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## The Distinction of Peace

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
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## CHAPTER 4

# Boundaries of the Field


### *The Peacebuilder, the Businessman, and the Scholar-Expert*



The boundaries of a social field are fuzzy and ill-defined, as they overlap with other fields. Fields are analytical categories. What makes a field is the common focus of actors that drives their direct or indirect interaction, whether in comparative, assimilative, isomorphic, or competitive form. Chapter 2 defined peacebuilding in terms of world-political bargaining and the resources world-political actors put to work in order to define a range of activities the UN and other organizations and actors can undertake to pursue a goal called “peace”; yet the question of what is to be called peace is subject of debate and contestation. Chapter 3 defined the peacebuilding field in terms of the social commonalities of the people working and practicing in the field. This chapter will look at peacebuilding from the perspective of professional overlaps between those who, by their practice and discourse, have the job of building peace, and those same people who pursue professional careers in fields that do not primarily focus on peacebuilding.

These overlaps constitute the professional and, to some extent, social and political boundaries of the peacebuilding field. Boundaries are determined relationally and comparatively by overlapping gray zones between different social fields. Whether people or activities belong to one social field, and not to another, or whether they belong partly to

**Total count of contracts before and after UN mission  
(*N* = 1573, multiple counts possible)**



**Fig. 4. Other employment of civilian peacebuilding staff**

this one or to another one, can be stated only in relative, not in absolute, terms; the distance to the core and the comparison to other fields is decisive. This is most obvious in military peacebuilding, where members of national armies move in or out of their national security apparatus into peacebuilding activities for determined times; however, it is also obvious from other “expertise” required of the peacebuilders. As this book focuses on civilian peacebuilding, the military field will not be further analyzed. Five other adjacent fields, however, are of central importance for delimiting this field, as the preceding chapter has already indicated: the field of international organizations; the field of governmental politics; the field of NGO activities; the field of business corporations; and the field of scholarly research, expert advice, and think-tank consultancies. These five are the main recruitment pools for peacebuilding, and they are also the areas in which peacebuilders continue to pursue their professional careers, as figure 4 shows.

The common ground where these adjacent fields overlap are the requirements of a university education and a professional focus on self-directed work based on skills such as report writing, project management, presentation, and communication skills. The particular overlaps of these fields emerge out of the network structures of the peacebuilding field. Through its specific institutional emphasis on an education in top Western universities, peacebuilding recruits from the same pool as the business world, civil services, and many political circles. Additionally, its discursive and normative insertion in world politics, notably in human

rights, humanitarianism, development, and security discourses, pushes the peacebuilding field into close vicinity with think tanks, government, and nongovernmental sectors.

Peacebuilding is a constantly and highly disputed activity. It produces a continuous flow of verbal justifications and discontents that are expressed in the endless flow of reports, evaluations, memoranda, and other type of publications that assess, evaluate, legitimize, criticize, or discuss what peacebuilders are doing, how they are doing it, and with what degree of success or failure. The professional skills necessary to produce and consume this mass of writing and talking comprise the specific educational capital that peacebuilders gain in their education and polish in their work in the field or at the headquarters of their respective organizations. It is also a kind of capital that can be converted into a rather limited number of other occupations. This chapter will first discuss the common ground of peacebuilding and other such occupations. It will then take a closer look at the five overlapping fields of international organizations, governmental politics, NGO activities, business corporations, and academia. The distinctions between the peacebuilding field and these other fields, and between these fields themselves, are vague precisely because the resources necessary to sustain a career in one field can be translated into a career in another field. On the other hand, these other fields also reach out further than peacebuilding, for example, because their professional rules and methods are applied to areas other than peacebuilding, or because that part of the field that overlaps with peacebuilding is a particular spin-off of the larger field, and its compatibility with peacebuilding is due to the isomorphism of the fields. As will be discussed further below, the gray zone between the business field and peacebuilding is a case in point. Organizations and institutions in the peacebuilding field have increasingly embraced business-like models of organization and ideas of efficiency, whereas, at the same time, business corporations have gradually adopted the decentralized decision-making structures and subsidiary team-managed projectism of the NGO world.

Boundaries between the fields cannot be nailed down precisely and definitively. They are moving targets with multiple overlays; the question whether one activity, organization, or person belongs to one field or another can be answered only from a given point of view, as all interconnections are relational. In this chapter the standpoint remains the UN-organized peacebuilding field. Other fields are identified and described by their relation to UN peacebuilding.

*Common Ground: Distinguished University Education*

Recruitment selection criteria at the UN and other organizations do not explicitly require a degree from a top university; neither do all these institutions offer specialized courses in an area of peacebuilding. Rather, peacebuilders graduate in general courses such as political science, international relations, or law. The heavy weight carried by the leading universities mentioned in the preceding chapter has to be explained instead by their reputation, and therefore correlates with their ranking in university league tables. This confirms findings from other institutional contexts in which clear hierarchies of educational institutions inform recruiters' choices.<sup>1</sup> The likelihood is higher that recruiters will refer to the university's overall reputation rather than to the candidate's qualities, as recruitment to many of the positions in peacebuilding is highly competitive and long-distance, which makes it necessary to preselect on paper or on an online basis before candidates can be invited for interviews or assessment talks.

The qualities looked for in candidates to positions in peacebuilding (and in international agencies more generally) are seldom technically circumscribed. Particularly in the field of peacebuilding, the professional profile is very loose and based on soft skill descriptors. The generic job profile of the UN entry level (P2) for officers in political affairs or peacekeeping, for instance, is largely articulated around soft skills such as researching, analyzing, and presenting information on countries in conflict (both in oral and written form), being a good team worker, taking responsibility for projects, staying abreast of technological developments, and being a good planner and organizer. The language with which these skills are described is the generic management jargon, hailing efficiency, autonomy, teamwork, strategic vision, communication skills, and client orientation. In terms of organization and planning, for instance, one job description tells us that a successful candidate will be someone who

develops clear goals that are consistent with agreed strategies; identifies priority activities and assignments; adjusts priorities as required; allocates appropriate amount of time and resources for completing work; forsees risks and allows for contingencies when planning; monitors and adjusts plans and actions as necessary; uses time efficiently.<sup>2</sup>

None of this requires either specific technical training or knowledge that could be assessed by practical means. Nothing allows a recruiter to assess a candidate's soft skills of researching, synthesizing, writing and communicating knowledge, conducting analysis, and gathering information without testing these capabilities directly—a major problem if organizations like the UN receive several thousand applications every week. Yet it is mainly in social science degrees that such soft skills are taught. Social science skills need to be assessed differently than skills in the technical professions, where the use of technologies is commonly associated with much more formalized and often quantitative forms of reasoning and documentation. Consequently, in STEM (science, technology, engineering, mathematics) subjects the graduate's capability in using specific techniques, procedures, methods, or materials can be more easily monitored externally by future employers through tests and exams; hence, uncertainty over recruitment is reduced and it is less necessary to refer to the university's preselection function in the recruitment process (although the university's or college's reputation also plays a major role in the assessment of how well technologies and techniques are taught).

In jobs that mainly require soft skills, however, university rankings and league tables function as preselection grids, the reflection being that “if this candidate can write essays that achieve an ‘A’ at LSE, then this candidate is certainly capable of fulfilling our criteria.” The highly competitive nature of admission to elite institutions is taken as a gauge of the candidate's qualities, and allows, in the context of a highly diverse, decentralized, dispersed, and distant recruitment process, one common factor to be set as decisively selective. It is the university's reputation that reduces uncertainty over the potential peacebuilder's qualifications; hence, it is the single most important career entrance factor. This shows the full extent of the importance of the quality of educational capital. A university degree is a minimum requirement; obtaining a job, however, requires a *distinguished* education, and this is granted by the name of a prestigious institution.

Another way of overcoming the uncertainty of recruiting on the basis of soft skills is through personal networks and references. Here, too, the alma mater of the peacebuilders is important as a pool for making essential contacts at the UN, the OSCE, international agencies, and NGOs. It is no coincidence that half of the top universities mentioned above are located in those global cities that are central to the international agency circuit (New York, London, Geneva). Peacebuilders often return to their educational institutions to teach peacebuilding, conflict reso-

lution, development, and other aspects of UN work. Students of these institutions thus also have significantly more access to talks, seminars, workshops, and other types of interaction with high-ranking UN or international agency officials.

This informal entry into the peacebuilding field is particularly important given the circumstances that peacebuilding is a very loosely codified and regulated beginner labor market. As the field has no clear, standardized professional boundaries, and as it is populated by a large variety of organizations, there are no standardized entry procedures, like the entrance exams to many national diplomatic services or the general UN entrance exam. In fact, the vast large majority of the peacebuilders analyzed in the prosopographic sample ( $N = 557$ ) started their careers on short-term contracts, either in field missions, as UN or other volunteers (e.g., Peace Corps), as electoral observers, or as interns at headquarters. Typically, a peacebuilder will spend the first couple of years on short-term contracts of one to eighteen months on various missions around the world before obtaining a long-term or even permanent contract with one organization. This accumulation of fixed-term positions, and the hopping from mission to mission, from project to project, is probably the furthest one can get from the old civil service ideal of a permanent job from graduation to retirement.

On average, the peacebuilders of the prosopographic sample have held seven jobs in their careers; over a third have switched jobs at least five times but fewer than ten times. An impressive 19 percent have switched jobs more than ten times, and another 3 percent have switched jobs more than fifteen times. However, the data also show that contract duration is of very unequal length. Most switches happen at the beginning of the career and at the end, usually when people take up electoral observation or similar missions after retirement from their regular job; this is especially the case for personnel working in security sector reform, as these are former military or law enforcement officers who have retired early from their regular security force jobs. Figure 5 shows a simple “Fragmentation Index,” which represents the ratio of the average duration of one contract to the total length of the work life of the analyzed staff ( $N = 530$ , excluding the missing). The index shows that the one-job-for-life career is very rare in peacebuilding. Careers are instead fragmented by frequent changes of contract and by relatively short contracts (compared to the overall length of a person’s work life).

Some organizations, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, have, in fact, institutionalized this short-termism.




Fig. 5. Fragmentation of peacebuilders' work lives

The maximum duration of one OSCE contract is two years in a field mission and three years in the Secretariat in Vienna or the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw. The maximum duration someone can work for the OSCE overall is ten years; afterwards, those peacebuilders move on to other agencies and organizations or out of the field. Some continue as self-employed consultants on OSCE projects, but the majority tries to get hold of a permanent contract in another organization. As a consequence, many peacebuilders go back and forth between a number of organizations. There is no regular pattern, but rather a number of trajectories that pass through a core of the most popular organizations, such as the UN and its family organizations (UNDP, UNHCR, and so forth), the OSCE, and a succession of NGOs. Some start their career in national civil services, for example, a national development agency, which leads them to an international organization, and from there back to a regional organization. Others start with international organization work and then go back to national civil services. Others will alternate missions for the UN or the OSCE with work in NGOs. Only for those who obtain a permanent contract at the UN or with a regional organization such as the European Union Commission does the career pattern stabilize; even then, people will frequently change jobs within the organization, either by alternating services within the organization or by switching from field missions to headquarters and back. The UN remains at the center of peacebuilding, for it is the organization that serves as the umbrella for all international agencies that make up a mission; it is also one of the rare organizations to offer long-

term or permanent contracts in this area. Unsurprisingly, after a number of contracts people typically either remain at the UN or move out of the field entirely.

Figures 6 and 7 show the entry and exit of staff into field missions (based on 557 *curricula vitae*). The results clearly show that for many of these people field missions are only a temporary job—this is partly due to the nature of field missions, which are designed for the short term, but it is also characteristic of the project-centeredness of careers. The short-term character of the missions, their urgency, and their hardship locations are the most important factors that make such placements highly unattractive for people who already have a permanent job or a high-ranking (and better paid) role in an international organization; on the other hand, the comparatively high entrance salary and the promise of a future career in the peacebuilding field make field missions attractive as entry level positions.

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the inner core of the UN, rarely recruits anyone on a first UN contract. Rather, staff at the DPKO come through a career within the organization into their current positions. Yet a large number stay with the UN after the end of their initial contract, as figure 7 shows. They move on to other missions or into the headquarters, and from there through the departments. In the interviews, a small number said they had taken the national entrance exams after their field experience, yet a much larger number seem to be hanging on from short-term contract to short-term contract until the legal requirement for receiving a long-term contract is met.

The overlap with the national civil services and international organizations has already been partly discussed in the preceding chapter. The affinities between the fields and the manner in which “capital” can be converted from one field to another are rather obvious. Many international organizations, most notably the World Bank, UNDP, UNHCR, or the World Food Program, work in areas closely related to peacebuilding, namely in development, assistance to refugees, and emergency aid. Some of these organizations participate actively in the peacebuilding field by sending their own missions and setting up projects financed by their own funds; as mentioned in chapter 2, the UNHCR, for instance, was actually the lead agency in humanitarian and emergency relief during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. But even if they do not have their own mission on the ground, these organizations often sponsor activities of the UN or other organizations in the peacebuilding field.

Similarly, the trajectories between national civil services and the





Fig. 6. Where first UN mission contract staff have worked before

peacebuilding field are direct and straightforward. National civil servants are seconded to missions, particularly in areas of special expertise such as the security sector, the rule of law, or specific aspects of public administration. Or, they might participate in the decision-making processes of peacebuilding at the headquarters of international organizations. The upper tier of the peacebuilding field, in which senior officials rotate frequently between positions in the UN and national administrations or politics, has clearly shown the close networks that make up the peacebuilding field at this level.

### *The Nongovernmental Sector*

At the lower level of programs, or among lower-level project directors, however, national civil services are unlikely to be associated with peacebuilding missions; hence, they play a lesser role as recruitment pools. International organizations and nongovernmental organizations, on the other hand, are much more important. The presence of NGOs in

### Further employment of staff having worked in one UN mission




**Fig. 7. Sectors of further employment**

the peacebuilding sector is particularly remarkable. NGOs constitute a huge recruitment pool for UN or OSCE field missions, and many former OSCE or UN staff continue their career in NGOs. As figure 4 shows, NGOs comprise the second largest employer in the peacebuilding field after the UN.

Yet, at a closer look, the three-tier structure of the peacebuilding field (discussed in chapter 3) clearly fashions the relations between the peacebuilding field and the other fields; it does so particularly in the passageways between fields. Hence, there is little passage between the peacebuilding's top-tier senior official roles and NGOs—with a few notable exceptions, such as Jan Egeland, who became secretary-general of the Norwegian Refugee Council and deputy director of Human Rights Watch after having been under-secretary-general for humanitarian affairs and emergency relief coordinator at the United Nations. This is probably due to the much more politicized character of visible senior roles; filling these positions requires much more diplomatic haggling between states, and the token “neutrality” of national civil servants is a bargaining chip that NGO directors rarely have.

Such sensitivity does not apply to the same extent to second-tier positions, where so-called professional criteria come to the forefront. Professional criteria are not only the role-holder's capacity for analyzing com-

## Peacebuilders moving in and out of UN peace operations



**Fig. 8. Frequency of moving in and out of peace operations**

plex political and bureaucratic processes, but also, at later stages of their careers, as in director positions, their capacity to manage projects, and their practical knowledge of the funding and implementation conditions of specific postconflict regions.<sup>3</sup> At this level, individuals who have experience in implementing and managing projects in specific local contexts have opportunities to translate this experience into other jobs in the peacebuilding field.

The field of international NGOs is huge, and the peacebuilding field only intersects with the areas of humanitarian assistance, human rights, conflict resolution, and development. Yet, although this subsection of the international NGO field is large, with many thousands of NGOs working in different crisis spots around the world, the prosopographic analysis shows that only a significantly smaller number of NGOs are on the career trajectory of peacebuilders.

NGOs are essential actors in the peacebuilding field, where they fulfill a wide range of functions, from implementing donor projects to advocating for specific issue areas. The NGO field is in itself highly diversified: NGOs vary in their activities, their funding sources, their staff, their capacities, and their objectives. Conflict situations and postconflict environments lead to a mushrooming of NGOs, particularly if the crises are in the eye of public opinion and, consequently, highly funded. According to an evalu-

ation report by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) on NGOs in Kosovo, there were only eleven NGOs in Kosovo in January 1999, but over four hundred at the end of the year, six months after the highly mediatized NATO strikes against Serbia; and these were the NGOs that ICVA has counted.<sup>4</sup> There probably were many more that ICVA did not take account of. The diffuse proliferation of NGOs or their efficiency cannot be discussed here.<sup>5</sup> However, it is important to note that the NGO field has developed its own dynamics, which, in the field of peacebuilding, create multiple relations; substantial amounts of money and personnel flow between international agencies.

Despite the impression of great diffuseness and decentralization, the NGO field has a number of essential characteristics. Most notably, one can distinguish between ephemeral NGOs, created to respond to one specific crisis, and professionalized NGOs. The large majority of the more than four hundred NGOs ICVA counted in the Kosovo conflict at the end of 1999 probably do not exist anymore. The big players in the NGO sector have large staff numbers, professionalized executive boards, illustrious advisory councils, and a financial turnover of several million U.S. dollars per annum. They engage in activities in a large variety of settings, and in different areas of development or emergency aid, conflict prevention, or reconciliation. In many Western countries their acronyms are household names, and they manage to derive funding from a large, diversified set of resources (private donations, a large variety of public donors, international agencies, and so forth). The difference between professionalized and impermanent NGOs often, but not always, corresponds to the distinction between international and local NGOs, as the latter often stand and fall with specific projects. They have far fewer, less professionalized, and poorer paid staff, and have a high and therefore risky dependence on donors. They tend to vanish as soon as the funding caravan moves on or their projects are finished.<sup>6</sup>


NGOs can further be distinguished by the importance of their international activity. Some organizations are purpose-built to contribute to specific crises; for others, international peace activities constitute only a small part of their much broader platforms. Hence, faith-based organizations like Caritas Internationalis, for instance, define their activities within a broader framework of serving God in daily life, conversion, and community service. Organizations like workers' unions or politically inspired foundations see their practical projects in peacebuilding as contributions to wider goals of democratization, the strengthening of social forces, or support for other specific groups.

Furthermore, NGOs can be distinguished by the kind of staff they

employ in peacebuilding activities. Some NGOs, like the early Doctors without Borders, are largely volunteer-based, with a very small full-time employed staff or even none at all. Other NGOs have a large base in their home countries, maybe as third-sector organizations (e.g., the Red Cross or Red Crescent national societies), or as membership organizations (e.g., Greenpeace or Amnesty International), in which professionals and volunteers work together at many different levels. Again, other NGOs have strongly professionalized their international services (e.g., the water-and-sanitation portfolio of Oxfam), or even transformed part of their activities into for-profit businesses.

The specific position of each organization determines the relationships it will sustain with other actors in the peacebuilding field. These differences can be traced through prosopographic research. Looking into the details of NGO recruitment, it appears that about three hundred passages between the UN and NGOs effectively came from fewer than one hundred organizations, and of these considerably fewer were local and small NGOs; more than two-thirds of all NGOs were among the big players in the field like Oxfam, Save the Children, International Alert, or the International Bar Association.

Among all NGOs, a handful stood out for having provided and recruited UN staff more frequently than others. People working in these organizations are either more likely to apply for positions at the UN, or the UN recruiters consider these NGOs more trustworthy, or both. Most important, however, these people's experience corresponds with the UN missions' central activities. As figure 9 shows, most peacebuilders come from and find employment with humanitarian/development aid or human rights NGOs, which reflect the humanitarian and rule of law approach to peacebuilding prevalent today. Table 3 gives an overview of the most frequently cited NGOs. It is also noticeable that a small but steady number of peacebuilders have entered the fields of development aid, humanitarian assistance, or peacebuilding through volunteering in national services, for instance in the American Peace Corps, in the British Voluntary Service Overseas, or as UN volunteers. This hints at the precarious nature of work contracts in the NGO sector, which is structurally similar to the UN field mission sector. However, the strong presence of big, transnational, and multitask NGOs also indicates that longer-lasting careers in the peacebuilding field are contingent on big organizations. Even though the NGO field consists of many thousands of NGOs, only a very small number provide conditions that allow staff to develop their activities toward pursuing a long-



**Fig. 9.** Types of NGOs that employ peacebuilders

term professional career. It is noteworthy in particular that all these NGOs are Northern, in the sense that their headquarters are based in the global North; they are also largely Northern financed, often working with the largest donor institutions.

Just as the UN sector of the peacebuilding field is stratified into three tiers, there is a remarkable and noteworthy difference between executive staff in home-countries' headquarters and field staff as far as recruitment by NGOs is concerned. Those NGOs that have a strong basis in their home countries, for example, as third sector organizations such as the Red Cross or Caritas Internationalis, tend to have their own recruitment circuit for executive staff in home headquarters; executive staff tend to have come up to senior positions through the third sector route, for instance as managers of service institutions (e.g., hospitals, ambulance services, soup kitchens) or as technical experts (e.g., lawyers, accountants, human resources). The wider spread of the organization's activities and its broader agenda, of which peacebuilding is just one facet and probably not the most important one in terms of the organization's mis-

sion and survival, privilege other recruitment routes. Staff are neither recruited from the peacebuilding field nor the UN; nor are many staff recruited into the peacebuilding field and into the UN.

However, in such NGOs for which peacebuilding is a core activity, or, at least, a very important part of their portfolio, headquarters executives are very likely to have gained experience in a UN field mission or a peacebuilding institution (UN, UN agency, OSCE, or similar), or to have been associated with peacebuilding through UN or international-agency-funded projects. Staff from these organizations gain specific professional capital, which they can more easily translate into jobs in a UN (or, for that matter, OSCE or UNHCR or any other international agency) mission and vice versa; and they have built their professional networks in those missions and through projects across the NGO field. Staff from these organizations circulate mainly in the NGO circuit, and usually only serve short stints in UN field missions, or on specific projects, such as, for instance, the Millennium Development Goals campaign. This is particularly true for those projects that make a clear distinction between professional staff, who are usually based at the headquarters or in regional offices, and voluntary staff, whether they are active in the peacebuilding field or not. For example, all members of the 2014 executive team of CARE UK have worked for other NGOs before; the same is true for Save the Children and Oxfam.<sup>7</sup> NGO work has undoubtedly become a profession over the past decades, with chief executive director posts and

**Table 3. Most commonly mentioned NGOs by activity sector**

Humanitarian	Human rights	Law and justice	Religious	Conflict resolution and reconciliation
Save the Children	Human Rights Watch	Lawyers without Borders	World Vision	Search for Common Ground
Tearfund	Amnesty International	International Bar Association	Caritas Internationalis/ Catholic Rescue Service	Reconciliation Resources
CARE International <sup>a</sup>		Transparency International	Pax Christi	Outward Bound Peacebuilding
		International Centre for Transitional Justice		Saferworld International Alert

<sup>a</sup>As a coding decision CARE was counted as a humanitarian NGO. Even though CARE's foundation is in the Quaker movement, its primary objective is humanitarian assistance, and not service to the Christian community.

a range of management positions that mirror those in business corporations, for instance, finance and accounting, marketing, communications, or human resources, as well as organizational development directors. Hence, NGOs also offer further employment opportunities to staff in the third tier, where local administrative and technical support staff will move from one organization to another, and in and out of the UN or international agency missions.

Yet they rarely move definitively from a global South country to an OECD country. While so-called field cred is an important argument for career advancement for NGO workers from industrialized countries, being a local from a conflict country does not provide any advantages in the aid labor market.<sup>8</sup> Similar to the constitution of the UN sector in the peacebuilding field, it is a university degree that serves as a distinct career element. Executive positions in NGOs, particularly the larger ones, tend to be occupied by graduates of top universities (e.g., Columbia University, Oxford, Cambridge, the London School of Economics), just like directorial positions in the UN. A degree from an OECD university and bilingualism for nonnative English speakers are minimum criteria. Third-tier positions, on the other hand, go predominantly to graduates from universities located in the global South.

It is also through NGOs that the peacebuilding field overlaps with national development aid. It is common for NGO staff to move into national development agencies or vice versa. Most executive boards of larger organizations boast at least one former member of national development agencies (e.g., Department for International Development, Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, Danish International Development Agency). Some organizations have invited representatives of national development agencies onto their advisory boards. This interconnection has become deeper ever since many OECD governments have pushed for delegating state functions to private and so-called civil society actors.<sup>9</sup> The subsequently created networks allow for an intensified circulation of staff, projects and funding, and ideas and practices. Access to information and project planning is crucial for NGOs in a highly competitive funding environment; reassurance of the reliability of investments is, on the other hand, highly valuable for donors when distributing closely monitored public funds. Another effect of the increasing embedding of the voluntary sector in the professional and public sector is the further professionalization of and insider recruitment within the voluntary sector through ever more entrenched networks.<sup>10</sup>

The career of Nick Thomson epitomizes such a career: a graduate

of a Russell Group university<sup>11</sup> in the United Kingdom, he was recruited as chief executive officer into the humanitarian NGO Children's Aid Direct, yet had to manage the organization's bankruptcy. He spent the following years as an adviser on humanitarian and development aid in Brussels until he "received a call from a friend," asking him if he wanted to move to Freetown, Sierra Leone,<sup>12</sup> where he became first the program director and then CEO of the Africa Governance Initiative, a consultancy NGO that had been founded by former British prime minister Tony Blair. The friend who had called was Kate Gross, former private secretary of Tony Blair. She and Liz Lloyd, Blair's vice chief of staff and CEO of Chartered Bank in Tanzania, became, with Blair himself, official founders and CEOs of this organization, which aims at helping African governments to govern. Gross and Lloyd were part of a larger group of "Blair's babes": young, ambitious advisers at 10 Downing Street in the late phase of the last Labour government, and who included, among others, Labour's candidate for 2015, Ed Miliband; his brother David Miliband, the former foreign secretary and now CEO of the International Rescue Committee; and a couple of members of Ed's shadow cabinet.<sup>13</sup>

Phone calls from friends are common recruitment paths into startup organizations, missions, and projects. All interviewees agreed that they had been at least once, if not most of the time, recruited into a UN mission or other occupation, either in an NGO or consultancy, through personal contacts. Personal networks essentially enable circulation of information on vacancies and on a candidate's qualities. They are also essential for the realization of projects and missions. As Rosalind Eyben emphasizes, donor policies requesting more coordination have additionally reinforced expatriate networking in mission sites.<sup>14</sup>

### *The Business Consultant*

The blurriness of the boundary between peacebuilding and the NGO sector, which also intermeshes with the gray zone that has emerged between national development agencies and NGOs, is replicated in the increasingly fuzzy line between the private (third) nonprofit sector and the for-profit business world. The business field has a very different focus from NGOs in general, and the peacebuilding field in particular. The American distinction between for-profit businesses and not-for-profit organizations (which, in the United Kingdom, are also called charities, and in many European countries civil society organizations) suggests that

two very different logics of action are at work. The logic of capitalism, which rules the business field, requires most fundamentally the production of surplus value (profit), which allows reinvestment into production and opens up opportunities for innovation and creativity. The necessity of generating profit requires businesses to perceive and conceive of the world on the grounds of cost-benefit calculations, and to seek to minimize costs in order to increase benefits. The question of how this can be done in the most efficient and productive way is, in the logic of the field, a competitive struggle over the ownership of resources on the one hand, and over the authority to shape the meaning of “benefit” on the other.<sup>15</sup>

The nonprofit field, on the other hand, is not subject to the profit constraint, yet in many ways is still dependent on the for-profit sector. The focus of the aid organizations is the assistance they can provide to people who are considered to be unable, for various reasons, to live their lives to their full potential, or even, in the case of humanitarian assistance, to live their lives at all. Although the logic of production, and profit-making for further production, does not apply directly to NGOs, they are nevertheless under the constraint of funding their activities and of surviving as organizations. The question of how much of the business world’s efficiency mechanisms and cost-benefit analysis must or must not penetrate the NGO field has specifically become a major area of dispute.

Yet many NGOs that work in peacebuilding, both commonly and institutionally, entertain close relationships with business corporations. Representatives of business corporations are invited to sit on advisory boards; business corporations, on the other hand, regularly offer pro-bono projects to NGOs. Corporate business also represents a recruitment pool for UN field missions, and, in return, an exit option for peacebuilders, although it is less important than NGOs.

The peacebuilding field overlaps, however, with only a very limited number of business sectors. Most prominent among them are strategic management consulting and legal advice or auditing. A disproportionately high number of peacebuilders have thus been recruited from or into one of the big four auditing firms (Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernest & Young, KPMG) or strategic management consultancies (Accenture, Mercer, and so forth). Again, it is likely that a graduate certificate from elite universities in the United States or Europe plays a more important role in this career trajectory than service to the peacebuilding field. Yet, for certain NGOs, consulting firms also allow the conversion of experience and knowledge gained in the field or in an international organization into commercial services.

Big audit firms and strategic management consultancies, which constitute the major link with the peacebuilding field, understand themselves as knowledge management firms. The capacity to verbally synthesize social processes and present knowledge in oral and written form according to given standards is essential in this profession—and it is a shared requirement with the peacebuilding field. Similarly, the peacebuilding field has integrated a variety of management concepts that originated in the consultancy world, from stakeholder approaches to SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis and KPI (key performance indicators).<sup>16</sup>

The peacebuilding and business fields also share the need for the creation of *projects*: the capturing of funds to finance these projects and their management. Peacebuilding as well as business consultancy are built on the premises that those actors involved in the actual processes—warring parties, African governments, or failing businesses, for example—are themselves unable to identify the causes for their problems, and that they are in need of external advice and consultation to manage change that will save the business from bankruptcy or the country from war.

These projects are concrete undertakings that are limited in time and with a priori identified targets, timelines, budgets, and people, and with benchmarking indicators of success and accountability. Swapping projects from peacebuilding to management consulting appears technically unproblematic, as the key skills of a consultant are the capacity to administer procedures of analysis, to synthesize information, and to make recommendations according to guidelines that have been established elsewhere. After all, the key idea of projectism is that people can be flexibly combined into any kind of work team as long as the objectives of the project are clearly set, the means and processes well defined and timed, the benchmarks and expectations laid down in guidelines, and the team members have the knowledge and culture to methodically work through their tasks.<sup>17</sup> The high visibility of organizations such as the UN tends to serve as a signal to employers that individuals have gained relevant project management experience, just as their top-university degrees signal successful training in the methods of project management. The connections between business consultancy and peacebuilding are in this respect enabled through the relatively easy translations of educational and professional capital from one occupation to the other.

Another kind of business-peacebuilding field connection exists through the peacebuilders isomorphism of the business world and the wish (or maybe, in the eyes of some, the need) of entertaining good

relationships with corporate businesses. Over the past twenty years, there has been a proliferation of business-like discourses in aid organizations.<sup>18</sup> The drive for professionalization is partly self-induced as a great movement of organizational isomorphism as neoliberal practices of management became globalized.<sup>19</sup> Yet the popularity of new public management approaches is also motivated by the organizations' donor dependency. Increased outsourcing of development and humanitarian aid to non-governmental organizations requires, in the framework of new public management, reinforced procedures of accountability, evaluation, and standardization that allow so-called quality assurance. As organizations fashion themselves more on managerial and entrepreneurial models, their distance from the business world vanishes.

This attention paid by peacebuilders to the business world is replicated in some businesses' interest in sharing the symbolic capital of "good governance" or, simply, "peace," as these ideas are conveyed by peacebuilders. In the name of "corporate social responsibility," some industries, notably extractive industries, have also engaged in partnerships with NGOs to reduce conflicts that have emerged locally at the sites of exploitation.<sup>20</sup>

The connections between business and NGOs are usually looser than those created by the passage of individuals from one occupation to another. They are established if representatives of big business (e.g., banks, extractive industry companies, investment companies, big manufacturers, and retailer chains) are invited to sit on advisory boards, take over patronage of specific projects, or become goodwill ambassadors. Such interweaving of business corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations reflects the general consensus underlying peacebuilding that the liberal market structure of world politics is, essentially, unproblematic, and the underlying conflict analysis that, whatever other reasons lead to civil strife and war, it is not the liberal world economy. On the contrary, the association of global businesses bears witness to the belief that they can make a positive contribution to peace.

### *The Scholar-Expert*

Many NGOs take on a double role in the peacebuilding field. They not only realize donor projects and constitute the humanitarian, development, human rights, or otherwise third-sector platform of peacebuild-

ing; they also serve as advocacy organizations, research institutes, purveyors of information and data, and opinion shapers. In short, many NGOs also act as think tanks in the peacebuilding field. They join the ranks of a row of nonuniversity research and training institutes and of a growing number of university departments that have set up research and graduate centers in peace and conflict research, and in peacebuilding and its related areas. As figure 4 above shows, for peacebuilders, universities and think tanks are central institutions in their work lives. Many return to think tanks, research centers, universities, and NGOs as researchers or for further study. Equally, many academics join peacebuilding institutions as consultants or on secondment, or are commissioned to undertake studies by donor agencies, NGOs, or international organizations.

In the 1990s, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called peacekeeping a “growth industry,” and the field of international relations scholarship and expertise has clearly grown with the expansion of the peacebuilding field.<sup>21</sup> Universities all over the world offer more than three hundred graduate degrees in conflict management, conflict resolution, and peace studies, or in development and reconstruction in conflicts.<sup>22</sup> The large majority of these programs are at U.S. universities. They are commonly hosted by either the social science departments (and within those departments usually in the schools of international affairs, or, rarely, in the schools of public health and social work), the law school, or religious studies; this means that peacebuilding is either seen as part of international politics, as a legal problem or technique, or as an issue of people’s beliefs and well-being. As will be discussed in the following section, the interconnections between peacebuilding and scholarly fields (universities and think tanks) are fashioned differently according to the differences in academic rules that exist within countries, and between different academic departments.

### *The Subfield of Social Sciences*

Among the very large number of think tanks, advocacy NGOs, and universities, only a few stand out as being connected with the UN peacebuilding field. Furthermore, because the peacebuilding field’s three-tier structure is built on an economy of prestige generated by educational degrees, the scholarly field is intimately intertwined with the peacebuilding field.

A handful of institutions (universities, think tanks, and NGOs) are

situated at the top tier, with frequent exchanges between UN senior advisory or special representative roles, on the one hand, and senior positions in these institutions, on the other. The prestige market works formidably at this level—senior officials from the UN or other international organizations bring in the prestige gained as heads of mission, special representatives, or advisers to the Secretary-General. They offer occasional lectures or short courses to students of prestigious educational institutions, and legitimize research in these institutions through their practitioners' blessing. On the other hand, university academics or researchers at top universities and think tanks bring specific knowledge, eloquence, and legitimacy to policies on the grounds of their scientific achievements. Annan, who in his time as Secretary-General frequently made use of the appointment of university academics and other experts, explained:

I have appointed high-level panels, composed of men and women of great experience and international repute, representing different countries and regions, to consider specific topics and to advance the agenda. Such people often find it easier to agree when working together as individuals, in a small group, than they would in their official capacities. And once they have done so, their names lend credibility to an idea which might otherwise have appeared utopian or fanciful. The Secretary-General can then put it before member states with greater authority and confidence than if it had been simply his own.<sup>23</sup>

The symbolic capital of these individuals translates particularly well into their membership on panels, commissions, or other ad-hoc networks, which are called upon to reflect on specific questions of peace and war in the world. These various groups come together, part, and then reunite in various settings. "The Elders" is probably the most exclusive of such clubs. The group was founded by Nelson Mandela, his wife Graça Machel, and Desmond Tutu, at the initiative of the billionaire and CEO of Virgin Group, Richard Branson, and the pop musician Peter Gabriel. The group consists of only thirteen personalities, all of whom have been in some way or other associated with questions of peace and war. At the time of the writing, the group was chaired by Annan, the former Secretary-General, who received the Nobel Peace Prize for UN peacekeeping in 2001; before this, the group was chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who was awarded

the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984. A third of the group have received the Nobel Peace Prize at some point in their career, and all have worked for the United Nations in some capacity, usually as special representatives or envoys on specific issues.

Hence, José Ramos-Horta has a good chance of joining The Elders in the future. He was a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996 for his resistance to Indonesia's occupation of Timor-Leste. In October 2014 he was appointed chair of the newly created United Nation's High-Level Panel on Peace Operations. Up until 2014 he was the special representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea-Bissau, a position to which he was appointed after having lost the 2012 presidential election in Timor-Leste. He had been president of Timor-Leste since 2006, and had held various high political positions following the country's independence in 2000. The panel's remit is to follow up on Lakhdar Brahimi's report of 2000. Brahimi, who had several roles as special representative and special envoy, is currently a member of The Elders group.

Like other high-level panels before it, this panel was composed of a dozen personalities from all countries that have a permanent seat on the Security Council, and from the new emerging powers in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. It submitted its report in June 2015.<sup>24</sup> These panels also commonly include one or two scholars of international affairs; the same or other scholars also participate in the preparatory process of such commissions, or are invited as advisers and experts. One of the panel's scholarly experts was Bruce Jones, who since 2014 has been deputy director of the foreign affairs program at the Brookings Institution, and formerly was director of the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University. His successor from January 2015 at the CIC was Sarah Cliffe, who was assistant secretary-general for the UN Civilian Capacities Team before her appointment to CIC. Before her stint at the UN, Cliffe had led the World Bank team that prepared the World Development report on "Conflict, Security and Development" of 2011; the World Bank research group was (at the time of writing) led by Betty Bigombe, who worked with Paul Collier from the University of Oxford and Nicholas Sambanis from Yale University. Both Collier and Sambanis have produced a number of reports for the World Bank linking conflict with "greed" and the looting of natural resources in the 2000s (which have been highly disputed and to a large extent refuted in academic research).<sup>25</sup> To come back to Jones, at Brookings he joined Jean-Marie Guéhenno (son of the French writer and "Académicien" Jean Guéhenno) as international affairs expert. In the fall

of 2014, Guéhenno, who was under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations from 2008 to 2012, replaced Gareth Evans, former chair of the Commission on the Responsibility to Protect, and director of the same-named research center, as chief executive officer of the International Crisis Group.

Such a game of revolving doors at the higher levels of think tanks, academic institutions, and the UN is not exceptional. People move in horizontal spirals through directorship positions rather than vertically in careers from the bottom of an organization to its top. Particularly in the United States, where the idea of policy relevance and impact is an important resource for academic careers, academics are likely to move from a university institution to an international organization, NGO, think tank, or other policy institution in order to further their academic careers. Notable examples are Michael W. Doyle from Columbia University, special adviser to Annan from 2001 to 2003, recipient of the American Political Science Association's Hubert H. Humphrey Award "in recognition of notable public service by a political scientist" in 2012, and author with Nicholas Sambanis from the World Bank and Yale University of *Making War and Building Peace*; John G. Ruggie, international relations scholar, whose five-year stint as special adviser to Annan allowed him to make the jump from Stanford to Harvard; Michael Ignatieff, the political philosopher of humanitarian intervention, academic expert on the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, unsuccessful candidate to the post of Canadian prime minister, and now Edward A. Morrow Professor of Practice at Harvard University; Anne-Marie Slaughter, international lawyer and vocal advocate of U.S. and UN interventions in the world, formerly Bert G. Kerstetter '66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, director of policy planning in the State Department under Hillary Clinton, and now CEO of the New America Foundation; Jennifer Welsh, equally vocal on the need to rebuild failing states, professor in international relations at the University of Oxford, codirector of the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, special adviser at the assistant secretary-general level on the responsibility to protect in 2013, and since 2014 a chair in international politics at the European University Institute. These personalities are only a few examples of the top-tier academia-peacebuilding carousel.

It is characteristic of the nexus of the peacebuilding field with the social science field that these revolving doors are made for individual careers. They do not represent epistemic communities or advocacy coali-

tions in the sense that the individuals in them share a common knowledge or an advocacy issue on which they work collectively. Rather, every scholar translates the credentials and achievements of their field (academia) into an individual advisory position; and the structure of the academic field, notably in the United States, allows retranslating their experience at an international institution or policy institution into academic credentials. Personal networks allow the flow of communication and ideas, not organized lobbying. Yet the passage from one institution to the other requires the minimum compatibility of ideas and only some general consensus on basic values, however vaguely they might be defined. The frequency with which those scholars who advocate humanitarian intervention in particular, and who stress the responsibility to protect and idea that failed states need to be rebuilt in general, move between advisory roles in the peacebuilding field and the academic field is not coincidental. The “culture of peacebuilding” will be discussed in more detail in the second section of this book, but suffice to say that this consensus comprises first of all ideological support for the liberal outlook of peacebuilding and a corresponding backing for ideas like the rule of law, the dominance of human rights, or the idea of protection for vulnerable groups. This basic consensus means that the scholars in the top tier of the carousel are unlikely to produce deeply critical views of peacebuilding or the UN. Indeed, the main contribution of the above-mentioned scholars to the field is the degree to which their prior research supports multilateralism, peacebuilding, and UN intervention in conflicts. It is exactly the apparent scientific rigor of the scholars’ research that lends credibility and legitimacy to these world-ordering policies.

Unsurprisingly, then, the first tier of the academia-peacebuilding border zone is highly self-referential and prone to legend building. UN senior officials like to write about their work and about each other. As they often have exclusive access to UN archives and other documents, their writings are an invaluable source for researchers, yet the writings are not exposed to counterchecks and academic review or discussion. Equally, researchers who focus on the top tier write about the UN and peacebuilders with often uncritical reference to their own writings. The number of biographies of Hammarskjöld might well reach into the hundreds, yet the 1972 biography written by Urquhart, who was at the time secretary to Bunche, certainly stands out. Urquhart had exclusive access to the family’s archives and the UN archives, and also to personal conversations and documents held by other individuals. Clearly he was also

well placed to write a biography of Bunche. Up to today, only those documents of Bunche's work and life that Urquhart carefully selected are accessible in Bunche's personal archives at the library of the University of California at Los Angeles. Similarly, Samantha Power has risen to the top tier as U.S. ambassador to the UN via writing biographies of personalities who have become heroes of peacebuilding.

The generalized support for peacebuilding is a major distinction to the second tier. The second tier of interaction between the peacebuilding field and scholarship exists at the level of universities that have a good and solid reputation, measurable in university rank (e.g., the *Times Higher Education Supplement* annual rankings), a noticeably high publication output, and a strong presence in academic debates. Yet these institutions are not part of the top ten or twenty universities and do not provide the same symbolic capital. Scholars of the second tier will not be called upon simply because of the prestige of the institution they represent.

As the academic positions in this tier are removed from the prestige economy of peacebuilding, they allow critical investigations into peacebuilding activities and practices. Many peacebuilders return to academia in this tier to reflect upon their experiences, systematize their impressions, and investigate the causes of what they have seen as the weaknesses or (less often) the strengths of their missions. They expect further training in specific technical areas or seek to investigate in their own research, for example, in doctoral work, specific aspects of the peacebuilding field. Much of the critical literature on peacebuilding has hence been produced by former peacebuilders: for example, the work of Mark Duffield,<sup>26</sup> Béatrice Pouligny,<sup>27</sup> Laura Zanotti,<sup>28</sup> Lisa Smirl,<sup>29</sup> or Séverine Autesserre,<sup>30</sup> to cite just a few.

The distinction between social science scholars and peacebuilders remains sharper in the second tier, where peacebuilders appear first of all as students, and where scholars are less likely to enter peacebuilding institutions; if they do so, they are more likely to be involved in shorter, practical missions (e.g., electoral observation missions) rather than long-term advisory roles.

To come back to the revolving doors: these do exist in the second tier, in the social sciences (international affairs), but to a lesser degree, and they turn at a much slower speed than in the first tier. As people tend to be younger in this tier it is very likely that the different structure of early or midcareer research makes the conversion of academic credentials into the practical peacebuilding field more difficult. Academics first

struggle for recognition in their own field, and in particular for tenure or long-term faculty contracts, and can only then liberate the resources, time, and energy needed to engage with the practical peacebuilding field. Additionally, their research does not bring in the same symbolic value of legitimizing peacebuilding, even if positive in its results, as it is not yet fully recognized by the rituals of the academic field such as degrees from top universities, publications and citations in highly competitive, peer-reviewed journals, or prizes and awards from academic institutions and associations.

This is particularly true for countries whose academic fields appreciate public engagement by university scholars much less than do American or British academia. In such countries—for example, in France, Japan, or Italy, where academic careers are sharply separated from the public policy sphere—scholars who take leave to join a peacebuilding mission or think tank are far less likely to be positively rewarded in their career. Hence, incentives to do so are low; and inversely, because their research is often much more analytical, self-referential, and restricted to an inner academic circle, and less policy-oriented, it appears to be of little practical interest to peacebuilders.<sup>31</sup>

In these cases, think tanks and NGOs will take over more of the advice function that is held by universities in the top tier and in the United States. Hence, institutions like the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden, the Berghof Foundation in Germany, or the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London are established consultancies on peacekeeping, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding in Europe. Their staff usually hold PhDs, attesting to their academic credentials; they offer consultancy, evaluation, and advice, but commonly do not participate directly in peacebuilding missions or projects. Careers tend also to be relatively stable and yet separate from academic institutions, so that crossovers from think tanks to universities are rare. Consequently, there are far fewer academics moving back and forth between international or public service and academia than there are in the Anglo-Saxon world. A notable exception exists if particular practical issues of peacebuilding are actually the research area of the academic in question. In the latter case, engagement in conflict resolution, mediation, humanitarian assistance, community work, human rights advocacy, and so forth might be (but does not have to be) a spin-off of these research activities. However, the more rigid the university career system is, the less likely such transitions are to happen.

*The Subfield of Legal Studies and the  
Dominance of Anglo-American Legal Studies*

The back and forth between universities, think tanks, and organizations is, however, much more frequent in the area of legal approaches to peacebuilding, such as arbitration and dispute resolution, transitional justice, international criminal justice, and human rights law. Here, even in the second tier, there will be many peacebuilders who pass through all types of organizations, because the legal studies field represents some particularities. These are due to the specific structure of the Anglo-Saxon, and in particular the U.S., academic field of legal studies. This field draws heavily on the legitimacy of its legal expertise in conflict and dispute resolution in the business world, in international arbitration, in international law, and, last but not least, in national constitutional and public law and human rights law. These areas can attain a high level of technicality, which makes academics' resources valuable in this aspect of the peacebuilding field. This happens particularly in areas where peacebuilding missions have taken over parts of the civilian administration and are in need of advice on lawmaking, in areas such as policing, privatization, and public administration design/redesign.

Peacebuilders in this area tend to have started their careers in law firms, moved on to peacebuilding missions, and returned to think tanks or academic institutions to systematize and further their practical experience, where they have often had to break new ground. As legal scholarship consists to a large extent of doctrinal work, that is, the interpretation and (re)codification of legal acts, the divide between the practical and academic fields in law is much smaller than in other disciplines. Exclusive experience in one peacebuilding area can constitute highly valuable capital to be converted into academic credentials, as it gives the peacebuilder exclusive access to specific, expert legal knowledge that can be interpreted only by a very small group of lawyers who have shared this particular experience.

As a number of scholars have pointed out, this duality of legal studies has allowed lawyers to play an increasingly important role in peacebuilding.<sup>32</sup> In some cases their activities reach far into the core of the field, without, however, attaining such a high degree of visible social science exchanges between the academic and peacebuilding fields as in the first tier. Due to their technical nature, these exchanges take place in the background and are less politicized. Only in very rare cas-

es does the appointment of a special envoy in legal affairs become a diplomatic issue (the Goldstone report of 2009, which accused Israel of war crimes, is a case in point). This is also due to the fact that the dominance of the U.S. legal studies field is largely undisputed; whatever battles of ideas exist in the field, they are often reflections of inter-American disciplinary quarrels.<sup>33</sup>

The dominance of the American legal studies field is a direct result of the convertibility of knowledge capital into peacebuilding. Due to its decentralization and derivative character, the legal puzzles and advances in the peacebuilding field correspond more to the nature of Anglo-Saxon common law, and less to continental European civil law traditions. Arbitration, litigation, and legal dispute resolution are far more important areas of legal practice in Anglo-Saxon countries than they are in civil law countries. Accordingly, the educational structure is very different, as is the career path of lawyers. In continental European countries, law firms rarely exist of American size and importance, and the golden career in Europe remains the civil service pathway. Prestige gained from international engagement, transnational advocacy, or an advisory role to international organizations rarely translates into career advancement in national civil services, and is, hence, far less attractive for European lawyers. Those participating in international legal activities, for example, in the international tribunals, tend to be either early in their career or seconded by national ministries. Advocacy of international legal issues rarely develops the same dynamics in European legal fields as it does in the United States.

The prestige of universities is also less important in continental European countries, where lawyers have to take a centrally administered state exam for accreditation. While it happens (and ever more frequently so) that aspiring lawyers will add a LLM (master of laws) or similar degree from a British or American university to their curriculum vitae, only successfully passing a state exam will allow them to practice law. Consequently, the academic field in these countries is far more introverted than the academic field in common-law countries. This results in the strong dominance of Anglo-Saxon understandings of the rule of law, legal procedures, and legal argument, and consequently of justice. Here, in the legal field, one can observe the formation of advocacy coalitions and epistemic communities, notably around the notion of the “right to intervention” and around human rights advocacy, as analyzed, for instance, by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink.<sup>34</sup> As Mikael Rask Madsen argues, this dominance was supported by European reservations

about human rights during much of the decolonization and Cold War periods.<sup>35</sup> Yet it is also the specific structure of the respective academic-peacebuilding nexus in Europe and the United States that allows for greater influence by American scholars and think tanks like the International Center for Transitional Justice, which was presided over from 2004 to 2007 by Juan Méndez, who is currently special adviser to the Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide (see also chapter 7).

### *The Subfield of Religious Studies*

Religious universities and organizations are a third type of academic and NGO field that reaches into the peacebuilding field. In faith-based academia or think tanks there is another economy of recognition and prestige at work. Most often, these organizations are Christian organizations. Islamic, Buddhist, or other religious conflict resolution practices frequently exist on the ground, but they rarely achieve a wider visibility in the peacebuilding field or in the scholarly field.<sup>36</sup> While Christian universities in many European, and also, in particular, North American countries are an integral part of the academic landscape, and while Christian NGOs in the North engage in a large variety of consultancy and cooperative networking, Islamic, Buddhist, or other religious peacemakers are far less organized, visible, and integrated than Christian organizations.

Although many Christian universities and colleges are an essential part of the university landscape of their respective countries, their original remit is to contribute to the building of Christian communities, support the theological foundation of Christian values, and facilitate their application and spread (including conversion) in daily life.<sup>37</sup> Some, though not all, are built around theological training and education. Such kinds of institutions are particularly strongly represented in the United States, and (obviously one might add) only very weakly represented in countries where the separation between church and state is very strong and stretches into the education sector (e.g., France). As such institutions have as an essential *raison d'être* the reproduction of faith, the conventional rules of the game of the academic field (e.g., publications, citations, research grants) play a less important role, and are offset by practical results in the dissemination of belief, knowledge production, and community services in the name of Christianity. Faithful ministry might be as highly valued as a high citation index.

Members of such institutions move horizontally to projects and activi-

ties on the ground in the peacebuilding field and take over specific advisory, training, or mediator roles, sometimes as implementing partners of the UN, sometimes independently, and sometimes in the services of the UN, for example, by training military peacekeepers. Usually these moves happen through religious networks, such as peacebuilders moving from a religious academic institution to a network of faith-based peacebuilding organizations, or through their church structure.<sup>38</sup>

The large majority of religious organizations engaged in peacebuilding are, as already mentioned, Christian, and among these Anabaptist groups are particularly important. This is due to the theologically founded pacifism of Anabaptists, which was prominently set out in academic circles by John Howard Yoder in the postwar period, and is currently promoted by John Paul Lederach. Anabaptist pacifism was particularly upheld by political peace movements during, and in between, the world wars, and during the anti-Vietnam War movement in the United States in the postwar period.<sup>39</sup> Of the fourteen graduate programs at religious institutions in North America that deal with conflict management and peace studies, eight are offered by Anabaptist universities or colleges.<sup>40</sup>

Figure 9 above shows that an important number of peacebuilders work at some point in their career for or with a religious NGO. These organizations, and the academics from these institutions, especially the churches and religious communities on the ground, play an important role in the practice of peacebuilding. They are implementing partners for projects; they play the role of mediators and consultants in conflict resolution processes; and they offer various forms of education, training, and employment in conflict and peacebuilding regions. They also forge views and concepts of peace in peacebuilding that are internally discussed in theological debates among and within communities (e.g., in the early Cold War debate between Yoder and Reinhold Niebuhr on pacifism in times of nuclear deterrence, or the ferocious debates within the Catholic Church over poverty and what do about it); and which are disseminated to secular as well as other religious communities through the practice of peacebuilding, and in the wide range of publications in various media, from academic journals to television and websites.

Dissemination, proselytism, and conversion constitute important dynamics of the religious field. The success of Christian (or Muslim, or Buddhist) peacebuilding is a formidable justification for the spread of religion. Peace services give new missionaries of faith access to communities, and allow them to practically reconstruct faith around peace and development initiatives. Within democratic, Northern, and liberal states,

and in the framework of liberal and human rights-based global governance approaches, the success of peacebuilding provides an important argument for faith in the struggle with the secular state over the legitimacy of humanitarian, social, and peacemaking action.<sup>41</sup> Successful peacebuilding shows that Christianity (or religion in general) can be a force for democratic change and peace—contrary to the arguments of secular political philosophers across the centuries that religion is a force of violence and destruction.<sup>42</sup> In the context of American culture wars, for instance, peacebuilding allows legitimizing a discourse of Christianity that is not necessarily associated with the conservative Far Right, but which appears as a progressive force reflecting many liberal concerns.<sup>43</sup> In Latin America, the engagement of Christian groups in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes has widely helped to draw a picture of a charitable and helping religion, in contrast to a church that had supported military juntas and violence in the civil wars. In the wider global discourse, successful peacemaking by faith-based organizations appears as a credible alternative to secularism, particularly if this mediation, conflict resolution, or peacebuilding success results from interfaith collaboration.<sup>44</sup> Indeed, as many observers have noticed, the distinction between secular and religious organizations and aid fades in peacebuilding contexts, thereby allowing the transposition of moral legitimacy from one sector to the other; humanitarianism can benefit from various religious ideas of charity and community service, whereas religion can draw on secular ideas of solidarity and responsibility.<sup>45</sup>

### *Conclusion*

The boundaries of the peacebuilding field are defined by the degree to which capital, and most important symbolic capital, can be converted from an adjacent field to peacebuilding, and vice versa. The prestige and authority to speak about peace, to act in its name, and to mobilize social forces in order to build peace can come from a variety of sources. It can be founded institutionally and legally, as is the case for UN missions, which have been authorized and are, at least in principle, supported by the UN Security Council and UN member states. It can also come from the prestige of other institutions and organizations; indeed, such a prestige economy exists between the UN, international organizations, pre-eminent global universities, global business corporations, think tanks, and, albeit to a lesser degree, NGOs.

Peacebuilders move within these boundaries of the peacebuilding field, frequently changing jobs and passing from one borderline institution to another. In these overlapping zones, particular types of symbolic capital—for example, professional-technical expertise such as legal knowledge, or moral capital such as that held by religious peacebuilders—can be translated from one field to another. The convertibility of symbolic capital (determining which kind of knowledge or prestige can be converted and which cannot) gives important indications as to the structure of the peacebuilding field and its adjacent fields. It is the convertibility of capital that tells us which forms of symbolic capital are valued, recognized, or refuted in the peacebuilding field. The scope of options not taken is infinitely wide; nevertheless, some stand out. Hence, the connection to labor unions or unionism in general is weak. Not one single peacebuilder in the prosopographic sample worked at any time in her or his career for a union. Similarly, people do not rise from very low to very high positions. The importance of a university education, and particularly an elite university education, has frequently been emphasized; the rags-to-riches career does not exist in peacebuilding. The importance of an elite university education also excludes the large majority of the so-called locals from careers in peacebuilding; it most particularly denies former fighters access to the field, and effectively excludes those agents who have been involved in the conflict.

The analysis of the peacebuilders' career trajectories also shows that the peacebuilding field has evolved in ways similar to other professional fields in domestic labor markets. While the first peacebuilders—Bunche, Urquhart, and others—entered the UN determined to stay with the organization for the rest of their working life, nowadays peacebuilders have a much more fragmented work life. The precariousness of jobs, short-termism and projectism, alternatively called flexibilization, are the hallmarks of peacebuilder careers, and indicate that a double movement is taking place: increased spending by donors and international agency engagement for peacebuilding, on the one hand, and an increased decentralization, privatization, and fragmentation of activities in the field, on the other.

For the peacebuilders this means first of all the sharply heightened importance of networks, and the sociability that founded such networks on the ground.<sup>46</sup> The network structure of the field, however, emphasizes even more the exclusiveness of circles and groups within the field, and leads to the reinforcement of horizontal, and a weakening of vertical, career paths. The closing of career circles introduces and consoli-

dates the inequalities of career chances into the field. These inequalities tend to follow categorical division lines between men and women (fewer women are in managerial positions in peacebuilding, and those who are usually come to these positions later in their career and with lesser pay); between North and South, with lesser career chances for “locals”; between professional and technical-administrative jobs, due to the rarification of vertical career paths; and between those who bring in inherited cultural and economic capital, which allow for a higher investment in university education and training, and those who do not dispose of this a priori capital.

The “boundary-less” neoliberalization of working conditions, and the rise of so-called portfolio careers<sup>47</sup> in the peacebuilding field, replicates developments in other fields, and hence shows the isomorphism of this field with others. The overlapping zones of the NGOs, business corporations, and religious (or, in a wider sense, spiritual) fields with the peacebuilding field testify to the convertibility of mostly symbolic and cultural capital. This convertibility is conditioned by similar conditions of work that have engendered a succession of similar practices over the past decade, in which all these fields have undergone significant changes in career mobility.<sup>48</sup> The key to convertibility remains a set of common references within the peacebuilding field, most notably to what is considered high-quality education and the necessary skills for this type of work. As the following section on the peacebuilders’ habitus will show, high mobility, cosmopolitanism, and liberal mind-sets belong equally to this commonly shared canon. The fragmentation of careers is not necessarily perceived as precarious by the peacebuilders themselves, but rather as flexibility, openness, and an entrepreneurial mind-set, or, simply, one of adventure. Rather than seeing themselves as precarious workers, peacebuilders refer to themselves as self-managing managers. The fluidity between fields, which makes moving between them relatively easy, the close network structure of the fields, and, very simply, the continued increase and widening in peacebuilding engagement by donors, states, and international agencies, reduces individual uncertainty about the future; and the financial rewards for peacebuilding compensate for the lack of career transparency.

