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## Diplomacy's Value

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
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## *Cards on the Table*

### THE TREATY OF MUTUAL GUARANTEE AND THE "SPIRIT OF LOCARNO"

Having persevered during the difficult prenegotiation phase, the three powers met in Locarno, Switzerland, in October 1925, where they drafted the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee as well as bilateral treaties of arbitration between Germany and its eastern neighbors.<sup>1</sup> The final product heavily favored Britain and Germany. Unlike Poincaré, Briand readily conceded to British demands that restricted the scope of the British guarantee to flagrant violations of the Versailles Treaty amounting to precursors to the use of armed force. More surprisingly, Germany avoided a French guarantee of its eastern arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia and also secured a note indicating that, when it joined the League of Nations, consideration would be given to its weakened military and economic position if the League implemented sanctions against an aggressor.

We are tempted to work backward from the results of the treaty and to infer that Germany had more negotiating leverage, possibly as a consequence of its more precarious domestic political situation. Or perhaps German preferences on both issues were simply more intense, allowing it to engage in more credible coercive bargaining. In reality, this is not how diplomacy proceeded around the table at Locarno. Accounts of the meeting universally indicate an absence of value claiming. Instead value creating prevailed. Despite the incentives present in all negotiating situations to retain private information and not reveal bottom lines, the Locarno discussions were remarkable for their good faith. All sides laid their cards on the table, revealing their negotiating positions openly

1. Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland also sent representatives.

and honestly. Transcripts reveal that the French and Germans did not resort to threats, positional commitments, or inflation of demands. They argued their positions and tried to convince others of their point of view. Indeed, participants noted how distinct the talks were from prior interactions among the parties. Negotiators spoke later of the “spirit of Locarno.”

This value creating was made possible by the combination of German and British pragmatic statecraft, on the one hand, and French reasoned dialogue, on the other. Consistent with the psychological argument I have made, it was the most liberal of the three governments, the French, that seemed to respond most to argumentation. France ceded on most issues to Germany, even though its initial position had British support. The outcome was not epiphenomenal to the distribution of power and interests.

Even as the nations agreed on the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Germany placed other issues on the table. Stresemann’s realist diplomacy originally foresaw that Germany would first reassure the French and British by negotiating the treaty and only then bring up the issue of the Rhineland in a new climate of trust. His conservative cabinet colleagues opposed this strategy, however, demanding, in essence, payment on the spot. Over their objections, and despite the weakness of Germany, the DNVP pressured Stresemann and Luther to demand certain concessions on the Rhineland as part of the formal negotiation requirements of the delegation sent to Locarno. The nationalists were again pushing the foreign minister and chancellor away from their preferred pragmatic style toward a more coercive and distributive one.

Stresemann raised the issue at the conference in its final days but received only a promise from France and Britain that they would work quickly to create a package of Rhineland alleviations. Nevertheless, in mid-November, the allies came through with an extensive list of ameliorations of the occupation, resulting in the ratification of the Locarno treaty by a sizable margin in the Reichstag. A rationalist account might claim that Germany, given the hostile reception of the draft treaty on Stresemann’s return to Berlin, was able to force these concessions because domestic opposition strengthened its leverage and credibility—what the allies were not initially willing to provide, the Germans were able to extract through coercive bargaining.

But a review of the documents shows that France and Britain did not grant these concessions on the occupation in response to German pressure. The allies intended to make these allowances to Germany as a gesture of reciprocity for Stresemann’s realist policy of reassurance. These concessions were the continuation of value creating. All parties spoke of the new spirit of Locarno that would make agreement on previously

contentious issues much easier. These *Rückwirkungen* might have indeed been necessary for German ratification, but this is not what motivated Britain and France.

At the end of this period of negotiations, all had received what they valued most. The French received security, the Germans greater sovereignty, and the British conciliation on the continent. Franco-German relations had been completely altered. In less than a year, with help from British realists and French liberals, Stresemann had transformed Germany from the object of negotiations to an equal participant, despite his complete lack of bargaining leverage. The overall result was not, however, a foreordained exchange of benefits based simply on a favorable distribution of interests. The German foreign minister recognized, and the French and British confirmed, that had the Germans first come to them with a package deal of the kind eventually agreed on—alleviations of the occupation in exchange for a pledge of nonaggression—the proposal would have failed. Structure allowed but did not determine events. Diplomacy added value.

#### AROUND THE TABLE: THE LOCARNO CONFERENCE

Diplomacy in Locarno proceeded through an exchange of arguments rather than demands, threats, and counterdemands. The parties practiced value creating rather than value claiming negotiation. Indeed, we can say that in some ways the representatives of the three countries went beyond value creating, engaging in communicative action in which all sides remained open to being persuaded to rethink their positions. As the representatives of the three countries (as well as Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland) met in Locarno in October 1925, there were two major issues of contention, both of which had occupied a prominent place in the earlier exchange of notes: the sanctions obligations of Germany when it became a member of the League of Nations and whether France would guarantee the treaties of arbitration that Germany would sign with its eastern neighbors. Briand playfully referred to these as the “rheumatism points” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 1; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25).

On the question of the eastern treaties, France framed its guarantee of the German arrangements with its eastern neighbors as different from a traditional alliance. Whereas the aborted 1919 treaty had been directed against Germany, the treaty that now was imagined in both the east and the west was reciprocal in nature. France would be guaranteeing Germany against Polish aggression as well. Briand stated that he did not believe in old-fashioned alliances but, rather, looked for pacts along the

multilateral lines of the League (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5; Locarno-Konferenz: 149–54; ADAP A14, No. 123; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174). The French foreign minister also argued that if Germany indeed had peaceful intentions and was indeed serious about not resorting to force to change the eastern borders, then it should have no problem with a French guarantee. There was “no reason why the principles applied to one frontier should not be applied to the other” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5; see also Locarno-Konferenz: 149–54). Stresemann had his own counterargument. He questioned whether it was possible for a state to objectively guarantee a treaty in which an ally was involved. France could not credibly claim it would go to war against Poland if its ally attacked Germany or judge Poland, rather than Germany, to be at fault in an ambiguous case.

On the issue of Germany’s obligations under Article 16 of the League Covenant, Stresemann used two arguments. First, he claimed that it was not fair to ask Germany to contribute to military or economic sanctions on behalf of the League in its currently disarmed state, one that Germany had not asked for but which had been imposed as part of the Versailles peace terms. This was not “willful inequality.” In its “exceptional position,” Germany “did not ask for privileges, but only for special treatment during a transitional period.” Germany would be able to take on the same obligations as other countries when, as foreseen in the League Covenant, global disarmament took place (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 8; see also Stresemann, Vol. 2: 176–78; Locarno-Konferenz: 161–72). Second, he noted that Britain and France, and the League in general, had already, during negotiations over the failed Treaty of Mutual Assistance, conceded the point that obligations to the League might take into account the different geographical positions and military power of the countries (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 522 and app. 8; Locarno-Konferenz: 161–72). The Germans were simply asking for an affirmation of this established principle.<sup>2</sup>

The French responded that the League of Nations was the “pivot” for the entire pact and was based on equal obligations that applied to all. For Briand, the League was “one and indivisible. It was not compatible with choosing what was pleasant and rejecting that which was unpleasant. All

2. The allies suggested that that Germany simply rely on its veto power as a future permanent member of the League Council to prevent the organization from implementing any undesirable sanctions. Luther and Stresemann protested that doing so would leave Germany in an unacceptable position of “moral isolation” in the event it blocked action against a wanton act of aggression by another state. They did not want to be under any ethical obligation to participate when it might prove practically impossible for Germany to do so (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 175; DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 8 and No. 523; Locarno-Konferenz: 161–72).

members must all take on the same obligations or the spirit of association would be broken." The German position was the "point of view of the individual and not the whole body" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 8; Locarno-Konferenz: 161–72).

The British made different, more pragmatic arguments. The foreign secretary urged the Germans to consider the practical effect of a French guarantee of the eastern treaties "apart from the objections of sentiment." Chamberlain pointed out that France already had alliances with the Eastern European neighbors of Germany, so any new guarantee changed little for Germany. Indeed, the treaty might limit the operation of this alliance if the League was obliged to take up any violations of the arbitration pact before France took action (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 518). German representatives responded that the symbolic recognition of this Little Entente was impossible for Germany (ADAP A14, No. 123). Luther described the German public's objections on the issue as "emotional" yet very real (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174).

On Article 16, Chamberlain's realism made him sympathetic to the points made by Germany about the uniqueness of its position, particularly its vulnerability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union: "If he had been a German, Mr. Chamberlain said he would no doubt have the same ideas as the German Government and would have sought to do what they were doing. All the same, it was certain that it would not be possible to get the League of Nations to accept the German view" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 8; No. 522). To ease German fears, the British urged the Germans to think of Article 16 as they did and to take advantage of its ambiguity. The League Covenant obligated some action to be taken by all states, particularly in regards to economic sanctions, in the case of aggression. It did not, however, specify any particular measures (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 8). There was already a "certain liberty left to the Powers as regards the extent and even the times of their co-operation" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 522). He even suggested that the Germans join the League and work to dilute Article 16 with the British from within. Given its extensive global economic ties, Britain would suffer the most from cutting off international commerce. And it was more important than any other country, given its navy, in implementing any blockade (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 533). When Luther expressed his admiration for Chamberlain's "practical idealism," the British foreign secretary reported, "I believe I blushed" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 528). Pragmatism was the greatest compliment such a realist could receive.

All parties remarked on the value creating that prevailed at the conference. The delegates were impressed by the skilled exposition of competing arguments. Miles Lampson wrote, "I claim to be as phlegmatic and unemotional as most of my countrymen: but I admit having been thrilled

to the bone once or twice by the eloquence and obvious sincerity of both Briand and Stresemann. . . . My pen has somewhat taken charge and you may well think that I am overdoing it as regards enthusiasm. Optimism is a catching complaint, and perhaps it blinds my vision; but I do not wittingly exaggerate (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529). Stresemann wrote in his diary, "In the evening Chamberlain said that never in his life had he been present at a more interesting debate. [Oswald] Hesnard observed that the debate had touched the limit of what was politically possible, but had been conducted in such a dignified manner that Briand himself had spoken with great appreciation of the argument, though my observations were naturally not much to his liking" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 178). Lampson reported back home, "Yesterday, over the question of Germany's entry into the League, they were both at their best and I have never before had the good fortune to hear a discussion conducted on so high a plane" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529). A German memo noted that Briand spoke with "excellent rhetoric" and Stresemann with "the most effective execution" (ADAP A14, No. 127).

Germany ultimately prevailed on both issues despite its lack of bargaining leverage. The parties moved beyond even integrative negotiation toward something resembling Habermasian communicative action. Each of the "rheumatism points" was discussed separately and resolved on its own merits rather than linked to concessions on a different point. The nations agreed that they could act against another pact member in defense of countries in Eastern Europe only if the League Council approved it. If the League Council could not come to an agreement about the measures to be taken, the parties could act only against the country that was the first to attack (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 12). The French then signed a treaty with the Polish, making such a commitment should the Germans be the first to strike, but this was not part of the official conference deliberations or protocol. By claiming they had reaffirmed their alliance, the French saved some face. As a result of the pact, however, France was in less of a legal position to defend its eastern allies than it had been before the treaty. On Article 16, the allies formally stated that their understanding of that particular clause of the League of Nations Covenant was that members would take action compatible with their geographical and military situation (DBFP, Vol. 27, No. 532, app. 10; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 182). This was effectively an informal exemption for Germany.

We may be tempted to simply reduce the German victory on these two conference issues, after the fact, to the bargaining leverage conveyed by their smaller "win set" domestically, the international strength conferred by domestic weakness (Putnam 1988). Stresemann declared that Germany was "absolutely unable to accept" a French guarantee of the east (DBFP, Vol. 27, No. 516; see also app. 1). Luther said the issue posed an

“almost insuperable difficulty” (DBFP, Vol. 27, No. 518). A guarantee was “impossible of acceptance by any representatives of Germany” (DBFP, Vol. 27, No. 518; see also *Kabinette Luther*, Vol. 2, No. 174). Did German threats coerce the allies into concessions? Was the outcome the reflection of the distribution of interests and power?

But this is not at all how the negotiations proceeded. Germany indeed stressed its domestic difficulties; however, the French did also. Briand noted that France had its own “nationalist hotheads” to convince. He reminded Stresemann and Luther that Germany was not the only country with a problem of domestic public opinion (Locarno-Konferenz: 149–54; DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). And each side did so not to coerce but to evoke understanding from the other. Lampson wrote, “Briand, Stresemann and Luther sit opposite to one another in the Conference Room and discuss with the utmost discretion and good humour their various difficulties. Each goes out of his way to show that he realizes those of the other; each is obviously genuinely desirous of helping the other out so far as he possibly can consistent with his own national interests. In short, there is a complete absence of bitterness or back biting. . . . This strikes me as really the most significant feature of the whole conference” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529). At Locarno, both the French and Germans were open and honest about their domestic constraints and believed the statements of the other even though each had incentives to bluff and to dismiss the claims of the other side. Extensive value claiming did not occur.

All observers at the conference commented on the spirit of good faith and goodwill that prevailed. Even on the very first day, Chamberlain offered the “general comment” that the “most striking atmosphere of helpful goodwill prevailed throughout. M. Briand and Dr. Luther went out of their way to emphasize their determination not only to bring Pact to a successful conclusion but also to eliminate once and for all division of Europe into rival camps of victor and vanquished.” He described the interactions as “easy, frank and loyal” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516), with a “noteworthy absence of any spirit of bargaining” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 547). The Germans agreed. Luther reported to the German cabinet, “The goodwill of the English, French and Belgians to reach a positive outcome that is also acceptable to Germany cannot be doubted based on all that we see. The type of cooperation and the mutual dealings have been completely irreproachable” (*Kabinette Luther*, Vol. 2, No. 180). The Germans praised Briand’s “courage” in making the concessions he did (ADAP A14, No. 157). On this good faith, Lampson wrote, “Frankly I am amazed—I think everyone must be—by the absence of all chicanery. All parties come to the table and explain their particular difficulties in the simplest and most straightforward language” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529).

In other words, the countries were putting their cards on the table. The foreign secretary wrote,

Something which the Chancellor had said led me to observe that if an inhabitant of Mars suddenly visited the Conference room, knowing nothing of the history of the last few years, he would certainly get no idea that those who were sitting round the table were lately bitter enemies: he would think, rather, that they were good friends who had indeed differences of opinion upon serious matters, but were bent upon settling them in the most amicable spirit. . . . Who would have dreamed a few months ago that a discussion of that kind, so frank, so open, so conciliatory on both sides, would have been possible? (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 528; see also *Hansard Series 5*, Vol. 188: col. 421)

The discussion proceeded on the basis of the equality that facilitates value creating. Lampson, the veteran British civil servant familiar with past efforts at conference diplomacy, claimed there was “all the difference in the world” between the Locarno negotiations and those of previous meetings:

However much in theory we may have met in London<sup>3</sup> on a footing of complete equality, in practice we certainly did not: we, the allies, decided what we wanted; we, the allies, persuaded the Germans to accept our proposals after, it is true, thorough and perfectly fair discussion: so that it was in fact a division into two groups. What is the position here? Strikingly different. No groupings of parties, no division into allies on one side and Germans on the other. . . . For the first time since the war the French and the Germans meet as man to man, one might almost say as friend to friend. There is complete equality; there is no longer a division into groups; all that is past and gone. (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529)

Briand claimed that he would not have found himself in Locarno if he had wanted the division between the allies and Germany to persist. He wanted complete equality. Chamberlain agreed. If this split persisted after Locarno, then the countries would not have achieved anything, he asserted (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516 and app. 1; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25).

Nor was this atmosphere simply endogenous to prior agreements on the issues being discussed or a glow that emerged after a successful compromise. “Fundamental divergencies of view of course there are: but in no single instance have they been expounded in such a way as to cause

3. The reparations conference of 1924.

the slightest umbrage to the other party," Lampson wrote (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529). At another point, the British described a "prolonged interchange of views and arguments between Herr Stresemann and Herr Luther and M. Briand conducted with excellent temper on both sides but not disclosing any possible basis for agreement. M. Briand insisted that the principle was fundamental but offered to consider any alternative form of its application" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 517).

In their role as honest broker and facilitator of a pragmatic compromise, the British were intentionally trying to create such an atmosphere. Although he had been asked to chair the discussions, Chamberlain proposed, instead, at the first meeting to forgo any formal chairmanship so that the negotiations should have the "character of 'conversations'" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516) that were "as free and as informal as possible" with "complete frankness" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 1). The parties should proceed on the basis of "perfect equality" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 1).

Nevertheless, it was the French who were most responsible for the value creating that prevailed at Locarno. The French foreign minister came to the conference with an integrative mind-set characteristic of liberal diplomacy. Of their meetings to draw up a draft treaty in August before departing to Locarno, Chamberlain wrote, "Briand was the first to insist . . . that we must prepare for a real discussion with the Germans so as to arrive at a mutual agreement, and not another treaty imposed by the Allies upon Germany" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 439). At the conference, the Germans described Briand as "conciliatory on even the most difficult questions" (ADAP A14, No. 163).

Sitting with Luther early in the conference, Briand revealed his prosocial motivation: "You are a German, and I am a Frenchman. But I can be French and a good European. And you can be German and a good European. Two good Europeans should be able to understand one another" (in Unger 2005: 495). Stresemann put his finger on the essence of French liberal diplomacy as well. He praised France's effort to balance the national interest with that of the collective. Paying tribute to Briand, the foreign minister said, "You started from the idea that everyone of us belongs in the first instance to his own country . . . but that everyone also is a citizen of Europe, pledged to the great cultural idea that finds expression in the concept of our continent. We have a right to speak of a European idea" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 239–40). Chamberlain had also commented on how Briand "has, in truth . . . a European mind" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 364).

Briand was perpetually optimistic rather than instrumentally pessimistic. He told the delegates in his opening statements that "He himself had long reflected on the consequences resulting from that act by Germany. . . . He wished to assure Dr. Luther that he had come to Locarno

without *arrière-pensée*, and with a real desire to settle this question of security so that it would not arise again." He wanted "to arrive at a balance" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516). Even as he laid out his arguments in favor of a French guarantee of the eastern treaties, Briand stressed that the solution was largely a question of doing the "same thing in another way in order to satisfy German public opinion" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). It was a matter of finding a "formula" (ADAP A14, No. 123; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174). He was "sure that each side would use its ingenuity to seek another solution" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). Chamberlain wrote that Briand "has almost taken my breath away with his liberality" (Grayson 1997: 57).

The French foreign minister also disclosed private information. When Luther asked him if France envisioned a guarantee of Poland and Czechoslovakia in which France would be able to act immediately without waiting for League deliberation, he revealed that this was negotiable (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). He even proclaimed himself "naïve enough to admit that he had proposals for a compromise to put before the conference" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 175). Briand had in mind identifying a set of trustees that would act on behalf of the League to guarantee the treaty. He had told the British in August that he hoped this would meet the German concern about impartiality without diminishing the effectiveness of the guarantee, suggesting he recognized the power of their argument (CC 42 (25)). His eventual concessions went even beyond this.

The French concessions were not driven by British pressure. Given the importance of the security guarantee of Britain to France, the British could have exercised considerable leverage on the French to make concessions to the Germans. But they did not do so. Even though the British were relatively uninterested in the east, they sided with the French on the issue of the French guarantee of the eastern treaties. And the British were insistent that the Germans be under some obligation to participate in League economic sanctions, even if the precise form were decided on a case-by-case basis (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). This was true during the entire course of negotiations, even before the conference (DBFP I, Vol. 27, Nos. 249, 321, 363, 405); CP 245 (25); CP 312 (25); CP 318 (25)).

Chamberlain's credited the success of the conference to diplomatic style, which he attributed to the characteristics of the German and French diplomats. On the first day he had observed that "Chancellor [Luther] seemed to me to show just the qualities which, joined with M. Briand's, are needed for success" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516). Later in parliament, Chamberlain declared, "I think I am not saying too much when I say that the success of the Locarno Conference was essentially due to the character of the representatives of Germany and the representatives of France at that Conference" (*Hansard* Series 5, Vol. 188: col. 421). Agency was

necessary to deliver the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. He gave particular credit to France. "I was particularly fortunate in the character of the great Frenchman who represented his country there. M. Briand is a man of singular courage, of great clearness of vision and of a wide and generous liberality of thought. When he sets to work to make peace, he does it in the largest spirit" (*Hansard* Series 5, Vol. 188: col. 421).

CLEARING THE TABLE: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF  
THE SPIRIT OF LOCARNO

Primate Diplomacy: New German Demands at Locarno

Stresemann's realist diplomacy was based on the idea that Germany would first secure a rapprochement with the allied powers through a security pact and then begin to push for the easing of the occupation and, eventually, the complete evacuation of foreign troops from German soil before the year stipulated in the Versailles Treaty—1935. From the beginning, the foreign minister told his cabinet colleagues that Germany would insist on an assurance that at least the Cologne zone would be evacuated after the conclusion of a pact. He believed that it would be too much to ask for any further alleviations for the Rhineland at the present moment (*Kabinette Luther*, Vol. 1, Nos. 49, 116, 123, 153; Gratwohl 1980: 71, 110–11). Full evacuation would not result from a treaty, but it was the "logical consequence" of a pact (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 79; Gratwohl 1980: 73). This was the official position of Stresemann's DVP as well (*Kabinette Luther*, Vol. 1, No. 116). In a Reichstag address in July, Stresemann merely stated that he "expected some alleviations, notably of the burden of occupation if the pact came into being" but not as a condition for its successful conclusion (*DBFP I*, Vol. 27, No. 422). Stresemann was restraining his demands to better reassure the French and British of Germany's peaceful and cooperative intentions.

This was not sufficient for the DNVP, as mentioned in chapter 5. Kuno Graf von Westarp, the leader of the nationalist parliamentary caucus and a strong conservative, identified not only the amelioration but also the reduction of the length of occupation as part of any acceptable deal (Gratwohl 1980: 98). This was the party official position (Gratwohl 1980: 84). In the cabinet, Schiele of the DNVP had more moderate aims but, at least in the short term, they were still markedly more inflated than Stresemann's. In the cabinet, he called for a revision of the occupation regime as part of any deal on the security pact and an evacuation of the Cologne zone before the conference took place so that it would not become an "object" of the negotiations, a bargaining chip that the allies could use to pressure Germany to accept other terms (Gratwohl 1980: 110–11;

Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 158). As part of coercive diplomacy, the right-wing politician was attempting to remove a source of leverage from the allies by claiming as much value as possible now.

This nationalist pressure from inside the coalition forced Stresemann to shift in the direction of coercive bargaining. The official guidelines for the delegation to Locarno required that Germany secure both the settlement of the remaining disarmament questions and the evacuation of Cologne, as well as an assurance that the conditions of the occupation would be made less burdensome. The representatives to Locarno were also to “strive” for a reduction in the length of occupation, although this was not a precondition for acceptance (Gratwohl 1980: 113–22; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 170). Stresemann was obliged to bring home something tangible in terms of the occupation.

Feeling this pressure, the Germans began to broach the topic of ramifications for the Rhineland with the allies even before the conference (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 151–53). The allies noticed the change in the German diplomatic style. Chamberlain complained that, although the German government obviously wanted to secure a deal on the security pact, he had “to confess that they hold at times a language incompatible with their earlier statements and assurances and their attitude may present unexpected difficulties” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 509). The Germans then attempted to raise the subject of ramifications early in Locarno (ADAP A14, Nos. 127, 132; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174) but were told to hold off until the pact was settled (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174; ADAP A14, No. 137). It was only after the deal on Article 16 and the eastern arbitration treaties had taken shape that the British and French were willing to engage the subject, and then only on the perimeter of the conference in a private meeting that was to be “absolutely informal” and “non-official” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11).

Stresemann began with a long list of concessions that the German delegation “wished to obtain to order to render their position in Germany easier.” In addition to holding firm on a few issues of disarmament that had blocked the evacuation of Cologne, the foreign minister asked for a reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Rhineland to the level of German troops that had been stationed in the Rhineland before the war. He requested the creation of a mixed commission, including German representatives, that would reduce the number of ordinances in the occupied zones that had created *de facto* martial law in the Rhineland. Stresemann called for an assurance that there would be no permanent inspection of German disarmament, an assurance of the right of Germany to develop civilian aviation, the immediate withdrawal of all black allied troops, and even the shortening of the length of occupation (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11;

ADAP A14, No. 138; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 179–80). The Germans did not make a positional commitment. They stressed that this was simply a list of desires, not demands. But something “concrete,” in Luther’s words, on the Rhineland was necessary to avoid the impression that they had returned “empty-handed” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). Stresemann explained that “it was necessary to have something beyond mere words to satisfy that anxiety” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11; see also ADAP A14, No. 138). Stresemann’s right-hand man, Carl von Schubert, later almost apologized in a private meeting with Chamberlain for the coercive bargaining. Nationalist pressure, he disclosed, was forcing Germany to engage in “primate diplomacy.” Germany could not operate with “diplomatic subtleties” but, rather, had to present “our wishes and demands very openly and baldly” (ADAP A14, No. 141).

A deal was reached on Cologne and disarmament on the basis of a British compromise proposal.<sup>4</sup> The first zone was finally to be freed. As for the other German demands, Stresemann wrote later that “Briand had almost fallen off the sofa. . . . He was astonished at my boldness, which indeed he thought had gone too far. If my views were to be accepted, the Treaty of Versailles might as well cease to exist” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 180–81, 185–88). Briand joked that all these issues would require their own conference. It bordered on “foolhardiness” (ADAP A14, No. 138).

Yet, in keeping with his liberal diplomatic style of reasoned dialogue, Briand did not reject the German demands outright but, rather, was conciliatory and empathetic. It was “natural” that after the pact was signed that they “should consider everything for the realization for which we hoped” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). German desires were “completely normal” (ADAP A14, No. 138). He recognized that the Germany “could not be satisfied with mere expressions of hope otherwise they would be called illusionists” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). Briand even expressed optimism. “In a general way, Dr. Stresemann’s list did not *a priori* seem

4. As he had before, Chamberlain took it upon himself to broker a deal on the remaining points of disarmament so that Cologne might be evacuated quickly, thereby helping to clear the path for German ratification. He devised a solution in which Germany would address a note to the Conference of Ambassadors on those issues that remained unsettled and pledge that it would make an effort to resolve them as soon as possible with the allies. The allies would take the Germans at their word and formally set a date for evacuation. The realist foreign secretary saw the remaining points of disagreement as trivial and wanted to remove them as an obstacle to a much more important goal—the conclusion of a security pact. Chamberlain applied pressure on his military representatives to move quickly and to stop quibbling about small points, such as how many German troops were allowed to be stationed in barracks or the title given to the German police (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11 and No. 541; ADAP A14, No. 149; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 186–88; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, Nos. 195b, 195a).

impossible of realization. Quite the contrary. He would say for himself that he could even conceive further points which might be considered" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). Briand even used Stresemann's terms. The pact must have "important repercussions" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 186). This was not simply cheap talk. Briand expressed the same sentiments to the British privately before the Germans raised these issues.<sup>5</sup>

Briand was willing to consider the German proposals because of Stresemann's pragmatic statecraft. At Locarno, the French foreign minister stated that, as a consequence of Stresemann's overtures, France had had its "anxieties allayed as regards her own frontiers" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). He said, "If there was general security we could make certain allowances" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11; also Stresemann, Vol. 2: 180–81).

Briand did not grant these concessions immediately at the conference for two reasons. First, he did not have any backing yet from his government. Stresemann had inserted issues on the agenda on which the French government had not formulated an official position.<sup>6</sup> Second, domestic opposition to his diplomacy also meant that it "must not appear that there had been any sort of bargain about the Pact behind the scenes" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11; see also ADAP A14, No. 138). In essence, any additional concessions would raise questions about the genuineness of German intentions at home in France (ADAP A14, No. 138). This had been the German foreign minister's own concern. Briand stressed he "had no objection to the treaties working out in this sense. Still we could not expect all this to happen at once. . . . He, too, had many enemies in France. *Unreasonable* persons were not a monopoly of Germany. He was attacked in Paris for exchanging a sound system of defence for a security system. He, too, had been called a traitor" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 180–81, emphasis added). The French military was a particularly formidable obstacle (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 195a).

Briand was not using the French right as an excuse for inaction, however. The foreign minister told the Germans that "it would be his first task to press this on the French Cabinet on his return to Paris" and even promised to resign if it did not bear fruit. He promised that the "facts which

5. The British wrote, "For example, he proposed that we should adjourn the question of military control after evacuation of the Rhineland, which appears on the agenda of the Council, remarking that, if our pact negotiations went through this would be easy to arrange. Many matters which would now present great difficulty would become of little or no importance" after conclusion of the pact (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 364).

6. The French foreign minister stated that "this was not the moment. He had not the mandate and his position would be untenable." It was "outside the notes which had been exchanged" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11).

would follow on the Pact would be sufficient proof" that the original memorandum had led to decisive gains for Germany (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 15; see also Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, Nos. 184, 195b). Briand hoped to reduce the number of troops and ordinances. The French minister even promised the Germans that they could "enlarge on the effects of the general reaction on all sorts of things, with the practical certainty that it would have these concrete results" that would "follow very quickly, more quickly indeed than the German public could at present anticipate" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11; also ADAP A14, No. 138). Rather than dismissing German desires as being impossible to realize, as one would do when engaged in coercive bargaining, Briand went so far as to ask the German government for an official memorandum identifying a wish list on the occupation (ADAP A14, No. 140; see also No. 149). He said he would think it dishonest to not follow through and bring about a decisive change in the occupation regime (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 184).

The Germans trusted Briand. Stresemann described a remarkable exchange at the conference. "After his speech on Friday evening, Briand came to me and stretched out both his hands to me. I took his right hand and said that I was grateful to him from my heart for the words that he had spoken, to which he replied: 'No, don't speak of words. I shall prove to you that they are not merely words, but deeds'" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 188; see also Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 184). The British recognized this explicitly as liberal diplomacy. Chamberlain wrote home of the "noble reply of M. Briand, breathing the true spirit of Liberal France. With his mandate exhausted and no longer able to speak in the name of his Government, he yet pledges himself on his return to France to endeavor to give the largest possible satisfaction to the unspoken wishes of the German delegation. None of us who had witnessed that scene would ever forget it" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 6).

Chamberlain responded differently, consistent with his pragmatic diplomatic style. He urged Germany to moderate its demands given the realities of the present circumstances (ADAP A14, No. 141; DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). The foreign secretary told its representatives, "She [Germany] would always find the other members of the Council sensible of what had passed at Locarno. We were just as anxious as they were that the new spirit engendered at Locarno should continue and bear fruit" but "there were concessions which were not in the [domain] of *practical politics*" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 14, emphasis added). Whereas Briand, as a liberal, expressed genuine empathy for the position of Germany, Chamberlain, as a more instrumental pragmatist, complained privately about German primate diplomacy (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 547). Even though the French should have been most opposed to the new German demands given their

greater vulnerability and insecurity, the British were actually the ones who objected the most. Nevertheless, Chamberlain promised the Germans that he would travel through Paris on the way home to impress on the French prime minister and other key officials the British support for Briand's concessions in this area (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 541).

The parties agreed to initial the final results in the form of a draft treaty to convey an official approval of the treaty proceedings while also allowing the German delegation to bring the instrument home to discuss with its cabinet. The success of the treaty hinged on the issue that had driven Stresemann to write his memorandum in the first place—steps toward returning Germany sovereignty in the western occupation zones.

### Amputee Diplomacy: Stresemann Returns and the German Nationalists Depart

Stresemann returned home to an angry German cabinet. The members had been briefed during Locarno on the progress of negotiations, and the now familiar divide had opened up between the centrist and conservative elements. The nationalists complained that the Article 16 arrangement was not comprehensive and binding enough.<sup>7</sup> Outside the cabinet, in the Reichstag Graf von Westarp denigrated "gentlemen's agreements" on issues such as Article 16 (Gratwohl 1980: 128, 138). Schiele insisted that definitive concessions be brought home on the Rhineland occupation now so that they did not become objects of negotiation later (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 197). He also wanted a specific commitment to reduce the length of occupation for the remaining zones (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 201). Hindenburg responded emotionally, complaining that the treaty amounted to a "perpetual genuflection" for the Germans (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 214).<sup>8</sup>

7. Hindenburg called the note on Article 16 that Stresemann had secured a "noose around the neck" (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 183). Han von Seeckt complained that Germany must secure a categorical exception from any obligations, rather than merely the right to participate to the extent that it sought fit (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 187). Schiele complained of its non-binding nature and demanded a League Council resolution absolving Germany of its responsibilities (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 190). He and Otto von Schlieben, DNVP member, also insisted on an explicit assertion that Germany had no obligation to participate in economic sanctions either (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, Nos. 183, 190).

8. He insisted on a clarification that Germany had not permanently renounced the Alsace-Lorraine (only a settlement through force), a "more precise" statement on war guilt, a complete exemption from any Article 16 negotiations, more binding commitments beyond simple promises to ease the occupation, and absolute flexibility in exiting the pact.

The DNVP caucus in parliament issued a communique denigrating the achievement and betraying their zero-sum heuristic: "The German Nationalist Reichstag delegation is not able to see in the results of the negotiations in Locarno the fulfillment of the demands justified by the vital necessities of the German people. The delegation also fails to find the fulfillment of the prerequisites to the conclusion of a treaty, as well as the compensations by the other participating powers commensurate with the sacrifices to be assumed by Germany" (Gratwohl 1980: 137; see also Stresemann, Vol. 2: 193).<sup>9</sup>

The German delegation had been informed of nationalist feeling while in Locarno. Hermann Pünder, the foreign office representative briefing the cabinet, had telegraphed the negotiating party to report the very serious opposition at home (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 183).<sup>10</sup> The nationalist opposition was so strong that Heinrich Brauns, as acting chair of the cabinet, could not secure cabinet approval for Stresemann and Luther to initial the draft treaty. The cabinet sent word forbidding them from doing so (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 197). Upon receiving the message, Luther, who was sitting with his British interlocutors, stated in colloquial English, "Tell him to 'kiss my ass.' I mean to sign" (in Gratwohl 1980: 130; Wright 2002: 338).

In his briefing to the cabinet on his return and in a meeting with Graf von Westarp, Stresemann made the pragmatic case for the treaty. He persistently emphasized that Germany had realized "100%" of its main negotiating goals (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, 201; see also ADAP A14, No. 160). This was not just grandstanding; Stresemann wrote the same in his diary (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 232–34). In recounting his successes, the foreign minister noted that his achievements came despite the structural weakness of Germany: "Never had a delegation had such a success. We had been a nation of helots, and to-day we were a State of world importance" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 191–92).

The difference between the centrists and the nationalists lay not in their goals but in their diplomatic styles. The right was unpragmatically

9. Beyond the issue of ramifications, the DNVP found fault with the fundamental premise of Stresemann's original memo, the legal rejection of using force to recover Alsace-Lorraine. The DNVP caucus vowed that "it will not approve any treaty . . . that does not exclude any renunciation of German land and peoples" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 193).

10. Graf von Westarp wrote Luther demanding that he put the war-guilt question at the center of discussions (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 171). Schiele telegraphed Stresemann once to complain of his "serious misgivings" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 184) and then again, on behalf of all the DNVP cabinet members, to castigate the delegation for the abandonment of Alsace-Lorraine (ADAP A14, No. 154).

making the perfect the enemy of the good. Stresemann complained, "The Peace of Versailles has but one pattern in the history of the world; that is the peace that Rome imposed on Carthage after the second Punic War. I don't know if there was a single supporter of Hannibal in the Carthaginian Senate who would not gladly have agreed to an armistice of the kind indicated by Locarno. I see in Locarno the preservation of the Rhineland, and the possibility of the recovery of German territory in the East. I may be wrong. But hitherto no one has shown me the slightest sign of any other way that might lead to the same goal" (Vol. 2: 231). The nationalists were being unrealistic. "Politics is the art of the possible," he stated again (in Jacobson 1972: 65). For instance, it was pointless to insist on an allied statement against war guilt because the allies would never grant it (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 215; see also No. 223). "Everything that could be done" on war guilt "has been done. . . . The idea that the Allies may on their side allow the Article to drop, I regard as purely Utopian" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 196–204).

Stresemann explained to his colleagues that the pact was the cornerstone for a longer-term and pragmatic strategy of emancipating Germany and preventing "the plan of Poincaré to remain on the Rhine. That was the most important element" (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 233). A Foreign Office memorandum emphasized the importance of thinking step by step "for a long future" and recognizing the current constraints of Germany. This was not a "genuflection" but, rather, a step forward in a long-term process of restoring German "freedom" (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 215; see also No. 223). Luther spoke of "laying tracks for tireless work to hollow out the [Versailles] treaty." This would take considerable time, and there would be setbacks (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 233). The "main point is the political effect," Stresemann emphasized (Vol. 2: 196–204). The spirit of Locarno would make it easier for Germany to overcome Versailles over time (Wright 2002: 343).

As pragmatists, Luther and Stresemann were more attuned to the opportunities offered by particular structural circumstances but also the necessity of exercising agency to seize them. Locarno was "like the hem of the garment in the story, to be grasped when opportunity offers," wrote the foreign minister (Stresemann Vol. 2: 304). Both recognized the deteriorating German status quo. Luther warned that "politics does not stand still" and that "such a passive approach is in the long run completely impossible." If Germany did not proceed, the possibility that it might find itself the target of a Franco-British alliance was "no fantasy" (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 110; Wright 2002: 316–17; Gratwohl 1980: 86–88; Jacobson 1972: 53).

The more moderate elements in the German cabinet, those with greater epistemic motivation than the nationalists, endorsed Stresemann's state-

craft. Heinrich Brauns, Center Party member, and Otto Karl Gessler, Democratic Party member, defended the results of the conference.<sup>11</sup> Expressing a similar realist style of diplomacy, Brauns praised the foreign minister for making an important step forward in what must be a long-term process. Rudolf Krohne of the DVP agreed that Germany had achieved much and would achieve more in the future. Not everything must be accomplished at once. Gessler likened Hindenburg's position to a "person missing both legs who threatens not to dance." He advised the former general, "We have to learn again to act in the spirit of Bismarck" (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 233). The pragmatic moderates had a better understanding of the weak German position.

The precarious domestic situation again put pressure on Stresemann to engage in coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis the allies on the issue of the ramifications. Even though he was personally very pleased with the outcome for Germany at Locarno, he instructed his representatives abroad to downplay the extent of the German gains. This would enable Germany to extract more concessions before the treaty came before the Reichstag, thereby putting the government in a better position to sign and ratify the treaty (ADAP A14, No. 163).

Germany had to walk a fine line, however. It did not want to give the impression that it valued these "specific advantages" more than the peace pact itself. Yet these were matters of such "vital interest" that they had to be secured before ratification (ADAP A14, No. 160). If Germany denigrated the agreement to date, it would be accused of ill will, which might threaten the treaty ratification abroad. If, however, Germany seemed too pleased, the allies would feel under no further "obligation," endangering the treaty's prospects at home (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 201). Luther agreed (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 200).

Stresemann's realism softened the coercive diplomacy. The Germans never gave the allies an ultimatum with specific demands that had to be realized for legislative approval. The foreign minister simply wrote, diplomatically, "I take it for granted that friendly assurances given in Locarno will materialize in a practical form without undue delay" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 43). German representatives abroad were instructed to stress the difficulties Germany would face in the coming weeks (ADAP A14, No. 163; DBFP IA, Vol. 1, Nos. 28, 36). Stresemann told the allies that it was up to them to choose their concessions themselves so that these

11. They saw the note on Article 16 as binding and clearly in line with the German negotiating guidelines (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, Nos. 183, 187, 190). And the moderates lauded the delegation for its success on the eastern question (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, Nos. 190, 197).

would not be regarded as a price paid for German acquiescence (ADAP A14, Nos. 160, 195). The Germans framed the issue not in coercive terms, as the minimum side payment required for them to ratify the treaty, but, rather, as proof of the new spirit of Locarno that had arisen as a consequence of the conference (ADAP A14, No. 187; see also No. 212).

### Ratification and the *Rückwirkungen*: German Ransom or Reward for Reassurance?

In mid-November, the allies sent a note to Germany listing their envisioned alleviations of the Rhineland occupation, including the removal of most ordinances governing civilian life, the reduction of the size of foreign garrisons, the abolition of the hated delegates who served as liaisons between the German local government and foreign troops, and the full evacuation of Cologne by December 1 (Jacobson 1972: 64; Wright 2002: 347; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 223; DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 69; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 211). This was a dramatic series of alleviations. Even Stresemann, despite his vow to maintain unimpressed, later confessed that they were “much more considerable than any of us could have imagined” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 232–34).

This outcome might appear on the surface to be the result of subtle coercive bargaining by Germany. Rationalists would point out the advantage conferred on Germany by the hostility to the pact within the cabinet. It restricted the win set of Germany and increased its leverage. But this was not what moved the allies. Rather, the concessions were the joint product of French liberal diplomacy and British realism. Chamberlain and Briand had always had every intention of making concessions to Germany following the conclusion of the pact. Germany did not need to coerce Britain and France. It was pushing on an open door.

The concessions to Germany by France and Britain were meant as a post-treaty reward for the new cooperative diplomacy practiced by Germany. They were the continued manifestation of the value creating that prevailed at Locarno. In transmitting their note to Germany, the allies wrote, “In the same spirit of confidence, good faith and good will, the Powers concerned in the occupation of the Rhineland have decided in regard to this occupation to introduce all the modifications compatible with the Treaty of Versailles” (in Stresemann, Vol. 2: 214–15).

That the allies had every intention of keeping their promise at Locarno was evident in British behavior immediately following the conference, well before Germany began to press. Before Chamberlain even returned to London, he wrote of the “*détente* which should inevitably follow entry into force of Pact and reaction which it should have not only upon question of evacuation of Cologne but also in direction of a general alleviation

of conditions in Rhineland." He referred to the "inevitable and most desirable effect on conclusion of pact" and promised "that anything in the nature of mollification in the Rhineland to which French are ready to agree will have my strongest support" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 2).

The foreign secretary immediately instructed the British commissioner in charge of British forces in the Rhineland to cancel all ordinances not necessary for the safety of allied armies, with a particular focus on those that would be the most striking to public opinion in the Rhineland (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 47). In keeping with the British role as honest broker, Chamberlain pushed the French for an evacuation of Cologne to begin on December 1, 1925, the day that that pact was to be signed (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, Nos. 50, 59). In British eyes, this was to be a "first gift" to Germany (ADAP A14, No. 49), not a quid pro quo brought about by the application of German leverage. The British felt that ramifications, in Chamberlain's words, "were not a bargain nor the purchase price of German assent" but, rather, "were to proceed from our own initiative because we felt that they were the natural results of the treaty of Locarno" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 73).

Because Britain had every intention of working earnestly on alleviations in the Rhineland, Chamberlain was irritated when Germany began to pressure the allies. He chastised the Germans again for shifting from pragmatic to coercive diplomacy. He wrote, "Since the return of the German delegates, the Nationalists have repudiated the treaty . . . and the German Ministers in this difficult situation open their mouths wider and wider, demanding the impossible, whilst more and more they and the supporters of the pact use language incompatible with the spirit of Locarno, create the appearance of a *marchandage* and give the impression of a condition or even an ultimatum to the doing of things *which were conceived and intended as a free act of appeasement and goodwill*" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 73, emphasis added). Chamberlain reacted particularly strongly to Stresemann's request after Locarno that the British consider a shortening the occupation. The Germans "must not make the mistake of asking the impossible, such as an assurance that the period of occupation of the remaining zones would be shortened, nor the equally grave mistake of treating concessions which would have appeared impossible to them a month ago, and which they now saw within their grasp, as valueless from the moment that they were offered, or of allowing themselves and their public to think that nothing was of any value except that which was refused" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 64).

If anything, the shift in German diplomatic style endangered rather than improved the prospects for ramifications. When the Germans began to press, the foreign secretary wrote to his ambassador in Berlin, "There is a limit beyond which we cannot go, and there is a risk that the German

government, in trying to push us too far, may end by defeating the very object they have in view. In short they are in grave danger of falling into their usual error of opening their mouths too wide. Time is on their side if they play their cards even moderately well. Can you not make them realize this?" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 53). At another point, Chamberlain wrote, "I do not for a moment question the good faith of the Chancellor or Stresemann but this course is *full of danger*. . . . The Germans ask a great deal too much. The attitude of their Nationalists *make more difficult* the grant of the concessions *for which we were prepared* nor are we in any way helped by the attitude of the other parties" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 73, emphasis added). Stresemann had a greater chance of securing concessions by maintaining his realist course.

Briand also consistently demonstrated a desire to grant Germany concessions unilaterally, independent of any German pressure. The British noted that while in Locarno Briand "had practically pledged his government to undertake some modifications in the occupied territories" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 18), and when the French foreign minister returned to Paris, he set about trying to make these a reality. The liberal politician encountered great resistance on the part of the military, particularly in regards to the reduction in the number of French forces (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, Nos. 28, 33; ADAP A14, No. 176). The British thought that the French military resistance would ultimately stymie his efforts (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 33). Marshal Foch demanded more time even on the issue of the Cologne evacuation. Briand and his leftist allies countered that a quick reply was necessary so as to maintain the "spirit of the Locarno Conference" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 33). In response to anxious inquiries, Briand told one of his representatives in Germany, "Tell your friends in Berlin that I am thinking of them, always thinking of them, and that I am working on it" (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 210). The Germans themselves reported that Briand demonstrated "far-sightedness without narrow-mindedness" and always had the "best intentions" (ADAP A14, No. 212; see also No. 176). His diplomacy was marked by good faith and goodwill.

Despite their greater degree of vulnerability to German aggression compared to the British, the French were the ones who were willing to give more. In reporting on the Franco-British deliberations over the extent of alleviations, the Germans expressed their astonishment that Briand, even with his reluctant military, was willing to make more concessions than even the British War Ministry thought wise (ADAP A14, No. 254). For the first time, the German ambassador to France noted, Germany had been successful in direct negotiations with the French and even created a common front against others. He advised they "should not overlook the progress in relations with the French and should be

pleased with the great change in Franco-German relations since the days of Poincaré" (ADAP A14, No. 25).

There is a second reason to believe that the limited coercive German diplomacy did not induce the allies to grant Stresemann's request for ramifications. The leverage of the German government came from the significant opposition of the DNVP in the cabinet. But the DNVP withdrew from the government several weeks before the allies sent their note on concessions. The nationalist cabinet ministers and even many of their parliamentary colleagues wanted to remain part of the government to be in a better position to shape negotiations. A meeting of provincial delegates and the executive committee of the DNVP, however, rejected the draft treaty as it currently stood and demanded the removal of the DNVP cabinet members, who subsequently resigned (Wright 2002: 304; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 207). Differences over diplomacy broke apart the German coalition.

This removed much of Stresemann's bargaining leverage because it was, correctly, assumed that other parties were more favorably disposed to the treaty. The Germans recognized as much (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 216; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 195) And, as Chamberlain told the Germans, the departure of the DNVP reduced the gains for the allies because a treaty approved by the DNVP would have been of greater value than one to which the party remained hostile (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 20; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 216). Chamberlain wanted to court "every moderate and reasonable element in Germany" so that the treaty had the "widest obtainable support" in the country (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 5). "A Pact endorsed by a Government supported by the Right is worth ten Pacts carried in the Reichstag against the votes of the Right," calculated the British ambassador to Germany (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 263). The Germans themselves had made this one of their selling points (ADAP A12, Nos. 28, 40, 81; Gratwohl 1980: 65). The resignation of the DNVP should therefore have, under rationalist bargaining logic, made the allies less likely to yield. Yet they persisted on the course of giving significant concessions. Briand was particularly unmoved by the change, showing again his more reasonable liberal diplomacy. Noting the difference between Britain and France on this issue, Stresemann correctly diagnosed that this was "because [Briand] . . . stands on the Left" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 206).

Stresemann made up for the lack of DNVP support by relying on the votes of the SPD, which had consistently backed his diplomatic efforts and on whose support he had always counted, even though the Socialists had a political incentive to withhold support to see the government fall (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, Nos. 43, 64; ADAP A14, No. 195). Unlike the nationalists, the SPD appreciated the significance of the allied concessions. The alleviations were to them a "triumph of the spirit of peace" (DBFP IA,

Vol. 1, No. 107). With the final statement on ramifications in hand, the German government was now in a position to take a stand on the treaty. The unusual nature of the cabinet, as a collection of personalities representing the views of their parties but without the formal confirmation of the German parliament, meant that it could continue on in office despite the resignation of the DNVP ministers. Stresemann and Luther announced that they would continue the business of pushing the pact to a vote, after which the president would be given the task of forming a new government. This allowed the SPD members to vote their conscience without ruling out the possibility that they might take up the reins of government (ADAP A14, No. 187; DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 43, 49). The cabinet sent the document with its endorsement to the Reichstag, where the treaty passed by a vote of 291 to 174, although without any of the DNVP votes that both the allies and Stresemann had hoped for (Gratwohl 1980: 155).

Even if coercive diplomacy was not necessary to bring the allies to make the concessions on the Rhineland occupation that they had promised at Locarno, the outcome might be regarded as a simple package deal reflecting the distribution of interests. Rationalists expect that, in such instances of asymmetric preferences, parties create package deals in which each side trades off the issues it cares less about in exchange for concessions on those items it values most. Germany received its first priority, an improvement of conditions in the Rhineland and the return of a substantial amount of German sovereignty in the region, in exchange for a legal pledge of peaceful relations with the allies. France secured a British security guarantee. Britain obtained peace on the continent. In this view, diplomacy per se is not really important. It is epiphenomenal to the structure of interests.

But such an account neglects that the allies needed prior reassurance before they were willing to make such concessions at all. And only a specific type of pragmatic or liberal statesman (in this case, Stresemann) would have done this. Germany was only in the position to ask for ramifications because of its previous realist diplomacy. Indeed, had Stresemann's initial memorandum proposed such a package deal in January, the allies would certainly have turned him down. As seen in chapters 3 and 4, one of the most reassuring aspect of the initial offer of Germany was that it was not made conditional on any changes to the occupation. Earlier Chamberlain had written, "The German offer of the 9<sup>th</sup> February was valuable because it tended to produce stability and confidence, and therefore, in the end, security" (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 429). The pragmatic statecraft of Germany transformed European relations, according to the British foreign secretary:

My general feeling upon the whole question of German disarmament is that its importance has been fundamentally modified by the initialing of the Locarno treaties. . . . In brief, the policy of the allies was to safeguard the peace of Europe by insisting upon Germany's scrupulous execution of her outstanding disarmament obligations. The initialing of the Locarno treaties, however, has introduced a wholly new spirit into the relations between Germany and the Allies, which . . . is reflected in the view that the peace of Europe will be better guaranteed by the exhibition of a conciliatory spirit on both sides. (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 50)

Now he vowed "to do everything that can be done to mark at once that our relations with Germany are now on an entirely new footing and that confidence established between us enables concessions to be made *which would have been unthinkable earlier*" (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 2, emphasis added). Diplomacy had made the unthinkable thinkable.