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## The Distinction of Peace

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
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## CHAPTER 3

# “There Are No Neutral Men”

## *The Sociological Structure of Peacebuilding*



In 1961, *International Herald Tribune* columnist Walter Lippmann, a great admirer of Hammarskjöld and a stern believer in the UN’s global mission, interviewed Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev at his Black Sea dacha. In discussing the current world situation and particularly the state of world peace, Khrushchev repeated his attack on the role of Secretary-General that had already dominated his proposal for a troika in September 1960. “While there are neutral countries, there are no neutral men,” Khrushchev told Lippmann.<sup>1</sup>

Of course, Lippmann thought that the international civil servant was undoubtedly neutral. Yet, as briefly discussed in chapter 2, the worldview of peacebuilders did, in fact, get in the way of their dealings with local politics and was anything but neutral in its effects on the way the peace missions were (and still are) carried out. Certainly, many people working for the UN or other peacebuilding institutions see themselves as neutral, and some strive hard to be, at least, impartial on the ground. Yet, social upbringing, socioeconomic standing, education, and the resulting worldviews and mind frames do not suddenly become irrelevant when a person becomes a peacebuilder. On the contrary, the lack of standardization of the field, its largely decentralized and diffuse organization, as well as its potential for highly politicized disputes over even minor details, make tacit understandings and underlying forms of shared culture even more important in forging the ideas and practices of peacebuilding.<sup>2</sup>

The preceding chapter has shown that peacebuilding emerged as a default space in which the UN and other international agencies and NGOs compensate for the failure of peacekeeping. Peacebuilding appears where the effective physical separation of warring parties is not possible but external pressures of various kinds (e.g., from the media, public opinion, diplomacy) demand some kind of intervention. In response to the dilemma of having to establish peace where it cannot be externally imposed, the UN and other international agencies as well as NGOs engage in a multitude of activities, which are presented by the UN and other organization as promoting “peace” in one way or another. We will see in later chapters which ideas motivate these practices. In this chapter the analysis will delve deeper into the constitution of the peacebuilding field.

The default space of peacebuilding is filled with a specific “class” of people. Not everyone can become a peacebuilder, and in the absence of a clearly defined vocational training profile, peacebuilders are more easily identified by social characteristics such as economic or cultural capital than by their profession. The notion of class must be understood in a large sense as a wide category of people who exhibit similar sociological characteristics. The boundaries of classes are fluid and fuzzy, and similarity must not be confused with sameness. The trees in a pine forest provide a useful analogy: they may differ in shape, size, and appearance, but they are all still pine trees. In the same fashion, the space of peacebuilding is populated by individuals who in their individual outlook are all different, but who, when considered as a group, share an important number of commonalities, most notably with respect to social origins, education, and their related value structure.

Over the course of decades, the peacebuilding field has widely expanded to include not only more individuals within the UN missions but also more affiliated organizations and other actors in the field. However, the sociological outlook has remained strikingly consistent, as has the geographical distribution, that is, the world regions peacebuilders come from. Other studies have noticed the preponderant presence of Westerners in international organizations, be it the UN,<sup>3</sup> the UNHCR,<sup>4</sup> other international agencies like the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund,<sup>5</sup> and in nongovernmental organizations.<sup>6</sup> These studies of civil servants in the UN or other international organizations commonly assume that national origins matter in the way that staff will understand the issues at stake (framing) and develop responses to challenges.

The sociological analysis in this and later chapters will show a more

nanced picture. Geographical origin is actually of little importance to the way people see their own role, mission, function, and value in peacebuilding. Geographical origin does play a major role in very visible positions that are subject to state diplomatic haggling over influence and recognition, but in what I will call the second and third tiers, nationality is not, per se, a good indicator of difference. However, educational background and family background are decisive in a person’s access to positions in the peacebuilding field. Hence, nationality does have a selective function for the career paths that are open to peacebuilders, through the very unequal distribution of educational and economic capital across countries.

This chapter will expose the sociological commonalities of those working in peacebuilding and analyze how all these individuals converge, particularly with respect to their social origins, education, and professional careers. Bourdieu’s notion of capital is helpful in capturing these similarities, as capital designates not only the investment and stock an individual has to build on in educational, professional, social, or economic terms, but also his or her opportunities, networks, and boundaries of social development.

A detailed analysis of the first UN mission in the Congo, 1960–64, will first explore these sociological characteristics (in Bourdieu’s terms, the capital configuration). In the second section of this chapter I will extend this analysis to the broader field as it represents itself nowadays. It will become evident that national origins, indeed, are less important than the sociological homogeneity of the field. The sociological constitution of the field has, over the decades, changed only slightly.

### *A Social Analysis of the Congo Mission*

The Congo mission, Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), established the field of peacebuilding not only institutionally but also socially. A closer sociological analysis of the men in the Congo mission reveals that they constituted a relatively homogenous group in terms of their socioeconomic origins, educational capital, and political value structures, although an important distinction has to be made between those who remained in the UN and those who had been seconded by their home country to the Congo mission.

Table 1 gives a very short overview of the top executive layer of ONUC over the four years.<sup>7</sup> The table distinguishes the person’s economic, edu-

cational, and social capital. The evaluation “high” to “low” is given with respect to the standards of the country of origin; these have been established by comparison with contemporary literature and classifications, and expert advice.

As this table shows, the permanent officeholders shared characteristics closer to those of civil service officeholders in the United States or West European countries than to other professional fields or cultural realms. Their social background was in many respects very similar, yet two clear distinctions stand out: Hammarskjöld’s overall higher capital configuration, and the comparatively lower family economic capital of U.S. officeholders relative to those from the global South. Most of these UN senior staff’s families had suffered from a major shock, commonly through the loss of the main breadwinner of the family through war (e.g., India-Pakistan’s partition war), disease, or accident.

Despite the very modest financial situations in which many grew up, all came from families that emphasized the importance of education. All for which there are records had educators in prior generations in their family. Often these educators had been pioneers in their fields. Ralph Bunche’s great-grandfather had set up evening schools for former slaves and freed slaves. Robert Gardiner’s grandmother had been the first woman principal in an English school in the Gold Coast. Mahmoud Khiari pioneered professional education in preindependence Tunisia, and his wife was director of a professional college after independence. Mekki Abbas had worked for fourteen years in Sudan’s Ministry of Education and had gained a PhD from Oxford University. Max H. Dorsinville’s father founded the first literary review in Haiti, and his brother became a renowned writer. For all, education was the prime capital on which their careers and sometimes even the survival of their families was built; for example, with his UN salary Bombay-born Syed Habib Ahmed supported those family members who had survived the partition in Pakistan.

The strong family emphasis on education probably influenced the choice of study subjects, in which classical education dominated. All had studied a subject in social sciences or humanities; a large number had studied public or colonial administration in Oxford. An important number also read classics and European philosophy either in high school or at the university level. Some pursued their interest in history and philosophy throughout their lives, commonly through an active career as a writer. More than half of the staff listed below have written autobiographies and other books. Some have also written personal accounts of the

events in the Congo; some have contributed to scholarly research on the topic of the Congo mission, or more largely to peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and the UN role. Others wrote more literary works during and after their time at the UN.

Hence, generally speaking, all officeholders had higher cultural than economic capital, but with sufficiently high economic capital to allow the acquisition of education and culture (sometimes at the expense of other relatives). This configuration locates the majority of them in the (admittedly broad) category of the educated middle classes, as it clearly distinguishes them from social classes of manual labor or rural, agricultural classes, on the one hand, and landed or otherwise rent-consuming upper classes (except for Galo Plaza Lasso), on the other. With respect to upper-class origins, the complete absence of families who gained wealth through manufacturing or industrial activities is equally remarkable; any family wealth came from trade, civil service, or other government service.

Table 1 also shows a very irregular pattern of geographic origin. Not one single executive staff member was recruited from Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, or any other country with communist sympathies. Certainly, candidates from socialist countries would have been sternly opposed by the United States and the former European colonial powers. Given the realities of the Cold War, the safest recruitment zones were African or Asian nonaligned countries. However, the geographic distribution obscures the very similar endowments in educational and family-transmitted economic capital, namely the very similar social class origins of the UN staff.

### *The Tasks of Middle-Class Men*

It was, in fact, this social homogeneity that the Congolese and the Soviets perceived as partiality when Khrushchev attacked the mission in 1960 as “partial” and when he called Hammarskjöld a “lackey” of U.S. interests (see chapter 2). Bunche wrote in a letter to his son that even he, a black American and great-grandson of slaves, was considered and threatened as a “white” in the Congo.<sup>8</sup> Skin color was, in the Congo of 1960, not automatically a social category, and in the postcolonial context Bunche was clearly perceived as American first and only then as black.

Indeed, Bunche was the great-grandson of a freed slave and became a prime example of an American and liberal success story. He was an alumni of two of America’s finest universities, the University of California at

**Table 1. Capital configuration of ONUC executives**

	Family's economic capital	Family's educational capital	Family's social capital	Actor's educational capital	Actor's economic capital when working for ONUC
Ralph Bunche	Very low but ascending (grandson of freeman)	Grandfather teacher, high disposition for education	Large as well integrated in neighborhoods and church communities	Very high UCLA Harvard, PhD	Upper middle
Andrew Cordier	Very low (U.S. Midwest farming family)	Low	Unknown	Very high University of Chicago Geneva Institute for International Studies	Upper middle
Heinz Wieschhoff	Low (mother widower)	Middle	Unknown but probably low as mother widower	Very high University of Frankfurt PhD, Institute for African Studies	Upper middle
Brian Urquhart	Low and declining (divorce)	High, many teachers in family, father artist	High	Very high Westminster School University of Cambridge	Upper middle
F. T. Liu	Middle (divorce but continued support by father)	High, father renowned artist from wealthy Shanghai family who took F. T. Liu to France	High	High Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques	Upper middle

Sture Linnér	Middle to high	High	High	Very High University of Uppsala, PhD in classics High University of Allahabad University of Oxford Unknown	Upper middle
Rajeshwar Dayal	High	High	High	Unknown	Upper middle
Ian Berendsen	High (father diploma)	High	High	Unknown	Unknown
Oscar Schachter	Middle to low (born in Brooklyn)	Unknown	Unknown	Very high Columbia University High	Upper middle class
General I. J. Rikhye	High (father military doctor in British Indian Army)	High	High	Unknown	Upper middle class
Chakravarthi Narasimhan	High	Unknown	Unknown	High University of Madras University of Oxford Unknown	Upper middle class
Francis Nwokedi	Unknown	Unknown	High (appointed by British to work on independence; later adviser to General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi)	Unknown	Unknown



Table 1.—Continued

	Family's economic capital	Family's educational capital	Family's social capital	Actor's educational capital	Actor's economic capital when working for ONUC
Mekki Abbas	Unknown	Probably high as English education	High	High Gordon Memorial College, Khartoum Postgraduate (Rhodes Scholarship) at University of Oxford	High (later became General-Secretary of the United Nations Council for Africa)
Robert Gardiner	Very high, trade business that allowed all seven children to study in England despite father's early death	High, grandmother first woman principal in Gold Coast, grand-uncles Methodist ministers, one uncle surveyor of British Gold coast	High	Very high University of Cambridge London School of Economics University of Oxford	Unknown
Mahmoud Khiari	Low	Unknown	Unknown	Middle (professional training, later studies, labor union activist) High University of Oxford	Unknown
Syed Habib Ahmed	High but declining due to father's death and partition of India	High	High		Upper middle class

Conor Cruise O'Brien	Middle to low	High	High	High Trinity College Dublin	Unknown
Galo Plaza Lasso	Very high (father had been president of Ecuador)	Very high	Very high	Very high University of Maryland	High
Bibiano F. Osorio-Tafall	Middle (born in small Galician town)	Unknown	Unknown	University of California Berkeley Georgetown University	Upper middle class
Max H. Dorsinville	Low	Very high	High (father editor of first Haitian literary review)	High Professor at Colegio de México	Upper middle class

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Los Angeles and Harvard, where he had been admitted on scholarships. He had been in the U.S. diplomatic service before entering the UN, and Dean Rusk, the secretary of state under the John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson administrations and the architect of much of their Cold War policies, considered Bunche a lifelong friend.<sup>9</sup>

Bunche's family background was typical for the European and American men (only men held executive positions) who worked in the Congo mission: most of Hammarskjöld's Western collaborators grew up in very modest, if not outright poor, households. The original Congo Club members in particular—Ralph Bunche, Andrew Cordier, and Heinz Wieschhoff—had very similar life stories. Wieschhoff, a native German, also came from a very modest family background. He had achieved his high-ranking UN position thanks to his considerable educational capital. Wieschhoff's father, a post office clerk, died young, and his mother married an elderly widower in order to support her five children. Economic hardship forced Wieschhoff out of school early to become a miner in Bönen, Westphalia. After a serious mining accident, Wieschhoff returned to school and won a university scholarship that allowed him to study African culture with Germany's founding father of modern anthropology, Leo Fröbenius. Fleeing the Nazis, who closed down the Frankfurt Institute for African Studies, Wieschhoff in 1936 settled in the United States where he became a professor of anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania. Now a U.S. citizen, he was called upon to participate in the creation of the United Nations Trusteeship Council after having served as an Africa expert in the U.S. Army during World War II.<sup>10</sup> At the Trusteeship Council he met Bunche and quickly rose in the UN system.

Cordier was born, raised, and educated in the American Midwest, where he also started his career as college teacher. He came from a poor farming family and started doing chores on his parents' farm at the age of five. He financed his university and postgraduate studies through scholarships and his own work as a Latin and mathematics instructor. In 1944, he joined the State Department and served with the U.S. delegation at the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco. He became executive assistant to the first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, in 1947. All through his UN career he remained close to his State Department colleagues. During the Cuban missile crisis Cordier played a crucial role as informal messenger between President Kennedy and UN Secretary-General U Thant.<sup>11</sup>

For Cordier, Wieschhoff, and Bunche, the United Nations repre-

sented a unique opportunity for a career in diplomacy and high-ranking civil service. Sociologically, none of them originated from the upper class, which traditionally provided their own country's and international economic and political elites.<sup>12</sup> All three had been working in academia before joining the UN. All three continued to pursue their academic interests while working for the UN. Cordier later left the UN to become first dean of the School of International Studies at Columbia University, and later president of Columbia. Wieschhoff continued throughout his UN years to occasionally teach at the University of Pennsylvania, and for a long time Bunche played with the idea of again taking up his professorial status at Howard University after his retirement from the UN, before his ill health prevented him from doing so.

In many ways, all three represent perfectly the postwar rise of the middle class in Western democracies. The English language to this day lacks a term equivalent to the German *Bürgertum* or the French *bourgeoisie* for this rather amorphous social group of what was called in the nineteenth century “middling men”; all three terms—middle class, *Bürgertum*, middling men—emphasize different aspects of the emergence and phenomenon of this social group. In the context here I will use all three notions for reasons to be explained.

The characteristics of the peacebuilders are similar to the social history, composition, and values of the European middle classes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and most particularly to what is called in German *Bildungs- und Beamtenbürgertum*. The German language allows differentiating the *Bürgertum* almost endlessly beyond the simple hierarchization of upper, middle, and lower classes, by adding a qualifying noun—the *Bildungsbürgertum*, the *Beamtenbürgertum*, the *Wirtschaftsbürgertum*, the *Industriebürgertum*, and so forth. Hence, variations in the middle classes' capital configurations, which result in varying social field structures, are more easily traceable.<sup>13</sup>

The conceptual advantage of the English phrase, however, is that it expresses the key idea of this particular social group being situated in the middle—that is, between the worker and proletarian class, on the one hand, and the aristocracy, landed or wealthy, on the other.<sup>14</sup> It expresses the relational constitution of the group as being different from the others, notably as a result of having to earn a living with their professional work, as opposed to the rent income of the upper classes or the physical labor of the working classes.<sup>15</sup> The notion of middle classes was and has remained a clearly comparative and distinguishing term. In England, it became collapsed with the ideas of liberalism when the House of Com-

mons opened up to larger circles than the landed aristocracy. Through its emphasis on merit, private ownership, and hard work, liberalism became the political discourse used to justify the middle classes' entrance into the House of Commons at the expense of the lower classes.<sup>16</sup>

The German and French terms, on the other hand, place the stress on how this group is united and distinguished *at once* by culture, values, and material reproduction modes that originated in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, and the political changes that transformed Europe between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries.<sup>17</sup> The *Bürgertum* is not simply the other, whether the proletariat's or the aristocrat's other; they are a social group of their own, yet one with internal differentiations, particularities, and variations of commonly shared cultural themes. The term *Bürgertum* recognizes as well the particularity of this social class as different from others, and its related term *Bürgerlichkeit*, which will be further discussed in the second section of this book, designates an entire set of cultural, moral, political, and economic characteristics that underlie the novelty and difference of the *Bürgertum* as compared to other social classes.

These distinctive evolutions of the concepts of *Bürgertum* in Germany, middle classes in England, and *bourgeoisie* in France are, according to Reinhart Koselleck, the result of the different social-political histories of these countries.<sup>18</sup> Historically, the *Bürgertum*, *bourgeoisie*, or middle classes dialectically built their self-description around the reasons why they should be considered different from the nobility and the poor, and why this difference should give them a greater weight in political decisions.

Given this background, the usage of middle classes in a globalized context may, at first sight, appear odd. Yet, as the following discussion of peacebuilding as a social field will show, the twentieth century saw a globalization of the middle classes' claims of liberal normality. Academic research, as well as politics, still lacks a clear concept for designating this new, globally emerging social group—most probably because its emergence is not (yet) associated with a social relational positioning on a global level that would in any way resemble the emergence of the middle classes in nineteenth-century Europe.

The terms “global citizens,” “world citizens,” or “cosmopolitans” are commonly used but still desperately lack clear definitions and are ideologically imbued in claims of a liberal legacy—a problem discussed in more detail in chapter 5.<sup>19</sup> Alternatively, Leslie Sklair's, Bastiaan van Appeldoorn's and Naná de Graaff's, or Kees van der Pijl's critical notion of the “transnational classes” derives from a focus on professions and

maintains a clear Marxist ring (which tends to reify social groups).<sup>20</sup> Post-modern notions of “vagabonds and tourists” are deliberately free from ideological references, yet throw out the baby with the bathwater when they avoid altogether the question of the social, political, and economic positioning of the emerging transnational social groups in world society and politics.<sup>21</sup> For the purposes of this study, I will stick with the term middle classes as it nicely encapsulates the relational logic of distinction. Furthermore, its inherent etymological lack of political meaning allows for the moment the exploration of the exact political significance of peacebuilders as global middle classes. Its manifold usage also makes it difficult to reify *the* middle class a priori; rather, the middle needs to be situated empirically.<sup>22</sup>

The first group of peacebuilders surrounding Hammarskjöld display in a most remarkable way characteristics of the European middle classes: wage income generated through professional merit and achievement; social positions built on education and expert knowledge; a high value attached to self-education and self-promotion; a declared distance from the lower classes; and a value orientation toward “statist” governance.

Bunche’s life and career are a particularly good example for the observation that social positioning is a complex and dynamic process of creating, maintaining, and reducing social distances in a given social and political space. For Bunche, this game had to be played on several levels. As a black man he had to position himself with respect to the dominant white U.S. society; as an educated Negro he had to position himself with respect to the wider black community in the still racially segregated United States of the 1930s to the 1960s. As an American black man and Africanist he had to position himself with respect to worldwide racial and colonial relations.<sup>23</sup> As an educated man who would work throughout his life in public service he had to position himself in a classical middle-class manner as distinct from the working class and distinct from a privilege-based upper class. Finally, as a liberal he had to distinguish himself in a world of raging ideological doctrines. These various processes of distinction came together in his self-positioning as a radically unpretentious middle-class man, assimilated into the dominant white American and liberal modern society.

Already as a student at UCLA, Bunche appeared in public with a moderate discourse on black advancement through education. His political views on overcoming racial segregation in the United States became more radical in the 1930s when he became an assistant professor at Howard University and staged a Young Turk revolt in the NAACP (the

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the oldest and for a long time the most powerful political organization of blacks in the United States). At this time, he defended Marxist, yet integrationist, views in a losing attempt to overthrow the NAACP's leadership and in a fierce attack on the pioneer of black consciousness, W. E. B. Du Bois.<sup>24</sup> Bunche's Marxism all but disappeared at the end of the 1930s when he came into close contact with the social-democrat Gunnar Myrdal, when extreme ideologies rose to the fore during World War II, and when in 1941 he found employment as an Africanist in the newly created Office of Strategic Services, a wartime intelligence agency that was the predecessor of the CIA.

However, he remained a fervent lifelong opponent of black nationalism, whether in the United States or abroad, and much of his antagonism to the anticolonial nationalist Patrice Lumumba in the Congo stemmed from his visceral dislike of all forms of celebration of *négritude*. Fundamentally, Bunche would argue throughout his life that the Negro was no different, ethnically, culturally, or racially, from any other American or, for that matter, any other human being in the world.<sup>25</sup> After the Second World War in particular, Bunche would argue that the advancement of the American Negro had to be based not only on equal and open access to education and to the country's political and economic spheres, but also on each individual's own efforts, hard work, and sense of achievement. In a strictly liberal train of thought, Bunche considered civil rights as an indispensable yet sufficient condition to solve the race problem—a turnaround from earlier, much more radical positions that distanced him even further from the black political leadership of the time. Du Bois's scathing comment that "Ralph Bunche is getting to be a white folks' nigger" is just one telling example of this estrangement.<sup>26</sup>

A loyal civil servant of the U.S. State Department, Bunche participated in the founding conferences of the United Nations as an Africa expert. Ever since the war, he had pursued in his rare public speeches a discourse of defending democracy and advocating social engineering. Notwithstanding his own prewar observations of the greater racial intermingling in Paris and London, Bunche developed a patriotic discourse of the superiority of American democracy over continental democracies because of the U.S.'s lack of colonies. His fervent attacks on colonialism and his steady pleas for a mandate system eventually earned him his post as chair of the Trusteeship Council, his ticket to the newly founded UN, where he would remain until his death in 1971.

Bunche's trajectory was largely determined by his huge capacity for

work but also by his ardent ambition to gain positions in society, which he thought hard work would earn him. His rejection of black nationalism was entirely consistent with his self-conscious rise into leading positions within the civil service and politics where he made occasional appearances in the civil rights movement in the 1960s. For Bunche, having been poor or having been born black were not particular reasons to be fundamentally different; they were simply obstacles to overcome in order to be “normal”—in order to live, earn an income, and work the same as any white, middle-class American.<sup>27</sup>


Brian Urquhart chose well the title of the biography he wrote about his former boss—Ralph Bunche: *An American Life*. As much as Hammarskjöld or Bunche himself might have pleaded national neutrality in the UN and particularly during the Congo crisis, Bunche is remembered today as a hero of the postwar American middle-class dream.<sup>28</sup>

### *Networks and Social Capital*

Social capital, understood as the wealth of private and professional connections a person can mobilize, is particularly important for the professional trajectory of individuals, as recruitment into missions was and, as will be shown below, still is highly dependent on the good will of the Secretary-General, on the one hand, and the involved states, on the other hand. No one is appointed a special representative or any other professional position in a UN mission on his or her professional merits alone. The candidate also needs to have sufficient credibility and trust from all involved actors. Nationality can, again, play a role here in the sense that candidates from neutral or noninvolved states are naturally considered more trustworthy. At the same time, certain missions and positions also represent national preserves. For instance, the under-secretary-general for political affairs had been throughout the Cold War a Soviet diplomat; the position had been, indeed, created by Hammarskjöld for the express purpose of allowing the Soviet Union to hold a key position in the Secretariat General.

Again, the Congo mission is a good starting point for understanding the closely knit, yet hierarchically differentiated, network structures of the peacebuilding field, as figure 1 shows. In terms of social capital, it is important to emphasize that all those who were appointed to senior positions subsequent to Khrushchev's September attacks had already been working for the UN either as full-time or occasionally seconded staff





**Fig. 1. Network analysis of the Congo mission**

**Legend:** The figure shows a network representation of the first peacebuilding mission in the Congo with a number of central personalities: the UN Secretary-General and senior UN officials, the heads of mission and their closest collaborators, and politicians (Mongi Slim, Jawaharlal Nehru) involved in their selection (nodes). The links represent the information flow (who informed whom). The figure clearly shows Dag Hammarskjöld's central position as well as the centrality of Ralph Bunche and Brian Urquhart. It also shows peripheral networks, for example, between Max Dorsinville, Bibiano Osario-Tafall, and Galo Plaza Lasso, who worked together again in Cyprus.

from other countries. Most, if not all, were personally known to Hammarskjöld, and later to his successor, U Thant. In order to calm Soviet indignation, Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru suggested a couple of candidates to Hammarskjöld in October 1960.<sup>29</sup> He was supported in this initiative by Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah. One of the people recommended was Rajeshwar Dayal, with whom Hammarskjöld had had friendly relations since his own arrival at the UN in 1954 when Dayal was a member of India's permanent mission to the UN.<sup>30</sup>

The head of the Tunisian permanent mission to the UN and later foreign minister of Tunisia, Mongi Slim, had also been instrumental in making staffing proposals that strengthened the nonaligned contingent of the UN in the Congo. In the tense atmosphere of mutual suspicion and accusations, the Secretary-General, too, was careful to appoint only staff of whose loyalty he could be reassured. If not based on his own experience with loyal service, he relied on references he trusted. Slim had been working with Hammarskjöld since 1957 when he was part of the special commission set up by the Secretary-General to investigate the 1956 uprising against the Soviets in Hungary.<sup>31</sup>

In some cases Hammarskjöld's references could be as extraordinary as a book he liked. Conor Cruise O'Brien reports having been recruited as special representative to Elisabethville in the Congo because Hammarskjöld had been an enthusiastic reader of his analysis of Catholic writers, *Maria Cross*.<sup>32</sup> However, Hammarskjöld might also have been impressed by O'Brien's record as head of the Irish permanent mission to the UN.

Although new to the Congo mission, very few staffers were, in fact, new to the UN. Sture Linnér, Hammarskjöld's classmate and his brother's business partner, was a notable exception to this rule. Indeed, many of the later Congo staff had worked with and under Bunche in the trusteeship council. Rajeshwar Dayal and Galo Plaza Lasso had formed with Hammarskjöld the directorship of the UN observation mission in Lebanon. Later on, too, the staff from the Congo mission came together in various other contexts to form new teams. Bibiano Osorio-Tafall and Max Dorsinville would work together again in the UN mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Urquhart, F. T. Liu, General Indarjit Rikhye, and Robert Gardiner would continue to work in various functions for Bunche, who became under-secretary-general for special political affairs from 1961 until his death ten years later.

Hammarskjöld thus initiated a practice in the UN of appointing his own cabinet, which gave the appearance of reflecting the political and geographical diversity of the UN, yet which was, in reality, based on a close-knit network. At a minimum, personal acquaintance and ties ensured that staff would remain loyal to the Secretariat. In times of high pressure on the Secretariat, when missions were disputed (as was the case in 1960s), the mission could only be upheld through this network.<sup>33</sup>

Hammarskjöld was the driver of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, so it is necessary to quickly analyze his special status, which was due not only to his thinking and initiatives (which will be explored in more detail in chapter 5) but also to his outstanding economic, educational, and social capital. Every subsequent Secretary-General (but most particularly

Annan) referred to this overwhelming figure as an inspiration and as a guide for the UN's peace politics. The veneration accorded to Hammarskjöld is well documented in Urquhart's and, more recently, Manuel Fröhlich's biographies.<sup>34</sup> Hammarskjöld's persona had shaped this particular network and in a much larger sense the field of peacebuilding in a much more profound way than simply being the chief of the UN administration. He was also the "patrician" of this first small group of peacebuilders and an example of what I will discuss below as the first tier of the peacebuilding field.

Hammarskjöld was born into a family of civil servants and high-ranking politicians. His father had been prime minister of Sweden and governor of Uppsala. The king of Sweden gave the family the name Hammarskjöld, which means "hammer and shield" in Swedish, in the nineteenth century for their loyal service. Dag Hammarskjöld's two brothers became a minister and a successful businessman, and when Hammarskjöld was invited to become Secretary-General of the United Nations he had already had a long career as a senior civil servant and minister in Sweden (he was minister of finance when appointed). Contrary to most other members of the Congo mission, Hammarskjöld held much higher economic and social capital, thanks to his family origins.

### *A Multitier Social Network Structure*

Overall, the first Congo mission reflects a multitier structure, with the individual with the highest concentration of economic, educational, and social capital—Hammarskjöld—at the top, followed by a very small and closed circle of senior officials—Bunche, Cordier, Wieschhoff, and on the brink, Urquhart—which rests on a further circle of senior administrators (e.g., Liu or Osorio-Tafall). Below them is a large pool of professionals who also circulate in horizontal networks.

### *The Top Tier of Special Representatives*

This kind of multitier structure of the peacebuilding field would be reproduced in later missions and is clearly visible in today's UN and peacebuilding organizations. The Secretary-General and his special representatives remain in a class of their own, while civilian staff in UN missions, and later on in other peacebuilding organizations and institutions,

circulate rather independently from this top tier and from each other. The networking structure of UN missions and the political bargaining around key positions such as special representatives have established a system in which high-level executives circulate in horizontal networks and vertical access from lower ranks within the UN or from within the larger peacebuilding field is very limited.

The number of special representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations has sharply increased since the 1980s. Yet the group of individuals who act as special representatives remains rather small, and many group members serve as head of mission or special representative in several missions. As in a large game of musical chairs, they move from one mission to the other. The more the mission is in the (mostly Western) public eye, and the more prestigious it is, the smaller the group of potential candidates for the post of head of mission and special representative of the Secretary-General.<sup>35</sup>

Figure 2 and table 2 show the carousel of a selection of special representatives.<sup>36</sup> They only show the current special representative's former function, but they do indicate how positions rotate among a selected few. Very few special representatives have come out of the UN career path. The common entrance to the special representative track is a national political, civil service, or diplomatic career. A large number of those listed have occupied political offices in their home country; some have even been heads of state or of government who find new employment after losing an election or are otherwise removed from power. Current examples include Nikolay Mladenov of Bulgaria, who is at the time of this writing special representative for Iraq and was formerly foreign minister of Bulgaria (2010–13). The conversion of the former president of East Timor, José Ramos-Horta, leader of the resistance movement in the 1980s and 1990s and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, into head of the UN mission in Guinea-Bissau after losing the election of 2012 exemplifies this trajectory.

Many special representatives previously have been permanent representatives of their home states at the UN. Many switch back and forth between national politics or civil service and senior postings in the UN. Bert Koenders's career is a good example: the Dutch minister of foreign affairs (at the time of this writing) was, until October 2014, head of mission of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was established in 2013. Before that, Koenders headed the UN mission in Côte d'Ivoire after having been minister for cooperation and a member of the Dutch parliament

**Table 2. Special Representatives (as of December 2014)**

Mission	Current head of mission/ Special representative (as of December 2014)	Previous positions of head of mission <sup>1</sup>	Predecessors at current mission
MONUSCO (Congo)	Martin Kobler (Germany)	UNAMI, 2011–12 UNAMA (Deputy Special Representative), 2009–11	Roger Meece (USA), 2011–12 Alan Doss (UK), 2007–10 William Lacy Swing (USA), 2003–7 Amos Namanga Ngongi (Cameroon), 2001–2 Kamel Morjane (Tunisia), 1999–2000 n.a.
MINUSMA (Mali)	Albert Gerard (Bert) Koenders (Netherlands)	UNOCI, 2011–12	
UNSOA (Somalia)	Augustine P. Mahiga (Tanzania)	Tanzania's permanent representative at UN	Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania), 2007–9
UNAMID (Darfur), joint African Union-UN mission	Abiodun Oluremi Bashua (Nigeria)	Head of Office of Joint Support and Coordination Mechanism of UNAMID	Winston A. Tubman (Liberia), 2002–6 Mohamed Ibn Chambas (Ghana), 2012–13 Ibrahim Gambari (Nigeria), 2010–11 Rodolphe Adada (Congo-Brazzaville), 2009
UNMISS (South Sudan)	Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark)	UNMIL, 2008–12	Jan Eliasson (Sweden), 2007–8 Hilde Frafjord Johnson (Norway), 2011–13
MINUSTAH (Haiti)	Sandra Honoré (Trinidad and Tobago)	Ambassador; Chief of Staff of Secretary General of OAS, 2000–2005	Mario Fernandez Amunategui (Chile), 2012–13 Edmond Mulet (Guatemala), 2011–12 Hedi Annabi (Tunisia), 2007–10 Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile), 2004–6

UNOCI (Cote d'Ivoire)	Aïchatou Mindaoudou (Niger)	Deputy Joint Special Representative (Political) and Acting Head for the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), 2012-13	Albert Gerard (Bert) Koenders, 2011-12
UNMIL (Liberia)	Karin Lindgren (Sweden)	Representative of the Secretary-General to Nepal, 2011-12	Ellen Margrethe Løj (Denmark), 2009-11
MINUSCA (BINUCA) (Central African Republic)	Babacar Gaye (Senegal)	Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Burundi and Head of the United Nations Mission in Burundi (BNUB)	Alan Doss (UK), 2005-7 Jacques P. Klein (USA), 2003-5
UNAMA (Afghanistan)	Jan Kubiš (Slovakia)	Assistant Secretary General and Military Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations Foreign Minister of Slovakia, 2006-9	Margaret Vogt (Nigeria), 2011-13
UNAMI (Iraq)	Nikolay Mladenov (Bulgaria)	Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2010-13	Staffan de Mistura (Italy/Sweden), 2009-11 Kai Eide (Norway), 2007-8 Tom Koenigs (Germany), 2006 Jean Arnault (France), 2004-5 Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), 2002-3 Martin Kobler (Germany), 2011-12 Ad Melkert (Netherlands), 2009-11 Staffan de Mistura (Sweden), 2007-8 Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria), 2004 Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil), 2003

**Table 2.—Continued**

Mission	Current head of mission/ Special representative (as of December 2014)	Previous positions of head of mission <sup>1</sup>	Predecessors at current mission
UNFICYP (Cyprus)	Espen Barth Eide (Norway)	Foreign Minister, 2013–14	Lisa M. Buitenhuis (USA), 2011–14 Taye-Brook Zerihoun (Ethiopia), 2008–10
			Alexander Downer (Australia) (special envoy), 2010–14 Elisabeth Spehar (Canada), 2008 Michael Møller (Denmark), 2006–8 Zbigniew Włosowicz (Poland), 2004–5 Alvaro de Soto (Peru), 2001–6 (special adviser)
			James Holger (Chile), 1999–2000 Dame Ann Hercus (New Zealand), 2000
			Diego Cordovez (Ecuador), 1997–98 (special adviser)
			Han Sung-joo (Korea), 1996–98
			Gustave Feissel (USA), 1994–96
			Joe Clark (Canada), 1993–96
			Oscar Camilión (Argentina), 1988–93
			James Holger (Chile), 1984–88
			Hugo Gobbbi (Argentina), 1980–84
			Reynaldo Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), 1978–80
			Remy George (Switzerland), 1977–78
			Javier Pérez de Cuellar (Peru), 1975–77
			Luis Weckmann-Muñoz (Mexico), 1974–75
			Bibiano Osorio-Tafall (Spain), 1967–74
			Pier P. Spinelli (Italy), 1967
			Carlos Bernardes (Brazil), 1965–67
			Galo Plaza Lasso (Ecuador), 1965
			Sakari Tuomioja (Finland), 1964

MINURSO (Western Sahara)	Kim Bolduc (Canada)	United Nations Resident Coordinator and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative in Panama, 2010–14 Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/ Humanitarian Coordinator for the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2010	Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber (Germany), 2012–14 Julian Harston (Kenya), 2009–11
UNMIK (Kosovo)	Farid Zarif (Afghanistan)	Director of the Europe and Latin America Division at DPKO	Lamberto Zannier (Italy), 2009–11 Joachim Rucker (Germany), 2007–8 Maarti Ahuissari (Finland) (special envoy), 2008 Søren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark), 2006 Harri Hermanni Holkeri (Finland), 2004–5 Kai Eide (Norway) (special envoy), 2005 Michael Steiner (Germany), 2003 Hans Haekerup (Denmark), 2001–2 Bernard Kouchner (France), 1999–2000 Sergio Vieira de Mello (Brazil) (special representative), 1994–99



**Table 2.—Continued**

Mission	Current head of mission/ Special representative (as of December 2014)	Previous positions of head of mission <sup>1</sup>	Predecessors at current mission
UNSMIL (Libya)	Bernardino León (Spain)	European Union Special Representative for Libya and European Union Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean, 2011–14	Tarek Mitri (Lebanon), 2012–14
BNUB (Burundi)	Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (Gabon)	Director of the Office of the Deputy Secretary General, 2007–12	Karin Lindgren (Sweden), 2011–12 Charles Petrie (UK), 2010 Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia), 2007–10 n.a.
UNIOGBIS (Guinea-Bissau)	José Ramos-Horta (Timor Leste)	President of Timor Leste, 2007–12	
UNSCOL (Lebanon, political mission)	Derek Plumbly (UK)	UK's Ambassador to Egypt, 2003–7	Michael Williams (UK), 2009–11

<sup>1</sup>Generally, only the last former function is mentioned except in cases where the person has had several successive UN functions in the peacebuilding area that do not show in the third column.

where he sat on the Defense Committee. In this function he participated in the parliamentary hearings on the role of the Dutch UNPROFOR battalion in the events in Srebrenica in 1995 and also served on other committees and commissions dealing with peacekeeping, postconflict reconstruction, and foreign affairs and defense. He had studied political science at the Free University of Amsterdam and earned a PhD from Johns Hopkins University. Since then his career has developed in the politico-diplomatic circles of the Netherlands; in European institutions including the NATO parliamentary assembly; and in high-ranking UN positions. Koenders moves in the network of domestic politics and senior positions in the UN, not in the network of international agencies and the civil servant circuit that Hammarskjöld had argued for in his advocacy of the international civil servant.<sup>37</sup>

Coming from an international organization, the most likely springboards into a special representative role are the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), or UNHCR. Conversely, former special representatives often become senior executives in international development or humanitarian organizations. For example, William Lacy Swing, a former special representative for Western Sahara and for the Congo, is now director general of the International Organization for Migration. Another pathway exists between other international organizations and the UN, most notably the OSCE, the African Union, or the Organization of American States. Senior executives of these regional organizations may be appointed special representatives, most commonly in hybrid missions; or, vice versa, they move from their field mission to regional organizations. Lamberto Zannier, for instance, became secretary-general of the OSCE after having been special representative for UNMIK.

Many also move on to the UN headquarters in New York or its regional offices (Geneva, Nairobi, and so forth). For example, the following have all held senior positions in field missions: Jan Eliasson, at the time of writing deputy secretary-general; Zainab Hawa Bangura, special representative on sexual violence in conflict; Ameerah Haq, under-secretary-general for field support; Leila Zerrougui, special representative for children in armed conflict; and Sahle-Work Zewde, director-general of the United Nations Office in Nairobi.

It is this separation from the UN and international agency career path that distinguishes the position of the high representative from the second tier of senior officials. It is also a strong indicator of the highly politicized role of the special representative. As the face of the mission,




Fig. 2. UN missions network structure

Legend: The graph shows the network structure of UN missions (selected missions as of fall 2014). Missions are connected to each other through the person of their head of mission. The network centers around the UN Secretariat General and is relatively dense around missions that are important to Security Council members and are very much in the public eye, for example, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria. Heads of mission move from one high-profile mission to the next or between the UN Secretary-General and other missions. Missions at the periphery are personally less connected to New York as they are either regionally embedded, for example, Kosovo, or of lesser importance to UN member states, the Security Council, and public opinion in powerful states, for example, Central Africa. Heads of mission in these missions tend to move in and out of the field but not to UN headquarters in New York.

they have a different diplomatic value. Their nationality is more easily subject to dispute. For states, the capacity to negotiate over the position of the special representative shows the degree of their influence over UN politics. Consequently, the posts of the high representatives, of heads of mission, and of under-secretary-generals are much more prone than other positions to become national fiefdoms. The more visible the post, the higher the salience of the occupant’s geographic provenance.<sup>38</sup> As Paul Novosad and Eric Werker have pointedly observed in their study of UN senior officials, the very top positions tend to be occupied by people from a very limited number of states, and some countries, including China and Russia, have historically been consistently and significantly under-represented.<sup>39</sup> Other countries that are more actively engaged in the UN have, on the other hand, effectively locked down specific positions. Since the mid-1990s, for instance, the position of the under-secretary-general for peacekeeping has been continuously held by a Frenchman, whereas the position of chef de cabinet (chief of staff) has remained occupied since Chakravarthi Narasimhan’s time by a representative of a UN member from the global South.

With respect to their sociological outlook, the special representatives reproduce the pattern established early on with the first mission in the Congo. The heads of mission or special representatives from Western states are commonly from middle-class or upper-middle-class backgrounds, while those from the global South clearly come from wealthy and upper-class backgrounds. For example, Winston A. Tubman, the special representative to Somalia from 2002 to 2007, is the nephew of Liberia’s longest-serving president, William Tubman.<sup>40</sup> Exceptions exist, but they remain exceptions—for example, Ismat Kittani, the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Somalia and chef de cabinet under Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, is said to have seen electrical light for the first time only at the age of twelve.<sup>41</sup>

The key to understanding these differences in economic family background lies in access to higher education. Education in the Northern Hemisphere and if possible in a global top-ten institution like Oxford, Cambridge, and Harvard remains the minimal requirement for securing a leading UN position. Hence, almost all top-tier senior officials have studied in one of the world’s top universities. Again, exceptions exist and most particularly those senior officials who are seconded by regional organizations are more often locally educated. But, generally speaking, a top-ten university diploma remains an entry ticket to this upper circle of senior officials. Yet, in order to study in such an institution, a per-

son from a global South country must have access to greater financial capital than a person from Europe or North America (or Japan for that matter). This starts with the family's ability to provide for an English-language education good enough to prepare the student for university entrance exams. Without scholarships, families also have to provide for much higher tuition fees, accommodation, and travel costs for their children who study abroad. Consequently, graduates from the global South are commonly from wealthier families than their OECD counterparts. The few special representatives who, like Kittani, originate from poor backgrounds studied with scholarships in universities in the Northern Hemisphere (just like Urquhart or Bunche).

In terms of educational capital and culture it is obvious that all senior officials have benefited from the same type of higher education, which should become a commonly shared marker not only with respect to the knowledge and epistemology acquired but also in the so-called soft skills of researching information, writing reports, and communicating, as well as more general views of what is worthy to be known, understood, and processed within the realm of their jobs. However, remarkably, the humanities and classics studies that dominated the educational background of senior staff in the 1960s have given way to the social sciences—particularly economics and law, but also political science. Natural sciences are, nevertheless, still not represented.

The group of senior officials does, indeed, represent a specific *social* class. Their careers and social backgrounds are rather similar, and most notably their socialization path is most similar with a shared educational background and a shared career experience. This results, unsurprisingly, in quite close networks, which allow Koenders and others to move between national politics and the UN.

Nationality does play a role, but more as a political bargaining chip. Even seconded senior officials will not, in all cases, act as spokesperson for their home country or in the explicit interest of this country; however, as Novosad and Werker also conclude from their study, it is likely that their worldviews, perceptions, ideational frames, and policy choices are much closer to those of people who share their domestic politics background than to those of the local population or even a broader international agency arena.<sup>42</sup> Yet, it is also very likely that the commonly shared educational background, the tightness of the professional network, and the dominance of the humanist globalization discourse (which will be discussed in more detail in later chapters) also lead to a high degree of ideological affinity. This does not include serious conflict over practicali-

ties or execution. Yet it is unlikely that anyone in a senior position in the peacebuilding field will largely depart from a broadly defined *doxa* (to be discussed in the second section of this book).

### *The International Agency Network*

Below and next to the circuit of the special representatives is the career track of high senior officials of the rank of directors of specific services or project managers. Here, much greater mobility between positions and between agencies can be observed. These positions are less visible than the head of mission or special representative posts; they allow for greater flexibility; and they are seldom the object of strenuous bargaining between the Secretariat General and involved states. Consequently, nationality plays a less important role and career paths resemble more the conventional senior executive manager model than do those of the special representatives—although here, too, the range of countries from which peacebuilders originate is limited. Large countries like Russia and China are, nevertheless, frequently underrepresented, as are most countries of the global South.

Novosad and Werker find in their study that citizens from Western countries held over 45 percent of the senior positions in the UN Secretariat General in 2007. This confirms the finding of the great weight of nationals from high-income countries in the field of peacebuilding, most notably in the UN. The 2012 survey for this book, which captured not only UN but also other peacebuilding staff, included all salary categories modeled on the salary scale of the UN, from technical and administrative staff to professionals and directors, but respondents came from only fifty-three countries. Respondents from the salary range, which required at least a basic university-level degree, came from an ever more restricted range of countries—specifically, forty-two countries.

Even though not representative per se, this number indicates that only a small number of all UN member states provide professionals with university degrees to the peacebuilding field.<sup>43</sup> Of those, high-income countries are again disproportionately represented. In this sample, more than seventy of the university graduate professionals come from industrialized high-income countries and none come from low-income countries.<sup>44</sup> Importantly, the family origin of most respondents reflected the huge disproportion between the geographic representation in peacebuilding and in the world. While more than two-thirds of the respon-

dents' parents were born in Europe or North America, only some 10 percent of the peacebuilders' parents were born in Asia, the most populated continent. South America was even less represented in this sample. Again, it has to be kept in mind that this sample is not stochastically representative; yet these figures match up well with the findings of Novosad and Werker on the preponderance of a small number of nations.

Again, the tacit requirement of a university degree from a top university of a Northern industrialized high-income country seems to be a significant marker for peacebuilders in the top range. The prosopographic analysis shows that almost 94 percent of the staff surveyed earned their postgraduate degree from a university in an industrialized, high-income country.<sup>45</sup> Given that more than 60 percent (and more than 80 percent of the professional) of respondents have a postgraduate degree, this means that the passage through an educational institution in an industrialized high-income country is almost obligatory. Within this category of postgraduates, about a third graduated from fifteen elite universities: the London School of Economics, Columbia University, the University of Oxford, New York University, Harvard University, Johns Hopkins University, Tufts University, King's College London, School of Oriental and Asian Studies, George Washington University, Princeton University, Georgetown University, the Graduate Institute of Geneva, the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (better known as Sciences Po), and the University of Cambridge.

University education is furthermore hereditary, at least in both survey waves (2008 and 2012) of this book: the large majority of peacebuilders come from families where one if not both parents graduated from a university. About 60 percent of the respondents' fathers graduated from university; however, only about 40 percent of their mothers were graduates. The most common household constellation was a father who was/is an engineer, teacher, or working in a liberal profession (accountant, lawyer, doctor, and so forth) and a mother who was/is a housewife, nurse, or school teacher. Roughly 10 percent of the survey subjects' parents had no degree at all; an even lower percentage of respondents indicated that their parents had worked/work in low-skilled occupations.

There also seems to be a relationship between the parents' education and the peacebuilders' current position, although the sample is too small to establish valid correlations. However, in the group of professionals above P2 pay level, the percentage of fathers who graduated from a university is higher and the percentage of fathers who have no degree drops below 10.




Fig. 3. Highest university degree

The effect is even stronger in the case of the mothers' education. If only the group of professionals is considered, the percentage of mothers with at least a high school degree rises from roughly 50 percent to over 60 percent. The family constellation also changes markedly in the smaller sample of only professionals: mothers work more, for the category of housewives is less represented, and most work as nurses or teachers. In the range of fathers' occupations, business and management become much more prominent than engineering or teaching. Consequently, one can conclude that this group of peacebuilders comes predominantly from families that are economically at ease if not overly wealthy. These people grew up in households where education was/is cherished and where mothers often dedicated their time to the family and, most probably, to their children's education in and outside of school.

The implications of this short sociological survey are multifold as they allow inferences on social class and social mobility. Bourdieu's own work, notably his study on schooling and educational achievement with Jean-Claude Passeron,<sup>46</sup> has elaborated how closely related education choices are with socioeconomic background and social class origins.<sup>47</sup> Analyzing the achievements of French school pupils, notably in their final exams and university entrance exams, the two sociologists found a close relationship between the parents' income and education and their children's success in school. They notably elaborated that the rigid



examination system of French schools did not promote equality, but, on the contrary, allowed children with substantial cultural and social capital inherited from their families to excel while discriminating against children who did not have access to high levels of cultural capital and income (expressed, for instance, in the number of books in the home or the frequency of theater or museum visits).<sup>48</sup> Subsequent studies have shown that, indeed, there is a strong link between achievement and cultural capital as well as family support.<sup>49</sup> Children who achieve well in school and who obtain high-paying jobs later on are more likely to be from families with a higher socioeconomic status that highly value education and, additionally, transmit specific cultural capital. This does not mean that socioeconomic status per se is a predictor of educational success (and some studies indicate that it is not), yet the family background and notably a “scholarly culture”—that is, the promotion of curiosity, reading books, and solving problems—strongly influence educational success, independently from national educational cultures, grade in school, or the pedagogic methods employed in schools.<sup>50</sup>

In the case of peacebuilders, their (minimum) bilingualism is also a strong indicator for a relatively wealthy family background in which education is highly important. All survey respondents say that English is the language they use the most in their daily lives; 67 percent indicate that this is the language they speak most often. However, only some 19 percent of the sample are nationals of English-speaking countries. Of course, the dominance of English as a lingua franca is not surprising in international organizations. Yet this points to the high frequency of bilingualism, or even multilingualism. As a common language, English is followed by French (13 percent) and other European languages (German, Spanish, Russian, and so forth). In total, more than 95 percent of the most common languages peacebuilders used in daily life are European languages.

However, when asked which languages apart from English they speak, survey respondents mention more than forty-five additional languages, including numerous African languages (e.g., Swahili, Yoruba, Fula, and Wolof) and languages of mission sites (e.g., Albanian, Tetun, and Tajik). This means that the large majority of peacebuilders in this survey have not only learned English (or French) as a second language, they have also, most frequently, learned a third or even fourth language, if from a non-English speaking country, or have made the effort to become immersed in the local language, or both.

Yet language education in schools is very uneven across the world. In all countries, second or third language acquisition is highly depen-

dent on the schooling system, on national language policies, and on the country’s position in the world. While smaller countries and former colonies often actively and successfully promote multilingualism, second language acquisition in U.S. or U.K. schools is a clear marker of elite education as very few public school pupils learn foreign languages to a high standard.<sup>51</sup> European states also actively promote the acquisition of a second language, usually English, and further languages, usually other European languages such as French, German, Spanish, Russian, or, most recently, languages of states that are considered important for world politics or the world economy, such as Mandarin Chinese or Arabic. Languages of former colonies or of smaller states are rarely or not at all taught in schools in bigger states or former colonial states (while English is the second official language of India, there is not one single state school in England teaching Hindi). However, former colonies are often the states in which peacebuilding interventions take place. Consequently, you’re much more likely to find English or French speakers among the local staff than to find, for instance, a Fula-speaking foreign peacebuilder.

In developing countries, learning English (and to a lesser extent French) at a level that allows postgraduate studies in an Anglophone (or Francophone) university (as most peacebuilders have completed) requires access to high-quality schools. In countries with low literacy and schooling rates, such institutions are commonly available only in major cities, usually in the capital city, and only with sufficient family support. In some countries quality education is not available at all, and affluent parents send their children to boarding schools abroad. This, too, explains why peacebuilders from developing countries with the same educational capital and job positioning are often from families with higher economic capital than their colleagues from industrialized countries.

For the peacebuilding field this indicates that the middle-class, high educational culture environment to which Bunche and his like aspired in their own lives and that of their children<sup>52</sup> has become the standard culture of the field. Only a very small minority of the peacebuilders in the sample for this book come from low socioeconomic status backgrounds, and even in these cases it is likely that the respondents’ families strongly emphasized school success and adopted education as their own value.<sup>53</sup>

The middle-class background of peacebuilders finds further expression in their leisure behavior as well as their travels. Peacebuilders’ leisure activities are first of all characterized as travel light, that is, they require little equipment and are practiced quite universally (soccer, jogging, yoga). Asked how they spend their spare time, the respondents

answered overwhelmingly that they read newspapers, novels, and journals, listen to music, and . . . travel. Many peacebuilders regularly play sports, yet, here, too, they prefer sports that don't require travel, that can be practiced alone, and that require little equipment (running, swimming, yoga). Expensive sports such as skiing and scuba diving are also on the list, as are other high-culture activities such as going to the movies or visiting museums. Typically, popular culture activities, most notably crafts, collecting, or other do-it-yourself endeavors, are entirely absent.

The internationality of the peacebuilders' lives, which is manifest even before they enter the field, is probably the most distinctive feature of this social group. Apart from the multilingualism discussed above, it is also worth mentioning that a large group are married to or live with partners of a different nationality.<sup>54</sup> Almost all spent time abroad before working in the peacebuilding field, either during their studies or in the time between their studies and their first job. Many survey respondents said that being part of an international community, and being able to travel and discover foreign countries and people, were some of their prime motivations to work in the peacebuilding field.

### *The Third Tier: Technical and Administrative Staff, or the Locals*

This interest in travel is ideally shared by the third tier of peacebuilding staff, the technical and administrative staff of field missions. Yet, practically, this staff is the least likely to have traveled. Technical and administrative staffers are commonly recruited locally, and despite their qualities and qualifications are much less mobile than professional staff. These job categories comprise financial and accounting services, logistics and warehouse management, maintenance, building, repair, and basic information services, as well as clerical jobs. These job categories are the least specialized and specific to a peacebuilding mission; they are therefore more likely to be nationally protected job categories, which makes it difficult to justify visa applications to bring in foreign nationals. Additionally, the wage difference between countries is likely to be very large in these job categories, which makes it attractive for organizations to recruit locally rather than to expatriate staff. Consequently, visa restrictions and limited career opportunities reduce enormously the mobility of this category of staff. Given the high importance of university degrees, local staff are also less competitive in applying for more highly valued and paid jobs when their degrees are from local universities or their

professions do not require a degree at all. Hence, this category of staff is likely to move in horizontal networks that are geographically limited. They might move geographically in limited zones, for example, from one African conflict zone to another, but they are very unlikely to move from the mission grounds to headquarters, or to move into Northern-based organizations.

The staffers in this group tend to see themselves differently from the professional staff of the second tier. In interviews, members of this group spoke about their feeling of being set apart and being different; some even felt that their employer discriminated against them by emphasizing specific types of educational degrees, knowledge, and skills that ignored the technical staff's abilities. Commonly these staff members saw themselves as more deeply rooted in the host society and more attuned to the problems on the ground. They consider localism as a resource to which the international staffers have no access, or, at least, not the same access they have. Interviewees employed outside their home country expressed this feeling of being more connected to the “real world” by sharing experiences of relative poverty and deprivation, or origins in a Third World country.

Interviewees in this category who did manage the jump from the local to the international level, for example, by working in headquarters in New York, Geneva, or other central cities of the development and aid world, emphasized the cost of this move. All interviewed had gained additional qualifications in order to obtain some professional expertise that would allow them to overcome visa restrictions. Once successfully moved to a high-income country, many sought to settle by bringing in their families, and employment with the international agency became twice as existential—their own stay not only depended on their continued employment but also that of their families. They followed a common pattern of high-skilled migration as they were subject to the same constraints as other high-skilled migrants. The fact that they were working for international organizations or nongovernmental organizations had far less impact on their geographical and professional mobility than it had on the first and second tier, in large part due to their lack of educational capital.

### *Conclusion*

The Congo mission set out a specific sociological profile of the peace-

builder as *Bildungsbürger* or *Beamtenbürger*, even though for first-generation peacebuilders such as Bunche or Urquhart this social position had to be gained through scholarships and educational success. By now, this profile has become the standard in the peacebuilding field. Roughly speaking, most peacebuilders at the professional level come from middle-income and upper-income families and have enjoyed a very high level of education. They are in every aspect cosmopolitan: they are polyglots, have frequently traveled, and are highly educated, independent, and mobile in their leisure activities and social networks.

The field is marked by an internal hierarchy of three horizontal professional network systems that allow little passage between them. At the top, the high elite of special representatives and heads of mission consists of a small circle of senior officials from international organizations, national diplomatic services, or national politics. This group has, generally speaking and with some exceptions, higher economic and educational capital than the second tier, but, more important, they also have different social capital. Their social capital draws on connections to other senior position holders in the UN, in international organizations, and in national politics—and it is these connections that allow them to be considered for such high-ranking positions in the first place. Opportunities for newcomers in this top tier are scarce. Rather, positions rotate through a set of persons who meet the highly selective criteria of the politicized bargaining in the global governance system.

In the second tier, rotation in the job is also highly dependent on networks, as will be discussed in chapter 4. The group of peacebuilders in this tier is also highly homogenous in terms of sociological characteristics, particularly family backgrounds. Similar to those in the top-tier group, they can safely be called “cosmopolitan” as they are polyglots, widely traveled, and highly educated. Their mobility and their education in a select number of universities in industrialized OECD countries distinguishes this group from the third tier of technical and administrative support staff. This group, although equally multilingual, is less mobile and more locally rooted. They see themselves as distinct from the professionals.

The professional and income stratification of the peacebuilding field reflects similar developments in labor markets in Western liberal market economies over the past thirty years. Large corporations have developed new models of management in which the decentralizing and delayering of management structures has led to more independent horizontal career paths with fewer vertical trajectories.<sup>55</sup> This has been accompanied by rising job insecurity and increased flexibility through the use of

contract labor, developments also observed in the peacebuilding field with its high employment fragmentation. Tight networks can be seen as a response to growing job insecurity and the increasing diversity of the labor market, which reduces visibility for recruitment (hence, a greater reliance on known values like elite university education) and increases the mutual dependence of employees (hence, greater opportunity hoarding). This in turn reduces opportunities for vertical career trajectories and reinforces the layered structure of the peacebuilding field.

This hierarchical structure and its sociological characteristics point to the boundaries of the field. The key to any position in the peacebuilding field is access to higher education and, here, to top institutions. Yet the acquisition of the educational capital that allows such studies is not equally distributed. On the contrary, it is highly dependent on preexisting social structures and economic production structures. The constitution of the core of the peacebuilding field closely follows the evolution of societies in Western liberal democracies. While the first generation of peacebuilders represented a group of socially mobile individuals who typically achieved high-ranking positions through their educational and work merit, later generations are rather heirs of their parents' middle-class or upper-class status, which allows them access to top-ten universities and, through them, access to jobs in the peacebuilding field.

This trajectory is similar to careers in Western liberal democracies. In-depth studies in the United Kingdom and the United States have found that social mobility hinges enormously on education and family background.<sup>56</sup> Not surprisingly, given the high value of education, social mobility is contingent on equal access to high-quality education.<sup>57</sup> Countries with high inequality in access to quality education have accordingly lower levels of social mobility, which in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom also correlates with high levels of income inequality.<sup>58</sup>

This configuration is mirrored in world society. Access to quality education is extremely unequal around the world, and it is almost impossible for a resident of a country in the global South to compete with residents in the global North. By all standard indicators—books and libraries per inhabitant, university rankings, school instruction in English, or simply books available in native languages—the educational offerings of countries in the global South lag tremendously behind those in advanced, industrialized high-income countries.<sup>59</sup> If access to top universities is already heavily restricted for lower social classes in these countries, it is entirely out of reach for lower social classes in the global South.