), do so for a due end (justice), and act firmly and immovably (fortitude) (61.4 arg 3, ad 3; *On the Virtues* 1.5c). Every morally virtuous act whatsoever requires the four general modes of virtue.²⁷

Accordingly, Aquinas identifies a more proper way of speaking of the cardinal virtues: “The cardinal virtues are understood in two ways. In one way, insofar as they are special virtues having determinate matters. In another way, insofar as they signify certain general modes of virtue” (II.II 58.8 ad 2).²⁸ The generic cardinal virtues apply reason to some generic matter of the moral life; the specific cardinal virtues, which are virtues in the strictest sense, apply reason in some more specific sphere (I.II 61.4c). For example, specific fortitude is not about standing firm despite any obstacle whatsoever, but it is about standing firm against the greatest obstacle—namely, the fear of death (61.3). Specific temperance is moderation and restraint as applied to the greatest pleasures—namely those of touch (that is, to do with food, drink, and sex) (II.II 141). It is to the most intense specifications of the four generic moral matters that the specific cardinal virtues are addressed.

The differentiation of virtue does not stop with the identification of four specific cardinal virtues. Prudence and fortitude are unitary and indivisible

virtues. However, specific justice and specific temperance, while determinate in comparison with their respective general virtues, are nevertheless generic in relation to their own subdivisions. Justice as a (semi-) specific virtue can be divided into distributive, commutative, and legal justice, together with its companion *epikeia* (equity) (II.II 61.1, 58.6, 120.2); temperance can be divided into abstinence, sobriety, chastity, and *puditia* (what today we might term “modesty”) (143). Aquinas calls these more specific virtues the “subjective parts” of justice and temperance: the species of a genus.

Aquinas also acknowledges many moral virtues, such as humility, perseverance, and religion, that are not subspecies or subjective parts of the four cardinal virtues. How does he specify and differentiate these? By referring to them as the principal virtues’ “potential parts” (*partes potentiales*) (II.II 48c): they are participants in the “power” or “capacity” (*potentia*) of a principal virtue.²⁹ As he puts it in *On the Virtues*, “Other adjunct or secondary virtues are posited as ‘parts’ of the cardinal virtues, not as integral [parts] or subjective [parts]; for they have a determinate matter and a proper act; but as potential parts, insofar as they *participate* in a particular and partial way what principally and more perfectly belongs to a cardinal virtue” (1.12 ad 27).³⁰ These power-participants share the mode or generic rationale with a principal virtue but differ in respect to matter: “Potential parts of any principal virtue are called secondary virtues, which observe the same mode the principal virtue observes concerning some principal matter, but in certain other less challenging matters” (II.II 143).³¹ For example, gentleness is counted as a power-participant of temperance: it participates in the mode of restraint and applies it not to the concupiscences of touch but rather to anger. The secondary virtues, then, consist of a general mode or rationale of the good as applied to some “secondary” or less challenging matter.

Since each of the modes of the moral virtues is a participation in the virtue of prudence suited to a specific moral matter, it follows that this intellectual virtue is somehow involved in all the moral virtues: “Prudence places the mode and form in all other moral virtues.”³² Prudence is the practical wisdom of the moral virtues.

The arts, sciences, and moral virtues have a mode. Do the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love also have a mode? In his later works, at least, Aquinas insists on finding a sense in which the love of God does have a mode, albeit not a limit: “In the love of God there is no mode as it exists in what is measured . . . but only as it exists in the measure” (27.6c).³³ Thus, “charity, which has the mode as the measure, excels the other virtues, which have the mode as measured” (ad 1).³⁴ Love of God has a mode in the same way that water, not a sidewalk after a downpour, is wet: essentially, not derivatively.

Every virtue has its own characteristic mode, whether we are talking of the intellectual, the moral, or the theological virtues. The mode of the sciences

and arts is the method suited to each of their specific matters; the mode of the moral virtues is the mode of reason; the mode of the theological virtues is a limitless mode that knows no bounds since it is not possible to believe in, hope in, and love God too much (compare I.II 64.4).

From the Mode to the Mean

What do we make of the doctrine of the mean that Aquinas inherits from Aristotle? According to Aristotle, “Virtue is an elective state existing in the mean relative to us, determined by reason and as the prudent one would determine it.”³⁵ This Aquinas takes to be an accurate definition of moral virtue. As with the mode, Aquinas frequently identifies the rational mean as the form of the moral virtues (I.II 66.2; II.II 47.7 ad 2; 61.2 arg 2; *On the Virtues* 1.10 arg 8, ad 8).

In Aquinas’s virtue theory, the mean is secondary to the mode of reason. This becomes evident in his most extensive argument for the mean:

The good in the case of human passions and operations is that they attain the mode of reason, which is the measure and rule of all human passions and operations. . . . The bad, on the other hand, is that someone exceeds the mode of reason or falls short of it in their human passions and operations. Therefore, since the human good is human virtue, it follows that moral virtue lies in a mean between excess and deficiency, where “excess,” “deficiency” and “mean” are understood in relation to the rule of reason. (*On the Virtues* 1.13c)³⁶

Here “mean,” “excess,” and “deficiency” are simply the application of a quantitative metaphor to the mode. The mean at which virtue aims is just conformity of virtue’s matter to the mode; excess and deficiency are two ways of its matter failing to equal the mode. Aquinas can therefore mention mode and mean in the same breath: “the mode of a virtue, that is, a certain mean” (*On the Virtues* 1.13 ad 4).³⁷

Contemporary virtue theorists argue about how to interpret the doctrine of the mean, and are often skeptical of its value. Aquinas’s understanding of the mean of moral virtue may help clear up some of the difficulty; moreover, it is worth examining here for the light it sheds on the formal cause of moral virtue. Aquinas distinguishes two aspects of the doctrine of the mean:

Virtue is called a mean in two ways. First, by reason of its objective matter, insofar as virtue makes it equal to right reason. And this mean belongs *per se* to every moral virtue. . . . Second, virtue is called a mean by reason of habit, that is, insofar

as it is a mean between the habits of two evils. . . . And this is accidental to a virtue, nor is it necessary that it exist in all virtues.³⁸

The core doctrine of the mean, then, is that a moral virtue makes its objective matter equal to right reason, as when temperance moderates the desires of food, drink, and sex. That temperance lies between two vices—intemperance and insensibility—is secondary.

Rosalind Hursthouse says it would be “a deeply mysterious fact” if each virtue were opposed by two and only two vices.³⁹ This criticism does not seem to touch on Aquinas’s accounting. For him, justice has only one vice by excess (*On the Virtues* 1.13 ad 12). In contrast, there are at least four vices of excess opposed to magnanimity: presumption, ambition, vainglory, and pride. This poses no problem, because “it is no contradiction for there to be, for one mean, multiple excesses in diverse respects” (II.II 119.1 ad 1). Even more interestingly, Aquinas thinks that a vice opposed to a virtue can be a mixture of excess and deficiency. Someone can possess a mixture of prodigality and miserliness (opposite vices that are both contrary to liberality) since “Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same thing in diverse respects” (119.1 arg 1, ad 1).⁴⁰ Aquinas would agree with Hursthouse, then, that moral virtue is not by some mysterious symmetry necessarily opposed by two and only two contrary vices. What is essential for Aquinas is that a virtue causes its objective matter to be “equal” but not “exceed” or “fall short” of the rule of reason.

How can we understand this equality with reason? Aquinas states that the mean is to be understood “according to circumstances” (*secundum circumstantias*) (64.1 ad 2). Indeed, it is “in relation to [circumstances that] the mean of virtue is found or lost in human actions and passions” (7.2 ad 3).⁴¹ The circumstances of a human act are “whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, yet touch in some way the human act” (7.1c).⁴² They are, in a sense, the “accidents” of an act, not its substance.

Aquinas, drawing on Cicero and Aristotle, lists seven or eight circumstances of a human act (depending on how one counts) that are relevant to its moral evaluation (7.1).⁴³ They are *when* the action takes place (time), *where* it is done (place), *how* it is performed (manner), *what* it brings about (effect), *why* it is done (reason), *about what* it concerns (material object), *who* performs it (person), and *by what means* (instrument). For Aquinas it is impossible to determine what is virtuous without a consideration of all of these contingencies: “Acts of virtue ought not be done anyhow, but by observing the due circumstances that are required for an act to be virtuous” (II.II 33.2).⁴⁴ For example, temperance will regulate appetite for food according to the circumstances of *material object* (not craving excessively luxurious or gourmet foods), the

quantity (not desiring too much food), the *manner* (not being too eager to eat), and *time* (not desiring to eat too early) (48.4).

Hursthouse worries that a “quantitative” doctrine of the mean is implausible.⁴⁵ Similarly, Aquinas repeatedly states, “The mean of virtue is not understood according to quantity, but according to right reason” (147.1 ad 2).⁴⁶ The occasion for this assertion is the objection that certain virtues seem to lie in a maximum rather than a mean. Fortitude concerns the greatest dangers; magnanimity the greatest honors; magnificence the greatest in expenses; piety the great reverence that is due to parents, to whom we can never make a return of equal value. The same applies to religion since no matter how greatly we honor God, we can never give God the honor that is His due (*On the Virtues* 1.13 arg 5). The virtues of poverty and celibacy also seem to lie in an extreme, as they reject all possessions and sexual pleasures (arg 6). None of these moral virtues seem to lie in a mean, but rather in an extreme. Aquinas’s reply is that virtue lies not in the quantitative mean but rather in the rational mean (*medium rationis*). What, then, is the rational mean?

The rational mean is determined but by *what is fitting in the circumstances*, not by absolute quantity. Even when a virtue tends to something great, as with magnanimity, it is still a mean because “virtues of this kind tend to this [object] according to the rule of reason, that is, where it is fitting, when it is fitting, and for the reason it is fitting” (I.II 64.1 ad 2).⁴⁷ A great-souled person fittingly aims at the greatest honors, as reason recognizes. As Aquinas puts it later, “The magnanimous man is indeed an extreme in *magnitude*, insofar as he tends to what is greatest, but in point of *fittingness*, he is a mean, because he tends to the greatest according to reason” (II.II 129.3 ad 1).⁴⁸ The rational mean in regard to a set of circumstances, then, is defined nonquantitatively and simply as what is fitting according to reason.

This insight, that the “mean” is to be defined primarily in terms of fittingness as determined by reason, relativizes the value of the quantitative metaphors of “mean,” “excess,” and “deficiency,” and points to what Hursthouse calls the valuable “central doctrine of the mean.”⁴⁹ Cajetan, in a display of analytic clarity that impressed his successors, also explains this nonquantitative definition of the rational mean as follows:

The rational mean . . . requires two things: namely, the matter, and the conditions of reason. So the rational mean lies in the affirmation of both, namely of the proper matter, and of all the conditions regarding right reason. For example, the rational mean in temperance is to take pleasure when it is fitting, in the manner that is fitting, for a fitting reason, and so on. But the extremes are understood as the negation of one, and the affirmation of the other: so that “excess” affirms

the matter, with the conditions negated; “deficiency” however negates the matter, with the conditions affirmed. For example, to use pleasures when it is unfitting, for an unfitting reason, where it is unfitting, and so on, is “excess”: for it is to use pleasures, which are the matter of temperance, “more” than is fitting. But not to use pleasures when it is fitting, for a fitting reason, and so on, is “deficiency”: for it is to take pleasure “less” than is fitting. (in I.II 64.2)

Even if we question the value of the quantitative metaphors as Hursthouse does, the core idea of the rational mean remains helpful: moral virtue aims at the affirmation of both matter and the conditions of reason. For example, magnanimity aims at great things when, with whom, and in the manner it is fitting. Any failure in adjusting this ambition to what reason judges to be fitting is a failure in moral virtue.

The important contribution of the concept of the rational mean is that it shows the situation relativity in the mode of reason, and therefore also in all the moral virtues. The good at which a virtue aims, Aquinas says, “can be enacted in many different ways, and not in the same way in all situations; whence the judgement of prudence is required for this: that the right mode be established” (*On the Virtues* 1.6c).⁵⁰ The mode or mean of reason is, as it were, the GPS of the virtuous life that helps work out the next step toward the destination in the particular location or circumstances of life.

The Principle of Unification

Together the material and formal objects of virtue address the problem of specification: each virtue is defined by the combination of its proper material object and the corresponding mode of reason that delineates what constitutes doing well in that sphere. However, the mode and the matter also help us address another related issue: unification.

Christine Swanton proposes a “pluralistic theory” of virtue. Two ways in which this account is “pluralistic” are first, that it acknowledges that a virtue may have multiple fields, and second, that it may respond to those multiple fields in a number of ways or “modes” (for example, by loving, or promoting, or respecting).⁵¹ This pluralistic approach has an advantage in that it recognizes a virtue may be exhibited in different ways. Yet this pluralism threatens to undermine any virtue’s unity. If a virtue exercises *diverse* modes of response to items in *diverse* fields, what ties these responses or items to the same virtue? Swanton refers to “constellations” of characteristic modes of responsiveness, which make up the “profile” of a virtue. Yet in the absence of any unifying

feature that can tie these modes of responsiveness together, her view runs the risk of undermining the integral identity of any single virtue. Virtues become accidental assortments rather than unified dispositions.

Aquinas's account, in contrast, insists that each virtue has its own unified object: "For one habit does not extend itself to many things, except in order to one thing, from which it has unity" (I.II 54.4c).⁵² A virtue is a disposition *ad unum*, toward a single thing (that is, one object, or one act) of the same moral species (*On the Virtues* 1.9). Temperance inclines to temperate acts, fortitude to brave ones.

How, then, is it possible to define the specific moral unity of a virtue's acts in light of its diversity of manifestations? The solution lies in the causal account. The formal object of a virtue provides not only its principle of specification and distinction but also its *principle of unification* since while a virtue may extend to many different material objects, these all agree in a single formal rationale. As Aquinas puts it, "For the unity of a power and a habit is to be considered according to the object, not indeed materially, but according the formal rationale of the object" (I 1.3c).⁵³ Feasting and fasting can be acts of the same virtue of temperance since these materially diverse acts intend the same formal object—namely, fitting moderation of consumption in the circumstances. Aquinas's analysis of specific virtues in terms of their form and matter allows for a healthy pluralism without giving up the unifying principle that maintains the integrity of each distinct virtue.

VIRTUE'S EXEMPLAR

The exemplar is an "extrinsic formal cause" after which the image is modeled and in which it participates (see chap. 5). Exemplar causation is important in Aquinas's theological ethics, as it focuses on the dynamic image of God on the way to becoming more like the exemplar. To what extent does exemplar causation influence virtue theory?

Aquinas follows Augustine in arguing that the exemplar of human virtue must preexist in God: "As Augustine says (*On the Morals of the Catholic Church*, Ch.vi), 'it is necessary that there be something that the soul follows, in order that virtue may be born in her, and this is God: if we follow him, we live well.' There must therefore be an exemplar of human virtue pre-existing in God, just as the rationales of all things pre-exist in him" (I.II 61.5c).⁵⁴ The human virtues are therefore modeled on their exemplar in God but allow for the distance between God and creature, which makes this exemplarity analogical rather than univocal. Humans are not virtuous in the way that God is virtuous; rather, insofar as humans are virtuous, they participate in God's goodness

in a manner fitting to human beings. It is by becoming like God through grace and the virtues and acts that flow from grace that we progress toward our true end. The exemplarity of the divine goodness is therefore a primary principle of the dynamic of human formation in virtue: “It belongs to the human being to drag himself as much as he can even to divine things, as even the Philosopher recognizes (*Nicomachean Ethics* X.7); and it is frequently commended to us in sacred Scripture, as in Matthew 5:48, ‘Be perfect, just as your heavenly Father is perfect’” (61.5c).⁵⁵ Since the exemplar cause is the agent, end, and form, virtue finds its origin, end, and nature in its divine exemplar.

Exemplar causality enables Aquinas to conceive of a radical dependence of all virtue on God: a dependence that is not merely efficient-causal and final-causal but even formal-causal. Aquinas says:

Just as we are said to be good by the goodness that is God, and wise by the wisdom that is God, because the goodness by which we are formally good is a certain participation in the divine goodness, and the wisdom by which we are formally wise is a certain participation in the divine wisdom, so also the charity by which we formally love the neighbor is a certain participation in divine charity. (II.II 23.2 ad 1)⁵⁶

Virtue is formally a participation in God, the perfect exemplar of all goodness. It is difficult to conceive of a more radically theocentric account of virtue.

It makes sense to see justice, wisdom, mercy, and charity as participations in divine virtue since God is just, wise, and loving. However, it is not clear that God can be temperate (having no bodily appetites), brave (needing nothing to fear), or religiously devout (having no superior to worship). The Salamancans suggest that the moral virtues, which by definition belong to a subject possessing some imperfection, are nevertheless present in God—not formally, but “eminently” and “virtually.”⁵⁷ By saying God possesses these virtues “eminently” it appears they mean that He possesses these virtues in some analogous and higher sense. For example, God’s “fortitude” is His immutability (I.II 65.5c). The “virtual” presence of the moral virtues in God can be interpreted, they say, through the conditional: “If God *could* be devout, brave, and temperate, he *would* be.” The doctrine of the Incarnation helps us to make sense of this idea: by becoming human, God further expresses His divine goodness through His human virtues.

Aquinas recognizes there is a problem of “distance” between the divine and human, if God is to be the exemplar of human virtue in any practical way, and he appeals to the Incarnation as the necessary bridge: “This exemplar, God, was previously truly remote from us. As it is said, ‘What is a human being, that he could follow the King his maker?’ (Ecclesiastes 2:12).

And therefore he willed to become a human being, to present to humans a human exemplar.”⁵⁸ The divine virtues become more accessible to us through their divine-human exemplar.

Aquinas points to the value of Jesus as an exemplar who is not only accessible but also trustworthy:

Someone’s words and examples are more efficacious in leading to virtue the firmer is our opinion of his goodness. But we could have no infallible opinion of any mere human being’s goodness, because even the holiest men are found lacking in certain things. And so it was necessary for humans, so that they be strengthened in virtue, that they receive teaching and examples of virtue from God humanized. For this reason, the Lord himself said, “I have given you an example, that just as I have done, so also you might do” (John 13:15).⁵⁹

Theological virtue theory has this advantage over its philosophical cousin: it can point with confidence to at least one human exemplar of virtue to be imitated, Jesus Christ.⁶⁰

There are parallels to this idea in contemporary philosophy and theology. Linda Zagzebski proposes an “exemplarist virtue theory.” For Zagzebski a moral exemplar is a person who is admirable and therefore imitable. Drawing on the Kripke-Putnam theory of direct reference, she proposes that basic moral concepts such as virtue are anchored in direct reference to exemplars of moral goodness: “Good persons are persons *like that*, just as gold is stuff *like that*.”⁶¹ If God is seen as the supreme exemplar, then God incarnate provides a moral exemplar within reach, so to speak, of humankind.⁶²

Exemplarist virtue theory is attractive to moral theologians as well, especially those with a Thomistic leaning. Patrick M. Clark sees the exemplarist approach as responsive to the Second Vatican Council’s desire to recenter moral theology on Christ. Clark traces exemplarist themes in recent work, especially that of Liva Melina, even arguing for a “Thomistic moral exemplarism.”⁶³ Brian Shanley has also referred to “Aquinas’s exemplar ethics,” arguing that understanding the human person as the image of the Trinity is “the key for an understanding of Aquinas’s moral thinking.”⁶⁴

Can Aquinas’s virtue theory accurately be described as an exemplarist virtue theory? Zagzebski observes that her theory is “foundational in structure,” like others in modern Western philosophy.⁶⁵ Its foundation is direct reference to moral exemplars through the experience of admiration. Zagzebski is perceptive in recognizing that while the ancient ethical approaches of Aristotle or Confucius (or, one might add, Aquinas) place a great deal of importance on moral exemplars, it is only in the modern era that foundational moral theory has arisen, due to the need to justify the practice of morality by reference to an

uncontroversial basis. For this reason Aquinas's virtue theory, though having an exemplarist strand, is not exemplarist strictly speaking. Aquinas's ethics is holistic, and virtue within it is not defined *foundationally* by its relation to the exemplar. While the exemplar cause is important, a comprehensive definition of virtue can be attained only by one that embraces all the causes.

NOTES

1. 55.4c: "Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum."

2. In contemporary philosophy this is referred to as the problem of "individuation" or "enumeration." See Daniel C. Russell, *Practical Intelligence and the Virtues* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pt. 2.

3. William C. Mattison III, "Thomas's Categorizations of Virtue: Historical Background and Contemporary Significance," *The Thomist* 74, no. 2 (2010): 189–235.

4. *On the Virtues* 4.4c: "Sicut autem forma in rebus naturalibus dat speciem, ita et in moralibus obiectum dat speciem actui, et per consequens habitui."

5. 55.4c: "Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi."

6. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach," in *Moral Relativism: A Reader*, ed. Paul K. Moser and Thomas L. Carson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 202–3.

7. Christine Swanton, *Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 20.

8. See Poinset, *Cursus Theologicus, Isagoge ad D. Thomae Theologiam*, in I.II 59 (Solesmes 5:171).

9. *Comm. Ethic.*, lib. 2 l. 3 n.3: "Materia enim uniuscuiusque virtutis moralis est id circa quod modum rationis imponit."

10. *Ibid.*; compare *Super Sent.* lib. 3 d. 33 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 2 arg 2, ad 2; qc.3c and ad 3.

11. 18.2 ad 2: "obiectum non est materia ex qua, sed materia circa quam, et habet quodammodo rationem formae, in quantum dat speciem."

12. *Comm. Ethic.*, lib. 2 l. 3 n.14: "Ars autem et virtus est circa difficilium, in quo magis requiritur quod aliquis bene operetur, ad quod ordinatur ars et virtus; nam in facilibus quilibet potest bene operari. Sed bene operari in difficilibus est solum habentis virtutem et artem."

13. I.II 59.4c: "circa omne id quod contingit ratione ordinari et moderari, contingit esse virtutem moralem."

14. 161.1 ad 3: "humilitas reprimit appetitum, ne tendat in magna praeter rationem rectam. Magnanimitas autem animum ad magna impellit secundum rationem rectam."

15. J. O. Urmson, "Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (July 1, 1973): 226. For a critique of this view see Russell, *Practical Intelligence and the Virtues*, 181.

16. I.II 60.5c: "Obiecta igitur passionum, secundum quod diversimode comparantur ad appetitum sensitivum, causant diversas passionum species, secundum vero quod comparantur ad rationem, causant diversas species virtutum."

17. 63.4: "Obiectum autem virtutis cuiuslibet est bonum consideratum in materia propria, sicut temperantiae obiectum est bonum delectabile in concupiscentiis tactus. Cuius quidem obiecti formalis ratio est a ratione, quae instituit modum in his concupiscentiis, materiale autem est id quod est ex parte concupiscentiarum."

18. 60.1 arg 2: "habitus non distinguuntur secundum materialia obiecta, sed secundum formales rationes obiectorum. Formalis autem ratio boni ad quod ordinatur virtus moralis, est unum, scilicet modus rationis."

19. North, *Sophrosyne*, 263.

20. 61.4: "temperantia vero sit quaedam dispositio animi quae modum quibuscumque passionibus vel operationibus imponit, ne ultra debitum efferantur."

21. *On the Virtues* 1.13c: "bonum in passionibus et operationibus humanis est quod attingatur modus rationis, qui est mensura et regula omnium passionum et operationum humanarum."

22. I.II 27.3c: "modus importat quandam mensurae determinationem." Compare I. 5. 5 c; scg. III 97, 100.

23. *Comm. Ethic.*, lib. 1 l.3 n.1: "Modus manifestandi veritatem in qualibet scientia, debet esse conveniens ei quod subiicitur sicut materia in illa scientia."

24. *Comm. Ethic.*, lib. 1 l. 3 n.5.

25. *Super Sent.*, lib. 3 d. 33 q. 3 a. 2 qc. 1c: "Sicut enim in scientiis modum oportet secundum materiam inquirere, ut dicitur in 1 Ethic., ita et in virtutibus."

26. *Nicomachean Ethics* II.4.

27. Terence Irwin comments, "These claims do not fit the passage in Aristotle that Aquinas cites, but they fit Aristotle's intentions in his account of virtue as a whole." Irwin, *The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study*, vol. 1: *From Socrates to the Reformation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 592.

28. II.II 58.8 ad 2: "virtutes cardinales dupliciter accipiuntur. Uno modo, secundum quod sunt speciales virtutes habentes determinatas materias. Alio modo, secundum quod significant quosdam generales modos virtutis."

29. Compare the helpful discussion of *partes potentiales* in Robert Pasnau, *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae 1a*, 75–89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 144–45.

30. 1.12 ad 27: "alie virtutes adiunctae vel secundariae ponuntur partes cardinalium, non integrales vel subiectivae, cum habeant materiam determinatam et actum proprium; sed quasi partes potentiales, in quantum particulariter participant, et deficienter medium quod principaliter et perfectius convenit virtuti cardinali."

31. II.II 143: "Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis principalis dicuntur virtutes secundariae, quae modum quem principalis virtus observat circa aliquam

principalem materiam, eundem observant in quibusdam aliis materiis, in quibus non est ita difficile.”

32. *Super Sent.*, lib. 3 d. 27 q. 2 a. 4 qc. 3c: “prudencia ponit modum et formam in omnibus aliis virtutibus moralibus.”

33. 27.6c: “in dilectione Dei non potest accipi modus sicut in re mensurata, ut sit in ea accipere plus et minus, sed sicut invenitur modus in mensura.”

34. Ad 1: “caritas, quae habet modum sicut mensura, praeminet aliis virtutibus, quae habent modum sicut mensurae.”

35. *Nicomachean Ethics* VII.6: “Est igitur virtus habitus electivus in medietate existens quoad nos, determinata ratione et ut utique sapiens determinabit.” Here I use the Latin text of the *Ethics* available to Aquinas. I translate “sapiens,” wise one, as “prudent one” because that is how Aquinas interprets it: wise, not simply speaking, but in human affairs. *Comm. Ethic.*, lib. 2 l. 7 n.5. When he discusses the definition, sometimes he switches from “wise” to “prudent.” E.g., I.II 58.2 ad 4.

36. *On the Virtues* 1.13c: “bonum in passionibus et operationibus humanis est quod attingatur modus rationis, qui est mensura et regula omnium passionum et operationum humanarum. . . . Quod autem in passionibus et operationibus humanis aliquis excedat modum rationis vel deficiat ab eo, hoc est malum. Cum igitur bonum hominis sit virtus humana, consequens est quod virtus moralis consistat in medio inter superabundantiam et defectum; ut superabundantia et defectus et medium accipiantur secundum respectum ad regulam rationis.”

37. *On the Virtues* 1.13 ad 4: “modus virtutis quasi medium quoddam.”

38. *Super Sent.*, lib. 3 d. 33 q. 1 a. 3 qc. 1 ad 5: “virtus dicitur medium dupliciter. Uno modo ratione materiae circa quam est, inquantum adaequat eam rationi rectae; et hoc per se convenit omni virtuti morali. . . . Alio modo dicitur medium ratione habitus, inquantum scilicet habitus virtutis est medium inter habitus duarum malitiarum . . . et hoc accidit virtuti, nec oportet quod sit in omnibus virtutibus.”

39. Rosalind Hursthouse, “A False Doctrine of the Mean,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 81 (1980): 59–60.

40. 119.1 arg 1, ad 1: “nihil prohibet eidem inesse opposita secundum diversa.”

41. The fuller text: “Consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad moralem, et politicum, et ad rhetorem. Ad moralem quidem, prout secundum eas invenitur vel praetermittitur medium virtutis in humanis actibus et passionibus.” Compare I.II 64.1 ad 2; II.II 33.2, 58.10; *De Malo*, q. 14 a.3c.

42. 7.1c: “quaecumque conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquo modo actum humanum, circumstantiae dicuntur.”

43. There is a helpful list of texts in Joseph Pilsner, *The Specification of Human Actions in St. Thomas Aquinas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 178.

44. II.II 33.2: “actus virtutum non quolibet modo fieri debent, sed observatis debitis circumstantiis quae requiruntur ad hoc quod sit actus virtuosus.”

45. Rosalind Hursthouse, “The Central Doctrine of the Mean,” in *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. Richard Kraut (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) 96–115.

46. 147.1 ad 2: “medium virtutis non accipitur secundum quantitatem, sed secundum rationem rectam.”

47. I.II 64.1 ad 2: “in hoc tendunt huiusmodi virtutes secundum regulam rationis, idest ubi oportet, et quando oportet, et propter quod oportet.”

48. II.II 129.3 ad 1: “magnanimus est quidem magnitudine extremus, in quantum scilicet ad maxima tendit, eo autem quod ut oportet, medius, quia videlicet ad ea quae sunt maxima, secundum rationem tendit.”

49. Hursthouse, “Central Doctrine of the Mean,” 109.

50. *On the Virtues* 1.6c: “Unumquodque autem horum contingit multipliciter fieri, et non eodem modo in omnibus; unde ad hoc quod rectus modus statuatur, requiritur iudicii prudentia.”

51. Swanton, *Virtue Ethics*, 93.

52. I.II 54.4c: “Non enim unus habitus se extendit ad multa, nisi in ordine ad unum, ex quo habet unitatem.”

53. I 1.3c: “Est enim unitas potentiae et habitus consideranda secundum obiectum, non quidem materialiter, sed secundum rationem formalem obiecti.” See also I.II 54.2 ad 1; *On the Virtues* 2.4c; and Pilsner, *Specification*, 101–2.

54. I.II 61.5c: “sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de moribus Eccles., oportet quod anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit virtus innasci, et hoc Deus est, quem si sequimur, bene vivimus. Oportet igitur quod exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes.”

55. 61.5c: “ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se trahat quantum potest, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in X Ethic.; et hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multipliciter commendatur, ut est illud Matth. V, estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus es.”

56. II.II 23.2 ad 1: “sicut dicimur boni bonitate quae Deus est, et sapientes sapientia quae Deus est, quia bonitas qua formaliter boni sumus est participatio quaedam divinae bonitatis, et sapientia qua formaliter sapientes sumus est participatio quaedam divinae sapientiae; ita etiam caritas qua formaliter diligimus proximum est quaedam participatio divinae caritatis.”

57. *Cursus Theologicus*, Tract. 12, *De Virtutibus*, Disp.3, Dub.3, n.48 (Solesmes 6:357).

58. Super I Cor., cap. 11 l. 1: “Hoc autem exemplar Dei prius erat a nobis valde remotum, secundum illud Eccle. II, v. 12: quid est homo, ut sequi possit regem factorem suum? Et ideo homo fieri voluit, ut hominibus humanum exemplar praeberet.”

59. *Contra Gentiles* IV.54: “Exempla autem alicuius et verba tanto efficacius ad virtutem inducunt, quanto de eo firmior bonitatis habetur opinio. De nullo autem homine puro infallibilis opinio bonitatis haberi poterat: quia etiam sanctissimi viri in aliquibus inveniuntur defecisse. Unde necessarium fuit homini, ad hoc quod in virtute firmaretur, quod a Deo humanato doctrinam et exempla virtutis acciperet. Propter quod ipse dominus dicit, Ioan. 13–15: *exemplum dedi vobis, ut quemadmodum ego feci, ita et vos faciatis.*”

60. Brian J. Shanley, “Aquinas’s Exemplar Ethics,” *The Thomist* 72, no. 3 (2008): 345–69.

61. Linda T. Zagzebski, “Exemplarist Virtue Theory,” *Metaphilosophy* 41, no. 1–2 (January 1, 2010): 51.

62. Linda T. Zagzebski, *Divine Motivation Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 228–70.
63. Patrick M. Clark, “The Case for an Exemplarist Approach to Virtue in Catholic Moral Theology,” *Journal of Moral Theology* 3, no. 1 (2014): 54–82.
64. Shanley, “Aquinas’s Exemplar Ethics,” 369.
65. Zagzebski, “Exemplarist Virtue Theory,” 47.