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The Distinction of Peace

Goetze, Catherine

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
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Peacebuilding Sensibilities



Just as the peacebuilders are sociologically identifiable as a globalized middle class, their habitus corresponds strikingly closely to the concept of *Bürgerlichkeit*. English lacks a word for this German term; it can be roughly translated as middle-class sensibility or middle-class culture, but it is at once larger and narrower than this. Certainly, *Bürgerlichkeit* designates a way of seeing and understanding the world, of behaving and moving around as someone specific, a *Bürger*: a citizen; a cosmopolitan, liberal, middle-class man; a self-made man. *Bürgerlichkeit* comprises political attitudes and cultural dispositions, and questions of morals and of taste, behavior, and values.

As a culture *Bürgerlichkeit* was and is the expression of a certain set of values, but, as Wolfgang Kaschuba notes, the term does not sit squarely with the social category of the middle classes.⁴ *Bürgerlichkeit* has never been in any way homogenous, and it extended beyond the middle class upwards toward the aristocracy and, later in the twentieth century, into the lower classes.⁵ It therefore makes sense to understand *Bürgerlichkeit* as being a set of certain practices and types of behavior centered on broad sets of principled beliefs and values. Kaschuba identifies five of those in his analysis of nineteenth-century Germany: the separation of the public and private spheres, an emphasis on individuality, a predilection for learned discourses, the promotion of charity and philanthropy, and a strong belief in progress and modernity.⁶ These value sets reflect much of the self-image that the middle classes gave themselves,

in which self-organization was considered the dominant and most valued principle of social organization; where education and technology took a central place in the construction of identity and material income; and where, at the same time and quite cosubstantially, the question of humanity's sense and purpose in the world accompanied a strong belief in modernity.⁷

The culture of *Bürgerlichkeit* thus quite straightforwardly resulted from the new professions' quest for a place in society. Although these were constituted very differently according to their professional training and organizational situation—from self-employed to employment as clerks—and according to their income and social circles, the new professions shared at least three common traits. Their income depended in every way on their performance and qualifications. Contrary to peasants, workers, or the nobility, income was not directly dependent on external factors such as birthrights, land ownership, or the provision of work by factories. The new middle classes saw themselves as their own “masters of fortune,” where their hard work and their ability to direct their destiny were decisive factors governing the income they could earn. Not bound by birth, land, or a master or guild, the new professions understood themselves as earning their income and their property through merit.⁸ Income based on merit was to be distinguished from income earned from rent, as was the case for landowners, or income earned from exploitation, as the workers. Hence, property and education were intimately linked to the good performance and high moral standing of the middle classes.

Similarly, the culture of *Bürgerlichkeit* allowed the redefinition of the moral economy of self-interest. As far as income was based on merit, self-interest (or egoism) needed to become morally acceptable. Indeed, Adam Smith's praise of self-interest expressed in the *Wealth of Nations* can be read as an ethical treatise. Smith reinterprets selfishness as contributing to the commonweal, as the title of the book indicates. In the culture of *Bürgerlichkeit*, self-interest becomes closely associated with the common interest.

Associating self-interest with the common interest was accompanied by the split between the private and public sphere and the political distinction between citizen and state. In terms of cultural identity, the almost schizophrenic dualism of a competitive, self-interested, utility maximizing public sphere, whether in the form of the business world or the political world, and a caring, philanthropic, and charitable world born of the private sphere, in the form of the house, the family, or the

community, also created a tension between the quest for authenticity and the “true self,” on the one hand, and the conformist, obedient individual, on the other. This tension, most often artistically expressed in novels, drama, music, or (later) film and photography, has been a sharply marked characteristic of *Bürgerlichkeit* from the eighteenth century until today.⁹

Peacebuilders display a distinctive habitus that is profoundly marked by *Bürgerlichkeit*, broadly understood as a culture articulated around the three pairings of self-interest vs. common interest, professional utilitarianism vs. a quest for authenticity, and education as means of earning a living vs. property as means of earning a living. However, just as the social class of the *Bürgertum*, or middle classes, has undergone fundamental changes in the past thirty years, with the increased neoliberal privatization of the public and social, the individual flexibilization and precarization of work, new organizational management styles and associated new living styles, so has *Bürgerlichkeit* undergone important changes. If the three paired concepts of middle-class sensibilities have remained the same, they are expressed nowadays in different forms than they were in the nineteenth century or in the immediate postwar years.

While the liberal self continues to be the core ideal of middle-class sensibilities and the dominant peacebuilding culture, it is nowadays articulated otherwise. As the examples drawn from the lives of Hammar-skjöld, Bunche, and Urquhart will show, the first generation of peacebuilders understood the civil servant ideal to represent the realization of the liberal, autonomous self. The emphasis was on serving a higher cause and being independent, in the sense of a civil servant who dedicates his (they were almost exclusively men) work life to this noble cause and its organization, the UN. The liberal self was articulated as an intellectually independent person of moral integrity who believes in (liberal and democratic) ideals and selflessly serves a “good” organization in order to fulfill these ideals. Being an international civil servant was a calling, in Weber’s sense, that is, a way of fulfilling a moral and ethical duty that was greater than the individual. The concept of the international civil servant gave a new purpose to the middle-class idea of earning an income through hard work and merit; now, hard work, commitment, and sacrifice for the job would lead not only to personal achievement (which remained important) but, even more significantly, to world peace.

Nowadays, due to the fragmentation of their work life, peacebuilders have come to see their own lives instead as a process of constant communication, and as a marketization of their capacity to live up to such

lofty ideals as those set by Hammarskjöld and others. Duty, service, and calling are concepts that have lost importance to a work life that requires the individual to move from one contract, project, task, and country to another. The “entrepreneurial self,”¹⁰ who combines neoliberal ideas of continuous self-productivity with post-1968 ideals of self-fulfillment, has now become the standard image of the peacebuilder. Yet there is no clear and neat break between the 1960s international civil servant of peace and the contemporary peace entrepreneur. On the contrary, the current form of peacebuilding habitus draws on powerful images, myths, concepts, and ideas of the past, and cultivates middle-class sensibilities of the nineteenth century, nurtured up until today, albeit in altered guises. This chapter and the following two will unfold the story of those new guises in order to explore the highly diversified and complex peacebuilding habitus.

This chapter, however, will first look at four legendary and standard-setting personalities in the field of peacebuilding, namely Dag Hammarskjöld, Ralph Bunche, Brian Urquhart, and Kofi Annan. The first three are of importance to the field as they were the subject of extensive legend building, following their deaths (Hammarskjöld and Bunche) and retirement (Urquhart), and are, without doubt, considered the spiritual fathers of UN peacekeeping and, by extension, of peacebuilding. The later personality, Annan, marks the switch of the peacebuilding field from its somewhat lumbering origins as a field of international civil service to the more dazzling field of neoliberal peacebuilding entrepreneurship.

Taken as an ideal type, Dag Hammarskjöld’s life and approach to his UN job might serve as matrix by which to gauge the presence and, over time, continuity of *Bürgerlichkeit* in the UN and in the wider field of peacebuilding. As will become clear in the following, his direct collaborators and two heirs, Bunche and Urquhart, resembled in multiple aspects this ideal type. Hence, they assured, by their very personality, a continuity of the peacebuilding culture all the way to the 1980s when Urquhart retired. Annan, too, on the surface at least, resembled Hammarskjöld, and made a big effort to establish himself as his heir; however, the drama of his own life as well as his politics in defending the UN’s central place in peacebuilding made him much more a representative of the neoliberal civil society entrepreneurs of global governance than an international civil servant.

By analyzing Annan, the chapter will look at the peacebuilding habitus in its contemporary form, and the shift from the image of the international civil servant based on liberal morality to the habitus of the

self-motivated, self-fulfilled peace entrepreneur based on the morality of neoliberal globalization. While the retirement of Urquhart certainly represented a rupture in the tradition of the international civil servant—a rupture that, ironically in the eyes of some,¹¹ was completed with the appointment of the only Secretary-General who had come up through the ranks, Annan—a certain number of sociological traits of peacebuilders continued to be of importance; consequently, a certain type of “culture” continued to be highly valued in the UN and in the peacebuilding field. The liberal self, autonomous and constantly reinventing himself and pushing herself to new limits (or “horizons,” to use current UN lingo), has remained at the core of the peacebuilding culture, but the context of this ideal has changed, allowing new forms of staging this role. The new context of flexibilization and fragmentation of work life most notably leads peacebuilders to redefine the notion of professionalism. The question of what makes a peacebuilding professional is of crucial importance for their own careers, as it serves as a distinctive marker of the wider labor market (which also comprises, as we have seen in the preceding chapters, the fields of NGOs, law and justice, religion, and domestic civil and development services); the question of peacebuilding professionalism is also important for the peacebuilders themselves, as it provides the fundamental justification that whatever they are doing, they are doing something good, namely helping create peace. The second part of this chapter is therefore delving deeper into the importance of professionalism in peacebuilding.

The Ideal-Type Peacebuilder, Protestant Ethics, and Dag Hammarskjöld

Even during his lifetime, Dag Hammarskjöld had come to symbolize what liberal internationalists wanted to see in the United Nations: a body independent and ethically above nation-states in the multilateral pursuit of peace, understood as the protection of individual human lives and, as in the Congo mission, private property.¹² Walter Lippmann, the Cold War journalist who probably should receive the honor of being the first to build the legend of Hammarskjöld, wrote in his eulogy in 1961:

[H]e [Hammarskjöld] was himself the fine flower of the European tradition of civility which, if it is not dying, certainly is not flourishing today. . . . In the great public world where the white lights blazed

upon him, he lived an inner life of contemplation and esthetic experience that had nothing to do with power and popularity and publicity. His diplomacy had a finesse and courtliness in the great traditions of Europe. . . . He was a Western man in the highest traditions of political excellence in the West. Khrushchev says that Hammarskjöld was not neutral in the Congo, and that there is no such thing as a neutral man. Hammarskjöld was in fact the embodiment of the noblest Western political achievement—that laws can be administered by judges and civil servants who have their first allegiance to the laws, and not to their personal, their class, or even their national, interests.¹³

As a prime example of the embodiment of European, nineteenth-century *Bürgerlichkeit*, Hammarskjöld certainly deserves closer scrutiny. Reading through the descriptions of Hammarskjöld's childhood and his spiritual, philosophical, literary and artistic interests as they are partly reflected in his personal notebook, *Markings*, one cannot help but be reminded of Weber's analysis of the "Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism." The Hammarskjölds, as a family and as individuals, were working hard and diligently but they were not channeling their energy into monetary gain; yet Weber specifically argues that it is not economic activity that makes a capitalist but his (her) work ethos.¹⁴ According to Weber, Protestants and capitalists alike profoundly believe that true human fulfillment has to be realized through unquestioning efficiency, no matter the professional activity or the challenges imposed. Weber's German term is *Tüchtigkeit*, the meaning of which actually goes beyond efficiency. *Tüchtigkeit* not only designates the thoroughness and reliability with which a certain task is completed, but also the relentless willingness to take up any challenge, no matter how onerous, time-consuming, or difficult its achievement will be. Work becomes a calling, an ethical duty, and not merely a means to gain one's daily bread; this actually distinguishes the capitalist spirit from that of the worker, for whom work means first of all physical survival and reproduction. According to Weber, professional efficiency is an end in itself for liberals and Protestants; it has its own beauty and worth.¹⁵ Hammarskjöld's life was fundamentally dominated by this core idea of duty-fulfillment.

Weber takes the greatest care in retracing the different Protestant currents and the evolution of the vocation doctrine. It is too much to compare in detail here which traits Hammarskjöld's beliefs are closer to: Calvinist, Methodist, Pietistic, Lutheran, or other Protestant theologies; in fact, much of Hammarskjöld's fascination with asceticism is projected

onto Catholic figures.¹⁶ Hammarskjöld's work, life, and ethics can, however, be neatly summed up in the definition that Weber gave of Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism. Weber identifies five crucial features of Protestant ethics. First, the idea that man lives in a state of religious grace, which settles him firmly in this worldly life. Second, that man's status of grace is neither granted nor confirmed by some magical, transcendental ritual, but only by him proving his worthiness and distinct calling through the efficiency and the success of worldly life. Third, and consequently, this requires a systematic and methodical control of one's state of grace, and hence the total penetration of religious zeal into every thought, action, or behavior. Fourth, this in turn requires and simultaneously produces an orderly social world in which status can be proven and perpetuated. Fifth, living a life has to be rational, orderly, and efficient.¹⁷

Hammarskjöld spiritually testified to the interiorization of ascetics in *Markings*. In practical matters he was reported to be able to work excessive hours without tiring. He also never married, and biographers eagerly point out how this self-chosen celibacy matched his spiritual interest in mystic ascetics and his sense of duty.¹⁸ If Hammarskjöld's biographers are to be believed, the fact that many of the darker entries into his diary ceased with his appointment as Secretary-General of the United Nations indicates just how much he saw this position as a calling.¹⁹ Hammarskjöld's understanding of his role reflects a deeply conservative Protestantism in which spiritual salvation is sought in fulfilling such a position in life in which birth, destiny, and ultimately God has placed man. All his writings, statements, and speeches about the international civil servant reflect the fundamental maxim that Weber identifies as the core of all religious reformation movements in Europe, regardless of their doctrinal differences:

But at least one thing was unquestionably new: the valuation of the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the moral activity of the individual could assume. . . . The only way of living acceptably to God was not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but solely through the fulfillment of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the world. This was his calling.²⁰

Biographers commonly stress the intensity with which Hammarskjöld's spiritual and work ethics came together in his practice of UN

politics. Even this engagement on behalf of humanity, Hammarskjöld's often professed (and celebrated) search for peace, fits entirely into Weber's analysis of Protestant ethics:

Charity is expressed—given that it is exercised to attend to the glory of God and not to human creatures—first of all through the fulfillment of the professional tasks which were imposed by the *lex naturae*, and charity hence acquires an objective, depersonalized character: that of assisting the rational creation of the social universe surrounding us²¹

Hammarskjöld was not interested in the single man, but in grander questions of world peace and humanity. His strong interest in international law, and his propensity to seek out opportunities to fix in writing the rules and procedures of the organization, to document the tasks accomplished and even (before the term became fashionable) the lessons learnt—for instance in the annual reports he introduced—shows that he particularly sought to order the world according to a specific idea of how the rules of the world should be written, and not how the brute force of states shaped it.

Here he followed in the footsteps of his father. Confronted with the German naval blockade that led to famine in Norway, Hjalmar Hammarskjöld had justified his intransigent neutrality policy during World War I with the belief that the shaping of international law and the confirmation of his country's status in the world were far more important tasks and goals than saving human lives from hunger.²²

Hammarskjöld's strong interest in authoring law can also be interpreted as the wish to fix meaning, to impose limits on the interpretation of ambiguities, and, ultimately, to control the flow of politics and diplomacy in the very form of methodically and systematically proving efficiency in every aspect of his work: what Weber identified as stereotypically Protestant.

Hammarskjöld's ethics thus profoundly shaped his work. When he perished in an airplane crash near Ndola, Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), on September 18, 1961, he was carrying three books in his briefcase: the UN Charter, the New Testament, and a copy of Martin Buber's *I and Thou*. All three, biographers agree, reflect particularly well Hammarskjöld's intellectual and moral imaginary.²³ The UN Charter was more than a simple legal text for Hammarskjöld; it represented the foundational legitimation of his role and vocation, and of world peace as

he saw it. The New Testament was the constant religious reminder of his Protestant ethics. Buber's *I and Thou*, which Hammarskjöld was about to translate into Swedish, reflected on the one hand his search for dialogue and understanding, but also, on the other, his mysticism and deep internalization of the individualistic loneliness of his Protestant ethics. Weber spoke of the "isolation of every single individual" in Protestant ethics, and biographers emphasize that Hammarskjöld had no friends, and was a profoundly lonely person.

Buber's *I and Thou* reflects the German philosophical tradition of cultural pessimism (*Kulturpessimismus*), in which modernization and modernity have left men disenchanting and thrown back upon their own individual and immanent souls. God had, in Buber's words, retreated from this world.²⁴ Similar to other contemporary thinkers of the fin de siècle, Buber deeply mourned the loss of meaning in modernity, yet he saw it as inevitable. He sought to develop a philosophy of the individual, no longer constituting himself through belief in divine fate but in his relations to the two sides of his own psyche, the *I* and the *me*, and their interrelations with the Other. Only in a world of deeply individualized and lonely human beings does the dialogical principle become a human necessity and foundation of communal life.²⁵

For Hammarskjöld, the UN Charter reflected this basic reasoning, and transposed both the loneliness of modernity and the necessity of the dialogical principle to the world of states: only through dialogue would it be possible for states, these profoundly separated entities, to peacefully live together. Hammarskjöld saw his own role as facilitator of this dialogue. Hence, it was his personal and professional duty to conduct an impeccable life of integrity. If he was known to have jokingly said that the job description for the UN Secretary-General should contain a sentence prohibiting the candidate from having a family life, he was only peripherally referring to the time he had spent at work. His main concern was, rather, that the loyalty and sense of duty of a UN Secretary-General had to be entirely and indivisibly dedicated to the organization.

True Heirs: Ralph Bunche and Brian Urquhart

Chapter 3 has already shown how close Hammarskjöld, Bunche, and Urquhart worked together as a team. However, it also emphasized the rather different social origins of the three. In terms of *Bürgerlichkeit*, all three certainly shared a middle-class origin, in the sense that they

were neither working class nor aristocrats. However, in terms of the social standing of their families and their income they could hardly have been further apart, at least within the broad category of the middle class. Hammarskjöld had rarely known any material hardship; he was born and had been socialized into the privileged world of Sweden's ruling elite, whereas Bunche and Urquhart had both suffered material hardship, prejudice, and social marginalization. While Hammarskjöld was a typical patrician, with an inherited claim to *Bürgerlichkeit*, Bunche's and Urquhart's cases were more complex, and representative of the social mobility that the middle-class category allowed for (particularly during the postwar years).

The one central characteristic that drew all three together was their education in central institutions of *Bürgerlichkeit*: the University of Uppsala (the traditional and oldest university of Sweden) for Hammarskjöld, Oxford University for Urquhart, and the University of California at Los Angeles and Harvard for Bunche. Chapter 3 discussed the importance of this educational standard as a marker of their belonging to the middle class. This section will discuss further how much the emphasis on education, and especially the kind of education they received, influenced their habitus and ways of seeing the world around them, as well as influencing their own vocations.

Bunche continued to occupy the position of under-secretary general for special political affairs and special adviser to the Secretary-General on peacekeeping until his death in December 1971, just a couple of days before Kurt Waldheim was elected the fourth UN Secretary-General. Throughout his time as under-secretary general Bunche had been assisted by Urquhart, who also had been his secretary in the Trusteeship Council and in the Congo. Other members of the Congo mission also continued to work closely with Bunche and Urquhart, who succeeded Bunche as under-secretary general in special political affairs. F. T. Liu remained in the peacekeeping team until his early retirement in the wake of the UN's financial crisis in the 1980s, when Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar was forced to make drastic reductions in personnel.

Bunche in particular diverged little from Hammarskjöld's commitment to working long hours, and shared his profound belief in man's self-construction through work. As his son related:

My father was a hard taskmaster and disciplinarian. On the top of his agenda during my childhood was education. . . . He continuously

drummed into [me] the importance of education, hard work and achievement to the best of one's own abilities. He believed that in spite of the prejudices in society, with dedication, perseverance and hard work, one could do anything one wanted to with life. . . . My second recollection was his belief in the equality of race and gender, and that all people were created equal and with hard work could achieve whatever they set out to achieve.²⁶

Bunche's views on education followed a typical middle-class canon of education, sports, self-contained activities for the family (e.g., picnics, board games, and educational activities like visiting museums and theaters), and social engagements. Unlike Hammarskjöld, Bunche did not have a family, yet he had little time to devote to them. Confronted with the strong dividing line between a caring family life and a competitive, demanding, strenuous public life, Bunche clearly spent most of his life on the public side. The family, and particularly the upbringing of his children, was entirely the responsibility of his wife, at least as far as the daily routines were concerned. In the most patriarchal manner, however, Bunche was never shy about delivering advice on the principles of education to his children.²⁷ It was also his wife's role to support and care for him; yet he frequently expressed his dissatisfaction with what Urquhart in his biography called his wife's "nagging" about his frequent and prolonged absences.²⁸ He had from an early age experienced health problems, and these increased over time; he expected his wife to be the commiserating and caring receiver of his complaints. Ruth Bunche was first and foremost Ralph Bunche's wife and the mother of their children; her own profession, fittingly as teacher, came second. The few private photographs that are publicly available of the Bunche family and their homes, whether the architect-built seven-bedroom house in Washington or the apartment in Manhattan, show a stereotypical image of a comfortably well-settled, middle-class family. Family-sponsored announcements, as well as feature articles on family events, published in the *New York Times* further indicate how much the Bunche family was part of New York's high society.

As mentioned in chapter 3, Bunche's life epitomized perfectly the constant positioning and balancing process of a middle-class individual in various social fields. This struggle over social position was also expressed in Bunche's professed views on society and the politics of his times, particularly with respect to Negro politics and the politics of decolonization. Together with E. Franklin Frazier, sociologist at the University of Chi-

cago, whose monumental study *The Black Family* considered the higher incidence of single-parent families, divorce, polygamy, and adultery in black communities as deviant or atavistic behavior,²⁹ he fiercely attacked all allegations that blacks in America would prefer to nurture a culture apart, with their own moral codes and cultural understandings brought from Africa, and which had survived slavery. In particular, Melville J. Herskovits, an anthropologist of West Africa at Northwestern University, had argued in the 1930s and 1940s that descendants of slaves had formed their own culture, mixing elements of their African traditions with the European cultures of the Americas, and that this could, among other things, be observed in the family and kinship structures of African American families (which at the time were still referred to as “Negro”).³⁰

The difference between Frazier and Herskovits was not empirical—little doubt existed that the large majority of African American families did not correspond to the nuclear family model of white society. And Bunche’s family was no exception. Bunche hardly knew his own father, who had disappeared even before his mother had given birth and who had lived separately all throughout Bunche’s life. Bunche had been mainly brought up by his grandmother.³¹ The debate between the anthropologist and sociologist was actually about the meaning of the different family structures—were these differences so fundamental as to justify the idea that they defined a separate culture, and hence a separate form of political community, as W. E. B. Du Bois concluded from Herskovits’s studies? Or was it simply an aberration induced through forced family separations under slavery, as Frazier argued, which would disappear as soon as former slaves became part of the American middle class? In his own life, Bunche clearly lived the experience of Frazier’s position.

As Elliott Skinner reports, Bunche would have most probably strongly disliked the label “African American”; and Urquhart’s avowal that Bunche himself self-consciously designated himself proudly as “Negro,” and even more strongly as “Black American,” supports this suspicion.³² Given Bunche’s own assimilation, it should not come as a surprise that throughout his life Bunche attacked first W. E. B. Du Bois and later Malcolm X and the Black Panthers for their separatism. Among others he testified against Du Bois during the McCarthy era, during which Du Bois was refused several times the issuance of a passport to leave the United States.³³ These attacks on Du Bois signaled substantial differences in the views of Bunche on the question of which kind of political claims black Americans should and could make. Hence, they were also important authority struggles within American politics; significantly, Bunche’s and

Frazier's first attacks on Du Bois were made in the 1930s, when both were still much more inclined toward Marxist readings of race, on the grounds that the leaders of the NAACP were too "middle class."³⁴ However, very quickly, and following Gunnar Myrdal's study of race relations in the United States, *An American Dilemma*, and the interpretation of the New Deal's effect on black Americans, both became stern defenders of black assimilation.³⁵

An important aspect of Bunche's strong belief in equal chances through education is the correlated steadfast conviction that expert knowledge is the best, the objective and the necessary basis for good policy making. In all his writings, whether on colonial politics, in his PhD dissertation on French colonialism, or in his sometimes scathing memorandum on black leadership in the South, written for Myrdal in 1939, he deplored the lack of knowledge, education, intellectual skills, and expertise as main causes for all social and political ills in Africa and black politics in the United States.³⁶

Bunche had very strong opinions on leadership. His PhD thesis compares direct and indirect rule in two French territories. Bunche had reached the conclusion that African people were civilizationally lagging behind and, hence, indirect rule was preferable to direct rule, as it provided more opportunities to train up local people to assume political leadership.³⁷

Without ever explicitly discussing his epistemology or ontology of history and society, Bunche adhered (like most social scientists of the time) to the view of history moving forwards, and he certainly believed in ideas of progress and civilization. Pearl Robinson points out that Bunche fundamentally believed in ideas of social progress and the perfectibility of man.³⁸ He later came to largely agree with Myrdal on the possibilities of social engineering, and gradually overcame his skepticism about the benefits of the New Deal—his newly developing anticommunism helping with this development.³⁹

With respect to the world's colonies, he genuinely believed in the necessity of independence, but not without education, training, preparation, and guidance. Although highly critical of and disgusted by the terror of colonialism, Bunche did admit that some colonial administrations, particularly the French, were training natives, but he argued that by definition colonizers could not do so in an altruistic and civilizing way.⁴⁰ As chair of the Trusteeship Council, Bunche could fully play out his conviction, stated in his PhD dissertation, that the mandate system would be the best way to intervene where mistakes previously committed

might be corrected, where, indeed, a new and better civilization might be cultivated, through deliberate application of human intelligence and understanding.⁴¹

Ironically, even though he was a stern critic of the provincialism of black leadership in the South, he does not seem to have been aware of his own sometimes parochial Americanism. He found it rather difficult to imagine other forms of political community than white American liberal democracy. He appreciated the greater freedom of movement for colored people in Paris and London, but despised the food, manners, and political institutions alike of both France and the United Kingdom.⁴² Despite having traveled extensively in Africa, and having received training and research practice as a social scientist as well as an anthropologist, Bunche seems to have nevertheless encountered major difficulties in making sense of the rapidly transforming societies in Africa and the independence movements. He experienced what nowadays would be called a “cultural shock,” but showed little self-awareness or reflexivity about this experience. He struggled with his own moral convictions in his encounters with strangeness, as was particularly obvious in his confused and irritable reactions to local politics and customs during his visit to South Africa and his travels in British West Africa in 1937–38.⁴³ His deep antinationalism and postwar abhorrence of extreme ideologies also led him to fiercely oppose pan-Africanism at the grass-roots level, and particularly Communist variants of pan-Africanist thought and politics. As Martin Kilson points out, this meant that Bunche failed to grasp

the black-peoplehood mobilization discourse [of Africa’s independence movements]. . . . Bunche’s preference for a kind of hyperpragmatic rationalism on the part of the emergent educated African power contenders under colonial rule was a version of wide-eyed idealism too removed from the oppressive specificity of the imperialist process in many parts of Africa.⁴⁴

The conviction that his way of viewing the world was right seems to have been deeply rooted, and allowed for little if no questioning; it was also the basis for his deep conviction that only experts should be involved in policy making. Bunche was, as a political scientist, clearly a behaviorist. Behavioralism was a rather progressive and critical epistemology to hold in the 1930s; yet, as we now know, it was heavily flawed by its systemic blindness to *longue durée* evolutions, the force of subjectivity in the shaping of social relations, and deeply engrained social structures.⁴⁵

Being a behavioralist notably implied having a stern conviction that a single objective, rational, and universal set of factors existed, against which human behavior could be measured as being conformist or deviant. Social engineering and politics then consisted of providing the conditions under which deviant behavior could be made to conform (again).⁴⁶ On these grounds he called colonial politics, whether well intended or exploitative, “unscientific.”⁴⁷

Bunche positioned himself in all respects—as a “Black American,” Africanist, civil servant, father—within a discourse of decency, individual merit and achievement, liberal equality, and social responsibility. He was deeply convinced of these values, and particularly of the values of merit, hard work, achievement, and education. These values shaped his personal life and his family life, but also his public life as a black intellectual and, later, as a UN civil servant.

They were and are widely shared by other peacebuilders. In terms of the Secretariat’s cultural continuity, it is particularly important to note the deep admiration for Bunche by his successors. Bunche is singled out as a role model, not only as a peacebuilder but also as a “Black American.” His direct collaborator and successor in office, Urquhart, has played a major role in creating the legend of Bunche. Urquhart took great care to depict modern heroes when writing the biographies of Hammarskjöld and Bunche. Having exclusive access to sources held by the respective families,⁴⁸ Urquhart had an excellent opportunity to fashion a distinguished picture of both. These biographies therefore represent an outstanding source for understanding not so much who Hammarskjöld and Bunche were (although both biographies are marvelously documented, researched, and annotated), but how Urquhart thought they should be remembered.

Neither of the two was able to write their autobiography, contrary to the dominant culture of the UN, where almost every major figure in the Secretariat has written their memoirs. For Hammarskjöld and Bunche, Urquhart took over the responsibility of satisfying the urge to bear witness to the work and lives of these international civil servants. His biographies are also excellent indicators of just how much key figures in the UN were embedded in *Bürgerlichkeit*. Given the strong impulse to give written testimony of the times in which the subjects lived, the narcissistic interest in biography and autobiography is a significant marker of liberal, individualized cultures. The individual understands himself or herself as an active agent of the world around them, whose testimony is of importance for the world. The autobiography is not only a way to

stage one's own self, but also to make sense of the often conflicting social spheres in which the individual is embedded, and which make the quest for authenticity so difficult.

Here, autobiographies (or biographies in the case of Hammarskjöld and Bunche) allow the resolution of the often unsettling contradictions created by the practice of peacebuilding and the lofty ideals behind it. Beyond bearing witness to "what actually happened," autobiographies and biographies allow the author to celebrate his or her own contribution to the events, as well as the contributions of his or her education, insight, wisdom, and deeper understanding—or lack of empathy and understanding for what is seen as wrongheaded and erroneous politics, accusations, or interpretations. History is no longer merely what is happening; instead, the desire of peacebuilders to bear witness to the history they lived means that they seek to present their subjectivity as crucial to the event itself. The reinterpreted, reread, and retold narrative is the expression of the peacebuilders' quest for an authentic account of peace; it is, literally, the authoring of the meaning of peace.⁴⁹ Autobiographies and memoirs particularly flourish in contentious cases, such as the Congo mission⁵⁰ or the failure of the UN in Rwanda, which have led to particularly intense soul searching.⁵¹

Urquhart's authoring of Hammarskjöld's and Bunche's biographies as well as his own autobiography is therefore the most valuable source of stylization: of how the ideal peacebuilder should be. In his autobiography, Urquhart emphasizes particularly his and his family's capacity to live up to adversity. His father abandoned the family when he and his brother were very young, leaving his mother alone to earn a living. Through family ties his mother became a teacher at a public school. Through scholarships, and hard work to gain these, Urquhart was able to go to one of England's most prestigious public schools (which are in fact private schools) and Oxford University.

In his books, Urquhart is never averse to discussing the qualifications of his colleagues and interlocutors. As he was himself the product of an English public school education, so many of the values associated with this education are also those he appreciated in others: intelligence, steadfastness, conscientiousness, determination, calmness, humor, pragmatism, realism, courage. The idea of leadership that transpires from Urquhart's characterizations is of a person who does not want to take credit for himself, who is independent in thought and action, and who is prepared to take risks and be brave in the face of antagonistic reactions. These positive values are contrasted with far less flattering attri-

butes of incapable leaders and international villains: cleverness, inconsistency, negligence, lack of vision, excitement, lack of humor, rigidity, fanaticism, and opportunism. The highest compliments Urquhart makes in his descriptions are of individual independence and integrity. In his biography of Hammarskjöld in particular, Urquhart draws the image of a solitary warrior of peace braving a hostile world—an image that contrasts strikingly with Conor Cruise O’Brien’s characterization of Hammarskjöld as a “Machiavelli of Peace.”⁵²

The ideal peacebuilder corresponds perfectly with the ideal image of the liberal gentleman drawn by Enlightenment philosophers of the eighteenth century, and then particularly represented in nineteenth-century paintings of gentlemen surveying, measuring, and watching the world, such as in Caspar David Friedrich’s *Wanderer above the Sea of Fog*. This is the reasoning, rational, upright, Enlightenment individual braving the world. This ideal type has become a benchmark against which peacebuilder’s actual habitus is measured and valued. Marrack Goulding, another British public school pupil, and successor to Urquhart as undersecretary for special political affairs (and later for peacekeeping after the creation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations), described Urquhart using exactly such terms:

Urquhart’s courage, intelligence and political street-wisdom had made him a model international civil servant, committed to the multilateral ideal, but realistic, and often very funny.⁵³

Again, a generation later, Samantha Power would deliver a flattering and heroic biography of Sergio Vieira de Mello, the head of the UN mission in Iraq, who was killed in a suicide bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in 2004. Power described de Mello as a highly committed, egalitarian thinking, freedom fighting, and intellectually high-flying individual who preferred action to theory and pragmatism to idealism.⁵⁴

Kofi Annan: The Gentleman and Entrepreneur of Peace

Civility and autonomy are also words of praise spoken about Annan. Similar to Hammarskjöld, Annan is from a patrician family background. Not only were both his parents from noble families, but his father, a converted Christian, was director of a subsidiary of a Unilever company

and commissioner of the Ashanti region.⁵⁵ Well off, well educated (in the Gold Coast's most prestigious boarding school), an Anglophone, and, of course, a Christian, Annan also demonstrates the typical level of overqualification of UN men originating from the (former) colonies. This imbalance between the colonial elites and the West is, obviously one would like to add, not discussed in any of the autobiographical or biographical sketches of his life. Annan masterfully creates the image of self that he wants to present to the public eye. He controls the legend building around his personality by carefully selecting the handful of anecdotes and stories that he and his entourage tell about his life. Hence, the narrative about his family is intended to tell the story that it was his father's origins that sowed the seeds for his later leadership of the UN. It is not a story of colonialism, of native elites in a colonial system, or of imperial roots laid down in the current international system. The story Annan wants to convey is a judiciously calibrated narrative about a gentleman peacebuilder. Anecdotes about his father, their father-son relationship, Ghana's independence, and other matters, such as his arrival as an African scholarship student in 1960s Minnesota, have been carefully crafted, and are retold, often word by word, by Annan, his wife, his collaborators, and his biographers in various settings (books, articles, interviews, lectures, and so forth).⁵⁶

His autobiography, *Intervention: A Life in War and Peace*, published in 2012, is a collection of these well-rehearsed anecdotes. In an impressive example of first-tier enmeshment of the economic and the peacebuilding fields, the book is coauthored by his former UN collaborator and now consultant in "geopolitical risk," "macro intelligence," and "investment strategy" for corporate finance and business, Nader Mousavizadeh; Annan sits on the Mousavizadeh's company's advisory board, among others, like the former British foreign minister and current CEO of the International Rescue Committee, David Miliband, or the former CEO of Shell Asia.⁵⁷ Each of these autobiographical anecdotes has the aim of conveying the image of a modest, empathetic, cosmopolitan, independent, calm, and thoughtful person whose position as Secretary-General was thrust upon him (rather than sought).⁵⁸

Annan tried with all his might to step into Hammarskjöld's footprints. He frequently quotes Hammarskjöld; he revived the tradition of reports by intensifying the pace of their publication; he solicited external expert advice in order to legitimize and extend the lineage of peacebuilding from Hammarskjöld to his own time; and, like Hammarskjöld, he surrounded himself with a close-knit, cabinet-type circle of inner staff who

were and remain entirely devoted to him. He also sought out opportunities to claim the inheritance of Hammarskjöld. For instance, he instigated and supported a large conference devoted to Hammarskjöld in honor of the hundredth anniversary of his birth, “The Adventure of Peace.” The conference was, like similar events, an excellent occasion of self-referencing in peacebuilding, with close aides of Annan (Shashi Tharoor, Jan Eliasson, Jean-Marie Guéhenno) contributing various chapters.⁵⁹ Forewords and contributions to books about Hammarskjöld, as well as frequent references to his works and writings, mark out Annan as an expert in Hammarskjöldian thought.

Yet Annan also renewed the image of the Secretary-General. The novelty of Annan’s image, distinguishing him from Waldheim, Pérez de Cuellar, and Boutros-Ghali, was that he, the career UN cadre, managed to fashion himself as an entrepreneur of peace. In an ever more competitive field, Annan overhauled Hammarskjöld’s argument that world peace can be administered only by the UN. Hammarskjöld argued that the UN was in between states, and therefore best placed to make sure that world peace was not breached; Annan undertook a seemingly endless series of initiatives, reports, conferences, commissions, and so forth to defend the UN’s centrality in a much more complex peacebuilding field, where other international agencies, NGOs, churches, security companies, corporate actors, and, last but certainly not least, armed groups, competed with the UN over the authority to determine what peace is and how it is to be achieved.

Any aspect of contemporary armed conflict constituted an opportunity for Annan to bring in the UN: as a forum of experts, as lawmaker, or as fundraiser for action. The reviews of the Rwanda and Srebrenica dramas were launching points for a discussion on the need for the UN to act, and to be accordingly equipped by member states. The wars in the former Yugoslavia led to the instauration of the international criminal court, and conveniently shoved a big chunk of uncharted legal territory the UN’s way, at the same time discarding political debates about statehood, rebellion, and government authority. The wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone made Annan take the topics of child soldiering and resource looting (blood diamonds) to the Security Council, wresting the latter issue out of the hands of the World Bank, thereby widening the scope of people who would be, by force of a UN Security Council resolution, under the protection of the UN. He also reached out to the business sector with his Global Compact, and increasingly involved the UN in climate change discussions under the rubric of peacebuilding. He eagerly

soaked up any debate about peace and war within and outside the UN, with the aim of converting the scholarly or political debate into symbolic capital for the UN in order to justify its continued central role in peacebuilding.⁶⁰ Hence, the debates over state failure in the 1990s, over democratization and peace, and about international criminal responsibility, for instance, were skillfully merged into a debate over sovereignty, which his friend and then foreign minister of Canada, Lloyd Axworthy, proposed to lead, and which ultimately culminated in the responsibility to protect doctrine and its influence on the 2005 World Summit Declaration.⁶¹ And, when push came to shove in the oil-for-food scandal in Iraq, Annan engaged Mark Malloch Brown, who had been before joining UNDP the lead partner of the political PR company Sawyer Miller, to refashion his and the UN's public image.⁶²

In the process, Annan displayed all the qualities an entrepreneur is supposed to show if classical entrepreneurial theory is to be believed: alertness to new opportunities and to market openings, zeal in exploiting such opportunities and maximizing gain from them, thinking up and realizing new coalitions and alliances to further goals, and the capability to steer and guide these new initiatives and processes to one's own advantage.⁶³ What is more, all these initiatives were typical examples of projects that have become popular as new management tools. For each initiative, Annan would put together a new and different team (although recycling old hands from time to time, as discussed in chapter 4). The teams would flesh out a report with recommendations, which were, in turn, outsourced to other nonstate actors (NGOs, ad-hoc alliances, think tanks, business corporations, and so forth) to be realized. The UN Secretariat would, in some cases, keep a coordinating role, yet most often in cooperation with a think tank or other international agency. The emphasis was on quickly and flexibly producing UN recommendations on topics that were in the public eye, from poverty to terrorism, to state failure, democracy, child soldiering, and blood diamonds; although the term "sustainability" was commonly associated with these initiatives, not all of these initiatives survived the times very well.

The entrepreneurial nature of Annan's time as Secretary-General reflects well the neoliberalization of peacebuilding, where private corporations, civil society organizations, private individuals, and a host of other nonstate actors have taken over functions, activities, and also the legitimacy of states and state actors. Tacitly, the role of the Secretary-General has shifted from following a spiritual calling to becoming a resourceful trader of peace ideas; just as, for many liberal professions, neoliberalism

has introduced a shift from an expert fulfilling his professional duty to individuals who have to market and sell themselves as problem solvers and project managers.⁶⁴

The Paradox of Professionalism

Chapters 3 and 4 have already shown that the peacebuilders' career paths follow the pattern of neoliberal market economies, with a high fragmentation and what could be called the projectization of their work lives. The increased precarity of the workplace—or what is called in neoliberal jargon the flexibilization of the workplace—places high demands on individuals because uncertainty over future employment affects all aspects of people's lives: their family relations, their financial situation, their further education and training, their place of living, and so forth.

In peacebuilding, as in humanitarian assistance or development, much of this uncertainty is wittingly accepted by newcomers to the field. In fact, it is the apparent cosmopolitanism of the workplace that makes peacebuilding attractive in the first place. Just as the liberal core values of peacebuilding have not changed from Hammarskjöld to Annan, despite its repackaging and different appearance, today's peacebuilders continue to value the core ideas of middle-class sensibilities. They perceive themselves as a cosmopolitan, merit-based, and philanthropic elite realizing the core values of liberalism—autonomy, individual freedom, human dignity—in their work and lives. The necessity to reinvent themselves, to find new contracts and projects, is seen as a challenge and, actually, as a constitutive part of their professional identity. Peacebuilders are truly liberal individuals who understand their work as part of their personal self-fulfillment. They are, so to say, a happy precariat who perceive their fragmented work lives as personal development and opportunities, and not as a misery resulting from the capitalist reordering of the world.

The image of the ideal peacebuilder is, in this respect, the image of an optimist, believing in the perfectibility of mankind and, as a central condition of that perfectibility, in individual freedom to make one's life better. All respondents to the 2008 and 2012 surveys placed individual liberty as their most important political value. All of those surveyed, furthermore, agreed on a core set of values (apart from individual liberty), including ideas such as tolerance, fairness, and solidarity. Yet important distinctions exist from other values with which "individual liberty" is

combined. The answers to the question as to which additional values should be part of a “good” political canon clustered into four groups (see figure 10), ranging from a libertarian cluster that emphasizes individuality and competition to a conservative cluster of values with family and patriotism at its core. The libertarian and conservative profiles are represented to a lesser degree than the classical liberal and cosmopolitan profiles, yet their presence is still important. These political differentiations give weight to the attitudes and opinions peacebuilders have about politics, the causes of wars, and the solutions to conflicts in the countries in which they intervene. These differentiations will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. Here, it is noteworthy that such differentiations exist, yet there is no radical departure from the liberal canon of individual liberty, human dignity, and fairness.

This core canon is the basis for peacebuilders’ own perception of their work and ethics. It helps create a self-legitimizing image of peacebuilding that gives consistency and coherence to a work life and professional field that, in fact, contains enormous ambiguities. In their individual careers, peacebuilders have to deal with a large variety of ruptures and reconstructions; as a social class, their professional existence hinges particularly on states, yet peacebuilding needs to be distinguished from state politics in order to be ethically credible and for the peacebuilders to be truly professional. The peacebuilders’ struggle for consistency is best expressed as a striving to professionalize, ideally and practically, what they are doing.

In their own perception, an essential part of the peacebuilders’ professional and personal identity is the philanthropic impetus behind their work. Peacebuilders insist that they are doing something meaningful—a conviction strongly conveyed by the exemplary figures noted above, who were ready to discuss technicalities, problems of administration, or the management of peacebuilding, but who would never have questioned (and still don’t question) the usefulness of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is building peace—maybe not enough, or not well enough, but nevertheless, the legitimacy of interventionism *per se* is never questioned.

As the *raison d’être* of the UN is the preservation of world peace, the international civil servant is, by definition, doing good when she is doing her job right, whether this involves state power or not, or whether the person is close to any state or not. And the converse is true: he is doing well by being good. This image has produced a particular discourse about professional ethics: a good international civil servant, a good peace entrepreneur, and a good peacebuilder strives to get the




Fig. 10. Political values clustered into four profiles

job done. Thus, the descriptions Urquhart, Power, and others give of an ideal peacebuilder focus on the specific understanding of peacebuilders as professionals. And in their own self-descriptions, peacebuilders distance themselves markedly from “bureaucrats”—from UN bureaucrats, if peacebuilders are not working for the UN, or from national civil service bureaucrats and diplomats if they are working for the UN. Hence, Power, for instance, describes in many places in her biography of Vieira de Mello just how much he hated the paperwork at the UN. Others, like Goulding, Urquhart, or staff interviewed in the United Nations Oral History Project, frequently relate anecdotes of how they subverted the established, complicated, and highly formalized procedures of their organizations.⁶⁵

What peacebuilding yet lacks, if it is to count fully as a profession in the business world sense, is the associated organizational, jurisdictional, and regulatory free space. It is, rather, a profession in the continuous

process of being made. The UN-centeredness of peacebuilding does resemble an informal regulatory authority, but although the UN has enormous ideational power, it has little legal canonical power. Projects like the “Horizon” Project⁶⁶ or the the Report “The Challenge of Sustaining Peace” of the Review of Peacekeeping⁶⁷ have been intended to establish a commonly shared canon of professionalism, similar to other code-of-conduct projects in the humanitarian field (e.g., the Sphere project)⁶⁸ or the international business field (e.g., the Global Compact).⁶⁹ Yet, to date, no enforcement processes exist; there is no formal accreditation process; there are not even institutions or legal rules that would allow for the raising of disputable cases and incidents of lack of professionalism, for example, in cases of human rights abuses by peacekeepers.⁷⁰ There is not one set of easily identifiable professional skills or knowledge that makes up the profession of peacebuilding. Other than classical liberal professions such as law or medicine, there is not even a single clearly designated object of work.

The elusive nature of the notion of “professionalism” in peacebuilding, and its weak relation to specific skills, knowledge, or even standardized protocols, emphasizes how much the discourse of professionalism is part of self-description and self-identification. Individually, this represents the peacebuilders’ wish to stylize themselves as the holders of esoteric knowledge that not only distinguishes them from what would be called in neobusiness jargon their “clients,” but also justifies the specific career paths they are following. Collectively, the discourse of professionalism draws boundaries between different organizations as it allows hierarchization along lines of professional efficiency, whether or not this professionalism is anchored in real, measurable entities.

The discourse of professionalism becomes possible because those activities comprising peacebuilding do correspond to the major, central criteria that much of business studies or organizational studies would associate with liberal professions: namely, the assumption of self-directed work based on specific skills and knowledge that are usually acquired in years-long studies in universities and work on the job. And, even though the peacebuilding’s deontology is rough, mostly tacit, and unwritten, and not in any way linked to a professional association, a clear set of professional values is apparent in the practices of peacebuilding. As Willem Schinkel and Mirko Noordegraaf point out, professionalism requires a certain self-awareness of what the work is about and what constitutes “good work.”⁷¹ This awareness may be implicit, and only minimally officially regulated, or even not regulated at all;

what's crucial, however, is the self-referential discourse it allows to those who consider themselves working in this domain to define what they understand to be "good work." Improving the human condition requires expert knowledge and extreme diligence—hence, from an elite who can provide, in Urquhart's words, "intelligence and courage" and is hard working. The highly selective, self-referential, and close-knit network structure of the field effectively excludes not only critical voices from other professional fields (e.g., academic, policy making) and within the organization, but also from the countries and populations where peacebuilding takes place. Dissident voices are perceived as uninformed, parochial, self-interested, sometimes as silly, and, in the worst case, as violent "spoilers" of peace processes.⁷²

The discourse of professionalism serves therefore not only to give a sense and purpose to the peacebuilders' career and to the social field collectively, but also to exclude others, critics or otherwise, from the field. The notion of professionalism also implies a normative distinction from amateurism, to be understood as work that does not generate income *and* as work that is poorly done, without skills and knowledge.⁷³ The peacebuilders clearly want to distance themselves from amateurism, which is frequently associated with spontaneous volunteer and grassroots organizations that are considered all too often to go into countries without sufficient preparation or knowledge, and with at best naïve, and at worst harmful, agendas.⁷⁴

Professionalism further implies a notion of independence and autonomous decision making. Independence and autonomy are co-requisites of expert knowledge. However, peacebuilders as a group typically do not hold a common canon of expert knowledge, unlike engineers, for instance, or other chartered professions or professions with minimum qualification standards. In order to be considered highly professional, the peacebuilder would rather make the argument that she or he brings in expert knowledge in one specific area (e.g., security, logistics, communication, law). Like other professionals, peacebuilders perceive themselves as not just working, but she or he "has to be educated and trained, [socialized] as [a] member of an occupational domain, supervised by his/her peers and held accountable."⁷⁵ Most important, the skills and knowledge associated with peacebuilding are specialized, acquired through extensive training and experience and not commonly available; in short, "esoteric knowledge."

In a catchy yet rather undefined manner peacebuilding's professionalism was summarized in the title of OCHA's 2011 report on humanitar-

ian assistance, “To Stay and Deliver,” authored by the former director of OCHA, Jan Egeland, and the think tank Humanitarian Outcomes.⁷⁶ A sense of duty appears to be one of the most important traits of the peacebuilder’s professional culture. Urquhart particularly liked to underscore this value with anecdotes about himself or others fulfilling their mission under the most difficult circumstances. The absence of a phone and any kind of catering in the Congo; the risks incurred during travel or on the ground; the frequent mention of long working hours, foregone weekends, and lack of holidays; the phone calls in the middle of the night and the work meetings before sunrise . . . all these anecdotes stress the 24/7 attitude, the unquestioned availability of the peacebuilder to the organization, and the unconditional willingness to fulfill the task.⁷⁷

“Stay and deliver” implies other work-related yet personal skills: stress resilience and the unpretentious acceptance of difficulties in work in order to overcome those difficulties. “Stress” and “challenge” are expressions that return frequently in interviews. Interviewees recurrently used expressions such as “you need to be able to get on with it,” “deal with it,” “it was my job so I just did it,” “it’s hard work but that’s what it needs,” “that’s the job,” and similar. They also tended to emphasize stress resilience and a sense of duty as crucial for taking the job in the first place, and for further career advancement. People who left the organization are commonly seen as having been unable to work under the harsh conditions of peacebuilding.

In the survey of 2012, which explicitly asked how challenging the peacebuilders thought their job was, about 65 percent of the respondents replied that their job was extremely or very challenging.⁷⁸ Correspondingly, about 60 percent indicated that they felt often or quite often stressed at work.⁷⁹ The survey also presented the blog post of an aid worker from a conflict zone reporting a verbal skirmish with local youth, whom the aid worker perceived as aggressive and ungrateful. The survey asked the respondents to say what they would tell the aid worker. Only a few respondents showed outright sympathy with the blogger. The large majority saw the aid worker’s behavior as a reaction induced by stress, indicating that the aid worker’s burnout was the likely cause for the skirmish, but nevertheless thought that his reaction to the youngsters’ provocation was unprofessional. An important number drew the conclusion that the blogger should “get another job,” hence showing that such a stress reaction was considered inappropriate and indicative of the person’s unsuitability for the job.⁸⁰

Stress resilience is also considered an indicator of belonging to an efficient and successful organization. The way stress resilience is understood has, however, changed over time. While the first generation of peacebuilders largely sought to justify high levels of stress as being simply part of their duty (and sometimes with military parallels), in the vein of the 1960s “organization man,”⁸¹ many contemporary peacebuilders have interiorized and individualized the requirement for stress resilience. Being able to cope is now a personal characteristic that needs to be nurtured and cultured individually. Just as being a peacebuilder is deemed a personal calling and a step toward self-fulfillment, experiencing stress or even breakdown is considered a personal failure.

Unsurprisingly, stress and burnout remain extremely sensitive topics. Interviewees commonly referred to other people being stressed or showing signs of burnout, and particularly having family or health problems associated with stress, but denied that they suffered the same. Blogs also talk about the effects of stress, but usually in ironic ways, for example by making fun of expats’ drinking habits,⁸² but rarely give a subjective account of what it means to work fourteen to sixteen hours a day, or to hold two or three jobs at a time in one mission. In this respect, peacebuilding shows again its isomorphism to related fields, like the academic field or the field of business corporation management, where the interiorization of self-exploitative models of work are equally widespread.⁸³

With respect to the business world, peacebuilders particularly draw attention to the nonprofit nature of their work. This is emphasized on a personal level as well as on the level of the collective image peacebuilders want to give of themselves. In personal interviews, interviewees often insisted that they could have had much better paid jobs in the business world, but that they preferred to work for their respective organizations in order to do something “sensible.” The same story is told in the many interviews and autobiographical sketches, where peacebuilders argue that they had never been motivated by material gain.⁸⁴

The delineation from the business world remains, however, a difficult task, and not only because many peacebuilders do in fact end up working for corporate organizations. Against the background of the same neoliberal paradigm of self-marketing, much of what is seen as characteristic of a successful peacebuilder corresponds to well-known images of successful business leadership: vision, seizing opportunities, inventiveness and improvisation in difficult environments, self-preservation in pursuing goals, diplomacy, pragmatism, realism, intelligence, and cour-

age. The peace entrepreneur presents a much more attractive image of peacebuilding nowadays than the civil servant, as Annan's self-stylization shows. Hence, the peacebuilder's distinction from the business world is first and foremost a discursive one, not one of practice.

The main value that distinguishes peacebuilding discursively from other occupations is its representation as a form of selfless commitment; peacebuilders particularly emphasize the nonprofit character of their hard work. This, however, moves them fairly close to the world of NGOs and charity organizations from whose amateurism peacebuilders also seek to be distinguished, leading to the simultaneous but somewhat paradoxical emphasis on procedures, hard work, and channels of accountability (report writing, meetings, feedback to headquarters) that assure the quality of delivery.

The peacebuilders' insistence on professionalism ultimately draws another thin line between the image of the *international* professional and the *national* civil servant and national bureaucrat, a line that is, again, often nonexistent in the reality of many peacebuilders' careers. The discourse of professionalism implies independence. As holders of esoteric knowledge, and as experts in their fields, real professionals act according to their own independent analysis of a situation, and devise a course of action that only they or their peers can evaluate and judge. Being a professional means, by definition, being independent and "neutral," in the sense of being solely committed to solving a problem and not being beholden to any vested interests that might have contributed to the problem in the first place.

In the view of many interviewees, survey respondents, and in the views articulated in published materials, a peacebuilder is *not* a diplomat in national service; his (most often not her) job is to defend the interests of humanity and peace. In personal interviews, every interviewee emphasized how much his or her international service had distinguished her or him from their fellow countrypeople, how little they felt committed to their own country's foreign policy, and how much they were pleased to work in a multilateral, international, and national-interest-free environment. In a world where most peacekeeping and peacebuilding takes place in intrastate wars, the continued insistence on Hammarskjöld's ideal of the international civil servant standing above national interests certainly appears as a relic of the past. Yet the insistence on neutrality continues to have an important function as a discourse of distance from national administrations and administrators.

Conclusion

The habitus of peacebuilders is articulated in behaviors, values, and practices that are profoundly marked by middle-class sensibilities. These have changed over time in accordance with the changes of the global capitalist system and most notably the flexibilization of the workplace. While early peacebuilders like Bunche or Urquhart saw their professional career in the terms of Hammarskjöld's image of the international civil servant, later peacebuilders like Annan understand themselves rather as entrepreneurs of peace. As professional careers have become more and more fragmented and precarious, peacebuilders have, like other liberal professions, embraced these changes as opportunities for self-fulfillment. These adaptations have allowed peacebuilders to preserve their core values and self-images such as their belief in careers built on merit and professional efficiency. The frequent job changes, the short-termism and projectism of peacebuilding, its high mobility and volatility, hence, have been normalized in the ways people in the field act out their professional careers. The field-specific values of professionalism, for instance, the expectation of stress resilience, have been largely internalized and are perpetuated in the professional practices of the field. It is not surprising then that in their political worldviews and discourses peacebuilders emphasize exactly such middle-class values as autonomy, leadership, efficiency, and accountability. The next chapter will delve deeper into those values.