




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## North-South Knowledge Networks Towards Equitable Collaboration Between

Tor Halvorsen, Jorun Nossun

Published by African Books Collective



Halvorsen, Tor and Jorun Nossun.

North-South Knowledge Networks Towards Equitable Collaboration Between: Academics, Donors and Universities.

African Books Collective, 2017.

Project MUSE.[muse.jhu.edu/book/51762](https://muse.jhu.edu/book/51762).

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# CHAPTER 1

## The role and impact of funding agencies on higher education and research for development

*Göran Hydén*

Financial and political support for higher education and research are generally considered crucial to any country's development. This support has become even more critical in recent decades, with the growing emphasis on creating 'knowledge societies'.<sup>1</sup> With universities deemed so important for progress, their quality and output are constantly measured. However, global ratings and rankings invariably indicate that the best universities are found in higher-income countries, and confirm that, in this arena, like most others, large discrepancies exist between low and high-income countries.<sup>2</sup> Globalisation is changing this situation somewhat, with middle-income countries and 'emerging economies' – such as China, India, Brazil, Malaysia and Turkey – becoming more widely known for offering quality higher education and for funding research. However, many countries, especially those in the lower-income group, are not in a position to spend as much on research and higher education as they might wish. They remain dependent on donor funding to sponsor certain research and tuition programmes and even basic infrastructure and equipment.

In this chapter, I discuss the role and impact of donor funding within the world of higher education and research. The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, given the absence of a

comprehensive overview and analysis of donor funding for the sector, I attempt to map what donors have done in the past, as well as how they currently work and why. In the second section, I analyse the consequences that seeking external funding for higher education and research has had for low-income countries that do not allocate sufficient domestic resources to fund this sector. In the third section, I suggest various policy priorities for the future. My main argument is that while low-income countries could hardly have done without donor support, its consequences have not always been positive. There is room to consider what might help strengthen local capacities in these countries so that higher education and high-quality research can be pursued in more equitable and sustainable ways.

### **Mapping the role of funding agencies**

Donor funding for higher education and research is complex and difficult to fully map and understand. Donors use different classifications and categories, which makes it tricky to identify funding flows and where these go.<sup>3</sup> Funding priorities also change fairly often. I attempt to get on top of these reporting issues but I do not pretend to tell the full story (see the Appendix to this chapter for a list of the organisations researched).

Donor support for higher education and research is strongly concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, although a few countries in Asia such as Bangladesh and Nepal also receive support for higher education from international donors. Donors tend to select countries using three main criteria.

The *first* is donor-driven and countries included are identified as ‘principal programme countries’ in the donor government’s strategy for development co-operation. Following the 2005 Paris Declaration’s call to avoid duplication, and organise a kind of ‘division of labour’ in the donor community, some donors reduced the number of countries they support – the Nordic countries did this, for example.

The *second* criterion relates to colonial legacies, and applies especially to Belgium and France, which both helped to create universities

in Africa based on their own models at home. While some universities in the former British colonies have worked hard to ‘Africanise’ their staff and curricula, this has happened much less in the former Belgian and French colonies, where the higher education sector has continued to be closely related to the systems in the former colonial states.<sup>4</sup>

The *third* criterion is self-selection, and assumes that because institutions in the recipient countries have initiated projects for which they require support, they own the ideas behind them. Where this is the case, donors sometimes support higher education and research even in countries that lie outside their usual range of priorities.

## History of donor funding

Support for higher education and research in many of the world’s lower-income countries goes back to the 1950s and 1960s when the US, and later the European countries, began providing considerable support.<sup>5</sup> The US was motivated by its strategy to counter communist influence, initially in Latin America but later also in Africa and Asia. Some European countries followed suit, partly related to compensating for their colonial occupation. The Nordic countries, which had no colonial record to speak of, joined in for more altruistic reasons, especially after African countries gained independence. In all cases, support for higher education was seen as part of nation-building, and can be broadly divided into three phases as outlined below.

### *The first wave*

This covers the 1960s and 1970s, when support consisted largely of three components. The *first* was funding for ‘bricks and mortar’ – that is, funds were directed towards the construction of buildings for teaching and research. Laboratories and other equipment needed for the more technical disciplines of the natural and physical sciences were included. Norway’s extensive support for the creation of a forestry school at Sokoine University of Agriculture in Tanzania, Germany’s funding for the establishment of the College of Engineering and

Technology at the University of Dar es Salaam, and Swiss support for infrastructure development and maintenance at the same institution, are examples of this. The Ford Foundation was also selectively involved in financing the construction of buildings at, for example, Makerere University in Uganda and the University of Ibadan in Nigeria.

The *second* component was technical assistance delivered by academic staff. In the 1960s and 1970s, many of the professors in the new universities in Africa were expatriates from many different countries. The largest contingents were American, British and French, but the Nordic countries also sent academic staff to various African institutions on short-term contracts.

The *third* component was that a large number of young African students were given scholarships to complete their doctoral studies at American and European universities. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations were major sponsors in the fields of agriculture and the social sciences. Germany focused on more technical fields such as engineering. No particular pattern is apparent in the scholarships offered by the Nordic countries. It should also be noted that many of those still teaching in African and Asian universities, especially in the hard sciences, received their initial doctoral education in what were then communist countries, such as Bulgaria, East Germany and the Soviet Union.

### *The reversal*

In the 1980s and 1990s, higher education fell out of favour with the donor community. Several African governments adopted the same attitude. Higher education was seen as expensive and as benefitting only a small and privileged group. Evidence of the 'brain drain' did not help. Why should donors support higher education, they argued, when the benefits tended to be so minor for the lower-income countries? The nail in the coffin was a World Bank report, which estimated that in low-income countries the social rate of return (that is, the increase in income) resulting from an additional year of education was on average 13 per cent lower for higher education than for basic education (Psacharopoulos et al. 1986). A subsequent review of 98 countries

found that, between 1960 and 1997, the typical social rate of return for primary education was 18.9 per cent, compared to just 10.8 per cent for higher education (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002). Tragically, this ‘return-on-investment’ philosophy prevailed at the 2000 World Education Forum in Dakar, where the international community agreed that support for primary education would be much more effective in driving broad improvements in social welfare. And, this view was again affirmed in the framing of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As a result, World Bank funding for primary education spiked in the late 1990s (reaching US\$ 1.4 billion in 1998) and support for higher education dropped to its lowest level in 2001 (at US\$ 120 million).

The World Bank often sets the pace for other donors, but like a large ship, it takes a very long time to turn around. In 1995, when James Wolfensohn took over as its president, the organisation was beginning to rebrand itself as the ‘knowledge bank’. Accordingly, their 1998 World Development Report was entitled *Knowledge for Development* (King and McGrath 2004). Two years later, the World Bank published a report with UNESCO, in which it argued that higher education in low-income countries was in a ‘perilous’ state, and while higher education would not guarantee rapid development, sustained progress would be impossible without it (World Bank 2000). Gradually, the foundations were laid for greater funding of higher education and research.

### *The second wave*

Today, donor involvement in higher education is widely embraced in what amounts to a second wave of support. The economic benefits to society are taken for granted now that knowledge apparently ‘equals power’. In a globalised world, the funding of higher education and research is seen as one way of helping low-income countries to gain greater access to global markets and new technologies. Political support for funding higher education has come from several sources, including the UK’s Commission for Africa (via its 2005 report, *Our Common Interest*) and the Danish Africa Commission (via its 2009 report, *Realizing the Potential of Africa’s Youth*) (Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009). Reflecting the priorities of donor countries, most

funding is directed towards strengthening the hard sciences and medical faculties. India's Institutes of Technology, which received significant funding during the first wave, are often held up as proof that such investments 'pay off'. If funded at all, the humanities and social sciences (with the possible exception of economics) tend to be seen as lesser priorities.

Ideas about the 'brain drain' have also changed. By building good quality research and education facilities in universities, many countries are working hard to attract academics in the diaspora to return home, thus encouraging 'brain circulation' instead. Institutions in China and India offer the best examples of this. Africa lags behind a bit, but the Network of Ethiopian Scholars encourages Ethiopian scientists in the diaspora and at home to exchange knowledge on local issues. Ghana and Nigeria have similar networks.

### *New actors*

Support for higher education and research in the South has long been a concern for Western donors, but as wealth accumulates in Asia and the Arab Gulf, new sources of investments in this sector are emerging. These newer actors seem particularly interested in funding the kinds of bricks and mortar developments that are now largely ignored by bilateral Western donors. For instance, the University of Dodoma in Tanzania is being constructed by a Chinese company using a Chinese design. Another example is the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, which has been in operation since 1971. The full extent of the United Arab Emirates' foreign aid was highlighted in a special report prepared by its Ministry of International Cooperation and Development as follows: 'between 1971 and 2014, government and non-government organisations, charitable and humanitarian institutions in the UAE provided Dh173 billion in foreign aid to 178 countries... Asia received Dh79.4 billion in foreign aid from the UAE during this period, followed by Africa at Dh75.4 billion'. Most of this funding was provided as grants or soft loans, and focused on infrastructure and equipment for various development sectors, including education. In many African countries,

basic infrastructure is still badly needed, so this kind of support remains crucial.

China is increasingly offering fellowships for foreign scientists to work at Chinese universities. In January 2009, the Chinese Academy of Sciences announced that it aimed to recruit some 1 500 ‘top’ scientists, professors and doctoral students to work with Chinese researchers. In addition, a special programme, established in the mid-1990s to bring Chinese scholars back home, succeeded in getting 1 300 researchers to return to China by 2009 (Xu 2009). When extending assistance to other countries, China tends to offer short-term and practical courses, as well as ‘cultural’ education through the Confucius Institutes that have been established on university campuses in several African countries (King 2013).

The Republic of Korea emerged as a donor in the late 1990s, but apart from a few training projects involving South Korean universities and partner institutions in the South, its contribution to higher education and research has so far been minimal. The Korean International Cooperation Agency focuses largely on other aspects of social development.

## **What donors do and why**

In this section, I begin by outlining the types of support that the OECD countries give to higher education and research, and then examine how donors justify their support for the sector.

### ***The amounts provided***

Given the importance that the international policy community places on statistics and evidence-based policy analysis, I expected it to be reasonably easy to find out what donors spend on higher education and research. This was not the case. What exists is a virtual jungle of figures and claims. Table 1.1 shows how misleading official statistics can be. The figures for the period 2004 to 2008 suggested that the major donors in higher education were not the main development donors,

**Table 1.1 Funding allocated to higher education in low-income countries, 2004–2008 (US\$ millions), by donor**

Donor	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Germany	814.12	973.33	955.74	977.15	1 094.80
France	996.24	1 140.66	1 248.33	1 349.45	1 072.28
Japan	294.40	497.77	471.40	425.95	488.89
European Community	13.98	125.80	162.68	209.19	185.25
Netherlands	84.93	76.42	98.45	113.48	132.26
Austria	67.86	84.63	95.08	112.06	124.75
Belgium	80.28	51.16	92.01	113.39	105.86
Spain	38.61	59.43	53.12	43.49	99.95
Greece	17.22	26.35	17.98	56.46	72.96
Portugal	42.67	42.14	44.09	47.02	49.02
Norway	26.91	28.72	31.21	48.38	46.04
United States	39.74	17.63	23.30	13.28	42.93
United Kingdom	0.46	0.17	1.55	54.62	40.60
Australia	21.98	7.00	28.68	40.97	26.75
Italy	5.63	1.14	8.39	5.62	17.84
Korea	—	—	21.47	37.21	15.59
Switzerland	3.95	10.34	11.74	11.04	12.08
Finland	—	—	5.47	5.05	7.00
Canada	64.90	4.83	7.48	7.43	6.68
Sweden	3.95	20.19	3.59	4.55	6.29
Denmark	0.90	1.31	2.88	1.31	2.51

Source: <https://data.oecd.org>

such as the UK, the Netherlands or the Nordic countries, but rather Germany, France and Japan.

These statistics, however, do not tally with the figures given by the bilateral agencies themselves. The OECD's statistics for higher education do not include support for research-based education or

development research, which has been the mainstay of the mainstream donors. For instance, if we examine the homepage of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) using this broader definition, then funding allocated from SIDA's research secretariat to higher education institutions amounted to approximately US\$ 100 million in 2009. Moreover, the mainstream donors, unlike those that appear at the top of the OECD list, often provide bilateral support in the form of 'basket funding'. This means that contributions that subsequently flowed into higher education and research were not specifically identified as such. Another factor that skewed the statistics is that various other international and regional inter-governmental and philanthropic organisations that also supported higher education and research are not reflected.

Among the development banks, the World Bank remains by far the dominant one. Since the relatively low allocations of US\$120 million that were made towards higher education and research in 2001 and 2004, the World Bank has boosted its funding to this sector considerably. In 2008, the total allocation was US\$500 million. By 2015, US\$600 million, or 20 per cent of its support for education in sub-Saharan Africa, went into higher education. Most of this went to 19 centres of excellence established at universities across the continent.

In terms of private and philanthropic funders, the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, which was made up of seven foundations, was the largest single donor, allocating US\$300 million between 2000 and 2010. However, this partnership came to an end in 2010, and ongoing funding now continues via some of the individual foundations instead.<sup>6</sup> Other important funders include the Gates Foundation, the UK's Wellcome Trust and Canada's International Development Research Center (IDRC).

### *Rationales for funding*


Two parameters shape the rationales that donors use to justify supporting higher education. The first is whether they choose to focus their programmes on individuals or institutions. The second is whether their policy perspective justifies educational and cultural or

developmental support. To be sure, some donors adopt multiple approaches but their main efforts are nonetheless usually identifiable (see Figure 1.1).

Thus several donors opt for an educational/cultural perspective and focus on individuals. Portugal, with its extensive scholarship programme aimed at strengthening the Lusophone sphere of interest, takes this approach.<sup>7</sup> The Norwegian Programme for Development, Research and Education (NUFU) and NORAD’s Programme for Master Studies (NOMA) also focused primarily on training individual scholars in the South (COWI 2009); the International Foundation for Science (IFS) also falls into this category.

France and Belgium are prime examples of countries that provide institutional support from an educational/cultural vantage point. They have been at the forefront of strengthening universities in the Francophone world, not least in Africa. Much of this also applies to Italy and Greece, although their support is not limited to former colonial territories.

**Figure 1.1** A matrix of rationales for donor support




The World Bank takes multiple approaches, but among these are a series of scholarships aimed at strengthening capacity to analyse development issues. Japan has a similar programme, which it runs partly through the World Bank. Many of the other southern European donors also tend to justify funding higher education and research in terms of development, but focus more on building institutional capacity. These organisations also lean towards supporting research and research-based education. With the exception of the UK, these countries have no history of close institutional links with the South and tend to be moved by the global development agenda – that is, as this shifts, so too does donor funding. Their support has been less focused on scholarship programmes, and has instead prioritised institutional development and partnerships or networking arrangements between universities in the North and the South as well as, more recently, between institutions in the South.<sup>8</sup> Norway is interesting because it is the only Nordic country that has run ongoing scholarship programmes for students from the South for several decades. The provision of these scholarships explains why Norway features so far above Denmark, Finland or Sweden in the OECD’s statistics.

### *Types of support*

As noted, activities that donors fund can broadly be divided between support for individuals or institutions, and it can also be categorised in terms of whether the support is focused on a single entity or on many. This makes it possible to identify four types of donor support: scholarships, institutional development, networks and partnerships as shown in Figure 1.2. The distinction I make between networks and partnerships is that the former involve individuals, while the latter are built between institutions. In the next few sections, I outline some of the most significant initiatives in each category.

### *Scholarships*

Scholarships are less dominant than they were before 2000, but, as noted, they still constitute a major part of the support offered,

**Figure 1.2.** Types of donor support

especially by non-OECD donors such as China and India. Several southern European countries also allocate most of their support to scholarships. *France*, for example, spends approximately half of its aid on scholarships – mostly in support of postgraduate study in France and less for study in low-income countries (Lewis 2009).

As shown in Table 1.1, *Germany* is one of the world's biggest supporters of higher education. Much of its funding is managed by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and involves the provision of scholarships for study in Germany. Like the Fulbright Program in the United States, DAAD does not run academic programmes but offers scholarships, based on merit, for German students to study internationally, and for students from other countries to study at German universities. With a budget of over US\$500 million, DAAD is the largest organisation of its kind in the world. It supports approximately 50 000 grantees every year, 11 000 of whom are on long-term scholarships.

Apart from the Fulbright Program, the *United States* supports a number of scholarship programmes. For example, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has run a graduate fellowship programme since 1963. According to an evaluation conducted after 40 years of operations, USAID had invested US\$182 million on sponsoring no less than 3 200 graduate students from Africa alone to study at over 200 American universities. The same evaluation found

that, on completing their studies, 85 to 90 per cent of all beneficiaries had returned to their home countries (Lewis 2009).

Since 2006, the European Commission has supported higher education through partnerships between universities within the *European Union* and the rest of the world. These partnerships involve scholarships that allow students from outside the EU to study at European universities. Between 2006 and 2009, approximately US\$400 million was spent on 65 partnerships. According to its website, some 12 000 students and staff benefited from these grants (see EACEA 2016).

*British* support for scholarships is also considerable, and is funded partly by DFID and partly by other government institutions. The Commonwealth Scholarship Commission manages most of the funding, offering over 900 awards a year, not all of which go to Commonwealth countries. The scholarships vary in type. The bulk are for students enrolled for PhDs and masters degrees, but quite a few are targeted at academic staff at universities in lower-income countries. In addition, the Commission makes available what it calls ‘split-site’ scholarships – these are for students doing postgraduate studies in countries outside the UK, and enables them to benefit from a year of study at a UK university.

The *Netherlands* Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been a generous supporter of scholarships through the Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education and Research (EP-NUFFIC). Its main scholarship programme is the Netherlands Fellowship Programme, which offers funding for PhD and masters degrees, as well as for short courses. The programme is demand-driven in the sense that organisations in the South apply and compete for the fellowships. Specific criteria are applied in the selection process so that half of the fellowships are awarded to female candidates and half of the budget is spent on candidates from sub-Saharan Africa.

Although *Norway’s* flagship programme (NUFU) had a broader mandate, its scholarship component was significant. For example, between 2007 and 2012, 194 PhD and 294 masters-level graduates were funded. More than a third of these students were female, and many graduated at universities outside of Norway (SIU 2013).<sup>9</sup>

To this list should be added the support provided by the *World Bank*, which operates two separate programmes. The first is the Robert S McNamara Fellowship Program, which supports young researchers working in low-income countries to spend five to ten months in a university, research or development institution in another World Bank member country. The second programme is the Joint Japan/World Bank Scholarship Program, which is funded by the Government of Japan, and focuses exclusively on supporting graduate studies in subjects related to development. To qualify, students must demonstrate that they have been admitted to a development-related masters programme in a pre-approved university. By 2015, the programme had awarded over 5 000 scholarships selected from more than 65 000 applicants, and disbursed over US\$200 million in funding from the Japanese government (World Bank 2015).

Of special interest, too, is the IFS, which is based in Uppsala, *Sweden*, and provides research grants to younger scholars, giving priority to women, following up with short capacity-building courses and grants for obtaining necessary equipment. Its geographic focus is on lower-income countries with weak research infrastructures, the majority of which are in Africa. In 2011, the IFS awarded 219 research grants to students whose work demonstrated high scientific quality, relevance and purpose. To strengthen its presence and role in Africa, the IFS established a 'hub' in Kampala, Uganda. IFS is supported by a consortium of bilateral donors, including Sweden, Norway, the UK, the US, Switzerland and France, as well as private foundations, including the US-based MacArthur Foundation and Switzerland's Syngenta Foundation.

### ***Institutional support***

The development of key institutions has been a major focus for Western donors. In the higher education and research sector, donors have aimed to contribute to the creation of professional environments in which academic pursuits can flourish. In the 1970s, donors gave priority to building national research councils but these were abandoned some ten years later after an evaluation concluded that the funds had been used

primarily to build new bureaucracies that had done little to serve the academic community (SAREC 1985).

Subsequent efforts to support institutional development focused on individual institutions, notably those with known track records. Thus, the Nordic donors, especially Norway and Sweden, have given both project-specific and longer-term support to Makerere University in Uganda, the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, and Eduardo Mondlane University in Mozambique. Project support has typically been research-based but also aimed at building departments or faculties. Other donors have paid special attention to upgrading university libraries and some, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have contributed to building and improving the infrastructure needed for the effective use of information technology.<sup>10</sup>

Support for specific university *departments* is often given via institutional collaboration with a corresponding department, usually at a university in the North but there is a readiness to make this a South-South venture too. Departmental support tends to be driven by individual scholars, so it also tends to be research-based and to benefit mainly those who are directly involved in specific research projects. Other benefits generally relate to increased prestige for departments within their institutions or internationally. As in the North, being able to generate research funding is one measure of success, both for individual researchers and their departments.

Funding directed towards whole faculties (or colleges as they are sometimes called) or entire universities usually focuses on cross-cutting issues such as increasing the recruitment of female academics and senior managers, curricular reform, and management training, notably in the field of finance. This kind of support tends to form part of 'core funding' or be provided in the form of funds that can be used to hire consultants. An interesting aspect of Sweden's core support to several universities is the establishment of faculty-wide funds to support small research projects initiated by local scholars.

Institutional governance and management have generally not been of major concern to bilateral donors but have, in some cases, been linked to broader support programmes. For example, Uganda's Makerere University and Mozambique's Eduardo Mondlane University

both received money from Norway and Sweden to strengthen university governance. In addition, the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA), which traces its origins back to 1988, has run a high-profile partnership between the World Bank and the Association of African Universities. ADEA's Working Group on Higher Education has taken the lead in monitoring governance and management issues as well as recommending reforms in this field. Their partnership with the World Bank has helped to direct the attention of university managers in Africa to the experiences of universities in other countries that have gone through similar kinds of expansion processes.

Many donors have attempted to support the growth of centres of excellence. In 2015, the World Bank took the lead in this, and helped fund 19 such centres in West and Central Africa, focused on agriculture, health, medicine or science and technology (World Bank 2014). Joint donor support has been important in creating a number of other such centres.

The International Institute of Water and Environmental Engineering (2iE) is a case in point. Established in 2006, 2iE was set up when two technical colleges that trained engineers and technicians in Burkina Faso merged. Located in Ouagadougou, the country's capital, 2iE's premise is that African development requires students trained at high-quality institutions in Africa. Although it initially catered for French-speaking students only, the institute now has programmes in English. Its degrees are accredited in Europe, and it works with a number of universities and polytechnics, primarily in France and Switzerland. The result is that students worldwide aspire to study there, and its degrees are acknowledged as being on a par with those conferred by European universities. 2iE has extended its network to prestigious institutions in Japan and the US. Created via a public-private partnership, 2iE operates as a foundation and is governed by a board made up of three representatives from each of its four partner categories: African governments, academic institutions, funders and business. Various committees are responsible for matters such as student affairs, academic issues, programme strategy and financial management, and these oversee the day-to-day management of the

institution. Its major research themes include climate change and its impact on resources, biodiversity, agriculture, energy, and water issues in Africa. Its courses cover a range of subjects, from mining management to entrepreneurship. The institute has 13 financial sponsors, which include the World Bank, USAID, IDRC, SDC, Japan's International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the UNDP, the EU, the African Development Bank and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### *Scholarly networks*

Networks are made up of individual researchers who wish to augment their own activities by interacting with others. In recent years, networking has become common all over the world. Africa, despite its poorer infrastructure, is no exception. Most academic networks focus on a particular sector (such as agriculture), a theme (such as gender), or problem (such as environmental deterioration). I will touch on just a few examples.

The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, based in Accra, is not exclusively a network but serves as such for international and African researchers in the field of agriculture. It is funded by private foundations and bilateral donors.

The Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa (CODESRIA), based in Dakar, is a social science network, bringing together researchers from all over the continent through a variety of activities. CODESRIA has pursued a broad social science research agenda, but like its sister organisation, the Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa, based in Addis Ababa, it has also given special attention to issues such as gender. Both organisations are funded by private foundations and bilateral donors.

Gender networks are common both nationally and regionally in Africa. Much the same applies to the environmental sector, in which research networks are often at the forefront of highlighting critical issues, collecting and comparing data, and helping to steer policy discourse. The African Centre for Technology Studies in Nairobi has played a leading role in this area.

### *Partnerships*

I see partnerships as networks that operate between institutions. USAID's Higher Education for Development was among the first partnership programmes; it sponsored collaboration between universities in the US and lower-income countries between 1987 and 2015. By then, the number of such partnerships exceeded 300 in about 60 different countries. Examples include exchanges and internships between US and Mexican universities, co-operation between schools of public health in East Africa and in the US, and collaboration between Ohio State University and Punjab Agricultural University in India on research into new crops and food products (Lewis 2009).

The European Union's Seventh Framework Programme provides opportunities for a range of individuals and organisations outside the EU to benefit from funding through partnering with European researchers. Such co-operation used to be confined to science and technology but now extends to all EU-funded research. It can involve individuals, public organisations and private companies that have an interest in working with EU institutions, and extends opportunities to individuals and institutions in a hundred different countries outside the EU.

The UK supports partnerships between higher education institutions through its Development Partnership in Higher Education (DELPHE) programme. Since its inception in 2006, it has been managed jointly by the British Council and the Association of Commonwealth Universities. By 2009, it had supported partnerships and multi-institutional projects involving 245 higher education institutions worldwide. Projects range from agriculture, the environment and health to information technology, and also include staff and student training, course redesign and communication workshops (Lewis 2009).

Germany's Higher Education Excellence for Development Cooperation (Ex/CEED) programme is run by the German Academic Exchange Service for the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Ex/CEED supports institutions that aim to contribute innovatively to the realisation of the Millennium Development Goals and other development programmes. Its aim is to strengthen

higher education institutions in the areas of education, research and consultancy. Partnerships it funds include collaborations between German and Southern universities in fields such as sustainable water management, food security, natural resources and public health.

Sweden has been at the forefront of fostering projects that put partners in the North and South on an equal footing. The Swedish model recognises that partnerships that are initiated and dominated by research institutions in the North often have a negligible effect on capacity building in the South. SIDA's policy has been to provide core funding to research-based universities in the South that enables them to work with partners in Sweden or elsewhere, including in the South, and to improve conditions for research – this includes stocking libraries, equipping laboratories, and helping to train academic staff. By providing funding for these core activities, SIDA's expectation is that Southern universities will be able to formulate their own strategies and steer external support into areas that they decide are important, rather than be steered by donors or universities in the North. This principle is one reason that support for development research in Sweden is a relatively small component of SIDA's overall research budget. Support for Swedish researchers is seen as important for maintaining an interest in and capacity for development work among Swedish citizens, but SIDA tries to strike a balance so that the real objective, of building research capacity in the South, is not hijacked along the way (Olsson 2009).

*Canada's* support for research and innovation is managed by the IDRC which, since 1970, has helped researchers and innovators in many countries find ways of overcoming poverty, improving health, promoting democracy and protecting the environment. In carrying out its work, IDRC supports partnerships between Canadian and international organisations on the one hand, and organisations in the South on the other, with the aim of expanding the resource base for research on critical issues. The IDRC is one of very few donors that explicitly emphasise the importance of disseminating research information through scholarly and other networks.

As mentioned, the Partnership for Higher Education in Africa, sponsored by seven private US-based foundations, was a major supporter of higher education between 2000 and 2010. Working in seven

countries with 22 universities, this loose network sponsored initiatives identified by the participating institutions in the fields of information and communication technologies; higher education research; regional networks for research and postgraduate training; and a university leaders' forum for exploring the frontiers of knowledge.

The Wellcome Trust launched its African Institutions Initiative with a US\$50 million commitment to strengthen Africa's biomedical universities and research institutions through partnerships. More than 50 institutions from 18 African countries are partnered in seven international and pan-African consortiums. Each consortium is led by an African institution and includes research and higher education partners from Australia, Europe and the US. They operate independently and set their own agendas. Activities include: leadership training and professional development; PhD and post-doctoral fellowships; improved infrastructure; competitive grant schemes; and the provision of up-to-date equipment.

The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) is considered one of the most successful partnerships that donors have helped build. Established in 1988 as a public, not-for-profit organisation, its objective is to strengthen the capacity for independent and rigorous research on issues relating to the management of African economies. Member institutions throughout the region use the network to connect individual researchers. The consortium offers research grants as well as a collaborative training programme for masters and PhD students. Especially innovative is its Joint Facility for Electives, which allows students from a university that does not offer a particular course to take the course with another member institution. AERC publications receive considerable attention within and outside Africa. Researchers supported by the consortium have contributed much to African governance, especially in the field of trade policy, and its collaborative research project on poverty has been instrumental in helping governments develop strategies on the issue. It regularly organises policy-oriented seminars to which government, civil society and private sector representatives are invited. The consortium is governed by a board who are drawn from member institutions, and its professional work is guided by an independent advisory committee made up of

African and international scholars. Its secretariat is based in Nairobi, Kenya. Among those who have served as an executive director is the governor of the Bank of Tanzania, Benno Ndulu. The AERC is supported by nine member funders, and several non-member funders.<sup>11</sup>

A more recent addition to the world of research partnerships in Africa is the Partnership for African Governance and Social Research (PASGR), which was established in 2011 and is also headquartered in Nairobi. It brings together a dozen or so universities from East, Southern and West Africa to conduct joint educational programmes at masters and PhD level. It also organises short courses on research methodologies for academics as well as for representatives of government or civil society organisations that conduct research.

The African Centre for Technology Studies in Nairobi is another example of a network that works closely with the World Agro-Forestry Center on environmental policy.

This list would be incomplete without a reference to the Southern Africa–Nordic Centre (SANORD), which operates out of the University of the Western Cape in South Africa. SANORD grew out of an earlier Norwegian exchange programme with South African universities, and now offers a low-cost arrangement for networking between universities in southern Africa and the Nordic countries. Its 42 member institutions include universities in southern Africa and in the Nordic countries and the Nordic Africa Institute.

There is little doubt that researchers in the South recognise the importance and value of networks and partnerships in the higher education sector. It is also clear that such mechanisms are often most effective when they are initiated by local scholars and operate at various scales and in multiple forums. As one research director has argued, the next important step will be to establish an Africa-wide accreditation scheme (see Muchie 2010).

## **The consequences of donor funding**

It should be clear from the previous section that donor funding has been a crucial component of the higher education and research sector

in low-income countries. Without it, the number of trained scholars in and from Africa would be lower, the width and depth of academic research would be reduced, and researchers would have even less access to libraries and research laboratories. Donor funding has also contributed to enabling African universities to retain cosmopolitan perspectives through exchanges, partnerships and networks. African academics are often the first to acknowledge the role that donors have played in enabling them to pursue their careers in meaningful and positive ways.

What would regional research councils such as CODESRIA have achieved without external funding? What research opportunities would scientists at national universities have had without donor support for libraries and laboratories? How would the quality of teaching have been without the extensive training programmes that donors have funded?

I fully acknowledge that donors' achievements have benefited many individuals in low-income countries. Nevertheless, this story also has a dark side. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that not all the consequences of donor funding have been straightforwardly positive. Of course, the donors are not solely responsible for this; they have generally worked in partnership with governments in recipient countries. However, in the higher education sector, at least, many such partnerships have produced results at the cost of national and institutional development in the South.

To be specific, three factors have shaped these partnerships: adherence to a neoliberal economic ideology; commitment to global development goals; and the bureaucratisation of aid relationships. I will now examine each of these factors in more detail to show that although donors might have tried to work as prime drivers of positive change, they also undermined many well-intentioned and carefully prepared schemes for building capacity and professionalism that would have enabled domestic institutions to take responsibility for their own development.

### *Adherence to neoliberal economics*

The neoliberal economic order that spread across the world in the 1980s arose in response to the incapacity of states to generate national wealth on a sustainable basis. In Africa, for example, national economies seemed to begin well after independence in the 1960s, but by the end of the 1970s, their state-run economies were proving more of a liability than an asset. Producers were punished and consumers favoured in ways that led governing elites to live way beyond what they could afford. Neoliberal economics were meant to rectify this. That is, as these countries transited to neoliberalism, it was envisaged that fewer and fewer resources would be allocated to government institutions, including universities, and that consumers would pay realistic or cost-reflective amounts for services received. The 1980s was an especially difficult decade for African universities. Their incomes fell drastically, and so did the supply of books and equipment necessary to sustain quality education.

Salaries have since bounced back to some extent, and most universities now have career systems in place that reward their employees in ways that compare favourably with those for other public servants. Even so, research institutions face serious challenges, many of which arose as a consequence of neoliberalism. Mahmood Mamdani's chapter in this volume provides a case study of this situation at Makerere University in Uganda, and Mamdani points out that academic remuneration levels, for example, are in no way internationally comparable.

Neoliberalism increased competition between universities, and encouraged the growth of a private higher education sector that lured staff away from the public universities. A report commissioned by UNESCO and the World Bank in 2000 described how the need for donor support in higher education stemmed from what the report called the 'new realities' of 'expansion', 'differentiation' and the 'knowledge revolution' (World Bank 2000).

*Expansion* was explained as resulting from the tremendous increase in student numbers. For example, the University of Buenos Aires and the National University of Mexico grew into 'mega-universities' – both catering for more than 200 000 students. A similar phenomenon

occurred across the world. One of the downsides of this rapid expansion has been a real reduction in the quality of the education provided by many institutions.

The huge expansion in student enrolment has been particularly overwhelming for African institutions because academic staffing and capacity has not been increased. Even when universities establish new posts, these are not filled. A capacity deficit has been created, with academic and administrative vacancy rates running at between 25 and 50 per cent (World Bank 2008: 53). This staff shortage can be attributed to many factors, including poor service conditions (Mihyo 2007), a shortage of postgraduate opportunities (Mouton 2008) and low graduation rates (Tetty 2010). It has also led to professors and lecturers teaching in more than one institution.

*Differentiation* refers to the creation of new institutions, many of which are private, to meet the growing demand for higher education. For example, in 1945, Indonesia had just 1 000 university students; yet by 2012, the country had 119 public universities. In addition, 65 accredited private universities and an unknown number of other private institutions were reportedly offering tertiary education in that country. To give another example, Ethiopia had 2 universities in 2000 and 31 universities in 2015. Meanwhile, Tanzania had a total of 26 universities in 2012, 10 of which were public and 16 private. The problem with this is that educational resources, including staff, become very thinly spread. This is particularly true in African countries where the number of well-qualified academics remains small.

The *knowledge revolution* has seen an exponential and continuing increase in access to knowledge in developed countries, but this has yet to have as wide an impact in lower-income countries. Although information technology has made ever-increasing amounts of information accessible, effective and powerful participation in the knowledge economy requires skills that are in short supply worldwide. This is especially true of lower-income countries and even more so in their rural areas. For example, according to a study conducted in 2011, 94 per cent of Rwandans have never used a computer and only 4 per cent feel confident to use one. While 12 per cent of Rwanda's urban population is

computer literate, this is true of only 2 per cent of the rural population (NISR 2012).

Donor-to-government cost-sharing has become the most common way of dealing with these realities, and has been strongly recommended by certain economists as necessary for the future (see World Bank 2010). The challenge is to ensure that this does not compromise equity. The University Leaders' Forum (2008) described some examples of scholarships given to poor students from disadvantaged areas of Mozambique, and a loan scheme in Kenya that satisfactorily addresses concerns of both efficiency and equity. Nigeria's Tertiary Education Trust Fund, which receives 2 per cent of national tax revenue, is another good example.

Neoliberalism has done little to enhance academic freedom in Africa. Sure, some progress has been made since the days of one-party states, and the direct control that governments used to exercise over universities is less apparent in some countries. However, many governments continue to use not so subtle means to ensure that public universities pose no political challenge to their rule, making academic freedom precarious in most African countries.

### *Commitments to global development*

Neoliberalism alone has not only changed the parameters of higher education and research in low-income countries. The donor community's insistence on formulating universal development goals, the MDGs for example, had a similar impact. While it may be difficult to question the moral correctness of working towards education for all, it becomes controversial when this is combined (as it was in the MDGs) with a narrow time frame within which results must be achieved.

African countries, for example, were forced to implement schemes that measured tangible outcomes only – such as the number of schools built or number of girls enrolled in schooling – but which required no consideration of the consequences involved in this overly simplified approach to progress. These forced attempts to get results have been disastrous in countries where governments have no resources to support basic bricks and mortar investment or to meet development goals

that have been set above their heads. Many countries cannot afford the ongoing costs of teachers' salaries and textbooks, much less the costs of modernising learning environments with the help of computers. As a result, the quality of education has declined at both primary and secondary levels, and this has affected higher education as well. In other words, the expansion of education provision at the lower levels has contributed to rapidly growing numbers of poorly prepared university students. In effect, higher education institutions now need to allocate more educational resources per student while watching their budgets being cut and student numbers rising.

In addition to the loss of quality, the rapid expansion of the education system has occurred in a context in which very little consideration has been given to what skills the labour market needs and can absorb (Ng'ethe et al. 2008). Graduates, not only of primary and secondary schools but also of tertiary institutions, are often forced to accept employment below their formal educational attainment or end up trying to make a living in the informal sector.

The 'youth crisis' in many countries is very much a result of governments' blind adherence to a set of global goals that have no productive relationship to their own local economic and social realities. Observers have rightly criticised donors' excessive focus on programmes such as the MDGs because they risk undermining the long-term investments required for building scientific capacity (see Dickson 2010). Philippine researcher, Lemuel Cacho (2009), has pointed out that when donors fund science on the basis of market or political considerations, the incentives and opportunities for basic research and local scientific discourse tend to decrease.

Furthermore, the uncritical approach adopted by donors and state institutions to rapid expansion and differentiation means that tertiary institutions are making little effort to build a co-ordinated and efficient education system that enables students to move easily between institutions. This is particularly true of the English-speaking African countries,<sup>12</sup> where competition tends to blur the boundaries between universities and other post-secondary training institutions. To earn enough income, some universities have fallen into 'vocational drift', seizing market opportunities to offer vocational training, while

polytechnics and the like are engaging in ‘academic drift’, and constantly seeking university status (Ng’ethe et al. 2008). Increasingly, the universities and polytechnics are starting to imitate each other rather than innovating in their own fields, and a lacuna is developing between the bottom and the top of the educational pyramid, so that the teaching of many basic technical and vocational skills is being completely neglected.

The rapid expansion of student numbers and the proliferation of private and public institutions has highlighted the need for innovation and reform in the higher education sector. Reform has proven difficult, however, because governments have had their hands full just trying to cope with the educational demands they have helped to generate. In several African countries, for instance, reforms have stalled because, for both political and social reasons, governments have opted to spend more money on student allowances than on investments in new equipment and infrastructure. This means that few of Africa’s universities are financially sustainable, and the financial gaps that need to be filled to restore the functionality of the higher education system have grown (see AAU 2004).

### *The bureaucratisation of aid relationships*

The third factor that has shaped the higher education and research sector is the bureaucratisation of aid relationships. This began in the 2000s, with the processes that led up to the 2005 Paris Declaration, and the statements subsequently adopted in Accra in 2008 and Busan in 2011. Effectively, OECD donors agreed to abandon the political conditions that they had imposed in previous decades as long as recipient governments agreed to take greater responsibility for ensuring that donor funds were spent effectively. At a first glance, this might be seen as having tilted the balance of power in favour of aid recipients. After all, donors were agreeing to channel their funds through recipient governments. However, the reality is that donors continue to determine policy direction and priorities, both globally and at a national level with states they support. Recipient governments control little more than policy implementation, and are now expected to comply with onerous

and bureaucratic reporting requirements that demand the creation of multiple and complex monitoring systems.

The OECD's Development Assistance Committee has played a leading role in harmonising donor approaches and methodologies so that the institutional architecture that determines aid relationships has become even more heavily loaded in favour of the donors. The underlying assumption seems to be that the more coherent the policy, the higher the chances of success. Donors, therefore, prioritise recipients that develop policy documents that reflect *the donors'* development goals. Recipient country priorities, and the context in which policies are to be implemented, are of secondary concern (even if, in the writing of proposals and reports, they appear much more important than they turn out to be in practice). As a result, every evaluation is carried out in terms of the goals set by donors, as if *aid effectiveness* is the answer to development in low-income countries.

So-called policy dialogues were established to allow development partners to monitor progress in specific sectors, but these have become increasingly contentious because they tend to be dominated by donors' demands for evidence of results. Government officials in recipient countries are often placed in the awkward position of having to respond to these demands, despite being fully aware that consultants and donors determined the terms and timeframes for measuring the outcomes of specific policy initiatives. The standardisation of donor thinking and practice since the mid-2000s has moved decisions about financing even further away from the political and administrative realities in recipient countries, and the ongoing refinements to methodologies for designing and evaluating donor inputs has done nothing to reduce this distance.

The 'general budget support' that has been an integral part of partnerships between donors and recipient governments since the late 2000s is also problematic. In these cases, donor funds are given in respect of a specific policy or programme but funds are paid into a general fund in the treasury of the recipient country. This offers recipient governments an opportunity to direct the money towards other projects before reporting back to the donor. Such practices are almost inevitable in countries where the revenue base is narrow and tax income

falls short of official targets. Expenditure-tracking mechanisms have done little to address this, leading increasingly frustrated donors to intensify the already impatient tone that tends to characterise their voices in partner dialogues.

In addition, the bureaucratisation of aid relationships has narrowed perspectives on the role of higher education and research in society. The higher education sector doesn't fit as neatly into poverty reduction strategies as primary or even secondary education do. As a result, donors not only see higher education and research as less significant, they also tend to overlook the special role that universities and research institutions play in the world. Most notably, the higher education sector's claim to autonomy and freedom from political interference has been ignored. In negotiations with recipient governments, donors treat the sector just like any other.

In the past, the funding of research and higher education tended to be treated as a separate entity and was often made available regardless of other policy priorities in particular countries. With increased bureaucratisation, those attempting to elicit support for this sector have had to try to make it fit into categories that are not compatible with the institutional objectives of academic institutions. In Africa, for instance, governments tend to be authoritarian, but academic freedom is seldom highly valued in donor policy documents. In such contexts, bureaucratised donor relations can give governments a licence to curb academic freedom. To sum up, the current aid architecture has done more harm than good, and this is especially so in relation to higher education and research.

## **Policy options for the future**

Institutions of higher education and research do not lend themselves to quick fixes. They exist to generate outcomes that become visible only after many years. Measuring results solely in terms of numbers of graduates, or numbers of patents and publications, misses the point about the role that these institutions play in a country's development. Nor do higher education institutions lend themselves to performance

assessment within the timeframes that typically apply to donor programmes. Unfortunately, donors have shown little readiness to accept or adapt to the characteristics of this sector.

The story of higher education and research in low-income countries highlighted in this chapter indicates that, despite the dire need for donor funding, this support has also given rise to some negative results. First, because higher education and research was perceived as sitting at the top of the education pyramid, the potential consequences for this sector were never adequately considered when the doors to primary and secondary education were opened to all. Second, higher education and research has fallen victim to the pressure on lower-income countries to comply with neoliberal economic policies and global programmes such as the MDGs. In other words, recipient governments have lost their ability to control the sector in ways that work to the benefit of their countries; quality has been sacrificed for the sake of numbers, and tertiary research and training programmes are too often forced to comply with bureaucratic reporting and monitoring systems that tend to undermine their primary purpose.

Drawing on these lessons and looking to the future, perhaps the primary justification for ongoing or new donor support should be to compensate for the retrogressive consequences of previous activities. Higher education and research in low-income countries needs continued support but on terms that are different from the standard approaches adopted by the OECD donor cartel in the past. In conclusion, I suggest five changes that donors could make to their own policies that have the potential to strengthen higher education and research in both the North and the South.

The first is that compliance with global development goals cannot and should not be the most important criterion for donors when they consider supporting particular countries. The MDGs proved to be a trap – statisticians at the UN and policy-makers in the donor community focused on numbers that often bore little relationship to reality and simply overlooked the stories behind how and why goals were or weren't achieved. Low-income countries should not be subjected to similar treatment in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that were adopted in September 2015 to guide the global

community over the next 15 years. Results are important but they must never again be allowed to be as crucial in determining the existence or the nature of partnerships between donor and recipient governments as they have been since the 2000s. Instead, much more emphasis must be given to local ownership of projects and programmes by recipient countries. It is important to note that even though local ownership was a key tenet of the rhetoric surrounding the 2005 Paris Declaration, in practice, this has been completely sidelined by the focus on policy development, and the entrenching of complex systems for measuring and reporting results. In essence, this first policy change relates to the very nature of the partnership between donors and recipients: *give recipients more say over which priorities should prevail and do not relegate their governments to mere implementers of policies and agendas set by donors in global forums.*

The second suggestion is that timelines for implementation of development programmes in low-income countries must be realistic and not determined solely by narrow political and bureaucratic criteria as was the case in the 2000s. In other words, partnerships must be developed on terms that *both* sides have a reasonable chance of fulfilling. Too often in the past, donor timetables placed undue pressures on recipient governments to be accountable to external actors and forced them to leave unattended many complex social and political issues that take time to address. Whether the aim is to tackle corruption or strengthen higher education and research, strong institutions tend to be built in back-and-forth processes that involve gains and losses over time. Many donors are aware of this, but find it difficult to allow for the time that such processes need, especially if things do not go well from the start or if their own priorities change. Thus, the second policy change is to *ensure that donor commitments are sustained for long enough to enable local actors to learn from their experiences, including from mistakes and missteps that they might make along the way.*

The third change is that support for higher education and research should be removed from the standard aid machinery and approached as an activity with particular needs. Sweden used to have a separate agency for supporting research and higher education – the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries (SAREC)

– but this was eventually incorporated into SIDA, and has since disappeared as an entity and lost influence. Allowing national research councils to take on this responsibility might be a step in the right direction, and would strengthen the input of academic peers. However, projects aimed at supporting the development of higher education and research tend to be far more complex than standard peer-review processes can handle. *The idea of special units with responsibility for allocating funds for projects linked to the higher education and research sectors in low-income countries is valid, and donors that fund this sector would do well to adopt it.*

The fourth change needed is for everyone in the sector to accept that so many more universities are competing for scarce resources. For years, many low-income countries had just one national university and the destination of donor funds was a given. Even after new universities were established, some of the ‘founding’ institutions continued to be the sole recipients of donor funds because they had well-established graduate programmes, and were providing staff for the newer organisations. Now, however, the new institutions are competing with the older ones, arguing that their researchers are just as good. It makes sense, therefore, for donors to consider supporting a national research fund that is accessible, on a competitive basis, to any individual or institution. Admittedly, the establishing of national research councils in the 1970s was not a positive step, but the political climate was more oppressive then, and few senior academics were able to stand up to the bureaucrats. The situation is different now; politics is more competitive and the universities have a core of more experienced researchers who are in a position to ensure satisfactory levels of professionalism. *Supporting research councils, in which members of the academic community can play a leading role without political or bureaucratic interference, could also constitute an important step towards improved institutional governance.* Developing institutions that enjoy a high degree of autonomy from partisan or personalised politics is the most critical governance challenge facing most countries.

The fifth policy shift to consider is that academic institutions fare best when they allow cosmopolitanism to flourish. By cosmopolitanism I mean the product of exchanges, networks and partnerships across

national boundaries. African universities have already benefited greatly from support given to such exchanges and it is important that these continue to receive funding. The Nordic governments have played a particularly important role in supporting institutional ties between the North and South, as well as ties between universities in the South. The Danish government also funds a major programme that allows Danish universities to develop closer ties with universities in low-income countries with a view to enhancing both teaching and research capacity on both sides of the equator (Danida Fellowship Centre 2015). *The policy challenge here is to ensure that individuals and institutions in the South have an equal say in these arrangements.* Experience to date suggests that the ostensibly better-qualified individuals in the donor countries take control, not only of planning but also implementing such projects. One way of countering this would be for national research councils in low-income countries (rather than organisations in the donor countries) to allocate money for such collaborative ventures. For example, a funding mechanism in these research councils could consider applications for collaborative ventures with academic institutions in the North alongside one that focuses only on funding for local research projects.

## Appendix

List of organisations researched	
Intergovernmental organisations	Private donor organisations
African Development Bank	Carnegie Corporation of New York
African Union	Ford Foundation
Consultative Group of International Agricultural Research Centers	Gates Foundation
European Union (Erasmus Mundus)	International Foundation for Science
OECD/DAC	Kresge Foundation
UNESCO	MacArthur Foundation
United Nations Institute for Training and Research	Mellon Foundation
World Bank: Global Development Network Task Force on Higher Education	Partnership for Higher Education in Africa
	Rockefeller Foundation
	Syngenta Foundation
	Wellcome Trust

**List of organisations researched**

<b>Government-funded donor organisations</b>		<b>Other organisations</b>
Belgium	University Commission for Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Abuja University of Science and Technology</li> <li>• Academic Ranking of World Universities</li> <li>• African Centre for Technology Studies</li> <li>• African Economic Research Consortium</li> <li>• Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa</li> <li>• Association for the Development of Education in Africa</li> <li>• Association of African Universities</li> <li>• Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa</li> <li>• International Association of Universities</li> <li>• International Institute of Water and Environmental Engineering (2iE)</li> <li>• Network of Ethiopian Scholars</li> <li>• Nigerian Education Trust Fund</li> <li>• Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa</li> <li>• Southern African–Nordic Centre</li> <li>• Science and Development Network</li> <li>• University World News</li> </ul>
Canada	Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), now merged into Dept of Foreign Affairs International Development Research Center (IDRC)	
Denmark	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	
Finland	Finnish Universities Partnership for International Development (UniPID)	
France	French Universities Agency (AUF)	
Germany	German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD)	
Netherlands	Nuffic	
Norway	NORAD/NORHED Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Higher Education	
Portugal	Camoes Institute	
Republic of Korea	Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)	
Sweden	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)	
Switzerland	Swiss Development Cooperation	
United Arab Emirates	UAE Interact	
United Kingdom	Department for International Development (DFID) Commission for Africa Association of Commonwealth Universities	
United States	USAID Higher Education for Development (HED)	

## Notes

- 1 Much of this chapter was first published online by the Danish Development Research Network in 2010. It is republished here because it helped to spark much debate, particularly among the Nordic donors, about the role of funding, and many of the points made remain relevant. Some aspects have been updated, and some new conclusions and policy recommendations put forward. Note also that while the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are mentioned, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) did not exist in 2009 when the initial research was done.
- 2 A map reflecting data for the 2015 Academic Ranking of World Universities graphically illustrates the uneven distribution of quality higher education and research (see <http://www.shanghairanking.com>). The developed countries (OECD members) dominate its list of the world's 500 best universities. The colour white denotes countries with no university in the top 500, most of East and Central Europe, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, much of Latin America and almost the whole of Africa are shown in white. Only five African universities, four in South Africa and one in Egypt, make the list. None of these are in the top 200, although South Africa's University of Cape Town comes close.
- 3 For example, a distinction is often made between education and research; these appear as separate budget categories and are treated differently when donors report on their support for academic institutions. Another example is that some countries include only academic institutions in their definition of higher education while others use the broader notion of tertiary education to include all post-secondary study.
- 4 Thus, for example, the Belgian University Commission and the French Universities Agency, acting on behalf of their respective foreign ministries, have been actively involved providing scholarships and broader institutional support to African universities in the Francophone countries. The latter institutions follow the French system, which makes it relatively easy for French universities and scholars to work with them. The result, however, is that, like the French system, the African institutions tend to be fairly conservative and less open to outside influence.
- 5 The terminology used by donors to describe what they support is often vague. Capacity building is the broadest term used but it is often unclear

whether this refers merely to individuals or also covers institutions and/or the policy environment in which higher education and research takes place. Given the inclination of some to apply this term very broadly, it makes sense to think of capacity building as covering all three levels: individuals, institutions, and the policy environment (DFID 2010). In addition, some donors refer to post-secondary, others to tertiary education. Judging from the way the terms are used, tertiary seems to refer more to universities and colleges that award academic degrees, while post-secondary seems to include professional and technical education for which diplomas and certificates can be awarded. Higher education institution is another term that is unspecific. In this chapter, I use it to refer to degree-awarding institutions. The term research-based education is sometimes used to highlight a contrast with regular course-based study.

- 6 The members of the partnership were the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment, the MacArthur Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, the Kresge Foundation and the Hewlett Foundation.
- 7 Countries such as Portugal and Spain, that follow their own priorities, tend to be seen as ‘laggards’ when it comes to aligning their aid with the principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration and the MDGs (Meyer 2010; OECD/DAC 2010).
- 8 However, the Commonwealth Secretariat organises most of the scholarships offered by UK universities, and these are not included as part of the UK’s bilateral support for higher education.
- 9 The NUFU Programme began in 1991 and was concluded in 2012, while the NOMA Programme ended in 2014. After several years of co-existence, the two programmes were replaced by the Norwegian Programme for Capacity Building in Higher Education and Research for Development (NORHED), which was launched by NORAD in 2012 and aims to combine the best of both programmes.
- 10 See the Gates Foundation Global Libraries strategy overview.
- 11 As of early 2016, the AERC’s member donors were DFID, Danida, the Kenyan government, NORAD, SIDA, USAID, the World Bank, the MacArthur Foundation, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Other funders include the African Development Bank (AfDB), the African Capacity Building Foundation, German Academic Exchange Services (DAAD) and

the United Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research.

- 12 As noted, the French-speaking countries have long operated within the framework they inherited from France (Mourin 2009).

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