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· 221 ·· CHAPTER 6 · Logic and Time In chapter 5, we approached the question of convergence from the starting point of Husserl’s intentional logic and formal logic (considered as two orders) in our search for a transductive logic. In this chapter, I want to move from the digital object to its milieu by showing that digital objects partially constitute what I call tertiary protention. Considering tertiary protention leads us into an inquiry into another order of experience that is different from the experience of the meaning horizon that we discussed in chapter 5 but that is fundamentally temporal and metaphysical . The aim of this chapter is to suggest that we should move from the notion of system to the notion of the associated milieu proposed by Simondon as a response to the rampant advance of industrialization. I take the word protention from Husserl, for whom it means the anticipation of the next moment. Corresponding to the primary and secondary retention that we discussed before, there are also primary and secondary protentions: the primary protention being the anticipation of the immediate coming moment, for example, melody when listening to a song, and the secondary protention being anticipation or expectation based on past experience. Protention is hence also imagination, through which we recollect and recognize what we have experienced and project it into the future. By tertiary protention, I refer to the fact that in our everyday lives, technology becomes a significant function of the imagination. Let’s look at a simple example: when people want to go to a restaurant, these days they are increasingly likely to search online first. We might also notice that Google is able to suggest which is the closest and most preferable restaurant for their needs according to its search and recommendation algorithm. We can make at least two primary observations based on this example: (1) tertiary protention tends to depend on tertiary retention, for example, the relations given by digital objects, those traces we have left, such as pictures, videos, or geolocations; and (2) orientation becomes more and more an algorithmic process that analyzes 222 LOGIC AND TIME and produces relations to pave the way for the experience of the next now or the immediate future. After the theory of Marshall McLuhan, André Leroi-Gourhan, and other thinkers of technics in the twentieth century, it is no longer a surprise to say that technologies are the extension of the body. This also resonates with the work of some cognitive scientists and analytic philosophers , such as Andy Clark and David Chalmers, who have proposed an understanding of the “extended mind.”1 The mind outside of the skull conditions the appearance and hence the experience of the phenomenon. Let’s follow Clark and Chalmers’s example of two protagonists, Otto and Inga, in their article on the extended mind. Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. He is not able to remember things, so he relies on his notebook, in which he stores his notes and which acts as his externalized memory. Inga is normal and has proper access to her memory. If Inga wants to go to the Museum of Modern Art, she recalls that it is on 53rd Street, whereas if Otto wants to go to there, he will have to access his notebook to find out this information. Now there is a relation between Otto and the notebook that is comparable to the relation between Inga and her mind. These extensions are spatial. It is probably only in the work of Bernard Stiegler that we see technics as time in the form of retentions. The body can extend following a technical lineage, but only through time can we retrieve the status of existence and put extension into question. This chapter is very much in debt to the works of Bernard Stiegler, especially his analysis of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in the third volume of his Technics and Time 3—Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise. I want to develop the implications of the hypothesis that imagination itself is no longer the imagination of the subject but rather shifts from subject to algorithms and digital objects. How about things that we cannot experience, or that we can call nonexperience, such as the execution of an algorithm that gives us the givenness of digital objects? On one hand, as we have already stated in the first chapter, discussions of lower-level realities, such as atoms, electrons , or logics, ignore the concreteness of phenomena, that...


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