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
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Creating Value

A PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF DIPLOMACY

Although diplomacy is arguably the most prevalent activity in interstate relations, rigorous theoretical and careful empirical work on diplomacy in international relations is extremely sparse (Der Derian 1987: 91; Sharp 2009: 1–2). Those few scholars who have explicitly engaged the subject complain that “IR [international relations] theory . . . has yet to give a theoretical account of what diplomacy is” (Jönsson and Hall 2005: 24). James Der Derian notes that “diplomacy has been particularly resistant to theory”; he cannot find “a substantial theoretical work on the subject in the contemporary literature of international relations” (1987: 91).¹ There is considerable research in recent years on diplomacy as a practice (Adler-Nissen 2014; Pouliot 2010; Neumann 2012; Sending 2011; Reus-Smit 1999). Yet the aim of this work is not to specify a theory of when diplomacy matters independently of other factors and how to establish that empirically.²

In this chapter, I build a theory of diplomacy, looking for guidance in three psychological literatures—on negotiation, political ideology, and moral values. The sections in this chapter link together disparate findings in these fields to develop a theory of diplomacy as agency. Like

1. Perhaps the most prolific student of the process, Paul Sharp admits that “what diplomacy is remains a mystery. . . . What we know about diplomacy has typically come from former diplomats themselves or from historians who document but do not explain its precise mechanisms” (2009: 1–2).

2. Those working in this vein generally understand diplomacy as a macro-level institution of international society, rather than a micro-level process in which individuals seek interests for their state. The two are not incompatible but operate at different levels of analysis with a different degree of historical sweep.

diplomats themselves sometimes do, I hope to create value through the combination of these different strands of research.

I first review the literature on negotiation, laying out the difference between value claiming and value creating. Formal rationalist work attributes negotiation behavior and outcomes to features of the structural situation, such as the distribution of power and interests. This vein of research, however, has difficulty explaining how negotiators resolve the dilemma when they have incentives to engage in both value claiming and value creating, and it problematically assumes that all negotiators interpret the same environment identically. Studies inspired by social and cognitive psychology show that attributes of the negotiators matter in addition to structure. Particular combinations of epistemic motivation and social motivation lead to different negotiating styles that demonstrate a remarkable parallel to the conceptions of diplomacy uncovered in chapter 1. These affect how political actors interpret their task and predispose negotiators toward value claiming or value creating independent of their situation.

I then develop a series of hypotheses about which kind of negotiating will prevail when different diplomatic styles interact. Because international relations theory does not yet offer a theory of diplomacy, the primary rival to a psychologically driven account is a purely structural account derived from microeconomic bargaining theory in which diplomacy is endogenous and epiphenomenal to situational factors. Structural theories provide a baseline from which to judge the effect of agency. Nevertheless, as we will see, rationalism and psychology are not mutually exclusive. Structure matters, but it is hardly the whole story.

Establishing the effect of diplomacy poses some thorny methodological issues of measurement and causal inference. Diplomatic outcomes might be epiphenomenal to the distribution of power and interests. Diplomatic style might be endogenous to those same factors. And the selection of cases might be biased in favor of finding an effect for diplomacy. In the last section, on research design, I explain how I chose the appropriate cases to solve these problems as well as how I rigorously measure psychological motivations and diplomatic styles in a nontautological way. In short, social and epistemic motivations are embedded in the political ideology of actors, allowing us to measure them independently of behavior. We then look for variations in diplomatic style among political parties in the same country that share the same foreign policy interests and beliefs, thereby showing that diplomatic style is not endogenous. Particular combinations of diplomatic styles are capable of yielding successful outcomes when others are not, even though the distribution of power interests is more or less constant; this shows that diplomacy is not epiphenomenal. And the core of the book revolves around a case in which

the preconditions for diplomatic success and value creating were completely absent at the beginning, mitigating the danger of selection bias.

NEGOTIATING STYLES: CREATING OR CLAIMING VALUE

Both the formal and the psychological literatures generally distinguish between types of negotiation. *Value claiming*, sometimes called distributive or contending negotiation, is marked by noncooperative behavior—one side making significant demands of the other side and refusing to make or only grudgingly making concessions. Value claiming is marked by the heavy use of “positional commitments,” in which parties insist on specific settlements tilted highly in their favor and threaten to walk away unless their demands are met. The aim is to pressure the other side into making concessions, coercing others into deals closer to one’s ideal point. Concessions from others are derided as inadequate yet quickly pocketed without reciprocation. Holdouts and delays can be used to extract as much as possible from the other side. One never reveals private information about his or her “reservation point,” the lowest possible outcome he or she would be ready to accept. Indeed, value claiming revolves around trying to make the other side believe that point is as high as possible. All sources of leverage are used. One might hold an issue of value to the other (but not necessarily to oneself) hostage, refusing to concede on it so as to extract concessions on more important issues (Odell 2000; De Dreu and Boles 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; De Dreu and Carnevale 2003; McKibben 2014; Weingart et al. 2007).

Value creating, on the other hand, aims at a win-win outcome in which both sides secure their most important goals. Also called cooperative, integrative, or problem-solving negotiation, value creating proceeds through reciprocity rather than coercion. In contrast to withholding information, value creating is possible only if states honestly and openly reveal their preference structure. Information exchange is crucial because only then is the potential for a win-win deal revealed. If states do not have asymmetrical preferences, those engaged in value creating will act creatively, trying to draw in other issues through side payments that make a mutually beneficial package deal. One concedes on issues of lesser importance, rather than holding them hostage, in exchange for concessions by the other side on those issues that one values more. Integrative negotiation avoids the use of threats and the brinksmanship of value claiming negotiation.

Note that the integrative style does *not* imply that one is “failing to work diligently to gain value for one’s own side” (Odell 2000: 32). Value

creating is no less self-interested than is value claiming (Odell 2000; De Dreu and Boles 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; De Dreu and Carnevale 2003; McKibben 2014; Weingart et al. 2007). Indeed value claiming negotiating, if it fails, can often result in a lower individual outcome than integrative negotiating, leaving potential gains on the table. Value creating is designed to “expand rather than split the pie” (Odell 2000: 21). It rests on reciprocity, in which concessions and information are exchanged so that both sides might benefit.

Perhaps the most common experimental scenario used in negotiation research involves two negotiators trying to reach a solution on three or more interconnected issues on which the pair has contrasting but also asymmetrical interests. In other words, each side would prefer to prevail on all the questions at hand, but the matter of most importance to each is different. For instance, participants in an experiment try to strike a deal on the sale of an appliance. They must agree on the price but also on the financing and the speed of delivery. The buyer would prefer the cheapest price, the least interest on financing, and the fastest delivery. The seller has the opposite preferences. There might nevertheless be potential outcomes that benefit both of them more than others; the key is to find them. For instance, the seller might care much more about price and the buyer about financing. In this way, integrative negotiation does not so much create value as it discovers it (Odell 2000; De Dreu and Boles 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; De Dreu and Carnevale 2003; McKibben 2014; Weingart et al. 2007).

Whereas the central problem in value claiming is demonstrating resolve, the main challenge in value creating is conveying cooperative intentions. Particularly in interactions among parties whose previous relations are marked by prior antipathy and conflict, value creating is likely to involve a process of reassurance (Glaser 2010; Kydd 2005; Ramsay 2011). One’s interlocutors must be convinced that one is negotiating in good faith.

Value claiming negotiation should be familiar to students of international relations because it is the basis for the models of coercive bargaining discussed in chapter 1, which were pioneered by Thomas Schelling and have been elaborated more recently in bargaining theories of war (Schelling 1966; see also Fearon 1994, 1995; Schultz 2001). Value creating, with its emphasis on good faith and goodwill, parallels the liberal conception of diplomacy as reasoned dialogue. While reasoned dialogue also offers the potential for a fundamental reappraisal of one’s interests arising from participation in the diplomatic process over the long term, I focus on the more simple process of discovering the potential for joint gains while holding interests constant.

THE STRUCTURAL BASELINE: MICROECONOMIC BARGAINING THEORY

Microeconomic bargaining theory, generally rationalist and formal in character, makes two primary claims regarding negotiation. First, the choice of negotiating strategy should be a function of one's bargaining leverage. This source of influence might be defined in various ways, such as satisfaction with the status quo, a restricted win set due to domestic political opposition, or material power. Those in a position of leverage should adopt a coercive bargaining strategy, something first observed by John Nash (1953) and subsequently applied to international relations (Moravcsik 1998; Morrow 1999; Muthoo 1999; Voeten 2001). Those lacking such leverage should pursue a conciliatory strategy of concessions or side payments, known as "obliging." Applied to diplomacy, a crude structural model would predict that diplomacy is endogenous to structure.

Second, rationalists expect that outcomes will reflect the distribution of bargaining leverage (Krasner 1991; Fearon 1998; Moravcsik 1998). In other words, the strong do as they will and the weak as they must. Applied to diplomacy, a crude structural model would expect diplomacy to be epiphenomenal. Outcomes are weighted toward status quo states or those with the power to coerce.

A more sophisticated set of structural arguments maintains that the underlying preference structure affects negotiating strategies as well as the outcome. Value creating strategies are more likely to be used when parties value different issues on the negotiating agenda differently, facilitating a package deal. When parties have symmetrical preferences—that is, the same preference function—negotiation takes on a zero-sum character and value claiming prevails (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; McGinnis 1986; Martin 1992, 1994; Lohmann 1997; Tollison and Willett 1979; Sebenius 1983; Martin 1994; Davis 2004; Morgan 1990). In such fixed-pie situations, states will resort to distributive bargaining. Where the pie can be expanded, they are able to create value. In any case, diplomatic style is still endogenous to the structure of interests, and the effect of diplomacy continues to be epiphenomenal.

Microeconomic bargaining theory has much to tell us about how states negotiate and forms the foundation of the argument that I advance. It reminds us that for successful diplomacy to take place there must be an overlap in the bargaining space between states and that states engage in a communicative process of conveying their interests to each other. If there is no outcome that both parties do not prefer to the status quo, no amount of diplomacy can overcome this short of a truly transformative process of persuasion. Nevertheless, bargaining theory is incomplete in a number of ways.

Given uncertainty, negotiators always face an incentive to engage in value claiming, even in situations with integrative potential. The very existence of joint gains is not revealed unless states engage in value creating negotiation (Pruitt and Lewis 1975; De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000; Olekalns and Smith 2009: 347–48). The distribution of interests is not something that states necessarily know as they consider negotiating with one another. Finding an outcome that creates value requires players to reveal private information about which issues are most important to them and how far they can actually compromise without crossing their red lines. As Mara Olekalns and Philip Smith explain, “The decision to offer accurate information to the other party is a critical one. Without information about underlying interests, negotiators are unable to identify mutually beneficial outcomes” (2009: 347–48; see also Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewick 2009; Pruitt and Lewis 1975). Experimental research shows that value creating is necessary to facilitate the striking of integrative deals in which both sides obtain what they value most (Schei and Rognes 2003; Weingart et al. 2007; De Dreu, Giebels, and Van de Vliert 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Schultz and Pruitt 1978; De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000). A favorable distribution of interests is not sufficient for generating a win-win outcome.

Yet parties to a negotiation, even in the presence of potential joint gains, still have an incentive to maintain a value claiming negotiating strategy and conceal their underlying preferences (De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000; O’Connor and Carnevale 1997). They can inflate the value of low-priority issues for use as bargaining chips (Olekalns and Smith 2009: 347–48; Risse 2000: 21). Even if they decide against this course, they will nevertheless fear that others will exploit their forthrightness (Jervis 1970; Fearon 1995; Schultz 2001; Glaser 2010). Or, just as problematically, they might not be believed when attempting such honest communication. At the heart of the rationalist approach to strategic interaction is an assumption of distrust among political actors (Kydd 2005; Rathbun 2012). States cannot believe others’ representations of their interests.

In other words, value creating negotiation can be impeded by a kind of prisoner’s dilemma logic. Olekalns and Smith write, “Despite these benefits, there is a strong temptation to withhold or misrepresent information as a way of increasing bargaining power and individual outcomes. Moreover, the decision to offer accurate information is high risk because it makes negotiators vulnerable to exploitation by the other party” (2009: 347–48). This dynamic might impede states from recognizing the existence of an underlying distribution of preferences that allows for value creating in the first place. This is the same conundrum highlighted by rationalists in distributive zero-sum games. By withholding

private information, even in fixed-pie situations, both parties risk not reaching an agreement that might have left both better off (Fearon 1995). Thomas Risse summarizes, “The successful joint search for better overall solutions requires creativity, effective communication, and mutual trust, whereas success in the distributive battle depends on strategic, and even opportunistic, communication and withholding of available information—and a good deal of distrust against potential misinformation” (2000: 21).

This lack of trust can make even coming to the table difficult (Ramsay 2011). If decision makers believe that others have malign intentions, they will refuse even to negotiate because any private information shared might be used against them in the event that talks break down (Schultz 2005; Larson 1997). Decision makers are also more likely to believe that there is no outcome that will leave both sides satisfied; that the greedy other will make unacceptable demands that can never be conceded; that the offer to negotiate reflects an ulterior motive; or that any agreement will be violated in the future, what rationalists call a commitment problem (Fearon 1995).

Value creating therefore requires both the structural fact of a potential package deal and also the agency that uncovers it. Rationalists argue that states might engage in a costly signaling process to reassure others about their cooperative intentions, which might *create* the trust necessary to facilitate value creating negotiation (Kydd 2005; Glaser 2010). Because the recipients of signals of assurance are uncertain of others’ intentions and fear exploitation (most classically to be the “sucker” of a prisoner’s dilemma), states seeking better relations must make unilateral and costly gestures of conciliation that leave themselves vulnerable so that their peaceful and cooperative intentions will be believed (Glaser 1994; 2010; Kupchan 2010; Jervis 1976). Implicitly in this vein, Kristopher Ramsay (2011) argues that states might honestly indicate their willingness to compromise, thereby revealing private information that demonstrates a serious intent to negotiate. Ramsay calls this cheap talk, but in revealing something about their reservation price, this is surely a costly action. Nonrationalists make similar arguments, stressing that these signals should not be made contingent on immediate reciprocal concessions (Larson 1997; Etzioni 1962; Osgood 1962; Nincic 2011).

These are important insights, and signals of this sort are undoubtedly crucial for generating value creating negotiation. Nevertheless, rationalist theories are incomplete in a number of ways. First, taking such steps toward reassurance presumes what Ken Booth and Nicolas Wheeler (2008) call “security dilemma sensibility,” the understanding that the other side is wary of one’s actions, something that should not be taken for granted. In fact, in the cases that are difficult for diplomacy, those

examined in this book, such a sensibility is distinctly lacking. Security dilemma sensibility requires states to objectively view the situation both from their own standpoint and from that of others.

Second, even when such costly signals are made, there is no guarantee they will be perceived as reassuring. Rationalists generally assume that all individuals will have the same prior beliefs and information and will interpret their environment similarly (Rathbun 2007; Yarhi-Milo 2014; Schultz 2005; Fearon 1995: 392). Clearly, such an assumption is not likely to hold up to empirical scrutiny. It is well known in the psychological literature on international relations that decision makers often operate on the basis of assumptions and heuristics that lead them to pay more attention to some pieces of information than others (Tetlock 1998). They often engage in belief assimilation and belief perseverance, drawing inferences from information that allows them to maintain a certain image of the other (Jervis 1976; Tetlock 1998; Yarhi-Milo 2014; Mercer 1996). This creates the possibility that seemingly objective costly signals will be judged by some as cheap talk whereas objective cheap talk will be regarded as credible signals. This subjectivity “opens the door for negotiators’ attributions and perceptions to shape how negotiations unfold” (Neale and Fragale 2006: 27). Who will read the signals in which way is an open question.

BEHAVIORAL NEGOTIATION THEORY: AGENCY AND INDIVIDUAL ATTRIBUTES

The poor record of microeconomic bargaining theory in explaining negotiation behavior has spawned an interest in social cognition approaches to negotiation built on previous work in behavioral economics. As Margaret Neale and Alison Fragale write, “Traditional economic theories, as well as conventional wisdom, suggest that negotiations should be rational transactions guided by the principle of utility maximization. . . . Unfortunately, in reality, negotiations are rarely this straightforward, and negotiations often fail to play out according to the predictions of rational choice models” (2006: 27). This psychological-inspired literature on negotiation provides solutions to the problems we have identified. It explains how individuals’ characteristics lead them to engage in very different negotiating behaviors in the same strategic situation based on how they interpret the environment. When this literature is applied to international relations, it indicates how diplomacy might be neither endogenous nor epiphenomenal to structure. I begin with the literature explaining individual behavior and then proceed to how different individual behaviors combine to produce different outcomes.

The literature to date highlights two individual motivations: social and epistemic. The former is the “desire to attain certain distributions of outcomes between oneself and the other party”; the latter is “the need to develop a rich and accurate understanding of the world” (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003). These directly parallel the two main themes of the behavioral economics literature: that individuals are not exclusively egoistic and that they are often less than rational (Kahneman 2003). As Neale and Fragale explain, “Unlike traditional economic models of negotiator behavior, the social cognition approach to negotiation recognizes that two negotiators, facing the same objective circumstances, may have different goals, express different behaviors, and obtain different benefits, simply because these two negotiators perceive their circumstances differently” (2006: 27). There is a very large psychological literature on the importance of individual-level differences in negotiation that has not yet been tapped by international relations scholars.

The Value Difference: Social Motivation

Social motivation is the most powerful predictor of individual-level differences in negotiation analysis to date (Deutsch 1960; McClintock 1972; Messick and McClintock 1968). Prosocial motivation is marked by a concern for not only one’s own outcome but that of others as well. Prosocials want to maximize joint benefits. They are also concerned with guaranteeing an equal distribution of gains (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001). In contrast, proselves have only egoistic interests. Social motivation is either primed in experiments through a treatment, so as to reduce omitted-variable bias, or captured as an intrinsic quality through measures of social value orientation. It has consistently been found that individuals have dispositional tendencies to prefer different distributions of benefits for themselves and others that substantially influence behavior in experimental settings. Research has indicated that priming social motivation and capturing intrinsic individual differences through prenegotiation surveys yield the same pattern of results in experimental behavior (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003).

These motivations help decision makers resolve the dilemma they face between value creating and value claiming behaviors. Prosocials generally prefer value creating negotiation; proselves prefer value claiming negotiation (Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Fry 1985; Beersma and De Dreu 1999). Proselfs offer less and demand more. In experiments, proselves make less conciliatory first offers and lower overall concessions than prosocials (De Dreu and Boles 1998; De Dreu and Van Lange 1995; Carnevale and Lawler 1986; Van Lange 1999; Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994; De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Liebrand et al.

1986) and make higher demands of others (De Dreu and van Lange 1995; Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004). Proselfs engage in more positional commitments, in which they draw a line they claim they will not cross (Carnevale and Lawler 1986). Proselfs also make more threats and give more warnings (De Dreu, Giebels, and Van de Vliert 1998; see also Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Tomlinson, Dineen, and Lewicki 2009; Weingart et al. 2007; Sorenson, Morse, and Savage 1999).

Committed to equal outcomes, prosocials often forgo gains so that others might also share in the spoils (Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976; Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; McClintock and Liebrand 1988). In “take-some and give-some” games, in which experimental participants move after an initial offer has been made, there is a dominant egoistic strategy of retaining all chips for oneself. Nevertheless, prosocials give significantly more than proselfs (Van Lange 1999; De Cremer and Van Lange 2001). In situations in which the decision about allocation must be made simultaneously, before knowing what the other does, prosocials give as much as they expect others to give, whereas proselfs donate less. Because the experiment is a one-shot game, there is no strategic reason to be generous (Van Lange 1999). Prosocials express a greater interest in the welfare of others in post-experiment surveys and less interest in maximizing their own utility (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; De Dreu and Van Lange 1995). Concern for one’s own outcomes and lack of concern for the other’s outcomes are both associated statistically with lower levels of concessions and higher level of demands in negotiation settings (De Dreu and Van Lange 1995; Sorenson, Morse, and Savage 1999).

Rationalist bargaining theories expect those with the bargaining leverage that comes with an exit option, such as being more satisfied with the status quo, to exploit it. But experimental research indicates that prosocials do not take generally take advantage of such opportunities; only proselfs do. In a game with integrative potential, having a one-sided exit option in the form of a payoff leads proselfs to engage in more coercive bargaining with more threats, leading to higher individual outcomes. Giving prosocials such power does not lead to a change in behavior (Giebels, De Dreu, and Van de Vliert 2000). Proselfs are more opportunistic and exploitative negotiators (Van Lange 1999). They meet weakness with higher demands (De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004). And they have been found to exploit asymmetric information about other’s type, whereas prosocials have not (Schei and Rognes 2003).

Proselfs and prosocials differ in terms of their values. That the term *value* indicates both the price that individuals place on something and the moral principles that guide individuals in life is an indication that we cannot separate negotiation from ethical considerations. Even selfish

behavior can have a moral motivation or justification. Individuals have a general tendency to regard themselves as fairer, more moral, and more honest than the average other and consequently believe that they deserve more in negotiations (Kramer, Pommerenke, and Newton 1993; Messick et al. 1985; Rothbart and Hallmark 1988; Thompson and Loewenstein 1992; Paese and Yonker 2001). Individuals often exhibit ego defensiveness, seeing themselves as more entitled than others. They also might engage in reactive devaluation, in which others' offers are seen as insufficient and insulting (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003). Both behaviors are particularly common among proselves. Self-righteousness is still a kind of righteousness.

The Cognitive Difference: Epistemic Motivation

Those with different social motivations adopt different negotiating styles because they have unique framings of the same situation. Negotiating strategies are accompanied by particular mindsets that operate as simplifying heuristics (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992; De Dreu and Boles 1998). Proselfs are more likely than prosocials to adopt a fixed-pie framing, viewing negotiations in distributive and zero-sum terms even when there is the potential for outcomes of mutual benefit (De Dreu and Boles 1998; De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon 2000; De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000). They are guided by notions such as "winner take all" and "your loss is my gain" (De Dreu and Boles 1998). Prosocials, in contrast, see more possibility for joint gains because they are more likely to frame negotiations in mixed-motive terms, in which interests are only partially incompatible (Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Golec and Federico 2004). They view negotiations more as a problem to be solved than as a game to be won.

Heuristics provide cognitive shortcuts that tell individuals how the world generally works and what their interactions with others will generally be like. Individuals generally expect others to share their social motivation, which is known in the literature as the egocentric bias (Iedema and Poppe 1994; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976). Not surprisingly, given their different framings of the same situation, prosocials expect negotiations to be more friendly than do proselves (De Dreu and Boles 1998).

Nevertheless, as shortcuts, heuristics can distort reality and interfere with the accurate interpretation of information. Behavioral economists and psychologists use heuristics to explain how individuals are less than rational (Kahneman 2003). These simplifying devices lead individuals to engage in confirmatory information searches, searching out and interpreting incoming stimuli to be in line with preexisting beliefs (De Dreu

and Van Kleef 2004). For instance, prosocials are more open to signals of cooperative intent than proselves because these signals confirm their pre-existing beliefs in the joint benefits of cooperation. In contrast, proselves demonstrate considerable reactive devaluation, denigrating even the generous offers of others (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003: 248).

In addition, psychological researchers point to the important role played by epistemic motivation, "the need to develop a rich and accurate understanding of the world" (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003: 235), in moderating the use of heuristics during negotiation (De Dreu et al. 2006; De Dreu, Koole, and Oldersma 1999). Epistemic motivation encourages openness to, and the complex processing of, new information. Those who are lower in epistemic motivation demonstrate more of a need for closure. Their information processing is marked by "seizing" and "freezing." They feel an urgency to make a decision quickly and are disinclined to revisit it because they are uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity (Kruglanski and Webster 1996; Webster and Kruglanski 1994). Those who lack epistemic motivation are less committed to developing a completely objective view of the situation they are in. De Dreu and Peter Carnevale summarize: "Individuals at the high need for closure end of the continuum are characterized by considerable cognitive impatience, leaping to judgment on the basis of inconclusive evidence and rigidity of thought. At the other end of the continuum, individuals with low need for closure may prefer to suspend judgment, engaging in extensive information search and generating multiple interpretations for known facts" (2003: 262).

Those with epistemic motivation are more likely to revisit and revise their beliefs in light of disconfirming evidence than are those with the same prior beliefs and social motivation because they are more open to information (Tetlock 2005; Baron 1994; Mitzen and Schweller 2011; Stanovich and West 1998, 2000). In the case of negotiations with those viewed from past experience as hostile, uncooperative, and intransigent, they will be more receptive to signals of reassurance to the contrary than will proselves who have a higher level of cognitive closure. The latter are more likely to engage in belief perseverance and belief assimilation. Those with epistemic motivation are also more able and more motivated to look at a situation from the point of view of others. When they interact with those with whom they have had past conflicts, this allows for the security dilemma sensibility often necessary to initiate negotiations. Finally, those with greater epistemic motivation are better able to admit the hard truth of their relative weakness when they are in unfavorable bargaining positions, a weakness that can make coercive bargaining fruitless. All these behaviors require cognitive effort, the hallmark of those with epistemic motivation.

We now have the tools to behavioralize the diplomatic styles we uncovered in chapter 1. The combination of epistemic and social motivation produces the four different diplomatic styles seen in figure 1, three of which we have already explored. Prosocials with high epistemic motivation are liberals who prefer reasoned dialogue. As reviewed in chapter 1, reason involves both a commitment to finding the truth through an exchange of information and arguments and a desire to find value for the other side as well as oneself. The former tendency is indicative of epistemic motivation, the latter of prosocial motivation.

Proselfs with low epistemic motivation are inclined to be coercive bargainers. Proselfs with high epistemic motivation are predisposed toward being realist advocates of pragmatic statecraft. Whereas the former are prisoners of their heuristics, the latter should be better able to adjust to their situation. They will be highly attuned to structure and adopt behaviors typically associated with both coercive bargaining and reasoned dialogue styles. I refer to integrative and distributive tactics used by pragmatists. *Tactics* are different from styles in that they are temporary. The term captures how pragmatists move back and forth between distributive and integrative negotiation, neither of which captures their general style. The pragmatist style is to have no fixed tactics. The realist uses all the tools in his or her toolkit.

		<i>Epistemic motivation</i>	
		Low	High
<i>Social motivation</i>	Proself	Coercive bargaining	Pragmatic statecraft (realist)
	Prosocial	Obliging	Reasoned dialogue (liberal)

FIGURE 1 Diplomatic styles.

The common thread of the pragmatist style is a global understanding of the situation, which requires more cognitive effort. More than others, pragmatists should (1) stress the priority of vital interests over peripheral considerations and the need to make painful tradeoffs; (2) self-consciously adopt an objective and unemotional appraisal of the environment, including the interests of other states; and (3) emphasize the necessity of thinking in steps toward a long-term goal.³ Pragmatists evaluate not just the present but also the future, not just one of their interests but all of their interests, and not just their own interests but those of others. These are all driven by an explicitly egoistic instrumentalism. Pragmatists should find themselves better able to overcome the fixed-pie bias in situations in which there is integrative potential. Less committed to their heuristics, pragmatists will be open to signals of both cooperativeness and hostility. Epistemic motivation should encourage perspective taking, in which one puts oneself in another's position, the instrumental empathy that realist theorists prescribe.⁴ To the extent that pragmatists pursue more integrative, conciliatory, and cooperative policies, they are nevertheless driven by instrumental proself motivations rather than by any normative commitment to reciprocity and joint gain, as prosocials are.

Prosocials with low epistemic motivation are the rosy-eyed idealistic utopians who Edward H. Carr (1964) warns about, those who are naively oblivious to wolves in sheep's clothing. They engage in "obliging." For reasons that I explain later, however, prosocials with a low epistemic motivation are likely to be relatively rare in politics, particularly international politics, and therefore we can focus primarily on the other three styles of diplomacy. Therefore, when I refer to prosocials in the empirical cases I present, I mean prosocials with high epistemic motivation.

Whether value creating or value claiming comes to prevail among negotiators is a function of the combination and interaction of diplomatic styles. The choice made by one country of how to negotiate is not always monadic in nature but often depends on the choices made by other states. This combination is what affects the character of the interaction among

3. This is not the same as having a longer time horizon, a greater discounting of present benefits, or a higher evaluation of future benefits. It is not that pragmatists are better able to deny themselves the immediate gratification of smaller gains and wait for larger gains down the line. They are more likely to point to the value of short-term benefits and even costs as steps in a gradual process rather than to denigrate them as insufficient and reject them. On the difference, see Rapport (2012).

4. This is different from genuine empathy in that it is instrumental in character.

the parties. Although value claiming and value creating are terms that also might be used to capture the negotiating styles of particular units, I reserve the use of these expressions to capture the spirit of negotiations. When referring to the individual use of value claiming, I refer to coercive bargaining, coercive diplomacy, or distributive negotiating. When referring to the individual use of value creating, I refer to reasoned dialogue, integrative negotiating, or liberal diplomacy.

In what particular combination of diplomatic styles is value claiming or value creating more likely to prevail? The most consistent finding in the social motivation literature on negotiation is that prosocial dyads are better able than proselfs to reach joint outcomes that benefit both partners (Schei and Rognes 2003; Weingart et al. 2007; De Dreu, Giebels, and Van de Vliert 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Schulz and Pruitt 1978; De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000; De Dreu et al. 2006; De Dreu and Boles 1998; De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon 2000; Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Carnevale and Lawler 1986). Considering the literature review above, this is not particularly surprising since each party has a preference for the same style of negotiation.

Research shows that proself dyads consistently leave gains on the table compared to prosocials because they do not share information or reciprocate concessions. These dyads are less able to reach integrative outcomes in which both sides obtain what they value most, even when such a possibility exists given preference structures (Schei and Rognes 2003; Weingart et al. 2007; De Dreu, Giebels, and Van de Vliert 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Schulz and Pruitt 1978; De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000). This leads to my first two hypotheses.

- *Hypothesis 1:* Value creating negotiation will prevail among prosocials practicing liberal diplomacy, making mutually beneficial agreements easier to reach.
- *Hypothesis 2:* Value claiming negotiation will prevail among proselfs practicing coercive bargaining, making mutually beneficial agreements more difficult to reach.

In the former case, negotiations will proceed more quickly and outcomes are less likely to simply reflect the distribution of bargaining power. In the latter case, successful agreements are harder to reach and stalemates are more likely. Negotiations will be slower and more arduous, with both parties engaging in brinkmanship bargaining. Agreements that are reached will probably reflect the crude distribution of bargaining power if the weaker side finally capitulates. This does not indicate that diplomacy is

epiphenomenal. Such outcomes emerge when a particular type of negotiation prevails. Diplomacy is still necessary to explain when pure structure prevails.

Pragmatists, given their higher epistemic motivation, should find it easier to recognize when it makes more sense to engage in value creating than in value claiming. Pragmatists are particularly likely to shift to integrative negotiating when they face prosocials and when they have less power (or expect to have less power in the future), that is, when coercive diplomacy is inefficient and inappropriate for the particular situational circumstances. Research shows that prosocials do not behave differently toward prosocials and proselfs pursuing a tit-for-tat strategy (McClintock and Liebrand 1988). These findings open up the possibility of collaboration between pragmatists and prosocials in a Baptist-bootlegger coalition to reach the joint gains of an integrative deal, particularly if the pragmatist is not in a position to exploit the other side's weakness in a proself manner (Schei and Rognes 2003).

- *Hypothesis 3:* Proselfs higher in epistemic motivation (pragmatists) will adapt their diplomatic style to the structure of the situation more easily than proselfs lower in epistemic motivation (coercive bargainers) when there is the possibility of joint gains, thereby making value creating with a pragmatic or prosocial partner easier.

Value claiming negotiation, however, is likely to prevail in any dyad that contains a coercive bargainer. Distributive negotiation induces a lowest-common-denominator effect on interactions with those with other diplomatic styles. Research shows that prosocials' commitment to value creating negotiation is contingent on reciprocity. Prosocials' commitment to equality and fairness places limits on their other-regarding behavior (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001). Reaching equal outcomes requires that others contribute to the group as well. In mixed-motive cooperation games, prosocials do not consistently choose the outcome that maximizes joint gains if the other is not cooperating (Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976). Consistent with their emphasis on joint gains, prosocials demonstrate a greater degree of "compensatory" trust, being willing to put up with a few defections to elicit cooperation (Kramer et al. 2004). Nevertheless, in a phenomenon known as *behavioral assimilation*, they defect against defection, indicating again that their interest in joint gains hinges on a commitment to reciprocity and equality (Stouten, De Cremer, and van Dijk 2006; Kanagaretnam et al. 2009; Kelley and Stahelski 1970; Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976; McClintock and Liebrand 1988; Rotter

1980). Prosocials begin with a *general* preference for value creating, but this might change their behavior vis-à-vis *specific* partners. Dialogue takes two; it is not a monologue.

This alerts us again to the important point that concern for other's outcomes does not imply a lack of consideration for one's own gains. It is the combination of a concern for one's own outcome *and* the outcome of others that tends to drive instances of win-win value creating (De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon 2000; Kimmel et al. 1980; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Sorenson, Morse, and Savage 1999; De Dreu et al. 2006). Prosocials want to expand the pie, not simply let others eat all of it.

Prosocials have been found to shift from an integrative to a distributive negotiating style when the number of proselves in a group increases (Weingart et al. 2007; Beersma and De Dreu 1999). Indeed, research shows that the joint outcomes of prosocials and proselves in experiments tend to be as low as those between proselves (Fry 1985; Beersma and De Dreu 1999). Prosocials significantly award generosity and punish stinginess (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Van Lange 1999; see also Liebrand et al. 1986; Kanagaretnam et al. 2009; Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994). They are less honest with proselves than with other prosocials (Steinel and De Dreu 2004).

Reciprocity is a morally laden principle of behavior for prosocials, not an instrumental one of the kind generally seen in the international relations literature, which is based on long-term egoistic considerations (Keohane 1984). Prosocials attribute behavior by others to moral characteristics, holding prosocials to be more moral than defectors. Prosocials believe that honesty will have a greater effect on the level of cooperation of others than proselves do (Kanagaretnam et al. 2009; Liebrand et al. 1986; Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994). Similar findings are found in negotiation studies. Prosocials believe distributive strategies to be morally inappropriate (De Dreu and Boles 1998).

Pragmatists, too, are unlikely to engage in value creating vis-à-vis a coercive bargainer because it leaves them vulnerable to exploitation. There is no instrumental gain from cooperative negotiation. Therefore,

- *Hypothesis 4*: Coercive bargaining by proselves with low epistemic motivation will induce value claiming on the part of others, leading to negotiations with a value claiming character.

By crossing the three types of negotiators, we generate different types of potential dyads and expectations for the spirit of diplomatic interactions (see figure 2). Because obligers are relatively rare empirically, I do not include them in the figure 2.

Creating Value

	Coercive bargaining	Pragmatic statecraft	Reasoned dialogue
Coercive bargaining	Value claiming likely		
Pragmatic statecraft	Value claiming likely	Value creating possible	
Reasoned dialogue	Value claiming likely	Value creating possible	Value creating likely

FIGURE 2 Interaction of diplomatic styles.

METHODOLOGY: DEMONSTRATING THE ADDED VALUE OF DIPLOMACY

My hypotheses do not give us a firm and specific prediction about the success of diplomacy in any particular case. The nature of any agreement, that is the ultimate outcome, depends on other factors that must be treated exogenously on a case-by-case basis, the most important of which is the structural environment. We must know the distribution of interests and whether it creates the possibility for a mutually beneficial outcome. We must know the distribution of power and which side is favored. Only then can we know whether diplomacy has added value. Evaluating the influence of the character of diplomatic interaction, the added value of diplomacy, therefore requires careful reconstruction of the diplomatic environment to generate the structural baseline. This forms the null hypothesis that might emerge from a simple rationalist bargaining model in which the powerful or satisfied prevail.

The study of diplomacy poses particularly difficult methodological problems, particularly regarding causal inference, case selection, and measurement. First, it might be the case that the effect of the character of the interactions, value creating or value claiming, is epiphenomenal. For

instance, parties whose reservation points are close together might find agreement easy to reach, but this has little to do with diplomacy. This problem is exacerbated by the danger of selection effects. States have a number of reasons not to begin negotiations unless they believe somewhat strongly that they are likely to bear fruit (Ramsay 2011). Therefore, the set of cases marked by the convocation of formal negotiations is likely to be unrepresentative and biased in favor of successful agreement. This has nothing to do with diplomacy per se but, rather, reflects a large zone of possible agreement.

I use a number of strategies to overcome these obstacles. The solution to the epiphenomenality problem lies in rigorous research design. We are looking for cases in which diplomatic style varies but other structural factors, such as the distribution of power and interests, do not. A longitudinal research design in which some combination of states with the same attributes is negotiating the same issues over some restricted period of time is appropriate to this task. This is akin to a fixed-effect model in statistics. The 1920s are well suited for this task in that the same three countries negotiated over the same issues over the course of a decade with little or no change in underlying preferences. Yet the governments of these countries frequently changed hands, altering the diplomatic style and therefore the character of the interactions. There are instances of all the types of combinations specified in figure 2.

Second, to cope with the problem of selection bias, the important case is one in which the likelihood of success was low but in which the parties nevertheless pursued diplomacy and found success. This describes the Locarno process of 1925, the core of the book, in which relations among the parties were initially marked by profound mistrust. Because value creating depends on the open and honest sharing of information, relations among former adversaries are particularly disadvantageous to successful diplomacy. The hostility of Germany to the Versailles regime is well known. The peace settlement left it bitter but also diplomatically weak, a tough nut for diplomacy to crack. French politicians of all political stripes were terrified of a German *revanche*. Franco-German relations deteriorated further when France under Raymond Poincaré invaded the Ruhr in 1923 to force Germany to pay reparations. And the geopolitical environment was made all the more difficult by the tremendous domestic instability in France and Germany, each of which saw constant collapses in governing coalitions. Politicians faced powerful incentives to exacerbate tensions to prove their patriotic credentials. My second case, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is also marked by suspicion and hostility.

These cases also allow us to observe the behavior of actors with different diplomatic styles from the same starting point in regards to their beliefs about their interlocutors. For instance, it might be that prosocials

find value creating easier because they have more trust in the other side than do proselves, which in other work I have found generally to be the case (Rathbun 2012). This would be a simple case of prosocial “doves” versus prosel self “hawks” (Schultz 2005). In these cases, however, distrust of the other is pronounced and invariant among all political actors in the same country. In the terms of Rathbun (2012), whereas prosocials have more “generalized trust,” this does not apply to their historical adversaries; they do not have “particularized trust.” Although trust might certainly facilitate value creating (Wheeler 2013), in these cases the parties began the process in its absence. As we will see, this makes epistemic motivation particularly important because it allows cognitively open individuals to revisit and revise their beliefs (Larson 1997).

Overall, the cases demonstrate instances in which agreement was extremely likely, given overlapping win sets or the potential for integrative negotiation, but nevertheless failed as well as cases in which diplomatic style overcame a structural environment rocky for diplomatic success, making us more confident in asserting that diplomacy added value to the outcome. So as not to be accused of cherry picking particular successes and failures, however, I engage all the efforts by Britain, France, and Germany to resolve issues of security during the 1920s.

But even if we demonstrate an independent effect of diplomatic style, we must be careful to consider the possibility that diplomatic style was induced by structure at some point earlier in the causal chain. Microeconomic bargaining theory expects that diplomatic style is strongly influenced by one’s interests and power. This is the endogeneity problem. My solution to this issue is discussed more extensively in the next section. I establish that there was significant variation *within* a country in the preference for diplomatic style on the part of those with the same interests and information. If so, diplomatic style was not endogenous. This variation was evident both cross-sectionally at any point in time and longitudinally as one government took over from another.

Measurement

An argument relying on psychological motivations raises some difficult measurement issues. When the subject is the decision making of political elites, particularly when the cases are historical, these two motivations are difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly through the traditional psychological survey instruments. Indeed, those measures might not even be applicable. A prosocial in his personal life may not necessarily be a prosocial in diplomacy, and vice versa. We are looking for some way of predicting either prosocial or prosel self behavior on behalf of one’s group in the arena of international politics as diplomats

take on the function of representing their nation-state in interactions with others. The psychological research on negotiation centers on how individuals interact with other individuals. These might very well be related, but we should not assume so.

The most direct way of measuring social motivation is to seek out evidence of how decision makers think about joint gains. It is not the case, as reviewed above, that prosocials are self-abnegating. The difference between proselfs and prosocials is in their degree of concern for the outcome of others. In the context of international relations, a proself position is an exclusively nationally oriented one. A prosocial position is a more internationalist, egalitarian, and universalist one. Social motivation is also evident in the heuristics that individuals exhibit, proselfs being marked by their fixed-pie and prosocials being marked by their expanding-pie characterizations of the situation. The most direct way of measuring epistemic motivation is looking for evidence about how decision-makers describe their thinking process. Reference to costs and benefits, feasibility, and anticipation of the reactions of others are all markers of a more epistemically motivated political actor.

These direct measures of our psychological attributes, however, are not easy to obtain and come with particular pitfalls. For social motivation, the danger is tautology. We risk measuring social motivation by reference to the negotiating and bargaining behavior of our actors such as their bargaining offers. For epistemic motivation, the danger is a lack of data. It is likely that those who lack epistemic motivation will be less inclined to describe their decision making since it will be less salient in their minds. Deliberate and effortful thought is a valence issue; no one wants to admit that they do not do it. Most of our data about key decision makers comprise what they do, and they generally act without explicit reference to their psychological motivations.

These issues lead me to supplement my direct measure with an indirect measure of these motivations. Making use of the latest advances in political psychology, I propose the innovation of capturing these constructs through political ideology. John Jost and colleagues make the case for political ideology as a motivated social cognition (2003). They argue that political ideology is driven by a number of underlying psychological motivations, which include those that other researchers have identified as crucial for understanding the psychology of negotiation.

As I have previously argued, the motivational difference between prosocials and proselfs is based on values, and value differences are at the heart of the distinction between left and right (Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010; Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Piuko, Schwartz, and Davidov 2011; Caprara et al. 2006; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Cohrs et al. 2005). Values are “trans-situational goals that vary in importance and

serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or a group” (Schwartz 2007: 712). In Shalom Schwartz’s scheme of universal values, those who identify with the left score more highly on “self-transcendence” values, marked by “benevolence,” that is concern for the welfare of close others in everyday interaction, but more importantly “universalism,” “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection of *all* people and nature” (Schwartz 1992: 12, emphasis added). Schwartz himself refers to these as “prosocial” attitudes.

Left and right are distinguished in large part by their commitment to equality and the welfare of others, both of which Paul Van Lange has found to predict social motivation in interpersonal settings (Van Lange 1999; Jost et al. 2003). A preference for social hierarchy is one of the defining principles of conservatism, whereas a preference for egalitarianism is an attribute of the left. The left has an “approach” orientation. It wants to provide for others, which explains its support for state programs to help the most disadvantaged (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Baldacci 2007).⁵ Helping those in the most need, of course, also serves to make society more equal, which is historically at the heart of distinguishing left from the right, even as the particular disadvantaged groups the left has sought to empower have evolved over time. More than fifty years ago, Seymour Martin Lipset wrote, “By ‘left’ we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater equality—political, economic, or social. By ‘right,’ we shall mean supporting a traditional, more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change towards greater equality” (1954: 1135). This definition has maintained a broad consensus over time (Gerring 1998; Putnam 1973).

The left also identifies more strongly with the moral foundations of protecting others from harm and caring for their well-being as well as ensuring fairness and equality (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Although there is great cultural and individual variation in moral values, social scientists have isolated a finite number of distinct moral systems, that is, discrete sets of different ethical values (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009; Haidt and Joseph 2004). Fairness/reciprocity and harm/care are grouped by Haidt and his colleagues under a broader rubric of the “ethics of autonomy” (Schweder et al. 1997). These “individualizing foundations” form the backbone of liberal

5. Although some might object that the left is less libertarian than conservatives, liberal and conservative support for state action has a different basis. Whereas conservative enthusiasm for government is almost exclusively premised on preventing negative outcomes through institutional restraints, liberal support for government action aims at positively providing for society, harnessing the power of the state to redistribute wealth or reach collectively more optimal resource allocation (Dworkin 1985; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Baldacci 2007).

philosophical thinking, dating to the Enlightenment, in which morality is about how well or poorly individuals treated other individuals (Turiel 1983). David De Cremer and Paul Van Lange (2001), seeking a better understanding of what drives prosocial behavior, evoke the twin morally defined motives of social responsibility and justice, which parallel the constituent elements of the ethics of autonomy.

Whereas the left demonstrates a more universal prosocial motivation, the right is marked by its concern for the security, safety, and stability of the in-group, which Jost et al. (2007) calls the “existential motive.” Hierarchy serves this motivation because it preserves social stability (Jost et al. 2003). The right sees adherence to traditional moral values and deference to authorities that coerce and punish violators of social norms as necessary checks on individual freedoms to protect society from those who would do others harm (Altemeyer 1998). Right-wing authoritarians resolve the trade-off between personal autonomy and social order in favor of the latter (Feldman 2003). They place a great stress on conformity and tradition because diversity and change are seen as threats to social cohesion and stability (Feldman and Stenner 1997). The left, in contrast, comes down in favor of greater political liberty, both in the United States and in other advanced democracies (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Kitschelt 1988a, 1988b, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). The left see less threat to society from free expression. It is more comfortable and supportive of diversity (Duckitt 2001; Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Janoff-Bulman 2009b; Jugert and Duckitt 2009; Stenner 2009; Van Leeuwen and Park 2009). The right also makes more intense distinctions between in-groups and out-groups and emphasizes loyalty to the former (Duckitt 2006; Duckitt et al. 2001; Jugert and Duckitt 2009; Van Leeuwen and Park 2009).

The right embraces the moral foundations of in-group/loyalty and authority/respect and Schwartz’s conservation values. Authority/respect concerns the maintenance of social hierarchies to maintain social order. This moral foundation highlights the values of obedience, respect, and role fulfillment. In-group/loyalty stresses individuals’ obligations to their group to preserve its cohesion, particularly against out-groups (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009; Haidt and Joseph 2004). These moral systems serve the same function as others—constraining self-interested action to benefit society as a whole. They simply do so by subordinating individual needs to the needs of the larger community. They are “binding foundations” based on the “ethics of community” (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009; Haidt and Joseph 2004).

The right identifies more strongly with conservation values, a set of principles that closely match the ethics of community, including

conformity, tradition, and security (Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 2010; Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Piuko, Schwartz, and Davidov 2011; Caprara et al. 2006; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Cohrs et al. 2005). Conformity restrains the individual expression that would violate social expectations and norms. Tradition involves respect for the customs of one's society. Security indicates a high valuation of the safety of one's society. All these values promote social order, stability, and predictability by suppressing the individual, binding him or her to the in-group. They inhibit individualism by restricting change across time and variety across space (Stenner 2009). Jesse Graham and colleagues (2011) report a strong association between this cluster of values and the binding moral foundations of in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity.

Left and right also differ in terms of epistemic motivation. Those who are more ideologically extreme are less likely to be epistemically motivated because it is more painful for them to change their beliefs or depart from their core values. There is evidence for this in the literature on political psychology (Rathbun 2004; McClosky and Chong 1985; Tetlock 1988). Extremists have what psychologists call a directional motivation or motivated bias, a desire to reach a specific conclusion (Jost et al. 2003). Their beliefs determine their level of epistemic motivation. Therefore, we expect the relationship between political ideology and the political spectrum to be curvilinear.

In addition, there is reason to think that the right will demonstrate something more of a need for closure than the left (Tetlock 1983a, 1984; Van Hiel and Mervielde 2003). Individuals also have nondirectional motives, those that reflect the desire to arrive at a belief independent of its content (Jost et al. 2003). Those who demonstrate a need for closure are uncomfortable with ambiguity and uncertainty and therefore have been found to gravitate toward particular beliefs that provide predictability. The right might therefore be expected to exhibit lower levels of epistemic motivation because conservative values promise more stability. Their lower level of epistemic motivation contributes to the adoption of their specific beliefs. Consistent with this theory, the need for closure is associated with support for a socially conservative program of traditional morality, social conformity, and strong law-and-order policies (Altemeyer 1998; Duckitt 2001; Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Kossowska and Van Hiel 2003).

Jost et al. argue that people on the right also have an "epistemic motive," a motivation to avoid uncertainty because they find it threatening (2007: 990). As a consequence, even though epistemic motivation is curvilinear in relation to the political spectrum, we can expect it to decline somewhat more precipitously on the right than on the left. Therefore

variation in epistemic motivation will induce a particularly salient cleavage within the right, which is otherwise unified in terms of social motivation, in terms of diplomatic style.

On the basis of this review, we can use political ideology as another measure of social and epistemic motivations (see figure 3). Placement on the center left captures prosocial and high epistemic motivation, which should lead to a preference for liberal diplomacy and reasoned dialogue. Center-right placement indicates a combination of proself and high epistemic motivation that should induce pragmatic statecraft. Far-right placement serves as a proxy for the combination of proself and low epistemic motivation, which should lead to coercive bargaining. The far left, prosocial combined with low epistemic motivation, will be idealists who engage in obliging diplomacy. Recall, however, that because of the weaker relationship between leftist ideology and epistemic motivation described before, this group should be relatively rare; this was confirmed in the case studies that follow. In addition, the competitive pressures of international politics select out the pursuit of purely idealistic policies, and the far left of the spectrum during this period is occupied by communist parties with Marxist ideologies that fit uncomfortably within the framework offered here, something I take up in the appendix to this chapter.

Of course, political ideology alone is not sufficient to measure social and epistemic motivations because ideology might also be capturing other factors that also affect foreign policy behavior, such as different

		<i>Epistemic motivation</i>	
		Low	High
<i>Social motivation</i>	Proself	Right	Center-right
	Prosocial	Far left	Left

FIGURE 3 Political ideology and psychological motivations.

conceptions of the national interest and different beliefs about other states, like how threatening they are. In the case studies that follow, I take these into account.

Rather than relying solely on the ideological placement of individual decision makers, I devote much attention to the political orientation of their domestic political support base, particularly the positions of their political parties. Political parties are aggregations of like-minded individuals. In past work (Rathbun 2004, 2012), I have shown that we can think of them as vehicles for bringing ideology into the foreign policy process. The behavior of foreign policy elites such as the prime ministers and foreign ministers must be our main focus of analysis given the centralized, high-stakes, and often secretive nature of diplomacy. But the social and epistemic motivations of leaders should be consistent with the diplomatic style preferred by their party or coalition base. Where it is not, we should expect (and indeed find) cabinet and parliamentary dissension that constrains and alters behavior. Although individuals are undoubtedly important in the cases that follow, it is possible to exaggerate their influence. Devoting attention to broader party orientations also leads to a more generalizable theory and more methodologically sound empirical conclusions because it enables us to more easily measure motivations independently of behavior.

A focus on parties also helps solve the endogeneity issue. If we see predictable variation in diplomatic style across the political system within the same country, whether judged through cross-sectional variation at time between the government and opposition or longitudinally as governments turn over from one side to the other, we can be more confident that diplomacy is not endogenous to structure and also that style has its origins in social and epistemic motivations. Thinking of parties as carriers of psychological motivations allows us to hold structure and the issues under negotiation constant with variation only in diplomatic style. We must, however, also be cognizant of the need to control for shifts in foreign policy goals that also accompany a change in a government party coalition. In each country under study, there is an easily identifiable left-right spectrum, described in the appendix to this chapter.

Nevertheless, the personal ideological position of those key decision makers is likely to be particularly causally important when parties are larger and encompass greater ideological variation or in coalition governments in which parties distribute key ministries. I expect that larger catch-all parties will demonstrate more ideological variation than smaller, more ideologically coherent parties. For instance, the British Tories were (still are) the main party of the British right, whereas the German People's Party (DVP) and German National People's Party

(DNVP) competed with each other on the conservative side of the political spectrum. In the former case, we expect internal divisions that correspond roughly to the ideological extremity of party members. When there is predictable variation within a government, the inclinations of the foreign minister and the head of government, who are responsible for diplomacy, will be particularly important.

Political actors other than politicians certainly matter as well. In the cases that follow, elected decision makers were often constrained by their militaries. I treat the latter's preference as largely exogenous and incorporate them into the story on an as-needed basis. The cases also generally neglect the positions and actions of professional diplomats. This is made possible by the high profile of the issues under discussion, which meant that decisions were made at the highest levels of government by political leaders rather than by bureaucrats. By virtue of their importance, security discussions were highly political and required a strong domestic basis of support from the parliament of each state. Nevertheless, a study of the issues of more day-to-day diplomatic interaction would probably need to explore the diplomatic style of regular diplomats, as others have done (Neumann 2012).

Political parties also have other, more self-serving interests. They seek reelection and need to deliver material benefits to their members, something that might be affected by foreign affairs (Downs 1957; Fordham 1988a, 1998b; Narizny 2007; Gaubatz 1991). It could be that the different diplomatic styles adopted by political parties are a consequence of these other functions of political parties. I consider this possibility on a case-by-case basis in the empirical chapters that follow. Security issues might have distributional implications for domestic political groups that could also explain party cleavages over diplomacy; however, there is more unity on national security goals because of their life-and-death nature, particularly in the aftermath of a major war, lessening this concern. National security issues also provide instances in which parties are more united on foreign policy goals, thereby allowing us to more easily distinguish between differences over substance and over diplomatic style. Nevertheless, I do not just assume, but empirically establish, this unity.

To measure diplomatic style (coercive bargaining, pragmatic statecraft, and reasoned dialogue) and the spirit of negotiations (value claiming vs. value creating), I draw from the inventory of behaviors identified in psychological work associated with different types of negotiation. We are judging style, which is monadic, and the spirit of negotiations, which is dyadic, simultaneously by the same actions. Where necessary, I distinguish the preferred diplomatic style of a state from the type of negotiating it engages in in light of others' behavior. This is tricky but unavoidable.

Coercive bargaining by any particular party (or value claiming by multiple parties) has the following elements:

- *Lack of information exchange*: Negotiators will not reveal their own private evaluation of different offers or their reservation point. Nor will they believe the representations of others who are also presumed to be engaged in coercive bargaining.
- *Pessimism*: Practitioners of coercive diplomacy can convey aloofness by expressing their skepticism that a deal can be reached. Optimism suggests weakness and a lack of resolve. The more this is feigned, the more this is coercive bargaining. Distributive negotiators will overstate, rather than understate, the differences between the sides to drive a harder bargain.
- *Ego defensiveness and reactive devaluation*: Value claimers will denigrate the sufficiency and generosity of others' offers. Instrumentally, this puts pressure on others to concede more. More genuinely, it reflects the feeling that their side deserves more than the other side. Ego defensiveness will inhibit empathetic understanding of the needs and constraints faced by the other side.
- *Offer inflation*: Negotiators open with high demands, which conveys the impression that they will settle only for a deal with major concessions, anchors the negotiation at points favorable to their reservation price, and allows some room for concessions while still commanding a larger share of the pie. The further opening bids are from their reservation price, the more coercive the bargaining.
- *Coercive linkage*: Value claiming parties will attempt to hold issues dear to the other side hostage to force the others to offer better terms on issues they care about. If an issue is of some worth to others, but not to them, they still have an incentive to hold onto it as a bargaining chip and demand compensation.
- *Staging*: Value claimers will insist that others make concessions before they do. This prevents commitment problems in which they have to trust that others will come through on their promises. It also allows them to pocket others' concessions and to ask for more without having spent any of their negotiating capital. This might include demanding prior concessions as a condition of even coming to the table.
- *Indifference and brinksmanship*: Negotiators should not be quick to concede but, rather, should hold out for eventual concessions. By not appearing eager, they convey resolve. In the event that a deadline is set, value claiming parties will play a game of brinksmanship.

- *Positional commitments*: Negotiators will use as a favorite technique staking out absolute take-home points and pledging not to agree on anything short of their obtainment. If done publicly, this creates a costly signal of resolve by making it harder to back down.
- *Cheap talk*: Negotiators will regard efforts by other side to persuade as cheap talk in value claiming, not as efforts to explain the others' position or arrive at an accommodation.

Liberal diplomacy by any one party (or value creating by multiple parties) has the following elements:

- *Honest information exchange*: Value creating parties will share accurate private information about their true preferences, feeling less concerned about exploitation, and be more inclined to believe the representations of others.
- *Optimism and earnestness*: Value creating parties will indicate their optimism that a deal can be reached to encourage the other side to negotiate in good faith. They will understate their differences with the other side rather than overstate them.
- *Recognition of generosity*: Value creating parties, in an indication of empathy, will recognize when others have made significant concessions and attempt to place themselves in others' shoes. They will not denigrate others' offers. When done publicly, this sends a signal of conciliation.
- *Fairer offers*: Value creating parties will present offers that more closely shadow their reservation point, if they have one, and include value for the other side as well as an indication of a commitment to equality and mutual benefit.
- *Integrative linkage*: Parties use integrative negotiation, which involves connecting issues, not to coerce a better deal but, rather, to find outcomes in which each side gains what it values most. Side payments can be used as positive concessions.
- *Staging*: Parties negotiate issues simultaneously, rather than holding them up to force concessions on other issues, even if an eventual integrative deal requires progress on both. Decision makers might consider unilateral concessions without immediate compensation to demonstrate cooperative intentions.
- *Argumentation*: Parties attempt to persuade others to concede to their point of view rather than to coerce them. The use of argumentation will be seen as an indication that the other side is open to dialogue.
- *Retaining flexibility*: Negotiators rarely draw lines because they impede the flexibility necessary to make trade-offs across issues.

Sources

Methodologically, I chose to engage in careful qualitative analysis, relying predominantly on primary documents. This kind of work is well suited for establishing the causal impact of diplomacy by establishing the structural baseline that also contributes to the outcome, which must be treated as an exogenous factor on a case-by-case basis. Because the distribution of interests, in particular, is private information, it cannot be measured through behavioral observation, making it difficult to put together a large data set. Historical case work is also necessary for establishing diplomatic style because observing behavior is not enough. For instance, if a state leader draws a red line that he or she promises not to cross, this might appear to be a coercive bluff aimed at extorting a better deal. On the other hand, it might also be a genuine representation of the reservation price of his or her country and therefore honest, integrative negotiating behavior. The action does not speak for itself; only by knowing the private information held by the leader can we judge.

The primary sources of the period are quite comprehensive in most cases. Both Germany and Britain have assembled enormous bound collections containing almost all the documents relevant to the cases examined in this book in their original languages. There is also a complete collection of cabinet minutes for both the British and German governments in their original languages. Where these collections proved to be insufficient, I conducted my own archival research. The documentation of French diplomacy is by far the worst.⁶ My findings on France must therefore be treated more tentatively. Still, I have attempted to triangulate using German and British sources as much as possible. Indeed, most students of French foreign affairs rely as heavily on these sources as they do on the French archives.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND THE PLAN OF THE BOOK

A bit of background is necessary to set the scene. Under the terms of the Versailles peace treaty, Germany was permanently forbidden to construct fortifications or maintain troops on the left bank of the Rhine and

6. For instance, Keeton complains that Briand, by far the most important French politician for the purposes of this book, “read little and wrote less” (1987: 107). He “never answered letters and never gave written promises” (29). This, he contends, was true of the French as a whole. They “committed little to paper, and often discarded what they did” (208).

50 kilometers to the east of the river. The left bank was divided into three zones, occupied and administered by French, Belgium, and British troops and to be evacuated in 1935 provided that Germany met its treaty obligations. The Cologne zone was set to be freed in 1925, the Koblenz area in 1930, and Mainz in 1935. The German army was reduced to 100,000, its navy was reduced to a token number of ships, and its air force was abolished, all monitored by an Inter-Allied Commission of Control of foreign officials whose expenses were paid by Germany. The Alsace-Lorraine was returned to France, Eupen-Malmedy was given to Belgium, colonies were turned over to the allies, upper Silesia was given to Czechoslovakia, and unification with Austria was forbidden. West Prussia became part of Poland, creating the Polish corridor to the sea and dividing Germany into two noncontiguous parts. Germany lost 10 percent of its population and land. The League of Nations took over the Saar for fifteen years, with control of its valuable coalmines given to the French. Yet the French were still obsessed with security and sought a bilateral guarantee of its borders from Britain.

Figure 4 presents an overview of expectations about the particular types of interactions, based on the ideological orientations of the governments in the three countries. In chapter 3, I compare a coercive bargaining dyad with a liberal dyad (the upper left and lower right boxes in figure 4) as France and Britain twice engaged between 1922 and 1924 in an effort to negotiate an increase in French security, first under rightist governments in both countries and then under leftist governments. Unable to come to an agreement, they tabled the issue. In chapter 4, I pick up the story in 1925 as Germany entered the mix, creating a pragmatic-integrative Franco-German dyad, a pragmatic-pragmatic Anglo-German dyad, and a pragmatic-integrative Anglo-Franco dyad that made value creating possible. Here I set the table, making the case that the particular combination of diplomatic styles in the three countries laid a fertile foundation for Germany to propose a multilateral security arrangement among the three countries, and I consider what might have been had other political forces been in power. In chapter 5, the most diplomatic of the chapters, I delve deeply into the minutiae of exchanging notes and formulating responses that allowed the three countries to get to the table, convening formal negotiations. When all sides laid their cards on the table, it resulted in the Treaty of Locarno and a dramatic improvement in relations that raised the prospect of a complete settlement of remaining issues between France and Germany; this is detailed in chapter 6. In chapter 7, I show the deterioration of relations following the 1926 shift in the French government to the right that turned the tables. As the Franco-German and the Anglo-Franco dyad shifted to value claiming, the three powers found it difficult to capitalize on the momentum of Locarno. In

Creating Value

	Coercive bargaining	Pragmatic statecraft	Reasoned dialogue
Coercive bargaining	1. Franco-Anglo relations, 1922–1923		
Pragmatic statecraft	2. Franco-German relations, 1926–1929 Franco-Anglo relations, 1926–1928	4. Anglo-German relations, 1925–1928	
Reasoned dialogue	3. Franco-Anglo relations, 1928–1929	5. Franco-German relations, 1925–1926 Franco-Anglo relations, 1925–1926 Anglo-German relations, 1928–1929	Franco-Anglo relations, 1924
	Value creating likely		
	Value creating possible		
	Value claiming likely		

FIGURE 4 Expectations and case studies.

chapter 8, I supplement the European cases with one from the Middle East. I note how many of the processes discussed in the earlier chapters repeat themselves in negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, indicating the added value of the argument. In the final chapter, I draw lessons from the 1920s experience for the Middle East.

APPENDIX: THE POLITICAL PARTY SPECTRUM IN INTERWAR FRANCE, GERMANY, AND BRITAIN

Party positions in interwar France, Germany, and Britain are understandable through the political psychological concepts explored in this chapter, allowing us partly to infer psychological motivations from ideological placement, providing this is supplemented with other measures

In Britain, the parties were, from left to right, Labour, Liberal, and Conservative. Labour had supplanted the Liberals as the main alternative to the Conservatives (Tories) by the 1920s. The Liberals had split during World War I and played only the most marginal of roles in inter-war politics.

Even the Conservatives in this oldest and most established of democracies represented the ethics of community rather than the ethics of autonomy. The Tories believed that there was a natural and beneficial hierarchy of classes in English society that preserved stability and allowed the community to function effectively as a whole. The interests of the nation were more important than that of any individual. Whereas radical liberals (and, later, Labour) spoke of rights, conservatives emphasized duties and loyalty to the church, king, country and the empire. Tories embraced only gradual change because anything else was disruptive to societal stability. They revered the British past and traditions, which held society together. Strong authority and law of order were necessary. The Tories were also the strongest advocates of adherence to traditional moral values (Baker 1993: xiv, 15, 127, 141, 198, 247; Smith 1997: 79; Hearnshaw 1967: 22–38; Barnes 1994: 315–22). The moral foundations and values of the Conservatives, in particular their lack of universalism and their intense loyalty to the nation-state, made them the natural party of empire (Barnes 1994: 336–38; Smith 1997: 79).

Labour represented universalist, self-transcendence values, which Jonathan Haidt and collaborators call the ethics of autonomy (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009; Haidt and Joseph 2004). The aim of the nationalization of industry, for instance, was the creation of a new utopian society marked by solidarity. The Labour election manifesto, *Labour and the Nation*, identified the egalitarian foundations of its domestic policies: “The Labour Party . . . is a Socialist party. Its aim is the organization of industry and the administration of the wealth which industry produces in the interest, not of the small minority (less than 10 percent of the population) who own the greater part of the land, the plant and the equipment without access to which their fellow-countrymen can neither work nor live, but of all who bring their contribution of useful service to the common stock. . . . It is the practical recognition of the familiar commonplace that ‘morality is in the nature of things’ and that men are all, in very truth, members one of another” (Labour Party 1928).

In Germany, the main parties were, from left to right, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), German Democratic Party (DDP), Center Party, German People’s Party (DVP), and German National People’s Party (DNVP). There were also some minor regional parties. The Nazis (National Socialist German Workers’ Party) also had a small representation

in parliament, although not of any discernible influence during the period under study.

The left-right divisions in Germany during the interwar years were the starkest of the three countries under study. The core issues were social reform, with the looming possibility of a communist revolution, and the stability of the recent transition to democracy, with the recurring prospect of a reactionary return to an aristocratic and autocratic government. The SPD, DDP, Center Party, and DVP were all committed to the preservation of a liberal form of government, that is, to the ethics of autonomy. They often came together in great coalitions. The DNVP, on the other hand, was largely hostile to the Weimar regime, and this intensified greatly in 1929 (Wright 2002; Mommsen 1996; Hiden 1996; Craig 1978).

However, the DVP, Center Party, and DDP frequently aligned with the DNVP on social issues, generally opposing any steps in the direction of social democracy, in what were known as bourgeois coalitions. Although the SPD was formally a Marxist party, it was not a truly revolutionary party, preferring to work within the confines of the political system to bring about gradual social change while maintaining democracy in a way not true of the communists (Eley 2002; Berman 2006; Berger 1994). The SPD was the strongest supporter of the Weimar Republic (Berger 1994: 177). Suzanne Miller identifies its core principles as the rights of democratic freedom, the demands for social justice, and the idea of solidarity. In other words, the SPD believed in self-transcendence values (Miller 1976: 16–31). It was the most prosocial of the parties.

In France, party labels were far more unstable. The French Third Republic was highly factionalized. Parties constantly dissolved and reformed. Politicians frequently quit their parties to remain in positions of power when their colleagues left the government. Fourteen of nineteen new interwar parties were formed as breakaways from existing parties; the other five were formed from scratch. Names meant little (Kreuzer 2001: 6). The Left Radicals, for instance, were a conservative and center-right party. The Radical Socialists were more centrist than the Socialists. The term *radical* indicates a link with the liberal values of the French Revolution.

We can, nevertheless, generally distinguish between a left and right bloc. The former was composed primarily of the Socialist Party, the primary vehicle of the French left, and the Radical (sometimes called the Radical Socialist) Party, the primary vehicle of the French center-left, or liberals. The latter was the equivalent of the British Liberal Party, the defenders of the democratic gains of the French Revolution against its conservative and authoritarian opponents. The Radicals shared values with the Socialists, although the latter were more extreme (Keiger 1997: 63, 65).

They were all in favor of “solidarism,” social reform and welfare to help those in need. Their program was “universal suffrage, freedom of the press, . . . the separation of Church and State, secular free and compulsory schools, income tax, a state-controlled economy, social insurance, and far-reaching social reforms” (Kayser 1960: 325). This dual commitment to individual liberty and providing for the less well-off in society is an indication of a belief in the prosocial ethics of autonomy.

The French right unified under what was called the Bloc National, later renamed the Union Nationale. Its constituent parties frequently changed their names and used different monikers in and outside of the parliament. It represented conservation values, seeking to prevent any radical overhaul of French society, particularly in regards to the Church, and generally opposing social reform that redistributed wealth and power to the masses. Class politics was thought to undermine the solidarity of the French people (Keiger 1997: 39, 40, 64). As a consequence of its values, the right was more nationalistic and proself in social motivation. The large number of former military members who served in the early postwar right-wing coalitions gave the Bloc National the nickname of the “Blue Horizon,” after the color of their uniforms (Keiger 1997 267).

For a number of reasons, I have excluded formally communist parties from the analysis. First, in no country did the communist parties have any effect on outcomes. Second, communists in the three countries were universally opposed to any effort at western reconciliation among Britain, France, and Germany. Such a reconciliation was seen as a precursor to a capitalist alliance against the Soviet Union; their position was driven not by diplomatic style but by revolutionary foreign policy goals. Third, communists fit uneasily on the left-right spectrum that forms the basis of how I capture social and epistemic motivations. It is not the case, for instance, that Marxists are simply more extreme than Social Democrats on issues of social welfare—Marxists and Social Democrats are qualitatively different (Eley 2002; Berman 2006). The ideology of the former is not based on the fundamental value of all human beings. Marxists do not have the individualizing moral foundations that are the basis of prosocial motivation. They would not score high on self-transcendence. As Howard and Donnelly (1986) argue, communist ideology is not based on a notion of rights. This is evident in the communist preference for authoritarian government, which would make Marxists more favorable to coercive bargaining than liberal diplomacy. Unlike social democracy, communist ideology is fundamentally divisive, drawing a strict division between the classes. It is not universalist in content, only in application (Berman 2006).

I stress that I am describing relative differences across the political spectrum. It is certainly the case that the ideological fulcrum of left-right

varied systematically across countries. The German far right, for instance, was significantly more conservative than the British far right during this period. Nevertheless, in all three countries, the points of ideological contestation between left and right were very similar, even in Britain—social reform and the extent of democratic participation and individual freedom (McCrillis 1998). Social and political egalitarianism went hand in hand. “In the Left’s tradition,” writes Geoff Eley, “some notion of social justice was practically inseparable from the pursuit of democracy” (2002: 18). Even the differences in leftist ideology between, for instance, the more radical German SPD and the more evolutionary and gradualist British Labour Party are often overstated and belie a set of core fundamental values (Berger 1994: chap. 5).

Readers might object to the application of the political psychological studies on which I rely to a very different period. Studies have consistently shown, however, that, although the issues of political contestation have changed over time as democracies have matured and changed, the new elements of conflict are simply grafted onto old political cleavages (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1989; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). For instance, it is not surprising that the left, which historically backed democratic inclusion and political equality against the right, is now the primary advocate for the rights of women, gays and lesbians, and racial minorities.