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The Weight of Love

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
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INTRODUCTION: WEIGHING AFFECT IN MEDIEVAL CHRISTIAN DEVOTION

1. Bonaventure, *Legenda Maior* 6.4 (*Doctoris seraphici S. Bonaventurae opera omnia*. Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventura, 1882–1902) XIII.520. Translations throughout this book are my own unless otherwise noted.

2. Ignatius Brady established the date of 1262 on the basis of several verbatim correspondences with Bonaventure's *Legenda Maior* of that same year, but this dating is not universally accepted. See Regis Armstrong, Wayne Hellmann, and William Short, eds., *Francis of Assisi: Early Documents*: vol. 2, *The Founder* (New York: New City Press, 2000), 718. J. F. Quinn argues for a dating of 1269 in "Chronology of St. Bonaventure's Sermons," *Archivum franciscanum historicum* 67 (1974), 145–84. This sermon appears as the fourth sermon on St. Francis in the Quaracchi edition of Bonaventure's *Opera Omnia* (Collegium S. Bonaventura, 1882–1902) IX.585–90.

3. Quaracchi IX.589.

4. On the eschatological interpretation of Francis's wounds in this sermon see Zachary Hayes, "The Theological Image of St. Francis in the Sermons of St. Bonaventure," in *Bonaventuriana: Miscellanea in onore di Jacques Guy Bougerol, ofm* (Rome: Edizioni Anoniamum, 1988), 1:333–34. On the eschatological significance of St. Francis for Bonaventure in general, see Joseph Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971), 31–38. On the metaphor of Francis as book, see Richard Emmerson and Ronald Herzmann, *The Apocalyptic Imagination in Medieval Literature* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 52–53, 70–72. On Francis's own contributions to the theology of ecstatic union and its cosmic dimensions, see Alessandro Vettori, *Poets of Divine Love: Franciscan Mystical Poetry of the Thirteenth Century* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), esp. 40–78.

5. On some of the meanings of *cor* and their importance in scholastic understandings of affectivity, see M.-D. Chenu, "Les catégories affectives au Moyen Âge," in *Du corps à l'esprit: Textes rassemblés et présentés par Jacques Durand* (Desclée de Brouwer, 1989), 145–53. Bonaventure is also drawing

an analogy from contemporary medical knowledge in identifying heat as a property of the heart related to vigor. For a brief overview of medieval theories of *complexio* underlying this comparison, see Nancy G. Siraisi, *Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge and Practice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 101–6.

6. Thomas H. Bestul, *Texts of the Passion: Latin Devotional Literature and Medieval Society* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 4.

7. Richard Southern, *The Making of Middle Ages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 232.

8. See Thomas Bestul, “St. Anselm and the Continuity of Anglo-Saxon Devotional Traditions,” *Annuaire Medievale* 18 (1977), 20–41; Rachel Fulton, *From Judgment to Passion: Devotion to Christ and the Virgin Mary, 800–1200* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). Both Bestul and Fulton maintain, nevertheless, that the eleventh century marked a turning point in devotional attitudes and practices. For a more extensive critique of conventional narratives of an affective turn in high medieval spirituality, see Allen J. Frantzen, “Spirituality and Devotion in the Anglo-Saxon Penitentials,” *Essays in Medieval Studies* 22 (2005), 117–28.

9. See Michelle Karnes, *Imagination, Meditation, and Cognition in the Middle Ages* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 15, and the similar critiques she cites there.

10. See, for example, Ewert Cousins, “The Humanity and the Passion of Christ” in *Christian Spirituality: High Middle Ages and Reformation*, ed. Jill Raitt (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 375–91; and Eric (Edmund) Colledge, ed., *The Medieval Mystics of England* (New York: Scribner, 1961), 3–55.

11. Fulton, 63 and 5.

12. Southern, 240.

13. Sarah Beckwith, *Christ’s Body: Identity, Culture, and Society in Late Medieval Writings* (London: Routledge, 1993), 51–52.

14. Beckwith, *Christ’s Body*, 53.

15. Beckwith, *Christ’s Body*, 52.

16. Bestul, *Texts of the Passion*, 43.

17. Bestul, *Texts of the Passion*, 48.

18. Sarah McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 84.

19. McNamer, 90. In Bonaventure’s *On the Perfection of Life Addressed to the Sisters*, McNamer recognizes the features of affective Passion meditation but notes that this text was written for a community of women and appears to reflect practices in which they were already engaged. I discuss this text further in the Conclusion.

20. Karnes, 5 and 65–70.

21. Karnes, 10.

22. For such studies, see Elizabeth Ann Dreyer, “Affectus in St. Bonaventure’s Description of the Journey of the Soul to God” (Ph.D. dissertation, Marquette University, 1983); Franz P. Sirovic, *Der Begriff “Affectus” und die Willenslehre beim Hl. Bonaventura: Eine analytisch-synthetische Untersuchung* (Vienna: Missionsdruckerei St. Gabriel, 1965).

23. Ann Astell, *Eating Beauty: The Eucharist and the Spiritual Arts of the Middle Ages* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), 104.

24. To put it another way, the becoming-body of Francis’s desire is the absolute visibility of the secret of affect in the sight of God. In Jacques Derrida’s analysis of secrecy in Jewish and Christian thought, secrecy is enabled by, paradoxically, the dissolution of secrecy in God’s infinite and unlimited gaze, interiorized in the soul in conscience: “*There where, wherever*, or, since place no longer takes place one should say more precisely *as soon as* there is no longer any secret hidden from God or from the spiritual light that passes through every space, then a recess of spiritual subjectivity and of absolute interiority is constituted allowing secrecy to be formed within it.” *The Gift of Death*, trans. David Wills (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1995), 100–1, emphasis original to translation.

25. For instances and a compelling critique of this enduring dichotomy, see Charlotte Radler, “‘In Love I Am More God’: The Centrality of Love in Meister Eckhart’s Mysticism,” *Journal of Religion* 90.2 (2010), 171–98.

26. Radler, 173.

27. See as representative Sarah Beckwith, “Passionate Regulation: Enclosure, Asceticism, and the Feminist Imaginary,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 93 (1994), 803–24; Amy Hollywood, *The Soul as Virgin Wife* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Sara S. Poor, *Mechtbild of Magdeburg and Her Book: Gender and the Making of Textual Authority* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Patricia Dailey, *Promised Bodies: Time, Language, and Corporeality in Medieval Women’s Mystical Texts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013). Hollywood provides an indispensable overview of this scholarship in “Feminist Studies,” in *The Blackwell Companion to Christian Spirituality*, ed. Arthur Holder (Blackwell, 2005), 363–86.

28. Caroline Walker Bynum, *Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion* (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 194.

29. See Amy Hollywood, “Inside Out: Beatrice of Nazareth and Her Hagiographer,” in *Gendered Voices: Medieval Saints and their Interpreters*, ed. C. Mooney (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 78–98; “Feminist Studies,” 366–74.

30. Patricia Dailey, “The Body and Its Senses,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism*, ed. Amy Hollywood and Patricia Z. Beckman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 264–76 at 264.

31. Dailey, *Promised Bodies*, 117.

32. Dailey, *Promised Bodies*, 5.

33. Dailey, *Promised Bodies*, 70.

34. Karnes, 16.

35. Karnes, 16.

36. Dailey, *Promised Bodies*, 102.

37. See, for example, *Breviloquium* 2.9, where the basic division between the cognitive and the affective are indexed to the soul’s relationship to truth and the good, respectively: “Rursus quia discretio veri est cognitio fuga et appetitus est affectio ideo tota anima dividitur in cognitivam et affectivam.” While Bonaventure uses the language of *partes*, he maintains the position that, essentially speaking, the soul is not divided into parts. I discuss this distinction further, and the qualifications Bonaventure makes regarding it, in Chapter 2.

38. “. . . magis movetur affectus ad exempla quam ad argumenta magis ad promissiones quam ad ratiocinationes magis per devotiones quam per definitiones,” *Breviloquium*, Prolog. 5.

39. Damien Boquet, *L’ordre de l’affect au Moyen Âge: Autour de l’anthropologie affective d’Aelred de Rievaulx* (Louvain: Brepols, 2005), 34–63.

40. Boquet, 91, my translation.

41. Cited in Boquet, 100.

42. Gordon Rudy, *The Mystical Language of Sensation in the Later Middle Ages* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 59.

43. Bernard McGinn, *The Growth of Mysticism: Gregory the Great through the 12th Century* (New York: Crossroad Herder, 1996), 501n212.

44. Michael Casey, *Athirst for God: Spiritual Desire in Bernard of Clairvaux’s “Sermons on the Song of Songs”* (Cistercian Publications, 1986), 97.

45. See Thomas Davis’s appendix to his translation of William of St. Thierry, *The Mirror of Faith* (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1979), 93.

46. Davis, 93.

47. William Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

48. Reddy defines an emotional regime as “the set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and emotives that express and inculcate them,” 129.

49. Reddy, 45.

50. Reddy, 54.

51. Niklaus Largier, “Inner Senses—Outer Senses: The Practice of Emotions in Medieval Mysticism,” in *Codierung Von Emotionen Im Mittelalter (Emotions and Sensibilities in the Middle Ages)*, vol. 1, ed. C. Stephen Jaeger and Ingrid Kasten (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2003), 3–15.
52. McNamer, 28. Compare also Fulton, *From Judgment to Passion*.
53. McNamer, 12.
54. Barbara Rosenwein, “Worrying About Emotions in History,” *The American Historical Review* 107.3 (Jun. 2002), 821–45.
55. Rosenwein, “Worrying About Emotions,” 842.
56. Sarah Ahmed, *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 3.
57. Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotion: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
58. Michel de Certeau, “The Freudian Novel: History and Literature,” in *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), 17–34.
59. Cited in Dixon, 14.
60. In Chakrabarty’s example, “*pani* in Hindi and *water* in English can both be mediated by H₂O.” See Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Time of History and the Times of Gods,” in *The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital*, ed. Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 35–60 at 38.
61. Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002), 27.
62. Massumi, 28.
63. “An Inventory of Shimmers,” in *The Affect Theory Reader*, ed. Gregg and Seigworth (Durham, N.C. and London: Duke University Press, 2010), 1 (emphasis original).
64. Ruth Leys, “The Turn to Affect: A Critique,” *Critical Inquiry* 37:3 (Spring 2011), 434–72.
65. Eugenie Brinkema, *The Forms of the Affects* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2014), xv.
66. Brinkema, xiii.
67. Brinkema, xii.
68. Massumi, 27.
69. Massumi, 27.
70. See Lauren Berlant, *Cruel Optimism* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2011); Kathleen Stewart, *Ordinary Affects* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007).
71. Stewart, 4, my emphasis.
72. Massumi, 27.

73. Rei Terada, *Feeling in Theory: Emotion After the “Death of the Subject”* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 28.

74. Terada, 31.

75. Terada, 44.

76. Terada, 45.

I. THE SERAPHIC DOCTRINE: LOVE AND KNOWLEDGE

IN THE DIONYSIAN HIERARCHY

1. On post-Bonaventurean scholastic debates concerning the autonomy of the will, see Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Thirteenth Century* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1995).

2. Edward Mahoney’s survey of the Dionysian conception of hierarchy in medieval philosophy, for example, makes no mention of Bonaventure (or Thomas Gallus, for that matter). See “Pseudo-Dionysius’s Conception of Metaphysical Hierarchy and Its Influence on Medieval Philosophy,” in *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter*, 429–75. Lees’s study of the sources of the Cloud discusses Gallus at length, as well as Hugh of Balma who was undeniably and extensively influenced by Bonaventure, but she makes no mention of Bonaventure.

3. *Celestial Hierarchy* (CH) 205B–C, trans. Colm Lubheid, *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works* (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1987), 162. For the critical edition of the Greek text, see Beate Regina Suchla, Günter Heil, and Adolf Martin Ritter, *Corpus Dionysiacum*, 2 vols. (*Patristische Texte und Studien* bd. 33 and 36) (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990–91).

4. CH 165A (Lubheid, 154).

5. CH 301B (Lubheid, 177).

6. Here the term “mediate” is misleading to the extent that it implies hierarchical ranks standing “between” God and the lower orders. Hierarchy does not separate one level from another; it is, on the contrary, the reason all things are united to and filled with God. For a thorough and precise analysis of this dynamic, see Eric D. Perl, *Theophany: The Neoplatonic Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2007), 65–81. Perl’s phrase for this aspect of Dionysian thought, “immediate mediation,” captures the simultaneous necessity and difficulty of using the term “mediate” to describe the activity of hierarchy.

7. CH 305A (Lubheid, 179). John Sarrazen’s Latin translation reads, “Ad intelligibilem visorum sursumagebatur cognitionem”; see Sarrazen’s and other Latin translations edited in P. Chevallier, ed., *Dionysiaca: Recueil donnant l’ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l’Aréopage*, 2 vols. (Bruges 1937–50), I.966.

8. Rorem, “The Early Latin Dionysius: Eriugena and Hugh of St. Victor,” in *Re-thinking Dionysius the Areopagite*, ed. Sarah Coakley and Charles M. Stang (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 71–84. In fact, the association of the Seraphim with a sublime circular movement resonates with ancient descriptions of the circular movement of heavenly bodies. More specifically, Gregory of Nyssa in his *Songs* commentary connects the “immovable movement” of the Seraphim with *epektasis*. See Maurice de Gandillac, *La hiérarchie céleste, Sources Chrétiennes* 58 (Paris: Éditions du cerf, 1958), 107n1.

9. Though Gregory mentions Dionysius the Areopagite by name in this homily, his knowledge of the *Celestial Hierarchy*—and thus his direct debt to Dionysius for his own angelic hierarchy—remains disputed. Joan Petersen argues that given the discrepancies between Gregory and Dionysius’s list of angelic ranks, Gregory may have derived his rank either directly from the relevant biblical passages or from earlier Latin authors. See Petersen, “‘Homo omnino Latinus?’ The Theological and Cultural Background of Pope Gregory the Great,” *Speculum* 62.3 (1987), 529–51. In the *Moralia in Iob*, Gregory provides an alternative ordering for the angelic hierarchy (Book 32, Chapter 23).

10. “And there are some who are enkindled with the fire of heavenly contemplation, and they burn with desire for their creator alone. They want nothing from this world, but are fed only with love for eternity. Abandoning every earthly thing, they transcend all temporal things with their minds. Loving and burning, and resting in their ardor, they burn with love. They inflame others by speaking, and those whom they touch with their words immediately begin to burn with love for God. What can I call them but Seraphim, whose hearts, which have been turned into fire, shine and burn?” *Homiliae in euangelia* 34.7, *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (CCSL)* 141, ed. R. Etiax (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999), 311.

11. *Hom. in euan.* 34.10.

12. *Sermones super Cantica Cantorum (Bernardi opera, vols. 1–2)*, I.111.

13. Associations of the Seraphim with love are widespread in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Cistercian writing. Isaac of Stella’s *Epistola de anima*, for example, connects the Seraphim with the desire for and love of God, which Isaac calls hope (in a passage that was included in the Pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima*, and thus familiar to Parisian theologians in the thirteenth century). Additionally, William of St. Thierry’s *De Natura et dignitate amoris* (discussed in Chapter 3) uses the image of the Seraph to describe those who are surrounded with such *affectus* that they ignite one another in the love of God. On the question of influence of the Dionysian corpus on Cistercian authors see McGinn, “Pseudo-Dionysius and the Early Cistercians,” in *One Yet Two: Monastic Tradition East and West*, ed. M. Basil Pennington (*Cistercian Studies* 29) (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1973), 200–41.

14. For an overview of the theological orientation of Hugh's commentary, see David Luscombe, "The Commentary of Hugh of Saint-Victor on the Celestial Hierarchy," in *Die Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter*, ed. T. Boiadjiev, et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 159–75, esp. 164–72. For an analysis of the ways in which Hugh revises and contests Eriugena's interpretation, see Csaba Németh, "The Victorines and the Areopagite," in *L'ecole de Saint-Victor de Paris*, ed. Dominique Poirel (Bibliotheca Victorina 22) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 333–83 at 337–41.

15. *Expositiones in Ierarchiam Coelestem*, ed. J. Barbet, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis (CCCM)* 31 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975). The relevant passages of Eriugena's commentary include Cap V, ln 139–40 ("angeli sunt Seraphim, quia feruore caritatis caleficantur a superioribus et se inferiores caleficant"); VII.26–29 ("Et quidem, inquit, qui sciunt hebraicarum uocum proprias significationes, sanctum nomen Seraphim aut incedentes, aut calefacientes manifestare; hic subauditur dicunt; est enim EKLEIPSIC uerbi"); VII.90–145 (on the warm motion of the Seraphim); VII.164–211 (on the relation of the Seraphic warmth to love, for example, lines 170–73: "Ipsa etiam ignea celestis Seraphim uirtus incircumelata et inextinguibilis, incircumelata uidelicet, quia totam se inferioribus reuelat, inextinguibilis uero, quoniam semper in ea diuinus ardet amor"); et al. Chapter XIII treats Dionysius's discussion of the Seraph who visited Isaiah.

16. On the relationship between the thought of Richard of St. Victor and Thomas Gallus, see Robert Javelet, "Thomas Gallus et Richard de Saint-Victor mystiques," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 29 (1962), 206–33. As Rosemary Lees notes, "Gallus' concept of the unitive experience is thus emphatically super intellectual, and in his *Spectacula Contemplationis* he underlines his divergence in this respect from traditional Victorine contemplative theory as it was formulated by Richard, which envisages union through the higher function of the intellect, the *intelligentia*," *The Negative Language of the Dionysian School of Mystical Theology: An Approach to the Cloud of Unknowing*, vol. 1 (Salzburg: Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik, 1983), 280.

17. See Lawell, "Thomas Gallus's Method as Dionysian Commentator: A Study of the *Glose super Angelica Ierarchia* (1224), with Considerations on the *Expositio librorum beati Dionysii*," in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge*, 76.1 (2009), 89–117 at 91.

18. Németh, 381–83. Among other hallmarks, Németh notes the shift in emphasis from the *Celestial Hierarchy* to the *Mystical Theology* as the central text of the corpus.

19. On the Dionysian corpus in thirteenth-century Paris, see H. F. Dondaine, *Le Corpus Dionysien de l'Université de Paris au XIIIe Siècle* (Rome:

Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1953), and Németh, “The Victorines and the Areopagite,” 334. For a study of one particular thirteenth century manuscript, see D. E. Luscombe, “Venezia, Bibl. Naz. Marziana, Latini Classe II, 26 (2473) and the Dionisian Corpus of the University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century,” *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 52 (1985), 224–27. Regarding the translations available to Bonaventure, Dondaine cites evidence from *De scientia Christi* and *De mysterio Trinitatis* that Bonaventure had access at least to the translations of Hilduin, Sarrazen, and Eriugena (Dondaine, 114n121).

20. Additionally, Gallus also refers to his own *Expositio* on the *Mystical Theology* and a *glose* on the *Celestial Hierarchy*. James McEvoy translated and published what he believes to be Gallus’s *Expositio* in *Mystical Theology: The Glosses by Thomas Gallus and the Commentary of Robert Grosseteste on De Mystica Theologia*, ed. and trans. James McEvoy, Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 3 (Leuven: Peeters, 2003). Lawell disputes this attribution and regards this work as a later gloss influenced by Gallus (“Thomas Gallus’s Method,” 111–17). Lawell has edited the *Glose super Angelica Ierarchia* in *CCCM*, vol. 223A (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011).

21. Coolman, “The Medieval Affective Dionysian Tradition,” in Coakley and Stang, 91; the passage to which Coolman refers is in Gallus’s *Extractio* on the *Mystical Theology*, Chapter 1 (Chevallier, 1.710).

22. “. . . principalis affectio, et ipsa est scintilla synderesis que sola unibilis est spiritui diuino . . .” *Explanatio MT I*, *CCCM* 223, ed. Declan Lawell (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 4. See Lawell, “Affective Excess: Ontology and Knowledge in the Thought of Thomas Gallus,” *Dionysius* 26 (2008), 147. As Lawell explains, however, Thomas distinguishes synderesis as a *vis animae* from the *scintilla*, which is not a power of the soul, but something produced in the contact of synderesis with the divine Other and thus not properly belonging to the soul. See also Lawell, “*Ne de ineffabili penitus taceamus*: Aspects of the Specialized Vocabulary of the Writings of Thomas Gallus,” *Viator* 40.1 (2009), 151–84, esp. 154–57.

23. Jacques de Vitry, *The Life of Marie D’Oignies* 1.22, trans. Margot H. King (Toronto: Peregrina Publishing, 1993), 54.

24. On the possible evidence for direct influence, see Sarah McNamer, *Affective Meditation and the Invention of Medieval Compassion* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 86, 236n3; and King’s introduction to de Vitry’s *Vita*, 8.

25. The original attribution of this title is generally credited to the Dominican friar Raynor of Pisa, who used the epithet for Bonaventure in his 1333 *Panttheologia*.

26. Here I am interested primarily in the Seraph as an image of fire, love, and hierarchy, though these significations are not the only functions of the Seraph image. For example, Ewert Cousins examines the six-winged Seraph image as a meditative image or mandala representing an “organized totality.” See Cousins, “Mandala Symbolism in the Theology of Bonaventure,” *University of Toronto Quarterly* 40 (1971), 185–201.

27. Wayne Hellmann, “The Seraph in Thomas of Celano’s *Vita Prima*,” in *That Others May Know and Love: Essays in Honor of Zachary Hayes, OFM*, ed. Michael F. Cusato and F. Edward Coughlin (Franciscan Studies 34) (St. Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1997), 23–41.

28. Thomas of Celano, *Uita prima sancti Francisci*, in *Legendae S. Francisci Assisiensis saeculis XIII et XIV conscriptae*, ed. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae (*Analecta Franciscana*, X, 1926–41), 2.94.

29. Thomas of Celano, *Uita prima*, 2.114.

30. Thomas of Celano, *Uita prima*, 2.114.

31. Thomas of Celano, *Uita prima*, 2.115.

32. Hellmann contends that Thomas would have been aware of the Dionysian and monastic theological associations of the Seraph image from his education at Monte Cassino. Whatever Thomas’s education had or had not exposed him to, however, what is evident is that his discussion of the Seraph does not at any point in his *Vita* exploit the association of the Seraph with fire. Moreover, Thomas’s Seraph-like figure is not depicted as performing the same purifying function as the biblical Seraph. Its significance is limited to its cruciform posture, its six wings outlining the virtues, and its flight symbolizing Francis’s ascent to Christ. For a discussion of the differences in the Seraph imagery in Thomas and Bonaventure’s respective accounts, see Hellmann, “The Seraph in Thomas of Celano and Bonaventure: The Victorine Transition,” in *Bonaventuriana I*, ed. Chevero Blanco (Rome: Edizioni Antonianum, 1988), 347–56. On the development of the legend of the Seraph in Francis’s vision, see Chiara Frugoni, *Francesco e l’invenzione delle stimmate: Una storia per parole e immagini fino a Bonaventura e Giotto* (Turin: Einaudi, 1993).

33. “. . . corroborato itinere, et sensus desere et intellectuales operationes et sensibilia et invisibilia et omne non ens et ens, et ad unitatem, ut possibile est, inscius restituere ipsius, qui est super omnem essentiam et scientiam,” *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* 7.5. Translations are my own; I refer throughout to the page numbers in the reprinting of the Quaracchi edition (with facing-page English translation) in Philotheus Boehner and Zachary Hayes, *Works of St. Bonaventure*, vol. 2 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 2002).

34. *Itin.* 7.4. (Boehner and Hayes, 36). Compare the similar statement in the *Breviloquium* 5.6 (Quaracchi V.260), in which Bonaventure characterizes

the *excessus* as “learned ignorance” and paradoxically identifies darkness as a form of illumination: “Quo quidem desiderio ferventissimo ad modum ignis spiritus noster non solum efficitur agilis ad ascensum, verum etiam quadam ignorantia docta supra se ipsum rapitur in caliginem et excessum, ut non solum cum sponsa dicat: In odorem unguentorum tuorum curremus, verum etiam cum Propheta psallat: Et nox illuminatio mea in deliciis meis. Quam nocturnam et deliciosam illuminationem nemo novit nisi qui probat, nemo autem probat nisi per gratiam divinitus datam, nemini datur, nisi ei qui se exercet ad illam.”

35. See also *Collationes in Hexaemeron* 2.30, where Bonaventure describes the “suprema unio per amorem” as a state in which “affect alone keeps vigil and imposes silence on all the other powers” (*sola affectiva vigilat et silentium omnibus aliis potentiis imponit*), Quaracchi V: 341.

36. Etienne Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, trans. Dom Iltyd Trethowan and Frank J. Sheed (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), 458–64.

37. George Tavard, *Transiency and Permanence: The Nature of Theology According to St. Bonaventure* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1954), 244–45.

38. Joseph Ratzinger, *The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure*, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971), 90.

39. *Commentarius in Ecclesiasten (Comm. in Eccl.)* 7 (Quaracchi IV.54).

40. Coolman, 86.

41. “Et dici potest secundum quod hic accipitur amor: ineffable quondam feuds armonicum creators et create uniuersitatis . . .” *Explanatio in libros Dionysii*, ed. D. Lawell, CCCM 223 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 248:1718–20. As Denys Turner writes with regard to Thomas Gallus: “In the last resort the true point of Gallus’ dependence on neo-platonic *eros* is there, where Bernard’s or Denys the Carthusian’s is to be found: in their enthusiastic espousal of a general world-view in which erotic love, or love modeled on the erotic, is the prime mover, the moved, and the end of all motion, whether in the orders of nature, of the human, or of grace,” *Eros and Allegory: Medieval Exegesis on the Song of Songs* (Cistercian Studies 156) (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1995), 73.

42. Hilduin translates *eros* as *cupiditas*. But Bonaventure favors the translation of *eros* as *amor* found in both Eriugena and John Sarrazen’s translations.

43. Denys Turner, *Eros and Allegory: Medieval Exegesis on the Song of Songs* (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1995), 47.

44. *Divine Names (DN)* 709D (Lubheid, 81). See Turner’s lucid discussion of Dionysian *eros* in *Eros and Allegory*, 47–70.

45. *Divine Names (DN)* 709D (Lubheid, 81).

46. On Dionysian *eros* and its relation to ecstatic union in the context of ancient Greek and Hellenistic thought, see Charles M. Stang, *Apophysis and Pseudonymity in Dionysius the Areopagite: “No Longer I”* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 170–81.

47. *DN* 712A (Lubheid, 82). Sarrazen’s translation reads: “Est autem faciens exstasim divinus amor, non dimittens sui ipsorum esse amatores, sed amatorum” (Chevallier, I.215).

48. “Amorem dicimus vim unitivam,” *Commentarius in Secundum Librum Sententiarum* (2 *Sent.*), d. 39, dub 1 (Quaracchi II.916). This is a paraphrase of *DN* 713A–B (Lubheid, 83), in which Dionysius credits his teacher Hierotheus with this definition of *eros*: “When we speak of yearning [*ton erōta*], whether this be in God or an angel, in the mind [*noeron*] or in the spirit [*psychikon*] or in nature [*physikon*], we should think of a unifying [*enōtikēn*] and co-mingling [*synkratikēn*] power [*dynamin*] . . .” Sarrazen’s translation of this passage reads, “Amorem sive divinum sive angelicum sive intellectualem sive animale sive naturalem dicamus, unitivam quamdam et concretivam intelligemus virtutem . . .” (Chevallier I.225–26). See Chapter 3 for further discussion of Bonaventure’s interpretation of this passage.

49. *Commentarius in Evangelium Lucae* 13.46 (Quaracchi VII.349).

50. “Excessivum autem modum cognoscendi dico, non quo cognoscens excedat cognitum, sed quo cognoscens fertur in obiectum excedens excessivo quodam modo, erigendo se supra se ipsum,” *Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi*, q. 7, concl. (Quaracchi VII.40). In his *Sentences* commentary, Bonaventure makes similar distinctions within knowledge. 3 *Sent.* d. 24, dub. 4 (Quaracchi III.531): “God is known through vestiges, through images, through the effects of grace, and through intimate union of God and the soul [*animae*], just as the Apostle says, ‘Whoever adheres to God is one spirit with him.’ And this is the most excellent knowledge [*cognitio*], which Dionysius teaches. This knowledge consists in ecstatic love and is above the knowledge of faith [*elevat supra cognitionem fidei*] according to its common state.”

51. *De scientia Christi*, q. 7, concl. (Quaracchi VII.40).

52. 1 *Sent.* d. 32, a. 2, q. 1, ad.1, 2, 3. (Quaracchi I.562): “Certain acts refer to a motion from a thing to the soul, such as wisdom, while others refer to the motion from the soul to the thing, such as loving [*amare*].” In his much later *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, Bonaventure discusses ecstasy as a *sapientia nulliformis*, but this passage from the *Sentences* indicates that *sapientia* is not necessarily an ecstatic movement any more than *cognitio* is.

2. AFFECT, COGNITION, AND THE NATURAL MOTION OF THE WILL

1. The most extended treatment of the development of the concept of synderesis is D. Odon Lottin, *Psychologie et morale au xii^e et xiii^e siècles*. Tome

II: Problèmes de morale, part 1 (Louvain: 1948), 101–349. Lottin edits many of the relevant texts and provides a clear analysis. For a brief summary, with emphasis on the spiritual and unitive sense of the term, see Aimé Solignac, “Syndérèse,” *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité: ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire* (DS), vol. 14.2, ed. Marcel Viller, et al. (Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1932–95), 1407–12.

2. See, for example, Romans 7:15 and 2:15, respectively.

3. See de Blic, “Syndérèse ou conscience?” *Revue d’ascétique et de mystique* 25 (1949), 146–57.

4. Douglas Kries, “Origen, Plato, and Conscience (*Synderesis*) in Jerome’s Ezekiel Commentary,” *Traditio* 57 (2002), 69. Kries argues convincingly that Jerome’s reference to followers of Plato who posit the fourth part of the soul as *syneidesis* refers directly to Origen. In his commentary on Romans, Origen identified *syneidesis*, mentioned in 2 Corinthians 1:12, with the *pneuma* of 1 Corinthians 2:11 and Romans 8:16. All of these Pauline passages would reappear as *auctoritates* in medieval discussions of *synderesis*. See also Michael B. Crowe, “The Term *Synderesis* and the Scholastics,” *Irish Theological Quarterly* 23 (1956), 151–64, 228–45.

5. “. . . quantumque ponunt quae super haec et extra haec tria est, quam Graeci uocant *syneidesin*—quae scintilla conscientiae in Cain quoque pectore, postquam eiectus est de paradiso, non extinguitur, et, uicti uoluptatibus uel furore, ipsaque interdum rationis decepti similitudine, nos peccare sentimus—, quam proprie aquilae deputant, non se miscentem tribus sed tria errantia corrigentem, quam in scripturis interdum uocari legimus spiritum, qui *interpellat pro nobis gemitibus ineffabilibus*. *Nemo enim scit ea quae hominis sunt, nisi spiritus qui in eo est*, quem et Paulus ad Thessalonicenses scribens cum anima et corpore seruari integrum deprecatur. Et tamen hanc quoque ipsam conscientiam, iuxta illud quod in Poueruiis scriptum est: *Impius cum uenerit in profundum peccatorum, contemnit*, cernimus praecipitari apud quosdam et suum locum amittere, qui ne pudorem quidem et uerecundiam habent in delictis et merentur audire: *Facies meretricis facta est tibi, nescis erubescere*,” *Commentarii In Ezechielem*, ed. F. Glorie, CCSL 12 (Turnhout, 1964) 12.

6. Though the theory that *synderesis* was a mistranscription of *syneidesis* is the most widely accepted, there have been other theories put forward to explain the term’s appearance in Jerome’s commentary. At the end of the nineteenth century, H. Siebeck argued that the term *synteresis* derives from *tereo* and signifies a principle of conservation or maintenance. See Siebeck, “Noch einmal die *Synderesis*,” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 10 (1897), 520–29. Also see Oscar Brown, *Natural Rectitude and Divine Law in Aquinas* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1981), 175–77; Jean Rohmer, “Syndérèse,” in *Dictionnaire Théologie Catholique*, vol. 14.2 (Paris,

1941), 299–96; Gerard Verbeke maintains that the medieval concept of synderesis is fundamentally related to the Stoic conception of *oikeiosis*, a term that “refers to the basic impulse of a being, especially of man, toward himself, toward his own nature and condition, toward what is suitable and connatural for him, in a word, toward whatever is appropriate for him,” *The Presence of Stoicism in Medieval Thought* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1983), 55.

7. “The Spark of Conscience: Bonaventure’s View of Conscience and Synderesis,” *Franciscan Studies* 53 (1993), 93.

8. *Conscience and Other Virtues: From Bonaventure to MacIntyre* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 36.

9. See, for example, 2 *Sent.* d. 24, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.559), in which he characterizes the question of the distinction between reason and will as one more of “curiosity than utility.” Nevertheless, while Bonaventure refuses an essential distinction between the faculties, he establishes a clear basis for differentiation in terms of operation.

10. Timothy Potts, *Conscience in Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980),

11. Joseph Ratzinger, *On Conscience: Two Essays* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007), 30.

12. Ratzinger, 22.

13. Augustine refers to the higher part of reason or the *ratio sublimior* throughout *De Trinitate* XII. For a helpful discussion of the sources and subsequent development of this concept, see R. W. Mulligan, “Ratio Superior and Ratio Inferior: The Historical Background,” *The New Scholasticism*, 29 (1955), 1–32.

14. *Speculum Speculationum*, ed. Rodney M. Thomson (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi XI) (Oxford University Press, 1988), 405.

15. *Questiones magistri Rolandi super quattuor libros Sententiarum* (Paris Maz. 795), ed. Lottin, 130–34.

16. For Philip, the disposition that informs synderesis is what distinguishes it from the natural will. The natural will, in turn, is no more than a simple potentiality in the soul, undetermined to any particular end.

17. See *Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono*, 2 vols., ed. Nikolaus Wicki (Corpus philosophorum Medii Aevi) (Bernae: Francke, 1985).

18. Thomas Aquinas treats synderesis and conscience as distinct as well. He expresses their relationship as one of habit to act, both belonging to the practical intellect (*STh* I.79.12–13). Aquinas discusses many of the traditional questions about synderesis at greater length in the sixteenth question of his *De veritate*, but the basic definition is the same. For a comparison of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas’s conceptions of synderesis, see Eduard Lutz,

Die Psychologie Bonaventuras, in Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters VI, 4–5 (Munster, 1909), 180–90).

19. *Summa Theologica* II.73.1.1 (Quaracchi: Ex Typographia Collegii St. Bonaventurae, 1924), 417. Alexander died before completing his *Summa Theologica*. What is known as his *Summa*—or the *Summa Fratris Alexandri*—was compiled in its completed form by Alexander’s students, including Bonaventure. See V. Doucet, “The History of the Problem of the Authenticity of the Summa,” *Franciscan Studies* 7 (1947), 26–42, 274–312.

20. *Summa* II.73.1.2 (Quaracchi II.418).

21. *Summa* II.73.2.3 (Quaracchi II.423).

22. *Summa* II.73.2.6 (Quaracchi II.426).

23. Lottin II.1, 199n1.

24. Latin text of Gallus’s commentary ed. G Théry, “Commentaire sur Isaïe de Thomas de Saint-Victor,” *La vie spirituelle* 47 (1936), 146–62.

25. *Explanatio MT* I (Lawell, 4).

26. Lawell, “Specialized Vocabulary,” 153.

27. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae in iu libris distinctae* 2. d. 39, c. 3, ed. I. Brady, *Spicilegium Bonaventurianum* 4–5 (Grottaferrata: Editiones Collegii S. Bonaventurae Ad Claras Aquas, 1971–81).

28. Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 39, c. 3.

29. Bonaventure, 2 *Sent.* d. 39 (Quaracchi II.897).

30. 2 *Sent.* d. 39 (Quaracchi II.897).

31. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 5 (Quaracchi II.898).

32. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 3 (Quaracchi II.898).

33. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.899).

34. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.899).

35. In his response to an objection, Bonaventure qualifies this definition a bit, noting that conscience can also be understood as a *potentia*. Though it is tempting to see here a parallel to his definition of synderesis as a *potentia habitualis*, he appears to be making a very different point about conscience. A *potentia habitualis* is a power that is perfected or determined to a particular end by a habit. By naming conscience as a power *and* a habit simultaneously, however, Bonaventure is gesturing toward its indeterminacy. See 2 *Sent.* a. 1, q. 1, ad 1 (Quaracchi II.900): “Since an acquired habit is able to purify and stain the soul, thus it is that conscience is called pure and impure, right and not right. Still, these differences pertain more to conscience as power than conscience as habit.”

36. In a response to an article by Cary Nederman, Marcia Colish lays out clearly the two competing senses of *habitus* in twelfth- and thirteenth-century scholastic theology. See “*Habitus* Revisited: A Reply to Cary Nederman,” *Traditio* 48 (1993), 77–92.

37. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, concl. (Quaracchi II.902).
38. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (Quaracchi II.903), citing *Posterior Analytics* II.19.
39. *De Trin.* XII.24.
40. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (Quaracchi II.903).
41. According to Timothy Potts, from the perspective of contemporary ethical theory, Bonaventure's distinction between innate and acquired knowledge thus becomes "a logical and no longer a psychological criterion for basic deontic propositions and is independent of whether we have any intuition about the truth of a deontic proposition." As a result, Potts argues, Bonaventure fails to provide "an appropriate method for determining the truth-values of *a priori* deontic propositions; thinking it complete, he turned to *synderesis*." *Conscience in Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 41–42.
42. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 2, resp. (Quaracchi II.904).
43. More precisely, *synderesis* is an orientation not simply to God but to the Good as it exists in others. Yet the significance of this distinction is tempered somewhat by Bonaventure's contention that every good is desirable only with reference to the supreme good, as in *De Scientia Christi* IV, fund. 29 (Quaracchi VII.20) (my emphasis): "Just as the affect holds itself to the good, so the intellect holds itself to the true, and as every good comes from the highest goodness, so every truth comes from the highest truth. *But it is impossible for our affect to be drawn directly to a good without in some way touching the highest good.*" Similarly, *Itinerarium* III.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 88): "Desire is principally concerned with that which moves it the most. And that which moves it the most is that which is loved the most. And that which is loved the most is to be happy. But happiness is attained only by reaching the best and ultimate end. Therefore, human desire wants nothing but the supreme Good, or that which leads to it or in some way reflects that Good."
44. By "secret," I mean an interiority that is both the limit of representability and, in a sense, its possibility, the space or interval that constitutes conscience as (never fully achievable) self-presence. I elaborate on this dynamic (as well as the philosophical debts that inform my thinking here) in the Conclusion.
45. Following the familiar framework of the scholastic disputed question, the particular difficulty arises from seemingly conflicting authorities: On the one hand, Jerome calls *synderesis* a fourth power distinct from the rational, irascible, and concupiscible parts. On the other hand, the pseudo-Augustinian *De spiritu et anima* posits only the threefold division of powers (*vires*). See 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.909).
46. Langston, "Spark of Conscience," 93.

47. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, resp. (Quaracchi II.910).
48. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.911).
49. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, resp. (Quaracchi II.910). On the cognitive and affective aspects of *liberum arbitrium* see also 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1, art. un., q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.592), and q. 3, concl. (Quaracchi II.598). I discuss these passages further in Chapter 5.
50. “hinc est, quod dicitur super alias volare . . .” 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.911).
51. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3. (Quaracchi II.910).
52. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 2, resp. (Quaracchi II.912).
53. 2 *Sent.* D. 39, a. 2, q. 2, concl. (Quaracchi II.912).
54. See 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 3, concl. (Quaracchi II.906): “All conscience either binds one to do what it dictates, or it binds one to change his conscience if it is in error.”
55. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 2, ad 3 (Quaracchi II.913).
56. See, for example, 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 2; and d. 16, a. 2, q. 3.
57. See 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
58. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3 (Quaracchi II.914).
59. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6 (Quaracchi II.915).
60. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6 (Quaracchi II.915).
61. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 6 (Quaracchi II.915).
62. See 2 *Sent.* d. 24, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.559).
63. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3 (Quaracchi II.913).
64. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
65. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
66. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
67. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
68. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).
69. See 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 ad 1 (Quaracchi II.910): “. . . just as Gregory said concerning the first chapter of Job, we speak to God not only through thoughts [*cogitationibus*] and exterior words, but even through affects and desires [*affectibus et desiderijs*].” Thus, Bonaventure reasons, synderesis is not cognitive even though it is described as “speaking.”

3. ELEMENTAL MOTION AND THE FORCE OF UNION

1. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.909).
2. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, resp. (Quaracchi II.910).
3. Alexander of Hales, 2 *Sent.* d. 40 (Lottin 2.1, 176).
4. See the discussion of ancient theories of affect in the Introduction, as well as Simo Knuuttila, *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 5–110.

5. Lottin, 198.
6. 2 *Sent.* d. 14, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, ad 2, 3 (Quaracchi II.340).
7. See also 2 *Sent.* d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 7 (Quaracchi II.562), in which, in the process of arguing for the distinction of reason and will as different powers, Bonaventure suggests that the sun heats and illumines by means of different powers.
8. There is no modern edition; J. P. Migne includes the work in the appendix to the works of Augustine (under uncertain authorship) in the *Patrologia Latina* 40:779–832. Bernard McGinn’s English translation appears in *Three Treatises on Man: A Cistercian Anthropology* (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications, 1977), 179–288.
9. Peter Lombard, *Sent.* 2. d. 39.
10. 2 *Sent.* d. 30, dub. 2 (Quaracchi II.916).
11. 2 *Sent.* d. 30, dub. 2 (Quaracchi II.916).
12. 2 *Sent.* d. 30, dub. 2 (Quaracchi II.916).
13. 2 *Sent.* d. 30, dub. 2 (Quaracchi II.917).
14. “Dicendum, quod bonitas voluntatis inchoatur in appetitu naturali et consummatur in virtute deliberativa; nec est voluntas simpliciter bona et recta, nisi sit recta, in quantum movetur deliberative, et in quantum movetur naturaliter,” 2 *Sent.* d. 39, dub. 2 (Quaracchi II.917).
15. See 4 *Sent.* d. 49, p. 2, s. 1, a. 3, q. 2, fund. 1 (Quaracchi IV.1020): “All cognition is motion to the soul . . .” and 1 *Sent.* d. 32, a. 2, q. 1, ad.1, 2, 3. (Quaracchi I.562): “Certain acts refer to a motion from a thing to the soul, such as wisdom, while others refer to the motion from the soul to the thing, such as loving [*amare*].” Here Bonaventure explains that while intelligence or understanding conveys a form, an act of love conveys to the soul both a form and an effect.
16. “Amorem dicimus vim unitivam,” 2 *Sent.* d. 39, dub. 1 (Quaracchi II.916). On the Dionysian reference, see the introduction, nn. 38–39.
17. See also 2 *Sent.* d. 16, a. 1, q. 1 (Quaracchi 2.393–94), where Bonaventure deploys this definition of love to demonstrate that man is truly an image of God: “Likewise, what is most bound to be united to the other is most bound to be configured and conformed to it—for love [*amor*], because it unites, is said ‘to transform the lover into the one loved,’ just as Hugh of St. Victor says [in *De arrha anima*]¹⁷—but a rational creature, such as a human being, is most bound to be united to God and to tend to Him through love: therefore he is most bound to be configured and assimilated to Him. If, therefore, image names an expressed similitude, it is clear that etc.”
18. “Amor enim dicit affectionis adhaesionem respectu amati,” 1 *Sent.* d. 10, dub. 1 (Quaracchi I.205).
19. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 3, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.915).

20. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.899).
21. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 1, ad 3 (Quaracchi II.910).
22. “Thus, it is no surprise that the two things that seem to be productive of movement are desire and practical thinking. It is because of the movement started by the object of desire that the thinking produces its movement, that which is desired being its point of departure. And even imagination, whenever it produces movement, does not do so without desire.” Trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (New York: Penguin, 1986), 213.
23. Though several passages are relevant for this problem (see especially *Physica* VIII.4), the difficulty is readily apparent in *De anima* III.10: “In form, then, that which produces movement is a single thing, the faculty of desire as such. But first of all is the object of desire, which, by being thought or imagined, produces movement while not itself in motion. In number, however, there is more than one thing that produces movement” (Lawson-Tancred, 215).
24. Furley suggests that the contradiction can be resolved by holding (as he believes Aristotle implicitly held) that the objects of animal desire are in some way intentional objects—that is, are in some sense internal to perceiving and thinking beings. See David Furley, “Self-Movers,” in *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses* (Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum), ed. G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 165–80. Furley’s argument has been the subject of a significant amount of debate, much of it collected in the volume (in which Furley’s original essay is reprinted) *Self-Motion: From Aristotle to Newton*, ed. Mary Louise Gill and James G. Lennox (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), 1994.
25. “The change of anything that is changed by itself is natural; this is the case with all animals, for example. For animals are self-movers, and we say that everything which has its own inner source of change is changed naturally.” Trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 196.
26. Waterfield, 33.
27. Waterfield, 199.
28. *De caelo* IV.1, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, trans. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 454. In the first complete Latin translation of the work (William of Moerbeke c. 1260), the terms are “grave” and “leve.” Robert Grosseteste produced an incomplete translation of the work several years earlier, but this did not include Book 4.
29. *De Caelo* 4.3 (McKeon, 459).
30. *De Caelo* 4.3 (McKeon, 459).
31. *De Caelo* 4.3 (McKeon, 460).
32. *De Caelo* 4.3 (McKeon, 460).

33. The Aristotelian concept of natural place as a theological theme can also be found in Meister Eckhart's notion of *abegescheidenheit* or detachment. In Eckhart's formulation, however, it is God who is inexorably and necessarily moved. "And I prove that detachment compels God to come to me in this way; it is because everything longs to achieve its own natural place. Now God's own natural place is unity and purity, and that comes from detachment. Therefore God must of necessity give himself to a heart that has detachment," *On Detachment*, trans. Edmund Colledge, in *Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense* (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1981), 286.

34. *Confessiones* XIII.9. Latin text ed. James O'Donnell, *Confessions: Introduction and Text* (vol. 1) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 187.

35. *Confessiones* XIII.9 (O'Donnell, 187).

36. "Si essemus lapides, aut fluctus, aut uentus, aut flamma, uel quid eiusmodi, sine ullo quidem sensu atque uita, non tamen nobis deesset quasi quidam nostrorum locorum atque ordinis appetitus. Nam velut amores corporum momenta sunt ponderum, siue deorsum grauitate, siue sursum leuitate nitantur. Ita enim corpus pondere, sicut animus amore fertur, quocumque fertur." *De civitate Dei* XI.28.

37. The precision of this understanding of *pondus* distinguishes Augustine's elaboration of the theme from other metaphorical descriptions of the soul rising to God. Cf., for example, John Cassian, *Conf.* 9:4–5.

38. For an overview of this theme in Augustine's writings, see C. Harrison, "Measure, Number and Weight in Saint Augustine's Aesthetics," *Augustinianum* 28 (1988), 591–602. See also Olivier du Roy, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin: genèse de sa théologie jusqu'en 391* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1966), 279–81.

39. *De Genesi ad litteram* IV.3, *CCSL*, vol. 47, ed. B. Dombart (Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), 99.

40. *De Genesi ad litteram* IV.4 (Dombart, 100).

41. *De Genesi ad litteram* IV.3 (Dombart, 100).

42. "... pondus sine pondere est, quo referuntur ut quiescant, quorum quies purum gaudium est, nec illud jam refertur ad aliud," *De Genesi ad litteram* IV.3 (Dombart, 100).

43. "... quomodo dicam de pondere rupiditatis in abruptam abyssum, et de subleuatione charitatis per Spiritum tuum, qui superferebatur super aquas?" *Conf.* XIII.7.

44. "... in potestate non habet lapis cohibere motum quo fertur inferius, animus uero dum non uult non ita mouetur ut superioribus desertis inferiora diligat. et ideo lapidi naturalis est ille motus, animo uero iste uoluntarius," *De libero arbitrio* III.1, *CCSL* 29, ed. W. M. Green (Turnhout: Brepols, 1970) 211–321 at 260.

45. William of St. Thierry, *De natura et dignitate amoris* n. 1, CCCM 88, ed. P. Verdeyen (Turnhout: Brepols, 2003), 177.
46. *De natura et dignitate amoris* n. 4 (Verdeyen, 177).
47. *De natura et dignitate amoris* n. 4 (Verdeyen, 177).
48. *De natura et dignitate amoris* n. 4 (Verdeyen, 177).
49. *De natura et dignitate amoris* n. 4 (Verdeyen, 180).
50. *De natura et dignitate amoris* n. 12 (Verdeyen, 186).
51. See Thomas Davis's discussion of William's notion of *affectus* in *The Mirror of Faith*, 93–95.
52. *De natura et dignitate amoris* n. 14 (Verdeyen, 188).
53. *De natura et dignitate amoris* n. 44 (Verdeyen, 211).
54. *Breviloquium* 2.1 (Quaracchi V.219).
55. *Breviloquium* 2.1 (Quaracchi V.219).
56. In 1 *Sent.* d. 3, p. 1, dub. 3 (Quaracchi I.79), Bonaventure correlates the triad of measure, number, and weight with Dionysius's triad of *substantia*, *virtus* and *operatio* and Peter Lombard's triad of *unitas*, *speciem*, and *ordinem*.
57. *Brev.* 2.1 (Quaracchi V.219).
58. *Brev.* 5.8 (Quaracchi V.273).
59. *Brev.* 5.1 (Quaracchi V.252).
60. "Deus non condescendit per sui essentiam incommutabilem, sed per influentiam ab ipso manantem," *Brev.* 5.1 (Quaracchi V.252).
61. ". . . illud non potest esse per habitum aliquem naturaliter insertum sed solum per donum divinitus gratis infusum . . ." *Brev.* 5.1 (Quaracchi V.253).
62. 1 *Sent.* d. 37, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi I.639).
63. For a concise and helpful presentation of Bonaventure's conception of *vanitas*, see Christopher Cullen, *Bonaventure* (Great Medieval Thinkers), New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 107–8.
64. *Brev.* 5.2 (Quaracchi V.253), citing Augustine, *Enchiridion* 32.9.
65. *Brev.* 5.8 (Quaracchi V.262).
66. "Et caritas ipsa est radix forma et finis virtutum iungens omnes cum ultimo fine et ligans omnia ad invicem simul et ordinate; ideo ipsa est pondus inclinationis ordinatae et vinculum colligationis perfectae," *Brev.* 5.8 (Quaracchi V.262).
67. On Bonaventure's notion of "hierarchization," see Chapter 4.
68. *Brev.* 5.8 (Quaracchi V.262). This bond of charity is also the principle of unity of the *ecclesia* as the mystical body of Christ. See Peter Fehlner, *The Role of Charity in the Ecclesiology of St. Bonaventure* (Rome: Miscellanea Franceseana, 1965).
69. As Jay Hammond notes, Bonaventure invokes the concept of *pax* frequently in his works to mean "right order." See Jay Hammond's essay "Order in the *Itinerarium*," in his translation and edition of J. A. Wayne Hellmann's *Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure's Theology* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.:

Franciscan Institute, 2001), 202. Hammond also argues, with respect to the *Itinerarium*, that Bonaventure’s “universal analogy” is in fact an affirmation of the univocity of God’s being throughout all creation, a presence which is at the same time God’s all-pervading love drawing all things potentially to union (Hammond, *Order in the Itinerarium*, 209).

70. “Dicitur autem transire figura huius mundi non quantum ad destructionem totalem huius mundi sensibilis sed quia per actionem illius ignis omnia elementaria inflammantis consumuntur vegetabilia et animalia, purgabuntur et innovabuntur elementa, maxime aër et terra, purgabuntur iusti et adurentur reprobi; quibus factis, cessabit etiam motus caeli, ut sic, completo numero electorum, fiat quodam modo innovatio et praemiatio corporum mundanorum,” *Brev.* 7.4 (Quaracchi V.284).

71. See Cicero’s discussion in *De natura deorum* 2.118, Loeb Classical Library 19, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967). Macrobius also discusses this theory in his *Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis* 2.10, a major source for ancient natural philosophy for twelfth-century Latin theologians. On the influence of these theories in the thought of Origen, see Alan Scott, *Origen and the Life of the Stars: The History of an Idea* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), esp. 115–17.

72. *Brev.* 7.2 (Quaracchi V.282). See also Aelred of Rivaulx’s discussion of corporeal fire in hell (which collects a number of late ancient authorities) in *Dialogue on the Soul* 3.

73. *Brev.* 7.6 (Quaracchi V.287), citing Rev 14.11.

74. “. . . necesse est, illos spiritus evolare, in quibus est caritatis ignis sursum levans, et nihil retardans ex parte impuritatis animae vel reatus.” *Brev.* 7.2 (Quaracchi V.283).

75. See, for example, the account of Diogenes Laërtius 7.156–57, trans. Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson in *The Stoics Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonials* (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2008), 57.

76. See Cicero, *De natura deorum* 2.118, Loeb Classical Library 268, ed. Jeffrey Henderson, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933): “ita relinqui nihil praeter ignem, a quo rursus animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret atque idem ornatus oreretur.”

77. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, dub. 1 (Quaracchi II.916).

78. 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1, art. un., q. 1, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.594). For further discussion of this argument, see Chapter 4.

79. *Brev.* 2.9 (Quaracchi V.227).

4. HIERARCHY AND EXCESS IN THE *ITINERARIUM MENTIS IN DEUM*

1. *Itinerarium* Prol.2. (Boehner and Hayes, 36).

2. *Itin.* Prol.2 (Boehner and Hayes, 36).

3. The *Itinerarium* is one of a number of treatises dated to within a few years of Bonaventure's appointment as Minister General of the Franciscan order in 1257. In the case of the *Itinerarium*, Bonaventure himself provides the date. If his dating can be taken literally, then the composition, or at least the conception, of the *Itinerarium* took place in September or October of 1259, around the thirty-third anniversary of Francis's death on October 4, 1226. See the excellent recent analysis of evidence for Bonaventure's chronology in Jay M. Hammond, "Dating Bonaventure's Inception as Regent Master," *Franciscan Studies* 67 (2009), 179–226. For a general (though in some cases disputed) chronology of Bonaventure's works, see Jacques Bougerol, *Introduction to the Works of Bonaventure*, trans. José de Vinck (Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1963), 171–82; also Joseph F. Quinn, "The Chronology of St. Bonaventure (1217–1257)," *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972), 168–86. Whether or not Bonaventure's own dating of the work is reliable, however, it would be a mistake to take it *only* literally, given its multifaceted allegorical significance. The *Itinerarium* is, in a sense, an exegesis of Francis's Seraphic vision at Mount La Verna and of the stigmata he received with that vision. Accordingly, the Christological significance is underscored by the number thirty-three, which recalls the traditional age of Jesus at the time of his crucifixion. Furthermore, the wording, "circa Beati ipsius transitum," connects the death (*transitus*) of Francis with the "passing over" (also *transitus*) that is the goal and summit of the *itinerarium*. The dating, then, should be understood as part of the strategy of the prologue, which frames the journey described in the treatise in a richly significant spiritual time and place, whatever else it might indicate about the historical circumstances of the writing.

4. Bonaventure's account of Francis's vision at La Verna is in *Legenda Maior* 13 (Quaracchi XIII.543ff).

5. On Bonaventure's conception of *transitus* see Werner Hülsbusch, "Die Theologie des Transitus bei Bonaventura," in *S. Bonaventura 1274–1974* (Grottaferrata: Collegio S. Bonaventura, 1973), 4:533–65 and André Ménard, "Spiritualité du Transitus," *S. Bonaventura 1274–1974*, 4:607–35.

6. *Itin.* Prol.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 36).

7. On *ecstasis* and the related term *raptus* in Bonaventure's writings, see Karl Rahner, "Der Begriff der ecstasis bei Bonaventura." *Zeitschrift für Aszese und Mystik* 9 (1934), 1–18, and J. Beumer, "Zwei schwierige Begriffe in der mystischen Theologie Bonaventuras ('raptus' und 'ecstasis')," in *Franziskanische Studien* 56 (1974), 249–62.

8. Gregory LaNave, "Knowing God through and in All Things: A Proposal for Reading Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*," *Franciscan Studies* 67 (2009), 267–99, and Jay Hammond's "Respondeo" to LaNave's essay in the same volume, 301–21.

9. For a comparison of the two works, and a discussion of Richard's influence on Bonaventure, see Stephen Brown, "Reflections on the Structural Sources of Bonaventure's *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*," in *Medieval Philosophy and Modern Times*, ed. G. Homström-Hintikka, vol. 1–16 (Netherlands: Kluwer, 2000), 1–15.

10. Karnes, 83.

11. *Itin.* Prol.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 38).

12. *Itin.* 1.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 44).

13. *Itin.* 1.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 44).

14. Jay Hammond, "An Historical Analysis of the Concept of Peace in Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*" (Ph.D. dissertation, Saint Louis University, 1998), 21. Hammond seeks to place the *Itinerarium*, and specifically its call for peace, in the historical context of the rifts developing in the Franciscan order during Bonaventure's first years as Minister General. Thus "order" resonates as both a political and theological ideal. For more on the notion of *ordo* in the *Itinerarium*, see also Jay Hammond, "Order in the *Itinerarium*" in J. A. Wayne Hellmann, *Divine and Created Order in Bonaventure's Theology*, trans. and ed. Jay M. Hammond (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 2001).

15. The multivalence of the term *mens* suggests "soul" as a better translation than "mind." At times, Bonaventure clearly uses it to mean the higher part of the soul—the memory, understanding, and will by which the soul is the image of God (see especially *Itin.* 3). In this usage, the term could be translated as "mind." Yet Bonaventure is also clear that the soul as a unity is the subject of ascent, and not simply the higher mind alone, making "mind" a misleading translation for the subject of the *Itinerarium*. While Bonaventure does at times recognize some distinction between *mens* and *anima*, it is clear that by "mind," he does not mean the "superior reason" or higher intellect. Thus, in order to avoid overemphasizing the cognitive aspects of ascent, and to signify that Bonaventure's subject is the entire soul, I have generally followed recent scholarly convention in translating *mens* as "soul," except where context suggests that the term refers restrictively to the higher powers or the triad of memory, understanding, and will.

16. Denys Turner insists rightly that Bonaventure's notion of hierarchy is one in which each step contains within it all of the previous stages. However, as I will argue later in this chapter, what makes Bonaventure's "hierarchy" truly dynamic is the way in which each stage also contains its superior stage. See Turner, "Hierarchy Interiorised: Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*" in *The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian Mysticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 102–34.

17. *Itin.* Prol.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 38).

18. *Itin.* 7.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 136).
19. *Itin.* 1.6 (Boehner and Hayes, 50).
20. Augustine discusses this triad as the image of God in *mens* at length in *De Trinitate* Book 10, in a reflection on the Delphic oracle and Ciceronian injunction, *nosce te* (know thyself).
21. *Itin.* 3.2 (Boehner and Hayes, 82).
22. *Itin.* 3.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 88).
23. “Desiderium autem principaliter est illius quod maxime ipsum movet. Maxime autem movet quod maxime amatur; maxime autem amatur esse beatum; beatum autem esse non habetur nisi per optimum et finem ultimum: nihil igitur appetit humanum desiderium nisi quia summum bonum, vel quia est ad illud, vel quia habet aliquam effigiem illius,” *Itin.* 3.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 88).
24. As J. Bougerol explains, *desiderium* for Bonaventure is “more than a force or impulsion—it is a tendency,” one that does not require cognitively certain judgment regarding the object, but rather only that the soul “taste the power, the beauty, and the fruit of the attraction” (“L’aspect original de l’Itinerarium mentis in Deum et son influence sur la spiritualité de son temps,” *Antonianum* 52 [1977], 311). See also *Comm. in Eccl.* 7 (Quaracchi IV.54): “When something is desired, it is not necessary that a certain cognition precede it. For desire follows estimation alone” (*Quod aliquid desideratur, non necesse est, quod praecedat cognitio certitudinis; desiderium enim sequitur solam aestimationem*). Bonaventure makes a similar claim for *dilectio* in 2 Sent. d. 23, a. 2, q. 3, ad. 4 (Quaracchi II.545–46), in response to the objection that, if Adam loved God in Paradise, he must have had a preceding vision of God. Refuting this argument, Bonaventure cites William of St. Thierry (misidentified as Bernard of Clairvaux) that *dilectio* “extends itself further than vision,” since “*dilectio* sometimes follows estimation alone.”
25. *Itin.* 4.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 100).
26. *Itin.* 2.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 64).
27. See *Brev.* 5.6 (Quaracchi V.259).
28. This point is also made clearly by Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologiae*, I.78.3. The standard critical edition is the *Opera Omnia, iussu Leonis XIII O.M., edita cura et studio fratrum praedictorum* (Rome: 1882–1996), vols. 4–11.
29. Trans. in Denys Turner, *Eros and Allegory: Medieval Exegesis of the Song of Songs* (Kalamazoo, Mich.: Cistercian Publications), 326.
30. For a more thorough account of Bonaventure’s teachings on the spiritual senses, see Karl Rahner, “The Doctrine of the Spiritual Senses in the Middle Ages,” in *Theological Investigations* vol. 16, trans. Cornelius Ernst (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961), 109–28; and Gregory LaNave, “Bonaven-

ture,” ch. 9 of *The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in Western Christianity*, ed. Paul Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 159–73.

31. *STb* I.78.3.

32. Thomas notes, however, that in sensible creatures, the effect an object has on the perceiver is never merely natural. That is, it is never entirely without an intellectual response; otherwise the sense of touch would have to be extended to even inanimate objects, which are also naturally affected by external agents. John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock point out that for Thomas, touch is the basest of the senses both in being the most bodily and the most extensive, and insofar as all sense perception is based on or understood on the model of touch. In fact, Milbank and Pickstock understand touch for Thomas as not only not opposed to intellect, but also as the mode (or model?) of intelligence, both human and divine. See John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, *Truth in Aquinas* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 71.

33. *Itin.* 4.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 100).

34. *Itin.* 4.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 100).

35. *Itin.* 4.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 100).

36. The same triad appears in Bonaventure’s *De perfectione vitae ad sorores* 5.6–9. On contemplation and the overthrow of reason in the *Beniamin Maior*, see Stephen Jaeger, “Richard of St. Victor and the Medieval Sublime,” in Stephen Jaeger, ed., *Magnificence and the Sublime in Medieval Aesthetics: Art, Architecture, Literature, Music* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 157–78.

37. Richard of St. Victor, *Beniamin Maior* 5.11; trans. Grover A. Zinn as *The Mystical Ark*, in *Richard of St. Victor*, Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1979), 325.

38. On Bonaventure’s elaboration of the Dionysian triad of purification-illumination-perfection in his *Triplex Via*, see J. Bougerol, “Le perfection chrétienne et la structuration des trois voies,” *Etudes Franciscaines* 19 (1969), 397–409.

39. *Itin.* 4.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 100).

40. *Comm. in Luc.* 10.62 (Quaracchi VII:271).

41. *Itin.* 4.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 98).

42. *Itin.* 4.8 (Boehner and Hayes, 106).

43. The verb “hierarchizare” and related forms appear in Bonaventure’s work only later, and most frequently in the *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, but his frequent use of the phrase *efficitur hierarchicus* in the *Itinerarium* suggests the same: being made into a hierarchy. For a thorough study of the uses and senses of *hierarchia* and related terms, see Romano Guardini and Werner Dettloff, *Systembildene Elemente in der Theologie Bonaventuras: die Lehren vom*

lumen mentis, von der gradatio entium, und der influentia sensus et motus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1964), 146–75.

44. *Brev.* 2.12 (Quaracchi V.230).

45. *Itin.* 7.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 132).

46. See especially Jay Hammond, “Order in the *Itinerarium*” and “Respondeo.” Note that Steven Brown also sees a correlation in Richard between *sensibilia* and vestiges, *intelligibilia* and images, and *intellectibilia* and—rather than similitudes—the divine reality itself. See Brown, “Structural Sources,” 5.

47. See 1 *Sent.* d. 3, p. 1, art. un., q. 2, ad. 4 (Quaracchi I.72–73), where Bonaventure distinguishes the *umbra* as another mode distinct from the *vestigium*.

48. The term *similitudo*, and the triad *vestigium*, *imago*, and *similitudo*, require, I think, a slightly different elaboration, and will be considered later in this chapter.

49. 1 *Sent.* d. 3, p. 1, art. un., q. 2 (Quaracchi I:71–74.)

50. In fact, Bonaventure himself seems to take this position in the first of his *Disputed Questions on the Trinity*, 1.2, concl (Quaracchi V.54): “Every creature is either only a vestige of God—as is corporeal nature—or an image of God, as is the intellectual creature.”

51. Etienne Gilson, *Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, 185–214.

52. *Brev.* 2.12 (Quaracchi V.230).

53. In the first chapter, Bonaventure refers only to the distinction of vestige and image: “In accordance with our condition, the totality of things [*rerum universitas*] is a ladder for ascending to God. And among things, some are vestiges, others images; some corporeal, others spiritual; some temporal, others, everlasting; some things are outside us, and some within us” (Boehner and Hayes, 46).

54. “Secundus modus distinguendi est, quod imago est in *naturalibus*, et similitudo in *gratuitis*, qui similiter habet ortum ex illa *prima* differentia. Quia enim *imago* dicit *configurationem*; et illa attenditur ex parte naturalium potentialium animae, scilicet memoriae, intelligentiae et voluntatis: hinc est, quod imago est in *naturalibus*. Quia vero *similitudo* dicit convenientiam, quae ortum habet a *qualitate*; et qualitas, in qua anima similitur Deo, haec est gratia: ideo *similitudo* dicitur in *gratuitis* esse,” 2 *Sent.* d. 16, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (Quaracchi II.405).

55. Turner maintains, though in a carefully qualified way, that the passage from stages three to four is the hinge of nature and grace in the movement of ascent. Here his qualification is that, in keeping with the nature of *hierarchia*, the fourth stage does not exclude the operations of nature as seen in the first three stages, but takes them up and transforms them. While I do not disagree

with this basic point, I maintain, as noted previously, that the distinction between the operations of nature and the operations of grace is complicated not only by the non-linear nature of the *itinerarium*, but by the excess that structures each of its stages. See Turner, *Darkness of God*, 112–13; and *Eros and Allegory*, 145–49.

56. *Itin.* 7.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 132).

57. For an analysis of the temple motif that structures the *Itinerarium*, see Bernard McGinn, “Ascension and Introversion in the *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*,” in *S. Bonaventura 1274–1974*, vol. 3 (Rome: Grottaferrata, 1974), 535–52; Lillian Turney, “The Symbolism of the Temple in St. Bonaventure’s *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*,” unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Fordham University, 1968).

58. *Itin.* 6.3 (Boehner and Hayes, 126).

59. *Itin.* 7.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 132).

60. *Itin.* Prol.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 34).

61. *Itin.* 7.1 (Boehner and Hayes, 132).

62. *Itin.* Prol.2 (Boehner and Hayes, 36).

63. Boehner’s notes to the *Itinerarium* draw many of these lexical connections. See *Works* vol. 2, 146nn6–7.

64. “Suspendium elegit anima mea, et mortem ossa mea,” *Itin.*, 138.

65. Bonaventure’s last work, *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, just as frankly posits the necessity of death, and its connection to ascent and to love: “quia oportet hominem mori per illum amorem, ut sursum agatur,” *Col. Hex.*, Princ.2.31 Ed. Ferdinand Delorme, *Bibl. Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi*, vol. 8 (Ad Claras Aquas: Florentiae ex typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1934). On Bonaventure’s conception of mystical death see Alois M. Haas, *Sermo Mysticus: Studien zu Theologie und Sprache der Deutschen Mystik* (Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz, 1979), 406–9. Haas rightly insists that *mors* for Bonaventure is not merely metaphorical, but expresses a reality as physical as the crucified incarnation of the Word.

66. *Itin.* 7.6 (Boehner and Hayes, 138).

67. “. . . non lucem, sed ignem totaliter inflammantem et in Deum excessivis unctionibus et ardentissimis affectionibus transferentem,” *Itin.* 7.6 (Boehner and Hayes, 138).

68. 2 *Sent.* d. 39, a. 2, q. 2, concl. (Quaracchi II.910).

69. “In hoc autem transitu, si sit perfectus, oportet quod relinquuntur omnes intellectuales operationes, et apex affectus totus transferatur et transformetur in Deum,” *Itin.* 7.4 (Boehner and Hayes, 136).

70. “sensus desere et intellectuales operationes et sensibilia et invisibilia et omne non ens et ens, et ad unitatem, ut possibile est, inscius restituere ipsius, qui est super omnem essentiam et scientiam.” *Itin.* 7.5 (Boehner and Hayes, 136).

71. On this Latin interpretive tradition see, most recently, two complementary essays: Paul Rorem, “The Early Latin Dionysius: Eriugena and Hugh of St. Victor,” and Boyd Coolman, “The Medieval Affective Dionysian Tradition,” in *Re-thinking Dionysius the Areopagite*, ed. Sarah Coakley and Charles M. Stang (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 71–84 and 85–102.

72. On fire as the active, motive element, see 2 *Sent.* d. 15 (Quaracchi II.379–81).

73. *Itin.* 7.6 (Boehner and Hayes, 138). On Bonaventure’s use of the term *passio*, see Erich Auerbach, “Excursus: *Gloria Passionis*,” in *Literary Language and Its Public in Late Antiquity and in the Middle Ages*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Pantheon, 1965), 67–81.

74. See also Thomas Gallus’s account of the *hierarchia mentis*: “The lowest hierarchy of mind consists in its very own nature; the middle in what it can do by effort, which incomparably exceeds nature; the highest in ecstasy (*excessus mentis*). At the lowest, only nature is at work; at the highest, only grace; at the middle, both grace and effort work together” (trans. Turner, *Eros and Allegory*, 321).

5. THE EXEMPLARY BODIES OF THE *LEGENDA MAIOR*

1. On the development of the concept of *voluntas* more generally in Latin Christian theology, see Albrecht Dihle, *The Theory of the Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), and N. Gilbert, “The Concept of the Will in Early Latin Philosophy,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 11 (1973), 299–317. On the concept of *voluntas* and its relation to the intellect and free choice in the later middle ages, see Kent, *Virtues of the Will*.

2. See J. Korolec, “Free Will and Free Choice,” in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Norman Kretzmann, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 630: “The will itself was defined as the rational appetite, or the desire for the good apprehended by reason, and not in terms of a capacity for choosing between alternatives.” See also discussion in Kent, *Virtues of the Will*, 98. Kent notes, however, that after 1270, though *liberum arbitrium* remained a common topic of inquiry, some masters began to discuss the problem of *voluntas libera* or *libertas voluntatis*.

3. The modern association of “rational” with “intellectual” or “cognitive” is also a misleading approach to medieval theological uses of the adjective *rationalis*, whose range of meaning for Bonaventure I discuss below. *Rationalis* and *intellectualis*, though not entirely discrete terms for Bonaventure, nevertheless are not synonymous, as I will suggest.

4. “Augustinus de Quinque Responionibus 4 ‘Cum de libero arbitrio loquimur, non de parte animae loquimur, sed de tota’: ergo non tantummodo comprehendit cognitivam, immo etiam affectivam,” 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1,

art. un., q. 3, fund. 1 (Quaracchi II.597). The common definition of *liberum arbitrium* as a “faculty of will and reason” was taken from Lombard’s *Sentences* II.25, though it was commonly misattributed to Augustine.

5. Brev. II.9 (Quaracchi V.226).

6. 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1, art. un., q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.592); and q. 3, concl. (Quaracchi II.598).

7. “Quod enim obiicitur, quod non comprehendit totam rationem, nec totam voluntatem; dicendum, quod verum est; sed comprehendit solum ipsam potentiam cognitivam, in quantum iuncta est affectivae, et affectivam, in quantum iuncta est cognitivae; unde dicit affectum deliberativum, vel deliberationem voluntariam. Et propterea, quia ratio nominat ipsam potentiam cognitivam ut ordinatam ad affectivam, et voluntas ipsam affectivam ut regulatam et ratiocinatam a cognitiva; hinc est, quod liberum arbitrium potius dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis quam intellectus et affectus” (2 *Sent.* 25, p. 1, art. un., q. 3, ad 2, 3 [Quaracchi II.599]).

8. 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1, art. un., q. 3, contr. 3 (Quaracchi II.598).

9. “Concedendum est igitur, quod naturalis voluntas et deliberativa potest esse eadem potentia, quae quidem secundum alium et alium modum movendi sic et sic appellatur. Eadem enim est potentia, qua appeto beatitudinem, et qua appeto virtutem, sive facere hoc bonum vel illud ad beatitudinem ordinatum; quae, ut appetit beatitudinem, dicitur naturalis, quia immutabiliter appetitus eius ad beatitudinem inclinatur; ut vero appetit hoc vel illud bonum facere, deliberativa dicitur, et secundum iudicium rationis potest ad contrarium inclinari,” 2 *Sent.* d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, concl. (Quaracchi II.566).

10. *Metaphysics* IX, 3 and 10.

11. Thus, free choice can only choose evil insofar as free choice itself is deficient, as Bonaventure explains in 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 2, art. un., q. 3, concl. (Quaracchi II.614).

12. See *Itin.* 3.4, and discussion in previous chapter.

13. 2 *Sent.* d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (Quaracchi II.565).

14. See Richard Sorabji, “The Concept of the Will from Plato to Maximus the Confessor,” in Thomas Pink and M. W. F. Stone, eds., *The Will and Human Action: From Antiquity to the Present Day* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 20–22. Sorabji argues that Maximus’s conception of the natural will (*thelema phusikon*) is directly related to this Stoic idea. See also Sorabji, *Animal Minds and Human Morals* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), chs. 12 and 13.

15. 2 *Sent.* d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (Quaracchi II.566).

16. 2 *Sent.* d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3 (Quaracchi II.566).

17. Bonaventure neither endorses nor refutes the notion of the natural will of animals as a self-preservation instinct.

18. 2 *Sent.* d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, ad. 2 (Quaracchi II.566).

19. “Si autem sic esset determinata ad unum quod nullo modo posset in opposita, sicut est potentia calefaciendi et illuminandi in igne, tunc esset pure naturalis, et non esset deliberativa sive rationalis,” 2 *Sent.* d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 3, ad 2 (Quaracchi II.566).

20. 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 2, art. un., q. 2, concl. (Quaracchi II.596).

21. *Brev.* II.9 (Quaracchi V.227).

22. 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.593).

23. 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.593).

24. 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1, ad 4 (Quaracchi II.594). See also 1 *Sent.* 1, dist 37, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, ad. 3 (Quaracchi I.658), where in response to the question of whether the fact that angels move indicates imperfection, Bonaventure distinguishes natural and voluntary movements—voluntary movements do not indicate any sort of lack in the one moving, whereas natural movement is always from lack or imperfection, because perfection in nature is a state of rest: “To the objection that all that is moved is moved on account of indigence, this must be admitted to be true in natural motion [*in motu naturali*], in which a nature moves only through an appetite for something. And this appetite stands as an imperfection in that nature, since a nature, once it attains its perfection, is at rest. But this is not true in the case of voluntary motion [*in motu voluntario*], in which something is moved either for the purpose of acquiring something, or to demonstrate its virtue, just as a gladiator is moved in the stadium. Or it must be said that it is true in every motion, insofar as ‘indigence’ can be taken generally . . . For in this way indigence can be posited either to a being whose privation indicates an imperfection, or to a being whose privation is not an imperfection, but a limitation, and the latter is case in Angels.”

25. 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.593).

26. 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1, concl. (Quaracchi II.593).

27. *Liber de Causis* XV.124, ed. Adriaan Pattin, in *Tijdschrift voor filosofie* 28 (1966), 90–203 at 167: “Every knower who knows its own essence returns to its essence in a complete reversion” (*Omnis sciens qui scit essentiam suam est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa*).

28. 2 *Sent.* d. 25, p. 1, art. un, q. 1 (Quaracchi II.592).

29. Denys Turner makes a similar point in analyzing Pseudo-Dionysius’s conception of *eros*: “Erotic love is necessity lived in the mode of freedom and freedom lived in the mode of necessity,” *Eros and Allegory*, 59.

30. Note the similarity to the account of reason’s abandonment to ecstasy in Richard of St. Victor’s *Beniamin Minor*.

31. This paradox of interiority and exteriority is an echo of Dionysius’s own understanding of God as ecstatic love, as Perl characterizes it: “In God

as Love, therefore, pure interiority coincides with pure exteriority” (Perl, *Theophany*, 46).

32. *Legenda Maior* XIII.10 (Quaracchi XIII.545). Translations are my own, but I have referred to the translation and notes by Ewert Cousins (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1978), 177–327. For an analysis of the major themes and structure of the *Legenda*, see Regis J. Armstrong, “The Spiritual Theology of the *Legenda Major* of Saint Bonaventure (PhD dissertation, Fordham University, 1978). Armstrong argues that the entire work is laid out according to the threefold pattern of purification, illumination, and perfection (52–54).

33. As Ann Astell puts it well, the *Itinerarium* and the *Legenda* provide “a kind of commentary on one another” (*Eating Beauty*, 104).

34. I agree with Richard Emmerston and Ronald Herzmann’s contention that a careful reading of the *Legenda* reveals its “close connection with several of Bonaventure’s theological works, particularly with those emphasizing Christology, mysticism, and the meaning of salvation history.” See Emmerston and Herzmann, *The Apocalyptic Imagination in Medieval Literature*, 44.

35. In his introduction to the text, Cousins provides a list of the material that is original to Bonaventure’s *Legenda*, and gives detailed notes throughout his translation for Bonaventure’s earlier sources (Cousins, *Bonaventure*, 39n74).

36. See Cousins’s introduction to his translation for a sketch of the historical circumstances of the *Legenda*’s composition (Cousins, *Bonaventure*, 37–42). Some historians in the twentieth century, interested in recovering the primitive Franciscan ideal, have criticized Bonaventure’s version as unreliable, unoriginal, and less a historical document than a political intervention in the growing schism within the order. When it was approved as the official biography by the General Chapter of Paris in 1266, all earlier *vitae* were suppressed. Astell wryly suggests that the evident failure of the *Legenda* to produce that unity constitutes an argument for its historical veracity (Astell, *Eating Beauty*, 100n4). These debates are important but, for the present study, the relation of the *Legenda* to Bonaventure’s other writings is more relevant than its relation to the needs of the order in the thirteenth century.

37. “. . . angelico deputatus officio incendioque seraphico totus ignitus et ut vir hierarchicus curru igneo sursum vectus.” *Legenda* Prol.1 (Quaracchi XIII.504).

38. Nor are the angelic associations limited to the Dionysian hierarchy. In the prologue, Bonaventure writes that Francis is symbolized by the “angel who ascends from the sunrise bearing the seal of the living God” depicted in Rev. 6.12. See analysis of this symbol and its apocalyptic resonances in Emmerston and Herzman, *The Apocalyptic Imagination*, 36–75.

39. *Legenda* Prol.2 (Quaracchi XIII.504).

40. *Legenda* 1.1 (Quaracchi XIII.506).
41. *Legenda* 8.5 (Quaracchi XIII.543). This section is original to Bonaventure's *vita*.
42. "Pietas vera, quae secundum Apostolum ad omnia valet, adeo cor Francisci repleverat ac penetraverat viscera, ut totum videretur virum Dei in suum dominium vindicasse. Haec est, quae ipsum per devotionem sursum agebat in Deum, per compassionem transformabat in Christum, per condescensionem inclinabat ad proximum et per universalem conciliationem ad singula refigurabat ad innocentiae statum," *Legenda* 8.1 (Quaracchi XIII.526).
43. *Legenda* 1.5 (Quaracchi XIII.507).
44. *Legenda* 5.8 (Quaracchi XIII.518).
45. *Legenda* 5.8 (Quaracchi XIII.518).
46. ". . . nondum didicerat contemplari caelestia nec assueverat degustare divina. Et quia spirituali auditui dat intellectum inflicta vexatio, facta est super eum manus Domini et immutatio dexteræ Excelsi, diutinis languoribus ipsius corpus affligens, ut coaptaret animam ad sancti Spiritus unctionem," *Legenda* 1.2 (Quaracchi XIII.506).
47. *Legenda* 1.2 (Quaracchi XIII.506).
48. *Legenda* Prol.4 (Quaracchi XIII.505).
49. *Legenda* Prol.3 (Quaracchi XIII.504).
50. *Legenda* Prol.3 (Quaracchi XIII.504).
51. *Legenda* 2.1 (Quaracchi XIII.507–8).
52. *Legenda* 2.1 (Quaracchi XIII.508).
53. *Legenda* 3.4 (Quaracchi XIII.510).
54. *Legenda* 10.2 (Quaracchi XIII.533).
55. *Legenda* 10.2 (Quaracchi XIII.533).
56. *Legenda* 10.4 (Quaracchi XIII.534).
57. *Legenda* 10.4 (Quaracchi XIII.534).
58. *Legenda* 13.2 (Quaracchi XIII.542).
59. *Legenda* 13.3 (Quaracchi XIII.543).
60. *Legenda* 13.3 (Quaracchi XIII.543). Jill Bennett suggests that this passage reveals the close association between sensory vision and affective transformation in medieval psychology, "Stigmata and Sense Memory: St. Francis and the Affective Image," *Art History* 24.1 (February 2001), 1–16.
61. On Francis as another Christ, and medieval critics of this form of veneration, see Lester K. Little, "Imitatio Francisci: The Influence of Francis of Assisi on Late Medieval Religious Life," in *Defenders and Critics of Franciscan Life: Essays in Honor of John V. Fleming*, ed. Michael F. Cusato and Guy Geltner (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 195–218 at 196.
62. By calling Francis's body a martyr, I intend to draw attention to its function as a witness to Francis's love and as a victim of it. On Francis's

wounds as a visible “index of *affectus*,” see Bennett, “Stigmata and Sense Memory,” 14.

63. *Legenda* 6.4 (Quaracchi XIII.520).

64. *Legenda* 9.2, 9.4, and 9.6, respectively (Quaracchi XIII.530–32).

65. Elsewhere, Bonaventure characterizes obedience as a matter of being moved by grace. See *Comm. in Eccl.* 2 (Quaracchi VI.25): “It must be said that to follow God through being equal to God is not given to any creature. And since Satan wanted this, he fell. But one can also follow through subjection and obedience, and this is possible for human beings: not whoever wishes, but those to whom it is given by God through grace, and whom he draws. And thus no one through themselves is able to follow without God’s help.”

66. “Et quia affectus ad exempla quam ad argumenta, magis ad promissiones quam ad ratiocinationes, magis per devotiones quam per definitiones . . .” *Breviloquium*, Prol.5.2. (Quaracchi V.206). That the affect is moved both to examples and to promised rewards amounts, according to a standard scholastic account of human motivation, to the same thing. In both cases, the example and the reward, it is a matter of an *end* moving the soul to act—in the first case, perfect imitation of Francis, which is imitation of Christ, is the end to which the example moves the soul. In the second case, the promised reward is nothing other than Christ, the beloved with whom the soul is united in spiritual perfection. See also *Collationes de decem praeceptis* 1.1 (Quaracchi V.507): “And this is the proper order, that the end moves the agent, so that agent might work to the proper end.”

67. *Legenda* 10.2 (Quaracchi XIII.533).

68. For a comprehensive study of the animal stories and their context, see Edward Armstrong, *Saint Francis: Nature Mystic: The Derivation and Significance of the Nature Stories in the Franciscan Legend* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973).

69. *Legenda* 8.6 (Quaracchi XIII.527).

70. *Legenda* 8.6 (Quaracchi XIII.527).

71. *Legenda* 8.10 (Quaracchi XIII.529).

CONCLUSION: A CORPUS, IN SUM

1. Trans. John P. Leavey, Jr., in *On the Name*, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 55.

2. *Legenda* 13.4 (Quaracchi XIII.543).

3. *Legenda* 13.4 (Quaracchi XIII.543). Given the dispossession of Francis in Christ through his spiritual martyrdom, these words are anything but a straightforward declaration of possession by Francis. In light of the scriptural provenance, they can themselves be understood as, paradoxically, an ecstatic utterance.

4. *Legenda* 13.4 (Quaracchi XIII.543).
5. *Legenda* 13.8 (Quaracchi XIII.544).
6. Derrida repeatedly appears to deny this structure of absolute secrecy to Christian apophatic discourse, as for example in “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” trans. Ken Frieden, in *Derrida and Negative Theology*, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1992). The question is not so much whether Derrida is right or wrong about the Dionysian tradition, but rather, whether it is possible to read that tradition otherwise. For analysis of this possibility and a convincing attempt to realize it in the text of the thirteenth-century beguine Hadewijch, see Amy Hollywood, “Derrida’s Noble Unfaith, or What Reading Hadewijch Can Teach You about Reading Derrida,” *Minnesota Review* 80 (2013), 95–105.
7. *Legenda* 14.1 (Quaracchi XIII.545).
8. See, for example, *Legenda* 5.6 (Quaracchi XIII.518).
9. *Legenda* 14.6 (Quaracchi XIII.547).
10. *Legenda* 15.3 (Quaracchi XIII.548).
11. On the *agilitas* of the glorified resurrection body, see *Brev.* VII.7, n. 1 (Quaracchi V.289).
12. *Legenda* 15.2 (Quaracchi XIII.547).
13. *Legenda* 15.4 (Quaracchi XIII.548). The episode of the knight echoes a scene before Francis’s death when a doubting follower put his fingers in the wounds (*Legenda* 13.8 [Quaracchi XIII.544]). This suggests, perhaps, that Francis’s body should be understood as a resurrection body both before and after his literal death, and that this passing is less decisive than the death he undergoes in his vision of the Seraph. The post-death appearance of this second Thomas figure is original to Bonaventure’s *vita*. The addition is consistent with Bonaventure’s intensification of biblical patterns in his presentation of Francis’s life and death, even as it confirms, specifically, the identification of Francis’s corpse with Christ’s resurrection body.
14. *Legenda* 15.3 (Quaracchi XIII.548).
15. Karnes, 112.
16. *Lignum vitae*, Prol. 1 (Quaracchi XIII.66).
17. *Lignum vitae*, Prol. 1 (Quaracchi XIII.66).
18. See Karnes, 130–35; Patrick F. O’Connell, “The Lignum vitae of Saint Bonaventure and the Medieval Devotional Tradition” (unpublished PhD Dissertation, Fordham University, 1985).
19. On the dating, context, and themes of the work, Lezlie S. Knox, *Creating Clare of Assisi: Female Franciscan Identities in Later Medieval Italy* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 64–69.
20. McNamer, 90–92.

21. This consistency has been recognized by scholars. See, for example, Knox, 66. On the threefold scheme in Bonaventure's works, see Bougerol, "Le perfection chrétienne."

22. *De perfectione vitae ad sorores* 6.1 (Quaracchi VIII.120).

23. *De perfectione* 5.5 (Quaracchi XIII.119).

24. *De perfectione* 4.10 (Quaracchi XIII.115).

25. *De perfectione* 4.10 (Quaracchi XIII.115).

26. *De perfectione* 6.2 (Quaracchi XIII.120).

27. Karnes, on the contrary, reads this passage as emphasizing "not sharing Christ's pain but rising with Christ to bliss," a journey from Jesus's humanity to Christ in heaven. Yet Bonaventure's language seems to resist any such disjunction—the kingdom of God that the meditant enters is, for Bonaventure, Jesus's tortured body. See Karnes, 135–37.

28. *De perfectione* 6.2 (Quaracchi XIII.120).

29. I am indebted here to Catherine Keller's insightful meditation on the aporetic nature of mystical writing as an opening toward rethinking embodiment in the medieval Christian *via negativa*. See "The Cloud of the Impossible: Embodiment and Apophasis," in *Apophatic Bodies: Negative Theology, Incarnation, and Relationality*, ed. Chris Boesel and Catherine Keller (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010).

30. Dionysius glosses Paul's words in Galatians 2:20 as the confession of the lover in ecstatic union in *Divine Names* 4 (Lubheid, 82). For an interpretation of the Dionysian corpus in light of it, see Stang, *Apophasis and Pseudonymity*, and especially the analysis of this passage in 161–70.

31. Stang, 205.

32. Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, 92.