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1. “Dyadic trust” is the term used throughout this book to describe the trust established between two individual actors. In this book, it is used explicitly in terms of trust between an individual subordinate and an individual superior, e.g., employee and manager. “Stratified trust,” as explicated in chapter 3, refers to the collective trust established between dyads of career executives and political appointees, i.e., the average dyadic trust established at the highest stratum of a respective organization. 2. C.f. http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/commission-appointments. 3. At the end of the Bush administration, for instance (according to the 2008 Plum Book), there were 1,141 positions subject to presidential appointment with Senate confirmation (PAS), 314 positions subject to presidential appointment without Senate confirmation (PA), 665 SES general positions filled by noncareer appointments, 121 SES positions filled by limited emergency or limited-term appointments, 1,559 Schedule C Excepted appointments, and 473 positions filled by Statutory Excepted appointment (http://www .gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/2008/index.html). In September 2008 the Bush administration had filled 1,510 Schedule-C appointments (1,215 of which were in cabinet-level agencies) (www.fedscope.opm.gov). 4. As quoted in Pfiffner, 1991. 5. There are several other constraints on the president as well. The president is structurally constrained by the separation of powers system in which the institutional presidency is embedded. While Congress has deferred substantial powers to the executive, the institution and its members retain the power to address threats to their own capacity and repeatedly prevent the adoption of grandiose administrative reforms proposed by presidents to achieve institutional congruence with his goals (Rosenbloom, 1983). At the same time, the president and his advisors possess limited knowledge of the modern administrative state’s organizational complexities and hybrid policy domains: “Even if they had the resources to impose any reforms they liked, they would not know how to design an institutional system optimally suited to presidential needs” (Moe, 1993, p. 241). Indeed, this hypothesis has repeatedly been tested and affirmed by countless half-hearted, halting, incremental , ignored, or abandoned attempts by modern presidents to design the executive branch. Presidents are “severely constrained by time” (p. 242). The president’s honeymoon quickly wanes, and opposition to his policy proposals and institutional reforms grow by the minute. Changes in the environment call for quick shifts of the president’s focus and agenda-­ setting opportunities are elusive, all while congressional support varies with each two-year electoral cycle (Jones, 1999). Lastly, while presidents are constrained by the path dependency created by past institutional reforms, they are also constrained by their placement in the “political time” of American regime cycles (Skowronek, 2008). 6. Marissa Golden (2000) described politicization as the utilization of “strategic apNotes 162 Notes to Pages 24–53 pointments” and central to the “administrative presidency”: “Whereas earlier presidents typically appointed individuals who had ties to agency clients and interest groups and whose loyalties were thus divided, administrative presidents select their appointees strategically , based on their ideological policy congruence with the president” (p. 6). 7. For instance, Dwight Ink (2000), executive director of Carter’s Personnel Management Project, argued that evaluations of CSRA have “erroneously” assumed that its intent was to “develop greater political control of the career service” (p. 42). He argued that there were legal safeguards put in place to minimize arbitrary actions and political interference but that these provisions have been “distorted beyond recognition” or ignored (p. 54). 8. The Heritage Foundation purportedly referred to Bush administration policies as emanating “straight from the Heritage playbook” (http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/ heritage-foundation). In fact, one of the report’s coauthors (Nesterczuk) was appointed “to oversee the design and implementation of the National Security Personnel System” (Durant , Stazyk, & Resh, 2010b, p. 396) that brought about a vast “reduction of Title V coverage for U.S. civilian personnel” (Pfiffner, 2007, p. 7). 9. Years surrounding the transition from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration were not included in the analysis due to extensive turnover, high rates of early departure preceding the transition, and subsequent delays in filling positions post-­ transition. 10. Interview conducted October 13, 2010, at American University’s School of Public Affairs, Washington, DC. 11. Consistent with the literature examining interpersonal trust in social units such as families, organizations, and institutions, I use the term “dyadic trust” to describe the trust established between two individuals (Larzelere & Huston, 1980; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman , 1995). However, as Korsgaard et al. (2015) argued, there...

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Additional Information

ISBN
9781421418506
Related ISBN
9781421418490
MARC Record
OCLC
922889469
Pages
176
Launched on MUSE
2015-10-13
Language
English
Open Access
No
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