




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CHAPTER 12

International co-operation and the democratisation of knowledge

Tor Halvorsen

During the 1990s, ‘internationalisation’ became a hot topic in higher education and research. By the early 2000s, internationalisation had become a separate research specialty and the primary focus of entire units or individual staff members in the administrative and finance offices at many universities. Meanwhile, multiple conferences and organisations promote internationalisation – the oldest being the International Association for Universities (IAU) (Halvorsen and Vale 2012). Judging from the findings of various higher education rating systems, institutions without clear internationalisation policies and strategies don’t quite make the grade. Internationalisation strategies can also be interesting in that they tend to reflect the degree of organisational autonomy enjoyed by universities, but more importantly, what values the institution seeks to promote, and from what sectors of society, nationally and internationally, it obtains (or wishes to obtain) support.

In this chapter, I discuss internationalisation as practiced in four ‘ideal types’ of universities. Each type has emerged and risen to prominence at different points in the history of modern universities, but aspects of each one still strongly influence contemporary tertiary education models and understandings of the role of internationalisation.

Before describing the four ideal types in more detail, I explore some of the cracks in the system, and highlight emerging alternatives.

Internationalisation and the paradox of competition

University internationalisation strategies have always expressed the ambitions of university leaders. In the contemporary era, in particular, they indicate where institutional managers seek to co-operate with other institutions to sharpen their own organisation's competitive edge. Although these strategies are ostensibly about collaboration, paradoxically their collective effect has been to intensify the competition between institutions. Almost all universities are now seeking to co-operate with a relatively small group of supposedly 'superior' universities to help them improve their positions in the global institutional ranking system. Universities expect that by improving their reputations and rankings, they will attract better students, better professors and more rewarding research projects, as well as more funding and more public support, etc. What happens, however, is that all universities end up competing to collaborate with the most highly ranked institutions. This competition has tended to strengthen the links between some universities and exclude many others. Those left behind tend to be left out.

In addition, cross-institutional competition has led to an increase in standardisation, uniformity and disciplinary specialisation, as well as augmenting managerial control over research agendas. Universities caught up in this system seem highly unlikely to be able to step away from its competitive and standardising imperatives for long enough to fully comprehend, never mind begin to tackle, the challenges of climate change, poverty and rising inequality that are facing us all. Yet, if these issues remain unaddressed, they have the potential to wipe humanity off the face of the planet.

For academics, the strategic shift towards institutional competitiveness has had serious consequences. For most of us, *academic* competition – that is, the ability to compete academically, to propose innovative theories, offer fresh insights, or reveal unexplored aspects of

established truths – is far more important than *institutional* competition. Academic competition is often inspired by novelty, and relies on imagination and creativity. In this sense, academic competition knows no borders and cannot be framed hierarchically, socially, spatially, politically or in terms of discipline. In fact, working with the ‘not so good’ can be as rewarding as working with the best.

Since the establishment of the first modern universities, many academics have sought collaboration wherever they could find like-minded colleagues. That is, in the past, research interests, not organisational strategy, inspired academic networking and motivated all manner of border crossings. In this context, motives for internationalisation were epistemological, and entirely unrelated to strategic alignment with externally imposed criteria for institutional achievement.

Neoliberalism and institutional competition

The transformation of universities into strategically oriented competitive actors occurred in response to the general shift in society (including ‘the public sector’) towards making competition a primary instrument of governance (Berndt and Boeckler 2009). No matter which version of neoliberalism we choose to highlight (Schmidt and Thatcher 2013), competition has become key to the governance of individuals and organisations.

As competition becomes global and ‘post-national’, internationalisation is beginning to dissolve national systems of higher education and research. That is, the need for evaluation initially gave rise to appraisals of institutions within nation-states. From the 1990s, a global evaluation industry emerged. Spawning a whole industry of evaluation instruments, rankings systems turned into measures of organisational success, linking academic quality not to academic content but to the ‘production’ or output achieved by single universities, which are now expected to compete internationally for resources, students, professors, etc. In this process, the ways in which academic knowledge is valued, and how academics work, has changed radically

(Matthies and Simon 2007; Power 1997, 2007). In essence, internationalisation now presupposes competition.

Ideally, universities should be driven by a search for knowledge (episteme), in which nothing is more relevant than a good theory. In reality, universities now face many pressing external demands that their work be ‘relevant’. These are invariably linked to particular social interests that often legitimise their interventions as being of ‘service to society’.

In addition, universities need administration; that is, they need to have, but not *be*, bureaucracies. However, when ‘relevance’ and ‘management’ combine to promote competition, as they have done in the neoliberal era, academic independence has been thoroughly undermined and epistemology completely undervalued. Essentially, universities are combining epistemology, relevance and management, such that many are turning into ‘knowledge factories’ (Bok 2004; Mamdani 2007).

Global challenges

This focus on competition between higher education institutions and their managements has been a dangerously destructive phase in the evolution of universities. In my view, we are entering a new and fundamentally different period in which co-operation between *academics* is again becoming crucial. As we confront the stark and global challenges of our epoch, co-operation between academics seems far more likely to contribute to new knowledge production than the pursuits of institutional reputation-building (Halvorsen 2015).

The challenges facing humanity cannot be solved by the kinds of competitive strategies that are making ‘internationalisation’ into a tool for ramping up organisational reputations. Instead, co-operation across the globe, *including* with institutions that are rated poorly in existing ranking systems, holds the potential to open up and renew global knowledge systems. Rather than increasing standardisation and uniformity, we need to harness the creativity to which a multitude of experiences allows us access. We must acknowledge the possibility that

many of the world's most creative academics might well be of little value in terms of organisational competition but of immense value to sparking our imagination. In the period we are now entering, academic (as opposed to strategic) co-operation is likely to be crucial for our future.

The stark reality is that humanity must either transform or become extinct after experiencing catastrophe on an unprecedented scale. If we fail to transform, the consequences will initially be toughest for the least affluent countries and communities, but ultimately humans, along with millions of human and plant species, will be destroyed. The Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2015), the Paris Declaration on the Environment (UNFCCC 2015), and several documents published by the International Labour Organization (ILO)¹ reflect an acknowledgment of how this transformation might begin. Academics must now show their ability to drive big projects and respond to great challenges.

The many scientists who created the atomic bomb worked together for disastrous ends. However, precisely that scale and intensity of co-operation is now needed for more noble goals. In fact, the quality of such co-operation, designed and carried out according to epistemic (and therefore internally defined) criteria, is what all the instruments of grading, rating and ranking should be trying to measure. If this were the case, knowledge that emerges from collaborations with those who have the fewest resources and also face the most severe challenges could well become the most highly valued, even in those universities that are already high up in the rankings.

Let me hasten to add, however, that such co-operation is only likely to be successful if it occurs through networks of academic co-operation that systematically prioritise and reflect on the challenges facing humanity. Our situation demands that we restore the ways in which academics and academic knowledge used to be valued in the past. Linking relevance and epistemology to the global challenges we face has the potential to give rise to a kind of university governance that counters the current drive to reproduce the neoliberal order and endorse academic capitalism (Münch 2007, 2011).

Contemporary universities and their Western hegemonic histories

Like all organisations, universities have institutionalised behaviours that operate according to norms, values and regulations devised within a variety of material constraints. Universities also change in relation to their interactions with their environments.

Just as there are different roads to modernity, there have been different kinds of universities within the broadly Western model that has spread globally. The varieties most widely adopted, often simultaneously within one institution, are:

- the French system of professional schools (Shinn 1980);
- British notions of liberal education;
- the German (Humboldtian) concepts of ‘Bildung’ and the freedom to learn and to teach (Bildung durch Wissen); and
- the US version (although only partially applied in their vast higher education system), which combines the German, British and French models (Brandser 2006).²

Japan’s copying of German technical education (after 1870), and the many Americans who attended German universities from the 1880s, until they themselves became the hegemonic force (see Brandser 2006), are just two examples of Germany’s early influence.

Less edifying is how the colonial powers imposed poor replicas of their universities on their colonies, without providing the autonomy or the resources they needed to build up research-based knowledge driven by local needs and perceptions of their own burning issues. Activated by the global challenges facing the world, reactions to these bleak Western-imposed models are now helping to initiate a revisioning of knowledge and disciplinary fields.

Universities in the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are attempting to develop alternatives to Western hegemony, and seem to be achieving a degree of regional influence, even if their global impact remains limited (Halvorsen 2016). Their model of collaboration is state-driven in the sense that political processes have encouraged networking activities between particular centres of

excellence creating a network of think-tanks. Although still embryonic, the BRICS initiative, and similar projects within its member countries, indicate the growth of a new type of internationalisation within the global knowledge community.

Of course, India's co-operation with the West and South extends well beyond the BRICS programme, and seems to be driven by academics and their knowledge interests, as much as by universities. Meanwhile, Tjomsland reminds us that, unlike in much of Europe, where the link between nation state and university tends to be dominant, 'the picture of the Arab regional landscape is quite the opposite of the European. It has as a point of departure a strong regional Arab identity that outweighed the national identities of the newly created Arab states at independence and has constituted a challenge to the legitimacy of Arab regimes ever since' (2005: 133).

A new hegemony may emerge from the new linkages and relationships that are being constructed across previous chasms and cleavages from parts of the world that are outside both BRICS and the OECD. It remains to be seen how such networks will respond to the global challenges, and if an alternative to Western hegemony really is in the making.

Given the extent of the global challenges we face, the question is, who or what should be the new external legitimising forces for universities, and for the changes they will have to implement to remain relevant? New types of alliances – particularly across the North–South divide, are not only sensible, but crucial. The question therefore remains: how do we analyse the relations between epistemology, relevance and organisational governance as the universities evolve and are transformed in space and time (Adriansen et al 2016)?³

Our multidisciplinary task

The growth of subject disciplines and increasing specialisation have history on their side. Reason and rationality follows 'discipline', and discipline is needed to make academic progress within ever-growing fields of researched knowledge. The debate about relevance calls this

into question, however, in that not all disciplines are necessarily relevant for the problems the world is facing at present. In addition, disciplinary boundaries might be preventing researchers from asking some of the most relevant questions – what falls between (or beyond) these boundaries might be key. Ideally, researchers should not be limited by specialist networks or blinded by successes in any narrow field of knowledge. The paradox is that, to succeed, such initiatives are often required to take the shape of a discipline. That is, to survive over time, and establish a knowledge field that is accessible to others, its disciplining into a discipline is a necessity.

The internationalisation of academic work has been important in raising awareness of the limits of specialisation. Similar disciplines can be constructed very differently depending on local circumstances, and meetings between international representatives of disciplines often quickly remind us that disciplines are social constructs that are held together as such, not by common theory, common methodologies or common ‘topics’, as is often argued when disciplines are defined (Eigen et al. 1988).

This understanding of disciplines as social constructs opens up space for multi-disciplinary work. This allows for explorations of how gaps between existing disciplines, and the creation of dialogue between disciplines, might help us cope with the challenges of our time. In the long run, this process will probably inspire entirely new disciplines, but the hope is that these arise in a context of stronger epistemic autonomy. In other words, the awareness that knowledge is socially constructed, and that economic and political interests frame all knowledge-creating processes, implies that academics should retain more control over knowledge creation with a new focus on cross-border co-operation and how it can work. Less competition and more imagination is necessary in North–South linkages if we are to deconstruct the old world of imperialist knowledge with its myopic worldview (see the debates around the Rhodes Must Fall movement in South Africa, for example).

How to balance academic specialisation with the views of other social actors about what is relevant, is a crucial issue. Global warming, poverty and social injustice seem impossible to address using the


approaches humanity has relied on thus far. The question is, can we change fast enough?

There are some grounds for optimism. Universities do seem to be trying to prove their relevance. In addition, many universities are promoting internationalisation and cross-border networking, and some have already developed international associations and networks. The November 2016 conference of the International Association of Universities (IAU)⁴ was one important expression of this; gatherings of European universities that have taken place since the Southern African-Nordic Centre's conference in Namibia in December 2015 are another. Such associations have to come to the fore, not only as epistemic communities, but also as voices that are relevant to the pressing issues of our time. The question is, will this also lead to the transformation of the relations between knowledge and power that is necessary to make new knowledge relevant to the global challenges we face?

Learning from history

In this section, I examine in a little more detail the history of different kinds of universities, or ideal types, whose 'existence' has had its time, is presently hegemonic, or is just emerging. The analysis is not linear, however. How the old and new are combined varies between regions and countries, and even within countries, thus creating differing motives for, and types of, collaboration between and within institutions. My hypothesis is that, due to the global challenges we are facing, epistemic identities that developed in the first period of modern universities are reappearing again and will become stronger in the phase we are entering now.

My analysis covers four periods as shown in Figure 12.1. The first is strongly related to the spread of the Prussian culture of learning from about 1810 to the late 1930s. It has been referred to as the Humboldtian university, or the *university of culture* (Readings 1996). After the Second World War, the *university of governance* emerged, characterised by an increase in numbers of students, disciplines and thus academics who became involved in the governing of society, state and the economy, as

Figure 12.1: A timeline of university development in the West

well as the universities themselves. At the same time, hegemony shifted from Germany to the US. In the third period, still led by US universities, but extended globally, the *university of excellence* (a characteristic first suggested by Readings 1996) became dominant. This type of university is best known for its contribution to academic capitalism, underwriting notions such as the ‘knowledge economy’ and ‘innovation societies’. The fourth period, and the one we are just entering, still lacks a name. My suggestion is that we call it the *university of democracy*.

We are all, if not yet to an equal degree, at risk because of our inability to control modernity; all life, and human life in particular, is facing extinction. In my view, humanity will develop solutions to this only if we also deepen and strengthen democracy. Democracy can remind us that the situation we are in is a consequence of knowledge development of the most destructive kind, and to which universities have been central contributors. These include nuclear weapons, all the technologies that are destroying the environment, farming methods that ruin the soil and poison our food, technologies and trade agreements that ensure the continued economic exploitation of low- and middle-income countries, to name just a few.

As indicated, my periodisation focuses less on tracing chronological development and more on highlighting dominant traits and ideal types.

In reality, most universities still try to live up to the ideals of the university of culture, while simultaneously acting as universities of excellence within the framework of academic capitalism. Similarly, a range of values, motivations and knowledge interests can act together to drive academic collaboration programmes.⁵ In general, however, the notion of ‘relevance’, in alliance with management values, has gained the upper hand in most academic institutions. This means that many university management teams not only promote certain disciplines above others (Higgins 2013), they also discern what new combinations of knowledge best serve the social division of labour, and can therefore be accepted as ‘disciplines’.

We are entering a period that puts particular demands on academics. Environmental disaster, intertwined with the challenges of ‘green’ economic growth, dwindling job opportunities, as well as growing poverty and inequality, raises new kinds of knowledge demands. Academics have to reconsider who we want to collaborate with, for what purpose, and within what kinds of disciplinary – and more so – cross-disciplinary contexts. This implies a return to greater academic control of epistemic communities, more emphasis on originality of knowledge, and a far stronger influence on what academics consider relevant.

Journals such as *Ecological Economics*, a transdisciplinary journal of the International Society for Ecological Economics for ‘non-commercial research and educational usage’, is but one example of how new kinds of knowledge battles are emerging. Economics, as a discipline, is facing the emergence of de-growth theories, arguing for the prioritisation of human relations above market relations, a deepening of democracy, the preservation of ecosystems and a more equal distribution of wealth (Järvensivu 2013). Other disciplines and professions, from farming to pharmaceuticals, are facing similar kinds of questions about their commitment to basic social and political agendas.

Generally, new kinds of knowledge networks are emerging, and the global challenges are transforming how academics choose (or, equally importantly, choose not) to collaborate. In an analysis of the growth of international science organisations in the twentieth century, Schofer (1999) not only described their rapid growth from the 1950s, but also the parallel and (again) exponential growth of socially committed

science organisations. The escalation has been particularly marked since the era of the ‘university of excellence’ began, as academics have tried to counter the hegemonic transition to academic capitalism. The subsequent growth of NGOs dedicated to environmental issues shows that much of this commitment is being carried forward into the coming period (Fink et al. 1996).

The university of democracy

So let me start with the present. It seems we are at the beginning of a period of radical change with far-reaching consequences for all social institutions, including universities. We must therefore ask anew, why should academics collaborate and what for?

In geological time, the period we are in has been termed the Anthropocene: acknowledging that virtually all of nature is now socialised (affected by human activity), and that this will have a lasting effect on the earth, even after humans have left it for good. Perhaps more important than this renaming of our age, is the acceptance, as expressed in the 2015 Paris Declaration on Climate Change, that humans are reaching the limits of our existence on earth if we do not end our carbon dependency by or before 2050 (UNFCCC 2015).

While some city dwellers might have difficulty remembering this, nature has the upper hand. We cannot geo-engineer ourselves out of that fact. We need planning and co-ordination, as well as shared (therefore democratic and binding) decision-making to regulate the world’s economic and political actors, so that we harness them into bringing about change. To put it in philosophical terms, the whole is bigger than the parts and, if left unregulated, the parts add up to a self-destructive whole. The need for planning and regulation at the post-national level therefore requires that we revitalise questions of how to expand democracy beyond the level of the nation-state, and also how to establish democracy in countries with anti-democratic regimes.

The characteristic feature of the new period, to which universities will have to justify their existence and adjust their institutional values, is the strengthening of democracy such that it becomes a force that

enables humanity to transition beyond carbon-dependent economies and infrastructure. Democracy is key because the planning and centralisation of power that will be required to facilitate rapid change will have to be democratically delegated so that entrenched social and economic inequalities do not incite individuals and communities to scupper or sabotage change and jeopardise our future. Universities and academics will therefore have to contribute to producing the knowledge required for a global shift in energy use *and* the widening of democratic influence so that this shift occurs globally. Without the confluence of these two kinds of knowledge, the effects of climate change will be catastrophic for all.

The 2015 Paris Agreement contains a strong appeal to universities to collaborate globally, rather than be part of the competition driven by global capital that generally escalates rather than addresses global problems. By aligning themselves with democratic values and practices, universities could help to counter the values of global capitalism. That is, universities could become the counter-movement that social scientist Wolfgang Streeck was searching for, but could not see, when he asked what actors and institutions will secure the collective good of liveable environment in a world of competitive production and consumption. Quoting Canadian political scientist CB Macpherson, Streeck (2014: 52) argued that capitalism will undermine itself from within, but asked, how the enormous collective resources required for preventing and repairing environmental damage will ever be mobilised in societies governed by ‘possessive individualism’.

‘Possessive individualism’ is precisely what universities of excellence have promoted and shaped through their focus on human-resource (and human-capital) development. The challenges we face as we exit this era seem to demand that the academic world makes its most abrupt shift since Humboldt’s era. The character and type of future academic collaborations and networks must be determined by how they address the issues surrounding global warming. As Naomi Klein (2015) put it: ‘this changes everything’, including who should decide what knowledge is valuable and relevant.

The university of excellence

Neoliberalism, of which universities of excellence are a by-product, is primarily a political project of the Western world, that challenges basic ideas about liberty, solidarity, justice, individuality and the role of academia (Boldizzoni 2013; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Mjøset 2011; Peck 2008). From this project, flows a particular understanding of what knowledge is, how to create it and how it should be valued.

The university of excellence is a product of, and is therefore tailored to, the neoliberal policies of the OECD, but it does, of course, also hold sway outside the OECD's member states, and particularly in the post-colonial countries, both in terms of practice and as a political-rhetorical tool of governance. As Streeck (2014) argued, in this era, universities have been transformed from critical institutions into tools of the global economy. They have thus, paradoxically, also been deprived of the reflective role necessary for the reproduction of capitalism itself. Even 'human capital' needs creativity to evolve!

To different degrees, the university of excellence tends to detach itself from the cultural context of the nation-state or region in which it is located. However, 'excellence' as a concept or category is basically empty; it gains meaning only through actors who operationalise it and thus determine what it means. Under neoliberalism, a hegemony related to the valuation of knowledge has been established globally among actors whose interests in university-based knowledge were shaped by how knowledge can be used in the production of profits, to service the elites, and to legitimise their hegemonic project. Among others, Mamdani (2007) has clearly described the particular consequences of this for the South. In many ways, the post-colonial world has become a laboratory for World Bank-led policy experiments related to education and research. Perhaps in response to this, actors in this part of the world have been among the first to develop alternative ideas about knowledge.

To be against 'excellence' is obviously absurd. However, processes of democratic deliberation about what knowledge is useful for social (nation-state) development, and what knowledge is good for communities that are seeking to make democracy work, also seem insane from

within a neoliberal framework. Instead, excellence is bureaucratically selected. Bureaucracies grew out of the ‘politics of large numbers’ (Desrosières 2007) that constitute modern nation-states and their related economies (Angermüller 2010). However, under neoliberalism, they have been transformed from agencies that collect statistics to measure progress in a nation-state into systems that encourage competition for resources between individuals and institutions across and beyond national systems.

A prominent example is the OECD’s Pisa test, which measures the knowledge of 15-year-olds all over the world and draws conclusions about the quality of schooling they have had. A network of bureaucrats and universities are now using similar kinds of comparisons for higher education institutions and for the implementation of the SDGs.⁶ In effect, a neo-numerocracy is creating the means for measuring academic work in terms of ‘multi-governance interactions’, thus giving the final word to post-national organisations such as the OECD (Angermüller 2010).⁷

This meant that, in 1992, the founder of the Institute for Scientific Information (ISI), Eugene Garfield, a pioneer and central actor in the neo-numerocracy, could sell the ISI to Thomson Reuters, a multinational media company that has since made billions of dollars from exploiting academic texts by selling them across several other databases. Academics who produced what should be public knowledge have thus had their works dissected and sold off for profit. Similarly, increasing numbers of academic institutions are governed by number crunchers, who apply the rules of supply and demand, as informed by institutional ratings, to help them determine the relative importance of research agendas and the size of budget allocations.

The academic world that initially produced the data (and the categories necessary for statistical data collection) to help improve the governance of specific sectors of the nation-state, is now itself governed by statistics calculated by global businesses that measure their competitive abilities across borders. According to Angermüller (2010: 178), an annual subscription to the Science and Social Science Citation Indexes (SCI and SSCI) cost US\$700 in 2009. The information technology that made this possible soon made ratings and rankings into hotter topics

than the research being rated, while on sites such as Google Scholar, the ‘number of hits’ is often spuriously correlated with academic merit.

This kind of ‘governance by numbers’ is complemented by the World Trade Organization’s General Agreement on Trade in Services, which aims to promote trade in services, including tertiary education. The agreement is constructed to drive a continual expansion of trade such that public universities either have to privatise or act as if they can compete with private institutions. Whatever crosses borders – from professionals to students, knowledge or other tangibles – count as an exchange of educational services, and have to have a market-related price. Ratings and citation indexes, etc. are in place to confer honour and status on universities and the prices of educational services are determined by the system.

The push to make higher education part of a service economy, and universities into marketplaces for the sale of educational services, has escalated rapidly. In relation to teaching students (as customers), standardised curricula using teaching technologies owned by big media firms are growing. University management experts, and techniques that promise improved rankings, ratings and citation indices, are all beginning to circulate according to a market value, while branding agencies target universities promising to promote their images as knowledge providers in a competitive market. The academic ‘economy of honour’ has thus been transformed into a monetary economy, on which bureaucratised universities have become dependent.

In terms of research, the transformation is primarily linked to the growing ownership of knowledge that the patent system and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement allows.⁸ As Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 75) argued, ‘intellectual property is perhaps our most spectacular example of economic coercion ... What is clear is that global property rights set strong limits on a state’s capacity to define territorial property rights in ways that enhance national welfare’. Altogether, the globalisation of intellectual property rights is fraught with dangers for citizens and state sovereignty (animal patents being just one example of the moral-sovereignty costs inherent in the system). Braithwaite and Drahos did not explicitly explore the impact of this system of global ownership on the

universities, but implicit in their argument is the notion that university-developed knowledge has been drawn into the battle in support of capitalist hegemony.⁹

Within this paradigm, the role of universities is to develop competitive 'human capital', while the notion of 'intellectual property' presupposes that prosperity for individuals and organisations involves transforming knowledge into assets that support economic growth and create financial rewards.

As Gorz (2003) pointed out, the so-called knowledge economy is characterised by a conflict between the total instrumentalisation of 'human capital' and the need to make space for human creativity.¹⁰ Human creativity cannot be *directed* by managerial concerns. Ideas of how to work on your 'personal brand', or contribute to intellectual property by putting 'human capital' to work might have evolved from notions of individual freedom, but they have turned into a straitjacket, leading to a growing need for psychological services and the emergence of quasi-psychological services such as 'life-coaching' (Honneth 2012). Within this framework, education is little more than a tool for the formation of a 'subject's' employability. Being self-employed, or making strategic educational and work choices, becomes 'an ideal', in line with what is seen as the ideal future for this neoliberal epoch: the end of wage-related labour and growing numbers of self-employed contractors whose individual identity is subsumed into the category of human capital (Gorz 2003: 27).

In a university of culture, knowledge is not a 'product' but something indefinable, its value indeterminable as part of culture and the public commons. The university of culture promoted the value of creativity for the sake of truth-telling (within the elitist limits of its time). The advent of digital data storage and cyberspace has undermined this aspect of knowledge. Knowledge is everywhere and potentially accessible to anyone who seeks it out. However, to have value in the contemporary market economy, some knowledge has to be limited to create a demand for knowledge services (King, n.d.).¹¹ The university of excellence therefore became concerned with knowledge as a production value.

With the help of TRIPS, some of the world's wealthiest capitalists made fortunes by creating artificial markets. The individuals involved are lauded as examples of how entrepreneurship leads to success. But at the same time, hackers – the antiheroes of our time – have shown that networking for problem-solving where profit motives and 'human-capital profiling' are not present, often produces superior knowledge and solutions. In cyberspace, the hackers' collective efforts are still ahead – something democrats should be thankful for. At the same time, however, the growth of commissioned research as a source of income for universities is transforming what was once a public research space into a sphere in which private wheeling and dealing is increasingly possible.

Neoliberalism supports this transformation, because it links the university of excellence to 'the politics of large numbers', and this, in turn, is linked to how knowledge is valued in the market economy. Judgement about what knowledge is valuable is shifted to knowledge users, and linked to external criteria for relevance. Users communicate their needs through the neo-numerocracy, and particularly through knowledge brokers such as ratings agencies and research councils. The criteria for excellence are thus created by a mix of bureaucratic interests, user interests and academic interests, in which the academy and epistemology has the weakest voice.

The aim of research collaboration in this context is primarily to promote competitiveness within and between units of excellence. Their central question is, 'what's in it for us?'

The university of governance

The inauguration of the university of governance was the final shift away from 'knowledge for the sake of enlightenment' towards 'knowledge for society'. The arrangement of universities into faculties was, of course, linked to Kant and the Enlightenment. The belief was that experts with specialist skills would make more effective interventions in governing society. The further growth of disciplines and specialisations underlined the role of universities in training elites to take up positions in public and private governance.

What is now a widely accepted belief in the value of rationality in the form of 'knowledge for development' came to the fore from the end of the Second World War and remained dominant until the early 1980s. In this period, public and private bureaucracies (as well as academic services – the so-called liberal professions) co-evolved with the massification of higher education within a framework of governance and organisation. The shift in the West from elite to mass (and even universal) access to tertiary education also transformed the universities and how those educated in them became linked to the world of work; the term 'knowledge worker' entered common usage.

In terms of the labour market, the belief in rationality was, above all, a belief in the division of labour with ever-increasing levels of specialisation. In the mid 1980s, Kocka (1987) estimated that about 4 000 disciplines existed. Today that number is probably closer to 6 000. In addition, knowledge that used to reflect on and give meaning to the interaction between disciplines – namely, philosophy in Germany and the liberal arts in the Anglo-American world – became just another 'specialty' alongside and equal to other disciplines, and has never regained its privileged position. Instead, centres for advanced or interdisciplinary research have become arenas in which universities and academics reflect on the accumulated value of all their specialist knowledge and on their roles as social institutions with growing influence, but diminishing power.

A hyper-belief in the value of science drove the growth of disciplines and specialisation to a point where proper dialogue between them in daily practice became almost impossible, even within the same faculties. In this period, academics became (through their specialisations) experts who conquered political and economic administrations. Lawyers had been numerous before, but now other professionals joined government as specialists in different sectors. The realm of governance and of state bureaucracies (as well as the bureaucracies within big companies) grew as new expertise was deployed. In field after field, academics conquered government offices: departments of health, social welfare, industrial policy, economic policy, etc. These are just the prime examples of this new kind of knowledge-based rule. The academic

community expanded with (and within) the state, until eventually the state grew into so-called fiscal crisis.

During this period, not academic reflection, but functionality dominated university policy-making. The question that emerged was: does everyone need to professionalise around specialised work roles? In response, Jürgen Habermas (1981) pointed out that the world of ‘systems’, governed by the language and power of experts, suppressed what he called the ‘life world’. By extension, concerns emerged that the debate about experts was also suppressing (democratic) politics. As the realm of expert knowledge grew, anxiety about how experts were shaping politics and influencing the decisions of politicians – essentially, the relationship between politics and knowledge – became acute. As Luhmann (1992) observed, without knowledge it did not work, but with knowledge alone, it cannot work either.

An important perception, which led universities into the next period, was that state expansion exhausted the tax-base. It was clear that further taxation would threaten accumulation and competition, thus undermining the foundations of the state in the long run. This fiscal crisis, together with a shift in popular faith in knowledge as always neutral and technical, and therefore beneficial,¹² transformed ideas about the state, and about the relationship between knowledge and politics. From this point on, limiting the growth of the state became a key element of neoliberalism. The self-governance of institutions was touted as an alternative to state governance, and again the notion of competition came to the fore.

As noted, the number of higher education and science organisations has grown globally during the neoliberal era. What grew even faster were different types of neoliberal regulations and regulatory bodies: quality-assurance agencies, research-funding units, etc. This stands in stark contrast to the university of culture, but also to the university of governance when academics (as professionals) were trusted to develop knowledge and make sure it was relevant. In these models, academic actors earned their autonomy, freedom and creativity in exchange for rationality and responsibility in relation to state and business organisations alike. International co-operation stemmed from the same

autonomous academic interests, and could thus flow in all directions wherever cross-national collegial networks were worth pursuing.

The transition from the university of governance to the neoliberal university of excellence was a dramatic shift that introduced competition into the field of knowledge itself, regulated by neo-numerocratic control mechanisms (again, through the politics of large numbers, and linked to the OECD's means of blaming and shaming via ranking and rating). The contract between academic organisations and the professionals they educate was also terminated, with academic freedom being exchanged for rationality and responsibility. Academia and its professions are more easily controlled by being forced to compete. Crucially, this shaped new ways of valuing knowledge according to its contribution and relevance to private accumulation.

The university of governance and the university of excellence agree on one point however: unlike the university of culture, they both value knowledge products (outcomes) more highly than the process of knowledge creation or the formation of scholars.

The university of culture

The university of culture can be traced back to the establishment of the Humboldt University of Berlin in 1810, and the intense debates that took place about how it should be organised. Although these debates deserve more discussion, I will limit myself to observations about how this model contrasts with those that prevail today.

Within German Idealism, the movement in German philosophy that began in the 1780s and prevailed in parts of Europe until the late 1800s, the ideal university is strongly linked to Wilhelm von Humboldt's ideas about:

- the indivisibility of research and teaching;
- the 'Bildung' of self-reflexive citizens who think independently;
- universities being funded and protected by, but independent of, the state; and
- universities as spaces for the development of a 'unity of knowledge' (with the help of philosophers).

Humboldt's aim was to create a sense of cultural unity through which, with the help of a common language, *Wissenschaft* could be expressed.¹³ The process of research, through which teaching evolves, was seen as far more important than the product of knowledge. It was acknowledged that the process of doing research is what 'builds the person' whose academic leadership then contributes to shaping the nation.

Of course, other models of the university of culture could be highlighted – the English, or Scottish or later the hegemonic American, where 'the liberal arts' served as a unifier of knowledge. For many US universities, Humboldt, and the University of Berlin that he helped establish, was a vital inspiration, with several US institutions seeing themselves as having implemented Humboldt's ideas (Brandser 2006). The point here is more general, however: the period in which the university of culture held sway lasted all the way up to the start of the Second World War.

The model was not static, however, and shifts occurred as Humboldt's ideas were implemented. For example, the Technische Hochschulen in Germany were upgraded to universities around 1900. Later, the model changed again, opening up to professional disciplines whose character was defined by what can be called an 'engineering epistemology'; that is, by an interest in *what works* more than in *what is true*. Humboldt's existential questions about why we do what we do with the help of knowledge began to take a back seat. What was later analysed in England as a conflict between two cultures (as part of the transition from the cultural university to the university of governance) was, in Humboldtian terms, perhaps more a competition between types of '*Wissenschaften*' within the same culture.

The ideal types and internationalisation

So how do the four types impact on academic collaboration across borders and across regions? Table 12.1 provides a summary of the four typologies of universities in terms of their relationships with other universities and academics around the world.

Table 12.1: Characteristics of the four university types in relation to international collaboration

<p>The university of democracy New alliances are forged around the globe to develop disciplines relevant to addressing 'global challenges' including social injustice. A growing division between academics working towards zero carbon growth, and those who argue that 'technology and the free market will rescue us'. A growing emphasis on ethical substantive rationality and behaviour with global networking guided by values of democracy and cross-disciplinarity. Allied with post-colonial deconstruction and reconstruction movements to oppose Western hegemony.</p>	<p>The university of excellence Networking and internationalisation is seen as a tool for self-promotion. University leadership guides internationalisation strategies to promote their institutions in competition with others in the so-called free market for educational and research services. 'Human capital development' and 'research output' are the focus of organisational efforts in a global competition. Downgrading of institutions and networks who can't or won't compete.</p>
<p>The (rational) university of governance Collaboration between academics and states to source relevant knowledge for nation-state development and economic growth, with the intention of making state policy scientific (based on empirical evidence). Focus on organisation, rationalism and goal-oriented behaviour, with internationalisation driven by efforts to increase specialised knowledge at home.</p>	<p>The cultural university Attempts to adapt universal principles of knowledge to local contexts in meaningful ways, and to develop a common language through which these can be expressed. Focus on identity formation using self-awareness as a model for collective culturally embedded behaviour; internationalisation is learning about oneself through the reflections of others.</p>

Various motives for internationalisation continue to inspire academics, but there has been a discernable shift towards the kind of motives outlined in Table 12.1 under 'the university of democracy'. Historical experience of similar kinds of change indicates that this means there is increasing awareness of the ways in which power shapes academic behaviour.

Each of the university types discussed have been marked by particular kinds of struggles between social actors and universities over the nature and extent of academic freedom. These include debates about degrees of state and religious control, and in the era of the university of excellence, the issue has been how 'knowledge for innovation' or supporting the 'knowledge economy' has conflated the role of universities with that of drivers of 'economic growth'.

If we are entering a new era of democratisation as I suggest, relations between knowledge and politics must and will change too. More

importantly, how academics can take responsibility for the ways in which the knowledge they produce is used, and whether they should make their research broadly accessible, is being questioned. Within these debates is a growing awareness of how scientific knowledge is shaped by the powers that determine the contexts within which researchers and professors work. The ways in which Western and colonial knowledge still dominate the curricula of universities in former colonies is just one example. Western knowledge does not clarify its presuppositions and, by imposing its implicit values, this now-hegemonic knowledge system systematically represses other forms of knowledge and other value systems (Habermas 1981). Academics in the post-colonial world must therefore be more explicit about formulating and articulating their worldviews, so that they understand and explore how this shapes their research priorities and practices.

A lack of contextualisation implies a failure to consider or take responsibility for the consequences of one's work, and can easily lead to unethical behaviour. This is as true for academics as it is for anyone else. The need to both contextualise and to take more responsibility for the intended and non-intended consequences of how scientific knowledge is used is a challenge often directed at the academic community. This is where the university of democracy has the potential to stand out as an arena that welcomes new alliances across the previous colonial divides, and around substantial and consequential questions of ethics.

So far, the modern era has given rise to many tragedies and, with the universities co-opted into the 'knowledge economy', this trend is growing (Rudy et al. 2007). A substantial body of research records how academics use 'scientific objectivity' to avoid taking responsibility for the consequences of the knowledge they produce, while also avoiding being critical of the regimes that have long directed and funded knowledge production. After fifty years of silence, information about how the academic community served the Nazi regime, and even used the Nazis to promote their own 'scientific interests' is being exposed, but hardly reflected on (Fløgstad 2016). That there were more Nazi lawyers in the German government *after* the war than there were under Hitler is but one indication of how both universities and professional associations

managed to neutralise their role during this period. Hiding beneath the convenient illusion that knowledge is ‘objective’, they convinced themselves that how knowledge is used is ‘political’ and that politics lies beyond the responsibility of both the academic profession and the university management (Jarausch 1990).

The same story can be told about apartheid. Many of those who drafted, and thereby helped to justify, apartheid legislation, have unashamedly continued to practise their profession under the new regime, making the necessary adjustments to hide their past, and create continuity within the country’s legal institutions.

With hindsight, it seems clear that the atomic bomb was dropped more to announce the arrival of the world’s new superpower than to stop the Second World War. Out of protests against nuclear weapons (including by those responsible for inventing them) a movement of scientists evolved who have stood up against weapon production. Admittedly, no network of scientists has had less success. In fact, without the weapons industry, America’s elite universities would not enjoy the levels of affluence that they are now using to help them conquer the academic world. Gradually, scientists have given up working against the use of nuclear energy. South Africa’s nuclear energy programme met little opposition in the apartheid years; today, plans for its expansion are on the table, although there is no solution to the nuclear waste problem. Again, the continuity is evident, and the protests have so far been too miniscule to make any impact on the state or its foreign allies. Similarly, numerous scientists continue researching and promoting the oil industry, even though the SDGs demand that the sector be scaled down and dismantled.

Economists, lawyers and accountants, particularly those that move in international circles, often with degrees from the most prestigious universities, make their fortunes by finding loopholes in tax laws, creating avenues for tax evasion and helping to create tax havens for multinational corporations and their tycoons. The universities that educate them boast of their candidates’ abilities as proof of the outstanding quality of the education they received.

University ranking systems include ‘labour market success’ as a criterion, and the ratings (at the international level) go up, no matter who

their graduates end up working for. A high number of the companies that currently offer the most rewarding and prestigious jobs are in industries that generate massive amounts of carbon emissions daily, regardless of the Paris Agreement. Thus, thanks to post-national academic networks, tax havens protect the global industries most responsible for global warming. Many critics of 'Western knowledge' from the post-colonial and other countries on the periphery condemn these kinds of alliances between knowledge, power and economics, pointing out that global capitalism's tax-evasions undermine the least developed countries even more.

The alternatives are growing, however, both within the universities and between the professionals they educate. Concerned scientists try to make colleagues aware of the consequences of their work, and develop an awareness that knowledge production has political consequences that scientists and academics must take responsibility for.

In the democratic university, which I believe is beginning to emerge, academic co-operation across borders will have to be politically responsible for its knowledge networks. Transcending the interests of individual universities with their logos and marketing departments, academics, whose aims are primarily epistemological, must drive post-national co-operation. This is necessary, both to renew scholarly disciplines and to strengthen the roles that academics play. However, as debates about how to escape the iron cage of neocolonial Western knowledge domination have shown, reforming curricula and knowledge institutions is not easy. Academics will need to ally themselves with and support other social forces that cut across national borders, to ensure that changes occur, making use of what can perhaps be called 'oppositional internationalisation' to supersede competition-based processes. International networks will be faced with the dilemma of how to take ethical and political responsibility for what knowledge to produce (while respecting academic freedom) and for how it gets shared and used. This includes reversing the TRIPS agreement and dismantling the patent system. Both what research is done and how findings must be shared is both a research and a political issue. The academic profession must regain control over its own work. Given the urgency of

both reducing global warming and getting rid of poverty, this process must begin immediately.

For a start, the academic profession must rid itself once and for all of the notion that knowledge is invariably ‘positive’, that every question has one correct answer (the truth), and that this is to be obtained through one correct method. Rather, those seeking knowledge try to tell the truth, but acknowledge that any truth is relative to the social and political environment it reproduces.

Until now, far too many excellent academics and innovative researchers with great qualifications from prestigious institutions have devoted their time and energy to inventing products and processes that increase carbon consumption and/or help businesses improve their profit margins by laying off their workers and poisoning our planet. In the period of democratisation, the question is: can academics be persuaded to take responsibility for the consequences of their research and innovations? Can we regain control over the means of our own knowledge production, and commit ourselves to at least meeting the SDGs and the requirements of the 2015 Paris Declaration on Climate Change?

Notes

- 1 On the ILO, see Stokke’s (2015) broad analysis that seems to support the view that ILO was weakened during the neoliberal epoch. Stokke also noted that the adoption of the SDGs means that the ILO must play a more important role, and that it is likely to have the space to do so.
- 2 Interestingly, by establishing departments of like-minded professors, the US democratised the German model, and introduced academic competition within universities and its departments, not only between the holders of chairs at different institutions (as was the case in Germany). See Brandser (2006: 343), who attempts ‘to describe how the Humboldt-university had a great impact on American education in the early and mid-nineteenth century’. He also tries to show ‘how the ideas gradually were brought into disrepute, first because they were considered old-fashioned and residues of pre-modern social order, later because they were assumed to be dangerous and a potential threat to democracy’.

- 3 The time–space dimension is discussed in an exceptional book titled *Higher Education and Capacity Building in Africa* (Adriansen et al. 2016). The contributors bear witness to the tragedies of academic imperialism, arguing that the main struggles related to universities’ European heritage ‘is that what counts as legitimate, relevant and valuable knowledge on these campuses is measured by the same standards as in the Global North – a standard presented as universal when in fact it is shaped in a particular context, historically in a Western European context, and currently most often in an Anglo-American context’ (p. 31).
- 4 The IAU planned to focus on how universities can contribute to the SDGs at their World Conference in Bangkok in mid November 2016. Before that, European universities gathered in October to discuss collaboration as well as the Higher Education Sustainability Initiative (HESI), which was established to influence the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20). With a membership comprising almost 300 universities from around the world, HESI took responsibility for more than a third of all the voluntary commitments that came out of the Rio+20 conference (see <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1073>). In addition, masters degrees in sustainable development are springing up worldwide, showing universities’ willingness to certify cross-disciplinary knowledge.
- 5 For a periodisation driven by a focus on power in and between societies, and which explains some of the environments within which universities institutionalise, see Mann (2013).
- 6 See <http://www.oecd.org/edu/skills-beyond-school/higher-education.htm> for more information on the OECD’s schemes for ‘enhancing higher education system performance’.
- 7 The numeriocentric period (without the neo) was between about 1945 and 1980 and was linked to state control.
- 8 Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 62) called the TRIPS agreement ‘a classic case of legal entrepreneurship’. According to them, the US’s political and business communities combined their efforts (following the US mode of governance), and worked through the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations. They were joined by the major OECD countries, and then managed to link intellectual property issues to trade, thus profiting from the kinds of control and systems of punishment developed within what

became the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In the run-up to the formation of the WTO, the TRIPS agreement became part of the domain of that organisation. The US business community thus managed to initiate a new global epoch – the beginning of ‘intellectual property globalisation’ (p.63), with an organisation to oversee and manage the agreement. The consequences for the cyberspace and of course for the pharmaceutical companies, who were the first to push for the General Agreement on Trade in Services, have been enormous.

- 9 As Braithwaite and Drahos have shown, the hegemonic powers have secured control over the raw materials, the sources of capital, the markets and all the competitive advantages involved in the production of highly valued goods. This includes control of ‘knowledge inputs’ and ‘abstract objects’, such as ‘algorithms implemented in software, the genetic information of plants and animals, chemical compounds and structures’ (2000: 84).
- 10 In their book on the tragedies of academic capitalism, Rudy et al. (2007: 4) note that ‘there are arguably three central principles and associated practices that must stand at the center of the world of higher education ... creativity, autonomy and diversity ... [and creativity is perhaps] the central principle’. What might be more important is to acknowledge that diversity is often a precondition for creativity. And diversity is precisely what the world stands to gain from new kinds of North–South relationships that are based on equity and respect.
- 11 King (n.d.: 5) noted that ‘only by making intellectual resources scarce can capital profit from it; but only against a background of non-scarce, culturally common resources can it market its products and be sure to have new products to market’. Alerting us to the dawning of the epoch of the university of democracy, King showed that the privatisation of knowledge in the software-development and pharmaceutical industries has been outcompeted by communal knowledge networks. He observed that ‘the fact that free peer co-operation can work and work well, makes the deliberate manipulation of knowledge for accumulation intolerable.’ Observing that groups across the political spectrum are agreeing that ‘concentrated ownership and control of knowledge, technology, biological resources and culture should be resisted by any means possible’, King argues that ‘the rights and identities underlying this ownership are contingent’ and that ‘new modes of co-operation are emerging on capital’s own network infrastructure’ (n.d.: 12).

- 12 Debates about positivism were also an important part of this shift.
- 13 Readings (1996: 65) defined *Wissenschaft* as ‘the unity of knowledge that marks a cultured people’.

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