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The Distinction of Peace

Goetze, Catherine

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
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Introduction



This book is not about peace. This book is about the social structures of power in globalization processes. Peacebuilding is a globalization process, and an extremely important one, as it provides the fundamental *raison d'être* of the United Nations system. The people, organizations, institutions, and agencies that claim to build peace in foreign lands exist and act on the grounds of specific patterns of power and domination in the world. Knowing of and about peace, doing peace, and building peace are practices of distinction in global processes. This book dissects how these power patterns shape a social interaction field, namely peacebuilding. I argue that peacebuilding exists because it has become for a sufficiently large number of people and institutions with sufficiently important authority an unquestioned way of political action in the world and, on a more individual level, a way of making a living (in the full sense of the word).

Peacebuilding has no proper definition, as the term is shorthand for many different activities conducted in countries and societies riddled by violent conflict, including humanitarian assistance, demilitarization and demobilization, human rights education, police force training, administration, and rights. It is often indistinctively used as synonym for statebuilding, democratization, humanitarian intervention, or peacemaking—peacebuilding's definition all too often depends on the contexts and actors. In this book I focus particularly on those contexts where the United Nations (UN) has been, or still is, leading military

and civilian peace missions. However, even in this restricted sense peacebuilding comprises a large variety of activities and is realized by many diverse actors, and not only by the UN itself. Peacebuilding is, therefore, a notoriously unbounded phenomenon that takes very different practical and visible forms in various environments. While peacebuilding in one context can be particularly characterized by humanitarian activities, it might be the judicial and legal reconstruction efforts that mark out peacebuilding in another.

For the purposes of this book, these differences do not really matter *sui generis*, but they do matter enormously for the field itself. In practice, they differentiate actors from one another, and they create boundaries of distinction. The title of the book draws these two phenomena—distinction and peace—together as I presume that the way actors aim to build peace is an important matter of distinction. Clearly, the key conflict in the peacebuilding field is over the authority to define what peace is and how it should be built. Engaging in this quarrel in one way or the other makes an actor part of the peacebuilding field; and actors engage by taking part in a competitive, and sometimes conflictual, struggle over authority in the field.

Power can be gauged by the recognition and authority actors have in devising their ways of building peace. The configuration of actors in the field reflects global patterns of domination. This book investigates those patterns and how they play out in the field of peacebuilding. They stem from various sources and not only from the peacebuilding activity *per se*. The book takes a sociological approach by investigating particularly who the people actually are who do peacebuilding: What are their socioeconomic backgrounds, their education, and their networks? Not everybody can become a peacebuilder, and not everybody wants to become a peacebuilder. Those who do so will have followed (and are still following) a personal and professional trajectory that is particular to peacebuilding and global governance. Their trajectories shape the peacebuilding field, and their individual and policy choices are, in turn, shaped by the field's structures of opportunity and power.

The notion of field is borrowed from the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu whose concepts have guided the research of this book. "Field" is an empirical tool of analysis, not a theoretical concept. Fields are spanned by the relations between agents that build up if they interact over an important stake; who, when, where, how, why they do so, all these questions need to be assessed empirically. Approaching peacebuilding from the perspective of looking at fields is very different from an insti-

tutionalist perspective. If peacebuilding is considered to be a field, institutions, like the UN, are considered as agents that interact with other agents. This interaction and the relationship, direct and indirect, that they form constitute the agents. They are positioned with respect to each other in a wider web of relations. The field perspective shifts the observation's view from the units to the relations and the relational web they form. This allows capturing how agents *live*, as they are understood in their dynamics of acting and reacting to each other.

Institutions of global governance—the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations, development agencies, and so forth—are not neutral bundles of rules, norms, and decision-making procedures, as many institutionalist theorists in international relations argue. On the contrary, institutions are filled with real people who have real ideas, interests, tastes, likes, and dislikes, and who work together to achieve not only abstract, institutional goals but also their own personal goals, furthering their own professional careers. They are “distinguished” people, too, and building peace is a way of situating themselves in the world and in the wider social group they are part of. Peacebuilding has thus developed its own dynamics, similar to other socio-professional fields, by generating its own career paths and conditions, and by being populated by a growing number of people for whom peacebuilding is a way of life.

As missions, finances, and personnel deployed to postconflict zones have expanded over the past two decades, peacebuilding has become a major area of research in international studies. A substantial body of literature shows clearly, even though not unanimously, that international peace interventions have an ambiguous effect on so-called postconflict societies. Even if they succeed in reducing armed violence or ending war, interventions often perpetuate or even reinforce the social cleavages on the ground. Peacebuilding propels these countries into bizarre states of global dependencies and suspends them in neither-nor states where conflicts are not outright violent but have not stopped tearing up society.¹ Even if they end war, peace missions rarely build definitive peace.

A wide variety of practical factors have been identified as being responsible for the mixed balance sheet of peacebuilding, from local resistance to organizational contradictions, which build up to form serious stumbling blocks to peacebuilding. The literature ranges from principally supportive analyses, which tend to place blame for peacebuilding's successes or failures on factors external to the UN or peacebuilders more generally,² to highly critical accounts, which disparage peacebuilding as a new form of global social engineering and an international way

of disciplining unruly territories and populations.³ Many authors propose different and (putatively) better ways to build peace, such as by integrating local forces more deeply⁴ or seeking to improve the internal functioning of all or certain aspects of the organizations that undertake peacebuilding, most notably the UN.⁵

The question of the efficiency and success of peacebuilding is a question of the problem-solving type, to take up the differentiation Robert Cox introduced more than thirty years ago between problem solving and critical thinking about world politics.⁶ He noted that these two perspectives differ substantially in their epistemological and political aims as well as in their ontology of world politics. While the problem-solving perspective

takes [the world] as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized as the given framework for action . . . the critical approach leads towards the construction of a larger picture of the whole and seeks to understand . . . processes of change.⁷

The largest part of research into peacebuilding is concerned with its efficacy and question of whether there are not better ways to build peace than those currently deployed. This literature by and large accepts (a) that peacebuilding is, indeed, legitimate to build peace in foreign lands, and (b) that its failure to do so is due to some form of technical or organizational dysfunction that can be fixed by some twists and tweaks. The question is to find the right screws to turn, and peacebuilding will build peace.

Recently, this research has taken a “local turn” and has proposed to look for those screws at the interface between peacebuilders and local populations. This research is inscribed in a large variety of methodological traditions, from classical political science theorizing about rational actor’s bargaining to the anthropology of development and humanitarian assistance. The closure of the peacebuilding field has rarely been overlooked, and a long row of analysts have pointed out that peacebuilders are perceived as arrogant and ineffective by the local population,⁸ that their policies and projects are one-size-fits-all and little adapted to their local environment,⁹ that local social forces integrate international forces into their power brokering and haggling,¹⁰ and that the ways peacebuilders behave and act on the ground are often inappropriate and counterproductive.¹¹ The recommendations of this research commonly propose to identify the “right” locals to work with whereby debates are still going on to know who the “right” locals are and where to find them.¹²

This research is highly sensitive to the various expressions of inequalities and injustices between international peacebuilders and the local populations. They astutely point out the many instances of unfair treatment and document their systemic character. However, due to their focus on problem-solving, these analyses fail to investigate the economic, social, and political conditions that make the unequal relationships between internationals and locals possible, relationships that sustain themselves over time and despite efforts to the contrary.

Much of the research on the local-international interface remains unsatisfactory for normative and empirical reasons. Normatively, the “local turn” echoes the paradox which Tania Li had analyzed for development projects, which tend to empower in a participatory way local communities: “Community is assumed to be natural, yet it needs to be improved.”¹³

In the case of peacebuilding, war and violence are, on the one hand, seen as indicators that local communities are broken, hence, requiring external intervention; on the other hand, such an external intervention should draw on local forces, which are either interpreted as having eluded the general anarchy by some miracle or having moved on into the peacebuilding mode that had been imagined for them. In any case, the local turn presupposes that local communities, or some people in those local communities, are not defunct and able to overcome the brokenness of the war. Yet, if there are such people, why they would need external assistance?

Drawing on Dipesh Chakrabarty’s metaphor of the colonial “waiting room of history,”¹⁴ Li retraces how this fundamental contradiction has elicited the response of “permanent deferral” from colonial times until today. For a never-ending row of reasons, local populations were and are simply never entirely ready and continue to need external intervention. Just as in colonial times, when “intervention was needed to teach (or oblige) natives to be truly themselves,”¹⁵ contemporary development and peacebuilding programs continue to seek to improve the fate of local communities by assisting them in “addressing the underlying causes of conflict, repairing damaged relationships and dealing with psychological trauma at the individual level,” as the institutionalized global discourse of peacebuilding often claims.¹⁶

The “permanent referral” is closely associated with claims that an expert regime is needed to change this particular situation of underdevelopment or conflict. As Li demonstrates in her book *The Will to Improve*, international agencies (governmental and nongovernmental)

frame their projects as technical tasks: the outsiders only contribute specific expertise, which does not exist on the local level. This way they are not contesting local authority but only supplementing it. Interveners are nothing else than the doctors we call upon to overcome specific moments of crisis (in its ancient Greek meaning of a potentially lethal disease). Yet the supplementing remains entirely oblivious of the fundamental economic, social, and political structures, which shape not only the local but also the intervention; experts, and academic experts included, are, rather often, unmindful of the negative ways they reproduce exactly those structures.

Peacebuilding, and in particular locally oriented peacebuilding, is often presented in a similar way to development aid as “the will to improve,” and the problem-solving debates turn mostly around the question of which type of intervention is more participatory or emancipatory. Peacebuilding and particularly its local interactions are represented mainly as a technical task that can be done well or not.

This is particularly obvious in the quest for alternative projects, local hybridizations, and “heterotopias,” although this research seeks to be particularly critical of international efforts of building peace.¹⁷ These analyses similarly struggle with conceptualizing the dynamics of power and domination that are at work in the local-international encounter. Research on hybrid forms of peace explicitly draw on concepts that are supposed to bring in an antiliberal sharp edge such as those developed by Michel Foucault.¹⁸

Foucault’s ideas of contingent, moving, and contextually and suddenly changing knowledge formations have spread over the last years. Based on Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing’s conceptualization of “friction,”¹⁹ research on the ground has identified numerous cases of local situations of peace in which local social forces have engaged with international global peacebuilding prescriptions.²⁰ This research provides a critical lens through which the claims of universality, which underscore humanist projects in general and peacebuilding in particular, can be empirically relativized. They notably show how local forces interact with the peace imposed and how new forms of political community and interaction emerge creatively and contingently (even though not always with the emancipatory effect hoped for).

Yet this research merely illustrates and documents the dynamics of power and domination that play out in the local-international encounter, but it does not provide an analysis of their conditions of possibility. The critique of liberal peacebuilding formulated by these approaches

is directed against the top-down imposition of liberal peace, and it is highly sensitive toward the inherent unfairness of the local-international relationship. However, it does not analyze the dynamics by which international peacebuilding generates its authority, domination, and power.

This book turns the perspective around and investigates the conditions of possibility of international peacebuilding's specific forms of domination. The creation of specific professions of peacebuilding, the institutionalization of peacebuilding careers, their normalization through educational institutions and nomothetic discourses, the work ethics and narratives associated with peacebuilding, the networks and personal interconnections in the past and present are all important building blocks in the edifice of domination of this particular type of Western, liberal peacebuilding. By retracing how peacebuilding emerged and stabilized as a professional field, this book analyzes its particular expert regime, and from there onward how its politics are shaped.

To analyze the emergence and maintenance of peacebuilding's structural inequality one needs, in the words of Robert Cox, to "stand(s) apart from the prevailing order of the world and ask(s) how that order came about."²¹ It is the aim of this book to scrutinize the world order that makes peacebuilding in its current form possible. The question looming large behind this book is: What global power structure is peacebuilding the imprint of?

Power in global politics is all too often understood as the sum of material power resources such as financial or military resources. My understanding of power here is at once larger and more differentiated. Power is not a resource, although it does find material expressions. Power is, rather, a quality of social relations, and as such encompasses instances of authority, domination, violence, leadership, and, at the same time, submission, subjugation, consent, adherence, following, and admiration. The ontology of power is hence not only material but also social and ideational.²²

The motivation to interrogate power through a sociology of peacebuilding arises out of a major dissatisfaction with existing institutionalist and constructivist approaches to power analysis in world politics. Political science in general, and international relations in particular, usually bases its analysis on the assumption that institutions regulate political behavior. Institutions standardize, rationalize, and formalize behavior, allowing interactions to take place according to set rules and by shaping expectations.

Institutions and the rules that regulate them are ascribed an agency of

their own, just as the norms that are reproduced in these institutions are thought to carry intrinsic value. Norms such as human rights or humanitarian intervention are often considered to have an inherent force that actors then can use to persuade others to “do the right thing.”²³ When ascribing intrinsic value to certain norms, the power struggles that make some norms more successful than others in public and lawmaking discourses are reduced to contests between the varying capacities of the actors to mobilize this or that set of resources in favor of “good” norms.²⁴ The question of who has the authority to designate this or that norm as “good” disappears from sight.

Such an approach to institutions, which takes the existing norms positively for granted, is not very helpful in identifying, circumscribing, or understanding the quality of power relations. Institutions must not only be seen as set frames for the processing of decisions, but also as social spaces in which actors—individuals, groups of individuals, other institutions, and so forth—seek to influence each other in order to obtain *their* respective goals.²⁵ Rules, procedures, and agreed-upon behaviors are conventions that serve the purpose of allowing such negotiations, yet they are also at the same time objects of negotiation. These kinds of conventions and agreements, or conflicts and disagreements, arise out of the interactions and relations between the various actors.

In this book I, therefore, do not assume that peacebuilding is, per se, legitimate and the right thing to do; neither do I assume that it is wrong and just another expression of neocolonial empire building. Peacebuilding as it is practiced now is an expression of a particular global power structure, and it would certainly be different if that global power structure were different. However, it is impossible to tell how it would be different and, if it were different, whether it would be a difference for the better. Peacebuilding as it is practiced now excludes many actors from the field and discards many alternative narratives; if the power structure were different, it would exclude different types of actors and discard other alternative ways of action. It is not up to my analysis to judge which form of exclusion/inclusion is better or worse; and this book does not analyze who and what has been excluded. Hence, it does not make any assertion about what a better peace could be and does not participate in the debates over local ownership or “hybrid peace.”

The sociological approach employed here moves between a holistic view of the field of peacebuilding and a specific view of its agents. The image of a social field is deliberately modeled on the idea of electrical fields, which are made up from the pushing and pulling forces of differ-

ently charged elements. In order to understand the tensions running through the field and how these structure the relationships of the agents to one another, it is necessary to tease out their specific ways of constituting their respective social positions. These are, by definition, particular.

Such an attempt at “provincializing peacebuilding” (to paraphrase Chakrabarty) is in open contradiction to the universalism with which peacebuilding projects claim to save lives and do good. I do not take this universalism for granted but rather as a starting point to deconstruct the claim that peacebuilding is common moral sense. The assertion that peacebuilding is, of course, good because it *obviously* saves lives is interpreted in this book as a strategy to gain legitimacy and authority for those who proclaim such. The ultimate power struggle in the peacebuilding field requires all actors to seek to impose their specific answers to conflict and violence; and to do so by presenting them as the *morally right* and the *commonsensical* solutions to the social conflicts in peacebuilding countries. Inversely, those whose vision of peace is the generally recognized and most legitimized are also those who hold prime authority in the field. This authority is, however, not only based on the persuasiveness of the vision of peace proposed, but more largely on a specific configuration of what Pierre Bourdieu calls “capital.” Capital very largely designates the resources actors produce, reproduce, and put into action to gain and defend their respective social positions. Actors in a field not only orient their visions toward the dominant one, they also adapt their behavior to gauge their social positions to the dominant one; this may mean contesting dominant capital configurations, or assimilating to their dominance. Both competition and assimilation are inscribed in the realms of the field, and largely follow what could be called the rules of the game; radical contention or difference excludes actors from the field.

Of course, in the process practices and politics change, and new forms of capital configuration appear as older ones shift in their hierarchical position. Research on local hybridization processes in peacebuilding shows how such movements take place; it shows in particular that such movements are peripheral, incremental, and often without major effect on the larger field. It is the aim of the analysis in this book to understand on which grounds the peacebuilding field remains stable and resistant to change due to its internal mode of reproduction.

Yet the book does not go so far as to analyze the order and hierarchy of fields of the entire globalization process. The focus remains on the peacebuilding field. Rather, I will draw on existing research on globaliza-

tion and its contemporary neoliberal character in order to contextualize my observations of the peacebuilding field. Globalization is understood here as complex process that has taken various political, economic, social, and cultural forms in history even though the term *globalization* is of much more recent origin.²⁶ This process is neither directed nor one-dimensional; it is also not only powered by economic forces, which draw the world together into one global production chain and consumer market. Yet neoliberal capitalism is the dominant force of globalization for its power to shape the economics, politics, societies, and cultures in different corners of the world is clearly higher than that of alternative projects. As Tsing notes:

In the last two decades of the twentieth century, capitalism was transformed by the establishment of new international rules of trade that offered tremendous advantages for the world's most powerful corporations. Capital whizzed around the globe. Free-trade zones and new technologies of communication encouraged companies to spread their operations to ever-cheaper locations. Transnational specializations—such as currency traders, energy traders—flourished. Privatization initiatives and free-trade regulations dismantled national economies, making once-public resources available for private appropriation.²⁷

Neoliberal politics have privatized (and still do) what was public, particularly by disassembling state-led mechanisms of solidarity in the welfare state, and neoliberal economics and politics have socialized the costs of economic crisis and failure. Part of this process was and is the privatization of risks associated with wage labor and employment, and the fundamental changes this has brought around the globe to industrial relations and organization on the one hand and to existential livelihoods on the other hand. As Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello argue in their seminal work on the “new spirit of capitalism,” flexibilization of work and just-in-time production have been enabled by global networks of real-time communication; this has led to changing management practices in which work and the workplace became increasingly financialized, and social life progressively commodified.²⁸ Government policies, which promote and protect financial interests at the expense of social projects, have furthered the paradigm of what the German sociologist Ulrich Bröckling calls “the entrepreneurial self” (alluding to the Ger-

man governmental policy of remodeling unemployment benefits as subsidies for self-employed enterprises, the so-called “I Inc.’s” [“Ich AG”]).²⁹

As this book shows, the peacebuilding field has followed this transformation from the nineteenth-century bourgeois spirit of the middle classes to the late twentieth-century new spirit of capitalism, yet these changes have taken place mainly in its professional practices; in the meantime, the humanist and bourgeois discourse of peace has been preserved. In their discourse, peacebuilding offers a refuge for bourgeois sentiments, lending meaning to work and life, for it defines peacebuilding as the ultimate form of doing good, namely saving lives. It also continues to claim discursively a work ethic, which is modeled on the spirit of capitalism as Max Weber originally had analyzed it. These transformations of the theory and practice of the “good peacebuilder” are (re)produced in the specific habitus of the field.

Habitus is another concept borrowed from Bourdieu. As the notion of field encompasses the relations between agents, it is crucial to analyze their behavior as mutually perceived and represented in order to understand the dynamics of the field. The ways fields are structured allow for certain behaviors and dismiss or look down on others. For the actors, distinction, that is, the tentative to show a distinctive and distinguished behavior, is an important strategy of positioning in the field. When actively employing such strategies, agents become actors. Bourdieu’s toolbox of concepts allows for moving between the analyses of the structure (the field) and the actor (the habitus). Both shape each other and are contingent upon each other. Chapter 1 of this book sets out the analytical tools that are borrowed from Bourdieu’s sociology. It specifically explains in more detail the notion of fields and habitus and how they are constituted by specific capital configurations.

The book is then further divided into two large parts. First, chapters 2 to 4 are dedicated to the concept of peacebuilding as a social and professional field, and, hence, analyze its sociology. Chapter 2 discusses the world political conditions that have made the emergence of the field possible. While the field is self-generating now, after it was first established it needed a cluster of external “birth helpers.” The peacebuilding field emerged over the past five decades mainly as a field of default activities to compensate for the lack of effective peacekeeping. Chapter 2 retraces how the UN has been incapable, from the Congo crisis in 1960 until today, of effectively pacifying the countries and societies in which it intervened. The poor results of interventions were due to a large number of

factors, most of which were out of control of the UN Secretariat General. Yet, in order to maintain the UN's authority in peace matters, and despite its near incapacity to effectively stop any fighting, the Secretariat General has, with the support of many member states, and in increasing cooperation with other international agencies, engaged in many other, subsidiary activities, for example, humanitarian assistance. Peacebuilding has hence emerged as a default space of activity.

Chapter 3 analyzes how this default space has been filled with real people and real activities. It delves into the core of the peacebuilding field by providing an analysis of the social profile of people working on UN missions and in other organizations associated with peacebuilding. The analysis shows a hierarchical, three-tier structure of the peacebuilding field, each of which represents a particular horizontal career network. The main distinction between the three tiers derives from the educational background and the professional networks of the peacebuilders. Overall, peacebuilders represent the social type of what is called in German the *Bildungsbürger*, that is, the bourgeois or middle-class man (or woman) whose main capital is their (distinguished and distinctive) education. National origins do play a role in the access that individuals have to professional positions in the peacebuilding field, but do so in ways other than is commonly assumed. Whereas social origins and networks are of much higher importance in gaining access to positions in the two top tiers, nationality and the related lesser educational opportunities in the global South, as well as visa restrictions, effectively block mobility from the third tier in the peacebuilding field to the upper stages.

Chapter 4 develops the sociological analysis of the field further by focusing particularly on its boundaries. The peacebuilding field overlaps with other socio-professional fields such as nongovernmental organization (NGO) or charity work. People move in their careers both into and out of the peacebuilding field, and from and to those adjacent fields. They do so because they are able to convert their field-specific capital, for example, their educational capital, into capital that is valuable in other fields. These conversions are, in turn, possible because the peacebuilding field and these other fields follow processes of isomorphism and homologation, as I argue in this chapter. Such processes result from the overall hierarchy among fields, which is, similar to the internal structures of fields, determined by the capacity of actors to dispose of different types of capital in order to impose their "right" view of the world. Chapter 4 shows that the peacebuilding field hangs suspended in an exchange of ideas and people with other adjacent or overlapping fields

such as strategic management consulting or law in the United States, but that it does not at all (or only very marginally) relate to fields at the local level of peacebuilding.

Chapters 5 to 7 form the second section of this book, which explores the effects that the sociology of peacebuilding has on the way peacebuilders see themselves, the world, and peace. Bourdieu called the internalized and incorporated images of oneself and the social world that go along with specific types of capital configurations, and social positions, *habitus*. This complex concept is explained in the prologue of the second section. Generally speaking, the *habitus* can be explained as being the subjective structure of a field, that is, the perception and identity of an individual with respect to the field in which she or he is situated. As I explain in the prologue to this section an individual is perceived to be “at the right place” in a social field exactly because she or he meets the social expectations of precisely the social position he or she is in.

Chapter 5 probes further the argument already put forward in the preceding chapters that the dominant *habitus* of the peacebuilding field is strikingly similar to the *habitus* of the well-educated European middle classes of the nineteenth century. Peacebuilders not only display similar sensibilities, they are also driven by an urge to professionalize their occupation in order to make peacebuilding a distinctively independent and education-based occupation. This resembles in many ways the middle classes’ drive for liberal professions in the nineteenth century.

Chapter 6 scrutinizes the political worldviews that result from the peacebuilders’ social positioning. Although they are not heterogenous, the political worldviews of peacebuilders remain firmly within the narrow realm of traditional European political thought. They cluster around three preoccupations—elite leadership, freedom, and social justice—that are discussed with reference to emblematic literatures. These three preoccupations provide, both alone and altogether, a complex discourse of justification for international intervention in crisis situations. They converge in a liberal and cosmopolitan core of values that put tolerance, merit, individual liberty, and fairness very high above others. These values not only underscore perfectly well the “liberal peace” of peacebuilding, but also reflect most astutely the Eurocentric middle-class socialization of peacebuilders discussed in the first section of the book.

Finally, chapter 7 examines more deeply the *nomos* of the field. The *nomos* describes the basic “norm” of the field. Here, norm is not understood in a reductive sense of ethical instruction for action, but in a more fundamental sense, as a principle of inclusion in and exclusion from the

field. The *nomos* translates as the very ethics of the field itself, its ultimate and definite moral boundary, which allows for the authority of the actors in the field and, at the same time, for the exclusion of all others who do not subscribe to the field's deontology. In the case of peacebuilding, this *nomos* can be described as the "fatalism of saving lives," that is, the absolute and absolutely indisputable claim that peacebuilding is about only, entirely, and, at least in principle, effectively saving lives. This claim is reproduced in a number of nomothetic and dogmatic stories about personalities, historical events, and historical lessons, which are presented and discussed in this chapter.

Given that this book is not about a better peace we could build, it does not conclude on any policy recommendations. There are certainly ways in which attentive readers can draw out practical lessons from my analysis, in particular in the ways peacebuilding work is organizationally structured or how education affects peacebuilding. I hope that this is done with the same critical intention as I have written this book. Yet such policy advice is not the goal of this book. Rather, I would like to imagine opening up the debate about the social reproduction of power structures in globalization processes and encouraging more questioning of neoliberal governance's concrete economic, social, and political conditions of possibility.