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401 Notes Chapter 1. The Red Army 1. B. I. Kuznetsov, “Eshelonnaia voina” [Echelon war], Sovetskaia voennaia entsiklopedii, t. 8 [Soviet military encyclopedia, vol. 8, hereafter cited as SVE] (Moscow : Voenizdat, 1980), 619, and “Eshelonnaia voina,” Voennaia entsiklopedii, t. 8 [Military encyclopedia, vol. 8, hereafter cited as VE] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 2004), 524. 2. Jacob W. Kipp, “Mass, Maneuver, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art, 1918–1936” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office [hereafter cited as SASO], 1988); A. Ekimovskiy and A. Tonkikh, “Red Army Tactics in the Civil War,” translated from Voennyi vestnik [Military Herald, hereafter cited as VV] 1 (January 1967): 9–15; and K. A. Meretskov, Serving the People (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), 36–45. Stalin’s close association with 1st Cavalry Army veterans (Budenny, Voroshilov, etc.) produced a clique of favorite officers who dominated the Red Army command well into World War II. 3. David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History (London : Frank Cass, 1992), 46–53. For the most detailed account of developments in this period, see N. F. Kuz’min, Na strazhe mirnogo truda (1921–1940 gg.) [In defense of peaceful work (1921–1940)] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1959), 10–32. 4. Hans W. Gatzke, “Russo-German Military Collaboration during the Weimar Republic,” American Historical Review 63, no. 3 (April 1958): 565–597; A. Zdanovich , “Sekretnye laboratorii reikhsvera v Rossii” [Reichswehr’s secret laboratories in Russia], Armiia [Army] 1 (January 1992): 62–68, 2 (January 1992): 59–64, 3–4 (February 1992): 67–71, and 6 (March 1992): 67–71; and S. A. Gorlov, “Voennoe sotrudenichestvo SSSR i Germanii v 20-e gody” [Military cooperation of the USSR and Germany in the 1920s], Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military-Historical Journal , hereafter cited as VIZh] 9 (September 1991): 4–11. 5. Whereas Western soldiers tend to use the term doctrine to describe specific principles applicable to all levels of war, Frunze used this term to describe abstract concepts of the state use of military power. The ensuing discussion therefore uses the Soviet terminology of strategic, operational, and tactical concepts and theories as analogous to Western doctrine. For an assessment of Frunze’s reforms, see M. A. Gareev, M. V. Frunze, Military Theorist (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1988). 6. R. Savushkin, “K voprosu o zarozhdenii teorii posledovetel’nykh nastupatel’ nykhoperatsii,1921–1929gg.”[Onthequestionoftheoriginofthetheoryofsuccessive operations, 1921–1929], VIZh 5 (May 1983): 77–83. See Triandafillov’s original study in V. K. Triandifillov, The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies, ed. Jacob W. Kipp, trans. William A. Burhans (London: Frank Cass, 1994). 402 Notes to Pages 5–7 7. A. A. Svechin, quoted in Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voennykh trudakh, 1917–1940 gg. [Questions of strategy and operational art in Soviet military works, 1917–1940] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), 238, and Svechin, Strategiia [Strategy], 2nd ed., 1927, quoted in The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art 1927–1991: The Documentary Basis, vol. I, Operational Art, 1927–1964, trans. Harold S. Orenstein (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 9–15. See a complete translation of Svechin’s 1927 work in Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, ed. Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992). See a brief history of Operational Art in David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass, 1991). 8. Quoted in A. Riazansky, “The Creation and Development of Tank Troop Tactics in the Pre-war Period,” VV 11 (November 1966): 27. See also George F. Hoffman, “Doctrine, Tank Technology, and Execution: I. A. Khalepskii and the Red Army’s Fulfillment of Deep Offensive Operations,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies (hereafter cited as JSMS) 9, no. 2 (June 1996): 283–334. The most comprehensive study of the theory of the Deep Operation, as described by its proponent G. S. Isserson , is found in Richard W. Harrison, Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G. S. Isserson (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010). See also Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940 (Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, 2001). 9. These three tank echelons were known as direct infantry support (neposredstvennoi podderzhki pekhoty, or NPP), long-range support (dal’nei podderzhka pekhoty , or DPP), and long-range action (dal’nego deistviia, or DD) groups. The latter , depending on their size, soon became forward detachments (peredovye otriady), which were formed to conduct tactical maneuver, and mobile groups (podvizhnye gruppy), which could conduct...

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Additional Information

ISBN
9780700621521
Related ISBN
9780700621217
MARC Record
OCLC
923132453
Pages
568
Launched on MUSE
2015-10-13
Language
English
Open Access
No
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