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· 255 · Notes Foreword 1. Martin Heidegger, Schelling’s Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985). 2. Gilbert Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Paris: Aubier, 1999), 61–65. 3. Mats Alvesson and André Spicer, “A Stupidity-Based Theory of Organizations ,” Journal of Management Studies 49 (2012): 1194–220. 4. He studied these disciplines, along with analytical philosophy, in Hong Kong, then studied Continental philosophy at Goldsmiths, University of London , which is where I met him and where he defended his thesis, which is the origin of the present work. We have since worked together, alongside Harry Halpin, in the framework of the Institut de recherche et d’innovation in Paris, of which I am the head. 5. Here we must recognize that Yuk Hui is also a reader and appreciator of Rimbaud. In a lecture at the University of Kent in November 2014, he analyzed Heidegger’s commentary on Rimbaud’s “Lettre du Voyant”: “In Greece . . . poems and lyres turned Action into Rhythm. After . . . poetry will no longer beat within action; it will be before it.” 6. Vincent Bontemps, “Quelques éléments pour une épistémolgoie des relations d’échelle cher Simondon,” Appareils 2 (2008), 7. “How about things that we cannot experience, or that we can call nonexperience , such as the execution of an algorithm that gives us the givenness of digital objects? . . . We cannot have an experience that an electron has just struck our skin, but we can imagine it; in like manner, we cannot experience the algorithm itself, but we can more or less imagine it within the limits of our cognitive capacity . What happens when such nonexperiences now concretely participate in our imagination?” (chapter 6). 8. The reticulated digital object weaves “a programmable memory that largely distinguishes between the technical objects of Simondon and Heidegger and digital objects as the technical milieu and programmable context. This gives us the second “given” of the word datum (the first referring to sense data).” These analyses of the digital object are conducted through examples of the everyday 256 NOTES TO FOREWORD features of the twenty-first century: “We finish this chapter with an example of our experience on YouTube to illustrate how the milieu has taken on a different role” (chapter 3). 9. In 1901, in section 6 of the Fifth Logical Investigation, Husserl posited that a consciousness is a flux consisting of retentions and protentions. In 1905, he took these studies of the retentional and protentional structure further and established that we must distinguish primary retentions, which constitute the temporality of perception, from secondary retentions, which form the recollections of memory, that is, consciousness of the past. In 1936, he posited in The Origin of Geometry that writing is the condition of constitution of the flux of consciousness in which geometric thought forms. I call tertiary retention the written grammatization that allows control to be taken of primary and secondary retention and the projection of those new forms of protention constitutive of Greek logos (and I have extended the concept of tertiary retention to all forms of mnesic exteriorization—which commence at the beginning of hominization). This grammatization is a spatialization of time, and it is spatialization that enables control and, in return, the retentional and protentional release of writerly and readerly consciousness. On this question, see also Bernard Stiegler, States of Shock: Stupidity and Knowledge in the 21st Century, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge, Mass.: Polity Press, 2015), 108–21, for an analysis of reading and writing as conditions of the speculative proposition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. 10. In the section titled “Recursivity and Computational Hermeneutics,” Yuk Hui writes in chapter 6, “Today when we write a computer program, we can write a nonrecursive function, but we can basically reduce every operation and number to recursive functions. Because it is a process that is to a large extent independent of observation, this hermeneutics cannot be grasped as a separate process of the imagination.” Introduction 1. 2. Aristotle, Categories, 2a13–2a18, 4. 3. Gilson, L’être et l’essence, 51. 4. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1028b4, 168. 5. Ibid., 172. 6. Marx, Introduction to Aristotle’s Theory of Being as Being, 36. Marx equates eidos with morphe, which nevertheless has to be closely distinguished. 7. Rotenstreich, From Substance to Subject, 2. “Substance was placed in the order of things, and subject in the order of ego or...


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